Interlegal Foundation for Political and Legal Research
Centre of Public Policy and Global Governance

RUSSIA - EUROPE RELATIONS:

A LOOK FROM SWEDEN

Academic Papers
of the 8th International session
of the HSE «Baltic Practice» Research center
Stockholm, Sweden, 1-8 August, 2008

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Academic Director of the «Baltic Practice»
International Research Project

Moscow 2009

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Международный общественный фонд «Интерлигал»
Центр публичной политики и глобального взаимодействия

РОССИЙСКО-ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ:

ВЗГЛЯД ИЗ ШВЕЦИИ

НАУЧНЫЕ ДОКЛАДЫ

ВОСЬМАЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ СЕССИЯ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКОГО ЦЕНТРА ГУ-ВШЭ

«ПРАКТИКА НА БАЛТИКЕ»

СТОКГОЛЬМ, ШВЕЦИЯ, 1-8 АВГУСТА, 2008

Под редакцией Н.Ю.Беляевой, научного руководителя Летних школ ГУ-ВШЭ «Практика на Балтике»

Москва 2009

УДК 327(470+570)(485)(06)
ББК 66.4(4)'6ж
R95

Данное издание выпущено при содействии
Государственного университета – Высшая школа экономики

www.hse.ru
http://balticpractice.hse.ru/index.html

Российско-Европейские отношения: взгляд из Швеции. Научные доклады. Восьмая Международная летняя школа ГУ-ВШЭ «Практика на Балтике», Стокгольм, Швеция, 1-8 августа, 2008 / Научное издание / Текст: на англ. яз. / Отв. ред.-сост. Н.Ю.Беляева; Международный общественный фонд «Интерлигал». - М. – Издательство «ИНТЕЛКОРП». – 2009. - 197с. – 500 экз.

ISBN 978-5-91769-001-8

Издание содержит научные доклады участников Восьмой Международной летней школы ГУ-ВШЭ «Практика на Балтике». Школа проводится с 2001 г. в разных странах Балтики на базе партнерских университетов в рамках развития академической мобильности и международного научного сотрудничества по общей теме «Россия – Европа: пути взаимодействия». Научные доклады включают работы российских ученых, зарубежных экспертов, их молодых коллег – аспирантов, магистров, студентов. Структура книги включает предисловие научного руководителя Школы и шесть разделов, в которых помещены вступительные статьи научных руководителей исследовательских групп Школы и статьи участников Школы, отражающие результаты работы групп. Издание ориентировано на специалистов по Российско-Европейской интеграции, а также на всех, кто интересуется вопросами академической мобильности, Болонским процессом и организацией международного научного сотрудничества.

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CONTENTS

Prof. Dr. Nina Belyaeva

Foreword by the Academic Director

Since the «working summer» of 2001 «Baltic Practice» - as a mobile research team - once having raised its sales over the Baltic Sea, for more than 9 years now is moving from one sea-coast to another, changing themes of working groups and the focus of heated debates, but still heading to our final destination – Europe. The team of our project is carefully preserving the main goal – involve young researchers in creative work of analyzing and problem-solving in the field of Russian cooperation with European countries and with EU at large. For almost a decade now, in good and bad times in Russian-European dialogue, we are sailing, like a small ship in unknown waters, gaining more experience in facing the storms and keeping our flag high up in the sky. Just the list of cities and countries, that we had visited and explored, is contributing to our pride – Svetlogorsk and Peterhoff, Kaliningrad and Viborg, Jurmala and Helsinki, Witten-Herdeke and Stockholm were all the unforgettable destinations of our intellectual – as well as the real – research travel. And each of those destinations provided an absolutely unique experience.

So, what was there special about Stockholm? Why and how was Sweden chosen to be the host of the 8-th summer session of Baltic Practice?

There were several serious reasons. First of all, Sweden perfectly «qualify» according the number one rule for the summer sessions we have each year – it is to sail to the BEAUTIFUL place, as we have to keep our sessions attractive for the participants. Sweden is so special for its natural beauties, that it was an easy argument to pack the travel bags. No less important is the «subject matter», that we wanted to focus on in the year 2008, and how does the chosen country fit under this criteria. As we had agreed in the numerous brain-storms with the Student Organizing Committee, we should add to our curriculum the new theme, that we had not explore properly before, but which lies beneath many other studies we do – the theme of DEMOCRACY. Thinking of the European country, that would really take this issue seriously – both on internal and international level – one can not surpass Sweden, having a very firm consensus in both society and the state level of not only «promoting», but really «practicing» democracy. Sweden was hosting a Forum on the Future of Democracy this year, co-organised by the Council of Europe, as the year of 2008 was Swedish Chairmanship in the CoE.

Another important factor was our new status with the Council of Europe and its INGO Conference, that had included «Baltic Practice» into their «Three year cooperation plan», focused on developing civil society in Russia.

Working with the Council of Europe INGO Conference and the CoE Secretariat had become an important resource for us, as it is solely for their support, that Baltic Practice was introduced to the Swedish Ambassador to the CoE – Mrs. Aurora Lundquist, who provided a necessary connection to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that agreed to act as the main host for Baltic Practice in the country.

I want to specially recognize, that we could not have a better host – in terms of the example of a state Ministry work as DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION. The meeting organized by Mr. Jan Nyberg, Head of the Division for Russia and Central Asia, was in no way «formal», but instead an academic event, for which all the participants – students and foreign experts – were really grateful, naming it one of the most memorable events – and a unique characteristic of the State institutions work in Sweden.

So, I want to cordially thank Jutta Gutzkov and Plamen Nikolov – members of the NGO unit of the Secretariat for organizing my meeting with the Swedish Ambassador, that made this experience possible. Our thanks also goes to Mrs. Annelise Oeshger, then-President of the INGO Conference, for her personal support, as she participated with us in one of our student organizing committee meetings in Moscow, during one of her visits, as well as her organizational contribution, providing support to the prominent INGO Conference members to come with us to Sweden, making our final debates truly all-European exercise.

The role of the European expert team at the «Baltic Practice» in Stockholm needs to be mentioned separately and all the members of this exclusive group should be personally named. Sylvia Geise from Germany, Izrael Mensah from France, Christine Cromwel-Ahrens from Great Britain and Chuck Hurt from Slovakia – this is to you, who agreed to work on the volunteer basis with our student research groups as co-chairs, who provided their expertise in response to the presentations and most of all – to your participating as a jury evaluating the final debate results, we owe our best moments in Stockholm. Thank you!

We have also broadened out network of scholars who are interested in co-operating with Baltic Practice – both from Universities and practicing experts. Vladimir Petrovsky from MGIMO and Vladimir Brushinkin from Kaliningrad University provided their papers, respectively, on new international order and on Russian-European identity. We are also strengthening our CoE and OSCE connections, that allowed us to invite more expert texts on the topic of Democracy and Human Rights – by Neil Jarman from Northern Ireland, chair of the OSCE/ODIHR Panel on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Edouard Yagodnik, chair of the Committee on Culture, Science and Education of the INGO Conference, – that allowed to bring more expert value to our publication.

I am also very greateful to our main academic team – leaders of the student working groups – to both «experienced veterans», like Shota Kakabadze and Olga Melitonyan, and the «newcomers» – Aleksander Chepurenko and Alexey Belyanin, who were able to assemble creative and devoted working groups, significantly adding to the academic level of presentations and debate.

This is the SECOND book of ACADEMIC PAPERS that «Baltic Practice» is publishing as a result of its yearly studies and summer session in 2008 (after the one we had published after our session in Germany in 2007), and we recognize the significant progress in the quality of the texts, specifically in the quality of the contributions of the young researchers. This allows us to place this publication as our contribution to the HSE research reputation.

We are looking forward to the next Baltic Practice session in coming summer of 2009 – in Bruges, Belgium – and are welcoming all the interested researchers to join us in our exiting intellectual journeys to Europe!

Experts contributions

Prof. Dr. Vladimir Petrovskiy

New Paradigm of Global Governance: Challenges and Opportunities for EU-Russia Relations

The post Cold War world is evolving towards complex dependency and multi-polar structure of international relations in both economic and security spheres, thus making EU-Russia relations a challenging task for both sides. Russia and the European Union have to agree on a new modality of relations, within the context of the new paradigm of Global Governance, centered on Human Development and Human Security.

Russia is still uncertain about its ‘Soviet legacy’, in terms of the foreign policy, global and regional role to play. It is gradually moving from empire to the open world thinking, while trying to balance multilateralism with a traditional *realpolitik* and one-sided advance of the national interest.

In fact, both EU, with its political complications related to the Lisbon Treaty, and Russia, with its uneven attitude to international institutions and regimes face the same problem of proper positioning itself within the emerging global system. If both sides decide on the future of their relationship, they will succeed in solving this basic problem. The concept of international regimes, as the author suggests, is a proper tool to design the new EU-Russia relationship in a globalized world.

Globalization has added complication and potency to European and world affairs. While creating wealth and better opportunities for many people, it has often negatively influenced the vulnerable strata of society. The diffusion of information technology, the advancement in transportation and communication and the free flow of financial capital, have accelerated the movement of people. However, those who have felt marginalized or deprived by poverty and inequity, have now try to voice their protest, with acts of suicide terror as its extreme manifestation.

Governance can no longer be considered a closed system. Its task is to find a balance between taking advantage of globalization and providing a secure and stable social and economic domestic environment. Global Governance is to find solutions to the global problems and to avoid clash of cultures and civilizations.

“Governance has three legs: economic, political and administrative. Economic governance includes decision-making processes that affect a country’s economic activities and its relationships with other economies… Political governance is the process of decision-making to formulate policy. Administrative governance is the system of policy implementation. Encompassing all three, good governance defines the processes and structures that guide political and socio-economic relationships"[1].

Governance encompasses the state, but it transcends the state by including the private sector and the civil society. The parameters of good governance in its three key domains (state, civil society and the private sector) ought to have such characteristics, as Participation; Rule of Law; Transparency; Responsiveness; Consensus Orientation; Equity; Effectiveness and Efficiency; Accountability; Strategic Vision. Being interrelated, these characteristics are mutually reinforcing and cannot stand alone. They represent the ideal, and no society has them all.

Human Development and Human Security Approach

Key elements of security and cooperation architecture in Europe are based on the Human Security and Human Development approaches. Post-Soviet transition in the former Soviet Union, and the transition in Central and Eastern Europe proves the decisive role of the Human Development conceptual framework in shaping political, economic and security environment.

During the 1990s, the Human Development concept has been accepted by an increasing number of researchers, policy advisors, politicians and social practitioners. The rediscovery of human development became most evident in the publication of the global Human Development Reports (HDR). The first global HDR published in 1990 defined human development as "the process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living"[2]. The Human Development Index reflects the essential choices of people by combining life expectancy, school enrollment, adult literacy and average income.

The conceptual framework for the human development was developed by the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen who makes the distinction between people's functioning's – reflecting the various things a person may value doing or being – and people's capabilities. In other word, a functioning is an achievement, while a capability is the ability to achieve. From a human development perspective, the quality of economic growth is just as important as its quantity. Aspects of 'quality', such as Good Governance, equality in health and education, environment protection, are central to what the poor – and everybody else – value most in economic progress[3].

Dramatic changes in the world's economic, political and social systems have brought unprecedented improvements in human living conditions in both developed and developing countries: the profound breakthroughs in communications, transport, agriculture, medicine, genetic engineering, computerization, environmentally friendly energy systems, political structures, peace settlements, etc. But these changes also bring new uncertainties and challenges to both human development and security.

Scholars and experts involved in Human Development studies have well developed the conceptual framework for Human Development, Human Security and Human Rights. In general, Human Security shares the "conceptual space" of Human De-

[1] *Governance for Sustainable Human Development. A UNDP Policy Document*, United Nations Development Program, January 1997,p. 2-3.
[2] *Global Human Development Report*, UNDP, 1990, p. 1.
[3] *Doi Moi and Human Development in Vietnam. National Human Development Report 2001*, Hanoi, 2001, p. 14.

velopment, which is likewise people-centered and multidimensional and is defined in the terms of human choices and freedoms. But human development is a broader, long term, holistic objective; the aim of human development is the flourishing or fulfillment of individuals in their homes and communities, and the expansion of valuable choices.

In contrast, Human Security has a strictly delimited scope. While both approaches address those who are already destitute, human security also has a systematic preventative aspect. While Human Development aims at "growth with equity," Human Security focuses on "downturn with security." The Human Security approach identifies and prepares for recessions, conflicts, emergencies, and the darker events of society. Finally, Human Security activities may at times have a much shorter time horizon, and include emergency relief work and peacekeeping as well as longer term human and institutional development.[4]

Human and State Security have a number of strong similarities. Both proactively identify and prioritize threats to the security of key populations, on the basis of empirical evidence and strategic analyses. At present both recognize key threats to be conflict, AIDS and disease, economic and financial instability, and terrorism. Both also develop systematic, comprehensive, durable, and coordinated institutional responses to selected threats that involve multiple actors and range from research to field action. The preparedness and response mechanisms use legal, political, sectoral, and economic as well as authorized military instruments.

Two differences between State and Human Security are also of note. First, State Security largely concerns territorial units and the persons who dwell within them. Second, state security is also significantly concerned with the relative distribution of power between states and with territorial integrity; this agenda is legitimate and complements, but is not part of, the Human Security agenda.

Human Security and Human Rights are likewise deeply interconnected. Both are concerned to identify a rudimentary set of universal concerns that span poverty and violence. However, Human Security may not necessarily prioritize all human rights equally, and in practice different institutions that respect or promote Human Security will legitimately prioritize and address only certain rights and freedoms. Still, to the extent that Human Security concerns at least some rights, institutions are clearly obligated to provide it.

