

There has been surprisingly little modern quantitative voter research done in transitional countries, especially in Russia. The bulk of the existing works investigate economic voting — whether a voter's desire to support an incumbent political party or president depends on her positive or negative retrospective or prospective economic evaluations.

Hesli and Bashkirova (2001) found that both prospective and retrospective economic evaluations were important for positive evaluations of President Boris Yeltsin in 1995-1999. According to the “transitional model” of economic voting (Tucker, 2006), the economic evaluations of voters in post-Communist countries are more long-term. The voters compare the current economic conditions with the pre-transition economy. Those who believe that the economic conditions have deteriorated should support the parties that are associated with the pre-transition Communist regime. Owen and Tucker (2008) tested this theory against data from Poland, with some evidence in favor of both the transitional model and the conventional model of economic voting<sup>1</sup>. Fidrmuk (2000a, 2000b) also provided a classification of in the post-Communist Eastern Europe; different types of parties have different support groups in the electorate, based on employment, education, and other factors that are corelated with the individual's positive or negative experience with economic reforms.

There have been fewer arguments in favor of ideological and issue voting. Colton and Hale (2008) compared the effects of positions on various ideological and policy issues on the 2000

---

<sup>1</sup>Cox and Powers (1997) earlier noted that voting in Poland was affected by whether an individual believed that the Communists or the reformens were to blame for the country's post-reform economic hardships. It has a stronger effect on vote than retrospective economic evaluations.

and 2004 Russian Presidential vote. They found that the role of such positions (including the left-right self-identification) declined in 2004. Only two issues (foreign policy and presidentialism) were found to be important for the election that year. According to a macro-level study by Mishler and Willerton (2003), ideology did play some role in the public's evaluations of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin from 1993 to 2000 — in particular, percentage of survey respondents who approved of authoritarian or nationalistic values negatively correlated with either Yeltsin's or Putin's approval. However, retrospective economic evaluations, and inflation, were found to have greater importance. In a similar approach, Treisman (2008) also argued in favor of economy-driven presidential approval.

This is the first work that uses a multinomial choice model to analyze the source of support for the main Russian political parties on the eve of the 2007 State Duma elections. I am interested in finding whether the high amount of support rendered to the pro-Kremlin United Russia party was a result of its neutral (and vague) ideological position<sup>2</sup>, demographic factors, or the approval of President Putin. Although the survey data that I use does not contain an explicit question about the retrospective economic evaluation, Putin's approval can be used as a proxy.

---

<sup>2</sup>The proposition that ideology or policy preferences affect voting can be tested with survey data that records the positions of the voters on various policy issues. One can then use factor analysis to calculate the position of the voter in the policy space, or include in the voter utility function a separate term for each policy issue. The first approach was used to analyze data from Netherlands and Great Britain (Quinn, Martin and Whitford, 1999), and Israel (Schofield, 2007). The second approach is used, for example, by Thurner and Eymann (2000) for German Bundestag elections.

# 1 The Data

The results of this work are based on a survey conducted by VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) in May 2007. Some 1588 adult citizens were interviewed in 46 Russian regions, out of a total of 83.

Over 66% of the respondents indicated that they would vote for some party if the election were held at the time of the survey (Table 4). The distribution of vote in the sample is similar to the distribution of actual vote in December, 2 elections. The lion's share of the vote went to the pro-Kremlin United Russia party.

It is commonly believed that the United Russia received unfair advantage due to the lopsided coverage on the state television channels and political pressure. The party also enjoyed an open endorsement by the then President Vladimir Putin, and it is widely believed that some form of election fraud had taken place (see, for instance, Harding, 2007). The support for the pro-Kremlin United Russia actually declined from 45% in the May sample to 40% in the December election. According to some sources, the decline may have been due to the popular dissatisfaction with the rising food prices in the third and fourth quarters of 2007 (see, for instance, Babich, 2007).

Most of the rest of the vote, both in the elections and in the sample, went to the three runner-up parties. Support for Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) has increased from 4,2% to 5,1%; for Fair Russia (SR) it has declined from 6,2% to under 5%; for the Communist Party (CPRF), it has remained constant at 7,1-7,3%. The share of votes for most minor parties (with the notable exception of the Agrarian Party) was also similar in the survey and in the

elections.

Some 54.7% of the respondents were female, 45.3% male. The age of the respondents varied from 18 to 92 full years, with the mean of 44,69 years. Rural residents composed 26,67% of the sample. The mean self-reported education on 0 to 1 scale was 0,56; for income, the figure was also 0,56 (see Appendix A on the index details).

The approval rate for President Putin is noticeably higher than for other federal government institutions — State Duma, Federation Council, the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet (Table 1). Only a small part of the population — 12% — disapproves of Putin, and an even smaller part — 8% — was undecided. For other institutions, the disapproval rates are much higher. The share of the respondents who answered “don’t know” is also greater, suggesting that the attitudes are weaker.

The respondent’s ideological preferences were measured by two survey questions. In the first question, the respondent was read a list of 40 words. After each item, he was asked to identify whether he felt positive toward the concept it represented. The second question was identical, except that the negative feelings were recorded (see Tables 2,3). “Order” was positively identified by the largest number of respondents (57%), followed by “justice”, “stability”, and “well-being”. The largest number of negative responses was given to “elite” (41%), followed by “non-Russians” and “West”.

For each concept, I constructed a variable that took the value of -1 if the respondent’s feeling was negative, 1 if the feeling was positive, and 0 otherwise. The Karhunen-Loeve transform was used to construct the two-dimensional ideological space and the positions of the respondents. Figure 2 shows the positions of the respondents in the ideological space.

Tables 2,3 show factor loadings for each of the 40 concepts. Each factor loading is proportional to the correlation between the values of the ideological factor and the feelings toward the concept. To use the terminology of Basinger and Hartman (2006), the concepts with high absolute factor loadings are “ideologically integrated”.

The first ideological factor (or the position along the first dimension) can be interpreted as the degree of a voter’s general (dis)satisfaction. High values of the first factor correspond to negative feelings toward “justice” and “labor”, and, to a lesser extent, “order”, “state”, “stability” and “equality”. Also, those with high values of the first tend to feel neutral toward “order”, “elite”, “West”, and “non-Russians”. Low values of the first factor correspond to positive attitudes to “order”, “justice”, “stability” and “equality”, and negative attitudes toward “elite”, “West”, and “non-Russians”.

The second factor can be called the voter’s degree of economic liberalism. High values correspond to positive feelings to “freedom”, “business”, “capitalism”, “well-being”, “success”, and “progress”, and to negative feelings toward “communism”, “socialism”, “USSR”, and related concepts.

One can see that the supporters of different parties tend to have different ideological preferences (Table 4). The supporters of the United Russia have the centrist position along both dimensions — partly due to the fact that they constitute 45% of the sample, and the sample means are zero for each ideological factor. The supporters of the Communist Party and Fair Russia have similar ideological profiles, with low values along each factor. The LDPR supporters tend to have low values along the first ideological factor (suggesting dissatisfaction), but high values along the second factor (suggesting economic liberalism).

## 2 The multinomial logit model

Denote by  $I$  the set of parties and by  $N$  the set of respondents. Each voter  $i$  is characterized by the vector  $x_i$  of observable individual-specific nonpolicy factors, and by the observable position  $(v_{i1}, v_{i2})$  on the two ideological dimensions. Each party  $j$  is characterized by the ideological position  $(y_{j1}, y_{j2})$ .

