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**ANGELS IN ETERNITY, WHILE  
DEMONS IN THE EMPYREAN  
HEAVEN? OPUS II, DIST. 2 BY  
HUGH OF SAINT-CHER**

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## **ANGELS IN ETERNITY, WHILE DEMONS IN THE EMPYREAN HEAVEN? OPUS II, DIST. 2 BY HUGH OF SAINT- CHER<sup>2</sup>**

Between 1231 and 1234 at Paris Hugh of Saint-Cher OP (ca. 1190–1263) finished his *Opus*, a commentary devoted to Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. The present paper offers the first study accompanied by transcription of Hugh's distinction II.2. I am dealing with Hugh's impact on scholastic theology considered in itself and within the broader scholastic tradition. According to Hugh, angels are temporally coextensive with the empyrean, prime matter, and first instant. Being bodiless, angels occupy the empyrean as a natural corporal place, while angel's essence and action determine their presence on earth. Unlike souls enclosed in bodies, the angelic intellect understands things in their direct presence rather than through similitudes. I also delineate tenets of Hugh's doctrinal influence upon subsequent generation of scholastic masters, notably John of la Rochelle, Eudes Rigaud, Richard Fishacre, and Richard Rufus.

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Keywords: Hugh of Saint-Cher, the Empyrean, angels, scholastic theology, *Sentences*, Aristotle's reception, temporality of the creation, medieval noetics.

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## Labyrinths of Paris *Sentences*

Our story begins in 1179 when Walter of Saint Victor denounced four Paris dialecticians including Peter Lombard (d. 1160), an author of the *Sentences*. Lombard faced reproach for allegedly denying the human existence of Christ. Being the most successful compilation of propositions drawn from Christian authorities, the *Sentences* furnishes a systematic treatment of essential theological questions, be it the Trinity or sacraments. For a large part Lombard's personal stance is missing. The humanity of Christ presented by Lombard with three conflicting opinions without resolution was of no exception that did not preclude Walter from unambiguously ascribing a clear-cut position to Peter and condemning him. As a historical twist, Walter's reactionary view on the dogmatic theology failed to endure within the burgeoning milieu of the Paris university where shortly after the confirmation of Peter Lombard's orthodoxy during the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 the *Sentences* gained popularity among mendicant friars and swiftly became the standard textbook of theology on which every student had to lecture.

History could have taken a more favorable turn for Walter's theological attitude if Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) had not delivered his lessons on the *Sentences* from 1224 to 1227, instead of focusing on Biblical lectures. Alexander established a pivotal precedent for the future Paris and Oxford theological curriculum. Alexander's commentary, preserved merely in several student reports (*reportationes*), centered around key phrases derived from Peter Lombard. The next milestone of the *Sentences* evolution occurred in ca. 1231–1234 when Hugh of Saint-Cher OP<sup>3</sup> (ca. 1190–1263) composed his commentary usually called the *Opus* or *Scriptum*. This text, characterized by its independent, continuous, and revised form, constitutes the subject of the present investigation. While there is a more or less transparent picture of Paris theology developed in the second half of the 13th century and early 14th century<sup>4</sup>, the period between Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* and Albert the Great's *Sentences*, roughly spanning 1227–1245, remains relatively obscure. *Sentences* authored during this time by Hugh of Saint-Cher, John of la Rochelle, Adam de Puteorumvilla, and John Pagus await their editors to come.

In the case of Hugh, multiple distinctions have been edited previously, primarily to prove that the Dominican lacked originality and extensively borrowed from predecessors such as Stephen Langton (d. 1228), William of Auxerre (d. 1231), Alexander of Hales, and Philip the Chancellor

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<sup>3</sup> For Hugh's biography and ecclesiastical career see *Paravicini Bagliani A.* Cardinali di curia e “familiae” cardinalizie dal 1227 al 1254. Vol. 1. Padova, 1972. P. 257–263.

<sup>4</sup> *Schabel C.* Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents. Aldershot, 2002; *Friedaman, R.L.* Intellectual traditions at the medieval university: the use of philosophical psychology in Trinitarian theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350. Vol. 1–2. Leiden, 2012.

(d. 1236)<sup>5</sup>. Not intending to contest research findings, I would dare to suppose that at least one particular distinction II.2<sup>6</sup> deviates significantly from the established historiographical account of Hugh redoing the prose of his university ancestors<sup>7</sup>. Hugh's departure from tradition, as evidenced in this instance, partly stems from the specific topic of angelology, dominated before by moral questions rather than physics and metaphysics<sup>8</sup>. What this distinction has not yet been examined implies that the Dominican remains a regrettable blind spot, especially regarding angelic time, location, and cognition<sup>9</sup>. I propose the first study and Latin edition of the distinction to make clear whether and how Hugh modified and reshaped traditional theological issues.

### **Time, empyrean heaven, and intelligence**

Hugh of Saint-Cher makes up the distinction II.2 from three consecutive questions devoted to the «angelic physics» of time, location, and cognition.

Hugh starts off by inquiring how the term «first» (*prima*) should be understood in relation to angelic nature. The Dominican supplies two plausible interpretations, stating that either «first» stands for privative usage or designates angelic dignity. In the former scenario, nothing came into being before angels, yet this does not preclude other things from being created simultaneously with angels. In the latter case, angels attain primacy through merit, I suppose, thanks to the divine image imprinted on them and their spiritual nature. One way or another, the Dominican vehemently clamors against certain Greek thinkers, specifically singling out Basil of Caesarea, whom he accuses of advocating the existence of angelic eternal intelligences that preceded the world (*deus ante mundum creavit intelligencias*)<sup>10</sup> [2]<sup>11</sup>. Additional authors potentially within Hugh's purview

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<sup>5</sup> Boureau A. *L'Empire du livre: Pour une histoire du savoir scolastique (1200–1380)*. Paris, 2007. P. 59, 87–88

<sup>6</sup> Known merely by its incipit (see *Bieniak M.* Contents of Hugh of St.-Cher's Commentary on the Sentences, Books I–II // *Przegląd Tomistyczny*. Vol. 19. 2013. 56–57).

<sup>7</sup> By no means I am able to rule out the possibility that Hugh actually espoused ideas from a lost or undiscovered source, perhaps never written down.

<sup>8</sup> *Harkins F.T.* The Embodiment of Angels: A Debate in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Theology // *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales*. Vol. 78. N. 1. 2011. P. 25–27.

<sup>9</sup> *Colish M.L.* Early Scholastic Angelology // *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*. Vol. 62. 1995. P. 80–109; *Faes de Mottoni B.* San Bonaventura e la Scala di Giacobbe. *Lecture di angelologia*. Naples, 1996; *Porro P.* *Forme E Modelli Di Durata Nel Pensiero Medievale*. L'aeuvum, Il Tempo Discreto, Ia Categoria «quando». Leuven, 1996. To do justice, I cannot fail to mention that in recent groundbreaking examinations of demonic generation and free will Hugh receives attention he deserves (*Van der Lugt M.* *Le ver, le démon et la vierge: Les théories médiévales de la génération extraordinaire. Une étude sur les rapports entre théologie, philosophie naturelle et médecine*. Paris, 2004; *Saccetti R.* *Conservare la retta volontà. L'atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225–1235)*. Bologna, 2013).

<sup>10</sup> Hugh makes use of the Latin translation where the Greek notion «supertemporal» (*ὑπέρχρονος*) was rendered by the phrase «generated without change» (*orta sine tempore*) (*Eustathius Metaphrasis Latina Hexaemeri Saeculo VII // Patrologiae cursus completus. Ser. Latina / Ed. J.-P. Migne*. Vol. 53. Paris, 1847. Cap. I.5). The original Greek leaves the matter of whether angels subsist in eternity much more uncertain.

<sup>11</sup> Henceforth numbers in brackets correspond to the division into paragraphs of the *Scriptum*.

may cover Neoplatonized Aristotle and Origen, not to mention Peripatetic philosophers like Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides.

