

How difficult is it to compute the winner(s) of a game?

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The context: who is the winner?

- A game with n players.
- For any pair $\{i, j\}$ of distinct players, i and j compete together.
- We assume that there is no tie: i defeats j or conversely.
- We would like to rank the players or at least to choose a winner.

The lack of transitivity

- The results obtained from the $n(n - 1)/2$ possible matches do not always provide a transitive structure: i may defeat j , while j defeats k who, in his turn, defeats i .
- The result is a (*round-robin*) *tournament*, i.e. an antisymmetric, complete, binary relation, and **not necessarily a linear order** (= **transitive tournament**).
- Question: how to rank the players from the obtained tournament or at least how to determine a winner (or several winners)?
- This leads to the so-called *tournament solutions*.

A link with the context of voting theory

- Similar issues appear in the context of **voting theory** when a **pairwise comparison method** (Condorcet, 1785) is applied:
 - ⇒ n candidates;
 - ⇒ we compute the number m_{xy} of voters who prefer candidate x to candidate y ;
 - ⇒ majority rule: x is collectively preferred to y if $m_{xy} > m_{yx}$.
- The result is still a tournament (called the **majority tournament**), even if the voters' preferences are linear orders (« voting paradox », « Condorcet effect », « Condorcet cycle »...).


The associated graph

- We build a *directed graph* $T = (X, A)$ where
 - ⇒ $X =$ set of players;
 - ⇒ there is an *arc* (= directed edge) from x to y if x defeats y .
- As there is no tie, T is a *tournament* (= complete asymmetric directed graph).


T may be **transitive** (then, it is a linear order), but not necessarily.

An example


- $n = 6$ players: a, b, c, d, e, f .



- An *absolute winner* (a *Condorcet winner* for an election...) is a player W who defeats any other player; in T , all the arcs leave W ; the outdegree of W is equal to $n - 1$. When there exists an absolute winner, there is only one.



no absolute winner



$a = \text{absolute winner}$

Tournament solution S

Let $T = (X, A)$ be a tournament on n vertices.

- A *tournament solution* is any mapping S satisfying:

$$S: T \rightarrow S(T) \subseteq X \text{ with } S(T) \neq \emptyset$$

$$S(T) = \{\text{winners of } T \text{ with respect to } S\}.$$

- How to design S ?
- What is the *complexity of S* ?
 - * S is *polynomial* if there exists a polynomial algorithm to compute $S(T)$;
 - * S is *NP-hard* if the computation of $S(T)$ is NP-hard.

Main features of the theory of algorithmic complexity

- **Combinatorial optimization problem (COP)**: given a finite set X and a function f defined from X to $\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$, compute the minimum of f over X :

minimize $f(x)$ with $x \in X$.

- **Decision problem**: problem in which we set a question with « yes » or « no » as its answer. Ex:
 1. Composite number: given an integer n , do there exist two integers $p > 1$ and $q > 1$ with $n = pq$?
 2. **DP** (Decision problem associated with **COP**): given X, f and an integer K , does there exist $x \in X$ with $f(x) \leq K$?

Links between COP and DP

- Any algorithm solving COP may solve DP: it is sufficient to compute the minimum of f and to compare it to K .
- Conversely, any algorithm A solving DP can be used to solve COP:

- start with $K = f(x_0)$ where x_0 denotes any element of X

- while the answer provided by A is « yes », do:

$$K \leftarrow K - 1.$$

The last value of K for which the answer is « yes » provides the minimum of f .

Complexity of an algorithm

- To solve a problem Π , we need an *algorithm*, i.e. a method designed to solve Π . The efficiency of an algorithm A can be measured by its (time) *complexity*.
- The complexity of A is given by the number of elementary operations (such as the additions, the comparisons, and so on) performed to solve the considered instance I .
- If the complexity of A can be upper-bounded by a polynomial in the size of I (here, n), A is said to be *polynomial* and Π also is said to be *polynomial*.

