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**CULTURAL CAPITAL IN AN EARLY MODERN ELITE SCHOOL:
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This study employs a unique database covering 2,293 cadets who graduated from the Noble Land Cadet Corps in St Petersburg from 1732 – 1762 to investigate the role of cultural capital in early modern Russia. Our analysis suggests that within this sample cultural capital was negatively correlated with wealth, but positively with father’s rank within the state service. At the corps itself, wealth and social status of families did not directly affect the success of their sons. The only significant factor of success at this school (promotion to a particular rank at graduation) was the family’s access to “Western” education and cultural skills. The results indicate the state was able to create an institutional framework where the possession of new “imported” knowledge and social skills gave the holder a measurable advantage over his peers. This could be considered one of the mechanisms which contributed to the sustainability of the cultural and social regime created by Peter I.

JEL Classification: Z

Keywords: cultural capital, nobility, education, early modern state, Peter I, Noble Cadet Corps, Russia

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Introduction

The concept of cultural capital has been employed for investigating and explaining cultural and social reproduction in numerous studies, and it remains very much central to our understanding of schooling and its role in modern society. Scholars interested in cultural capital, however, rarely, if ever, venture into the periods prior to the mid-20th century. Works on sociology of modern education rely on such sources as school records, educational credentials, and standardized test results (not to mention purpose-designed surveys) to assess educational inputs and outcomes and to identify the impact of cultural capital on educational attainment of students and their subsequent life trajectories. However, for earlier periods the data one needs for similar studies might not be available, as learning did not necessarily take place within institutionalized contexts; even if it did, the schools rarely used standardized or formal ways of assessing their incoming students and graduates.

Yet, the concept of cultural capital might be especially useful for understanding some of these earlier historical periods – the periods that witnessed rapid shifts in legitimate cultural patterns and norms, such as in the aftermath of Peter I’s reforms in Russia and during similar episodes of “Westernizing” reform in other countries, from Muhammad Ali’s Egypt to Meiji Japan.¹ In all of them, the states not only attempted to impose a set of “imported” cultural skills and norms on traditional elites, but also claimed to be making efforts to create new technocratic elites through institutionalized schooling and merit-based promotion schemes. From that point of view, these regimes might arguably be considered among the first examples of the distinctly modern relationship between culture, schooling, and social position that frames sociology of education in general. What was the social role of legitimate knowledge in such societies, that is, what impact did the possession of “Westernized” cultural skills have on one’s chances for career success and social reproduction? Did such skills predominantly serve to enable upward mobility, or on the contrary, to reinforce the positions of established elites? How did cultural capital interplay with other forms of resources, such as social or financial capital – or was it overwhelmingly trumped by them? Indeed, even though such regimes typically promised to reward the mastery of “Western” cultural skills with promotions and appointments, it is not clear to what extent were they able, given their apparent institutional weakness, to construct the necessary organizational frameworks that would be immune from the overwhelming impact of nepotism and corruption. All of these questions are central to our understanding of the social foundations of such “Westernizing” transformations and the early stages of modern schooling in general.

In this article, we make a first approach towards identifying and measuring the role of cultural capital in an extra-European early modern setting by focusing on a particular elite educational institution in post-Petrine Russia – the Noble Land Cadet Corps from the period from its foundation in 1731 roughly to the accession of Catherine II. Below, Section I provides an overview of this school, its early history, and the key elements of its organizational structures, recruitment processes, and educational practices. These aspects make the corps an especially appropriate case for a study focused on cultural capital and determine the nature of sources at our disposal. In sections II and III, we describe the data to be used for our study, present descriptive statistics characterizing the student body at this school, and introduce our approach for measuring the cultural capital of the corps’ students. Finally, in Section IV we perform a regression analysis to test the role of cultural capital vis-à-vis other dimensions of family background in determining the students’ success at the corps. Surprisingly, it appears that neither family wealth, nor social standing (as approximated by father’s rank in state service) had any impact on a young noble’s rank at graduation. The only variable that appears to have exercised any influence on one’s success at this school was his cultural capital – which, again surprisingly, was very weakly correlated with both wealth and rank. In conclusion, we discuss the potential implications of these results for our understanding of the post-Petrine regime in Russia and some avenues for further research.

I. Peter I’s Reforms and Cultural Capital

For the purposes of this article, we follow the standard definition of cultural capital as “institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion, the former referring to exclusion from jobs and resources, and the latter, to exclusion from high status group.” It is hypothesized that schools are not “socially neutral institutions, but reflect the experiences of the ‘dominant class.’” Some children possess the values and cultural skills associated with the dominant class and are awarded by teachers above and beyond their academic ability, while others are penalized for a lack of such skills.² The foundation texts on the role of cultural capital in society are still the works of Pierre Bourdieu and Paul DiMaggio.³ Both view cultural capital associated with the dominant cultural paradigm as central for understanding the social role of education. However, for Bourdieu cultural capital is acquired pretty much

exclusively at home, through interaction with one's parents. Thus, the dominant class students have much greater access to it, so by rewarding the possession of such capital, schools preserve and reproduce social hierarchies. For DiMaggio, however, lower class students can acquire cultural capital (understood here as familiarity with prestigious status culture), employ it to impress the "gatekeepers" and attain upward mobility. In fact, according to DiMaggio's model, lower class students receive disproportionately higher benefits from the possession of cultural capital. There is a huge body of literature testing these and related hypotheses, but results are somewhat inconclusive. One reason for that might be related to the difficulty of operationalizing the concept of cultural capital in quantitative studies. Researchers (including DiMaggio) tend to equate cultural capital with the possession of certain goods or the participation in certain activities that are considered "highbrow." This might include listening to classical music, certain reading patterns, possession of certain artifacts (musical instruments, art objects) at home, attendance to theaters, museums, art galleries, etc. The question remains, though, to what extent such symbolic goods and activities really serve as a proxy for the cultural skills and values that are rewarded in a modern school setting. Scholars do not necessarily demonstrate that the "gatekeepers" themselves (such as teachers), possibly coming from the lower middle-class milieu, view such activities and artifacts as prestigious and legitimate. Another possible approach is to use parental education qualifications as an indirect measure of cultural capital that a child might face at home. While the former approach implies using some sorts of surveys, the latter relies on statistical data. The catch here is that we often assume that there is a correlation between parental education attainment and their cultural capital; given the increasing massification of higher education, this might not be the case.⁴ Considering the difficulty of operationalizing cultural capital in modern societies, it is not surprising that there are few studies that attempt to investigate it in a pre-modern setting using quantitative methods, where the situation is naturally exacerbated by the problems of data availability. One notable example of a study that rises to this challenge is the work of Karin J. MacHardy who looked at the role of cultural capital in the family strategies of early modern nobility in the Habsburg lands. Despite employing the data on university attendance among early modern nobles, her study is more qualitative in nature.⁵

Understanding the ways in which cultural capital shaped one's life strategies and was shaped by them is crucial to arriving at an adequate picture of early modern state-building. This is especially true for countries such as Russia, where the governments were engaged in purposeful, intensive campaigns to transform the elites using schooling as one of the key tools in such a transformation.⁶ As is well known, in Peter I's Russia mastery of imported technical

and social skills such as familiarity with foreign languages, advanced secular subjects (such as geometry), social arts (from polite conversation to dancing), etc., were declared key prerequisites for social advancement and career success, while alternative sets of cultural skills that were surely shared by many members of the traditional elite (those associated with pre-Petrine religious and aristocratic cultural systems) lost their “institutionalized” status. New secular schools teaching new technical subjects were being established, and attendance was sometimes made compulsory: famously, Peter forbid his nobles to marry until they mastered arithmetic. Numerous decrees called upon nobles to study, explaining in exalted terms the benefits of learning, promising rewards and Imperial patronage to those who eagerly sought new knowledge and grave punishments to those who tried to avoid it. How did the elites respond to these calls is a different matter. On an anecdotal level, the well-established consensus seems to be that the Russian nobility, while initially resisting Peter’s attempts to subject them to new modes of schooling, eventually embraced them.