Hence, angels subsist in the same time flow humans do, prompting a new question of the precise temporal origin when angels were formed [3–4]. The moment of creation does not comprise a succession of time instants (*successiuum*) since the beginning of time (*in termino iniciali temporis*) cannot encompass a series of successive moments. The series of instants requires at least two consecutive moments. Thus, among four equally primal substances (viz. the empyrean, time, angelic nature, and prime matter) time exclusively accommodates the first instant (*nunc*) from which the timeline for existing world commences. Demonstrating his dialectical prowess, Hugh considers an alternative proposition: if someone were to posit that time anticipated the world, such time would cease to measure motion and accomplish its function par excellence (*mensura motus*)<sup>12</sup> because doubtless no motion had existed before the world was made. Therefore, this time would flow eternally and serve as a symbol of enduring, unmoving, and unchanging things in one and the same being (*permanens in eodem esse*) that leaves no room for motion, action, and time itself:

Generated without change, what is false, given that time cannot exist without movement because time is a measure of movement with respect to the before and after; unless someone asserted that eternal time is not a time at all but rather a state of affairs permanent in one and the same being. However, how would angels then serve the Lord if they did nothing? In other words, if there was an action, then by virtue of this action there was also a movement since every action would end in movement and every movement would correspondingly end in action. Therefore, there would be time itself since there would be instants of the before and after. Thus, it is necessary to give a response to opponents: what time preceded the world is an apparent falsehood [5].

Such a vital necessity for angels to serve and administer God triggers a chain of arguments which interconnect time, action, and movement. In a nutshell, Hugh erects a vicious logical circle to highlight that, as a matter of fact, time is nothing more than a sequence of instants coming after the world creation. This demonstration has significant implications for the proper understanding of angelic temporality, a concept left unidentified by the theologian. In Hugh's view, angels transcend physical time because they antecede time by the order of creation and move

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<sup>12</sup> Hugh relies on the Aristotelian definition of time (*Aristoteles Physica: Translatio Vetus // Aristoteles Latinus 7.1 / Ed. F. Bossier, J. Brams. Leiden, New York, 1990. Cap. IV.11*). I cannot avoid noting that strictly speaking Hugh substitutes Aristotle's original notion of «number» (*ἀριθμὸς; numerus*) for «measure» (*μέρος; mensura*) which does not change a lot but is worth mentioning.

«metaphysically» as attested in the following distinction<sup>13</sup>. It would be logically plausible to accommodate so called aeon (*aevum*) between the physical time of creatures (*tempus*) and divine eternity (*eternitas*). Originally coined by Calcidius' misunderstanding of Plato<sup>14</sup> (*αἰών*) and taken up at the School of Chartres, the aeon was specifically adapted for angels mediating between the human and divine orders by Philip the Chancellor several years before Hugh<sup>15</sup>. Alexander of Hales and Eudes Rigaud (d. 1275) later endorsed the same idea<sup>16</sup>. Notwithstanding, Hugh keeps conspicuously silent on this matter that reflects his lack of interest in the perpetuity of the world, a contemporary way to safeguard Aristotle's view on eternity advanced by the same theologians<sup>17</sup>.

As we move into, Hugh delves into the sophisticated question of theological space where angels should dwell [6]. What Hugh emphasizes angelic mode of location inside the empyrean may appear innovative<sup>18</sup>, but first things first. The empyrean heaven occupies the sixth highest position among the seven spheres, a traditional cosmology going back to the «Ordinary Gloss» and Praepositinus of Cremona (d. 1210)<sup>19</sup>. Here I have no intention to demand and judge Hugh's philosophy from the high bell tower, albeit the reason why Hugh picks up this particular model resides in the darkness. By this time numerous alternative cosmographies have been elaborated, be it John of Damascus' three heavens rooted in Holy Scripture or Michael Scot's ten spheres built on the Arabic astronomy and supplemented with the Christian empyrean. For instance, an anonymous Franciscan, who glossed Hugh's manuscript Assisi 131, juxtaposed Bede and Strabo's positions. Few years afterward, Eudes Rigaud reconciled Strabo, Isidore, Bede, and Damascus in order to propose his authentic ninefold depiction of the world with separated empyrean on top<sup>20</sup>.

Beyond that, the empyrean should be the place where angels find their abode which fuels Hugh's mind [7]. Having assimilated the noblest heaven into Aristotle's «proper place» (*ὁ ἀπὸς τόπος; locus naturalis; locus proprius*<sup>21</sup>), Hugh fends off against the proposed identification. Apparently, beatitude encompasses rest and happiness without external needs pressing down an

<sup>13</sup> To outline cross-references to Hugh's other distinction I am going to avail a sigla *V* which denotes Città del Vaticano. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Vat. Lat. 1098 (*V*. Fol. 48ra). For other manuscripts see the final section.

<sup>14</sup> The Greek «aeon» (*αἰών*) means eternity surpassing cosmological time, which should have been translated into Latin simply as «eternity» (*eternitas*). Medieval scholars were well aware of this error.

<sup>15</sup> Wicki N. *Die Philosophie Philipps des Kanzlers: ein philosophierender Theologe des frühen 13. Jahrhunderts*. Cambridge, 2005. S. 5–6.

<sup>16</sup> Città del Vaticano. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Vat. Lat. 5982. Fol. 79rb, 81vb; *Dales R.C.* *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World*. Leiden, 1989. P. 52–54, 66–67. Sometimes history moves in circles: Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) and John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) imposed back the aeon onto each substance, either corporal or spiritual. They argued that substances considered in themselves do not change or move within astronomical time (*Porro, P.* *Il vocabolario filosofico medievale del tempo e della durata // Il tempo nel Medioevo / a cura di R. Capasso, P. Piccari*. Roma, 2000. P. 89–95). Consequently, time became as homogenous as it had been before aeon's introduction.

<sup>17</sup> *V*. Fol. 45va–46rb.

<sup>18</sup> Alexander of Hales remains a notable exception, even though he tackles the problem down rather succinctly (*Alexander de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi*. In *librum secundum* / Ed. Quaracchi Friars. Rome, 1952. Cap. VII.20).

<sup>19</sup> Paris. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Lat. 14526. Fol. 14vb.

<sup>20</sup> Assisi. La Biblioteca del Sacro Convento. MS 131 (onwards *A*<sub>2</sub>). Fol. 42r; Vat. Lat. 5982. Fol. 81va.

<sup>21</sup> That is one location toward which a particular body is inclined to move for the sake of perfection.

agent to seek satisfaction elsewhere. Angels then would lose beatitude when descending from their proper place to aid humans. A pertinent question arises regarding the mechanics of angels descending and ascending — whether it involves teleportation, movement at incomprehensible speed, or angelic multilocation? Here is the best place to look into Hugh's university master Roland of Cremona (ca. 1178–1259) who was fully aware of the problem implicated in Hugh's angelological reasoning and grappled with this issue. By means of a hypothetical experiment where two angels descend with absolute speed, Roland demonstrates that they cannot reach the surface of the earth simultaneously. Thence, they move down locally and discretely<sup>22</sup>.

Back to Hugh of Saint-Cher, someone might respond that wherever angels appear, they bring the empyrean with them, akin to demons bearing a yoke of hell when present among people [7]. Hugh generally retorts, asserting that if it were true, human subjectivity would be torn apart:

The Gloss asserts that demons are not always in hell nor constantly punished with infernal fire. Similarly, it must be inferred that people would reside in the empyrean heaven when angels accompanied them that no one permits; by the same token, men would find themselves in hell when demons appeared before them. Or when both angel and devil at the same time appeared before a human being, this man would end up in the empyrean and hell simultaneously what is impossible [8].

The place of angels is doubled and the location of the empyrean is shifted toward multiple points where each angel subsists. Developing this part of the counterargument, I would wonder do we need the empyrean altogether when individual angels have their own empyrean. Even though Hugh was not ready to go as far as Duns Scotus who, seventy years later, released angels from any necessity to occupy natural place<sup>23</sup>. Apart from that, paradoxes arise when one must concede that a human would find himself in both hell and empyrean while being assisted by an angel and demon at the same time.

This line of thought deserves attention and pends a historical examination in its own, given that Hugh refrains from resolving these dilemmas in the course of the *Scriptum*. Implicit in Hugh's argument is rejection of the human right to settle in the empyrean. The theologian centers on the incoherence of angelic and human multilocation. Exegetically avowed by the Dominican

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<sup>22</sup> Città del Vaticano. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Barb. Lat. 729. Fol. 33r.

