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**THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY AND ITS INTERPRETATION IN
WITTGENSTEINIANISM: THE SWANSEA SCHOOL**

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INTRODUCTION

The topical value of the research is represented by three main factors:

Firstly, even though many prominent philosophers of the XX–XXI centuries criticized traditional views on the nature of philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein could be named as the most radical challenger. Many of his dramatic remarks are widely known, e.g.: “Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless” (TLP, § 4.003); “the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to” (PI, § 133), “What is your aim in philosophy? – To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (PI, § 309), etc. Questions about the conception that lies behind such remarks caused many discussions and until today retains its value for philosophers.

Secondly, Wittgenstein’s ideas have given rise to a wide range of conflicting interpretations. Even between his most devoted followers, there are deep controversies. In the case of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, the most striking controversy concerns the question of the aim of Wittgenstein’s so-called “new method” (a philosophical technique he introduced at the beginning of the 1930’s). Although Wittgenstein is explicit in stating the inapplicability of this method for building theories, he gives only vague explanations of the aim of this method is intended for. It should be emphasized, that that method encapsulates all of Wittgenstein’s late thinking on the nature of philosophy¹, and depending on its aim there could be crucial variations in understanding Wittgenstein’s late metaphilosophy (and, as a result, the whole of his thought). Within Wittgensteinian philosophy this goal has the following interpretations:

¹ In more detail the ground for interchangeable use of terms “the nature of philosophy” and “the idea of right philosophical method” in accordance to the ideas of Wittgenstein and his followers will be discussed in § 2.1.

a) conceptual clarification (see § 2.3.1.), philosophical therapy (see § 2.3.2.), philosophical study of the forms of life (see § 2.3.3.).

Thirdly. In my view, the Swansea School's, or Swansea Wittgensteinians' (R. Rhees, P. Winch, D.Z. Phillips, I. Dilman, and others) interpretation helps to reduce the radicalism of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical ideas. Indeed, the Swansea School treats the aim of philosophy as concerned with the nature of reality and understands philosophical problems as problems of the possibility of discourse and intelligibility of language. This point of view enables us not to dismiss the traditional philosophical teachings as a series of conceptual confusions, but to re-examine their content in the light of Wittgenstein's ideas.

Those factors pose several topical questions. What exactly does attract numerous followers of Wittgenstein in his views on the nature of philosophy? Are all Wittgenstein's followers should be considered Wittgensteinians or we should be aware of some pitfalls here? Are there grounds for coining out the term "Wittgensteinianism" and is there something like a philosophical movement of Wittgensteinians? What interpretations of the new method should we take into account? What are the strengths and weaknesses of those interpretations? What allowed the Swansea School to deviate from radical revisionism about traditional philosophy? How conclusive are their ideas?

The extent of prior research into Wittgensteinianism and its discussions on the nature of philosophy is not significant. Nevertheless, several related issues are considered in detail and provide a sufficient background for the present research.

Thus, there are many significant studies of Wittgenstein's method. In particular, *The New Wittgenstein* (2000)¹. This collection of essays criticized the so-called "standard interpretation" (i.e., the view that there are different philosophical methods in early and in later Wittgenstein's philosophy and that each of those methods is based on a distinct theory of meaning). On the contrary, New Wittgensteinians claim that Wittgenstein had only one method, which wasn't based on any theory. Moreover, in their view, this method is meant to reveal the confusion of attempts to theorize in philosophy. The contrapose of these interpretations polarized the Wittgensteinian community and brought many prominent philosophers into the discussion². The fact that the novel works on Wittgenstein's method still mention the New Wittgenstein debate shows its enduring importance.

Although *The New Wittgenstein* discusses both early and late Wittgenstein's ideas its focus is primarily on the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. As a result, later metaphilosophical ideas were discussed by it in less detail. This gap has been filled by two collections of essays. The first one is *Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations* (2004)³. Among the participants of this work there are both proponents of standard (P.M.S. Hacker, H.-J. Glock, and others) and "new" (C. Dimond, S. Mulhall and others) interpretations. The second collection is *Wittgenstein and Scepticism*⁴ (2004), which distances itself from the New Wittgenstein debate. In this book C. Wright, J. Conant, I. Dilman, S. Cavell, and

¹ *The New Wittgenstein* / Ed. by A. Crary, R. Read. London: Routledge, 2000; Обзор дискуссии см.: Bronzo S. The Resolute Reading and Its Critics. An Introduction to the Literature // *Wittgenstein-Studien*. 2012. Vol. 3. No. 1. P. 45–80.

² See, e.g.: Proops I. The New Wittgenstein: A Critique // *European Journal of Philosophy*. 2001. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 375–404; Mounce H.O. Critical notice of *The New Wittgenstein* // *Philosophical Investigations*. 2001. Vol. 24. No. 2. P. 185–192; Hacker P.M.S. Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New American Wittgensteinians // *The Philosophical Quarterly*. 2003. Vol. 53. No. 210. P. 1–23; *Beyond the Tractatus Wars: The New Wittgenstein Debate* / Ed. by R. Read, M.A. Lavery. New York: Routledge. 2011.

³ *Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations* / Ed. by E. Ammereller, E. Fischer. London: Routledge, 2004.

⁴ *Wittgenstein and Scepticism* / Ed. by D. McManus. London: Routledge, 2004.

others discuss Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy within the context of his views on skepticism.

Echoes of the New Wittgenstein debate could also be found in other works, relevant to the current research. For instance, the profound critique of the standard interpretation in the context of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein is presented in the posthumous collection of G. Baker's articles *Wittgenstein's Method. Neglected Aspects*¹ (2004). Critique of both the standard and the new interpretations are featured in P. Horwich's *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*² (2011). Horwich shows that also it is true, that throughout his life Wittgenstein had only one philosophical method, this method is not ineffable and could be formulated clearly. Another critique of standard interpretation was proposed by S. Mulhall in his book *The Great Riddle: Wittgenstein and Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy*³, where he shows that the claim that religious language is nonsensical doesn't mean that those utterances are devoid of their importance to philosophy. A view hostile to both the standard and new interpretations is discussed in O. Kuusela's book *Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy*⁴ (2019), in which it is maintained the view that Wittgenstein's only method is logical clarification based on G. Frege's and B. Russell's ideas.

Besides the works on Wittgenstein's method the background for the current research is provided by studies on the process of interpretation of his ideas. Such works could be divided into the following three groups:

¹ *Baker G.P.* Wittgenstein's Method. Neglected Aspects / Ed. by K. Morris. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.