What was the social reality behind this process? On the one hand, contemporaries complained about the rise of Peter’s “new men”, gaining entry into the elite by virtue of their mastery of imported cultural and technical skills: foreign languages, shipbuilding, artillery and arts. On the other, studies seem to indicate that that old elite proved to be quite resilient, and the old aristocratic families continued to dominate the upper reaches of state service⁷. Yet, the only study so far to look systematically at the interdependence of socioeconomic background and educational attainment finds that one third of all the nobles retiring from 1762-1777 were graduates of cadet schools. Among the wealthiest nobles, the share of graduates was even higher, reaching 70 percent. However, since Faizova’s study is based on a sample of petitions for retirement, i.e. on data reflecting their status as they were approaching the end of their careers, it is unsurprising that wealth, rank, and education turned out to be significantly correlated. The sample is hardly representative: one could expect that wealthier nobles would be more likely to retire earlier, as they were less dependent on service for their livelihood.⁸ Thus, it is hard to tell from this data how exactly education, wealth, and rank were interrelated: did wealthier people tend to get a better education, or did better-educated people tend to achieve higher ranks and accumulate wealth? Did the system consistently provide rewards for mastering the required knowledge? Indeed, could it even do so, given the legendary prevalence of corruption and nepotism in the state machinery of early modern Russia?

The sources that might allow us to begin tackling these questions are provided by the Noble Land Cadet Corps, established in St Petersburg in July 1731.⁹ Unlike earlier Petrine schools, which tended to be rather amorphous, the corps had a clearly defined organizational

structure with hierarchical and functional delineation of teaching and administrative roles; formalized curriculum and procedures for monitoring and assessment; and other recognizable elements of modern schooling. It was also based on a very clear definition of what constituted legitimate knowledge and cultural skills, these being enshrined in its charter, curriculum and internal regulations. In that respect, the corps was the first school of this kind in Russia. It is also the reason why, unlike earlier schools, it left behind a large institutional archive that provides the basis for our study. Our sources indicate that young nobles arrived at the Cadet Corps with very different cultural baggage, and that this baggage did not necessarily directly reflect their wealth and social standing. At least in some cases, their families had already pursued proactive strategies in order to provide their sons with legitimate knowledge and cultural skills.

Creation of the corps could, at least to some extent, be viewed as a response to the demands voiced by the nobility during the 1730 constitutional crisis, when a number of elite factions specifically called upon the government to provide channels for young nobles to reach officer ranks without having to first serve in “degrading” lower ranks.¹⁰ The corps was also a follow-up on a number of expert proposals dating from the 1720s that called for creation of either a “cadet corps,” or “cadet companies” to train future officers. The corps fit both of these demands: its charter stipulated that only nobles or sons of commissioned officers would be admitted and promised that the noble cadets who demonstrated the necessary application in their studies would be able to graduate with officer ranks.¹¹ Yet, the purpose of the corps was more than just creating a channel for young nobles to gain commission without serving in degrading ranks or providing professional training in military matters – for its founders, its mission was to create a new breed of the Russian elite, a “true nobility.”

The program of studies, described in the founding documents, was very ambitious indeed, considering the general level of education of the Russian nobility and the complete novelty of most of the subjects for a young provincial nobleman of that time. According to a decree of July 29, 1731, announcing the establishment of the corps, the cadets were to be taught “Arithmetic, Geometry, Drawing, Fortification, Artillery, Fencing, Riding and other subjects necessary for a military career.” Some cadets, moreover, were to be given the opportunity to pursue civil, rather than military careers, and therefore, to study “foreign languages, History, Geography, Jurisprudence, dancing, music and other useful subjects.”¹² In December 1731, this list of subjects was expanded with the addition of “Grammar,” “Rhetoric,” and “other such useful military and political sciences”: the document asserted that those were the subjects that the young nobles “could have learned in foreign academies,” and that those able to master them would then be “worthy to serve the State and to gain honor, benefit, and glory for themselves and

for the Fatherland.”¹³ Organizationally, the new institution consisted of the Noble Cadet Corps, a military unit (a battalion) led by its commanding officers, and the so-called “Knightly Academy” (a reference to German *Ritterakademie*), which was comprised of around two dozen civilian teachers¹⁴.

Thus, the corps’ documents provided a very clear vision of legitimate “gentlemanly” knowledge and cultural skills firmly anchored to the international (Western European) models. The founders, most notably, Field Marshal Burchard Christoph von Münnich (1683-1767),¹⁵ the first High Commander of the Corps, explicitly wanted to emulate the model set by “Prussian, Danish, and other royal cadet houses.” He made a point of staffing the corps with foreign officers, including some who had actually served in the Berlin Cadet Corps.¹⁶ Disciplinary practices at the corps were based on the assumption that the arriving cadets were bearing the kind of habits and mores that, if left unattended, would prevent them from succeeding in the corps.¹⁷ Therefore, constant supervision was necessary to fend off harmful influences, to identify transgressions and to point them out (both to the offenders themselves and to their comrades) through punishment. According to the Imperial decree, it was necessary that “all the cadets of the Corps live in one house ... so that they waste less time on walking around, inappropriate behavior and entertainments, but rather [spend their time] on their studies as well as on all other activities under constant supervision.”¹⁸ So, while earlier Russian schools were usually housed in random buildings, often sharing them with military units or governmental bureaus, the corps was located in the palace of Prince Menshikov, the exiled favorite of Peter I, on Vasilievskii Island. By the 1720s it was the largest and, according to a contemporary, the most luxurious building in the new capital, surpassing even the imperial residence itself.¹⁹ All the enrolled cadets had to reside in the complex. The authorities also tried to accommodate the faculty and the officers of the corps. A foreign traveler reported that all the cadets “live in this house, and it has only one large gate”²⁰; the gates in the wall surrounding the corps were guarded by sentinels, and special rules regulated the cadets’ access to the city, depending on the season and the time of day.²¹ Their supervisors were to “diligently watch their mores, habits, and deeds, so that they behaved according to the demands of virtue, politeness, due humility, and honor, while lies, unfaithfulness, and other vices inappropriate for nobility were rooted out from them early on.”²² Each “chamber” of cadets had to have a supervisor-“headman,” and the best among the cadets were appointed as non-commissioned officers (NCOs) charged with “overseeing” and “supervising” other cadets.²³ “Supervision” also meant that the cadets were to observe a set of detailed rules, such as the “Rules on how to act in the grand hall where the cadets dine,” or the “Regulation” prescribing the correct ways of leaving and entering the class.²⁴ Taken together

these documents and practices were designed to create a certain way of life which emphasized discipline and order, cleanliness and control over one's mind and body. It must have been a dramatic change for noble youngsters accustomed to a carefree life on their fathers' estates. Even the cadets' meals were supposed to be a kind of cultural experience, exposing cadets to a model gentlemanly way of life.²⁵

For our purposes it is important to stress a number of elements of pedagogical and administrative practices at the corps that had direct implications on how the record-keeping was organized, and thus, our sources. First, the multitude and variety of the subjects to be taught at the corps were split into five broad disciplinary areas.²⁶ Within these broad areas, rather than moving from one class to another every year or two, cadets were expected to move up separate "chains" of subjects. A cadet, for example, had to stay in arithmetic class until, in von Münnich's words, he "completely masters one subject, so he can move to a higher one."²⁷ Upon mastering arithmetic, a cadet would progress to geometry and so on, all the way up to artillery. Meanwhile, in languages, he could remain in the lowest class all this time. Each cadet moved from one class to the next on his own when he was ready. Furthermore, each subject was in turn divided into separate and consecutive steps. In lower arithmetic classes, these steps were simply "multiplication" or "division." In fortification, for example, "attacking fortresses," "defending fortresses," and "drawing regular fortresses" were separate steps, while "artillery" consisted of "studying various types of guns," "drawing tools belonging to guns," etc. Rather than giving a student a grade for mastering each of these steps, teachers simply indicated how far he was able to move.