<sup>23</sup> *Cross R. The Condemnnations of 1277 and Henry of Ghent on Angelic Location // Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance / Ed. by M. Lenz, I. Iribarren. London, 2008. P. 78, 86.* What is more striking, Scotus does not hesitate to exaggerate the other side of Hugh's aporia. Provided with a natural place of any kind angels would stop moving and limit themselves to passive existence. Above all, such a disposition does not suit messengers responsible for various divine errands.

himself<sup>24</sup>, Paul's famous rupture into the Third Heaven and divine absolute power to elevate whomever He wishes into heaven run counter to Hugh's argument. Furthermore, the theologian does not embrace the question of location for the blessed in the following distinction II.14 dedicated to cosmology. In the distinction IV.44 and in his later Biblical *Postille*, Hugh separates contaminated by the original sin human paradise, so to speak Eden, from the empyrean reserved exclusively for angels<sup>25</sup>.

Long story short, I suspect that Hugh aligns with the undisclosed Paris theologians. In 1241/4 they faced condemnation for believing that saints would occupy only the heaven beneath the empyrean, either crystalline or aqueous. Since no proponents of such views have been identified to date<sup>26</sup>, in all likelihood Hugh resembles the most probable candidate based on the evidence presented<sup>27</sup>. The first authoritative theological response to the debate came from Eudes Rigaud. Shortly after 1244, the Franciscan guaranteed saints and angels' presence in the empyrean under the label of natural utility and harmony in the universe (*propter nature congruenciam*), in other terms intertwining world order with human soteriology<sup>28</sup>.

Onwards, Hugh endeavors to define the angelic celestial position itself by first inquiring «what is it» (*quid sit*) [9]. Thereby, he overlooks two crucial preliminary questions: «is it possible» (*an sit possibilis*) and «does it exist» (*an sit*). The former technique of research, which looks into the possibility before considering any actual state of affairs, penetrated scholastic discourse only after the advent of Scotistic modal logic. The latter method of scientific survey was common from the time of the *Analytica Posteriora* and indeed grounded Roland of Cremona's reflection. The Italian master suggests imagining alternatives and deliberating ways the empyrean could have existed to prove both that it must exist, providing a dwelling for angels with saints, and should be immobile, round-shaped, and ethereal<sup>29</sup>. In contrast with his teacher, Hugh is satisfied with Biblical exegesis (Gen. 1:1; Job 38:7) and goes on to pose the question whether the empyrean is a substance or accident with respect to Aristotle's metaphysics [9]. Accidents should be attached to

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<sup>24</sup> V. Fol. 52rb; *Hugo de Sancto Charo* Opera omnia in universum Vetus et Novum Testamentum. Tomus I / Ed. Nicolaus Pezzana. Venice, 1754. Gen. 1:28.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. Tomus VII. II Pet. 3:1; V. Fol. 202va–203va.

<sup>26</sup> *Grice D. Church, Society and University: The Paris Condemnation of 1241/4*. Abingdon, NY, 2019. P. 210, 215. Potentially, John Pagus adhered to a similar position. He was mentioned in one condemnation manuscript and proven to err with regards to other articles (*Gründel J. Die Sentenzenglosse des Johannes Pagus (circa 1243–1245) in Padua, Bibl. Ant. 139 // Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift. Vol. 9. 1958. S. 181–185*). Nevertheless, I could not identify any corresponding discussion of the separation between angels and saints in his Paris lectures (Paris. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Lat. 15652. Fol. 56vb).

<sup>27</sup> In favor of my supposition even speaks the fact that to A2 a list of articles condemned was appended where someone significantly enlarged the paragraph about heavens (A2. Fol. 75rb).

<sup>28</sup> Vat. Lat. 5982. Fol. 81ra, 81vb; *Sorokina M. Les sphères, les astres et les théologiens L'influence céleste entre science et foi dans les commentaires des Sentences (v. 1220 – v. 1340)*. Vol. 2. Turnhout, 2021. P. 27–28.

<sup>29</sup> Barb. Lat. 729. Fol. 30r, 32r. This said does not fit with conventional assumption about medieval reluctance to philosophically vindicate the empyrean (see *Fioravanti G. Aristotele e l'Empireo // Christian Readings of Aristotle from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance / Ed. L. Bianchi. Turnhout, 2011. P. 28*).



substantial subjects where they exist. So, were the empyrean an accident, it would hold a position neither inside angels, who are contained within the empyrean according to John of Damascus, nor in God, nor in the firmament, or nor in prime matter:

If the empyrean exists in a subject other <than an angel>, the question is where exactly. This is impossible to determine since the empyrean is located neither in God, nor in the firmament or somewhere below it, given that the empyrean was created before the firmament, nor in the first matter which was created along with the empyrean [10].

What the first two possibilities concerning God and firmament do not hold true Hugh takes for granted. I might illuminate this by the fact that God cannot mixture with what He created. The firmament must lay by definition underneath the empyrean. Hugh further contends that the temporal order of creation precludes prime matter from providing a substantial space for the empyrean since both were created at the same moment.

Continuing the exploration, Hugh intends to exhaust remaining possibilities. The empyrean might form either spiritual or corporal substance [11]. The Dominican rejects right away the first explanation since there are only three spiritual substances: God, angels, and souls. It is remarkable how the theologian combines Aristotle's metaphysical concept and analytical method of research with dogmatic theology. Although in this part of Hugh's investigation reason gives way to faith. Thereupon, the empyrean corporeality impedes bodiless angels, who lack three-dimensional size, from dwelling on its surface. It is further confirmed by John of Damascus' self-contradiction which Hugh pinpoints. I venture to acknowledge it is rather bizarre that Hugh's argument terminates with a claim denying angelic «existence and operation in different places simultaneously» [11], on the condition that Hugh was initially aimed at highlighting incongruity between spiritual substance and corporal space. The only interpretation, I am able to put forward, may lie in angels being in the empyrean by essence and operating somewhere else — a point seemingly irrelevant for Hugh. He generally casts doubt on angelic presence and being-in-corporal-place rather than addressing multilocation. In addition, Hugh's syllogism envelops an undefined premise according to which angels are immaterial. This idea receives a germane exposition only afterward in distinctions II.3, II.7–8, and IV.44 where the Dominican grants angels bodies in comparison with God, not *per se*<sup>30</sup>.

After throwing light on issues surrounding angelic proper place and ontological status of the empyrean, Hugh unfolds the ultimate question of the empyrean's astronomical position [12].

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<sup>30</sup> V. Fol. 47va, 52ra–52rb, 193vb.

The empyrean heaven is installed «as either encompassing, or adjacent, or distant» (*aut continuum, aut contiguum, aut distans*) with respect to the firmament. Bonding the empyrean with inferior skies, the first two localizations would result in the empyrean being moved along with the rest of the heaven, so that angels would undergo motion and time, thus corruption. With due respect, I honestly confess I find the argument challenging and cannot afford a straightforward reading of this tenet because corruption is not coextensive with motion and time. For example, planets are corporal, movable, responsible for physical time, and still incorruptible. More than that, whatever place angels took for the sake of divine service would render them mobile and corruptible, in accordance with Hugh's logic. In turn, the third option, a distant location of the empyrean, purports a void between the highest firmament and the empyrean. In other words, there would be a vacuum which marks the end of all possibilities for the Peripatetic physics.

«The solution» inscribed above the exit frames the scholastic labyrinth full of exquisite questions [13]. Hugh recapitulates that the empyrean is an angelic natural corporal place enclosing the firmament from a distance (*distans ex omni parte concludens intra se firmamentum*). The space between heavens is taken up by crystalline heaven made from frozen evaporations of water. On this occasion, Hugh relies on Peter Comestor (d. 1178) under unspecified phrasing «according to someone» (*secundum quosdam*)<sup>31</sup>. As a result, the empyrean secures the status of a transcendental and invisible «theological» heaven existing as a material substance which remains with angels at rest<sup>32</sup>. But what is about angels?