² *Horwich P.* Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

³ *Mulhall S.* The Great Riddle: Wittgenstein and Nonsense, Theology and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

⁴ *Kuusela O.* Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

a) Works analyzing the views of Wittgenstein's followers. Among those are S. Mulhall's *Stanley Cavell: Philosophy's Recounting of the Ordinary*¹ (1994), R. Wiseman's *Guidebook to Anscombe's Intention*² (2016) and following collections of essays – *Philosophy and Life: Essays on John Wisdom*³ (1984), *The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright*⁴ (1989), *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker*⁵ (2007), *Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond*⁶ (2007), *Friedrich Waismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy*⁷ (2019), etc. Though those works don't discuss Wittgensteinian metaphilosophy, they reveal several significant nuances.

b) Works on the reception of Wittgenstein's ideas and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. Perhaps, the earliest such work is an essay by G.H. von Wright⁸ "Analytic Philosophy: A Historico-Analytic Survey". This essay inspires P.M.S. Hacker to write his influential book *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*⁹ (1996), which is the main source on this topic up to date. Hacker's work examines Wittgenstein's influence on the analytic tradition, it lists his followers, analyzes prominent interpretations, locates centers of Wittgensteinian thought and discusses the history of their

¹ Mulhall S. *Stanley Cavell: Philosophy's Recounting of the Ordinary*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

² Wiseman R. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Anscombe's Intention*. London: Routledge, 2016.

³ *Philosophy and Life: Essays on John Wisdom* / Ed. by I. Dilman. Boston: Maninus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984.

⁴ *The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright* / Ed. by P.A. Schilpp, L.E. Hahn. La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1989.

⁵ *Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker* / Ed. by G. Kahane, E. Kanterian, O. Kuusela. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.

⁶ *Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond* / Ed. by A. Crary. London: MIT Press, 2007.

⁷ *Friedrich Waismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy* / Ed. by D. Makovec, S. Shapiro. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2019.

⁸ Wright, von G. H. *Analytic Philosophy: a Historicocritical Survey*. In Wright, von G. H. *The Tree of Knowledge and Other Essays*. N. Y.: E. J. Brill, 1993. P. 25—52.

⁹ Hacker P.M.S. *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

emergence. The book by A. Biletzki (*Over) Interpreting Wittgenstein*¹ (2003) emphasizes differences between interpretations and asks about the rationale that lies behind the attention that Wittgenstein's philosophy achieved. Of a little less relevance is *Wittgenstein after His Nachlass*² (2010), which discusses the significance of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* for the interpretation of his ideas, and C. Erbacher's small book *Wittgenstein's Heirs and Editors*³ (2020), which examines the process of edition of Wittgenstein's books by his literary heirs: G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright and R. Rhees.

c) Biographical treatises of Wittgenstein⁴, his correspondence,⁵ and the memories of his contemporaries⁶. Those works are instructive in pointing out the content of Wittgenstein's lectures in Cambridge and their attendees. It should be mentioned that those lectures were the main platform for Wittgenstein to promote his views on the nature of philosophy.

Also for this research are relevant issues discussed in works on the Swansea School. Those are a collection of essays *Sense and Reality: Essays out of Swansea*⁷ and a special issue of the journal *Philosophical Investigations*⁸. Those works provide an overview of the main ideas of the Swansea School's members. However, the evolution of those ideas and the issue of unity have haven't been considered by those philosophers as a special issue yet.

¹ Biletzki A. (*Over) Interpreting Wittgenstein*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

² *Wittgenstein after His Nachlass* / Ed. by N. Venturinha. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

³ Erbacher C. *Wittgenstein's Heirs and Editors*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

⁴ Kanterian, E. *Wittgenstein*. London: Reaktion Books, 2007; Monk, R. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.

⁵ *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911 1951* / Ed. by B. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.

⁶ *Portraits of Wittgenstein: in 4 vols*. Vol. 2–3 / Ed. by F.A. Flowers. Thoemmes Press, 1999.

⁷ *Sense and Reality: Essays out of Swansea* / Ed. by J. Edelman. Frankfurt: Ontos, 2009.

⁸ *Philosophical Investigations*. 2012. Vol. 35. No. 3–4.

As a distinct class of works that serves as a background for the current research should be mentioned works in the Russian language. Thus, one of the first attempts to examine Wittgensteinianism as a special phenomenon was made by A.F. Gryaznov in his book *Language and Activity. Critical Analysis of Wittgensteinianism*¹ (1989). An important development in that area was made by V.A. Ladov in his *The Illusion of Meaning: Rule Following Problem in Analytic Philosophy*² (2008), in which he discusses the Rule Following debate and its evolution. In his work, Ladov juxtaposes several Wittgensteinian views on the nature of meaning and shows that there is a dialogue between interpretations what is of crucial importance for the present research. Wittgensteinian though in the context of philosophy of religion³ has been discussed in a series of papers by A.Yu. Rakhmanin. Some of those are devoted to the Swansea School⁴. Particular Wittgensteinian philosophers are analyzed in papers of M.S. Kozlova⁵,

¹ Gryaznov, A.F. *Yazyk i deyatel'nost': kriticheskiy analiz vitgenshteynians'tva* [Language and activity: a critical analysis of Wittgensteinism]. Moscow, 1989.

² Ladov, V.A. *Illyuziya znacheniya: problema sledovaniya pravilu v analiticheskoi filosofii* [The Illusion of Meaning: Rule Following Problem in Analytic Philosophy]. Tomsk, 2008.

³ See: Rakhmanin, A.Yu. Logika i religija v filosofii jazyka Dzhona Uizdoma [Logic and Religion In John Wisdom's Philosophy Of Language]. In: *Review RCHA*. 2019. Vol. 20. No. 4. P. 33–46; Rakhmanin, A.Yu. Norman Malkol'm ob ontologicheskom argumente: filosofskij analiz, obydenyj jazyk i zdravij smysl [Norman Malcolm on the Ontological Argument: Ordinary Language, Common Sense, And Philosophical Analysis]. In *Epistemology & Philosophy of Science*. 2018. Vol. 55. No. 4, P. 114–128, etc.

⁴ See: Rakhmanin, A.Yu. "Religija" v filosofii obydenogo jazyka: neskol'ko nabljudenij ["Religion" in Ordinary Language Philosophy: a few observations]. In *Review RCHA*. 2018. Vol. 19. No. 4. P. 26–36; Rakhmanin, A.Yu. "Grammatika" ponimanija, "Grammatika" racional'nosti: P. Uinch i A. Makintajr ob antropologii Je. Jevans-Pritcharda ["Grammar" of Understanding, "Grammar" of Rationality: Peter Winch and Alasdair MacIntyre on Evans-Pritchard's Anthropology]. In *Researches in Religious Studies*. 2018. Vol. 2. No. 18. P. 112–137.

⁵ Kozlova, M.S. Dzhon Uizdom. Konceptcija filosofskih paradoksov [John Wisdom: the conception of philosophical paradoxes]. In *History of Philosophy*. 1997. No 1. P. 111–120.

V.V. Ogleznev and V.A. Surovtsev¹, K.A. Rodin², O.V. Artemieva³, A.S. Mishura⁴ and others. Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy is analyzed in the works of M.S. Kozlova⁵, A.F. Gryaznov⁶, Z.A. Sokuler⁷, V.A. Surovtsev⁸, S.V. Danko⁹, K.A. Rodin¹⁰. Those works provide a qualified analysis of Wittgenstein's ideas and terminology. Instructive guidelines through Russian literature on Wittgenstein are proposed by S.V. Nikonenko in his *Wittgenstein and Linguistic Philosophy in the Context of Russian Thought*¹¹ (2018).