Second, in the corps' charter the government explicitly promised that upon graduation students would be awarded military and civil ranks "depending on their progress [in studies] and their worth (*po dostoinstvu*)." Subsequently, an extensive system of monitoring and examinations was created in order to assess the cadets' "worth" according to the standards set by the state. The central event in the academic life of the cadets were to be yearly "general examinations," and depending upon their performance on the exam, they might be promoted to the next class or to receive their commissions, in which case the new officers were expected to make a "public speech."²⁸ This was supplemented by a system of on-going monitoring and record-keeping based on a "general table" of the entire corps compiled in 1734, after much labor, by two expatriate experts, Captains de Bodan and de Raden, so as to "to turn this endless confusion into order and sort all the cadets out." This general table "consisted of 36 tables where all 360 cadets were listed according to their [progress in] studies, worthiness, sharpness, and seniority." After the general table was compiled, an "ober-professor" was charged with keeping

it up to date with monthly reports produced by the teachers (on the cadets' academic progress) and company officers (on their behavior). The teachers and company officers were, in turn, required to keep their own "books of observations," while the disciplinary transgressions committed by students were entered in yet another set of books.²⁹

Finally, the government made a point of introducing new methods of recruiting to the corps. The result of this being that its student body was largely a self-selected group. "This decree of ours is to be published and made known for all of the nobility, so that the volunteers (*zhelaiushchie*) would come to the Senate [to sign up for the Corps]," – read an imperial decree of July 29, 1731, announcing the foundation of the corps.³⁰ This call for "volunteers" was a radical departure from the Petrine habit of filling the schools, bureaus, and branches of service by arbitrarily drafting a required number of candidates: the government was actually looking for those willing to study at the new school. This change of policy was further reflected in the new rules of entering state service established in 1736-37 that gave nobles the right to choose between alternative ways of studying (at home, in "garrison" schools, at the Cadet Corps and similar schools) and starting one's service (such as in the guards, the field army, civil service, etc.).³¹ Competition for admission does not seem to have been extremely high, though: whereas 47 young nobles applied to the Cadet Corps during their registration at the Heraldry in 1745, 36 of them were duly enrolled, as were two other young nobles.³²

II. The Data

It is thanks to the administrative and pedagogical practices described in the previous section that we have at the sources employed in this study. The data analyzed below mostly come from the cadets' petitions for admission, collected in the corps' annual registers of incoming correspondence and from the corps' rolls compiled by the officers.³³ Details of enrollment procedures varied over time, but in general young nobles all had to present themselves at the Heraldry. Their names and personal information were recorded, and their petitions for admission eventually found their way into the corps' yearly registers. In these petitions young nobles reported their name and age; their father's name, rank, branch of service, and also whether he was retired or dead; the number of male serfs in their family's possession, and the districts where they had estates; their previous education, that is, whether they could read and write, knew arithmetic, or anything above that (in most cases foreign languages or geometry). Officials at the Heraldry checked whether the minors were indeed nobles or officers'

children (applicants had to bring a witness to certify their nobility), whether they were physically fit, and whether they fulfilled the minimum literacy requirements. The rest of the information could not be verified immediately; only in the case of serious doubts were inquiries made with the local authorities, or with the bureaus and the regiments where the fathers of the young men allegedly served. The Noble Cadet Corps' charter did not provide any criteria for accepting or rejecting the applicants. The decisions, in fact, were often made on the highest level: applications to the corps had to be forwarded to the highest authorities for approval, such as the Senate, the Imperial Cabinet, or the sovereign herself.³⁴ Generally, the data available to us on the cadets' backgrounds are highly fragmentary for the 1730s due to lax procedures of registration for service, but increasingly complete for the later period.³⁵ Also, due to the peculiarities of the legal status of the Baltic nobles, their petitions for admission did not include data on their family background, or if they did the data are incomparable. Thus, we generally limit our analysis to "Russian" cadets.

The data allow us to construct two quite straightforward indicators reflecting parameters that are traditionally employed in any analysis of early modern Russian elite, and that also arguably correspond rather well to Bourdieu's notions of financial capital and social capital, respectively³⁶. One such parameter is *Wealth* (*W*) measured as the number of male serfs ("male souls," m.s.) owned by a family; in our sample it ranges anywhere from 0 to 1,000 and more, although most families had somewhere between 50 and 150 m.s. This was a standard measure of wealth for early modern Russian landlords, and it is used as such both in the contemporary official documents and in modern studies. This data was self-reported by the applicants, and the authorities had no ways of checking it; nor do we. As there were no explicit quotas or preferences for poorer or wealthier students, applicants had no obvious incentives to misreport this data. Still, in many instances, teenagers responded "I don't remember," or "I don't know," when asked about their fathers' wealth, or gave seemingly approximate numbers. The number of serfs in one's possession was always reported according to the latest "revision" (so some numbers might have been ten years old when reported); nor can we control for the size of the noble's family.³⁷ In our database $W=0$ means that the noble in question explicitly reported not having any serfs.

The most striking feature of the self-selected group that the corps' student constituted is that the cadets on average were significantly wealthier than the Russian nobility in general. Really wealthy cadets (with over 1,000 m.s.) were not numerous: there were no more than few of them in a normal yearly intake. For example, in 1750 among the new students there were two Khovanskii princes (4,800 m.s.), Prince Ivan Golitsyn (4,000 m.s.), Baron Pavel Shafirov (1,580

m.s.), two Zinoviev brothers (1,300 m.s.) and Aleksei Kozhin (1,150 m.s.).³⁸ In the 1752 intake there was only one cadet who had over 1000 m.s., Vasilii Kolychev (1,500 m.s.). In 1737, the intake included Ivan Golokhvastov (1,400 m.s.), the Titov brothers (1,800 m.s.), and Prince Aleksandr Dolgorukov (2,500 m.s.). These magnates were clearly an exception. The majority of cadets were coming from the “upper-middle” nobility. They were not super-rich, yet able, according to the governmental definition, somehow to maintain an “honorable” and “clean” lifestyle.³⁹ In the three decades under study around 50-60 per cent of the students came from families with over 100 m.s. For example, the father of Appolon and Lev Pronchishchev, an army major, owned 260 m.s. in the Bolkhov and Elets districts, while Sergei Mansurov inherited from his father, an *assessor* at the College of the Mines, 400 m.s. in Tula, Livny, and Moscow districts.⁴⁰ These strata of the nobility were highly overrepresented in the student body. In fact, there were quite a few years when half of all the new students had between 100 and 500 m.s. The nobles with 21 to 100 m.s. comprised the second most numerous group: they normally supplied about one third of the incoming cadets. Among them we find such young nobles as Prince Aleksei Putiatin, son of an army major and the heir to a modest estate of 95 m.s., or Andrei Neledinskii, whose father, a lieutenant, owned 75 m.s.⁴¹

As for the poorest nobility, they accounted for 10 to 20 percent of the intake. In 1750 only four incoming cadets had no serfs at all, although one of them had some land. In addition, Osip Chelishchev had 20 m.s., and two Georgian émigré princes, Egor Andronnikov and Stepan Eristov, had five “households” (about 15-20 m.s.) each. In 1752 there were three incoming cadets who had no serfs whatsoever, and three more cadets had seven, seventeen, and twenty m.s., respectively. Given the absolute dominance of this poorest group among the Russian nobility in general,⁴² the numbers make it clear that the poorest stratum was terribly underrepresented at the corps. Thus, the corps as a unit drew mostly the sons of well-to-do nobility: they were not rich in absolute terms, or if compared to the magnates, yet they still belonged to the top – or upper-middle, should we say – strata of the elite.