In relation to angel, the theologian cuts off the false distinction between different corporal and spiritual locations [14]. Employing scholastic discourse, it can be deduced that these notions are distinct merely in mind (*secundum rationem*) and not in reality (*secundum rem*). Correspondingly, one should take into account that these terms designate different definitions of the same place considered in comparison with solid bodies (*corporalis*) or with spirits (*spiritualis*). To simplify, such a distinction depends on the type of substance occupying a place. Otherwise, one had to invent another spatio-spiritual dimension for angels and face inevitable objection about angelic apparitions before us. Therefore, adopting John of Damascus, Peter Abelard<sup>33</sup>, and Alexander of Hales, Hugh endorses the following resolution:

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<sup>31</sup> Grant E. Planets, Stars, and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200–1687. Cambridge, 1996. P. 104, 332–333.

<sup>32</sup> Alas, the Dominican falls short of a rationale when it comes to a conundrum of the empyrean immobility. It proves to be crucial even for Hugh's anonymous student. He added in the margin «unmovable» (*immobile*) to Hugh's definition of the empyrean (A2. Fol. 42rb).

<sup>33</sup> Marenbon J. Abelard on Angels // Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance / Ed. by M. Lenz, I. Iribarren. London, 2008. P. 68–71.

An angel holds place in two ways: in relation to his distinct essence since this way he exists somewhere in one place and therefore not in another; and according to his action because he acts in this particular way here and not somewhere else. This overtly follows from the aforementioned authority of John of Damascus. Hence, the angel who acts before me cannot simultaneously perform an action in England; and also act or comprehend something in England while being present here [14].

At this juncture, angelic proper essence (*secundum essenciam distinctiue*) and action (*secundum operationem*) set out the stage for spatial presence specifically within a defined location and not elsewhere. The angel's motion is spiritual and physical at the same time. However, it proves reasonable to sort out what angelic presence without operation implies. There is a danger that passive angels without bodies cannot manifest their being here unless they took action. Moreover, Hugh's view meets with Duns Scotus' attack on Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Henry of Ghent after the condemnation of 1277: if angels occupied a place by being active, they would disappear from the empyrean where no angelic office is executed<sup>34</sup>. To avoid this, Hugh might introduce the first way of physical presence by virtue of the angel's essence, yet unfortunately leaves his idea unspecified. Apart from internal tension, Hugh's argument [14] fails to rebut his preceding counterargument [7] and does not clarify why angels would not forfeit beatitude upon departing from the natural abode. Were I Dominican living in the 13th century, I would reply that angels compensate such a loss by voluntarily fulfilling divine commands on earth and thereby obtaining new blessing instead. Viewed exegetically, Christ could not lose beatitude, having descended into hell to rescue the souls held captive there. Consequently, beatitude should be redefined beyond the confines of the natural place, as proposed by Roland of Cremona<sup>35</sup>.

A short time after, Hugh returns to the question of angelic localization once more in relation to William of Auxerre's conjecture<sup>36</sup>. God can be called the natural place of angels and any spirits only in the likeness (*per similitudinem*). Otherwise, angels would be omnipresent, akin to God, without motion requisite for their duty [16]. This metaphorical resemblance underscores the natural inclination of all entities toward God and transcends the physical limits of designated natural places.

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<sup>34</sup> *Cross R. Op. cit.* P. 75–78.

<sup>35</sup> Barb. Lat. 729. Fol. 34rb.

<sup>36</sup> *Guillermus Altissiodorensis Summa aurea (Liber I)* / Ed. J. Ribailier. Grottaferrata, Paris, 1980. Tr. 14.3.

The third closing question is comparatively minor but touches upon an equally pivotal matter about angelic cognition. Angelic proper understanding diverges from Aristotle's conventional psychology:

If you were to object, here is Aristotle's saying that the intellect understands regardless of here and now. This holds true only in relation to intellect of the soul which exists inside the body because such an intellect knows things through similitudes, not by their immediate presence. Nevertheless, the disembodied soul and angel get to know things by their direct presence and not through similitudes. That is why their intellect is called vision. However, I have not heard it determined at what distance the separated soul or angel can see things this way [15].

Aristotle's idea of abstract intellectual cognition, which forecloses immediate categories of presence «here and now» (*hic et nunc*), applies just to embodied souls. They rely upon sensual experience of similitudes (*species*) conveyed through animated bodies. In contrast, angels and separated after death souls resemble vision, apprehending objects in their direct presence (*per rerum presenciam*). It is easier to explicate Hugh's idea than to identify a precise source of inspiration because neither Aristotle nor Averroes in the *De anima* offer any similar formula to outline intellectual cognition. On the contrary, these philosophers are adamant that the human intellect has no choice but to rely on sensual similitudes impressed with spatio-temporal attributes. To put it bluntly, for Peripatetics the embodied intellect comprehends «here and now». The closest expression «our intellect does not understand without intervening space and time» (*intellectus noster non intelligit sine continuo et tempore*) with an opposite to Hugh sense shows up solely in early 14th century excerpts from Aristotle's *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*. The lack of identifiable source propels me to attribute the aforesaid concept [15] to Hugh's angelological disclosure, sparked by a potential misunderstanding of the Stagirite<sup>37</sup>.

After all, such a step opens a new path toward non-discursive and direct cognition, a direction taken up by outstanding minor friars such as Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (ca. 1221–1274) and Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–1298). However, the intricate mechanics of angelic comprehension in Hugh's *Opus* present challenges. If angels had to appear before each individual thing in order to apprehend it «in presence», Hugh's proposal would put into question angelic perfection in

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<sup>37</sup> *Hamesse J.* Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique. Louvain, 1974. P. 200. In various versions of Aristotle's tractate, translators faithfully followed the initial Greek «without phantasms» (*ἀνευ φαντάσματος*) in lieu of Hugh's statement «without here and now» of cryptic origin. For instance, «without phantasm» (*sine fantasmate*) was clearly rendered by Michael Scot (Città del Vaticano. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Borg. 309. Fol. 262ra).

juxtaposition with the human ability to seize knowledge over a distance. In the 1230s, Alexander of Hales came up with a more thorough treatment of angelic understanding which might entail a charge versus Hugh. From his perspective, angels remotely flash out like an x-ray and capture similitudes of things without the need for motion and disturbance on the part of spiritual substances<sup>38</sup>.

Overall, Hugh of Saint-Cher introduces in the *Sentences* and sheds light on three interconnected physical problems concerning angelic time, place, and understanding. These aspects bear independent philosophical and theological value within the context of medieval intellectual culture.

### Hugh of Saint-Cher's heritage

Unlike the dogma of the Trinity or incarnation, angelology fosters an ideal field for mental experiments conducted inside a laboratory where flawless spiritual substances exist, move, and communicate without much pressure from dogmatic theology<sup>39</sup>. The angelological questions, enlightened in the present distinction, set up a precedent for next generations of *Sentences* commentators thereafter Hugh departed from the university. It goes without saying that Hugh's fame was no coincidence inasmuch as his *Scriptum* survived in forty handwritten copies, evolved into a manual for the Franciscans, and underwent a transformation into educational glosses (*Filiae magistri*)<sup>40</sup>.

Approaching later *Sentences* prepared between 1240 and 1255 by John of la Rochelle (d. 1245), Eudes Rigaud (d. 1275), Richard Fishacre (d. 1248), and Richard Rufus (d. after 1259), I searched for similar to Hugh expressions, terms, and arguments, as scholastics did not favor explicitly citing their contemporaries by name. To begin in chronological order, John of la Rochelle refines Hugh's model of angelic cognition. He specifies that angels know «here and now in presence» future contingent, accidental, and singular things. Such objects cannot be deduced from innate and universal species bestowed upon angels at their creation. The Franciscan would also call into account Hugh's silenced argument about loss of beatitude. For John, angels accidentally acquire utility and perfection by executing their terrestrial missions<sup>41</sup>. In conformity

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<sup>38</sup> Paris. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Lat. 16406. Fol. 41rb.

<sup>39</sup> Perler D. Thought Experiments: The Methodological Function of Angels in Late Medieval Epistemology // Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance / Ed. by M. Lenz, I. Iribarren. London, 2008. P. 143–144.

<sup>40</sup> Bougerol J.G. (1983) Autour de «La naissance du Purgatoire» // Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge. Vol. 50. P. 13.