¹ Ogleznev, V.V., Surovtsev, V.A. Fridrih Vajsman o mnogourovnevoj strukture jazyka i problemah redukcionizma [Friedrich Waismann on the Many-Level-Structure of Language and Problems of Reductionism] // In *Epistemology & Philosophy of Science*. 2018. Vol. 55. No. 4. P. 206–218

² Rodin, K.A. Problema sledovanija pravilu i mesto L. Vitgenshtejna v sociologicheskikh issledovanijah: vozvrashhenie k Piteru Uinchu [The Rule-Following Problem and Wittgenstein's Place in Sociology Studies: A Return to Peter Winch]. In *Epistemology & Philosophy of Science*. 2020. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 23–33.

³ Artemieva, O.V. U istokov sovremennoj jetiki dobrodeteli [The Origin of Modern Virtue Ethics]. In *Ethical Thought*. 2010. No. 6. P. 167–184.

⁴ Mishura, A.S. Ponyatie namereniya v filosofii deystviya Elizabet Enskom [The Concept of Intention in Anscombe's Philosophy of Action]. In *The Russian Sociological Review*. Vol. 17. No. 2. P. 87–114.

⁵ Kozlova, M.S. *Filosofija i iazyk* [Philosophy and Language]. Moscow, 1972, P. 200–237, etc.

⁶ Gryaznov, A. F. *Jevoljucija filocofckix vzgljadov L. Vitgenshtejna* [The Evolution of the Philosophical Views of L. Wittgenstein]. Moscow, 1985. P. 96–102.

⁷ Sokuler, Z.A. *Ljudvig Vitgenshtejn i ego mesto v filosofii XX veka* [Ludwig Wittgenstein and his place in the philosophy of the XX century]. Dolgoprudny, 1994. P. 101–120, 135–146.

⁸ Surovtsev, V.A. "Vazhnaja bessmyslica": F.P. Ramsej i prakticheskaja filosofija L. Vitgenshtejna ["Important Nonsense": F.P. Ramsey and L. Wittgenstein's Practical Philosophy]. In *Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science*. 2016. No. 2. P. 310–324.

⁹ Danko, S.V. Otmenil li Vitgenshtejn filosofiju? (Labirint nenapisannoj chasti Logiko-filosofskogo traktata) [Did Wittgenstein cancell philosophy? (The labyrinth of Logico-Philosophical Tractatus's non written part)]. In *Vox. Philosophical Journal*. 2013. No. 15. P. 1-38.

¹⁰ Rodin, K.A. Ustrojstvo filosofskoj golovolomki po Vitgenshtejnu (kembridzhskie lekicii po osnovanijam matematiki) [The structure of the philosophical puzzle (Wittgenstein's lectures on the foundations of mathematics)]. In *Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science*. 2017. № 40. C. 200-205.

¹¹ Nikonenko, S.V. *Vitgenshtejn i lingvisticheskaja filosofija v kontekste otechestvennoj mysli* [Wittgenstein and Linguistic Philosophy in the Context of Russian Thought]. Saint-Petersburg, 2018.

The object and subject of the research

The object of the present research is the process of interpretation of Wittgenstein's thoughts by his followers.

The subject of the research is the metaphilosophy of the Swansea School and other proponents of the so-called "Orthodox Wittgensteinianism" (i.e., several Wittgenstein's followers, who sets the main directions for the reception of his ideas).

Aim and objectives of the research

The present research aims to survey and analyze Swansea School's views on the nature of philosophy in the context of Orthodox Wittgensteinianism.

The objectives of the research:

1. To identify Wittgensteinianism as a philosophical movement, what implies an overview of its history, its main proponents, its geography, etc.
2. To frame the terms "Orthodox" and "Non-orthodox" Wittgensteinianisms, and to outline the circle of orthodox Wittgensteinian philosophers.
3. To explicate the ideas that are shaping later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy.
4. To reveal and identify a) types of orthodox interpretations of later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, b) features specific to those types, and c) essential discrepancies between them.
5. To examine the Swansea School's interpretation of philosophy as a study of the form of life, what implies a) a survey of the evolution of this view in inquiries of School's members, b) an explication of similarity and continuity in their understandings of this view, c) a demonstration of the distinctive features of this view.

6. To evaluate the consistency and significance of Swansea School's views on the nature of philosophy.

Methodology of the research

My realization of those objectives is based on various methods. I use historical analysis to pursue the broadest aims. Analysis of forms and directions that the interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas took allows me to identify Wittgensteinianism as a philosophical movement. Examination of the development of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy by Orthodox Wittgensteinians allows me to reveal three basic types of interpretations and to identify differences between them. Historical representation of the development of the metaphilosophical views of Swansea School allows me to evaluate the consistency and significance of those views.

In solving more precise issues I use supplementary methods. To clarify the "Wittgensteinianism" and the conceptual framework of this movement I use conceptual analysis. I use comparative analysis a) in distinguishing Wittgensteinianism from the movements close to it, and b) in juxtaposing views within Wittgensteinian metaphilosophy. I use analytical reconstruction in formulating major lines of interpretations of Wittgenstein's new method, and also in describing the answer Swansea School gives to the question "What is philosophy?".

The scientific novelty of the research

The present work is one of the first studies on Wittgensteinian metaphilosophy. As already mentioned, metaphilosophy in Wittgensteinianism was not previously considered. The scientific novelty of the current research can be summarized in the following points:

a) Although Wittgensteinianism sometimes is referred to as a philosophical movement, its scope and limits, in fact, until now have not been the special

subject of examination. In recent work, we try to establish those scope and limits, as well as to identify the main features of this movement.

b) Our research attempts to consider debates about Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy not as concerning the authenticity of interpretations, but as a self-contained subject for investigation into the nature of philosophy.

c) The present research is the first survey of the genesis of the Wittgensteinianism in Russian language and for the first time in Russian philosophy proposes a general examination of Wittgensteinian metaphilosophy and, in particular, views of the Swansea School.

d) Many of the sources used in this work have not yet been translated into Russian, and the current work introduces them to the Russian philosophical society.

Theses to be defended

1. Wittgensteinianism can be described as a philosophical movement the representatives of which support not just any Wittgenstein's views, but above all his views on the nature of philosophy.

2. The works of Wittgenstein's followers, interpreting the nature of philosophy, should be evaluated not only as interpretations of the thinker's ideas but also as original teachings that made a considerable contribution to the problem of the nature of philosophy.

3. A crucial difference between the orthodox and non-orthodox forms of Wittgensteinianism is the ability of the former to preserve and creatively develop the anti-dogmatic motive of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy.

4. Numerous discrepancies within the Orthodox Wittgensteinianism are largely caused by the ambiguity of Wittgenstein's philosophical style and his unceasing reflection on the nature of philosophy. Consequently, there could be identified not one but three dominant patterns of thought: a) the conceptual clarification of language; b) philosophical therapy; c) the study of life forms. Those patterns were reflected in correlative ways of interpretation. Thus, such authors as P.M.S. Hacker, N. Malcolm, F. Waismann, and G.H. von Wright in Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical thought accentuate an aim to make a conceptual clarification. Such authors as G. Baker, J. Wisdom, and M. Lazerowitz stress a therapy of philosophical utterances and the idea of curing a disease. Such authors as S. Cavel, C. Diamond, J. Conant, and the Swansea school put weight on an only sketched conception of a study of life forms.