Suppose that the utility that voter  $i$  attributes to party  $j$  is

$$u_{ij} = a_j + \alpha_j x_i^T + \beta_1 (v_{i1} - y_{j1})^2 + \beta_2 (v_{i2} - y_{j2})^2 + \epsilon_{ij} \equiv \bar{u}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad (1)$$

where  $a_j, \alpha_j, \beta_1, \beta_2$  are unobservable parameters, and  $\epsilon_{ij}$  is an unobservable independent random variable distributed according to the rule

$$P(\epsilon_{ij} \leq h) = e^{-e^{-h}}. \quad (2)$$

Denote by  $d_i \in J$  the party that respondent  $i$  intends to vote for.

Assume that the respondents votes for party  $j$  if that party gives him the maximum utility. Given that the error terms are distributed according to (2), the probability that voter  $i$  will support party  $j$  is

$$P_{ij} = \frac{\exp \bar{u}_{ij}}{\sum_{l \in J} \exp \bar{u}_{il}}. \quad (3)$$

Denote the likelihood of the model by

$$L = \prod_{i \in I} P_{id_i}. \quad (4)$$

The estimation problem is to find the values of  $a_j, \alpha_j, \beta_1, \beta_2$  that maximize  $L$ .

Ascertaining  $y_{j1}$  and  $y_{j2}$ , the ideological positions of political parties as they are perceived by the voters, is a methodological problem. There are several ways to do it, such as expert survey of party elites (see Quinn, Martin, and Whitford, 1998), own expert judgement (Schofield, 2007), or a systematized analysis of party manifestos (Bulge et. al., 2001). For this work, I took the party positions to be equal to the average positions of respondents:

$$y_{jk} = \sum_{i|d_i=j} v_{ik} \quad (5)$$

for all  $j$   $i = 1, 2$ .

### 3 The results

The multinomial models of voter choice generally perform poorly when some parties have very limited support.

For this reason, I initially limit my estimation to four parties — United Russia, the Communist Party, LDPR, and Fair Russia. In order to check the robustness of the results, I then estimate the voter choice model with seven parties, adding Yabloko, SPS, and the Agrarian Party.

Several variants of the four-party model are looked at.

1. The full set of explanatory variables is used. These include ideological positions, age, gender, rural residence, income, education, approval and efficacy. See Table 5.
2. All of the above, except ideological positions. See Table 6.
3. Model 1 with significant explanatory variables retained. See Table 7.

4. Model 1 less approval and efficacy. See Table 8.
5. Model 4 less age and gender. See Table 9.
6. Model 5 less education, income, and rural residence ( $\alpha_j = 0$  in (1)). See Table 10.

For the seven-party model, I use the following restrictions.

1. The full set of explanatory variables is used. See Table 18.
2. Model 1 less ideological positions. See Table 19.
3. Model 1 with significant explanatory variables retained. See Table 20.
4. Model 1 less approval and efficacy. See Table 21.
5. Model 4 less age, gender, education, income, and rural residence ( $\alpha_j = 0$  in (1)). See Table 22.

The findings show overwhelming support for the hypothesis that ideology affects voting. For the four-party and seven-party models with the full set of other explanatory variables, adding the two spatial terms improves log likelihood by 45 and 50,8, respectively. This translates into an increase from 40,9% to 42,9% in the geometric average probability of predicting the vote correctly for the seven-party model. For the four-party model, the corresponding increase is from 46,5% to 48,7%. Likelihood ratio tests show that the addition of the two spatial terms is significant (see Tables 11, 23). The estimated values of both  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  are approximately equal for the four-party and the seven-party models.

The ideological preferences of a voter strongly affect her predicted vote. In Tables 13 and 14 I give the probabilities of a male and a female voter supporting the four large parties (based on the estimation of the four-party model with the full set of explanatory variables). One can see that the support for the high-valence United Russia can vary from 45% to 83%, depending on ideological position. The support for low-valence parties varies by a greater extent — from 1% to 31% for the Communist party, for example.

The approval of President Putin had a significant and negative effect on the support for all parties other than United Russia. The effect was the strongest for the CPRF and weakest for the Fair Russia (see Table 5). Hence an increase in one's approval is likely to increase a voter's probability of voting for United Russia at the expense of the other three parties, with CPRF being hardest hit. This signifies the fact that Russian voters clearly perceived United Russia as a pro-Putin party even in May 2007, well before it was announced that Putin would head the United Russia party list on October 2001.

The approval the Prime Minister and Cabinet did not have any significant effect on the vote. Approval of the State Duma had a small, negative and marginally significant effect on the LDPR vote; for other parties, that effect was not significant. The term for the approval of the upper house of the Russia parliament, the Federation Council, was significant only for the Fair Russia party. It was also positive, as the party leader, Segei Mironov, is also the head of that legislative body.

The magnitude of the 'Putin effect' on the level of support for the United Russia can be estimated by setting the approval scores equal to zero for all respondents, then re-estimating the probabilities of voting according to the four-party model with

the full set of explanatory variables. The expected voteshares for each party by can be obtained by averaging the estimated probabilities for each party across all respondents in the four-party subsample.<sup>3</sup>

The results of this estimation appear in Table 12. One can see that the high approval of President Putin affected the support for the United Russia to a very large extent. In the original four-party subsample, 72% of the votes went to that party. If the approval for Putin uniformly decreased to 0,5 (equivalent to a “don’t know” answer to the question whether the respondent approved of Putin), the support for the United Russia would decline to 61%. If everyone completely disapproved of Putin, United Russia would receive only 43% of the vote that went to the four parties, or only 27,2% of the popular vote, if we assume that the share of the abstaining or undecided voters, as well as the vote share of the small parties, remained constant. The main beneficiaries of the decrease in approval would be the Communist party and LDPR, with more modest gains by SR.

Thus this work corroborates what have been common knowledge: the popularity of the United Russia was due to the high approval rating of Vladimir Putin, and to the party’s perceived connection to the popular president.

The respondents who supported parties other than the United Russia also had lower internal efficacy scores. One can see that an increase in one’s efficacy score will increase her probability of supporting United Russia, at the expense of all other parties for the four-party model, where all three efficacy terms are negative and significant. For the seven-party model, the efficacy

---

<sup>3</sup>Conveniently, the expected voteshares for the unaltered subsample are equal to the actual voteshares in that subsample. This is a very nice property of Logit models of multinomial choice.

terms for the three small parties are not significant.

Education was found to have no effect on the political preferences of the voters. For all models, the education terms in (1) were individually insignificant, with the exception for SPS, where it was significant at 10% level. Education was the only significant individual nonpolicy factor found to affect the voter's latent utility for SPS. A voter with a higher education is more likely to support SPS, at the expense of all other parties.

For the four-party model, the income effect is significant only for the LDPR. A voter with a higher income will be more likely to support LDPR. The effect is quite large in magnitude. An increase in self-reported income by one level (from "medium" to "high", for example) will have approximately the same effect on the voter's likelihood to support LDPR as a change in approval from maximum to minimum. For the seven-party model, the income also had a positive effect on the preference for the Agrarian party.

Gender was the one of the most important factors that affected party preferences. Out of 67 LDPR supporters in the sample, 55 were males. The United Russia had slightly more female supporters (414 out of 726), while the Communist party and the SR has an equal number of male and female supporters. When controlling for all other factors, male voters are more likely to support the Communist Party and especially LDPR at the expense of the SR and the United Russia. For the extended dataset including the supporters of the three small partues, female voters were more likely to support Yabloko and equally likely to support either SPS or the Agrarian party.

