

Nationalism in Russian republics: historical and comparative perspective

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Introduction

- The 1990-s were characterized by the sudden rise of national movements in almost all Russian ethnic regions.
- The 2000-s are often presented as period of political stability.
- Two questions arise. How may one explain nationalism in Russian ethnic republics?
- Should the rise of ethnic nationalism in Russia be treated as kind of deviation, related solely to the crisis and collapse of the Soviet state and weakness of new Russian state, or it could be regarded as much more deeper phenomenon?

Theory

- Great Debate in literature on Nationalism: primordialism vs. modernism
- I use modernist approach. Nationalism was invented in the Modern Time
- B. Anderson and E. Gellner. Education, science and technology are keys to emergence of nationalism.
- Miroslav Hroch: Nations emerge because of national movements. National movements emerge because of existence of national intellectuals.

Cultural nationalism and Political nationalism

- David Laitin. Nationalism – is a privilege of rich societies
- Rich societies may afford to invest/ spend resources in inventing/ maintaining/ spreading traditions, customs, beliefs
- Dmitrii Gorenburg. Two ‘Nationalisms’: political nationalism and cultural nationalism

Cultural nationalism and Political nationalism

- *Cultural nationalism* is defined as support of the titular (national) official language, the expansion of its teaching in schools, introduction of a greater or lesser degree requirements / incentives to learn the titular language representatives of non-titular nation
- *Political nationalism* (separatism) may be defined as demand for declaration of national sovereignty and recognition of the right to national self-determination – up to secession

Cultural nationalism and Political nationalism

- Gorenburg: the strength and success of national movements (political nationalism) in the Russian regions in the 1990-s depended on the degree of development of ethnic institutions during the Soviet period. How?
- Ethnic institutions lead to emergence of national educated class/ intellectuals (*intelligentsia*), who become the driving force of political mobilization
- Intellectuals participating in educational process create social networks among young people whom they teach in universities
- Cultural and educational organizations provide essential resources on initial phase of political mobilization
- The level of ethnic institutions' development depended on the Union policies which were based on the status of the region in the official Soviet national-administrative hierarchy: the higher is the status, the more resources were allowed to spend on ethnic institutions development
- *Union SSR – Autonomous SSR – Autonomous oblast – National Autonomous District*

Model

- I use the Gorenburg's argument about interdependence of cultural and political nationalism. Under special conditions – during political crises – political nationalism will be stronger in those regions with the higher level of cultural nationalism
- What predicts the higher level of cultural nationalism?
- Comparative historical approach. I expect path-dependency effect: present nationalism is predicted by developments in the past
- the entire period of the Soviet rule (1917-1985). I split it in 5 periods:
- 1) 1917-25; 2) 1925-40; 3) 1940-1955
- 4) 1955-1985 5) 1986-2000.
- I add other factors in my model: a) *formal status*, b) *informal status*; c) *religion*
- Formal status – as in official Soviet hierarchy (John Miller)
- Informal status – nationality of regional party leaders; economic dimension – the role of industry in regional economy

Data and Methods

- Political nationalism. D.Treisman and E.Guiliano approach: construction of indices on factual basis
- I use 16 indicators (0/1 value) to construct index of political nationalism in the 1990-s:
 - *Declaration of sovereignty*
 - *Language law adopted*
 - *Rejection to sign the Federal Treaty in 1992*
 - *Constitution adopted before 2000*
 - *Including right for secession?*
 - *Boycott of 1993 April referendum*
 - *Refusal to send soldiers in Russian army*
 - *Priority right on national resources claimed*
 - *Presidency established*
 - *Exclusiveness of titular language*
 - *Referendum on sovereignty held*
 - *Constitution adopted before 1993?*
 - *Priority of republican laws*
 - *Boycott of 1993 October referendum*
 - *Formal administrative status raised*
 - *Right to own currency declared*
- Then I converted these data in “0 – 1” scale (mean value).

Top 5 separatist regions in the 1990s

Region	Score
Tatarstan	0,88
Chechnya	0,69
Yakutia	0,63
Tyva	0,56
Bashkortostan	0,5

Political nationalism

- In the similar way I compose index of political nationalism for 1917-25. I use 9 indicators:
 - *Declaration of sovereignty*
 - *Uprising (single event, against the Reds or the Whites; small scale uprising – 0,5)*
 - *Rebellion movement (long lasting guerilla)*
 - *Occupation by the Whites*
 - *Constitution adopted (provisional political program – 0,5)*
 - *Soviet republic proclaimed (from below, not from above; as part of broader state only parts were included in this state – 0,5)*
 - *Independent state declared (non-Soviet)*
 - *Constituent convention held (ethnic convention with broad powers and goals – 0,5)*
 - *Own currency printed*

Top 5 separatist regions in the 1917-25 period

Region	Score
Bashkortostan	0,89
Dagestan	0,83
Chechnya	0,78
Tyva	0,78
Tatarstan	0,67

Some parts of Russian state proclaimed their independence (*Idel –Ural project* in Tatarstan; *Bashkurdistan* in Bashkiria; *Gorskaya /Mountain Republic* in Dagestan; *North Caucasian Emirate* in Chechnya; *Ingria, North Karelian government, Olonets government* in Karelia; *Buryat-Mongol state* in Buryatia; *Karakorum Altai District* in Altai republic; *Provisional Yakut Regional People Government; Tyva People's Republic*).