<sup>41</sup> Città del Vaticano. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Vat. Lat. 691. Fol. 56r, 58v.

with the senior Dominican, Eudes Rigaud rehearses the proof for the empyrean substantiality and the identification of spiritual and corporal places. On top of that, Eudes echoes John of la Rochelle's insight and copes with the unresolved problem of beatitude. Going on earthly assignments, angels freely subject themselves to the divine will and attain an additional source of accidental blessedness which they would not have discovered otherwise<sup>42</sup>. Richard Fishacre, now we cross the Channel to visit Oxford, marches in lockstep with Hugh<sup>43</sup> concerning the predication of the «first», polemics against Greeks to whom the theologian adjusts Avicenna, the metaphorical designation of God's natural place for all spirits, and the absence of beatitude among angels outside of the empyrean. It might be the case that Hugh's reservations about angelic location provoked not only the condemnation 1241/4 but also early angelological-physical disputations. Let us examine Richard who, in sharp contrast with John and Eudes, mounts ten counterarguments refutation against angelic presence through essence. The reason behind such confutation embraces angelic supremacy over physical dimension. This drives Richard to conclude that angels can be present anywhere they want through spiritual matter which is not essentially enfolded in corporal place. Thus, angels always retain beatitude<sup>44</sup>. Fishacre was not alone in advancing opposed to Hugh conception which liberates angels from spatial necessity. Compelled by similar inconvenience, Alexander of Hales<sup>45</sup> goes beyond Richard by denying that angels possess a natural place in the empyrean. Instead, angels are sustained in being by the Holy Spirit alone and do not depend on a body for their existence and happiness<sup>46</sup>. At the end, lecturing at Paris Richard Rufus follows Hugh's heels, defending theory of angelic location by essence and action along with endorsing the conception of immediate angelic understanding<sup>47</sup>.

All in all, such a small window into early scholastic angelology confers a good sense of Hugh's far-reaching influence and further necessity to put efforts into editing his *Scriptum*.

## Ratio edendi

The present edition is based on the collation of six manuscripts, all available to me. I avail the following sigla to designate the manuscripts: Vat. lat. 1098 = V, BNF lat. 3073 = P<sub>1</sub>, Brugge

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<sup>42</sup> Vat. Lat. 5982. Fol. 81ra–81vb.

<sup>43</sup> See *Gibiino F.* La «Glose» de Richard Fishacre sur la distinction 26 du premier livre des «Sentences» // Instytut Tomistyczny. Vol. 26. 2020. P. 40–42.

<sup>44</sup> *Richard Fishacre.* In *Secundum Librum Sententiarum.* Part 1: Prol., Dist. 1–20 / Ed. R.J. Long. München, 2008. P. 30–34, 40, 44–46; *Long R.J.* Of Angels and Pinheads: The Contributions of the Early Oxford Masters to the Doctrine of Spiritual Matter // *Franciscan Studies.* Vol. 56. 1998. P. 248–253.

<sup>45</sup> In the early *Glossa* (ca. 1224–1227) he had supported the identical to Damascus and Hugh position, while making up his mind only in posterior *Quaestiones disputatae* (ca. 1230–1242) (*Alexander de Hales.* *Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi.* In *librum primum* / Ed. Quaracchi Friars. R.: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1950. Cap. XXXVII.4–5).

<sup>46</sup> Oxford. Bodleian Library. MS Bodley 292. Fol. 311vb–312va. During discussion Alexander might again intentionally invoke Hugh's example about the impossibility of being, acting, and cognizing at the same time here and in England.

<sup>47</sup> Città del Vaticano. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Vat. Lat. 12993. Fol. 140vb–141ra.

178 = *B*, Assisi 130 = *A*<sub>1</sub>, Assisi 131 = *A*<sub>2</sub>, BNF lat. 10728 = *P*<sub>2</sub>. *VP*<sub>1</sub>*A*<sub>1</sub>*A*<sub>2</sub> account for a family of *peciae* taking roots from the common *exemplar* (Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig. MS 573). *A*<sub>2</sub> bears tenets of students' loan including notes and authorities written in the margins, in particular Gueric of Saint-Quentin. *B* is also a *pecia* derived from another *exemplar*, while *P*<sub>2</sub> represents a separate textual tradition since it comprises the second book alone preceded by tractates on moral theology<sup>48</sup>. Manuscript *V* has been selected to be the principal codex for its legibility and clarity. I have corrected *V* misreadings through collating other manuscripts.

I have synchronized the grammar, punctuation, and paragraph division of the transcription with modern standards. The medieval manuscript spelling has been preserved, all quotations and references are italicized. To make the text more accessible, I have split up the distinction into three questions and small enumerated paragraphs. Proper names begin with capital letters except for *nomina sacra*. All verbal citations from Peter Lombard are underlined, || indicates the start of a new column, < > stays for editorial supplements. Now, I hope you will allow Hugh of Saint-Cher to claim your interest.

## Hugo de Sancto Caro

### Opus. Liber II. Distinctio II. De angelica itaque<sup>49</sup>

1. Hic incipit *tercia*<sup>50</sup> pars ubi agitur de angelis. Et primo querit magister, quando creati fuerunt<sup>51</sup> angeli, utrum ante mundum, uel cum mundo, uel post mundum. Secundo ubi, utrum scilicet in celo empireo<sup>52</sup> aut<sup>53</sup> alibi. Si in celo empireo, quomodo ergo uerum dixit lucifer *ascendam in celum* et cetera Ysaia XIII<sup>i</sup>. Celum enim empireum suppreum est omnium celorum, ut patet<sup>54</sup> a Strabo super Genesim: *in principio*, ubi enumerat VII celos scilicet aereum, ethereum<sup>55</sup>, igneum, sindereum, cristallinum, empireum et celum trinitatis<sup>ii</sup>. Tercio querit, utrum omnes angeli sint equales et in essencie subtilitate, intelligencie, et perspicacitate, et liberi arbitrii facultate; hec

<sup>48</sup> *Faes de Mottoni B.* Ugo di S. Cher e i manoscritti 130 e 131 della Biblioteca Comunale di Assisi // *Miscellanea Cesare Cenci*. Rome, 2002. P. 151–169; *Bériou N.* Federico Visconti, archevêque de Pise, disciple de Hugues de Saint-Cher // *Hugues de Saint-Cher* († 1263), bibliste et théologien / Éd. L.-J. Bataillon, G. Dahan, P.-M. Gy. Turnhout, 2004. P. 262–263.

<sup>49</sup> *V*: 46vb–47vb; *P*<sub>1</sub>: 32rb–33ra; *B*: 39rb–40ra; *A*<sub>1</sub>: 42rb–43ra; *A*<sub>2</sub>: 42ra–43ra; *P*<sub>2</sub>: 99rb–100va

<sup>50</sup> *tercia*] ~~quarta~~ *V* *quarta* *P*<sub>1</sub>*A*<sub>1</sub>*P*<sub>2</sub> ~~quinta~~ *A*<sub>2</sub>

<sup>51</sup> *fuerunt*] *fuerint* *P*<sub>1</sub>*A*<sub>1</sub>*P*<sub>2</sub>

<sup>52</sup> *empireo*] *emphireo* *V*

<sup>53</sup> *aut*] *uel* *B*

<sup>54</sup> *patet*] *add.* in *A*<sub>2</sub>

<sup>55</sup> *ethereum*] *hereum* *P*<sub>2</sub>

enim tria data sunt omni angelo scilicet essencie subtilitas et alia duo, et in hiis conuenit angelus cum | 47ra | anima<sup>56</sup>. Quartum uero magister addit, quod fuit datum similiter angelo in sui<sup>57</sup> creatione scilicet personalis discretio, in quo differt ab anima, anima enim persona non est. Qualis facta est creata,<sup>58</sup> utrum scilicet tantum in naturalibus aut etiam in gratuitis, auersione scilicet malorum, conuersione scilicet bonorum, de excellencia, utrum dignior sit anima quam<sup>59</sup> angelus, et donorum, utrum omnes angeli equaliter uideant in speculo et equaliter gaudeant, uel donorum id est gratiarum datarum sibi a deo.