International Regimes: New Tool of Good Governance

The concept of international regimes could be interpreted within the context of Neo-realism and Neo-Liberalism, as two basic schools of thought in Political Science related to International Relations. While Neo-realism primarily deals with the classic notion of the balance of power, according to which International Law and international institutions are being viewed as supplements of state-to-state interactions on the international arena, Neo-liberalism is more optimistic about the future World Order, which, it believe, should be based on balance of interests rather than balance of power.

By assuming that international stability could be secured by asymmetric distribution of complex national power, one should admit that international regimes are to be conceptualized on a basis of interpretation of interaction of respective

[4] Sabina Alkire, *Conceptual Framework for Human Security: Working Definition and Executive Summary*, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org.

national interests, in view of a key role played by International Law and international institutions, and with regards to specific region of the globe and specific area of international relations.

John Ruggie had introduced the concept of international regimes to Political Science in 1975 as a set of mutual expectations, rules, plans, organizational and financial arrangements, adopted by a group of states. At a special academic conference, international regimes were defined as a set of defined or presumed principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, which reflect agreed position of actor states concerning a particular sphere of international relations. Principles reflect understanding of origins, facts and integrity (honesty) of the behavior. Norms are standards of behavior reflected in rights and responsibilities. Rules are specific guidelines for behavior. Decision-making procedures reflect established practice of making and executing of a collective choice.[5]

Some scholars think that international regimes include all kind of interactions within the international system. Such a broad interpretation could be argued by the fact that the system of international relations by definition[6] consists of independent sovereign states which, simply put together, cannot be viewed as a regime. On the other hand, regimes could not be reduced to international institutions with formal rules and structure. More reasonably, international regime does exist if relations of actor states are regulated in a certain way and/or not based on independent decision-making.

International regimes could also be defined as decentralized institutions, which means not an absence of sanctions for violating norms and rules of a regime, but a necessity of consensus on sanctions implementation, which could be less strict, comparing to a collective security system. Regimes are necessary not for centralized implementation of agreed decisions, but rather for an atmosphere of confidence and predictability in international relations, conducive to international cooperation and coordination of national interests. International regimes set up standards of behavior, which could help to estimate intentions and reputation of a partner and to exchange information, thus increasing mutual predictability of behavior on international arena.

Principles of a regime provide for a broad definition of common goals. Norms more strictly define legitimacy of international behavior, but still regulate rights and responsibilities of the participants in a general way. Rules, though often mean the same as norms, more specifically regulate rights and responsibilities of the participants and could be more easily corrected in case of necessity. Decision-making procedures have the same level of instrumentality as rules, and define ways and means to enforce principles and correct rules of a regime, if necessary.

Principles, norms and rules of an international regime are closely inter-linked, which is a basic criterion for its legitimacy and viability. It helps to distinct between a correction of rules within the regime and a change of the regime per se. In common, principles, norms, rules and procedures regulate behavior of the participants of a regime, though it is not being automatically enforced with the help of hierarchical law.

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5 Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. 1984. p. 57.

6 According to Robert North, international system (“Third Image”) means “Two or more states regularly interacting with each other in positive or negative way”. - North, Robert C. *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis*. Boulder: Westview Press. 1990. p. 19.

International security regimes, comparing to international economic regimes, are less developed because of the Security Dilemma, which makes an actor state always perceive a neighbor as a potential threat and thus causes inevitable chain reaction of military potential upgrade. Actor states are specifically concerned not with an absence of agreed rules in international security sphere, but with a risk that one of the players could drop the ball and get a comparative advantage. A "price of betrayal" is much higher in international security than in economics, which makes security regimes less sustainable comparing to economic ones. Two basic types of international regimes differ in "price of betrayal", complexity of control over rules implementation and a trend towards gaining a comparative advantage.[7]

Mutual predictability, confidence and information exchange are of paramount importance for international security regimes, which do not stand for total reciprocity but rather strengthen and institutionalize it. Norms and rules of a regime secure agreed understanding of reciprocity in a particular sphere of international relations, thus making violation non-legitimate.

Balance of power and balance of interests are the core of international security regimes. National security interest is an ultimate priority for each actor state on international arena. National security is being defined here as a state of protection of vital interests of an individual, society and a state from internal and external threats, and as a state of a country with no threats of war or any other attempts to challenge its sovereignty, independent development, territorial integrity, and ability to act as a subject of international relations.

National security interests define attitude of actor states to International Law and international regimes, which could vary from total isolationism to constructive engagement. In turn, balance of power could be interpreted as:

A policy aimed at maintaining of a certain level of power;

Actual state of balance of power between actor states;

More or less equal balance of power;

Any other balance of power.

Balance of power system has a built-in contradictory function, for it provides for stability of power relations between actor states, and at the same time aims at prevention of power domination (which presumes possible shift of the power balance).[8] Within a balance of power system, actor states are supposed to equalize power ambitions of each other and thus decrease level of violence within the system. They would try to upgrade their positions primarily through negotiations, but, in the end, would be ready for confrontation to achieve this goal.

Within the balance of power system, an actor state would stop the confrontation, to prevent elimination of an essential element of the balance, and would counter any attempts of domination by other members of the system. It would help to restore and/or acquaint a partner status for those members who lost or did not achieve it yet. In fact, balance of power system is a non-stable equilibrium with no return to previous position if the balance is disrupted. Balance of power could change depending on a

[7] Charles Lipson. International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. David A. Baldwin, Ed. Columbia University Press. New York. 1993. p. 76.

[8] North, Robert C. *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis* p. 144.

concrete situation of regional and/or sub-regional security and a degree of involvement of states in international security arrangements.

Provision of national security, protection and promotion of national economic and security interests in the international arena is still being viewed as a state's exclusive prerogative. As Hans Morgenthau, a political science classic, used to point out, state interests defined as a state power are a key to understanding the essence of international politics and explaining the nature of policies pursued by states.[9] *National interests thus act as predominantly state interests. In this case, the state is an autonomous agent tackling a task impossible to reduce to a sum of individual interests and aspirations.*[10]

One can hardly dispute the idea that international security regimes can never rely exclusively on balance of power and strong-arm relationships. Rather they will constitute a complement to the strong-arm relations that are there anyway. It follows from this that complex power unequally distributed between states would make sure that multilateral security mechanisms stay asymmetric, particularly on regional level, and also lend a quality of hierarchy to modern international relations per se.

Within the framework of similar regimes some participants achieve security, others autonomy. A more powerful state would provide security for its weaker counterparts, thus enhancing the autonomy of decisions taken; a weaker regional power would receive security guarantees in return for promises to follow the stronger state's politics, putting its military bases at the latter's disposal.

Conceptualization of international regimes based on the dialectics of the balance of power and the balance of interests implies that the states, on the strength of certain perception of national security interests, may, under some circumstances, prefer to take security decisions together, if they think they stand to gain from this.

Abiding by the jointly agreed "rules of the game" does not mean that states pursue the same goals and ideals in their politics or reject the principles of national sovereignty. Their chief driving motive there is an urge to look after their long-term interests and ensure that their partners' behavior in the international arena is predictable.

The functional dynamics of international regimes rest on the notion of cooperation, which is not at all synonymous with harmony or affinity between national security interests. Cooperation within an international regime is a response to conflicts, real or hypothetical, rather than the absence of conflict.[11]

The road to cooperation within an international regime is through negotiations during which the parties may achieve position convergence or policy coordination with the result that the likely negative impact of certain things they decide on other decisions is fully or partially removed. As Robert Keohane argues, interstate cooperation occurs when the policy of one state is seen by its partners as conducive to their own policies through coordination.

Cooperation and policy coordination within the international regime framework are not the same. The former underlies the regimes intended for achieving a certain

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[9] Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggles for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p. 5.

[10] Stephen D. Krasner. *Defending the National Interest*. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1978. p. 5-6.

[11] Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. 1984. p. 54.

positive result; the latter is the basis of regimes created not to follow any particular course, but to avoid certain consequences (a negative result). For the second type regimes to function it is enough to work out mutually acceptable conventions (formal or informal). The first type regimes also require, on top of that, a degree of institutional legalization.

Moreover, the balance of interest's dialectics implies that collaboration within the international regime framework is not merely a function of security interests. In itself, the existence of common or similar interests is not enough to ensure the functioning of such regimes. There have to be suitable institutions, besides, to make sure that the partners behave in a predictable way, and to reduce imbalance in information exchange.

Conceptualization of international regime presupposes a more detailed functional division between international regimes and international institutions, which has been a subject of theoretical debate. Even those scholars who deny that international regimes need to be institutionalized recognize this as a major parameter of the regime functioning.

While some analysts view the un-institutionalized regimes as "quasi-regimes", others argue that international regimes and international institutions are independent and perfectly capable of "going it alone". The regimes may or may not be institutionalized, whereas international organizations can (although not necessarily) function as regimes.[12]

Russian Political Science Association: Experience of Foreign Policy Debate

Since the process of Russia's new self-identification is still not completed, national self-awareness, statehood, comprehension of the goals and prospects of the national development, all these essential conditions for shaping national interests are still in the making. Thus the Russian civil society is engaged in discussions on country's foreign and security policy.

This is of special importance for the EU-Russia relations. The new design of EU-Russia partnership and cooperation requires coordinated effort of state and civil society institutions on both sides.

In April 2004 the Executive Board of the Russian Political Science Association (RPSA), in cooperation with International Federation for Peace and Reconciliation, conducted the academic debates on the Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia, approved by President Vladimir Putin on June 30, 2000. The Concept was drafted as a strategic policy document by several Russian agencies, with the Security Council of Russia acting as a supervisor and coordinator. The document emerged as a product of numerous inter-agency cooperation and coordination efforts, involving the Russian academic community.

The Foreign Policy Concept was created in the times of Yeltsin's Administration, when the issue of Boris Yeltsin's successor was still not resolved. Administration of Vladimir Putin inherited this document, which was positioned as its own product, while, in fact, it does not reflect their values and interests. Vladimir

[12] Arthur Stein. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. New York, 1993. p. 46.

Putin set his own foreign policy priorities a certain time after becoming President, when the current Concept was an acting document.

The document needed to be adapted to the new international realities even since 2001. The September 11 events drastically changed the key priorities and approaches to the national security. These fundamental changes, however, were not reflected in the current version of the Foreign Policy Concept, which in a certain way contradicts to the actual foreign policy, pursued by Russia today.

The new foreign policy course was shaped by the Presidential Administration, and then government agencies started, rather reluctantly, to implement it. However, a certain opposition to Putin's foreign policy course existed inside the Russian political establishment. Despite the fact that the Byzantine type of organization is still predominant in Russia, and the figure on the top still makes the key decisions, this opposition was represented by the influence of the bureaucracy, which made their careers in the previous decades by building up the anti-Western approaches.

Some of the participants to the debates suggested that the opposition to the foreign policy course was represented by a larger segment of the military industrial complex, conservative minded political establishment, and the left-wing side of the political spectrum. However, the concerns of the political course, aimed at establishing partnership with the West, have certain grounds.

As the participants to the discussion suggested, during Boris Yeltsin's Presidency Russia and the West had experienced "partnership number one" already, which was spoiled due to the number of reasons, including selfish and near-sighted Western policy towards Russia. In the 1990s this policy disappointed those among democrats and liberals, who advocated partnership, and strengthened positions of the "anti-Westerners" inside Russia.

1999, when Russia found itself marginalized on the international arena, became the moment of truth, – just to recollect the participants of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, severely criticizing Russia. After that a new pragmatically oriented leader appeared in the Kremlin, and the corrections of the foreign policy course became inevitable.

The Foreign Policy Concept should definitely reflect the vision of the long-term tendencies in the global development and the strategic trends in the country's foreign policy. However, the factor of uncertainty also matters in international relations. That is why the Concept implied "*fundamental and dynamic changes*". Keeping these changes in mind, some experts suggested that it makes no sense to plan the foreign policy for 10-15 years ahead, - not to say that a good strategic policy document could hider the foreign policy tactics and the negotiations practice.

However, the acting Concept provided, as a whole, an adequate vision of the current international relations and the long-term tendencies of the new world order. The certain key provisions just need to be focused in such a way as to portray the existing realities and the current foreign policy practices. That is why the participants to the RPSA debates spoke in favor of the renewal, rather the complete replacement of the acting Foreign Policy Concept.

The Concept's definitions of the modern world and of Russia's foreign policy top priorities caused the most heated debate. E.g., the Concept implied that the United Nations "*should remain the main regulating centre of international relations*". The UN's role in global affairs could not be enhanced without its consistent and radical reformation, while the Concept referred to this reform in rather general terms. The Concept should contain the more clear vision of the reformation of the "UN Family" as a whole, including the UN Security Council, specialized agencies and programs, etc.

Another problem was how to make the United Nations more efficient, while keeping the UN Charter intact. The transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE could be an example: new documents of the same high status, as the founding acts, were being adopted, which introduced new issues, mutual obligations of the States and new development benchmarks.

A new document could be also adopted by the UN, which would get round the issue of the UN reformation and of changing the Charter. Such document would contain new founding principles, for the international community to follow nowadays.

One of the two extremes in the attitude to the UN were definitely predominant in the Concept: total pessimism, on the one hand (the UN is not able to make timely decisions and implement them effectively, etc.), and the extreme legalist approach, implying that the UN Charter should be implemented, exactly as it was written, on the other. However, the UN Charter is neither an international law nor the list of the rules of international behavior. Even if so, it is subject to various interpretations, anyway.

The Concept did not touch upon another vital issue of how to make the UN more efficient in dealing with the intra-state problems and conflicts, which are not international. The document should also give a clue to Russia's interaction with the international organizations and regimes, such as G8, Contact Group for Yugoslavia, the Middle East Road Map sponsors pool, etc.

The Foreign Policy Concept promptly said: "*Humanitarian intervention, limited sovereignty, etc. concepts are totally inappropriate for the international behavior*", while these interventions have been de facto practiced, under the UN aegis, for quite a while.

One should recollect the polemics of 1999, involving the UN Secretary General and a number of States, including Russia. The positions were obviously different. The Secretary General maintained that the large scale and systematic violations of human rights force the international community to react and sometimes to interfere in country's internal affairs, while Russia clearly objected.