Age was also found to have a significant effect for almost all parties. The effect (relative to the United Russia) was largest for the CPRF. Indeed, the average age of CPRF supporters was

59,0 This finding suggests that the factors that make CPRF more popular among the older population are not captured by either ideological preferences, the approval of government, or internal efficacy. The high age of CPRF supporters also explains the gender bias: in 2006, the average life expectancy of Russian males was only 60,3 years compared for 73,2 years for females. The age effect for the SR was similar (with the average age of the supporters being 54,9 years). For LDPR, the age effect was negative and significant; at the average age of 36,8 the LDPR electorate was the youngest from among the seven parties in the large sample. The age effect for SPS was positive and marginally significant.

The final sociodemographic factor that I studied was whether the respondent lived in a rural or urban area. There were no rural residents among Yabloko supporters and only one among the SPS. The proportion of rural residents among the CPRF, United Russia, SR supporters, and the general population, was almost equal (30%, 28,5%, 29.5%, and 30%, respectively). As a result, rural coefficients for neither CPRF or SR were significant. This corroborates the claim that the Communist Party lost the support of rural voters (Wegren and Konitzer, 2006). The only party to have a significantly smaller proportion of rural voters was the LDPR (23.8%).

Tables 13-16 examine the effects of various factors on the voter's probability of supporting each of the four major parties for the four-party model. In Table 17, I used the estimated four-party model to construct the profile of voters who are most likely to support each of the four major parties.

Poorly educated, low-income, young females who approve of the federal government and have centrist ideology are most likely to support United Russia, with probability 96% according

to the model. The most likely supporters of LDPR are young urban men with above average income, who disapprove of the government, have low efficacy scores, profess liberal economic ideology and are dissatisfied. The most likely supporters of CPRF and SR are dissatisfied elderly males with below-average income who disapprove of the government, have low efficacy scores, and have anti-market economic views. A voter belonging to this group is expected to support CPRF with probability of 48% and SR with probability 22%.

There are two remarks with respect to the model's capacity in predicting individual votes. First, most types of voters are expected to support the pro-Kremlin United Russia with a large probability. The lowest probability is for the pro-LDPR voter in Table 17 (8%), while for all other voter profiles from Tables 13-16, the figure is above 22% and usually is much higher. For the other three parties, the voting probabilities are usually below 10% for most voter profiles. This augments the claim that the voters have a strong pro-United Russia bias that is not accounted for by ideological and non-ideological voter characteristics measured in the survey. The source of this bias is the most likely the mass media.

The second thing to note is the model's poor ability to differentiate between CPRF and SR votes. The ratio of probabilities of voting for the two parties is relatively constant across the voter profiles, since the model coefficients are approximately equal for the two parties, and the supporters of the two parties have similar ideology.

## 4 Discussion

A number of other model specifications were tried by the author. First, I tested the hypothesis that certain factors — such as the willingness to discuss politics, education, or internal efficacy — can affect the importance of ideology in an individual's evaluation of a political party. The importance of ideology was found to be unaffected by any of these variables, in contrast to some previous studies<sup>4</sup>.

Second, I looked at the possibility of regional economic conditions affecting the vote.<sup>5</sup> The survey did not contain questions on retrospective self-evaluation of economic conditions, either in the short or long term. As a substitute I used two measures of actual economic conditions: the absolute level of mean disposable income, and the percentage change in that level from 2000 to 2006. I found two statistically significant effects. First, the support for the Communist party was higher in the regions with lower economic growth. Second, the support for Just Russia is higher in the regions with the higher absolute income. However, the magnitude of either effect is small compared to the effects of either approval or internal efficacy.

Third, I tried to find whether ideological preferences affect voter abstention. There are two testable theories of voter abstention due to ideology. First is voter indifference: A voter will support any one party only if he likes the party significantly more than all other parties. The second theory is voter

---

<sup>4</sup>Zakharov and Fantazzini (2008) found that education significantly increased the weight of ideology for UK and Netherlands; similarly, Hellwig (2008) in his study of European workers found that the importance of left-right policy dimension depends on the sector of individual's employment.

<sup>5</sup>See Owen and Tucker (2008) for economic voting in Poland.

alienation: A voter will support a party only if it offers a payoff that is above certain minimum level.<sup>6</sup> I found no support for either theory. The ideological preferences of the abstaining respondents are located in the center of the ideology space and occupy roughly the same position as the United Russia supporters. This is inconsistent with either voter indifference (the abstaining voters should occupy the ideological gaps between the positions of the political parties), or alienation (the abstaining voters must have positions far away from those of all parties). Instead, several of the individual nonideological factors are highly correlated with abstention. The most important of these are approval and efficacy. Out of 284 respondents who indicated that they would not vote, 104 (or 37%) do not approve of any federal institution, including the President. The corresponding figure for the whole sample is 23% (376 out of 1588). Approval for Putin and for the cabinet of ministers are the most important factors. For the efficacy scores, the difference is similar, with 64% and 43% of the respondents having the internal efficacy score of zero. Testing a multinomial logit model with abstention as one of the options, I found that abstaining voters tend to be of higher self-reported income, have lower education, be younger, and are less likely to live in the rural area. Gender is the only factor that is found not to affect the likelihood of turnout.

There were several reasons why I used only the first two ideological factors. First, the eigenvalues for the first two factors

---

<sup>6</sup>Indifference and alienation was first suggested as a possible explanation of abstention as early as by Smithies (1941) and Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook (1972). Positive empirical evidence for abstention due to indifference and alienation can be found, for example, in Adams, Dow and Merrill (2007). See Zakharov (2008) for a review of literature.

were much higher than for the subsequent factors (see Figure 1). Second, it was not possible to give a transparent interpretation to the subsequent factors. Finally, the inclusion of additional factors did not improve the fit of the model. In the four-party case, the log likelihood was 768,5 for zero factors (Table 4), 759,9 for 1 factor, 721 for 2 factors, 714,1 for three factors, and 711,8 for four factors.

The work does not control for several other factors that affected voter preferences. Most importantly, the parties' access to local mass media outlets, and the degree to which the law is selectively applied in favor of United Russia, vary across regions; such regional factors are not captured.

Certainly, neither media bias (White, Oates, and MacAlister, 2001) nor vote-rigging (Myagkov, Ordeshook, Shakin, 2005), can be overlooked as factors that contributed to the success of United Russia at the December, 2007 election. However, this consideration does not alter this paper's key message. My work shows that the principal role was played the high approval rating of President Putin. Although this work does not examine the origins of Putin's popularity, most accounts, scholarly or not, suggest that the country's economic performance was its primary source.

## Appendix

### A. Question wording

**Age.** What is your age in full years?

**Education.** "What is your education? 1 — Primary education or below, 2 — Incomplete secondary education, 3 —

Secondary education, 4 — Vocational school, 5 — Less than 4 years of higher education, 6 — 4 or more years of higher education.” Those who responded “Don’t know” were assigned the value of 3,5. The variable **education** was obtained as follows:  $(\text{response}-1)*0,2$

**Income.** “To which income group does your family belong? 1 — Cannot afford to buy food, 2 — Can afford food but cannot afford clothing, 3 — Can afford clothing but not durable goods, 4 — Can afford all durable goods but cannot afford real estate, 5 — Can afford real estate.” For the variable **income**, those who responded “Don’t know” were assigned the value of 3. The variable **income** was obtained as follows:  $(\text{response}-1)*0,25$

**Approval.** “Do you approve of A. President, B. Prime Minister, C. Government, D. State Duma, E. Federation council.” Each question was coded as follows: “1 — Yes, 2 — No, 1,5 — Can’t answer.” Each of the approval variables was obtained as follows: 2 – response.