### <Questio prima de tempore angelorum>

2. Prima omnium creata Ecclesiasticus I: *creata*<sup>iii</sup>, id est genita, sic de filio dei exponitur, de natura angelica sic: *prima* id est percipua inter omnes alias creaturas, quia magis lucet in ea bonitas dei et sapiencia; uel prima inter primas creaturas, sicut fides dicitur prima<sup>60</sup> uirtutum, non quia ante<sup>61</sup> omnes alias, sed quia una primarum; uel prima omnium id est ante ipsam nichil, sed uidetur quod angeli creati fuerunt ante omnia alia ex hoc propositio. Dicit<sup>62</sup> Iohannes Damascenus: *'primo quidem excogitauit angelicas uirtutes et celestes et excogitatio eius opus fuit'*. *Ego enim consentio Gregorio Theologo. Dicebat enim: 'primum intellectualem substanciam creari, et sensibilem, et tunc quod ex utraque scilicet hominem'*<sup>iv</sup>. Hic dicitur quod primo creatus sit angelus, deinde<sup>63</sup> sensibilia ut elementa et huiusmodi, ultimo<sup>64</sup> homo. Sed dicimus quod *primum* tribus modis dicitur. Quandoque enim *primum* dicitur ens ante quod nichil<sup>65</sup> et sic priuatiue dicitur, quandoque positue tantum id est ens post quod aliud<sup>66</sup>, quandoque utroque modo similis et tunc proprie accipitur. In primo casu<sup>67</sup> accipitur hic unde sensus est: primum excogitauit id est ante illos, uel fecit sicut dicitur in<sup>68</sup> Mattheo: *nisi, donec peperit primo genitum*<sup>v</sup>, uel primum dicitur hic dignitate<sup>vi</sup>. Item, Basilii in Exameron: *erat antiqua nature ordinatio illis, que extra sunt mundum, sunt apta*, id est aptata, *uirtutibus, id est orta sine tempore, sempiterna, sibi que proposita, in qua conditor omnium*

<sup>56</sup> anima] nostra P<sub>1</sub>

<sup>57</sup> sui] uisus V

<sup>58</sup> est, creata] eadem creatura V

<sup>59</sup> quam] uel P<sub>1</sub>BA<sub>2</sub>

<sup>60</sup> prima] om. VA<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>P<sub>2</sub>

<sup>61</sup> ante] animas V

<sup>62</sup> dicit] dicitur V

<sup>63</sup> deinde] sit angelus V

<sup>64</sup> ultimo] om. V

<sup>65</sup> nichil] naturalis A<sub>1</sub>

<sup>66</sup> tantum] id est ens post quod aliud add. V

<sup>67</sup> casu] sensu B

<sup>68</sup> in] om. V



*deus opera perstituit, id est lumen intelligencie conueniens beatitudini amantium deum rationabiles inuisibiles*<sup>vii</sup>.

3. Perstituit ergo et primo instituit, sed dicendum<sup>69</sup> ut prius in alia auctoritate: creata non est, sed Ecclesiasticus XXIII ubi ipsa loquitur de se dicit *ab initio et ante seculum creata sum*<sup>viii</sup> id est genita uel prouisa creati uita uel natura. Nam si prima scilicet dignitate uel prima ante quod nichil<sup>ix</sup>, quia IIII dicuntur esse creata scilicet celum empireum, natura angelica, materia IIII elementorum et tempus. Quod autem angeli cum tempore creati sint, non ante, patet per Iohannem Damascenum: *angelus et tempus circumscribitur et loco et si intelligibiliter cepit enim esse*<sup>x</sup>. Qui uiuit in eternum Ecclesiasticus XVIII<sup>xi</sup>, creauit omnia simul id est in materia<sup>70</sup> uel similitudine siue<sup>71</sup> exemplo in materia ut corporea in similitudine, siue exemplo<sup>72</sup> ut anime que primo create sunt ad<sup>73</sup> similitudinem angelorum; uel omnia ut fiat distribucio inter genera singulorum id est corporalia et spiritualia, successiua<sup>74</sup> et permanencia. Illam enim cum tempore uidetur quod prius, quia fuerunt in termino<sup>75</sup> iniciali temporis<sup>xii</sup>, et nondum erat tempus, quia successiuum non est in sui termino, unde dicit Augustinus quod deus fuit dominus antequam tempus esset<sup>xiii</sup>.

4. Dicimus quod reuera celum empireum et angeli et materia illa precesserunt tempus processione instantanea. Sed quia illa pro nichilo habetur, ideo dicitur quod cum illis tempus simul creatum est et quod mundus et tempus | 47rb | coequalia<sup>76</sup> sunt; uel etiam<sup>77</sup> ideo quia simul inceperunt esse, non tamen equaliter primo fuerunt, quia angelus in primo instanci creationis fuit, tempus uero non. Dicit quod deus fuit dominus supra distinctio XXX: sunt<sup>78</sup> enim quedam et cetera<sup>xiv</sup>. Antequam tempus esset id est fluxus temporis, non in tempore, sed cum tempore. Sed nota quod alicuius rei determinata sicut non incipit deus esse dominus in tempore et ex tempore; dominus id est dominans actu, aliter contradiceret sibi in eodem capitulo, supra distinctio XXX: sunt quedam, quando cepit esse tempus id est quando primo fuit, quia non erat in uno instanti<sup>79</sup>, sed a seculis<sup>80</sup> id est cum se.

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<sup>69</sup> dicendum] *add.* est *B*

<sup>70</sup> materia] natura *V*

<sup>71</sup> siue] sine *B*

<sup>72</sup> ut corporea in similitudine, siue exemplo] *om.* *B*

<sup>73</sup> ad] in *B*

<sup>74</sup> successiua] successiua *P1A1A2P2*

<sup>75</sup> termino] *om.* *VP1BA1A2*

<sup>76</sup> coequalia *corr.*] *coeqerua*  $\Omega$

<sup>77</sup> etiam] quasi *V* uel ideo *A1*

<sup>78</sup> *sunt*] *sicut* *B*

<sup>79</sup> quando ... instanti] *om.* *B*

<sup>80</sup> a secluis] osculis *VAIA2P2 om.* *P1*

5. Hieronimus tamen<sup>81</sup> ante<sup>82</sup> incarnationem transi<t> V<sup>83</sup> ciliades<sup>84</sup>. Loquitur autem Hieronimus secundum tempus suum<sup>85</sup> fuit enim in sexta etate, quando currebat VI<sup>86</sup> ciliades<sup>87</sup>. Ortum sine mutatione hoc nichil est, quia tempus non potest esse sine motu, quia tempus est mensura motus secundum prius et posterius, nisi dicatur quod tempus eternum non est tempus<sup>xv</sup>, sed status rerum permanens in eodem esse. Sed item quomodo seruiebant domino, si nichil agerent id est si<sup>88</sup> ibi<sup>89</sup> actio erat, ergo et motus, quia omnis actio in motu et omnis motus in actione finiatur, ergo et tempus, cum ibi sit prius et posterius, et sic oportet dicere eos quod tempus precessit mundum quod aperte falsum est. Intemporaliter id est sine temporali alteratione, quod prius dictum est scilicet quod cepit esse cum aliis tribus, sed aliorum opinionem id est Grecorum, qui dicebant quod deus ante mundum creauit intelligencias per quas creauit mundum; uel potest dici quod interrogacio Hieronimi<sup>xvi</sup> sonat in negatione quasi dicens nullas eternitates, nulla tempora et cetera. Uel seruierunt<sup>90</sup> in predestinatione, sicut dicitur *agnus occisus*<sup>91</sup> *ab origine mundi*<sup>xvii</sup> id est prouisus occidi Apocalypsis XIII; uel per occisione, quia occisio, quare agnus, id est Kristus, occisus est, precessit originem mundi, scilicet equalitas filii cum patre quam appetiuit lucifer in origine mundi et ideo cecidit et sapiencia filii quam primus homo statim ut creatus est concupiuit, unde Ionas I: *propter me hec tempestas orta est, mittite me in mare*<sup>xviii</sup>.

### <Questio secunda de loco angelorum>

6. Iam ostensum est quando, hic quarentur duo principaliter. Primum<sup>92</sup> ubi creati sunt angeli: an in celo empireum, an alibi. Secundum quid sit celum empireum et ubi sit.