Consequently, this prompted the UN Secretary General to stop using the term "Humanitarian Intervention" and to start looking for other approaches to the problem. The Secretary General has approved the report "Responsibility to Protect", produced by the Sahnoun/Evans Commission, which was tasked by the UN to investigate the problem of protection of victims of aggression and genocide.

The potential of this document is still far from being exploited to the full extent, which became obvious after the war in Iraq. Russian politicians, diplomats and experts should pay close attention to it, especially in view of the fact that the Sahnoun/Evans Commission continues its work, involving the Russian representatives.

Certain provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept had become clearly obsolete, like the that on the ABM Treaty of 1972, or on the Global Missile Control System Initiative, which has been proposed, but not been substantiated by practical policy moves in the recent years.

The Concept implied the necessity of the collective reaction to international crises "*on the basis of strict adherence to the International Law*", which needs to be corrected. As is known, these norms are far from ideal, and fail to properly deal with the burning issues of the current international peacekeeping. The Concept should rather say: "*on the basis of adherence to and development of the International Law*" (as is understood, the norms of the International Law should be obeyed, unless new ones are not introduced).

The Concept also said: "*Russia presumes that only the UN Security Council could sanction the use of force for the purposes of peace enforcement*". However, in certain cases Russia itself rely on principles, having been used by the Western countries during the operation in Yugoslavia in 1999. None of the Russian peace support operations in the CIS was mandated by the UN Security Council, and from the point of view of International Law these situations were not being handled properly.

Russia contented itself by the UN observation missions, and/or by informing the UN Secretary General on a regular basis or by the UN resolutions with a general support of the CIS as a regional organization entitled for peace support operations, etc. It was in the interests of Russia, RPSA experts suggested, to increase the role of the regional organizations in the peace support operations.

One should recollect, in this connection, the address of President Vladimir Putin to the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, with the explicit outline of Russia's foreign policy, including the necessity to delegate the UN peacekeeping responsibilities to regional organizations and arrangements, including NATO, the European Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), etc.

The Concept should admit the necessity of agreed criteria for humanitarian intervention into country's internal affairs, including that with the use of force, instead of labeling humanitarian intervention as totally unacceptable. The cases for sanctioned humanitarian intervention could be as follows:

When threats to international peace and security emerge ("classics" of the UN Charter);

In the case of humanitarian disasters and the necessity to protect the civilians – Responsibility to Protect, as the Sahnoun-Evans report puts it;

When chaos and anarchy rule the territory of the Failed States, with possible negative international consequences, etc.

These are criteria for humanitarian intervention, one could argue them, but can not just ignore. The problem here is that the current International Law lacks the proper definitions of objects of the use of force for the purposes of peace enforcement. Article 51 of the UN Charter, on the right for self-defense, is being interpreted differently by different States. The agreed definitions of terrorism, including state-sponsored terrorism, are also absent in the International Law.

The participants to the discussion spoke in favor of a special international convention, to classify the existing armed conflicts, depending on the level of violence. The first level could classify for observation missions and peace support operations; the second level – for the preventive troops deployment and support for civilian authorities and humanitarian relief; the third – the most serious level – putting troops into operation and the large-scale use of the armed force, etc.

Russia's foreign policy priorities, related to the obligations in the sphere of Human Rights, should be amended to read that Russia will honor and protect Human Rights globally, "*on the basis of respect for International and Humanitarian Law, and the conventional principles of democracy and humanism*".

The Foreign Policy Concept put Russia's relations with the CIS Member States as a top regional priority. Probably it was quite natural for the 1990s, but the situation has drastically changed since that time. The discussants suggested the alternative viewpoints on this issue. However, all of the participants to the RPSA debate agreed that the relations with the USA and the European countries are the top priority for Russia at present.

The Concept outlined the main objective for the Russian foreign policy in Europe as "*the creation of stable and democratic system of pan-European security and cooperation*". However, the hopes for the OSCE's overwhelming role have not been actual any more, and the discussion on the role of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces also looked archaic. New goals should be set here.

The main and the most urgent task for Russia, the discussants suggested, was to design a new mode of relations of the EU and NATO, while both organizations continued their enlargement to the east, thus shaping new geopolitical and geo-economic environment for Russia.

The Concept harbored the contradictory desire to develop positive relations with one of the European integration bodies, i.e. the European Union, and the reserved/negative approach to the other (NATO), while most of the European countries have membership in both.

After 2001 it became obvious that it makes no sense for Russia to oppose NATO to the EU, the USA to Western Europe, etc. The issue was discussed by the special Board of Russia's Foreign Ministry. All that is going on in the course of the EU and NATO enlargement represents the logic development of the European integration processes. From this particular viewpoint the EU and NATO enlargement should be assessed.

The point on "*the limited and restrictive character*" of the integration processes in the Euro-Atlantic region should be corrected and specified. Does it mean Russia's willingness to join the EU, or the accession to the EU of the Baltic States, or something else? Russia stated officially that it does not intend to join the EU even in the future, but it represented the balance of political power and priorities as of the end of 1990s, which does not mean that this particular vision should be reflected in the new edition of the Concept.

New mechanisms of partnership and cooperation between Russia and the EU, Russia and NATO emerge nowadays. The Russian vision of these mechanisms should be outlined in the Foreign Policy Concept, including the compromise solution on the expansion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia on the Central and East European countries, which have joined the EU, as well as the successful start of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

The Concept should contain the explicit outline of long-term Russia's interests with regards its accession to the EU and/or developing the strategic partnership with the European Union, as well as on still unresolved issues, such as Kaliningrad, prospects for the EU/Russia visa-free regime, the rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States, etc.

The pragmatic perception of the North Atlantic Alliance as a powerful military and political player and the future partner has already prevailed in Russia's foreign policy practice. This perception presumes certain NATO's inertia and the tendency towards expansion of its sphere of responsibility, on the one hand, and NATO's readiness to reform itself and to adapt to Russia's interests, on the other.

In September 2002 the NATO-Russia Council approved the document "Political Aspects of the Concept of NATO-Russia Joint Peace Support Operations". Certain key points of the documents could be replicated in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept, including the joint search for new ways and means, for the international community to react to crises and conflict situations, while adhering to the International Law.

The Russian diplomacy needed to use more diverse instruments, than is provided by the Concept, to react to contradictory situations, like had emerged in Iraq.

In similar circumstances conflicts could be prevented by joint effort. Russia's participation in international operations with the use of force could become inevitable, form the point of view of country's national interests, like it happened during the international action against Taliban in Afghanistan.

Russia's cooperation with the European Union on issues related to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and its emerging Rapid Reaction Force, also needs to be elaborated. Whatever coalition with the EU and NATO Member States Russia could ever join, the conditions for that should be as follows:

Joint assessment of threats to stability and security;

Joint threats prevention and elimination activities;

Joint shaping of coalitions to implement the agreed decisions;

Joint implementation of agreed measures;

Joint post-conflict settlement, strengthening of peace, democracy and stability in a conflict zone, etc.

The Foreign Policy Concept implied that Russia should continue its participation in the Council of Europe activities, "*based on its own requirements to build a civil society*". Did it mean that these requirements could differ from those conventional, internationally agreed upon? This point still needed to be clarified.

Certain regional priorities of Russia's foreign policy, including relations with the countries of the Asia Pacific region, Africa and Latin America, were outlined in the Concept in a fragmentary and inconsistent way. The goals of Russia's policy in such conflict zones, as Afghanistan or the Middle East, were declared by the Concept as "*restoration and strengthening of Russia's positions*". However, it was only achievable, if the Russian diplomacy shows its usefulness and effectiveness in solving the acute regional problems. The ways and means to solve these problems should also be outlined in the Concept.

In a broader sense, the Concept should stress Russia's role as a new actor in the solution of the global problems, as the subject, rather then object of the world politics, and as a full-fledged member of the G8 club, which decides the key tendencies of the global development today. New approaches to the whole spectrum of the global problems, including poverty reduction, economic and social development assistance, HIV/AIDS prevention, protection of the environment, etc., should be outlined by the Concept more explicitly, especially before Russia takes over the G8 chairmanship in 2006.

In this context, the Concept could suggest the creation of the Russian Agency for International Development, within Russia's Foreign Ministry or as an independent body, to deal with the inter-agency coordination of Russia's activities in the field of technical and development aid to the CIS Countries, as well as to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The Agency could also promote humanitarian and cultural integration on the post-Soviet territory, as an institutional basis for the development of partnership and cooperation between both State actors and NGOs in Russia and the CIS[13].

The creation of such an Agency on the eve of the G8 Summit in Moscow, scheduled for 2006, would symbolize the full-fledged status of Russia inside the G8, rather then "G7 plus Russia", as well as separation from the past, in which Russia

[13] As a certain response to this proposal, an Agency on CIS Affairs was created within the structure of the Russian Foreign Ministry in 2008.

received economic, financial and technical aid from other developed countries, which questioned its real role and status in the global affairs.

The preparations for Russia's accession to the WTO were not mentioned by the Concept as Russia's foreign economic policy priority, while it was considered as such by President Putin in his State of Nation Address in 2002, entitled "Russia Should Become Strong and Competitive". The WTO accession still requires big effort in terms of negotiations and the adjustment of the Russian legislation to the WTO rules and regulations, which should be addressed by the Concept accordingly.

Finally, to make the document workable for a lengthy period, Chapter V of the Concept, dealing with the design and implementation of the foreign policy should be substantially upgraded. This Chapter dealt with the decision making mechanism related to foreign policy, involving President, the Federation Council, the State Duma, the Security Council, and the Foreign Ministry. Competencies and responsibilities of the state bodies of various branches of powers were to be outlined in this Chapter in more detail.

In particular, the Foreign Policy Concept should elaborate on the provision, as approved by a special Presidential Bill, which reads: "*Russia's Foreign Ministry exercises coordination and control of the federal executive bodies, involved in the foreign policy activities*". The coordination and control mechanisms, as mentioned, needed to be explicitly outlined in the Concept.

Interaction between the State bodies and non-government organizations in the process of the foreign policy course design and implementation should be outlined by the Concept as well. The State bodies were to interact with NGO's on a streamlined and regular basis, and not "*as appropriate*", as the Concept suggested.

Russia's academic community and civil society institutions should be involved in the foreign policy decision making and assessment; Russian and international NGOs should also render support of the State bodies, related to their foreign activities. In fact, the Russian Foreign Ministry has been already providing support for NGOs, seeking the status and/or registration with the Council of Europe, UN ECOSOC, etc.

As RPSA experts suggested, the Foreign Policy Concept should provide more detailed guidance on the information and PR support of Russia's foreign policy activities, creation of Russia's positive image abroad, etc. In this context, promotion of the Russian language and Russian culture abroad, especially in the CIS Countries, should be a priority. This could become, as the experience of certain developed countries shows, an effective foreign policy tool and a powerful resource of inter-State and humanitarian cooperation. E.g., the British Council, with the similar functions, is a major tool of promoting the influence of the United Kingdom in the British Commonwealth. Russian culture should be also viewed as a potential resource of Russia's influence abroad.

RPSA proposals and suggestions, as mentioned above, were partially included into the Russian Foreign Policy Review (March 2007), and into the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, adopted just recently.

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While introducing the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, approved on July 12, 2008, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev said at a meeting with the key Russia's MFA officials:

"*We need multilateral diplomacy for a more equitable, democratic system of relations. The same framework should involve mechanisms of collective leadership by* *leading states, those states that have a special responsibility for the situation in the world…This is the foundation of the modern democratic architecture of international relations*"[14].

Such intention, including the vision of collective leadership, promises new start for the EU-Russia relations and new opportunities for the system of Global Governance. Let us use this opportunity in a joint effort to build a system of partnership and cooperation.

[14] www.kremlin.ru

Prof. Dr. Vladimir Bryushinkin

Methodology of identity studies with the focus to Russian and European identity

1. Logical analysis of the notion of identity

Identity is now a popular subject of cultural and social studies. However, if we want to get a well-grounded judgement concerning identity, this notion has to be prepared to usage in the framework of these disciplines. That is why applied research on identity must be preceded by logical and methodological analysis. I will start this paper with an example of such a research and then demonstrate its abilities applied to the notion of "European identity".

Logical analysis is connected with the reconstruction of *logical form of propositions* concerning identity. In which propositions are our judgements concerning identity expressed? There are some examples:

I am a Kaliningrader
I am Me
Petrov is Russian
The English are Europeans

All of these are propositions of the form

S is P

i.e. simple attributive propositions of subject-predicative structure. Propositions concerning identity differ from other propositions of the kind, such as "Ivan is a generous man" and "Kaliningrad women are beautiful". The two last statements are not usually considered as statements concerning identity, though one can say that Ivan is identified in the framework of some category of generous men and Kaliningrad women are related to the category of beautiful human beings. So the specific character of statements concerning identity and their difference from other statements of the same logical form are determined by the type of notions that play the part of subject and predicate. The above-given examples show that these statements concern individuals and certain-type groups of them. A notion of a group of people acts as a predicate in all the above-given examples. This characteristic can be taken as the distinguishing feature of statements concerning identity. But these examples show that there are different types of statements concerning identity, which presuppose different means of their justification. Various meanings of connection "be", distinguished by Bertrand Russell, act as a ground for classification.

Notion	*Natural language proposition*	*Mathematical symbol*
identity	*a is a*	$a=a$
relation of including an element into a class	*a* is *B*	$a \in B$
relation of including a class into a class	*A* is *B*	$A \subseteq B$

Where *a*, *b* stand for individuals, and *A*, *B* for groups (classes) of individuals.

Taking these meanings of connection "to be" we can distinguish the following types of statements concerning identity:

Identity of a person refers to the first type of the statements. It is a proposition responding to the traditional philosophical problem of personal identity.