It is useful to compare the corps’ student body to the Guards regiments. Strikingly, while the share of the poorest nobles (20 m.s. or fewer) among the rank-and-file guardsmen could be well above 50 percent, at the corps it never rose above 23 percent and usually stayed below 20 percent.⁴³

* * *

Another parameter, *Father’s rank (fr)* is measured as the position of a cadet’s father on the Table of Ranks, which we take to reflect as the best indicator of one’s social standing. We

coded commissioned ranks as they appear on the Table of Ranks (1 to 14, with 14 being the lowest), and we introduced additional grades for lower ranks: 15 – for sub-ensigns; 16 – for sergeants; 17 – for corporals, and 18 – for privates. We also accounted for the fact that the same ranks in different branches of service could occupy different positions on the Table of Ranks, reflecting relative standing of these services in terms of prestige (for example, *landmilitia* officers were one grade below the army ones of the same rank, while the guards were two grades ahead of them). In addition, individuals with foreign or pre-Petrine (*stol'nik*, etc.) ranks, or with rare, non-standard or ad-hoc offices outside of the Table of Ranks (such as “secretary in the household of the Bishop of Novgorod”) were assigned equivalent grades which, according to our best judgment, reflect their relative social standing.

Again, a look at the ranks of fathers who sent their sons to the Cadet Corps demonstrates that the corps predominantly attracted the sons of the upper-middle strata of elite, while the highest- and the lowest-ranking families occupy relatively marginal positions. The majority of cadets came from families of commissioned officers (and their equivalent in the civil service), with field officers usually, but not always, managing to send slightly more cadets to the corps than staff officers. Quite often these two categories combined accounted for 80 percent, or even 90 percent of the entering cohort. The sons of civil and military officers with ranks above colonel accounted for up to 12 percent of the yearly intake, but in absolute numbers they were never represented by more than six cadets; sometimes their number dropped down to zero. In 1747, the *generalitet* was represented (in the overall intake of 35) by four Epishkov brothers, the sons of a deceased brigadier-general. In 1757, there was only one son of a relatively high-ranking officer: Ivan Bakhmet'ev's father was a brigadier-general and the *komendant* of St Petersburg. On the other hand, the lowest-ranking nobles (by far the most numerous category among the nobility in general) were never able to supply more than 17 percent of all the entering cadets, and sometimes they accounted for as little as 2-3 percent of the intake. In 1747 there were only two such cadets in the entire intake: Vasilii Razladin, son of an army NCO, and Dmitrii Potemkin, whose father served in the Smolensk gentry militia. In 1757 there were six sons of NCOs among the new cadets. The father of two cadets, the Davydov brothers, was a retired *gardemarin* (cadet officer) in the navy, while the father of two Lavrov brothers had never served at all.

* * *

The key parameter that reflects the young nobles' success at the corps is the rank they received at graduation, which we use as a dependent variable *Rank at Graduation*, or *Rank-g* in our calculations below. There was no fixed course of study or term of study at the corps. Rather,

cadets entered at the age of 8 to 12, and left the corps at the age of 20 or 21. By this age, the authorities believed, the worthy ones would have learned all they needed, and unworthy ones – all they could. In addition, large groups of cadets could be commissioned when the army entered the war, as in 1736, for example. All the decisions regarding graduation and awarding of ranks were accompanied by detailed registers listing all the subjects taken by the cadet in question and his grades (that is, descriptive characteristics of his classroom achievements). However, as the authorities did not use grades, but rather descriptive assessments in their evaluations of students, it is impossible to reconstruct the formula used for converting grades into ranks – if such a formula existed at all. Decisions regarding the ranks of the graduates were sent for approval to the highest authorities, such as Field-Marshal von Munnich (in the late 1730s), the Senate, or the Cabinet. In that sense, they could reflect not only the subjective assessment of the teachers and officers at the corps, but also pressures and priorities from the government and elite at large. As earlier, we coded commissioned ranks as they appear on the Table of Ranks (1 to 14, with 14 being the lowest), and we introduced additional grades for lower ranks: 15 – for sub-ensigns; 16 – for sergeants; 17 – for corporals; and 18 – for privates. Some cadets were permitted to retire at graduation because of health reasons, yet were also awarded a rank following the normal procedures. We included these cases in our sample. Around half of the cadets graduated with the lowest commissioned rank, that of ensign (*praporshchik*). One fifth of the students, however, received a higher rank, that of sub-lieutenant (*podporuchik*). Slightly fewer cadets (15.6 percent) graduated as lieutenants (*poruchik*). At the same time, nearly 14 percent did not receive any commissioned ranks at all and left the corps as sub-ensigns (*podpraporshchik*), sergeants, or even privates. Less than 2 percent of cadets, usually those earmarked for teaching duty at the corps itself, stayed much longer at the school and finally left it with still higher ranks, mostly as captains.

* * *

In some of the regressions below we also attempted to control for other variables, such as the indicator of whether the father was dead or alive (*Fdr*), rank of postgraduate assignment prestige (*rank_p*) and the length of study (*study_length*). In particular, ***Father_dead_or_retired, or Fdr***, reflects whether the father was reported as dead or retired at the moment of a cadet's entry at the corps. In this period, nobles were allowed to retire from state service only when they were crippled or physically incapacitated by wounds, illness, or age. So, we hypothesize that a dead father had fewer opportunities for oversight over his sons and for pulling strings on their

behalf. A retired father might generally have also had fewer opportunities to help his son and direct him. We will not bring up the results controlling for these variables, as they did not drastically change the effects of the variables of interest.

III. Measuring Cultural Capital at the Corps

Naturally, it was impossible for us to employ the same methods that are employed in quantitative studies of cultural capital in modern settings. However, our data allowed us to construct two proxy indices reflecting two key aspects of cultural capital. On the one hand, we attempted to measure *cultural capital embedded in the families*. To this end, we make use of the fact that the young nobles in many cases reported not only their fathers' ranks, but also their branch of services (or it could be surmised from their titles, which are often specific to one or another branch). It might be reasonably hypothesized that different branches of service implied a different degree of familiarity with, and exposure to, appropriate types of specialized knowledge on the part of the fathers and thus a different degree of their sons' potential exposure to "imported" European culture. Service in the artillery, for example, was supposed to require some knowledge of mathematics and geometry, as well as foreign language (since all the relevant technical literature was likely to be in German or French). There was also a much higher likelihood of serving side-by-side with Western European expatriate officers, whereas for infantry or cavalry that was not necessarily the case. Proximity to court, or service in the Baltic provinces, might also signal a higher exposure to "imported" Western European culture.