7. Ad<sup>93</sup> primum sic: si angeli creati fuerunt in celo empireo, constat quod creati fuerunt in loco suo, ergo celum empireum est locus angelorum<sup>xix</sup> sicut terra locus est hominis, quia in ea factus fuit, ergo quando sunt nobiscum, non sunt in loco suo, et nichil extra proprium locum quiescit, quia quoslibet<sup>94</sup> naturaliter tendit ad locum proprium<sup>xx</sup>, ergo non habent perfectam beatitudinem<sup>95</sup>,

<sup>81</sup> Hieronimus tamen] ~~ioam~~ V quia non erat P<sub>1</sub> locum A<sub>1</sub>

<sup>82</sup> ante] tamen A<sub>2</sub>

<sup>83</sup> V] VI B

<sup>84</sup> ciliades] ciclades V marg. ylias V

<sup>85</sup> sumi] sumii V sumi P<sub>1</sub>A<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>P<sub>2</sub>

<sup>86</sup> VI] III B

<sup>87</sup> ciliades] inter alias B

<sup>88</sup> si] suue V nichil agerent nec agebant B

<sup>89</sup> ibi] om. VB

<sup>90</sup> seruierunt] add. ei B

<sup>91</sup> occisus] ~~ariosus~~ V

<sup>92</sup> Primum] add. est BP<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>P<sub>2</sub>

<sup>93</sup> Ad] marg. an V

<sup>94</sup> quoslibet] quodlibet VAI

<sup>95</sup> beatitudinem] habitudinem VAI P<sub>2</sub>

quia<sup>96</sup> beatus est<sup>97</sup> cui omnia optata succedunt. Forte dicet aliquis<sup>xxi</sup> quod celum empireum est ubiconque angelus est<sup>98</sup>, sicut dicitur quod infernus est ubiconque diabolus est<sup>99</sup>.

8. Sed patet quod utrumque istorum<sup>100</sup> falsum est, quia super illud Matthei VIII ut quid *uenisti nos torquere ante tempus*<sup>xxii</sup> dicit glossa, quod diaboli non semper sunt in inferno nec semper puniuntur igne infernali<sup>xxiii</sup>. Item secundum hoc oportet dicere quod homines<sup>101</sup> sunt in celo empireo, quando angeli sunt cum eis, quod nemo concedit; similiter in inferno, quando demones assistunt. Uel cum simul assistit homini angelus et diabolus, esset homo simul in<sup>102</sup> inferno et celo empireo, quod | 47va | est impossibile.

9. Item queritur, quid sit celum empireum: utrum substantia uel accidens. Hoc enim est necesse<sup>103</sup> quia quicquid est aut<sup>104</sup> substantia, aut accidens. Si est accidens, ergo est in subiecto. Queritur in quo: in angelo non, quia dicit Iohannes Damascenus: *omnino quidcumque est quod*<sup>105</sup> *continet, non est in eo quod continetur*<sup>xxiv</sup>, sed celum empireum continet angelum, ergo non est in eo<sup>106</sup>.

10. Si in aliquo alio, queritur in quo et non est assignare, quia in deo non est nec est in firmamento uel aliquo sub ipso, quia celum empireum prius fuit<sup>107</sup> ipso, nec in prima materia que fuit creata cum ipso id est eque primo, quia sic non annumeraretur<sup>108</sup> cum eo<sup>109</sup>, ut<sup>110</sup> iam non posset dici IIII primo fuisse creata, quod tamen dicit glossa super Genesim circa principium: *primum*<sup>111</sup> *illa materia creata*<sup>112</sup> *fuit informis*<sup>xxv</sup>.

11. Si dicitur quod substantia, ergo aut corporalis, aut spiritualis. Spiritualis non, quia tantum sunt tres spirituales substantie species: scilicet deus, angelus, anima<sup>xxvi</sup>. Si corporalis, ergo et est locus angelorum, ergo angeli sunt in loco corporali. Contradicit Iohannes Damascenus: *locus est corporalis finis eius quod continet secundum id quod continetur*<sup>xxvii</sup>, id est locus corporaliter, id est secundum trinam dimensionem, finit, id est terminat, illud quod continet, in quantum tale est. Sed angeli non habent trinam dimensionem sicut dicit Iohannes Damascenus<sup>xxviii</sup>, ergo non sunt in

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<sup>96</sup> quia] ~~per~~ V

<sup>97</sup> beatus est] *om. est* V perfectus A<sub>1</sub>

<sup>98</sup> est] *om. VA*<sub>1</sub>

<sup>99</sup> est] *om. VA*<sub>1</sub>

<sup>100</sup> istorum] *om. VA*<sub>1</sub>

<sup>101</sup> homines] demones B

<sup>102</sup> in] *add. in A*<sub>1</sub>

<sup>103</sup> necesse] necessum A<sub>2</sub>

<sup>104</sup> aut] *add. est B*

<sup>105</sup> quod] ~~eumque~~ V

<sup>106</sup> eo] ~~quod continetur~~ V

<sup>107</sup> fuit] *sive V*

<sup>108</sup> annumeraretur] *numirantur V numeraretur A*<sub>1</sub>

<sup>109</sup> eo] ipso VA<sub>1</sub>

<sup>110</sup> ut] *add. si V*

<sup>111</sup> primum] *preteera V*

<sup>112</sup> creata] *om. V*

loco corporali. Preterea dicit Iohannes Damascenus: *intellectus*<sup>113</sup>, *existentes in intellectualibus locis, sunt non corporaliter*<sup>114</sup> *circumscripti, non enim corporaliter secundum naturam figurantur neque tres habent dimensiones, sed quia intellectualiter adsunt et operantur ubicumque iussi fuerint, quia non possunt secundum idem hic et illic esse et operari*<sup>xxix</sup>. Intellectus uocat angelos, quia sunt spiritus intelligibiles. Ex hoc patet quod angeli non sunt in loco corporali, quia non habent trinam dimensionem et quia<sup>115</sup> non sunt nec operantur in diuersis locis simul.

12. Item celum empireum aut est super firmamentum, aut subtus. Patet quod non sub, ergo supra, ergo aut continuum, aut contiguum, aut distans. Si continuum uel contiguum<sup>116</sup>, ergo moto firmamento necesse mouetur. Et illud, et angeli sunt in illo tanquam in loco proprio<sup>117</sup>, ergo angeli subiacent motui et tempori, et corruptioni. Si distans, tunc queritur quid sit medium.

13. Solutio: dicimus quod celum empireum est corpus<sup>118</sup> et est locus angelorum proprius, et est supra firmamentum connexum, ut firmamentum tamen non continuum uel contiguum, sed distans ex omni parte concludens intra se firmamentum<sup>119</sup>. Et sunt in medio aque uaporabiles<sup>120</sup>, que secundum quosdam<sup>121</sup> congelate in cristallium dicuntur celum crystallinum, unde Iohannes Damascenus diffinit celum sic: *celum est continencia uisibilium et inuisibilium creaturarum; infra enim ipsum et intelligibiles angelorum uirtutes, et omnia*<sup>122</sup> *sensibilia concluduntur et circumferuntur*<sup>xxx</sup>.

14. Ad illud quod obicitur dicimus quod angeli sunt in loco corporali, quia idem est locus corporalis et spiritualis. Sed dicitur *corporalis*<sup>123</sup> in se consideratus et ad corpora contenta comparatus, *spiritualis* in comparatione ad angelum et animam. Est autem dupliciter angelus in loco<sup>xxxi</sup>: et secundum essenciam distinctiue, quia ita est alicubi quod non est alibi, et secundum operationem, quia ita operatur hic quod non alibi, sicut per predictam patet auctoritatem Iohannis Damasceni<sup>xxxii</sup>. Unde angelus qui operatur hic contra me non potest<sup>124</sup> simul operari in Anglia | 47vb | nec manens hic posset aliquid facere uel intelligere in Anglia.