Social identity is connected with relating an individual or a group (set) of individuals to a broader social group. It refers to the two last types of propositions. Thus social identity is naturally divided into *individual* social identity ($a \in B$) and *group* social identity ($A \subseteq B$).

Thus, the classification is as the following:

Identity		
Of a person	Social	
	Individual	Group

Identity of a person comes to the traditional philosophical problem of personal identity. The formula of identity of a person is:

I am Me.

Personal identity is an important philosophical problem, which has been widely discussed in European philosophy, starting with John Locke. However, it does not play an important part in the light of contemporary methods of handling the problem in social, historical and other types of literature.

Social identity has immediate relation to the contemporary discussions concerning identity. As we have already seen, social identity is divided into the two following classes: relating an individual to a certain social group – individual identity, and relating a certain social group to a broader one – group identity.

The formula of *individual* identity is:

$$I\ (he/she) \in G,$$

The formula of *group* identity is:

$$We(they) \subseteq G$$

where G stands for a certain set of individuals constituting a social group.

According to set theory, G can be specified:

- as a list,
- with the help of characteristics, peculiar to the elements of G.

In case of list specification one cannot get any information about identity, since the relation of an individual to a group is presupposed. Specifying of a set using its elements' characteristics, corresponding to axiom of folding from set theory, is substantial for discussion concerning the notion of identity.

It is necessary to formulate a list of characteristics $F_1,F_2,\dots,F_n$, , peculiar to the elements of G, to determine individual social identity. In order to ground a proposition concerning identity of the form:

$$a \in G$$

it is sufficient to show that *a* possesses the characteristics $F_1,F_2,\dots,F_n$..

2. Regional identity with the focus to Kaliningrad identity

The BaltMION social research group focuses on regional identity, in particular on the Kaliningrad identity, and its identifiable features, which can have quantitative measure. However, I believe that before speaking on the plan, the questionnaire, and the results of sociological inquiry we must clearly understand the purposes of the inquiry, as well as the cultural presupposition of possible working hypotheses. I suppose that general purpose of the investigation could be creating by the research group a project of stimulating the desired type of regional identity and introducing it to the regional society. The Kaliningrad region seems to be the region proper for the project because of the predominant Soviet identity of its population from the end of the Forties to the end of the Eighties. A simple fact illustrating this thesis is that there were no orthodox churches in the region until the late Eighties. After the breakdown of the Soviet State, the crisis of identity in the region was deeper then in other Russian regions. In this situation, it is still possible to suggest a reasonable project to the regional community.

The geographical position of the Kaliningrad region as the Russian exclave in the Central Europe and the German past of the region propose the idea of a project of *Russian European identity* as a predominant type of the regional identity. *Vladimir Kantor*, the author of a comprehensive research on the phenomenon of Russian Europeans in the XIXth century Russia, advanced the idea in 2003. However, before formulating such purpose to the regional community we have to make clear whether it is possible and attainable. We have to put two questions: 1) Is a "Russian European" possible at all? 2) Are there any preconditions for that kind of identity in the Kaliningrad region?

The starting point is the consideration of the notion of 'Europeanness' from the standpoint of Russian culture. The result of the analysis is *the list of features* that are usually attributed to a European in the Russian literature. The basis is the tradition starting from Petr Chaadaev, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Vladimir Soloviov, Nikolai Lossky, Nikolai Berdyaev, Dmitry Likhachov etc. It is easy to see that 'Europeanness' is an example of individual social identity, this term that was introduced in the first section of this paper.

The comparison with the European interpretation of the notion shows that the Russian view on the composition and order of the list is slightly different from the European one. The second step of the argument is trying to understand what 'non-Europeanness' is. Keeping this purpose in mind, one compiles a list of negations for the features given below. Analysis of the second list shows that it coincides substantially with the self-estimation of Russians when they compare themselves with representatives of Western civilization. It means that there is a possibility of the situation where Russians relate themselves to non-European type of civilization. In that case, the notion of "Russian European" may be inconsistent.

The features of 'Europeanness' are:

- rationality (striving for actions being rationally planned, justification of planning);
- creation and support of culture as a way of putting the Being in order;
- dependence on the achieved level of civilization;
- striving for irreversible social, technical and cultural progress;
- dependence on comfortable private life;
- insistence on the universal status of their own values;
- striving for professionalism in the chosen type of activity;
- striving for the maximum of information for decision-making;
- striving for autonomous existence, to individual liberty;
- regarding all the moral habits differing from theirs as barbarian;
- being aware of limits in pleasures and sufferings.

Negations of the features of "being European":

- belief into Being, but not into rational thinking;
- preference for chaos of Being, not for cultural order;
- independence on the level of civilization;
- being aware of reversibility of every social, cultural and technical changes;
- independence on comfortable private life;
- experience of the inferiority complex in attempting to promote their own values;
- acquiring professional in the chosen type of activity only under special social or personal pressure;
- acting before gaining the necessary information for decision-making;
- establishing rationally inexpressible relations to other members of the community that limits individual liberty;
- regarding their own moral habits as barbarian;
- unacceptability of limits in pleasures and sufferings.

The negations of "European" features coincide substantially with the self-estimation of Russians when they compare themselves with representatives of European civilization. The non-European identity forms a part of Russian self-identification. It means that the notion of a "Russian European" can be inconsistent.

3. Cultural backgrounds of the notion of "Russian European"

Possible empirical inconsistency of the notion "Russian European' demands deeper analysis of the basic features of the European and Russian cultural backgrounds. It is stated usually that "individual autonomy" and "sobornost" can be regarded as the core notions of ideal types of Western and Russian cultures. It is easy to show that the two principles, if we take them in their abstract form, are also inconsistent. However the deeper analysis of the world model lying in the background of Russian life shows that there are alternatives to the notion of "sobornost'. One of them is the notion of "vospolnienie" (mutual compensation of the incomplete being) as it was introduced by Vladimir Soloviev [1]. “Vospolnienie” in contradistinction to “Sobornost” refers to the personal relations. If we regard “vospolnienie” as a substantive feature of Russian world model, then it can be shown that it is compatible with “individual autonomy” as a basic principle of the European life.

The core notions of the ideal types of Western and Russian cultures:

- Individual autonomy,
- Communality (“sobornost”).

It is easy to show that the two principles, if we take them in their abstract form, are inconsistent.

There are alternatives to the notion of Sobornost in Russian Philosophy (Vladimir Soloviev, Nikolay Lossky). Vladimir Soloviev introduces the relation of “Vospolnienie” as a basic relation among the representatives of Russian culture. “Vospolnienie” is a mutual compensation of the incomplete individual human beings and refers to the personal relations. It can be shown that “Vospolnenie” is compatible with “individual autonomy” as a basic principle of the European life.

4. Empirical studies of European identity in the Kaliningrad region

The sociological inquires confirm the difficulties in uniting the types of identities in the consistent whole. When residents of Kaliningrad oblast (KO) were asked to choose only one of the alternatives: “I am a local citizen”, “I am a Kaliningrad citizen” , “I am Russian”, “I am European”, “I am a cosmopolitan”, the results of three inquires, held in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005, showed the permanent trend of increasing predominant Russian identification (24,6% – 31,5% - 32,5% - 41,0%) and fluctuations in the self-estimation as Europeans (2,6% - 7,6% - 2,4% - 5,8%). It is interesting that the cosmopolitan orientation was more stable in comparison to European one: 2001 – 6,6%, 2003 – 6,7%, 2004 – 4,1% [3, p. 35]. However when KO residents were asked to choose three alternatives from the list in decreasing importance 20,6% of respondents stressed the second- or third-order importance of “European identity” [3, p. 36-37].

Social and territorial identification in the Kaliningrad region, 2001-2004

Social-territorial community	2001	2002	2004
Local community (city, village etc.)	32.2	27.5	40.0
Regional community “I am a resident of Kaliningrad region”	28.0	21.2	19.9
Country as a whole “I am a citizen of Russia”	24.6	31.5	32.5
Europe *“I am a European”*	2.6	7.6	2.4
The world as a whole *“I am a cosmopolite”*	6.6	6.7	4.1
“I do not know”	5.5	6.7	1.0

(Anna Alimpieva, IKSUR, 2001-2004)

In 2005 when KO residents were asked to choose three alternatives from the list in decreasing importance 20,6% of respondents stressed the second- or third-order importance of "European identity". The sociological inquires confirm the difficulties in uniting the European and Russian types of identity in the consistent whole.

5. Prospects of Identity Study

After these considerations we have to put question "What to do?" It is clear that there is a need of more objective empirical information. However we can gain this information only on the basis of clear theoretical considerations. First I suppose that we should distinguish three notions:

the notion of *identity*,

the notion of *identification*,

the notion of *self-identification*.

Identity is the objective relation between an individual and a social group. *Identification* is the process (or procedure) of establishing of identity.

Self-identification is the attribution of an individual to a social group established by the individual themselves.

The major part of the research of social identity is based on the study of *self-identification* of an individual. It is definitely true for the sociological studies of regional identity implemented in the Kaliningrad region. The task of the sociological research is to establish *identity* based on more objective procedures of *identification*. The basis of the sociological inquiry must consist in *indirect questions*, i. e. include elements of socio-psychological testing. I list the first questions from the *questionnaire* on rationality that is the first part of the questionnaire on European identity.

If you have bought a new washing-machine, you:

Read the manual carefully before starting.

Try to find in the manual how to switch on the washer.

Switch on the washer without having a look at the manual

If you are trying to persuade your friend to come with you the concert, you:

Explain her/him the attractive features of the concert.

Tell her/him that the recognized expert recommended attending the concert.

Ask her/him to accompany you.

Conclusion

The analysis shows that the question on the possibility of "Russian European" in modern Russia and in particular in the Kaliningrad region of Russia is still open. The correct answer to it demands deeper theoretical and empirical investigations.

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Dr. Edouard Jagodnik

Culture, Science and Education as instruments for Promoting democratic Values: European NGO experience

Abstract

It is important to consider, that the contributions of NGOs to the democratic culture are made through an extremely diverse body of activities which can range from acting as a vehicle for communication between different segments of society and public authorities, through the advocacy of changes in law and public policy, the provision of assistance to those in need, the elaboration of technical and professional standards, the monitoring of compliance with existing obligations under national and international law, and on to the provision of a means of personal fulfilment and of pursuing, promoting and defending interests shared with others. In order to make those contributions be visible and serve the community in the most effective way, Council of Europe had endorsed the special mechanism for this – standing Conference of the International Non-Governmental Organizations, whose member-NGOs have participatory status with the Council of Europe.

Legislators and executives, dealing with NGOs, should bear in mind that the existence of many NGOs is a manifestation of the right of their members to freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of their host country's adherence to principles of democratic pluralism. This is why there should a close connection be made with such international legal instruments as Article 5 of the European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No. 163), Articles 3, 7 and 8 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157) and Article 3 of the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level (ETS No. 144).

Therefore, the Recommendations, adopted by the CoE Council of Ministers as regulating mechanism, is not only directed towards Governments of member states, but should also be promoted by the NGOs themselves – through such effective tools, as culture and education. To be guided in their legislation, policies and practice by the minimum standards set out in the CoE recommendations, they should also be promoted during regular educational seminars, organized for the government officials, legislators, enforcement agencies and judges. It is also important to take account of these standards in monitoring the commitments they have made – and the monitoring services may be provided by the research community from the social science, who could suggest specific "measuring instruments" for it.

Only by complimentary use of culture, social science and educational instruments, we can ensure that those recommendations are put to wide use, disseminated as widely as possible to NGOs and the public in general, as well as to parliamentarians, relevant public authorities and educational institutions, and could be properly used for the training of officials.

Speaking of democratic culture is not easy because democracy is the government of everybody, for everybody, by everybody (Theodore Parker, 1850) and everyone knows that trainers in seminars on leadership always say: everyone is thinking "I feel good, I feel all right, but all the others are so-so" ", and the democratic soup is not easy to taste good, and keep all the flavor for everybody, in these conditions.

But, maybe, it is easier to speak of what is done by the International nongovernmental organizations of the Council of Europe, because this institution is particularly suited to the blooming of democratic culture.

I shall successively speak of:

- The role of the Council of Europe
- The place of INGO in it
- The work of the committee

I chair: Culture, Science, and Education

I. <u>Council of Europe</u>

"The aim of the council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members..." art.1 of the C.E.

Following the Second World War, and the thoughts of people like Winston Churchill, the Council of Europe was founded in 1949. The Council of Europe seeks to develop throughout Europe common and democratic principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights and other reference texts on the protection of individuals.

Member States

The Council of Europe has a genuine pan-European dimension:

47 member countries

1 applicant country: Belarus; Belarus ' special guest status has been suspended due to its lack of respect for human rights and democratic principles.

<u>The aims are</u>

- to protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law;
- to promote awareness and encourage the development of Europe's cultural identity and diversity
- to find common solutions to the challenges facing European society: such as discrimination against minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, bioethics and cloning, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, organized crime and corruption, cybercrime, violence against children;
- to consolidate democratic stability in Europe by backing political, legislative and constitutional reform.

The current Council of Europe's political mandate was defined by the third Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Warsaw in May 2005.

How it works

The main component parts of the Council of Europe are:

- the **Committee of Ministers,** the Organization's decision-making body, composed of the 47 Foreign Ministers or their Strasbourg-based deputies (ambassadors/permanent representatives);

- the Parliamentary Assembly, driving force for European co-operation, grouping 636 members (318 representatives and 318 substitutes) from the 47 national parliaments;
- the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the voice of Europe's regions and municipalities, composed of a Chamber of Local Authorities and a Chamber of Regions;
- the I.N.G.O (400) with representative statute.
- the 1800-strong secretariat recruited from member states, headed by a Secretary General, elected by the Parliamentary Assembly;

Official languages

English and French are the Council of Europe's two official languages. German, Italian and Russian are also working languages.