So, our *Culture_father_service* index (*C_father_service*) could be equal 0, 1, or 2. We coded *C_father_service* as 0 for those whose fathers served in "ordinary" branches of service, which we took to include infantry, cavalry, local administration, various local/ethnic formations (Smolensk *szlyahta*, units of Georgian or Serbian hussars, etc.), and the "old formations" (traditional gentry militia, *strelety*, etc.) Servitors listed with civil ranks but without any indication of their place of service were also assigned *C_father_service* = 0. When applications for admission did not explicitly specify father's branch of service, *C_father_service* = 0 by default. *C_father_service* = 1 for those whose fathers served in the navy, were known to have been stationed in the Baltic garrisons (with radically better access to schooling), were commissioned officers in the guards, or held the equivalent of commissioned ranks in the central government agencies. *C_father_service* = 2 for those whose fathers served in branches of service requiring the highest levels of technical expertise, such as artillery and engineers (officers only),

medical service, foreign service, mining, etc. Teachers in various Petrine schools and palace servants are also assigned to this category, as are cadets with identifiable foreign connections (such as having a foreigner as a step-father, etc).

On the other hand, we constructed an index reflecting the efforts of cadets and their families to *purposefully acquire legitimate knowledge* prior to their entry to the corps. We made use of the fact that some cadets reported in their applications what they had already learned by the time of their enrollment (in addition to ability to read and write, which was required by law). To test different possible ways of using this information, we introduced two alternative, somewhat differently constructed indices of acquired culture. *Culture1* awards one point for every subject (besides reading and writing) mentioned by a cadet in his application, and thus ranges from 0 to, at most, 7 or 9. *Culture2* was constructed to reflect the relative difficulty of different subjects, as it was perceived in that period. So, *Culture2* = 0 for those cadets who did not report any learning beyond literacy prior to entry to the corps. *Culture2* = 1 for those who only reported knowing arithmetic. *Culture2* = 2 for those who claimed to know one of the subjects that we consider somewhat advanced for this period: geometry, German, or French. *Culture2* = 3 for those who had previously studied any two of these subjects. *Culture2* = 4 for those who had studied up to two of the rarer subjects, i.e. trigonometry, history, geography, drawing, or Latin. *Culture2* = 5 for those who reported having studied the most rare and advanced subjects, that is, fortification, logic, or “mechanics.” Note that whereas our *Culture_father_service* index reflects certain qualities that we ascribed to the families in question, the index of acquired cultural capital reflects the actions actually taken by the families, that is, their efforts to learn certain prescribed subjects, identifying available channels of learning and investing necessary resources. We hypothesize that making these efforts reflects a reasonable level of appreciation of social importance of “imported” knowledge in the post-Petrine regime. In that sense, this indicator might be a better proxy for cultural capital and its effects might be more pronounced; on the other hand, the problem here is that unlike the embedded cultural capital index, this indicator is based on self-reported data.

* * *

In our regressions below we are going to use these indices to test basic hypotheses regarding the potential interplay of wealth and social standing with cultural capital, both within the Cadet Corps and in the early modern society at large. First, we would like to know how our measures of wealth and social standing interact with each other and with indicators of cultural capital. A close correlation between them would suggest the presence of a homogeneous elite

where wealth, social standing, and cultural capital go hand in hand, and different forms of capital are easily converted into each other and magnify each other. This would be more consistent with the social reproduction model and indicate that the traditional elites have successfully mastered post-Petrine legitimate knowledge and cultural skills. A low correlation between various forms of capital would suggest a more fluid elite that included both older families, possessing inherited wealth but losing control over high-ranking appointments and struggling to master the new cultural paradigms, and upwardly mobile families that might have been seeking to use their position in state service to acquire wealth and cultural capital, or to use their mastery of legitimate knowledge to move up the ranks. Furthermore, it also matters whether the index of acquired cultural capital correlates with wealth or with father's ranks, as it would suggest different channels of acquiring cultural capital.

A separate issue is the possible correlation, or lack thereof, between embedded and acquired cultural capital. A high correlation between these indices would indicate that the option of acquiring cultural capital was only available to those families that already had access to it by virtue of their service status, which is more consistent with the social reproduction model. Low correlation would point towards the social mobility model, where some families were able to acquire access to legitimate knowledge even if they were short on cultural capital at the time.

A further set of questions has to do with promotion within the corps. Normally, all other things being equal, the possession of cultural capital should increase one's chances for graduating with a higher rank, and if cultural capital is poorly correlated with wealth and father's rank that would additionally support the social mobility model. If, however, we find that cultural capital did not impact promotion, or had a lower impact than father's wealth or standing, the conclusion would be that the system failed to reward mastery of legitimate knowledge and cultural skills.

A caveat is due here. We expect our results to reflect at least to some extent the fact that our sample is self-selected. Not all nobles were eager to send their sons to the Cadet Corps: each year, fewer than a hundred families applied, while some of the young nobles sent to the corps by the government even petitioned to be transferred elsewhere. A few were sent to the corps because they were quite simply orphans, or for similar practical reasons. Still, one might expect that the very fact of applying to the corps was likely to indicate a higher than average level of cultural capital in the family. Furthermore, as we have mentioned earlier, in terms of wealth and rank the corps' student body was relatively homogeneous, drawing boys from a relatively narrow segment of upper-middle nobility. We expect that to contribute to the dampening of our effects.

In order to increase the likelihood that we capture at least some effect of cultural capital on graduation rank, we introduced a combined indicator *Culture_comb*, which is a simplest binary index equal to either 0 or 1 – 1 was assigned to anyone with any indication of exposure to cultural capital, either embedded or acquired (*C_father_service* or *culture2* = 2 or more).

IV. Data Analysis

Our data covers a total of 2,293 cadets with available graduation years. Summary statistics for variables of interest are given in Table 1. Notice that wealth data is missing for roughly two-thirds of all cadets, which reflects problems with the self-reported nature of our data.

Table 1. Summary statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
rank_g	1965	13.73	1.46	18	8
wealth	741	251.94	513.27	0	4800
fr	959	10.36	3.87	2	18
c_father_service	824	.42	.69	0	2
culture1	2360	.36	.96	0	9
culture2	2362	.43	1.06	0	5
culture_comb	2362	.17	.37	0	1
entry_year	2354	46.87	10.48	1732	1762
graduation_year	2293	52.25	10.66	1732	1777
fdr	2362	.30	.68	0	2
rank_p	2002	2.04	.44	1	4
study_length	2286	5.55	2.36	0	19

In our analysis of the data we notice that the characteristics of a small number of extremely wealthy cadets have an inordinate amount of influence on the results. So we decided to cut off the outliers and considered only those cadets whose self-reported wealth did not exceed 500 m.s. As a result, we have disregarded only 85 data points. We also introduced the variable *wealth_log*, which is a logarithm of *wealth*+1, so as to take into account the relative variation in wealth levels. Arguably, the relative differences in wealth levels (the measure of “how many times” someone is as rich as someone else) are more important in wealth effects than absolute differences (the measure of “by how much” someone is richer than someone else).

Table 2 shows Spearman rank correlation coefficients between some of the variables. We can see that different culture variables are highly correlated with each other and negatively correlated with rank at graduation. This is consistent with the social mobility model. At the same time, the absence of correlation (or slight negative correlation) of *wealth* with *culture_comb* might indicate a certain heterogeneity of the elite, that is, the coexistence in our sample of the traditional, wealthier – and less educated – nobility with a strata of technical experts recruited from among the lower nobility and non-nobles. Notice also that father's rank serves as a substitute for wealth – it is negatively correlated with wealth and positively with culture. This supports the hypothesis that service was at this period a more important channel of acquiring cultural capital: one could say that legitimate knowledge and cultural skills were not so much “bought” on the market, as accessed through connections developed through state service.