5. Within the Orthodox Wittgensteinianism R. Rhees, P. Winch, D.Z. Phillips and I. Dilman propose the least radical and dogmatic understanding of the nature of philosophy by a) refusing from the idea that philosophical problems are deprived of meaning and by reading those as questions about the possibility of discourse and the intelligibility of language, and b) identifying the main task of philosophy as giving an account of the nature of reality.

6. Those common features legitimize characterizing the Swansea Wittgensteinians as a philosophical school.

7. The Swansea School proposes the most consistent Wittgensteinian view on the value of traditional philosophy and its problem-oriented approach, as well as the need to rethink it in the light of the criticism put forward by Wittgenstein.

The theoretical and practical relevance of the research is due to the novelty of the research and the importance of its results. Both those results and the proposed approaches can be used in further historical and philosophical inquiries of the

analytic tradition. The material presented in the dissertation is also relevant for metaphilosophical research. In addition, the results of the dissertation can be used in lectures and seminars on analytical philosophy, writing manuals, and syllabuses on this topic.

MAIN CONTENTS OF THE WORK

The introduction substantiates the relevance of the topic of the research and discusses the extent of prior investigations. The object, subject, purpose, and objectives of the research are described. Also, it reveals the methodology, scientific novelty, and theoretical and practical significance of the research.

The first chapter (“Wittgensteinianism as a Phenomenon”) is devoted to the discussion of Wittgensteinianism: its characteristics is introduced, its history is overviewed, its leading representatives are listed, and its forms are outlined. It is shown that despite seeming clarity, the terms “Wittgensteinians” and “Wittgensteinianism” are vague and pose difficulties in interpretation. For example, it is not clear what specific circle of philosophers is covered by the term “Wittgensteinians”, whether those philosophers form a movement, and if they do, how and to what extent this movement is institutionalized. A preliminary survey of the centers of the Wittgensteinian philosophy, of the internal structure of Wittgensteinianism and its genesis is proposed. This serves us as a preparatory stage, necessary for further examination of the Wittgensteinian metaphilosophy in the following chapters.

Section 1.1. (“The History of the Term *Wittgensteinians*”) analyses the use of the term “Wittgensteinians” in the scientific literature. Four uses are identified:

a) “Pupils of Wittgenstein”. Since in his later period Wittgenstein didn’t publish his works or participate in conferences, the attendees of his Cambridge lectures (1930–1947) were the only people acquainted with his ideas and, what is more important for the present research, with his philosophical method. When those attendees started to use his method and mentioned Wittgenstein as its creator it gave rise to such identification as “pupils”, or “Wittgensteinians”, and “Wittgensteinian philosophical technique”. According to that, until the mid-1950s the term “Wittgensteinians” has been used as referring to direct apprenticeship with the philosopher.

b) “Supporters of Wittgenstein's philosophy”. After the publication of *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953, the ideas of Wittgenstein attracted many admirers, as well as opponents. Both used the term “Wittgensteinians”. If the term “Wittgensteinians” was used previously to identify only those who personally learned from Wittgenstein, now this has become unnecessary. The term started to indicate certain philosophical ideas. Thus, E. Gellner ascribed to Wittgensteinians a desire to reduce philosophy to the consideration of everyday uses. M. Dummett argued that Wittgensteinians had a common theory of meaning. J. Wisdom pointed out that the Wittgensteinians were rejecting attempts to solve a philosophical problem or build a philosophical theory.

c) “Wittgenstein scholars”. Since the late 1960s, Wittgenstein’s philosophy became the subject of numerous exegetical inquiries. Although this exegetical direction of research is known as “Wittgenstein studies”, its representatives are also sometimes identified as Wittgensteinians. Despite the apparent incorrectness of such use of the term, the very possibility of Wittgenstein's studies as a purely exegetical work on Wittgenstein was called into question by the fact that since the 1960s consensus on any significant point of interpretation had not been reached.

d) “Members of the Wittgenstein societies”. Today, several societies are aimed at study and popularization of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. For example, “The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society”, “British Wittgenstein Society”, etc. Although membership in those societies gives rather questionable grounds for identifying associates of those societies as “Wittgensteinians”, this usage should be mentioned. Given that in recent decades these societies have achieved impressive success in popularizing the ideas of the thinker, this use could not be ignored.

Those meanings of the term “Wittgensteinians” show that there is a tendency to increase the number of circulating uses and, hence, the growing vagueness of the term. Thus, the revealed meanings can intersect and create new uses, for example, “supporters who were pupils” or “scholars who do not only interpret Wittgenstein’s ideas but also support those ideas”. The course of the recent research makes it necessary to define the meaning of this term more univocally.

Section 1.2. (“Wittgensteinianism as a Philosophical Movement”) provides an identification of Wittgensteinianism, and outlines Wittgensteinian philosophers. It is proposed to define the term Wittgensteinians as referring to those Wittgenstein's followers who are loyal to his views on the nature of philosophy. Consequentially, it is proposed to define Wittgensteinianism as a philosophical movement, based on the belief in the special historical and philosophical value of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. The efforts made in this direction are of significance, given Wittgenstein's influence on the analytic tradition, and his critique of its scientism, philosophical theorizing, and academic neutrality.

Section 1.3. (“On Distinguishing Wittgensteinianism and Close Movements”) delineates the boundaries between Wittgensteinianism and such related to it groups as the Vienna Circle and the Ordinary language philosophy.

Section 1.3.1. (“The Vienna Circle”) applies the loyalty principle to separate the Vienna Circle from Wittgensteinianism. It is shown that among the Vienna Circle’s members, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy was shared only by M. Schlick and F. Waismann and that others, for example, G. Hahn, R. Carnap, and O. Neurath criticized it.

Section 1.3.2. (“The Ordinary Language Philosophy”) discusses critical arguments of G. Ryle, J. Austin, P. Strawson, and other Ordinary language philosophers against Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. Although this does not deny the enormous influence of Wittgenstein on those philosophers in many other aspects, the presentation of this

criticism allows us to reject the assumption that this group belongs to Wittgensteinianism.

Section 1.4. (“Genesis of Wittgensteinianism”) gives an overview of the development of Wittgensteinianism and outlines its main centers and representatives. It is proposed that Wittgensteinianism took two main forms. The first one is “Orthodox Wittgensteinianism”, the one that is of chief interest for the present research. It is its representatives who by the creative comprehension of Wittgenstein's views and succeeding in preserving the dominant anti-dogmatic motive of his philosophy determined the main directions of the interpretation. The second form is “Non-orthodox Wittgensteinianism”, representatives of which focused mainly on the popularization of Wittgenstein’s ideas. It should be noted that “non-orthodox” does not mean here a rejection of the steadfast adherence to the ideas of Wittgenstein. Many of these authors strictly follow philosopher’s teachings. However, their works have little impact on the development of the Wittgensteinian movement and mostly clarify certain nuances of the already established lines of interpretation.

Section 1.4.1. (“The Orthodox Wittgensteinianism (I)”) examines the birth of Wittgensteinianism at the Cambridge University. It surveys Wittgenstein’s lectures, which he read there from 1930 to 1947. It is suggested that the dialogical style of Wittgenstein’s lectures contributed to the transfer of his method of philosophizing to his students. It also mentions J. Wisdom as the main proponent of Cambridge Wittgensteinianism.