**Size of township.** “Where do you live? 1 — Moscow or St. Petersburg, 2 — City over 1 mln., 3 — 500 thousand to 1 mln., 5 — 100 thousand to 500 thousand, 6 — 50 thousand to 100 thousand, 7 — urban-type settlement, 8 — village.” The variable **is\_village** was generated by assigning the value of 1 for “8 — village” and 0 otherwise.

**Ideological attitude.** There were two questions: “Please say if you feel positively (negatively) to each of the following concepts.” For each question, a list of 40 words was given (see Tables 2,3).

**Internal efficacy.** “Do you think that the ordinary voters like you have a say in who will be in power in the future, and on the country’s future policies? 1 — Yes, a lot depends on the regular voters, 2 — A few things depend on the voters, 3 — Nothing depends on the voters, all main decisions will be made without their consent”. The “can’t answer” response was coded as 2. The variable **efficacy** was generated as  $1,5 - 0,5 * \text{response}$ .

## B. The map of ideological preferences.

	Pres.	Gov.	P.M.	Duma	Fed.	C.
0 (disapprove)	12,72	42,54	29,88	54,24	39,27	
0,5 (don't know)	8,55	21,66	26,48	22,49	34,83	
1 (approve)	78,73	35,80	43,64	23,26	25,90	

Table 1: Approval of various federal institutions (percent of the sample).




Figure 1: Eigenvalues of principal components.

	<b>Concept</b>	<b>% pos.</b>	<b>% neg.</b>	<b>Fact. 1</b>	<b>Fact. 2</b>
01	Nation	0,21	0,08	0,11	-0,08
02	Order	0,57	0,01	-0,18	0,01
03	Freedom	0,37	0,03	-0,13	0,20
04	Market	0,10	0,15	0,26	0,08
05	Russians	0,34	0,02	-0,15	0,03
06	West	0,02	0,23	0,21	0,10
07	Socialism	0,11	0,11	-0,13	-0,28
08	Communism	0,07	0,19	0,05	-0,32
09	Democracy	0,15	0,09	0,11	0,07
10	Tradition	0,29	0,01	-0,06	-0,04
11	Patriotims	0,34	0,01	-0,14	-0,15
12	State	0,26	0,03	-0,17	-0,03
13	Competitiveness	0,05	0,07	0,07	0,12
14	Sovereignty	0,07	0,05	-0,08	0,01
15	Elite	0,02	0,41	0,30	0,04
16	Party	0,02	0,16	0,04	-0,14
17	Power	0,09	0,18	0,26	-0,09
18	Justice	0,49	0,02	-0,30	0,02
19	Opposition	0,01	0,17	0,12	-0,06
20	Business	0,07	0,13	0,17	0,27

Table 2: The frequency of positive and negative responses and factor loadings (part 2).

	<b>Concept</b>	<b>% pos.</b>	<b>% neg.</b>	<b>Fact. 1</b>	<b>Fact. 2</b>
21	USSR	0,12	0,08	-0,01	-0,34
22	Church	0,21	0,02	-0,13	-0,01
23	Revolution	0,01	0,22	0,13	-0,26
24	Property	0,14	0,04	0,13	0,14
25	Success	0,31	0,00	-0,16	0,21
26	Liberalism	0,01	0,14	0,15	-0,01
27	Reform	0,06	0,14	0,23	-0,02
28	Stability	0,38	0,00	-0,16	0,00
29	Labor	0,31	0,00	-0,26	-0,08
30	Individualism	0,02	0,12	0,05	0,10
31	Non-Russians	0,02	0,29	0,25	-0,12
32	Equality	0,18	0,02	-0,18	-0,06
33	Collectivism	0,06	0,09	0,02	-0,22
34	Morality	0,22	0,03	-0,05	-0,07
35	Human rights	0,32	0,02	-0,15	0,12
36	Wealth	0,12	0,01	0,15	0,25
37	Russia	0,28	0,00	-0,03	0,07
38	Well-being	0,37	0,01	-0,11	0,25
39	Progress	0,21	0,01	-0,03	0,27
40	Capitalism	0,15	0,02	-0,09	0,22

Table 3: The frequency of positive and negative responses and factor loadings (part 2).

<b>Party</b>	<b>Samp.</b>	<b>Vote</b>	<b>F1</b>	<b>F2</b>
Agrarian Party (AGR)	0,63	1,47	-0,16	-0,92
United Russia (ER)	45,72	40,96	0,05	0,30
Communist Party (CPRF)	7,12	7,37	-0,76	-1,59
LDPR	4,22	5,13	-0,53	0,69
Patriots of Russia	0,25	0,57	0,22	-0,10
Fair Russia (SR)	6,17	4,93	-0,60	-0,87
Civilian Power	0,69	0,67	-0,43	0,31
Union of Right Forces (SPS)	0,57	0,61	-0,47	1,14
Yabloko	0,76	1,01	-0,56	0,20
Russian Republican Party	0,25		-0,16	1,36
Democratic Party of Russia	0,19	0,08	-0,25	0,75
“Will not vote”	17,88		0,23	-0,06
“Can’t answer”	14,92		0,43	-0,04
Did not vote		36,3		

Table 4: Factor averages across the supporters of each party.




Figure 2: Distribution of voter ideal points for all respondents.




Figure 3: Distribution of region means. 1 - Adygea 2 - Bashkortostan, 3 - Buriatiya, 4 - Gorny Altai, 5 - Dagestan, 7 - Kabardino-Balkariya, 9 - Kerachaevo-Cherkesiya, 10 - Karelia, 13 - Mordovia, 16 - Tatarstan, 18 - Udmurtiya, 22 - Altai, 23 - Krasnodarskii Krai, 24 - Krasnoyarskii Krai, 25 - Primorye, 26 - Stavropolskii Krai, 28 - Amur Oblast, 29 - Archangel Oblast, 30 - Astrakhan Oblast, 31 - Belgorod Oblast, 32 - Bryansk Oblast, 33 - Vladimir Oblast, 34 - Volgograd Oblast, 36 - Voronezh Oblast, 39 - Kaliningrad Oblast, 42 - Kemerovo Oblast, 45 - Kurgan Oblast, 47 - Leningrad Oblast, 48 - Lipetsk Oblast, 52 - Nizhegorodskaya Oblast, 53 - Novgorod Oblast, 54 - Novosibirsk Oblast, 55 - Omsk Oblast, 56 - Orenburg Oblast, 58 - Penza Oblast, 61 - Rostov Oblast, 64 - Saratov Oblast, 65 - Sakhalin Oblast, 66 - Sverdlov Oblast, 69 - Tver Oblast, 72 - Tumen Oblast, 75 - Chita Oblast, 76 - Yaroslavl Oblast, 78 - Saint Petersburg, 86 - Khanty-Mansi AO, 90 - Moscow Oblast 99 - Moscow