Table 2. Rank correlation coefficients

	rank_g	wealth	Fr	c_fath~e*	culture1	culture2	culture3
rank_g	1.0000						
wealth	-0.0304	1.0000					
fr	0.0795	-0.2621	1.0000				
c_fath~e*	-0.0402	-0.0436	-0.0751	1.0000			
culture1	-0.0950	0.0002	-0.1017	0.1353	1.0000		
culture2	-0.1011	-0.0071	-0.1128	0.1424	0.9928	1.0000	
culture_comb	-0.1442	-0.0444	-0.1538	0.3654	0.6896	0.7184	1.0000

*c_father_service

To investigate properly the dependence of rank at graduation on variables of interest, we should proceed from mere correlations to regression analysis. First, we consider the following linear regression model:

$$rank_g = \alpha + \beta_1 wealth_log + \beta_2 fr + \beta_3 culture + \gamma c_father_service + \varepsilon,$$

where in different versions of the model *culture* is either *culture1*, *culture2* or *culture_comb*, and *c_father_service* is either included or not ($\gamma = 0$). Notice that we cannot use several cultural variables at the same time as they were constructed from the same source and, basically, proxy the same underlying force. As *culture_comb* is constructed taking into account father's service characteristics, this variable also cannot be used in the same regression as *c_father_service*. Table 3 presents the results of these regressions.

Table 3. Static regressions

	Model				
	1	2	3	4	5
wealth_log	0.013 (0.047)	0.010 (0.047)	0.013 (0.047)	0.009 (0.047)	0.009 (0.047)
Fr	0.022 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.021 (0.019)	0.021 (0.019)	0.020 (0.019)
culture1	-0.140* (0.079)	-0.135* (0.080)			
culture2			-0.119** (0.061)	-0.126** (0.064)	
culture_comb					-0.341** (0.161)
c_father_service		-0.033 (0.109)		-0.024 (0.110)	
R ²	0.011	0.012	0.012	0.014	0.014
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.003	0.006	0.005	0.008

* – significant at 10%; ** – significant at 5%; *** – significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses.

We can never make the logarithm of wealth or father’s rank significant whereas culture variables are always significant. Adding a control for the type of father’s service (*c_father_service*) does not change the results, and the type of father’s service itself turns out to be insignificant. Generally, the explanatory power of these regressions is pretty low so that our variables explain at most 1.4 percent of total variation in ranks at graduation. Note that the index of embedded cultural capital *c_father_service* has the lowest explanatory power, which again points towards the social mobility model.

A plausible explanation for the lack of explanatory power might be the heterogeneity of the time periods that we considered. Far from being stable, institutional arrangements, and social and political environments experienced several drastic changes at the time. Thus, we consider several breaking points in time, suggested by suitable historical events, so as to be able to identify the effects of those changes on the institutional environment at the school. In particular, we look at the changes in the imperial government and in the corps’ management. Furthermore, considering the poor quality of data in the early 1730s, we restricted our sample only to cadets who graduated after 1736.

One of the breaking points we explored turned out to be the most promising in terms of statistical significance of changes, and it occurred in the year 1757. Thus, by introducing a time dummy⁴⁴ *per57_* for years later than 1756, and the corresponding interaction terms⁴⁵ *i_wl_per57_*, *i_fr_per57_*, *i_cul1_per57_*, *i_cul2_per57_* and *i_cul3_per57_*, we got a new series of regression models:

$$rank_g = \alpha + \beta_1 wealth_log + \beta_2 fr + \beta_3 culture + \gamma per57_ + \delta_1 i_wl_per57_ + \delta_2 i_fr_per57_ + \delta_3 i_culture_per57_ + \varepsilon,$$

where again, *culture* stands for *culture1*, *culture2* or *culture_comb*. The results of running these regressions on our data are presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Linear regressions with a breaking point in 1757

	Model					
	1		2		3	
wealth_log	-0.043	(0.061)	-0.046	(0.061)	-0.073	(0.062)
Fr	-0.004	(0.023)	-0.006	(0.023)	-0.010	(0.023)
culture1	-0.321***	(0.110)				
culture2			-0.268***	(0.082)		
culture_comb					-0.828***	(0.204)
per57_	-1.692***	(0.662)	-1.743***	(0.660)	-1.989***	(0.663)
i_cul1_per57_	0.379**	(0.154)				
i_cul2_per57_			0.321***	(0.119)		
i_cul3_per57_					1.046***	(0.316)
i_fr_per57_	0.056	(0.038)	0.058	(0.038)	0.064*	(0.038)
i_wl_per57_	0.075	(0.091)	0.077	(0.091)	0.102	(0.091)
R ²	0.066		0.070		0.083	
Adjusted R ²	0.051		0.056		0.068	

* – significant at 10%; ** – significant at 5%; *** – significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses.

Again, culture variables are always significant, now at 1% significance level, and their signs are intuitive: higher levels of cultural capital are associated with lower numeric graduation ranks (which are higher in status). Clearly, the breaking point of 1757 turns out to be justified as it is always significant. Its sign suggests that after 1757 there was a uniform increase in graduation ranks – on average up two levels in numeric value (based on the third regression model). At the same time, after 1757 cultural variables stopped playing any discernable role in predicting rank at graduation, based on the coefficients on cultural variables and corresponding interaction terms. Recall that before 1757 they contributed negatively to the predicted numeric value of rank at graduation. It is notable that 1757 was the year when the corps got its first ethnic Russian director, Brigadier Aleksei Petrovich Melgunov (1722-1788), whereas until that point the corps was directed by German expatriate officers: 1731-1734, Johann Ludwig von Luberas; 1734, Actual Privy Councilor Baron Christian Wilhelm von Münnich; 1734-1741, Colonel (later Major-General) Abel Friedrich von Tettau; 1742-1756, Lieutenant-Colonel Johann von Sigheim (as acting director). Note that changes in the Imperial government (such as the banishment of the corps' founder, Field-Marshal von Münnich in 1742), appointment of an ethnically Russian High Commander of the Corps (first, Prince Vasilii Nikitich Repnin in 1745, and then Prince Boris Grigorievich Iusupov in 1748) did not have a similar effect. This indicates that indeed it was the

day-to-day control over the monitoring and assessment tools, and not the political interference that might have been crucial in terms of recognizing and awarding cultural capital. Interestingly, Brigadier Melgunov was actually a corps graduate, which might raise questions about the corps' ability to fully transit appreciation of relevant values and commitment to awarding cultural capital.⁴⁶

Notice that the model employing the *culture_comb* variable fits the data the best. The significance of many coefficients is much improved – so much so, that the interaction of father's rank with *per57_* also becomes borderline significant (at 10% level). Its sign is positive (though absolute value is small), which gives the expected association between father's and son's ranks. We could also discern a preference for *culture_comb* among all culture variables from the initial regressions in Table 3. We might suggest that, given the construction of the variable *culture_comb*, it combined all relevant information from *c_father_service* and *culture2*.