Class P, class NP

- $P = \{\text{polynomial decision problems}\}$.
- Many problems are not known to belong to P.
- $NP = \{\text{decision problems such that we can check the answer « yes », in polynomial time, thanks to some information (certificate) guessed and provided by somebody else}\}$.
- Ex. 1. Composite number belongs to NP.
 2. DP often belongs to NP: it is sufficient to « guess » an appropriate $x \in X$ with $f(x) \leq K$ and to be able to check that x fits in polynomial time.
- $P \subseteq NP$. Open problem: $P = NP$ or $P \subset NP$?

NP-complete problems, NP-hard problems

- For two problems Π_1 and Π_2 , we say (approximation...) that Π_2 is at least as difficult as Π_1 ($\Pi_1 \leq \Pi_2$) if the polynomiality of Π_2 would involve the one of Π_1 .
- An *NP-complete problem* Π is a decision problem belonging to NP and which is at least as difficult as any other problem of NP:
 1. $\Pi \in \text{NP}$;
 2. $\forall \Pi' \in \text{NP}, \Pi' \leq \Pi$.
- An *NP-hard problem* is a problem at least as difficult as any problem of NP (or, equivalently, as difficult as any NP-complete problem).
- Usually, DP is polynomial if and only if COP is polynomial. When DP is NP-complete, COP is NP-hard.

CPU time (1000 operations per second)

n	10	20	30	40	50
$\log_{10}(n)$					
n					
n^2					
n^3					
n^5					
2^n					
10^n					
$n !$					
n^n					

CPU time (1000 operations per second)

n	10	20	30	40	50
$\log_{10}(n)$	0.001 s	0.0013 s	0.0015 s	0.0016 s	0.0017 s
n	0.01 s	0.02 s	0.03 s	0.04 s	0.05 s
n^2	0.1 s	0.4 s	0.9 s	1.6 s	2.5 s
n^3	1 s	8 s	27 s	64 s	125 s
n^5	1.7 mn	53.3 mn	6.75 h	28.3 h	3.6 days
2^n					
10^n					
$n !$					
n^n					

CPU time (1000 operations per second)

n	10	20	30	40	50
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n^5	1.7 mn	53.3 mn	6.75 h	28.3 h	3.6 days
2^n	1 s	17.5 mn	12.4 days	34.9 years	357 cent.
10^n	116 days	3×10^7 centuries	3×10^{17} centuries	3×10^{27} centuries	3×10^{37} centuries
$n!$	1 h	7.7×10^5 centuries	8.4×10^{19} centuries	2.6×10^{35} centuries	9.6×10^{51} centuries
n^n	116 days	3.3×10^{13} centuries	6.5×10^{31} centuries	3.8×10^{51} centuries	2.8×10^{72} centuries

Copeland solution C (1951)

- A vertex x is a *Copeland winner* if the number of players defeated by x (called the *Copeland score* $s(x)$ of x) is maximum.

Ex.

Scores:


$$s(a) = 4, s(b) = 3,$$

$$s(c) = 2, s(d) = 2,$$

$$s(e) = 1, s(f) = 3;$$

the Copeland winner is a

(preorder: $a > b \sim f > c \sim d > e$).



Zermelo solution Z (1929): maximum likelihood

- Let $p(x, y)$ denote the probability that x defeats y .

Assume that the results are independent: the fact that x defeats y does not provide information about the result between z and t .

Assume that each player x is characterized by a *strength* w_x such that we have: $p(x, y) = w_x / (w_x + w_y)$.

Then the probability to obtain T knowing the strengths w_x is:


$$p(T / \{w_x\}) = \prod_{(x,y) \in A} \frac{w_x}{w_x + w_y}$$

- Given T , **Zermelo's maximum likelihood method** consists in computing the strengths w_x^* maximizing $p(T / \{w_x\})$ and then in ranking the players according to the decreasing values of the w_x^* 's.

- Ex.

$$\text{Maximizing } \prod_{(x,y) \in A} \frac{w_x}{w_x + w_y}$$

$$\text{with } \sum_x w_x = 1$$



gives: $w_a = 0.27$, $w_b = w_f = 0.18$, $w_c = w_d = 0.14$, $w_e = 0.09$.

The Zermelo winner is a (preorder: $a > b \sim f > c \sim d > e$).

- **Theorem** (L.R. Ford Jr, 1957)

Copeland method and Zermelo method lead to the same winners (more precisely, the same rankings).