## C. Estimation of voting models.

		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P >  z
$\beta_1$	_cons	-0,154	0,034	-4,44	0,000
$\beta_2$	_cons	-0,150	0,020	-7,43	0,000
<b>CPRF</b>	education	0,409	0,507	0,81	0,420
	income	0,490	0,784	0,63	0,532
	age	0,046	0,008	5,53	0,000
	is_village	-0,179	0,274	-0,65	0,513
	gender	-0,617	0,251	-2,46	0,014
	efficacy	-0,754	0,374	-2,02	0,044
	approve_putin	-2,051	0,389	-5,27	0,000
	approve_pm	0,246	0,387	0,64	0,524
	approve_gov	-0,194	0,389	-0,50	0,617
	approve_duma	-0,205	0,473	-0,43	0,664
	approve_sf	-0,406	0,509	-0,80	0,426
	_cons	-0,057	0,697	-0,08	0,934
<b>LDPR</b>	education	0,084	0,610	0,14	0,890
	income	2,650	0,886	2,99	0,003
	age	-0,021	0,009	-2,19	0,029
	is_village	-0,526	0,333	-1,58	0,114
	gender	-1,899	0,344	-5,51	0,000
	efficacy	-0,531	0,424	-1,25	0,211
	approve_putin	-2,047	0,460	-4,45	0,000
	approve_pm	0,195	0,483	0,40	0,686
	approve_gov	-0,094	0,496	-0,19	0,849
	approve_duma	0,830	0,537	1,54	0,123
	approve_sf	-0,711	0,607	-1,17	0,242
	_cons	-1,296	0,806	-1,61	0,108

		<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>z</b>	<i>P &gt;  z </i>
<b>SR</b>	education	0,519	0,482	1,08	0,282
	income	0,152	0,758	0,20	0,841
	age	0,037	0,007	4,95	0,000
	is_village	-0,135	0,261	-0,52	0,604
	gender	-0,328	0,238	-1,38	0,168
	efficacy	-0,523	0,348	-1,50	0,133
	approve_putin	-1,064	0,441	-2,41	0,016
	approve_pm	0,511	0,359	1,42	0,155
	approve_gov	-0,387	0,350	-1,10	0,270
	approve_duma	-1,059	0,389	-2,72	0,007
	approve_sf	0,639	0,411	1,55	0,120
	_cons	-1,193	0,705	-1,69	0,091
<b>N</b>		1004			
<b>ln(L)</b>		-694,2			

Table 5: Estimation of the four-party MNL model 1. ER is the base outcome.

		<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>z</b>	<i>P &gt;  z </i>
<b>CPRF</b>	education	0,233	0,482	0,48	0,628
	income	1,074	0,728	1,48	0,140
	age	0,061	0,007	7,84	0,000
	is_village	0,081	0,257	0,32	0,752
	gender	-0,488	0,235	-2,08	0,038
	efficacy	-0,863	0,356	-2,42	0,015
	approve_putin	-1,952	0,360	-5,41	0,000
	approve_pm	0,054	0,365	0,15	0,882
	approve_gov	-0,256	0,377	-0,68	0,497
	approve_duma	-0,138	0,447	-0,31	0,757
	approve_sf	-0,514	0,470	-1,09	0,274
	_cons	-0,444	0,654	-0,68	0,497

<b>LDPR</b>	education	0,191	0,594	0,32	0,747
	income	2,640	0,875	3,02	0,003
	age	-0,025	0,009	-2,65	0,008
	is_village	-0,485	0,327	-1,48	0,139
	gender	-1,865	0,341	-5,46	0,000
	efficacy	-0,552	0,416	-1,33	0,185
	approve_pu_n	-2,056	0,452	-4,55	0,000
	approve_pm	0,207	0,479	0,43	0,666
	approve_gov	-0,090	0,483	-0,19	0,852
	approve_duma	0,833	0,521	1,60	0,110
	approve_sf	-0,783	0,590	-1,33	0,184
	_cons	-1,381	0,790	-1,75	0,080
<b>SR</b>	education	0,427	0,473	0,90	0,367
	income	0,488	0,745	0,65	0,513
	age	0,046	0,007	6,26	0,000
	is_village	0,083	0,254	0,33	0,742
	gender	-0,194	0,232	-0,84	0,404
	efficacy	-0,610	0,344	-1,77	0,077
	approve_pu_n	-1,002	0,430	-2,33	0,020
	approve_pm	0,392	0,353	1,11	0,267
	approve_gov	-0,357	0,348	-1,03	0,305
	approve_duma	-1,023	0,384	-2,66	0,008
	approve_sf	0,485	0,402	1,21	0,228
	_cons	-1,418	0,692	-2,05	0,041
<b>N</b>		1004			
<b>ln(L)</b>		-740,4			

Table 6: Estimation of the four-party MNL model 2. ER is the base outcome.

		<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>z</b>	<i>P &gt;  z </i>
$\beta_1$	_cons	-0,161	0,034	-4,65	0,000
$\beta_2$	_cons	-0,151	0,020	-7,54	0,000
<b>CPRF</b>	age	0,044	0,007	5,76	0,000
	is_village	-0,240	0,264	-0,91	0,364
	gender	-0,598	0,246	-2,43	0,015
	efficacy	-0,763	0,368	-2,07	0,038
	approve_putin	-2,263	0,343	-6,59	0,000
	_cons	0,482	0,348	1,38	0,167
<b>LDPR</b>	income	2,633	0,859	3,07	0,002
	age	-0,021	0,009	-2,17	0,030
	is_village	-0,545	0,328	-1,66	0,097
	gender	-1,911	0,341	-5,60	0,000
	efficacy	-0,528	0,421	-1,25	0,210
	approve_putin	-2,110	0,413	-5,11	0,000
	approve_duma	0,397	0,341	1,16	0,245
	_cons	-1,254	0,654	-1,92	0,055
<b>SR</b>	age	0,034	0,006	4,95	0,000
	is_village	-0,205	0,252	-0,81	0,416
	gender	-0,339	0,234	-1,45	0,148
	efficacy	-0,501	0,342	-1,47	0,143
	approve_putin	-1,035	0,416	-2,48	0,013
	approve_duma	-1,115	0,370	-3,01	0,003
	approve_sf	0,803	0,370	2,17	0,030
	_cons	-0,745	0,408	-1,82	0,068
<b>N</b>		1004			
<b>ln(L)</b>		-698,9			

Table 7: Estimation of the four-party MNL model 3. ER is the base outcome.

		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	$P >  z $
$\beta_1$	_cons	-0,163	0,033	-4,87	0,000
$\beta_2$	_cons	-0,156	0,019	-7,93	0,000
<b>CPRF</b>	education	0,683	0,478	1,43	0,153
	income	1,326	0,723	1,83	0,067
	age	0,044	0,008	5,60	0,000
	is_village	-0,336	0,259	-1,29	0,196
	gender	-0,725	0,236	-3,06	0,002
	_cons	-2,741	0,562	-4,87	0,000
<b>LDPR</b>	education	0,270	0,588	0,46	0,646
	income	3,180	0,859	3,70	0,000
	age	-0,021	0,009	-2,24	0,025
	is_village	-0,462	0,319	-1,45	0,148
	gender	-1,885	0,336	-5,60	0,000
	_cons	-3,609	0,664	-5,44	0,000
<b>SR</b>	education	0,606	0,468	1,29	0,196
	income	0,426	0,719	0,59	0,554
	age	0,035	0,007	4,80	0,000
	is_village	-0,199	0,255	-0,78	0,435
	gender	-0,344	0,232	-1,48	0,140
	_cons	-2,446	0,537	-4,55	0,000
<b>N</b>		1004			
<b>ln(L)</b>		-736,4			

Table 8: Estimation of the four-party MNL model 4. ER is the base outcome.