Section 1.4.2. (“The Orthodox Wittgensteinianism (II)”) discuss the development of Wittgensteinianism at Oxford University, Swansea University, the University of Helsinki, the University of Melbourne, Cornell University, Smith College, and also at Harvard University. It is emphasized that Swansea University stands out by conducting a regular seminar, which imitates the intellectual atmosphere of Wittgenstein’s lectures in Cambridge. It is argued that the spirit of this seminar

influenced the interpretation of Wittgenstein's method by the Swansea Wittgensteinians.

Section 1.4.3. (“The Non-orthodox Wittgensteinianism”) overviews a tendency in the Non-orthodox Wittgensteinianism to isolate itself from the actual issues of the analytical philosophy and concentrate on exegetical concerns. Given the fact that in recent years the non-orthodox form of Wittgensteinianism has started to prevail over the orthodox form it is concluded that a transition of Wittgensteinianism to a new stage of development is occurring. This stage is distinguished by several negative features, such as isolationism, specialization of discussing aspects, and decrease in the level of the originality of new ideas. Section surveys several views claiming that there is stagnation in the development of the movement.

At the end of the First chapter, it is concluded that although the terms “Wittgensteinians” and “Wittgensteinianism” have a vague meaning, it is possible, under some specification, to consider them as referring to a philosophical movement loyal to the principles of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. It is also concluded that in the context of the study of the Swansea School, it is necessary to limit the consideration of Wittgensteinianism to its “orthodox” form.

The second chapter (“The Nature of Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Orthodox Wittgensteinianism”) discusses Wittgenstein's late ideas on philosophical method and strategies of their interpretation.

Section 2.1. (“On the Nature and the Method of Philosophy”) argues that for Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians the issues of the method and of the nature of philosophy are posed in synonymous manner. Thus, discussions of the method of philosophy here are concerned not with some particular research technique, but with such general issues as aim, subject and nature of the problems of philosophy. At the

same time, discussions of the nature of philosophy are focused on the prescriptive status of the question “how to do philosophy?”.

Section 2.2. (“The Problem of the Nature of Philosophy in Wittgenstein: a New Method”) examines the later methodological views of Wittgenstein presented in *Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33*, *The Blue Book*, the first part of *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*.

Section 2.2.1. (“Rationale for the Selection of Wittgenstein’s Texts”) discusses relevance and reliability of texts listed above. First, it is pointed out that those works had the greatest influence on Wittgensteinian metaphilosophy. Second, it is argued that despite all these works were subjected to external editing, there is no sufficient evidence of distortion of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy by his editors.

Section 2.2.2. (“Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33”) analyzes one of the first Wittgenstein's descriptions of his so called “new method”. It is emphasized that Wittgenstein evaluated historical significance of this one as extremely high. For instance, he connected it with the birth of “modern philosophy”, at the center of which, in contrast to the “traditional philosophy”, there would be a “skill”, or correct method. According to Wittgenstein, the old ways of philosophizing are no longer relevant, remaining only in the form of well-established, but fruitless ways of thought, which only put obstacles: “... [modern philosophy] required a ‘sort of thinking’ to which we are not accustomed and to which we have not been trained – a sort of thinking very different from what is required in the sciences”¹.

Explaining the content of this new method, Wittgenstein proposes the following precept: “...we had to follow a certain instinct which leads us to ask certain questions, though we don't even understand what these questions mean; that our asking them results from ‘a vague mental uneasiness’, like that which leads children to ask ‘Why?’; and that this uneasiness can only be cured ‘either by showing that a

¹ Moore, G.E. Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33. In: *Mind*. 1955. Vol. 64, No. 253. P. 26.

particular question is not permitted, or by answering it’.”¹ At the same time, although Wittgenstein refused from the possibility of obtaining new knowledge in philosophy and pointed out the need for healing our “intellectual discomfort”, he nevertheless emphasized that only by a “synopsis of *many* trivialities”² this healing could be achieved and compiling of this synopsis “must say a great deal about language”³.

Section 2.2.3. (“The Blue Book”) analyzes the nature of philosophical problems as it is presented in *The Blue Book*. It is shown that according to it the essence of philosophical problems should be described with the term “puzzles”. As Wittgenstein noted, “The very word ‘problem’, one might say, is misapplied when used for our philosophical troubles”⁴.

Reasoning about the nature of philosophical problems, Wittgenstein emphasizes three aspects: a) in the core of a philosophical problem lies some linguistic confusion; b) a philosophical problem wonders us; c) such a problem is capable of causing “mental discomfort” (a sensation Wittgenstein paralleled with insatiable hunger). It is noted that although Wittgenstein continued to direct his method at eliminating confusions, he also began to stress that they cannot be easily swept aside and should be carefully analyzed.

Thus, for example, he argues that it is impossible to save the solipsist from the temptation to say something metaphysical just by “restating the views of common sense”⁵. The solipsist is well aware of these realist’s points. They do not dissolve, but rather exacerbate his uneasiness. The need for a careful attention here is not only due to the special ability of puzzles to tempt us to go beyond the boundaries of common sense, but also due to the painful side, namely “mental cramp”, or “mental discomfort”, which causes genuine suffering.

¹ Ibid. P. 27.

² Ibid. P. 27.

³ Ibid. P. 27.

⁴ Wittgenstein, L. *The Blue and Brown Books*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 1998. P. 46.

⁵ Ibid. P. 59.

Section 2.2.4. (“Philosophical Investigations”) considers the method of the *Philosophical Investigations*. It is noted that in this work Wittgenstein ceases to use the term “puzzles”. It is suggested that this happens because of the shift in Wittgenstein’s concern from the issue of the nature of philosophical problems to the goal of “curing” the painful conditions they bring.

A new direction in Wittgenstein’s development of his method usually is identified with so called “philosophical therapy”. It is in this direction his method became most radical. For example, it is in this context he famously remarks: “...the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question” (PI, § 133).

At the same time, it is shown that Wittgenstein did not completely abandon the aim to clarify philosophical grammar. Such clarification is based on the analysis of the various examples of the use of concepts and is aimed at a more accurate knowledge of those uses. It is important to note that in the context of conceptual clarification, Wittgenstein actually deals with a problem in a way opposite to philosophical therapy: instead of finding a way out of the “fly bottle”, he, on the contrary, suggests that “we should yield” to the temptation to get evolved into philosophical difficulty and then investigate it (PI, § 374).

Thus, in the “Philosophical Investigations” there are proposed two different tasks: a) a therapy, the result of which is the complete elimination of philosophical problems and the cessation of philosophizing; b) the revealing of important truths about language by means of conceptual clarification and, thus, the continuation of philosophizing.

Section 2.2.5. (“On Certainty”) discusses the method of philosophy in *On Certainty*. It is shown that Wittgenstein set before his method a new task – to study forms of life. In this work Wittgenstein examines G.E. Moore’s refutation of the skepticism

and his use of such statements as “I know that this is my hand”. It is noted that Wittgenstein doesn’t criticize the incorrect use of such statements like “I know that ...”, nor he emphasized that they could not free a skeptic from his disquiets. Instead, Wittgenstein applied his method to the study of “truisms of common sense” and their place in our worldview.

