Lectures on «The notions of strategy and equilibrium in strategic and extensive form games» and «Games with incomplete information» by Professor Shmuel Zamir

Teaching staff, researchers and research interns from International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis have enhanced their qualification during the lectures by Professor Shmuel Zamir that were held from May 26 to May 29.

The Purpose of qualification enhancement courses.

1. The notions of strategy and equilibrium in strategic and extensive form games.  

          • Behavior strategies and Kuhn’s theorem.  

          • Subgame perfect equilibrium.  

          • The ‘trembling hand principle’ – perfect equilibrium.  

          • Backward and forward induction.  

          • Sequential equilibrium.  

2. Incomplete information  

          • Interactive knowledge and beliefs – belief hierarchies.  

          • Aumann’s model of incomplete information.  

          • Harsanyi’s model of games with incomplete information.  

          • The Bayes Nash equilibrium.  

          • The universal belief space.

Additional materials:

• Syllabus
• Video lectures