		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	$P >  z $
$\beta_1$	_cons	-0,138	0,032	-4,31	0,000
$\beta_2$	_cons	-0,193	0,018	-10,27	0,000
<b>CPRF</b>	education	-0,241	0,457	-0,53	0,597
	income	1,525	0,691	2,20	0,028
	is_village	-0,404	0,253	-1,60	0,111
	_cons	-2,445	0,528	-4,63	0,000
<b>LDPR</b>	education	-0,015	0,539	-0,03	0,977
	income	2,182	0,791	2,76	0,006
	is_village	-0,374	0,308	-1,21	0,226
	_cons	-3,472	0,610	-5,69	0,000
<b>SR</b>	education	-0,085	0,452	-0,19	0,850
	income	0,762	0,689	1,10	0,269
	is_village	-0,250	0,251	-1,00	0,319
	_cons	-2,269	0,515	-4,41	0,000
<b>N</b>		1004			
<b>ln(L)</b>		-789,3			

Table 9: Estimation of the four-party MNL model 5. ER is the base outcome.

	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>P &gt;  z </b>
$\beta_1$ _cons	-0,138	0,031	-4,39	0,000
$\beta_2$ _cons	-0,197	0,018	-10,72	0,000
<b>CPRF</b> _cons	-1,830	0,114	-15,98	0,000
<b>LDPR</b> _cons	-2,376	0,128	-18,51	0,000
<b>SR</b> _cons	-1,975	0,110	-17,82	0,000
<b>N</b>	1004			
<b>ln(L)</b>	-796,3			

Table 10: Estimation of the four-party MNL model 6. ER is the base outcome.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Model 2	2 45,8 <0,00001	—			
Model 3	14 4,7 0,44		—		
Model 4	18 42,2 <0,00001			—	
Model 5	24 89,1 <0,00001			6 54,9 <0,00001	—
Model 6	33 102,1 <0,00001		19 97,4 <0,00001	15 60,3 <0,00001	9 5,4 0,28

Table 11: Likelihood ratio test comparing models 1-6.

	<b>ER</b>	<b>CPRF</b>	<b>LDPR</b>	<b>SR</b>
Original sample	0,723	0,112	0,066	0,097
Neutral Putin approval	0,609	0,163	0,112	0,116
Zero Putin approval	0,430	0,253	0,194	0,121

Table 12: Predicted voteshares in the four-party subsample — original sample and the altered zero-approval sample.

fact1	fact2	<b>ER</b>	<b>CPRF</b>	<b>LDPR</b>	<b>SR</b>
0	0	0,861	0,042	0,019	0,076
3,4	0	0,924	0,020	0,011	0,043
-3,4	0	0,758	0,082	0,030	0,128
0	3,4	0,936	0,006	0,031	0,025
0	-3,4	0,609	0,202	0,009	0,178

Table 13: Predicted probabilities of voting depending on the ideological preferences, according to model 1. Female voter, income, education, approval, `is_village`, age, and efficacy are set at mean values.

fact1	fact2	<b>ER</b>	<b>CPRF</b>	<b>LDPR</b>	<b>SR</b>
0	0	0,725	0,074	0,107	0,092
3,4	0	0,835	0,038	0,069	0,056
-3,4	0	0,577	0,131	0,151	0,139
0	3,4	0,784	0,011	0,173	0,030
0	-3,4	0,452	0,314	0,044	0,189

Table 14: Predicted probabilities of voting depending on the ideological preferences, according to model 1. Male voter, income, education, approval, `is_village`, age, and efficacy are set at mean values.

<b>putin</b>	<b>effic.</b>	<b>inc.</b>	<b>vill.</b>	<b>age</b>	<b>ER</b>	<b>CPRF</b>	<b>LDPR</b>	<b>SR</b>
1	1	1	1	30	0,936	0,014	0,016	0,034
1	1	4	0	30	0,781	0,020	0,162	0,036
0	0	1	1	30	0,605	0,153	0,134	0,107
0	0	4	0	30	0,227	0,099	0,622	0,051
1	1	1	1	60	0,846	0,052	0,007	0,093
1	1	4	0	60	0,737	0,078	0,080	0,105
0	0	1	0	60	0,374	0,380	0,043	0,203
0	0	4	1	60	0,205	0,360	0,293	0,143

Table 15: Predicted probabilities of voting for male voters depending on Presidential approval, efficacy, age, income, and place of residence, according to model 1. I take **fact1=0**, **fact2=0**, and set **education** and other approval variables at their mean value.

<b>putin</b>	<b>effic.</b>	<b>inc.</b>	<b>vill.</b>	<b>age</b>	<b>ER</b>	<b>CPRF</b>	<b>LDPR</b>	<b>SR</b>
1	1	1	1	30	0,964	0,008	0,002	0,025
1	1	4	0	30	0,927	0,013	0,029	0,030
0	0	1	1	30	0,771	0,105	0,025	0,098
0	0	4	0	30	0,552	0,130	0,226	0,090
1	1	1	1	60	0,897	0,030	0,001	0,071
1	1	4	0	60	0,850	0,049	0,014	0,087
0	0	1	0	60	0,511	0,279	0,009	0,200
0	0	4	1	60	0,376	0,355	0,080	0,188

Table 16: Predicted probabilities of voting for female voters depending on approval, efficacy, age, income, and place of residence, according to model 1. I take **fact1=0**, **fact2=0**, and set **education** and other approval variables at their mean value.

Profile	<b>ER</b>	<b>CPRF</b>	<b>LDPR</b>	<b>SR</b>
I	0,973	0,009	0,009	0,009
II	0,088	0,023	0,883	0,005
III	0,375	0,332	0,116	0,176
IV	0,379	0,224	0,057	0,338

Table 17: Combined effects of ideology and other observable factors on the predicted probability of voting, according to model 1. Profile I: Female, fact1=0, fact1=0, income=0, is\_village=0, age=30, efficacy=1, approve\_putin=1, approve\_duma=1. Profile II: Male, fact1=-1,7, fact1=1,7, income=0,75, is\_village=0, age=30, efficacy=0, approve\_putin=0, approve\_duma=1. Profile III: Male, fact1=-1.7, fact1=-1.7, income=0, is\_village=0, age=60, efficacy=0, approve\_putin=0. Profile IV: Male, fact1=-1.7, fact1=-1.7, income=0, is\_village=0, age=60, efficacy=0, approve\_putin=0, approve\_sf=0.