Section 2.2.6. (“On Polyphony in Later Wittgenstein's Views on Method”) reveals five general ideas of Wittgenstein’s method: 1) philosophical research is not aimed at generating any meaningful truths; 2) philosophical problems are puzzles by their nature; 3) philosophy is a therapy; 4) conceptual analysis is the only correct technique of philosophy; 5) forms of life can serve as the subject of genuine philosophizing.

It is concluded that the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thought created a kind of polyphony in his writing on metaphilosophy. The pointing out of such polyphony reveals the following suppositions: a) the diversity of interpretations of his method is caused by emphasizing its different aspects; b) juxtaposition of these interpretations gives more complex representation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy than it is in the context of separate consideration.

Section 2.3. (“The Nature of Philosophy in the Orthodox Wittgensteinianism”) reveals three main lines of interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy in the Orthodox Wittgensteinianism.

Section 2.3.1. (“Philosophy as a Conceptual Analysis”) discusses conceptual interpretations of method. It considered the views of P.M.S. Hacker, N. Malcolm, F. Waismann and G.H. von Wright.

The most famous proponent of this interpretation is **P.M.S. Hacker**. He formulates his understanding of the conceptual analysis in the following manner: “The aim of philosophy is the clarification of the forms of sense that, in one way or another, are conceptually puzzling ... The charge of philosophy

... is the extirpation of nonsense. There is, Heaven knows, enough of it, both in philosophy and in the empirical and a priori sciences. The prize is not more knowledge about anything. Rather, it is a proper understanding of the structure and articulations of our conceptual scheme, and the disentangling of conceptual confusions”.

A familiar view is found in philosophy of **N. Malcolm**. However, two differences between him and Hacker are revealed: a) In Malcolm’s view conceptual investigation may not be enough to cure a philosophizer from an erroneous way of reasoning and false analogies, and b) indication of an incorrect use of a concept in a philosophical problem is superfluous, as long the very framework implies it. It is also noted that Malcolm thinks of philosophical confusion in a slightly different way from Hacker, interpreting it not just as a single conceptual error, but as distortion in the way of thought.

According to **F. Waismann** conceptual clarification is not exhausted by the task of extirpating nonsense and could provide “a more profound understanding of language”¹. According to Waismann, the troubles a skeptic has are the result of his unsuccessful attempt to verbally express what skeptic lacks words for. Thus, language is shaped by our everyday experience and is not suitable for describing skeptic’s doubts, because to do this “language would first have to go into the melting-pot”². The right way to respond to the skeptic is to “make him see the build of the concepts and the moulds in which he expresses the question”³, and thereby reject “the channels carved out by numberless repetition of the same modes of expression”⁴. Discussing skeptical doubts, Waismann emphasizes: “These problems are not spurious”⁵.

¹ Waismann, F. *How I See Philosophy*. London: Palgrave, 1968. P. 13.

² *Ibid.* P. 14.

³ *Ibid.* P. 20.

⁴ *Ibid.* P. 18.

⁵ *Ibid.* P. 14.

d) **G.H. von Wright** interprets linguistic confusion as a consequence of a gap in our grammar. In his view the aim of conceptual investigation is to “mould” the meaning of concepts that do not yet have criteria for use, for example, the concept “good”.

The following ideas common to conceptual interpretations are revealed: a) the main task of philosophy is to clarify the language; b) the generating of meaningful truths in philosophy is prohibited, because those truths are linguistic confusions; c) philosophical problems are the result of either the violation of the rules of philosophical grammar, or the lack of established meanings; d) philosophical therapy is another name for the linguistic elimination of confusions, and any parallels with psychoanalysis here are extremely arbitrary; e) the form of life is not so much a subject of philosophy, but rather its premise.

Section 2.3.2. (“Philosophy as Therapy”) discusses the therapeutic line of interpretation. It is concerned with the ideas of G. Baker, J. Wisdom and M. Lazerowitz.

G. Baker argued against the conceptual interpretation that it pays no attention to the personal content of philosophical confusion and especially it ignores the ability of philosophical confusion to cause anxiety. It is thereby emphasized that these confusions take place not only in a linguistic, but also in a psychological realm. The last one is presented by Baker as instructive in search for the right approach to philosophy. Thus, in his view, Wittgenstein’s method is aimed at replacing the implicit images or aspects of meaning that provoke the paradoxes or confusions disturbing a person. Presentation of those images and aspects in a new perspective can neutralize confusions and anxiety.

According to **J. Wisdom** “philosophical statements are somewhat reminiscent of the neurotic’s – one is guided by them, not completely believing them”¹, and “the work of a philosopher resembles, if not reproduces, the work of a psychoanalyst”². Wisdom emphasizes that the statement of the problem should take the form of a narrative and should describe the statement that causes the problem in the most complete way. If this requirement is met, things should “fall into place” and the mystery of the problem goes away.

M. Lazerowitz pays much less attention to personal aspect of the therapy. In his view, its subject matter is a failure of philosophers to soberly assess the nature of their research. In his view, although traditional philosophy is built on a distortion of ordinary language, it is driven by a neurotic obsession with the image of “omnipotent thinker”, i.e., “the Platonic investigator of reality in its ultimate aspects, who by the power of his thought is able to survey ‘all time and all existence’.”³ The irresistible desire to speculate on the ultimate objects blurs the linguistic intuitions of philosophers, which slightly resembles the conflict between Freud’s principles of pleasure and reality. Lazerowitz finds this tendency not only in traditional metaphysics, but also in the analytic tradition, which is more limited in its ambitions. In Lazerowitz’s view, philosophers are prone to ignore the obvious shortcomings of such images for the reason that their real possibilities are much less attractive than illusions they create.

Therapeutic interpretation is based on the following common ideas: a) the main task of philosophy is to rid people from philosophical problems; b) the main source of philosophical problems is human psychology and its specific pathologies; c) the

¹ Kozlova, M.S. Dzhon Uizdom. Konceptija filozofskih paradoksov [John Wisdom: the conception of philosophical paradoxes]. In *History of Philosophy*. 1997. No 1. P. 112.

² Rakhmanin, A.Yu. Logika i religija v filozofii jazyka Dzhona Uizdoma [Logic and Religion In John Wisdom’s Philosophy Of Language]. In: *Review RCHA*. 2019. Vol. 20. No. 4. P. 37.

³ *Lazerowitz M.* The Language of Philosophy: Freud and Wittgenstein. Boston: D. Reidel, 1977. P. 2.

promotion of substantive truths in philosophy is unacceptable, because they stimulate various kinds of intellectual neuroses; d) the procedure of conceptual analysis is not an independent method of research, but an instrument of therapy. It should be noted, however, that “forms of life” do not have significant role within the therapeutic interpretations.

Section 2.3.3. (“A Study of Life Forms”) examines the sociocultural aspect of Wittgenstein's method in the interpretations of the New Wittgensteinians and S. Cavell.