<sup>113</sup> intellectus] intellectos VP<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>

<sup>114</sup> corporaliter] ~~non~~ V

<sup>115</sup> quia] om. V

<sup>116</sup> Si continuum uel contiguum] om. V

<sup>117</sup> in loco proprio] in ipso, sicut in loco proprio B

<sup>118</sup> corpus] marg. immobile A<sub>2</sub>

<sup>119</sup> firmamantum non continuum] firmamantum ex omni parte concludens V

<sup>120</sup> uaporabiles] incomparabiles V

<sup>121</sup> quosdam] quoddam B

<sup>122</sup> omnia] circa V

<sup>123</sup> corporalis] corpus VP<sub>1</sub>A<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>P<sub>2</sub>

<sup>124</sup> non potest] *add.* si et secundum operationem, quia ita operatur hic, ergo non alibi, sicut patet per predictam auctoritatem Iohannis Damasceni P<sub>1</sub> *add.* si et secundum operationem, quia ita operatur hic, quod non alibi, simul P<sub>2</sub>

### <Questio tertia de cognitione angelorum>

15. *Intelligentia dico uespertina, quia matutina*<sup>xxxiii</sup> id est qua uidet<sup>125</sup> res<sup>126</sup> in uerbo potest intelligere omnia presenciam et futura pro uoluntate speculi<sup>127</sup> siue uerbi<sup>xxxiv</sup>. Si tu obicis, ibi<sup>128</sup> uerbum Aristotelis quod intellectus intelligit sine hic<sup>129</sup> et nunc, uerum est hoc de intellectu anime existentis<sup>130</sup> in corpore, quia per species rerum intelligit res, non<sup>131</sup> per presenciam. Sed anima exuta et angelus non intelligit per species rerum, sed per rerum presenciam, unde intellectus eorum dicitur uisus. Sed in quanta distancia possit angelus uel anima uidere exuta res non audiui determinari.

16. Ante casum fuisse in celo empireo. Dominus in Euangelio Luca X<sup>xxxv</sup>. Non ab ardore igneum<sup>132</sup> in Iobe XXXVIII<sup>xxxvi</sup>: <ubi eras> cum me laudabant <astra matutina> et cetera, matutina id est in principio temporis facta per hoc quod ostenditur, quod non<sup>133</sup> prius factum fuit celum empireum quam angeli, secretum id est diuisum, sanctis id est innocentibus, nondum enim erant sancti per gratiam, repletum id est inhabitatum<sup>134</sup>, ex hiis liquet<sup>135</sup> et ita patet quod celum empireum est proprius locus angeli. Sed probatur quod deus<sup>136</sup> est proprius locus angeli et anime quod dicitur in Ecclesiaste X: *Si spiritus potestatem habentis <ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne demiseris>* et cetera<sup>xxxvii</sup>, ibi locum tenet id est deum, ergo deus est locus anime, essencie rationalis et angeli. Secundum hoc uidetur quod angelus omnino immobilis est secundum locum, quia deus ubique est et ita angelus semper est in eodem loco<sup>xxxviii</sup>. Sed<sup>137</sup> dicimus quod deus per similitudinem dicitur locus spirituum, sed non<sup>138</sup> uere, quia sicut res non quiescant nisi in loco proprio, sic nec spiritus, unde Augustinus in libro Confessionis: *inquietum est cor meum domine donec perueniat ad te*<sup>xxxix</sup>. Informi id est indistincta, utraque informis hoc dicit secundum communem opinionem, que dicit angelos creatos in naturalibus tantum, de quo post satis habebitur<sup>xl</sup>. Ita spiritualis, quia angeli creati fuerunt in optimis naturalibus et non in gratuitis secundum magistrum, formam id est caritatem et alias uirtutes. Uite spiritualis id est spiritualium uiuentium, sicut in se potest: caue, non dicit quod angelus sine creatore possit existere, sed hoc

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<sup>125</sup> uidet] uides B

<sup>126</sup> res] tres A<sub>1</sub>

<sup>127</sup> speculi] spirituali VA<sub>2</sub>

<sup>128</sup> ibi] illud B

<sup>129</sup> hic] marg. ydola, alibi species A<sub>2</sub>

<sup>130</sup> existentis] exubentis A<sub>1</sub>

<sup>131</sup> non] om. VA<sub>1</sub>

<sup>132</sup> igneum] uiuem V matutina B inuen A<sub>1</sub>

<sup>133</sup> non] si V

<sup>134</sup> inhabitatum] habitatum VA<sub>1</sub>

<sup>135</sup> liquet] que VP<sub>1</sub>A<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>P<sub>2</sub>

<sup>136</sup> deus] ideus V om. A<sub>1</sub>

<sup>137</sup> Sed] Scilicet VA<sub>1</sub>

<sup>138</sup> non] si V

intendit quod per *celum* intelligitur angelus existens in naturalibus solum sine gratia, per conuersionem sui ad deum inuenit optinere. Ysaia XIII<sup>xli</sup>: et est tale id est talis sensus.

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- <sup>i</sup> Isa. 14:13; *Stephan Langton* Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton / Ed. A.M. Landgraf. Münster, 1952. S. 71
- <sup>ii</sup> Glossa ordinaria // *Patrologiae cursus completus. Ser. Latina* / Ed. J.-P. Migne. Vol. 113. Paris, 1852. Gen. 1:1; BNF Lat. 14526. Fol. 14vb; *Alexander de Hales* Op. cit. (Liber II). Cap. II.21
- <sup>iii</sup> Ecclesiasticus 1:4
- <sup>iv</sup> *Johannes Damascenus* De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus / Ed. E.M. Buytaert. New York, 1955. Cap. XVII.19
- <sup>v</sup> Mt. 1:25
- <sup>vi</sup> *Stephan Langton* Op. cit. S. 70
- <sup>vii</sup> *Eustathius* Op. cit. Cap. I.5
- <sup>viii</sup> Ecclesiasticus 24:14
- <sup>ix</sup> BNF Lat. 14526. Fol. 14vb
- <sup>x</sup> *Johannes Damascenus* Op. cit. Cap. XIII.6
- <sup>xi</sup> Ecclesiasticus 18:1
- <sup>xii</sup> *Guillermus Altissiodorensis* Summa aurea (Liber II–I) / Ed. J. Ribailier. Grottaferrata, Paris, 1982. Tr. XIV.3
- <sup>xiii</sup> *Stephan Langton* Op. cit. S. 70
- <sup>xiv</sup> *Alexander de Hales* Op. cit. (Liber II). Cap. II.11
- <sup>xv</sup> *Aristoteles* Op. cit. Cap. IV.11
- <sup>xvi</sup> BNF Lat. 14526. Fol. 14vb
- <sup>xvii</sup> Apoc. 13:8
- <sup>xviii</sup> Jon. 1:12; *Ibid.* Fol. 15rb
- <sup>xix</sup> *Guillermus Altissiodorensis* Op. cit. (Liber II–I). Tr. VI.2.6
- <sup>xx</sup> *Aristoteles*. Op. cit. Cap. IV.1; *Alexander de Hales*. Op. cit. (Liber I). 37.III.b
- <sup>xxi</sup> Beda. *Historia Ecclesiastica* // *Patrologiae cursus completus. Ser. Latina* / Ed. J.-P. Migne. Vol. 95. Paris, 1861. P. 256
- <sup>xxii</sup> Mt. 8:29
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Glossa ordinaria Op. cit. (Vol. 114). Mt. 8:29
- <sup>xxiv</sup> *Johannes Damascenus* Op. cit. Cap. XIII.1
- <sup>xxv</sup> Glossa ordinaria Op. cit. (Vol. 113). Gen. 1:1
- <sup>xxvi</sup> *Guillermus Altissiodorensis* Op. cit. (Liber II–I). Tr. VIII.2.6
- <sup>xxvii</sup> *Johannes Damascenus* Op. cit. Cap. XIII.1
- <sup>xxviii</sup> *Ibid.* Cap. XVII.10
- <sup>xxix</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>xxx</sup> *Ibid.* Cap. XX.1; cf. *Alexander de Hales*. Op. cit. (Liber II). Cap. II.22
- <sup>xxxi</sup> *Alexander de Hales*. Op. cit. (Liber I). Cap. XXXVII.4–5
- <sup>xxxii</sup> *Johannes Damascenus* Op. cit. Cap. XIII.4
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> Gen. 1:8
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> *Guillermus Altissiodorensis* Op. cit. (Liber II–I). Tr. VI.1
- <sup>xxxv</sup> Lk. 10:18
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> Iob 38:7
- <sup>xxxvii</sup> Ecclesiastes 10:4
- <sup>xxxviii</sup> *Guillermus Altissiodorensis* Op. cit. (Liber I). Tr. XIV.3
- <sup>xxxix</sup> *Aurelius Augustinus*. *Confessiones* // *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* / Ed. P. Knoll. Vol. 33. Wien, 1896. Cap. I.1
- <sup>xl</sup> BNF Lat. 14526. Fol. Fol. 15ra
- <sup>xli</sup> Isa. 14:13