II. <u>Place of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Council of Europe</u>

Independent non-governmental organizations are a vital component of European society, guaranteeing freedom of expression and association, both of which are fundamental to democracy.

Recognizing their influence, the Council of Europe provides international NGOs (INGOs) with the opportunity to acquire participatory status.

The participative status gives INGO a weight they do not have in any other international institution.

Independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a vital component of European society, guaranteeing freedom of expression and association both of which are fundamental to democracy.

The Council of Europe recognized their influence as early as 1952 when it gave international NGOs the opportunity to acquire consultative status. This Resolution has been replaced by Resolution (2003)8 on participatory status which was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 November 2003.

A link with the public

The Council initiated dialogue with NGOs to meet a three-fold need:

- to know the views and aspirations of European citizens;
- to provide direct representation for them;
- to publicize its own activities through these associations. More than 400 now hold participatory status.

In order to obtain participatory status an NGO must fulfill the following criteria:

- it must share the Council of Europe's aims and contribute to its work;
- it must be international and representative, both geographically and in its sphere of activity, with permanent headquarters, a structured organization and a secretary general.

Active participation

The Council of Europe co-operates with NGOs in all bodies of its organizational structure. Co-operation takes many forms, from simple consultation to full-scale collaboration on specific projects.

A wide-ranging field of action

NGOs enjoying participatory status have set up specialist committees within their own organizational structure. These committees deal with the following areas:

- Human Rights Committee,
- Culture, Science and Education Committee,-Civil Society and Democracy Committee,

- Social Cohesion and Eradication of Poverty Committee,
- Sustainable Territorial Development Committee,
- Gender Equality Transversal Group,
- Europe and Global Challenges Transversal Group.

Practical involvement

NGOs have been involved in the preparation and drawing up of many of the Council of Europe's conventions and charters, including the following:

- the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers;
- the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture;
- the European Cultural Convention.

Dr. Neil Jarman

European instruments promoting freedom of peaceful assembly - as an important contribution for re-ensuring democratic culture of tolerance to "others”

Abstract

These Guidelines are based on international and regional human rights treaties, evolving state practice (including domestic case law), and general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.

The Guidelines demarcate a clear minimum baseline in relation to these standards, thereby establishing a threshold that must be met by national authorities in their regulation of freedom of peaceful assembly. By combining key principles with practical examples, the document fills a void in international law.

While these Guidelines will inform those involved in the drafting of legislation pertaining to freedom of assembly, the document is also aimed at those responsible for implementing that legislation (the relevant administrative and law enforcement authorities), and those affected by its implementation. The Guidelines are addressed to practitioners in many sectors – legislative draftspersons, politicians, legal professionals, police officers, local officials, trade unionists, assembly organisers and participants, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and those involved in monitoring both freedom of assembly and policing practice.

Freedom of peaceful assembly is one of the fundamental human freedoms and as such is included in each of the international human rights instruments that focus on civil and political rights. Freedom of peaceful assembly is particularly important insofar as the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket, rally, march and protest is an important aspect of all democratic societies. Freedom of peaceful assembly is associated with the right to challenge the dominant views within society, present alternative ideas and opinions, promote the interests and views of minority groups and sections of society, and provide an opportunity for expression of views and opinions in public for those with less power, wealth and status. Public assemblies may be particularly important and prominent at times of wider political tensions or at times of demand for social change. Demonstrations and protests are often factors in variety of political or oppositional campaigns. Assemblies are always important aspects of election campaigns, and often they have also been prominent in the post election period if the results are contested, for example in Kenya in December 2007 and in Armenia in February 2008. But they can also be an important aspect of demands for change in less democratic contexts, for example public protests played an important role in helping to end the Apartheid regime in South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s; and also in bringing to an end the Soviet Union and its dominance in eastern

Europe over the same period. While more recently public protests were a factor in the resignation of the governments in Iceland and Latvia in the winter of 2008-2009 as people voiced there opposition to the governments handling of the economic crisis. Demonstrations may also be important strategies during a process of political change, as for example during the Northern Ireland peace process from 1995 onwards, when inter-ethnic rivalries led to frequent outbreaks of violence associated with public assemblies. But the mobilization of people in a public assembly is most often simply a means of trying to influence government or reflect international opinion, to vent opinion without aiming to overthrow an existing regime, for example the massive mobilizations in many countries of the world against the war in Iraq in 2003 or the protests against the Chinese Olympic torch relay in early 2008.

Because assemblies take place in public spaces and because they are used by diverse organizations, groups and people they are very visible indicators of the levels of tolerance and respect that is given to different political, social and cultural views, practices and beliefs. The way that assemblies are treated is thus a clear indication of the respect that any individual state is willing to pay to uphold people's basic human rights. While many fundamental human rights are restricted or abused by the state at various times, most such abuses take place in private, or in less public circumstances: for example in police cells, or through bureaucratic restraints. However, restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly very often take place in a very visible manner, they impact on a large number of people at the same time and they are often widely reported in the media. Such restrictions thus all too readily convey a repressive or controlling attitude of a state towards its citizens and a cynical or hostile attitude towards human rights in general. The overt repression of assemblies may also in turn provoke an immediate and public response, which may lead to a spiraling cycle of protest, repression and violence. This is not to argue that freedom of peaceful assembly is more important than other human rights, rather simply that its abuse is often more visible, and is often experienced by a wide range of members of society in a very immediate and often physical manner.

This paper provides an overview of some key issues and recent developments related to freedom of peaceful assembly within the wider region of Europe and Central Asia. It begins by outlining some of the problems associated with public assemblies within Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union that occurred during 2007, this was not a particularly problematic or notable year for freedom of assembly as similar incidents and issues could have been noted in many previous years, but rather serves to illustrate the impact of freedom of assembly across a wide range of countries. The paper then describes a project initiated by the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, within the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe, to identify and outline a set of basic guidelines related to law and practice related to freedom of peaceful assembly. Finally, it briefly considers some recent developments that illustrate the dynamic impact of assemblies and protests, before highlighting some elements of best practice that have been established across many parts of the OSCE region and highlighting in particular an ODIHR training project designed to build capacity among human rights defenders to monitor standards and practices related to freedom of assembly.

Protests and Disorder

The problems that can occur when governments, local authorities, the police or other officials attempt to restrict freedom of assembly are evident from a scant review of the media. The following is a list of public assemblies that resulted in prohibition or violence in a range of OSCE participating states and which were reported in the UK media during 2007.

- Belarus: There were clashes at a rally in Minsk to mark the anniversary of the 1918 Belarussian Republic as protesters tried to get through a police cordon (25 March 2007).
- Belgium: The Mayor of Brussels prohibited a march against Islam on the anniversary of 9.11. The police also clashed with around 200 far right anti-Islamic protesters on 11 September as they attempted to mark the anniversary (30 August 2007).
- Czech Republic: A neo-Nazi march through the old Jewish quarter of Prague was banned, and there were disturbances as far right attempted to hold their demonstration (10 November 2007).
- Denmark: Police clashed with young protesters in Copenhagen who were objecting to the demolition of youth centre (1 March 2007). There was further violence in the city on the six-month anniversary of the initial trouble (2 September 2007).
- Estonia: Police used tear gas to disperse protests by ethnic Russians against plans to move a Red Army memorial in Tallinn (26-29 April 2007).
- Georgia: The police used rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannon to break up against protests against the government in Tbilisi after six days of demonstrations (7 November 2007). The government also introduced a state of emergency.
- Germany: Police in Hamburg used water cannon and batons in fights with anti-globalization protesters who threw bottles and stones in return (29 May 2007). A few days later there was violence in Rostok at anti-globalization protests, in which the police used tear gas and batons (2 June 2007).
- Hungary: There was violence in Budapest after the police blocked far-right demonstration marching to a venue where the Prime Minister was giving speech. Police used tear gas and water cannon; while the protesters used petrol bombs (23 October 2007).
- Kyrgyzstan: Police in Bishkek used tear gas and batons to disperse anti-government protests and to clear a week-long tent camp in front of the President's office (19 April 2007).
- Lithuania: The Mayor of Vilnius banned a Lesbian, Gay and Transsexual rally citing safety concerns due to building works (26 October 2007).
- Russia: Riot police arrested dozens of demonstrators at an opposition rally in Nizhny Novgorod (25 March 2007). Opposition activists were also arrested in Moscow after an anti-government rally banned (14 April 2007), while attempts to hold the rally the following day were prevented by the police. The following month a number of gay activists were arrested and there was violence at protests after the Pride event in Moscow was banned by the Mayor (27 May 2007). Opposition leaders again arrested for organizing an unauthorized protest in Moscow in November and the following day opposition protesters in St Petersburg

were arrested when police attempted to remove banners at rally (24-25 November 2007).

- Turkey: Police in Istanbul used tear gas to stop left wing protesters trying to hold a demonstration, with 600 people arrested (1 May 2007). In Diyarbakir in November the police used water cannon and tear gas to disperse pro-Kurdish protesters (25 November 2007).
- United Kingdom: Armed police were authorized to use anti-terrorism powers to control climate change protesters who were threatening to disrupt Heathrow airport in London (11 August 2007).

The media reports illustrate that while there was a diversity of contentious assemblies across the different countries, a relatively small number of recurrent responses by the state can be noted. These include the banning of opposition events; the dispersal of anti-government protests; prohibitions of events organized by far right groups, restrictions on assemblies organized by left wing groups; prohibitions on events by LGBT groups; restrictions imposed on the locations in which assemblies may be held and the use of repressive and / or anti-Terrorism laws to deal with peaceful protests. One of the notable facts that occurred at many of the events noted above was that the assemblies ended in outbreaks of violence. At time the violence was initiated by the demonstrators, but in many cases the violence broke out as the police intervened, sometimes to enforce the law, sometimes to restrict an assembly and sometimes to disperse participants[1].

In some cases the use of force by the state may be considered as a necessary and proportionate response to concerns for public order or disruption to the rights of other sections of the community, this is because although the freedom of peaceful assembly is a fundamental human right, it is not an unlimited right. Article 11.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights makes it clear that it is possible to restrict the freedom of assembly in a variety of circumstances, which are similar to the legitimate grounds that may be invoked to restrict the related freedoms of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9) and of expression (Article 10). The full text of Article 11 of the Convention is as follows:

Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or the administration of the state.

Article 11.2 sets out a number of limited grounds under which it is possible and legitimate to impose restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly. Furthermore, the state always also has some scope (or ‘margin of appreciation’) for how it might interpret the need to impose restrictions on freedom of assembly in the particular circumstances that occurred at the time. However, any restrictions that are imposed may in turn be challenged, if not always immediately, and the European Court of Human Rights has been asked to determine the legitimacy of a growing number of cases related to Article 11[2] and their judgments in turn provide guidance and opinion for people working on issues associated with freedom of assembly. The complex interrelationship between principles, practice and context means that the boundaries of legitimacy and of limitation on the right to assemble is always subject to interpretation, and thus to dispute, contest and challenge.

OSCE ODIHR Guidelines Project

In 2004 the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw drafted a set of guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly. The aim of the draft guidelines was to inform people responsible for drafting legislation about basic principles and best practice related to this particular right. Later, in response to comments from a variety of sources, it was decided to convene a panel of experts to review, revise and formalize the guidelines and thus to establish a benchmark for standards within the region. The panel on freedom of peaceful assembly, included members from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Tajikistan, United Kingdom and United States of America. It was convened in early 2006 and, with the support of an independent secretary and members of the Legislative Support Unit and the Human Rights Department within ODIHR, the panel held four public consultative events in Georgia, Serbia, Kazakhstan and Poland between May and September 2006. These events were designed to enable the panel to gather information and perspectives from a wide range of people and from a diverse range of countries; those contributing to the discussions included government representatives, police officers, academics, human rights activists and representatives of NGOs from twenty-nine OSCE participating states. Following the consultation process the final version of the guidelines was published in English in March 2007 and in Russian in September of the same year.

The published document begins with a brief text, which sets out the formal Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly. This was deliberately kept as a short document and is limited to outlining the basic core of the principles and practices that it was agreed underpin freedom of peaceful assembly. However, this initial text is followed by a longer set of 'interpretative notes', which elaborate on the themes and the thinking behind the Guidelines, while the document also includes an annex of all the legal cases that were cited and other reference documents.

The focus and orientation of the final version of the Guidelines was somewhat wider than the original document and was designed to inform people responsible for both drafting and implementing the law in the various countries, as well as those who might be practically involved in organizing or managing assemblies such as police officers, event organizers and human rights defenders. The work was also intended to be a living document and would be subjected to update, extension and revision as necessary and appropriate in response to developing practices and new judgments by the European Court of Human Rights and other bodies. As a result the panel of experts has been re-convened as a standing panel within ODIHR with a remit to update the guidelines as necessary[3]. The panel also have responsibility to review existing and draft legislation upon request[4], to translate 'good practice' models of freedom of assembly legislation into Russian[5] and also to develop and deliver a training program on monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly.

Full text of the OSCE ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly can be found on the ODIHR – OSCE website.[6]

The Guidelines have been utilized by practitioners and officials in a number of countries, furthermore in June 2008 they were adopted by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Also in addition to English and Russian versions, the Guidelines have also been translated into Armenian, Azeri and Romanian and it is also hoped that they will be translated into a number of other languages over time, in an attempt to promote a greater understanding and awareness of the issues, as well as to encourage changes in law, policy and practice and a greater understanding and respect for international human rights standards.

Changing Contexts

The importance of freedom of peaceful assembly within all political systems has meant that new forms of protest and new contexts for the use of public assemblies have continued to emerge. In some cases these have had a wider impact than within a single state. For example, there have been a number of occasions in recent years within the OSCE region when sustained or persistent public assemblies have been associated with mass mobilization against the authorities, in response to contested national elections or in protest against economic problems. The examples of the Rose revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, when public protests led to a change of political regime has ensured that many governments have become increasingly sensitive to the potential of mass assemblies, or the mobilization of large numbers of people, particularly those that might lead to the creation of long stay protests with tent encampments in a major city. This recent history had an impact on the state response to mass protests in Georgia in November 2007 and in Armenia in February 2008, in both cases the government introduced a state of emergency, restricting a range of human rights, in an attempt to restore order and re-impose its authority.