Using simple linear regressions with ranking dependent variables has well-known methodological drawbacks⁴⁷. In our case, as mentioned earlier, the majority of students received rank 14 and any real acknowledgment of a cadet's worth started only with bestowing rank 13. Progressively fewer students got higher ranks with a really small proportion of them being able to reach outstanding ranks 8–10 upon graduation. Thus, it might be unreasonable to expect a linear association between rank at graduation and our explanatory variables. Recognizing this potential problem, we also ran a series of ordered logit regressions which came up with the same qualitative results as the linear regressions above. We have also aggregated some ranks to cut down on the number of rank levels, many of which in our database are not filled anyway. The results of ordered logit regressions with the breaking point in 1757 are shown in Table 5. In terms of coefficient significance and their signs, we get qualitatively the same results as with linear regressions. Unlike linear regression coefficients, though, the values in Table 5 themselves are not easily interpretable, so we also present the probabilities of getting ranks at graduation depending on whether *culture_comb* is 1 or 0 before 1757 and after. The probability of getting a better rank increased appreciably whenever *culture_comb* got up from 0 to 1 before 1757. At the same time, the *culture_comb* variable did not invoke any changes in the probabilities of graduation ranks after 1757. Furthermore, 1757 was a breaking point in a different way as well: starting in that year, graduating cadets got consistently better ranks.

Table 5. Ordered logit regressions with breaking point in 1757

	Model		
	1	2	3
wealth_log	-0.077 (0.087)	-0.080 (0.087)	-0.118 (0.088)
Fr	0.010 (0.023)	0.008 (0.031)	0.001 (0.032)
culture1	-0.467*** (0.144)		
culture2		-0.381*** (0.109)	
culture_comb			-1.271*** (0.278)
per57_	-2.111** (0.888)	-2.168** (0.887)	-2.565*** (0.898)
i_cul1_per57_	0.528*** (0.198)		
i_cul2_per57_		0.436*** (0.156)	
i_cul3_per57_			1.451*** (0.419)
i_fr_per57_	0.056 (0.051)	0.058 (0.051)	0.068 (0.051)
i_wl_per57_	0.153 (0.122)	0.155 (0.122)	0.192 (0.123)

* – significant at 10%; ** – significant at 5%; *** – significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses.

Conclusion

In this paper, we used a unique database covering the graduates of the Noble Land Cadet Corps, a leading elite school in St Petersburg from 1732 to the early 1760s, to perform the first quantitative study of cultural capital and its interaction with other key socioeconomic parameters, wealth and social standing in post-Petrine Russia. We offered a method of assessing cultural capital on the basis of the data available for that period and performed an analysis to test the social reproduction and social mobility models. We find that among the Corps' applicants cultural capital appears to have been uncorrelated (or slightly negatively correlated) with family wealth, while father's rank has been positively correlated with cultural capital but negatively with wealth. Between our two indices of cultural capital, capturing embedded and acquired cultural capital, it is the latter that has higher explanatory power. At the corps itself, the possession of cultural capital increased one's chances of graduating with a higher rank, especially prior to 1757. Surprisingly, it appears that neither wealth, nor father's rank in state service had a significant impact on one's own rank at graduation – what mattered was one's family exposure to the “imported” legitimate knowledge and cultural skills.

While the overall explanatory power of our results is somewhat limited (our sample was self-selected and largely homogeneous in socio-economic terms, while the data themselves were self-reported), all the results point in one direction. What emerges is a picture of an institutional setting where the possession of cultural capital was rewarded, while the cultural capital itself tended to come hand-in-hand with service rank – and it was acquired through service channels.

All of this is consistent with the social mobility model. Even though this mobility was rather limited in the sense that it took place (in our sample) within a narrow segment of the upper-middle elite, this insight contributes to our understanding of sustainability of the Petrine project. In other words, it suggests that it was possible for the Petrine state, despite its institutional weakness, to create such a framework where it did pay to be “Westernized.”

The question remains, to what extent can our observations be applied more broadly, beyond the narrow oasis of the Noble Cadet Corps. Indeed, Melgunov’s case indicates that even small changes in key personnel could easily distort the institutional framework that made possible the systematic recognition of cultural capital. At the same time, the role of expatriate experts as “gatekeepers” looms large in our story. Thus, a promising direction for further research is the investigation of the role of cultural capital in early modern Russia at large. This might include, first, constructing a more representative sample of the elite, and second, assessing the impact of cultural capital on life trajectories of nobles both outside the corps and beyond it. In particular, this might imply investigating to what extent was the career advantage gained at the corps due to his cultural capital was subsequently sustained in “real life.”

¹ For a brief comparative overview of these reforms see Ralston, DV 1990, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions in the Extra-European World, 1600-1914*. Chicago.

² Lamont, M & Lareau, A 1988, “Cultural Capital: Allusions, Gaps and Glissandos in Recent Theoretical Developments”, *Sociological Theory*, 6(2), pp. 153-168, here p. 156.

³ Bourdieu, P 1998, *State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, Stanford; Bourdieu, P & Passeron, J-C 1977, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, Sage; Bourdieu, P 1986, “The Forms of Capital”, *The Handbook for Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, Richardson, JG, editor, Greenwood Publishing Group, pp. 241-58; DiMaggio, P 1982, “Cultural Capital and School Success: The Impact of Status Culture Participation on the Grades of U.S. High School Students,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr.), pp. 189-201.

⁴ Some of recent useful overviews of issues related to research on cultural capital are found in: Lareau, A & Weininger, EB 2003, “Cultural Capital in Educational Research: A Critical Assessment”, *Theory and Society*, 32 (5-6), pp. 567-606; Savage, M & Bennett, T 2005, “Editors’ Introduction: Cultural Capital and Social Inequality”, *British Journal of Sociology*, 56, pp. 1-10; Goldthorpe, J 2007, “‘Cultural Capital’: Some Critical Observations”, *Sociologica*, 2, pp. 1-22; van Eijck, GKK 2010, “The Intergenerational Reproduction of Cultural Capital: A Threefold Perspective”, *Social Forces*, Volume 89, Number 1, September, pp. 209-231. For a broad overview of relevant education studies, see Sirin, SR 2005, “Socioeconomic Status and Academic Achievement: A Meta- Analytic Review of Research”, *Review of Educational Research*, 75 (3), pp. 417-453.

⁵ MacHardy, KJ 1999, “Cultural Capital, Family Strategies and Noble Identity in Early Modern Habsburg Austria, 1579-1620,” *Past & Present*, No. 163 (May), pp. 36-75.

⁶ For a general overview of these developments in Russia, see, among others, Raeff, M 1966, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility*, New York; Black, JL 1979, *Citizens for the Fatherland: Education, Educators and Pedagogical Ideals in Eighteenth Century Russia*, Boulder; McClelland, JC 1979, *Autocrats and Academics: Education*,

Culture, and Society in Tsarist Russia, Chicago; Cracraft, J 2003, *The Revolution of Peter the Great*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

⁷ See, for example, Meehan-Waters, B 1982, *Autocrats and Servitors: The Russian Service Elite of 1730*, New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University Press.

⁸ Faizova, IV 1999, “*Manifest o vol’nosti” i sluzhbe dvoryanstva v 18 stoletii*. M., pp. 51-54.

⁹ Petrukhintsev, NN 2007, “Stanovlenie Kadetskogo korpusa pri Anne Ioannovne. 1731 – 1740”, *Pervyi Kadetskii Korpus vo dvortse Menshikova. Materialy konferentsii*, SPb., pp. 132 – 144; Fedyukin, II 2009, *Learning To Be Nobles: The Elite and Education in post-Petrine Russia*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill; Fedyukin, II & Lavrinovich, MB (in print), *Sukhoputnyi Kadetskii korpus v Sankt-Peterburge (1730-e gody) i ego berlinskii proobraz*.

¹⁰ On the vents of the crisis, see: Kurukin, IV & Plotnikov, AB 2010, *9 ianvaria - 25 fevralia 1730 goda: Sobytiia, liudi, dokumenty*, Moscow, Kvadriga.

¹¹ Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii Povelieniem gosudaria imperatora Nikolaia Pavlovicha sostavlennoe: sobranie pervoe s 1649 po 12 dekabria 1825 goda. Sanktpeterburg: Pechatano v Tipografii II Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830 (hereafter PSZ I). 5811, 5881.