		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P >  z
$\beta_1$	_cons	-0,153	0,034	-4,47	0,000
$\beta_2$	_cons	-0,153	0,019	-7,79	0,000
<b>CPRF</b>	education	0,243	0,399	0,61	0,542
	income	0,414	0,770	0,54	0,590
	approve_pu_n	-1,986	0,360	-5,50	0,000
	approve_duma	-0,200	0,465	-0,43	0,668
	approve_sf	-0,418	0,479	-0,87	0,383
	efficacy	-0,777	0,372	-2,08	0,037
	age	0,045	0,008	5,50	0,000
	is_village	-0,218	0,273	-0,80	0,425
	gender	-0,635	0,248	-2,56	0,011
	_cons	-1,971	0,822	-2,40	0,017
<b>LDPR</b>	education	0,072	0,482	0,15	0,881
	income	2,433	0,871	2,79	0,005
	approve_pu_n	-1,917	0,421	-4,55	0,000
	approve_duma	0,805	0,518	1,55	0,120
	approve_sf	-0,649	0,560	-1,16	0,246
	efficacy	-0,464	0,421	-1,10	0,271
	age	-0,022	0,009	-2,24	0,025
	is_village	-0,532	0,332	-1,60	0,109
	gender	-1,848	0,341	-5,42	0,000
	_cons	-0,279	0,829	-0,34	0,736
<b>SR</b>	education	0,380	0,382	0,99	0,321
	income	0,095	0,756	0,13	0,899
	approve_pu_n	-0,919	0,418	-2,20	0,028
	approve_duma	-1,109	0,377	-2,94	0,003
	approve_sf	0,672	0,380	1,77	0,077
	efficacy	-0,544	0,347	-1,56	0,118
	age	0,036	0,007	4,87	0,000
	is_village	-0,163	0,260	-0,63	0,529
	gender	-0,359	0,236	-1,52	0,129
	_cons	-2,751	0,812	-3,39	0,001
<b>SPS</b>	education	1,194	1,215	0,98	0,326
	income	0,535	2,279	0,23	0,814
	approve_pu_n	-5,210	1,529	-3,41	0,001
	approve_duma	4,343	2,061	2,11	0,035
	approve_sf	-0,975	1,620	-0,60	0,547
	efficacy	0,510	1,138	0,45	0,654
	age	0,039	0,021	1,83	0,067
	is_village	-0,841	1,137	-0,74	0,459
	gender	1,622	1,108	1,46	0,143
	_cons	-6,490	2,417	-2,69	0,007

		<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>z</b>	<i>P &gt;  z </i>
<b>Yabloko</b>	education	0,972	0,978	0,99	0,320
	income	1,852	2,113	0,88	0,381
	approve_pu n	-4,064	0,984	-4,13	0,000
	approve_duma	-2,422	1,175	-2,06	0,039
	approve_sf	2,636	1,198	2,20	0,028
	efficacy	-0,420	1,024	-0,41	0,682
	age	-0,015	0,020	-0,76	0,447
	is_village	-15,345	745,792	-0,02	0,984
	gender	-0,257	0,625	-0,41	0,680
<b>Agrarian</b>	_cons	-2,128	1,745	-1,22	0,223
	education	0,552	1,113	0,50	0,620
	income	3,446	1,893	1,82	0,069
	approve_pu n	-1,512	0,877	-1,72	0,085
	approve_duma	1,301	1,153	1,13	0,259
	approve_sf	-1,981	1,292	-1,53	0,125
	efficacy	-0,132	0,959	-0,14	0,890
	age	0,011	0,021	0,52	0,602
	is_village	0,560	0,677	0,83	0,408
<b>N</b>	gender	-0,868	0,680	-1,28	0,202
	_cons	-5,388	2,109	-2,55	0,011
<b>ln(L)</b>		1035			
		-830,6			

Table 18: Estimation of the seven-party MNL model 1. ER is the base outcome.

		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	$P >  z $
<b>CPRF</b>	education	0,128	0,379	0,34	0,735
	income	0,996	0,717	1,39	0,165
	approve_pu_n	-1,941	0,336	-5,76	0,000
	approve_duma	-0,191	0,431	-0,44	0,658
	approve_sf	-0,605	0,443	-1,36	0,172
	efficacy	-0,883	0,354	-2,49	0,013
	age	0,060	0,007	7,84	0,000
	is_village	0,068	0,255	0,27	0,788
	gender	-0,470	0,232	-2,02	0,043
	_cons	-3,143	0,783	-4,01	0,000
<b>LDPR</b>	education	0,150	0,470	0,32	0,748
	income	2,446	0,860	2,84	0,004
	approve_pu_n	-1,959	0,412	-4,75	0,000
	approve_duma	0,814	0,504	1,61	0,107
	approve_sf	-0,714	0,543	-1,31	0,189
	efficacy	-0,495	0,414	-1,20	0,231
	age	-0,026	0,009	-2,72	0,007
	is_village	-0,505	0,326	-1,55	0,122
	gender	-1,820	0,338	-5,38	0,000
	_cons	-0,137	0,809	-0,17	0,865
<b>SR</b>	education	0,318	0,376	0,84	0,398
	income	0,434	0,743	0,59	0,558
	approve_pu_n	-0,880	0,409	-2,15	0,032
	approve_duma	-1,087	0,369	-2,94	0,003
	approve_sf	0,502	0,371	1,35	0,176
	efficacy	-0,620	0,344	-1,80	0,071
	age	0,045	0,007	6,21	0,000
	is_village	0,065	0,253	0,26	0,797
	gender	-0,206	0,230	-0,89	0,371
	_cons	-3,438	0,803	-4,28	0,000
<b>SPS</b>	education	1,437	1,149	1,25	0,211
	income	0,512	2,285	0,22	0,823
	approve_pu_n	-5,243	1,474	-3,56	0,000
	approve_duma	4,020	1,945	2,07	0,039
	approve_sf	-0,723	1,530	-0,47	0,636
	efficacy	0,490	1,120	0,44	0,661
	age	0,033	0,021	1,55	0,122
	is_village	-0,908	1,129	-0,80	0,421
	gender	1,689	1,116	1,51	0,130
	_cons	-6,418	2,327	-2,76	0,006

		<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>z</b>	<i>P &gt;  z </i>
<b>Yabloko</b>	education	1,005	0,982	1,02	0,306
	income	2,112	2,135	0,99	0,323
	approve_pu_n	-4,031	0,972	-4,14	0,000
	approve_duma	-2,416	1,168	-2,07	0,039
	approve_sf	2,652	1,195	2,22	0,026
	efficacy	-0,295	1,018	-0,29	0,772
	age	-0,009	0,020	-0,45	0,654
	is_village	-13,434	310,534	-0,04	0,965
	gender	-0,174	0,623	-0,28	0,780
<b>Agrarian</b>	_cons	-2,691	1,780	-1,51	0,131
	education	0,504	1,112	0,45	0,650
	income	3,814	1,890	2,02	0,044
	approve_pu_n	-1,447	0,875	-1,65	0,098
	approve_duma	1,385	1,163	1,19	0,234
	approve_sf	-2,146	1,299	-1,65	0,099
	efficacy	-0,184	0,960	-0,19	0,848
	age	0,021	0,021	0,99	0,323
	is_village	0,681	0,676	1,01	0,314
<b>N</b>	gender	-0,781	0,680	-1,15	0,251
	_cons	-6,158	2,131	-2,89	0,004
<b>ln(L)</b>		1035			
		-880,9			

Table 19: Estimation of the seven-party MNL model 2. ER is the base outcome.