The “**New Wittgensteinians**” point out that Wittgenstein’s rejection of theorizing in philosophy should be interpreted more “resolutely” and should be turned against his own works which intentionally contained several philosophical theories. In their view, it would be incoherent of Wittgenstein to deny the meaningfulness of philosophical theories, and, at the same time, to place theories in the heart of his own teachings. According to New Wittgensteinians, the claim that philosophical theories are meaningless must be understood as pointed also only towards Wittgenstein’s own theories. As it is stated: “...one of Wittgenstein’s main aims throughout his work is getting us to see that the idea of an external standpoint on language is thoroughly confused and that its abandonment is accordingly without consequences for our entitlement to our basic epistemic ideals”¹. The New Wittgensteinians believe that the rudiments of this external standpoint are consciously placed by Wittgenstein in his texts. Thus, in their view, ideas of language games and “family resemblance” are challenging the reader to overcome them. At the same time, the New Wittgensteinians save room for philosophizing on the essence of things “by attention to our everyday forms of expression and to the world those forms of expression serve to reveal”².

¹ *Crary A.* Introduction // *The New Wittgenstein*. P. 4.

² *Ibid.* P. 1.

S. Cavell, who has influenced the New Wittgensteinians, believed that in the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein doesn't try to refute the skeptic and, on the contrary, sees truth in their statements about the absence of any unconditional grounds supporting our picture of the world. Thus, in Cavell's view, skepticism shows to man an important thing about himself. Since there is no objective perspective from which one can justify a picture of the world, the worldview cannot be accurately formulated or verified. This gave the way to Cavell's philosophical romanticism: nothing limits a person in creating his inner world and constantly striving to widen it.

The interpretations proposed by the New Wittgensteinians and S. Cavell have the following common ideas: a) the aim of philosophy is to make changes in the form of life; b) in philosophy, one should not only to refuse theorizing, but also to be aware of theories in one's own thinking; c) the technique of conceptual clarification, built on the theory of meaning, must be refused; d) philosophical therapy is aimed at eliminating not personal anxiety, but doubts about the authenticity of the forms of life; e) philosophical problems are metaphysical distortions of real worries and difficulties that a person faces in everyday life.

Section 2.3.4. ("Does the Riddle Exist?") summarizes our consideration of the Orthodox approaches.

1. Considered interpretations lack a satisfactory explanation of the nature of philosophical problems. Most Wittgensteinians tend to believe that philosophical problems have no rational grounds. Thus, they a) argue that meaningful word usage is limited to ordinary language and philosophy frequently violates its boundaries, and b) show that some philosophical problems are posed by incorrect use of language. At the same time, even assuming that (a) is true, one cannot conclude from (b) that not just few, but all philosophical problems are nonsensical. To do this it is necessary to show

that the violation of grammar is their essential feature, what is hardly conceivable.

2. Philosophy is aimed at a practical result which has a humanistic value. Indeed, even the clarification of language is aimed at clearing human mind.

In the end of the Second chapter the obtained results are summarized. It is claimed that in the later works of Wittgenstein his method is rooted in a several crucial ideas. A hypothesis is made that the differences between orthodox interpretations of Wittgenstein's method arose due to differences in understanding the hierarchy of his ideas on his new method.

The examination of metaphilosophy of the Orthodox Wittgensteinianism revealed three main interpretations. Thus, if it is claimed that the aim of the method is the clarification of language, philosophy becomes a conceptual geography and elimination of conceptual confusions. If it is claimed that the aim of the method is therapy, philosophy becomes an activity of eliminating the neurotic states caused by philosophy. When its aim is defined as the study of forms of life, philosophy becomes the study of life and self-determination of man.

This framework gives following preliminary characteristics of the Swansea School: a) it understands philosophy as the study of forms of life; b) it admits that philosophical problems could have rational grounds; c) it denies ways of philosophizing aimed not only at theoretical, but also at practical results.

The third chapter ("The Swansea School on the Nature of Philosophy") is devoted to the survey and analysis of the Swansea School's metaphilosophy.

Section 3.1.1. ("The Private Language Argument and the 'Community View' of Rush Rhees") examines R. Rhees's views on language. It shows that according to Rhees publicity is an essential feature of language because a) meaning is rooted in the rules of grammar, and b) the rules of grammar cannot exist privately. Thus, there is no reason for a person external to any community to introduce a regular use for a

concept for designating colors, shapes, sensations, species, etc. Rhees considers this differentiation as result of people's need for mutual understanding and, thus, a prerogative of the public language.

Section 3.1.2. (“The Incompleteness of Language Games, the Unity of Language, and Deep Grammar”) examines Rhees’ critique of the concept of language games. Following ideas are emphasized:

- a) Language games alone cannot provide a real communication. In Rhees’s view, the ability to speak is based on more than the ability to form correct sentences. To speak we need also the ability to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate statements, between their successful and unsuccessful usages, between literal and figurative usages, etc. Separate grammars of language games cannot regulate this; they lack a “side vision”.
- b) Language should be considered not as a family of games, but as a whole: “...different language games are not different languages in the sense in which French and English are”, because “it would make no sense to talk of translating from the one language game into the other”¹. In other words, if language games were autonomous, they could not be said to belong to the same language.

Rhees’s view of language is revealed to be similar with the concept of “deep grammar” (according to Wittgenstein, the rules that are responsible for what is only implied by speaker, e.g., hints, irony, etc. (PI, § 664)). This leads us to the conclusion that the unity of language, according to Rhees, is provided by integrating language into the form of life.

Section 3.2. (“Skepticism and Understanding in R. Rhees”) explicates Rhees’s view on the nature of philosophical problems. It shows that his concept of the unity of language implies doubts in the possibility of understanding and, thus, in that the life

¹ Ibid. P. 176.

and its practices have sense. Thus, even when grammar defines the meaning of a word (for example, in the language game 2), the question of the meaningfulness of its use remains open.

It is argued that according to that view genuine philosophical doubts are rooted not in epistemology, but rather in anthropology, the realm that C. Dimond calls “our life with concepts”. The key issue in this consideration is the question of whether we are aware of the meaning of words we use. The doubt that arises here, turns out to be central for philosophy. It allows to interpret Rhees’ idea of growth of understanding as the main aim of philosophy.

Section 3.3. (“P. Winch: Philosophy as Epistemology, Epistemology as a Social Science”) discusses the development of Rhees’s ideas about the unity of language and the growth of understanding by P. Winch. Winch argues that philosophy is an investigation of differences between the kinds of ‘understandings of reality’ and their criteria of the real. Winch distinguishes between two types of that investigation:

- a) The consideration of particular ways of understanding reality (scientific, religious, political, etc.). According to Winch, it is not philosophy's primary subject matter.
- b) However, what is philosophy's primary subject matter, Winch shows rather vaguely.

To explicate (b) it is showed that Winch’s metaphilosophical views are based on philosophical ideas of Rhees and especially on his idea of the unity of language. It is shown also that Winch develops those ideas by emphasizing that some of our everyday concepts and statements are fundamental to our form of life and provide its unity.

It is argued that Winch’s approach has two disadvantages a) such a study is potentially infinite and it is impossible to obtain in it any specific results; b) it blurs the boundaries between philosophy and cultural studies.

Section 3.4. (“The Contemplative Conception of D.Z. Philips”) examines the contemplative conception of D.Z. Philips, emphasizing that philosophy should not be aimed at affecting forms of life.