Uncovered set UC

(Fishburn, 1977, Miller, 1980)

- A player x is *covered* by a player y in T if y defeats x and if all the players defeated by x are defeated by y : $(x, z) \in A \Rightarrow (y, z) \in A$.
A player x is *uncovered* if no player covers x .
- The winners of T according to UC are the uncovered players of T .
- We may iterate UC to get $UC^2, UC^3, \dots UC^n = UC^{n+1} = \dots = UC^\infty$.

Uncovered set UC

(Fishburn, 1977, Miller, 1980)


- Ex.

b and c are covered by a ;

e is covered by d ;

a , d and f are uncovered:

$$UC(T) = \{a, d, f\}.$$



- $UC^2(T) = UC^3(T) = \dots = \{a, d, f\}.$

Markovian solution MS (Levchenkov, 1992, Laslier, 1993)

• A *Markov chain* is defined on X from $T = (X, A)$ with the following transition probabilities:

$$p(x \rightarrow y) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } (x, y) \in A \\ 1/(n-1) & \text{if } (y, x) \in A \\ s(x)/(n-1) & \text{if } x = y \end{cases}$$

where $s(x)$ denotes the Copeland score (= the outdegree) of x . This defines a stochastic matrix $P = (p(x \rightarrow y))$.

- Then we start from any vertex and we randomly go from the current vertex to another one with a probability given by P . After k steps, the probability distribution $\pi_k = (\pi_{x,k})_{x \in X}$ is given by

$$\pi_k = \pi_{k-1}.P = \pi_0.P^k,$$


where π_0 denotes the initial probability distribution.

- The Markovian theory shows that π_k admits a limit $\pi^* = (\pi_x^*)_{x \in X}$ when k tends to infinity with $\pi^* = \pi^* P$.
 - ⇒ π_x^* can be interpreted as the **strength** of x .
 - ⇒ The **Markovian solution** consists in sorting the candidates according to their strengths: the winners are the candidates x maximizing π_x^* .

- Ex.


tournament

(missing arcs: →)



Markovian chain

(missing arcs: ←)




⇒ $\pi^* = (0.561, 0.738, 0.246, 0.241, 0.050, 0.009, 0.112)$.

⇒ b is the winner ($b > a > c > d > g > e > f$).

Minimal covering set MC (Dutta, 1988)

- Let $Y \subset X$. For $y \in Y$ and $x \in X - Y$, we say that y covers x in $Y \cup \{x\}$ if y covers x in $T_{/Y \cup \{x\}}$.
- Y is a *covering set of T* if, for any $x \in X - Y$, x is covered in $Y \cup \{x\}$.
Ex: UC and UC^∞ are covering sets.
- The *minimal covering set $MC(T)$* of T is the smallest (w.r.t. inclusion) covering set of T : $\forall x \in X - MC(T)$, x is covered in $MC(T) \cup \{x\}$ and $\forall Y \subset MC(T)$, $\exists x \in X - Y$ which is not covered in $Y \cup \{x\}$.
- Ex.

(missing arcs: \rightarrow)



$$MC(T) = \{a, b, c\}$$

$$UC = UC^\infty = \{a, b, c, d, e, f\}.$$

Bank's solution B : maximal transitive subtournament (Banks, 1985)

- $B(T) = \{x \in X \text{ such that there exists a maximal (w.r.t. inclusion) transitive subtournament, i.e. a linear order, of } T \text{ with } x \text{ as its absolute winner}\}$.


- Ex.

$$B(T) = \{a, d, f\}$$

a because of $a > b > c > d$

d because of $d > e > f$

f because of $f > a > b > c$.



Slater's solution Sl : linear orders at minimum distance (Slater, 1961)

- For any linear order O , let $d(O, T)$ be the symmetric difference distance between O and T : $d(O, T) = |\{(x, y) \in X^2 \text{ with } (x, y) \in O \text{ and } (y, x) \in T\}|$.
Rk: $d(O, T)$ measures the number of disagreements between O and T .
- A *Slater order* of T is a linear order O^* minimizing d . This minimum distance is called the *Slater index* $i(T)$ of T .
- A *Slater winner* of T is the absolute winner of any Slater order of T .

Slater's solution Sl : linear orders at minimum distance (Slater, 1961)


• Ex.