		<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>z</b>	<i>P &gt;  z </i>
$\beta_1$	_cons	-0,153	0,033	-4,55	0,000
$\beta_2$	_cons	-0,153	0,019	-7,87	0,000
<b>CPRF</b>	approve_pu_n	-2,283	0,338	-6,75	0,000
	efficacy	-0,793	0,363	-2,18	0,029
	age	0,045	0,007	5,90	0,000
	gender	-0,603	0,241	-2,50	0,012
	_cons	-1,600	0,499	-3,21	0,001
<b>LDPR</b>	income	2,477	0,848	2,92	0,004
	approve_pu_n	-2,111	0,407	-5,18	0,000
	approve_duma	0,390	0,340	1,15	0,252
	age	-0,021	0,009	-2,17	0,030
	is_village	-0,478	0,322	-1,49	0,137
	gender	-1,865	0,337	-5,53	0,000
	_cons	-0,430	0,659	-0,65	0,514
<b>SR</b>	approve_pu_n	-1,034	0,416	-2,48	0,013
	approve_duma	-1,121	0,370	-3,03	0,002
	approve_sf	0,796	0,371	2,15	0,032
	efficacy	-0,497	0,339	-1,46	0,143
	age	0,034	0,006	4,98	0,000
	gender	-0,334	0,232	-1,44	0,151
	_cons	-2,361	0,516	-4,57	0,000
<b>SPS</b>	approve_pu_n	-5,180	1,302	-3,98	0,000
	approve_duma	3,215	1,342	2,40	0,017
	age	0,031	0,019	1,65	0,099
	_cons	-3,479	1,067	-3,26	0,001
<b>Yabloko</b>	approve_pu_n	-3,843	0,830	-4,63	0,000
	approve_duma	-2,189	1,152	-1,90	0,058
	approve_sf	2,038	0,995	2,05	0,041
	_cons	-1,521	0,459	-3,31	0,001
<b>Agrarian</b>	income	3,565	1,764	2,02	0,043
	approve_pu_n	-1,563	0,849	-1,84	0,066
	approve_sf	-0,894	0,967	-0,92	0,355
	_cons	-4,704	1,423	-3,31	0,001
<b>N</b>		1035			
<b>ln(L)</b>		-846,1			

Table 20: Estimation of the seven-party MNL model 3. ER is the base outcome.

		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P >  z
$\beta_1$	_cons	-0,161	0,033	-4,88	0,000
$\beta_2$	_cons	-0,159	0,019	-8,27	0,000
<b>CPRF</b>	education	0,509	0,379	1,34	0,180
	income	1,351	0,720	1,88	0,061
	age	0,044	0,007	5,56	0,000
	is_village	-0,356	0,259	-1,37	0,170
	gender	-0,735	0,236	-3,11	0,002
	_cons	-4,711	0,733	-6,42	0,000
<b>LDPR</b>	education	0,208	0,470	0,44	0,658
	income	3,070	0,853	3,60	0,000
	age	-0,021	0,009	-2,26	0,024
	is_village	-0,465	0,319	-1,46	0,145
	gender	-1,867	0,335	-5,56	0,000
	_cons	-2,567	0,691	-3,71	0,000
<b>SR</b>	education	0,461	0,373	1,24	0,217
	income	0,435	0,717	0,61	0,544
	age	0,035	0,007	4,77	0,000
	is_village	-0,208	0,255	-0,82	0,414
	gender	-0,348	0,232	-1,50	0,134
	_cons	-4,005	0,671	-5,96	0,000
<b>SPS</b>	education	1,910	1,126	1,70	0,090
	income	1,330	2,198	0,61	0,545
	age	0,033	0,022	1,49	0,135
	is_village	-0,877	1,085	-0,81	0,419
	gender	1,532	1,071	1,43	0,153
	_cons	-9,150	2,170	-4,22	0,000
<b>Yabloko</b>	education	1,302	0,938	1,39	0,165
	income	2,784	1,815	1,53	0,125
	age	-0,016	0,020	-0,83	0,409
	is_village	-12,786	270,413	-0,05	0,962
	gender	-0,170	0,604	-0,28	0,778
	_cons	-5,522	1,522	-3,63	0,000
<b>Agrarian</b>	education	0,733	1,089	0,67	0,501
	income	4,192	1,834	2,28	0,022
	age	0,012	0,021	0,57	0,569
	is_village	0,519	0,663	0,78	0,433
	gender	-0,968	0,668	-1,45	0,147
	_cons	-7,600	1,935	-3,93	0,000
<b>N</b>		1035			
<b>ln(L)</b>		-891,3			

Table 21: Estimation of the seven-party MNL model 4. ER is the base outcome.

		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P >  z
$\beta_1$	_cons	-0,136	0,031	-4,39	0,000
$\beta_2$	_cons	-0,197	0,017	-11,00	0,000
<b>CPRF</b>	_cons	-1,829	0,113	-16,05	0,000
<b>LDPR</b>	_cons	-2,378	0,128	-18,53	0,000
<b>SR</b>	_cons	-1,976	0,110	-17,84	0,000
<b>SPS</b>	_cons	-4,396	0,336	-13,06	0,000
<b>Yabloko</b>	_cons	-4,100	0,291	-14,08	0,000
<b>Agrarian</b>	_cons	-4,262	0,319	-13,35	0,000
<b>N</b>		1035			
<b>ln(L)</b>		-966,20			

Table 22: Estimation of the seven-party MNL model 5. ER is the base outcome.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Model 2	2 50,3 <0,00001	—		
Model 3	23 15,5 0,12		—	
Model 4	24 60,7 <0,00001			—
Model 5	54 135,6 <0,00001		51 100,1 <0,00001	24 75,1 <0,00001

Table 23: Likelihood ratio test comparing models 1-5.

## Literature

Brader, Ted A. and Joshua A. Tucker. 2007. “Reflective and Unreflective Partisans? Experimental Evidence on the Links between Information, Opinion, and Party Identification.” Unpublished paper

Fidrmuk, Jan. 2000. “Economics of voting in post-communist countries.” *Electoral Studies* 19: 199–217

Fidrmuk, Jan. 2000. “Political support for reforms: Economics of voting in transition countries.” *European Economic Review* 44: 1491–1513

Hesli, Vicki L., and Elena Bashkirova. 2001. “The Impact of Time and Economic Circumstances on Popular Evaluations of Russia’s President.” *International Political Science Review* 22: 379–389

Mishler, William, and John P. Willerton. 2003. “The Dynamics of Presidential Popularity in Post-Communist Russia: Cultural Imperative versus Neo-Institutional Choice?” *Journal of Politics* 65(1): 111–141

Mikhail Myagkov, Peter Ordeshook and Dmitrii Shakin. 2005. “Fraud of Fairytales? Russian and Ukrainian Electoral Experience.” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 21(2): 91–131

Owen, Andrey, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2008. “Conventional vs. Transitional Economic Voting in Poland, 1997-2005”. Unpublished paper

Quinn, Kevin M., Andrew D. Martin, and Andrew B. Whitford. 1998. "Voter Choice in Multi-Party Democracies: A Test of Competing Theories and Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 1231–1247

Powers, Denise V., and James H. Cox. 1997. "Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland." *American Political Science Review* 91(3): 617–33

Schofield, Norman. 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium." *Review of Economic Studies* 42: 27–50

Thurder, P., and A. Eymann. 2000. "Policy-Specific Alienation and Indifference in the Calculus of Voting: A Simultaneous Model of Party Choice and Abstention." *Public Choice* 102: 51–77

Wergen, Stephen K. and Andrew Konitzer. 2006. The 2003 Russian Duma election and the decline in rural support for the communist party." *Electoral Studies* 25: 677–695

White, Stephen, Sarah Oates and Ian MacAllister. 2001. "Media Effects and Russian Elections, 19992000." *British Journal of Political Science* 35: 191–208