¹² PSZ I. 5811.

¹³ PSZ I. 5894.

¹⁴ PSZ I. 6050; RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1632, ll. 26-37. In practice, however, the distinction between the two was soon forgotten, and the term “Knightly Academy” fell out of use.

¹⁵ A native of Oldenburg, von Münnich spent nearly twenty years in the armies of France, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel, and Poland, before finally joining the Russian service in 1721 as a military engineer. By 1730 he was the governor of St Petersburg and the head of artillery. In the 1730s he became field-marshal, count, and the head of the Military College. For (outdated) biographies, see Vischer, M 1938, *Munnich: ingénieur, feldherr, hochverräter*. Frankfurt a.M.; Ley, F 1959, *Le Marechal de Munnich et la Russie au XVIIIe siècle*. Paris. See also Khmyrov, MD 1848, “Fel'dtsekhmeisterstvo grafa Minikha”, *Zapiski grafa Minikha*, ed. Shubinskii, SN, St Petersburg, pp. 217-387. For a review of the historiography, see Berg, B 2001, *Burchard Christoph von Münnich: die Beurteilung, Darstellung und Erforschung seines Wirkens in Russland in der deutschen und russischen Historiographie; der Versuch einer Perspektivenuntersuchung an Hand von Beispielen*, Oldenburg.

¹⁶ See, for example, RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 8011. Mentioned, among others, are officers of the French, Danish, Prussian, and Hesse-Cassel armies. While some of the officers were hired on the “international market,” or were transferred from other units of the Russian army (which they had previously joined for a variety of reasons), at least a few were obtained directly from the King of Prussia in exchange for recruits for his famous “tall grenadiers.” See also Fedyukin, II & Lavrinovich, MB *Sukhoputnyi Kadetskii korpus*.

¹⁷ Luzanov, PF 1907, *Sukhoputnyi Shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus: Istoricheskii ocherk*, Vyp. 1, St. Petesburg, Appendix 6.

¹⁸ PSZ I. 5881.

¹⁹ Berk, KR 1997, “Putevyie zametki o Rossii”, Bespiatykh, IuN (ed.), *Peterburg Anny Ioannovny v inostrannykh opisaniakh*. St. Petersburg, p. 227.

²⁰ Cook, J “Puteshestviia i stranstviia po Rossiiskoi imperii”, Bespiatykh, IuN (ed.), *Peterburg Anny Ioannovny*, pp. 407-408.

²¹ Luzanov, PF *Sukhoputnyi Shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus*, pp. 58-59.

²² Ibid.

²³ RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2343, passim.

²⁴ Ibid. Appendix 6.

²⁵ PSZ I. 5881. RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1679, ll. 175-177, 180-189.

²⁶ PSZ I. 7369.

²⁷ RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1737, l. 10-11.

²⁸ PSZ I. 6050.

²⁹ *Materialy dlia istorii imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk*, Vol. 3 (1736-1738), St. Petersburg, 1886, pp. 451-456. Not only cadets were to be disciplined and monitored, but the instructors as well. According to a government decree, besides good teachers, there were also “the lazy ones, who have so much forgotten their duty” that they spend their time in the classroom “chatting and in indecent conversations, and do not display any true zeal and diligence in teaching.” An ober-professor was supposed to produce reports on the teachers’ diligence every four month, and absence from classroom without an acceptable excuse was to be punished by a fine. RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1794, l. 96 ob.; d. 1757.

³⁰ PSZ I. 5811.

³¹ Fedyukin, II 2014, “Chest’ k delu um i ohotu razhdaet: Reforma dvorianskoi sluzhby i teoreticheskie osnovy soslovnoi politiki v 1730-kh gg.”, *Gishtorii rossiiskie, ili opyty i podrazhaniia v chest’ A.B. Kamenskogo v ego iubilei*, Sbornik statei, Moscow, Drevlekhranilishche, pp. 83-143.

³² Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents (hereafter RGADA), f. 286, op. 1, dd. 178, 305.

³³ Key among them are: RGADA, f. 281, op.1, dd. 116, 178, 183, 305; RGVIA, f. 314, op 1, dd. 444, 1632, 1678, 1712, 1759, 1835, 1905, 1961, 1987, 2087, 2130, 2197, 2251, 2259, 2334, 2383, 2385, 2426, 2523, 2621, 2729, 2766, 2797, 2845, 2852, 2976, 3082, 3162, 3198, 3247.

³⁴ See, for example, RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 135, l. 28.

³⁵ Scholars note the overall breakdown of the system of registration of young nobles for service in the first half of the 1730s (Romanovich-Slavatinskii, AV 1912, *Dvor’anstvo v Rossii ot nachala XVIII veka do otmeny krepostnogo prava*. Kiev, pp. 79-80), and indeed for 1731-1732 we do not have any personal data on the incoming cadets whatsoever: the register lists their names and age only. The only exception here is the list of the first 24 cadets who signed up for the corps in the fall of August-November 1731.

³⁶ See Bourdieu, P “The Forms of Capital”.

³⁷ Some applicants with deceased fathers owned their estates jointly with their brothers. We treat such cases as functionally equivalent to a family where a father is alive and owns the property (i.e. we do not divide the reported number of serfs by the number of siblings, even when we can). Sometimes applicants report their wealth in “households,” an older way of measuring it. Following Chernikov, we treat one “household” as equal to 3.88 m.s. Chernikov, SV 2003, *Dvoryanskie imeniia Tsentral’no-Chernozemnogo regiona Rossii v pervoi polovine XVIII veka*. Ryazan.

³⁸ RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 2259.

³⁹ Fedyukin, II “Chest’ k delu um i ohotu razhdaet”, p. 123.

⁴⁰ RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 178; RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, d. 1987.

⁴¹ RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 178.

⁴² Mironov, BN 1999, *Sotsial’naia istoriia Rossii perioda imperii (XVIII-nachalo XX veka)*, St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, Vol. 1, pp. 82-97.

⁴³ Smirnov, IuN 1989, “Osobennosti sotsial’nogo sostava i komplektovaniia russkoi gvardii v pervoi polovine XVIII veka”, *Klasy i sosloviia Rossii v period absol’utizma*, Kuibyshev, pp. 103-105; RGADA, f. 286, op. 1, d. 305; RGVIA, f. 314, op. 1, dd. 2130, 2197, 2251, 2259, 2283, 2223, 2621, 2729, 2845, 2976, 3199.

⁴⁴ In other words, $per57_$ is defined as a binary variable, equal to 0 when $graduation_year < 57$, and to 1 when $graduation_year \geq 57$.

⁴⁵ Here, for example, $i_wl_per57_ = wealth_log \cdot per57_$.

⁴⁶ Viskovatov, AV 1832, *Kratkaia istoriia Pervogo kadetskogo korpusa*, St Petersburg, pp. 76-77, 80-81. On some of these experts, see: Fedyukin, II & Lavrinovich, MB *Sukhoputnyi Kadetskii korpus*; Ageeva, OG 2007, “Khristian Vilgelm Minikh – ober-gofmeister russkogo dvora. K biografii vtorogo direktora Kadetskogo korpusa”, *Pervyi kadetskii korpus vo dvortse Men'shikova: k 275-letiiu osnovaniia*, Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii, Trudy Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha, Vol. XXXVII, St Petersburg, pp. 14-20; Dolgova, SR 2007, “Boris Grogor’evich Iusupov – reformator Sukhoputnogo kadetskogo korpusa”, *Pervyi*

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