Correlation between two indices is 0,541

Cultural nationalism

- Data limitations
- Anderson and Silver: bilingualism in schools, linguistic assimilation. They show that linguistic assimilation was a complicated process. This process could be divided into a few periods and it was much stronger on the level of ASSR than Union republics, and even stronger for AO and NAD levels. The more russified regions were Orthodox Finno-Ugric regions
- I construct *index of cultural nationalism* for 3 periods: 1925-40, 1940-55, 1955-85. I use five variables. I use one value for the entire period. Due to the lack of data in some cases I count values for late 1950-s (1956, 1958 or 1959) for period 1940-55
- *Books in native language* – total circulations (Soviet statistics). I take these data for years 1937/40, 1956 and 1980. Data show that in most cases circulations of books printed in native language significantly dropped. I transform all values into “0-1” scale.
- *Titular language as primary language* – share of titular population, who claimed their native language as their primary language. I use these data from the Soviet statistics, the census data – 1959, 1970 and 1989. I reconfigure all values into “0 – 1” scale

Cultural nationalism

- *Students* - number of students enrolled in higher education. I use these data from the official Soviet statistics. Data are taken for year of republic's origin, 1940, 1956/60; 1980. I transform all values in "0-1" scale
- *Existence of writing in native language before the October Revolution*. It is a dummy variable showing whether the ethnic republic had writing in titular language before 1917. I code 0 – no, 1 – yes. In one case I give value 0,25 to Dagestan
- *Bilingualism in schools*. I use data from Silver. He publishes data for 1958 and 1972; the cultural nationalism index is calculated without data for the 1925-40 period. His main finding is that after the 1958 educational reform majority of ethnic republics faced with decrease of instruction in native language. I reconfigure all values in "0 – 1" scale
- Finally I compose *Index of cultural nationalism* as mean of these 5 variables mentioned above. I use this variable as dependent variable.

Independent variables

- *Formal status* – status of ethnic region in the official Soviet hierarchy. This value was calculated in three steps. Each status was given its code (0 = no separate region; 0,25 = district in non-ethnic region; 0,5 = national district in autonomous republic, autonomous oblast; 0,75 = Autonomous republic; 1 = Union republic; 1,1 = independent state).
- *Informal status* – informal status of ethnic regions based on nationality of the first party secretary. John Miller: ethnic regions in the Soviet Union are informally ranked based on nationality of the first and second party secretaries. I take only data for nationality of the first secretaries. I code nationality of the first party secretaries as 1 if he is titular, 0 – non-titular.
- *Industrial output growth rates index* – indicator of industrial development. One may expect that the larger share of industry improves region's status in unofficial hierarchy. Industrial output growth rates – starting with year of the region's origin. Data are provided for 4 periods: from origin till 1940 (1925-40); 1940-55; 1955-85. I transform all values in "0-1" scale
- *Non-Orthodox religion* - variable for predominant religion in ethnic region

Correlation matrix

	<i>Cultural nationalism index</i>	<i>Formal status</i>	<i>Informal status</i>	<i>Industrial output growth</i>	<i>Non-orthodox Religion</i>
<i>Cultural nationalism index</i>	1,00	0,248*	0,109	0,377**	0,204
<i>Formal status</i>	0,248*	1,00	0,367**	0,169	-0,019
<i>Informal status</i>	0,109	0,367**	1,00	-0,046	-0,185*
<i>Industrial output growth</i>	0,377**	0,169	-0,046	1,00	-0,055
<i>Non-orthodox Religion</i>	0,204	-0,019	-0,185*	-0,055	1,00

Preliminary results

- Cultural nationalism is positively correlated with industrial output growth rates and slightly with formal status. Formal and informal statuses are also positively correlated; informal status is negatively correlated with non-Orthodox religion.
- $CNI_{i,t} = a_i + b_1(\text{Formal Ind}_i) + b_2(\text{Inf Ind}_i) + b_3(\text{Ind Out}_i) + b_4(\text{Rel}_i)$

Preliminary results

	Standardized Beta – coefficients
Formal status	0,315**
Informal status	0,138
Industrial output growth rates	0,345**
Non-Orthodox religion	0,267*
<i>R-square</i>	<i>0,331</i>
<i>Adjusted R-square</i>	<i>0,284</i>
<i>Observations</i>	<i>61</i>

* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level

Informal status is not significant, although it has sign as predicted.

Further steps

- I plan to extend research to the post-Soviet period. Budget statistics on expenditures on ethnic institutions support. New approaches to measure region's informal status.
- I plan to use SEM approach to connect political nationalism, cultural nationalism and explanatory variables. My main hypothesis:
 - *Cultural nationalism predicts political nationalism*

- THANK YOU
- FOR YOUR ATTENTION!