Section 3.4.1. (“Ethics as a Study of Moral Practices in D.Z. Philips”) explicates an interpretation by Philips of Wittgenstein’s remark “[philosophy] leaves everything as it is” (PI, § 124). On the basis of Phillips’s discussion of metaethics and virtue ethics it shows that, according to Phillips, the presence of conflicting points of view in the form of life is not something that philosophers should overcome. On the contrary, philosophy’s task is to comprehend different views and identify implicit differences. It is concluded that Phillips understands the above statement of Wittgenstein as a maxim that forbids philosophers to affect actual practices and prescribes them to focus on the providing of descriptions.

Section 3.4.2. (“Philosophy is Going Nowhere”) discusses Phillips’s view that it is wrong to use philosophy for achieving any practical results. According to him, those results imply eliminating differences within our form of life and, in fact, lead to a distortion of our account of reality. It is argued that this contemplative conception lacks refusal of methodological pluralism. If it is true that non-contemplative methods of philosophy distort our accounts of reality, it should be claimed, it is wrong to use them.

Section 3.5. (“Realism and a Priori Anthropology of I. Dilman”) on the example of I. Dilman’s work considers the anthropological turn that the Swansea School made in its metaphilosophy.

It is showed that, according to Dilman, belief in the physical existence of things is already embedded in the concepts denoting them. On his view, the concept of reality shouldn’t be thought of in the context of the objective-subjective dichotomy. Reality is not some area existing independently of the everyday life of people, but a specific worldview inherent to it. This idea allows Dilman to present the problem of realism

as a problem of the meaningfulness of the form of life, and to emphasize the importance of literature to express this problem.

It is claimed that such anthropological approach has an important shortcoming. According to it, philosophical investigation presupposes the survey of the entire sociocultural sphere. However, not all genuine philosophical questions are suitable for considering by using this method.

In the end of the Third chapter, it is concluded that the Swansea School's metaphilosophy is based on the following ideas: a) the aim of philosophy is the study of forms of life; b) questioning of the intelligibility of language is the central issue of philosophy; c) in philosophy it is wrong not only to theorizing, but also to try to make practical changes in the form of life; d) conceptual analysis should be directed towards the deep rather than surface grammar.

This allows us to explicate pros and cons of the Swansea School's approach:

Pros are their idea of philosophical problems and their attitude towards philosophical tradition. Unlike the most Orthodox Wittgensteinians, the Swansea School shows that not all philosophical problems violate rules of grammar and exist only from the external point of view. They show that the possibility of understanding is substantial philosophical problem that is immune to both of those objections. This enables them not to refuse from traditional metaphysics, but to reinterpret it in the Wittgensteinian framework.

Cons is the limitations this approach has as the method of philosophy. Indeed, explication of the meaning such concepts as "language", "reality" or "religion" have for our form of life is based on examination of different contexts of use. But this kind of broadening of view is hardly applicable in philosophy of logic and mathematics, which required as the narrowest scope as possible.

In this regard, it could be said that attempt to limit philosophy with anthropology emphasizes a negative feature common to the most of the Orthodox Wittgensteinians

and consists in their unwillingness to juxtapose Wittgenstein's view of philosophy with the views of other analytic philosophers.

CONCLUSION

The question “What is philosophy?” has a long history of discussion. It can be noted that, depending on the era and the prevailing worldview, the content of answers is different. In this regard, the XX century is distinguished by its rejection of speculative metaphysics and by its interest in more specific research subjects such as man, language, science, etc. What contribution does the Wittgensteinianism make to this turn? How can one characterize the metaphilosophical niche of Wittgenstein and his followers?

As I have argued, the answer to these questions depends on the meaning of the terms “Wittgensteinianism” and “Wittgensteinians”. It has been proposed to define those terms by linking both of them with Wittgenstein’s followers who are loyal to his views on the nature of philosophy. At the same time, even that framework covers an extremely wide area of views, a survey of which would make research too broad and unspecific.

An appeal to the Orthodox Wittgensteinianism narrows that area. Those authors hold an anti-dogmatic attitude and offer a creative understanding of Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of philosophy. Among those philosophers: G.H. von Wright, N. Malcolm, F. Waismann, P.M.S. Hacker, G. Baker, J. Wisdom, M. Lazerovitz, C. Diamond, representatives of the Swansea School, and others.

In their metaphilosophy, the Orthodox Wittgensteinianism opposes a view of philosophy as an activity aimed at building explanatory theories and obtaining new knowledge. My examination of those views shows that by denying the possibility of any meaningful reasoning about “objective reality”, they are limiting philosophy to the boundaries of human life.

As a result, most Wittgensteinians refused from all questioning about reality in philosophy and aimed at particular results of obvious practical value, such as

conceptual clarification, elimination of mental discomfort, or changing of worldview.

Along with that, a belief that philosophical problems are devoid of rational foundations and thus have to be dissolved spread within the movement. According to it, almost all philosophy is based on metaphysical confusions and only the Wittgensteinian version of the subject is accurate.

However, not all Orthodox Wittgensteinians have expressed support for such a belief. Thus, representatives of the Swansea School (R. Rhees, P. Winch, D.Z. Phillips, and I. Dilman) rejected it. They pointed out that the question about the possibility of understanding cannot be reduced to some confusion. Interpreting this as the core of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, they displaced its rejectionism about different views on the nature of philosophy.

At the same time, it has been argued that philosophical approach of the Swansea School is not suitable for all philosophical issues. Thus, based on the consideration of sociocultural contexts it is incongruent with such research subjects as philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. For, to investigate the sense of certain religious or moral norms it is reasonable to consider them in a broad cultural context. On the opposite, in the case of such issues as the nature of numbers or foundations of mathematics, such an approach will only provide sidetrack investigation.

Despite this shortcoming, it should be emphasized that the Swansea School suggested a way to overcome the Wittgensteinian rejectionism in metaphilosophy by pointing out rational foundations for classical philosophical problems.

It also should be noted, that consideration of the metaphilosophy in Wittgensteinianism provides a fresh look at the history of analytic philosophy. Generally, analytic philosophy is associated with the ideals of impersonal scientific knowledge. Discussion of Wittgensteinianism shows that this strand, however, did

not exhaust the whole analytic philosophy, and, as I tried to show in this work, suggests alternative forms of investigation.

APROBATION OF THE WORK

Articles which are published in journals indexed in international indexing and citations databases and included in the **HSE's list of high-level journals**:

1. Zolotkov, G.A. 2017. 'The theory of language-games' as the solution of the problem of the nature of philosophy, *Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science*, No 40. pp. 46–52. (in Russian)
2. Zolotkov, G.A. 2017. The nature of philosophy in 'orthodox' Wittgensteinianism, *The Philosophy Journal*, vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 61–73. (in Russian)
3. Zolotkov, G.A. 2018. On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind, *Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences Filosofskie nauki*, No. 10, pp. 130–142.

Other publications:

1. Zolotkov, G.A. 2015 On the ethical meaning of "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" by Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Values and Norms in the Flow of Time*, Ed. by B.S. Shalyutin, Kurgan: Kurgan State University. pp. 44–46.
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