In other parts of the OSCE region the presence of foreign leaders or representatives of states with a poor record of respect for human rights have often caused problems for host governments, particularly if the country is home to a significant Diaspora. For example the protests related to the 2008 Chinese Olympic torch relay in the UK, France and the USA. In many cases the host state will impose potentially unlawful restrictions of rights to protest. The recurrence of anti-globalization and environmental protests since the late 1990s have also often created significant problems for governments in Western Europe and the USA and have raised concerns both about the quality of policing and also about how to effectively police an assembly when the participants intend to use violence against the police or against property. The anti-globalization protests have also raised difficulties for states due to the international nature of many of the assemblies, with participants travelling from many different countries. This has led to concerns among the human rights community about the imposition of restrictions on freedom of movement to participate in an assembly.

One other way in which assemblies have been used and abused and have thus resulted in tensions, violence, disorder and abuse of human rights, has been in relation to ethno-national diversity and minority communities. In particular problems have occurred when the state has intervened to restrict the rights of minority to expression of its culture or political demands; or alternatively when sections of society have sought to demonstrate or protest against the political or cultural rights of a minority. Such events have led to recurrent outbreaks of disorder in many parts of Europe and America. There have been many problems and outbreaks of disorder in recent years in relation to a large number of restrictions imposed on, or protest organized against, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender events[7]. The problems have mostly occurred in parts of eastern Europe and states which had previously been part of the Soviet Union, but protests have also taken place in both Northern Ireland and Israel, two regions with a strong conservative, religious culture.

The changing and developing political context in different areas creates new challenges for those responsible for managing public order, protecting human rights and organizing public assemblies, and while there is a need for some allowance for local customs and context, there is also a growing acceptance that there a number of basic standards and principles of practice related to assemblies that should be applied in all countries and in relation to all public assemblies[8].

Developing Good Practice

The OSCE ODIHR / Venice Commission Guidelines have been developed as a practical working document with the aim of developing greater understanding of legal issues associated with freedom of assembly, but they were also written with the aim of improving practice around the regulation and management of public assemblies. In general the Guidelines emphasis the need for the main actors, who are responsible for ensuring assemblies pass off in a peaceful manner, to work together as far as possible and to work to common standards and principles. In particular they highlight the roles of the regulatory authorities, the police, the event organizers and of those people attending to observe the event. This section briefly highlights some key points for each of these four categories of actors.

Authorities: The basic aim of the authorities should be to ensure that all peaceful assemblies should be facilitated, wherever possible, even if they are technically breaking the law. It should be acknowledged that all public assemblies cause some degree of disruption to daily routines, but also that people have as much right to use public spaces for different forms of assembly as they do for shopping, business, going to and from work and for travel.

The authorities should thus ensure that any required notification of an assembly is a simple & transparent process; they should be willing to accommodate instances where notification is made late; and if there are disputes they should encourage the different parties to participate in open discussion to resolve disputes. However, while the authorities should retain the right to impose restrictions on a proposed assembly, they should also allow the time and facility for an aggrieved party to make an appeal to an independent court or other legally structured authority.

The authorities should also acknowledge and work with the organizers of a diverse range of public assemblies. This will include not only instances of fully legal assemblies, where organizers have complied with all requirements that may have been imposed, but also with spontaneous assemblies, which may arise in response to a specific concern or problem and for which there is insufficient time to provide advance notification. They should also be prepared to work with organizers of un-notified or even illegal assemblies as it will often cause less disruption to facilitate an assembly than to try and prohibit it or to disperse or arrest participants, while people who break the law may be arrested more readily after an event has ended rather than during the event. They should also be willing to accommodate more complex scenarios such as situations when there might be multiple or oppositional assemblies. Too often and too readily the authorities cite the notification of another event or activity, or the possible presence of opponents as a reason for prohibiting an event, rather than working to ensure that multiple events can take place simultaneously.

Police: The management of public assemblies will largely fall on the police. A successful peaceful assembly will often be in large part due to the quality of the policing; but equally poor policing can all too readily lead to disorder, disruption and violence. The military should not be used in policing assemblies as they rarely have the appropriate skills or training to manage such public events peacefully. The successful management of public events requires a clear understanding of human rights, crowd dynamics and how conflicts unfold by senior officers, and there is also a need for good planning, a clear command structure and good communication. However, it is important that all police officers, not just officers, have a good understanding of the basic principles of human rights, are well trained in public order policing, and are trained in the use of weapons and the use of force[9]. But it is equally important that the human rights of police officers are also respected and that they are provided with appropriate safety equipment to enable them to work in potentially dangerous situations.

Current best practice emphasizes the importance of the police working with the event organizers as much as possible, and that they should focus on maintaining public order rather than simply working to the letter of the law. It is widely accepted that a low key approach to the presence and visibility of police officers is important; that riot gear and weapons should not be deployed until necessary, rather than as part of a preventative approach; and force should only be used when absolutely necessary, with patience, tact and diplomacy being much more effective means of ensuring that events pass of peacefully and without disorder.

One of the recurrent problems is that too often the police work to the interests of the state, or those of prominent political actors, rather than work to uphold the rule of law and the protect human rights. This means that the orientation of policing practice is towards suppressing or constraining freedom of speech, expression and protest, rather than trying to ensure that people have the opportunity to exercise their rights and freedoms in a safe and peaceful environment.

Organizers: Event organizers also have a responsibility to try to ensure that events pass of peacefully and thus they should aim to work with police where possible. This may involve identifying lines of command & communication, both among the participants and with the police. It is also important that event organizers have a plan for ending an event and for encouraging people to disperse, rather than just focusing on mobilizing people and encouraging participation.

The organizers can also take responsibility for much of the practical policing of events through use of trained and visible stewards, who should be responsible for controlling the activities of those protesting. The presence of trained stewards can help to ensure that the police are less frequently involved in minor disturbances that could spiral into more serious trouble. However, stewards should not be responsible for the behavior of people outside the body of the demonstration, whose behavior should remain the responsibility of the police.

Observers: The term ‘observer’ can be used to include a wide range of people who attend a public event but who do not consider themselves as participants[10]. Of particular importance in relation to documenting the range of activities by those who are participating are the various elements of the media and human right defenders. The print and visual media are often present at prominent assemblies, although at times the state may try to restrict their presence if the assembly is considered contentious.

Journalists have also been subjected to intimidation, harassment, violence and arrest when trying to observe and record the events related to public assemblies. It is important therefore that human rights standards related to freedom of assembly are also applied to journalists[11].

Human rights defenders also play an important role in monitoring assemblies and observing the extent to which human rights are respected and policing adheres to international standards as well as respecting the local laws[12]. It is important that human rights monitors remain independent from the organizers and those demonstrating as well as from the police. Their role is to observe, document and record incidents, behavior and activities and produce reports or other testimonies at a subsequent time. Local human rights monitors can also be an important source of independent information for international bodies and can act as a 'conscience' and thus encourage peaceful behavior simply through their physical presence.

The OSCE ODIHR have acknowledged the valuable role that monitors can play in trying to improve respect for human rights and arising standards around the management of public assemblies and have recently established a training program for monitors. The training covers both international standards on freedom of assembly and the local law and experiences. Having established a trained a body of monitors, the OSCE ODIHR works with a local NGO to co-ordinate and organize a program for monitoring and reporting all public assemblies over a six month period. The aim is to analyze a wide range of practice across a diverse range of assemblies rather than just focus on high profile or contentious events. Once the monitoring program is concluded the report will be published with recommendations for areas of behavior and practice that could be improved. The first monitoring training was held in Moldova in October 2007 and the monitoring project has been running in that country since that time. A second monitoring project has been running in Armenia since September 2008 and there are plans to run further training programs in other countries in the future.

In Conclusion

Freedom of peaceful assembly remains a cornerstone of democratic society and is a key element in creating a space for a diversity of voices and opinions to be heard. However, public assemblies often create problems for the state and its agents and too often this has resulted in violence and disorder, and to restrictions on, or the suppression of, human rights. The development of the OSCE ODIHR / Venice Commission Guidelines has been one attempt to systematize the core principles that should underpin legislation, policy and practice related to freedom of assembly for the public authorities, the police, event organizers, the media and human rights defenders. The Guidelines acknowledge the complexities involved in attempting to both protect human rights and maintain public order, but aim to set out the core principles that should underpin the approach of all the key actors.

Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the Guidelines remain a work in progress and that the social, political and cultural context in which assemblies take place will vary and develop over time. However, the recognition of a small number of common principles and basic elements of good practice will help to ensure that the freedom of peaceful assembly is protected for all. Finally, in recognizing the full breadth of actors involved in protecting freedom of assembly, the OSCE ODIHR has also set out basic standards for the protection of the rights of the media in reporting at public assemblies and is supporting the work of local human rights defenders to monitor how assemblies are managed and policed with the aim of promoting and encouraging a greater respect for human rights and the freedom of peaceful assembly. Collectively these various areas of work aim to increase respect, understanding and practice in a number of areas of activity related to freedom of assembly.

Resources on Freedom of Assembly

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Prof. Dr. Nina Belyaeva

Freedom of Association and Freedom of Assembly as Implemented in Local Advocacy Campaigns in Russia

Abstract

Advocacy is especially important in democratic societies where decision-makers are held accountable to the citizens through elections, and where the process of decision-making – at least in theory – is a public matter. In these societies, decision-makers often take action in response to arguments and pressures brought to bear on them from others. Friends, family, business associates, donors, experts, voters, media, civil society organizations and the general public all incline decision-makers in one way or another. Under democratic governance, competing interests wage their advocacy campaigns to pull decision-makers this way and that. Advocacy is thus an essential skill for all that seek to influence policy in a certain direction, and provides a number of important benefits.

For the research project, that Interlegal Foundation was leading together with ADF Foundation, USA, on the basis of the two-year practical NGO-training activities, we defined **advocacy - mobilizing citizen participation to bring about changes in policies, programs or practices in government or any other sector of society.** This definition goes far beyond the limited concept of advocacy as lobbying government for change. It places an emphasis on action by citizens and the organizations they create to influence any public sector institutions or private institutions in which decisions are made that have an impact on their lives. Advocacy not only enables civil society organizations and citizens to influence policy makers on public policies and laws, it has an important role in mobilizing citizens to work together for their collective interests, independent of government.

Advocacy addresses issues of fairness and justice. Where some group has been treated unfairly, advocates may step in to speak for them or encourage them to speak for themselves. Where current policies and laws contribute to a problem, advocates help define this problem and contribute solutions.

Advocacy organizations and movements recognize that the key to change is the ability to rally forces that connect people and communities to concrete issues affecting their lives. They know that local, regional and national decisions affect every person in every community. Effective advocates recognize leadership qualities in others and nurture those qualities so that their organizations and movements flourish and grow. They build networks and coalitions with both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. They are based on Freedom of Associations, as this is one of the fundamental human right, and on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly – to express their opinion publicly. They also use the media to help spread their message. They recognize that change is a slow process that requires commitment, persistence, and the emergence of a new social consensus. They know that the voice of one person acting alone will be readily ignored, but the voices of many working together can have a significant impact. In contemporary times, despite of many gloomy predictions and pessimistic sociological data on almost total absence of independent, spontaneous citizens activity in Russia, we analyzed 300 local advocacy campaigns, that show a lot in common with European practices.

After 2003, when the democratic political parties were forcefully withdrawn from the "official" realm of state power, Russian state machine mostly consists of "civil servants" put in power "from the top" by the bureaucratic mechanisms, who are not promoted by people and do not report to the people, so, in every scholarly sense, current Russian state is, truly bureaucratic. Officials are appointed from above and report only to their bosses, whose main motive of keeping their jobs is staying close to the power.

This is where a problem of effective governance emerges: the implementation of any intellectual product in the sphere of social engineering can't be done without the bureaucracy's sanction, but the bureaucracy has its own interest, and their interest is clearly selfish, not public interest. An intellectual product that is useful for the society but contradicts the interests of the bureaucracy has no chance of coming to life.

Generally, Russian authorities can be described as bureaucratic, imposed on people from above, supported by the state machine, and not elected through the free expression of people's will. But public interest doesn't always really contradict the interests of bureaucracy. I don't think that Russian bureaucracy is a faceless block or a ferroconcrete construction with no doors, windows or even cracks, through which public interest could enter this "block", and I try to do it by finding and widening those "cracks". I search – and I find "windows", sometimes even small "doors" in the state machine, through which sensible propositions can be implemented – without losing the meaning. I don't accept the rules of "sovereign democracy" and don't strive to find a "historically specific" justification for it, which many of our colleagues eagerly do. At the same time, I state: even under the current political regime there're channels of socially significant cooperation with the bureaucracy, including motivated criticism and competent opposition.

In each region, in each city there are people who are ready to make their contributions to developing healthy relationship between people and the state in all its forms, which is basically building civil society in Russia, difficult though it seems. We believe that this should be done from the lower, local level through personal involvement and the development of personal relations between various civil activists and the officials. This is why International Public Foundation *Interlegal* in its desire to support civil initiative in Russia decided to conduct a project under the general title *Non-Political Advocacy Campaigns in Russia*, with the help of America's Development Foundation, the intention of which was to teach local and regional activists from all over Russia to find those "cracks" too and to be more efficient in their advocacy activities.

The priorities of the project were:

- enhancing advocacy skills of Russian NGOs,
- making educational resources and better technical support more available for Russian NGOs,
- promoting and enhancing cooperation among Russian NGOs in order to increase the efficiency of their advocacy activities.