1 Slater order:

$f > a > b > d > c > e$,

$i(T) = 2$,


$Sl(T) = \{f\}$.



Top cycle TC

- Let $G = (X, A)$ be a directed graph. The *top cycle* $TC(G)$ of G is the union of the strongly connected components of G with no incoming arcs.

Ex.



Tournament equilibrium set TEQ (Schwartz, 1990)

- For any tournament solution S and any tournament $T = (X, A)$, define the (asymmetric) *contestation relation* $D(S, T)$ by:

$$x D(S, T) y \Leftrightarrow x \in S(T_{/N^-\{y\}}),$$


where $N^-\{y\}$ denotes the set of predecessors (in-neighbours) of y .

- We define a *contestation graph* $D_S(T)$: $D_S(T) = (X, D(S, T))$ and a new tournament solution S^* by: $S^*(T) = TC(D_S(T))$.

- TEQ is the only tournament solution S with $S^* = S$:


$$TEQ(T) = TC(D_{TEQ}(T)).$$

• Ex.



vertex x	a	b	c	d	e	f
$N^-(x)$	$\{d, f\}$	$\{a\}$	$\{a, b\}$	$\{b, c\}$	$\{a, b, c, d\}$	$\{b, c, d, e\}$
$TEQ(T_{/N^-(x)})$	$\{d\}$	$\{a\}$	$\{a\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a, b, d\}$	$\{b\}$

$D_{TEQ}(T)$:



⇒ $TEQ(T) = \{a, b, d\}$.

Complexity results

- Polynomial methods:

- ⇒ Copeland method and Zermelo method, in $O(n^2)$.
- ⇒ Uncovered set UC , in $O(n^2)$ for checking that a player is a winner, in $O(n^{2.38})$ to compute all the winners (multiplication of two $n \times n$ matrices).
- ⇒ $\forall k \geq 1$, UC^k (the complexity depends on k).
- ⇒ Markovian solution MS , in $O(n^{2.38})$ (resolution of a linear system).
- ⇒ Minimum covering set MC (as a linear programming problem; F. Brandt and F. Fischer, 2008).
- ⇒ the computation of a Banks winner, in $O(n^2)$ (O. H., 2004).

Complexity results

- NP-hard methods:

- ⇒ checking that a given vertex is a Banks winner (G. Woeginger, 2003)
- ⇒ the computation of all the Banks winners
- ⇒ Slater method Sl (N. Alon, 2006; P. Charbit, S. Thomassé, A. Yeo, 2007; V. Conitzer, 2006; O. H., 2010)
- ⇒ TEQ (F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, M. Mair, 2010)

Links between these tournament solutions

	UC	$TC(UC)$	UC^∞	C, Z	Sl	B	MC
UC							
$TC(UC)$	\subset						
UC^∞	\subset	\subset					
C, Z	\subset	\emptyset^{13}	\emptyset^9				
Sl	\subset	\subset	\emptyset^8	\emptyset^6			
B	\subset	\subset	$\cap \neq \emptyset$	\emptyset^{13}	\emptyset^{14}		
MC	\subset	\subset	\subset	\emptyset^9	\emptyset^8	$\cap \neq \emptyset$	
TEQ	\subset	\subset	\subset	\emptyset^9	\emptyset^8	\subset	\subset


$S \subset S' : \forall T, S(T) \subseteq S'(T)$ and $\exists T$ s.t. $S(T) \neq S'(T)$

$S \emptyset^k S' : \forall n \geq k, \exists T$ with n vertices s.t. $S(T) \cap S'(T) = \emptyset$

$S \cap S' \neq \emptyset : \forall T, S(T) \cap S'(T) \neq \emptyset$

An illustration

- $C(T) = Z(T) = \{a\}$
- $UC(T) = \{a, d, f\}$
- $UC^\infty(T) = \{a, d, f\}$
- $MC(T) = \{a, d, f\}$
- $MS(T) = \{a\}$
(1 order : $a > f > d > b > c > e$)
- $B(T) = \{a, d, f\}$
- $Sl(T) = \{f\}$
(1 Slater order : $f > a > b > d > c > e$)
- $TEQ(T) = \{a, d, f\}$



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Thank you for your attention!