The project took place between September 2007 and December 2008; during it we managed to:

a. organize an all-Russian meeting of NGO leaders who have advocacy experience in order develop general rules of the project, contest-based criteria for choosing participants, conditions on which regional juries will be chosen, and conditions on which experiences trainers would take part in the project (January 2008),
b. conduct a training for Russian trainers, who have passed the contest and are motivated to take part in educational project on advocacy (April 2008),
c. conduct a series of 6 educational trainings in 6 federal districts (Central, Southern, North-Western, the Volga, the Urals, and Siberian & the Far East together) for NGO leaders, who have passed the contest and have campaigning experience in advocating for the rights of various vulnerable social groups in Russia (April – June 2008). As a results, the participants developed and presented campaign projects that were later executed by their organizations,
d. organize a contest among socially important NGO initiatives in advocacy sphere and as a result of it, award grants of no more than $1000. (Mini-projects of Russian NGOs that will be submitted to the contest had to not contradict their main activities (April – September 2008).)

We also mean to organize a kind of «virtual resource centre» about public activities, so that all the participants could share experience with each other and try to solve difficulties together because people who perform advocacy in the regions rarely receive some special training: usually they emerge from conscious citizens who were concerned about a certain issue that touched their lives and did their best to solve the problem. It often happens that people get really involved into civil activism, and after solving their own problem, they turned to help other people in similar situations through sharing practical experience and advice.

As our trainers, e.g. Alexander Zotin from Perm reported, an ordinary group of training participants included people of different age (18 – 70 years, average age exceeded 40 years) and was, on the whole, gender-balanced. The level of practical skills and experience varied greatly: from non-existent to vast serious experience that could be and needed to be shared with other people. Some participants had never engaged into advocacy activity systematically but got into a situation when they needed to defend the rights of the groups they represented, though not really knowing how to do it. About 1/4 – 1/3 of the participants represented new initiative groups and had little experience in advocacy but had already done the first steps. Other participants were experienced activists and NGO leaders with a strong background in conducting advocacy campaigns.

So, besides creative an efficient channel of experience exchange, one of the main goals of the project was to strengthen social capital in the Russia-wide coalition of the independent NGOs, existing since 1999, called “*We, The Citizens!*” , both through reviving old ties and attracting new partners from the regions.

At the beginning of the project, there were 300 applications with campaign drafts in different but equally important areas of life, such as basic human rights and education in the sphere of human rights, children and youth issues, cultural and intercultural issues. However, the distribution of topics touch varied from region to region.

Table 1: Approximate distribution of campaign problem areas according to region

Region	**The Retired and the Socially Unprotected**	**Children and the Youth (including Soldiers), Education**	**Animals**	**Human Rights, Education in the Sphere of Human Rights, Politics**	**Ecology**	**Culture and Sport**	**Housing, Living Conditions**	**The Disabled**	**Professionals, Trade Unions**	**Women**	**Ethnic Minorities, Migrants, Residents of One City**	**Health: Alcohol, Drugs, HIV**	**Total**
Volga	1	11	2	10	5	8	1	3	6	2	3	2	54
South	3	5	0	5	2	6	2	3	0	0	1	9	36
North	1	7	0	8	6	15	3	4	4	2	2	5	57
Centre	0	11	0	11	3	3	3	4	2		4	1	42
Siberia and the Far East	0	9	0	11	4	12	4	1	4	4	3	2	54
The Urals	2	13	2	10	7	5	13	3	1	1	0	0	57
Total:	7	56	4	55	27	49	26	18	17	9	13	19	300

For example, as seen in Table 1, housing issues related to the recent housing reform are a matter of serious concern in the Urals (13 projects), while in the South, a traditionally unstable region, there still are many drug-related problems (9 projects).

After the contest-based selection process, 180 projects out of 300 were selected, and finally 158 advocacy campaigns were supported during the 18-month period, including:

- 26 campaigns – in the Central Federal District,
- 29 – in the Southern Federal District,
- 25 – in the Urals,
- 27 – in the Volga Federal District,
- 29 – in the North-Western Federal Distrct,
- and 23 – in Siberia and the Far East.

Basically, we have decided to share our intellectual product with real consumers (who are potentially conscious customers) and have seen that the demand for this product is high, especially in faraway regions and towns, where it is easier to try and change the situation that it is at federal level. There, at the local level, local authorities have to solve problems. And it's rather not because they're driven by some highly ethical motives, by some "twinges of conscience" or because they have finally "felt sorry" for the people. It is because they literally have to, otherwise they can be replaced, fired or even sent to prison. The motives of their innovative and often courageous activities vary greatly, and this, as the journalist Boris Vishnevsky recently described in his presentation at the last Khodorkovsky Readings, in fact requires, perhaps, a separate study.

There, at the local level, bureaucratic self-assertion of the authorities isn't the problem – the problem is severe lack of expert resources. There you especially feel shortage of specialists who could give advice on what to do. Municipal and regional officials often have a local agricultural college as a background, while they have to make decision in the sphere of public policy, social dialogue, economic strategy. They need experts badly but they don't know where to find them, where to go. They see no experts. They know not in which shop, on which shelf is the expert resource they need. They don't need (at least, now) a "global" kind of resource that concerns the general principles of state structure, social relations, development of the party system. They have thousands and thousands of specific issues, such as balancing local budget or building a new kindergarten, the money for which has been spent in the previous quarter to cover wages debts. All these problems can't be solved effectively without experts, but as they can't find them, they rush, make mistakes and stalemate local economy. They need to be helped out.

Moreover, I believe that intellectual products should be implemented aside from the state machine. Without its help, or, to be more precise – without its permission. The implementation has to be done through the society, through social networks. Even under our regime the society remains the customer of the expert product. I state that not only the bureaucracy is the customer but the society too. What is the society as customer? Firstly, it is really active social unions. They do exist, they work, they need our expert product: there're thousands of them, dealing with real people's problems – from self-help in families with handicapped people (there're more than 30,000 such people in Russia) to parents control over drugs in schools, because in some southern regions this problem is practically a national disaster. What kinds of people do this? They are ordinary citizens, just citizens who have nothing to rely on expect themselves, their self-organization. What do they do? They search for information, find specialists, create action committees, deal with problems. The main result of their work is that people learn to survive without governmental help and support, relying just on themselves.

This can be proved by numerous real cases all over the country. For example, the campaign “Let’s Save Utrish” in the South of Russia, which was covered by federal television and was led by ordinary citizens who just wanted to save and protect the Utrish Nature Reserve. All nature reserves are, de jure, protected by the state but de facto, in most cases they are neglected or become subjects of commercial speculations. However, in the Utrish case people managed to organize themselves and conduct an informational campaign against a barbaric attitude to the nature reserve, promoting a conscious and sensible approach nature.

Another example of pure grass-root initiative is the campaign in Ilyinsky district of Perm Region by Perm Public Organization *Dobry Dom* aimed at the preservation of the heritage of the famous local scientist A.Teploukhov, who used to live in the region, by re-opening a museum in the house he used to live in, and organizing various education seminars and other events. From just a campaign for the preservation of Tephloukhov's heritage, this initiative developed into the establishment of a local cultural foundation "Obvinskaya Rosa", which has become a coordinating organization for various regional NGOs and volunteers. This is a pure example of a free assembly that later evolved into a prominent local civil organization, which, in its turn, attracted more people to participate in civil activity.

As part of research work at my department, we have developed subjective-institutional approach to describing modern political processes. Basically, modern political institutions are very weak, while the subjects that can twist them around are very strong. However, it isn't very easy to build those institutions because those strong subjects – the Kremlin in the first place – don't want to change anything. This is where we come: to "build" new institutions – or "re-build" the old ones – first, we have to create "builders" themselves, that is, to raise new subjects of political action.

Actually, in some regions the process of literally raising people with a stout civil position is taken seriously. For example, one of the local projects supported during the general 18-months project was School of Civil Position in Krasnoschekovo (Altay Krai), which was aimed at increasing the civil engagement of young people by educating them at open seminars. As a result, the most active young people were sent to further trainings at the regional level and were given a chance to participate in conferences alongside with real civil activists and help them in solving important issues.

However, raising active, self-esteemed independent actors of politics in society isn't easy. People aren't born conscious citizens – they become conscious citizens through regular social activities, that gradually transform them from "objects of state care" into the people with self-esteem, the active creators of social rules and practices The "level of self-esteem" develops gradually, it develops from the experience of political action. We also specify the terms of social and political actors, who, even though they act in politics, are to the large extent "subordinate" – that is, aren't always independent. But the interaction of actors – both independent or not – makes what we call public space and its features (contents, value, fullness, ongoing processes). There is a considerable research conducted in this field, several papers had been presened on those topics, two books with a collection of essays on this topic had been published, and there's even a tool for measuring this space.

Actors, according to those studies, have different levels of "self-esteem" and independence, which we called "subjectness." For example, there's no use in considering the political subjectness of "state employees on the whole" or "the youth on the whole". But if we examine a specific pro-governmental youth movement "Nashi" or the columns of the retired old people, who went outdoors to protest against the benefits of the "monetization" (again, not "all the retired" but only those who went out to protest), we can see the difference their level of "acting on their own", i.e. self esteem, or "subjectness". While "Nashi" was created "extrinsically", under the influence of an "external subject", no one urged the retired "from outside" – they thought of it themselves and this was their own conscience decision, obviously, connected with a lot of risks. So, the self-organized pensioners had suddenly become independent political subjects. They grew from the social environment through articulating their interests, building relations with similar individual actors ("horizontal" relations are extremely important to bare in mind in such cases of "creating a joint subject" - single personified actors were individually making connections to each other and individually taking decisions on this – without any pressure from "above"), voluntarily building a community – community of people who have faced similar situations.

Such “communities of collective action” – as social “subjects” of social and political innovation – are not ready to be customers of intellectual product -yet - but already are its consumers. There are huge vulnerable communities, such as migrants, for example, for whom the state machine has done nothing. However, there are people like Svetlana Gannushkina and her organization – "Civil Cooperation" – who work for them. Such an organization is already a real customer of expert suggestions and social technologies in this sphere. Unfortunately, most experts search for customers somewhere in the federal government, neglecting thousands of real customers in the society around them, and this is a totally wrong approach.

Another example is people who aren't satisfied with the recent housing reform, or payment for utility services – or, to be more precise, with the procedure of choosing managing companies. There are hundreds of non-governmental organizations practically in each region that deal with this problem. For example, "Union for Perm Citizens", leaded by Alexander Zotin, is a relatively new but already influential organization. They defend specific interest of Perm citizens. They get legislative acts through, organize piquets and other actions, send letters. They work with deputies, with the executive authorities – with everyone who can do something about their problems. And for me as an expert, it is A.Zotin and his organization that can become customers, not the administration of Perm Region. It is "Union for Perm Citizens" that is a real subject of political activity, it represents public interest. The step from a community to a subject is a very specific process, and it lies in self-organization. There're people who are dissatisfied with something (in-built construction, housing reform, increase in duties on foreign cars), but there actions won't be efficient unless there's consolidation, systematization and description of their interest, and a thought-through strategy of activities to defend this interest. All these issues questions become issues of an organization initiated by real, specific people – such as Zotin and his fellows. At the same time, his is exactly a real subject of public policy, as he acts independently defending collective public interest. In this sense, as a subject, he is at the same level with, say, the head of municipal council. Zotin can shut off a road with piquets, and in such case, the head of municipal council will depend on him and will have to consider him.

As I've been working with real citizens initiatives – who clearly “qualify for “subjects” of their activities – for more than 20 years already – since the very beginning of perestroika, I am not happy with all those general theoretical appeals from our intellectual platforms – including the Khodorkovsky Readings. Most “liberal analysts”, while criticizing the current political regime, usually talk publicly about the things that are pretty abstract, and I don't see if any such “expert” wants to work with real citizens initiatives, who are currently “awakening” to become “political subjects”. Even though these subjects aren't big and strong yet and aren't really noticeable at the federal level, I am convinced, that only them are the ones, who can develop into big and influential subjects, that would be truly independent and self-esteemed. The most important thing is that civil subjects – the real, not fake ones – unite real citizens into real communities. They already are customers for expert knowledge now. Moreover, they're ready to pay reasonably for expert resources, and – what is more important – they are interested to implement them promptly.

Through the research project with those local advocacy campaigns , it has become absolutely clear, that it is important to study such local communities, as “potential customers” for the intellectual product for the social innovation – that is, real activists – as the existence of such people in Russia proves that civil society exists and works here, and that it is not much different from anywhere else. What differs is the environment for the citizens activity, which is much more aggressive in Russia and is generally directed against the independent activity.

As an example of such an “aggressive environment” in which the Russian civil society have to exist, it is important to mention here the notorious case of one of our local partners and trainers for the whole region of “Volga” - Irina Malovichko, started in Volgograd 2008. Irina Malovichko, the founder and the president of Volgograd Regional Public Charity Organization UNESCO Club *Child’s Dignity*, became a victim of Volgograd Law-Enforcement authorities and their unlawful behaviour. It started in May 2008 with baseless accusations of Irina Malovichko of a minor money fraud, followed by an illegal arrest of the Club’s documents and an illegal search in Irina’s house. It was supported by a purposefully maligning informational campaign against Irina in the local press and led to a court case against her in June 2008. Throughout the rest of the year Irina Malovichko and her organization filed numerous appeals to the court but all of them were declined, and finally Irina was arrested alongside with her colleagues, who were later set free. Despite the long years of the Club’s work in the region for the benefit of ordinary people and children, the authorities view the Club as a somewhat dangerous organization and reacted in their own, specific way.

Therefore, I believe it is important to study such cases as vivid examples of the realities of Russian activism, and to do so, one has to work with civil networks, with those that exist as part of *Memorial*, *Helsinki Group*, Youth Human Rights Movement, coalitions *We, the Citizens!*, *For Civil Service*, *Civil Society – for Children*, *For Freedom of Assembly and Association* and many other civil networks. All of these are regional and interregional networks. However, many Russian sociologists react to some super-massive actions (such as the Scherbinsky case, of the benefits monetization) but don't see at all dozens and hundreds of thousands local actions. They aren't covered by the all-Russian statistical sample. But researchers can't only do massive research. There have to be case-studies too – about specific people in specific circumstances.

Unfortunately, many sociologists say: what are those activists of yours, no more than 3-4% of the population – it might be just statistical discrepancy. But I believe that the destiny of the country depends on this "discrepancy". No state machine, no political party will be able to build a normal society in Russia. This has been proved many times, both in theory and in practice. If we don't have those 3-4% of civil activists, Russia will stay in its "autocratically bureaucratic" track forever, and at least, this deprives the country of its competitive strength. Our way to the future isn't just innovations but social innovations that lead to creative and intellectual activity in the society. Only those 3-4% can do it because it's them who aren't just independent, clever, not indifferent people, but also talented social organizers who are ready to lead other people. Moreover, under the conditions of such high social risks, getting over fierce resistance of the bureaucracy. These are such people like Alexander Zotin from Perm and hundreds of thousands of regional activists from social networks.

However, we can give numerous examples of successful civil initiatives that have led to real changes, even if they are small and may seem insignificant at the country-level. For example, a campaign for adoption of orphans held by the Postnykh family in Tula Region, which was held in August-December 2008, lead to the increase of public acknowledgment of the ways of helping orphans, several local children found new families, more of them were accepted by foster families. The campaign included mostly educational seminars for prospective foster parents and the distribution of informational booklets.

Another example is a massive campaign of Novorossiysk Committee for Human Rights (South of Russia) and its tireless leader Vadim Karastelyov, who started a fight against an anti-constitutional law passed on in Krasnodarsky Krai last year, forbidding underage citizens to be in public places after 10pm without guidance. This law initiated a major wave of reproach in Krasnodarsky Krai because it became another instrument for the representatives of law-enforcement authorities to enrich themselves through bribery. However, the campaign started by Novorossiysk Committee for Human Rights and aimed at teaching young people to defend their rights and to stand up to policemen raised a lot of interest in the region and gained support. Several court cases against the unlawful acts of the police have already been started, and thousands of young people have been taught through trainings and the distribution of printed materials how to stand up for themselves.

It is important to mention that, in spite of the authorities' aggressive and suspicious attitude to civil initiatives, absolute majority of them still pursue non-aggressive character and even non-political character – and from this point – they are quite "harmless" to the authorities, who are so much afraid of open public activities: they mostly take forms of seminars, round-tables, publication of educational leaflets, booklets – mostly conscious-rising activities. This does not mean, that there are no public activities at all, but it really requires a lot of experience from the activists, as well as courage in some regions, this is the reason, that public assemblies – even in forms of picketing are rather rare. We have analyzed the methods of work proposed by all of our 300 original participants, and 157 stated that they would distribute informational materials (booklets, leaflets, etc) on the topics. 124 projects included various educational events, such as seminars and trainings, and 92 projects listed round-tables and press-conferences among their priorities, as may be seen from Table 2. What is important, 71 projects involved volunteer work. Other ways of campaigning suggested by the applicants were, of course, writing open letter (43), collecting signatures (25), or organizing public hearings (34). Quite unsurprisingly, the least used way of work was organizing meetings and picketing (16 projects), which proves that civil activists in Russia aren't aggressive and prefer more civilized ways of getting through to the officials, therefore meetings and other large outdoor public actions are only organized in extreme cases, when all the other methods have already been used and haven't provided necessary results.

Another possible reason why regional activists prefer quieter forms of work is that not all of them possess necessary resources and organizational skills because most of them operate as local-level organizations, few – as branches of all-Russian or international non-governmental organizations, and some – just as initiative groups without official registration. It is important that the project executed by *Interlegal* included such groups and encouraged their activities because they represent the real grass-root initiative, and even if they are narrow-oriented, they may evolve into larger groups to help people from different districts with similar problems and eventually become organized entities, as it usually happens.

Table 2: Preferred Forms of Advocacy Work Proposed by the Regional Participants

	Meetings / Piquest	Round-tables, Public Seminars	Public Hearings	Conferences	Open Letters	Collecting Signatures, Polls	Educational Events, Trainings, Contests	Leaflets, Booklets, Newspapers	Volunteer Labour
Region									
Centre	3	16	4	11	8	2	12	22	14
Volga	5	23	12	14	12	5	24	36	26
South	0	24	7	7	8	7	17	30	15
North-West	4	9	4	6	7	7	22	21	9
Siberia and the Far East	1	8	3	5	2	2	21	16	4
The Urals	3	12	4	8	6	2	28	32	3
Total:	16	92	34	51	43	25	124	157	71

On the natural question upon the results of a project so wide as this one, - how many out of all the local campaigns have been "fully successful" to this point ? – it is hard to give a comprehensive answer, first of all, because of the difficulty of the criteria of a "full success", as the situation may have changed only partially. It could also be the case, that some "positive change" had been reversed later – by the new "appointed authority" to a much worse result. Also, we cannot be sure in the "full success" of each campaign, because some of them might have been approached formally or might have faced other challenges, that were impossible to envisage at the start.

Nevertheless, but we – both the collective of researchers and the body of local trainers and jury, who was selecting the campaigns for support, - truly believe that the project on the whole is a definite success. Here are the reasons for it:

- first, and most importantly, it shows the existence of civil society and "real", "grass-roots" citizens initiatives in Russia, including its most remote and "God forgotten" areas, just like in any other country
- second, that we also regard as very important - that the internationally accepted definitions of civil society, as "bonds of trust and reciprocity", individual consciousness, awareness of the social problems, willingness to unite and work collectively to solve those problems, as well as certain level of local "social solidarity" are perfectly applicable in Russia. It is proved by the fact, that without much publicity, we managed to collect 300 applications in a couple of month, and teach 180 regional civil activists advocacy skills, who were competing to get to such trainings.
- third, that the project provided a clear proof, that despite the very hard financial conditions, local activists – those that are really concerned with the problem that united their forces, are prepared to work totally voluntarily. There was a clear

risk, when we announced, that there will be no salaries covered and no support even for office or other costs of “keeping the organization” – this had to be done exclusively at their own expenses – we still did not have lack of applications!

- also important, that people are interested to learn about social activity, share their experience in campaigns already held, looking for methods for the effective advocacy, so they are interested in social change and are willing to participate

The problem is – the “social environment”, in which civil society have to exist in Russia. In many cases with regional social campaigns, that were aimed solely to helping people in need, we experienced that the state institutions, even though they claim that they “respect democracy”, do not really play by the rules and do not recognize and implement the democratic rules and proceedures of interaction between the people and the “ power” at every level, where the “power” can prevent citizens to act.

Those rules are clearly stated in all the International documents on Human Rights regulations, and were to large extent “repeated” in the Constitution on 1993, but they are not followed.

There are also certain legal standards on regulating the freedom of associations and freedom of peaceful assemblies, adopted by Russia as a member of the Council of Europe and OSCE. Therefore, there is a clear task – for both educated civic activists and the members research and expert community to continue gathering information about such local activities, in order to monitor, that those standards would finally be implemented into Russian practice as well.

Prof. Dr. Alexander Chepurenko

GEM and early entrepreneurial activity of Russia population: some evidences

What is the GEM?

The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is a longitudinal research project designed to answer two interconnected questions that are key to determining the aims and means of state economic policy, namely:

What is the contribution of entrepreneurial activity to the economic prosperity of individual nations and the international community as a whole?

What can governments do to increase the level of entrepreneurial activity?

GEM research focuses on the following:

- comparing levels of entrepreneurial activity in different countries;
- uncovering the factors that determine variation in levels of entrepreneurial activity;
- determining policies that could increase levels of entrepreneurial activity.

Entrepreneurship is taken to mean any attempt to create a new enterprise or business, including self-employment, the creation of a new entrepreneurial structure or the expansion of a pre-existing business, undertaken by an individual, a group of individuals or an existing business structure.

The results of the study explore four phases of individual entrepreneurship:

potential entrepreneurs, actively planning and organizing entrepreneurship;

early-stage and **nascent entrepreneurs**, at the moment that resources are brought together for the beginning of economic activity, when production has already begun but gross combined income, if any, is no more than three months;

new, or baby business: gross combined income from a period of three to 42 months;

established business: functioning for more than 42 months.

The full text of the report is available on the website www.gemconsortium.org.

The results of the research, conducted by the Laboratory of Sociological Studies of the HSE in 2007 based on GEM methodology are presented below.

Main results of the GEM adult population surveys 2006-2007 in Russia

The level of early-stage and nascent entrepreneurship among the able-bodied population fell almost by half: the TEA index was at 2.7% in 2007, against 4.86% in 2006. This may evidently be connected with a range of causes, including: (a) the appearance of alternative opportunities for economic activity among the population within large industry and the state sector; and (b) a worsening operating environment for new entrepreneurs.

While the **ratio of voluntary to involuntary entrepreneurs** in 2006 was 5:3, it grew almost to 7:1 in 2007. This signals the growth of the 'quality' of potential entrepreneurs, given that voluntary entrepreneurs, as a rule, have a higher level of education, are better able to attract the necessary resources, and also have a more creative approach to business.

In 2007, 1.33% of respondents were nascent entrepreneurs and the same amount (1.34%) were owners of new businesses.

The level of entrepreneurial activity among nascent entrepreneurs saw the greatest contraction, by 61.6%, compared to a drop of 21.7% among new business owners. Nevertheless, slightly more than 1.3% of respondents were nascent entrepreneurs, meaning that they had begun actively preparing to open their own business or had already conducted the start-up.

Approximately 1.4% of respondents were owners or co-owners of new businesses, created not more than 42 months prior to the survey.

The level of entrepreneurial activity in established businesses increased by 150% to 1.86% of respondents, as a portion of the owners of new businesses transitioned into the 'older' category. This signals an expanded regeneration of established businesses against the background of an improving economy and growing GDP.

The **proportion of women among early-stage entrepreneurs** is stable at 40%. In 2007, the index of early-stage entrepreneurship among women was 1.64%, while the index was almost 2.3 times higher among men.

Dynamics of the realization of the entrepreneurial potential of the population, reflected in the *coefficient of expansion of early entrepreneurship:*

Nascent : Discontinued (Where **Nascent** is the proportion of people who have made active efforts in the last 12 months towards opening a business, and **Discontinued** is the proportion of people who have closed, abandoned or otherwise ended their business in the last 12 months) is negative. While the expansion coefficient in 2006 was approximately 3.5, i.e. there were three and a half nascent entrepreneurs for each failed entrepreneur during the year, in 2007 the coefficient more than halved, falling to 1.35. In other words, *exit is barely covered by the birth of new businesses*.

Parallel early-stage entrepreneurship grew during the year by more than 23.7%. This signals constricting opportunities for entry into entrepreneurship by social groups who do not already involved in business.

The proportion of informal investors was approximately 1.6% of respondents, compared to almost 3.5% in the previous year. However, the average volume of financing they provided to early-stage entrepreneurs more than doubled.

Portrait of an early-stage entrepreneur. The typical early-stage entrepreneur in the Russian Federation is 35 years old, has professional, technical or specialized secondary education and is confident that his or her knowledge and qualifications are sufficient to create a new business. He or she lives in a major city (but not in a megalopolis).

Gender. Women are approximately half as likely to be found among early-stage entrepreneurs as men and are most often found in medium-sized or small cities. The typical woman in this category is 42 years old, she usually has higher education and is confident that her knowledge and qualifications are sufficient to create a new business. Women generally enter entrepreneurship at a later age and (perhaps for that reason) have a higher level of educational achievement than men among early-stage entrepreneurs.

More often than among men, entrepreneurship among women is likely to be the only option for employment and for earning a living. This sort of ‘forced entrepreneurship’ is to a significant extent particular to women.

Evidently, women in big cities have more stimuli to open their own business, and so these cities lead in female entrepreneurial potential (this is particularly the case in Moscow and St. Petersburg), and specifically in the proportion of women among established entrepreneurs. The least favorable conditions for women seeking to open their own business is in villages and small cities, owing, evidently, to the underdevelopment of infrastructure and resources.

Regional and local factors. The level of entrepreneurial activity varies significantly across the regions of the Russian Federation. As in 2006, the proportion of potential entrepreneurs in the typical Russian region is 11-12%.

The level of entrepreneurial activity varies depending on the size of the locality, although no direct causality between the level of entrepreneurial activity and the size of the locality was found.

The most problematic environments for entrepreneurial activity are cities with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 people (in 2006) and villages (in 2007, entrepreneurial activity decreased by 38%).

In both years, the regions with the highest levels of entrepreneurial activity also led on indicators of social capital: St. Petersburg in 2006, and the Northern Caucasus in 2007. A fairly stable statistical connection has been found between these two indicators.

At the same time, the proportion of people personally acquainted with entrepreneurs among the respondents declined from 2006 to 2007 (except in the Northern Caucasus and Central-Black Earth macro-regions).

In Russia as a whole, the proportion of respondents who believed that fear or insufficient skills could prevent them from organizing their own business grew from 2006 to 2007, while the proportion of respondents who believed their knowledge and experience to be sufficient for starting a new business decreased. This, taken with the decrease in entrepreneurial activity, can be seen as a somewhat worrying tendency.

Motivation. For 12.5% of Russian entrepreneurs, the decision to start a business was necessitated by the lack of any viable or desirable alternatives for economic activity. Moreover, entrepreneurship is more likely to be the only option for gainful employment among women than among men.

For approximately half (49%) of Russian entrepreneurs, opening a business was a voluntary decision, driven by the search for additional advantages; what is more, the overwhelming majority (more than 60%) are driven by psychological factors, such as the desire for independence, rather than economic interests.

There are statistically significant differences in the structure of motivational factors among various groups. Thus, among the owners of new businesses, involuntary entrepreneurship is much more common than among the other groups analyzed. Moreover, the educational attainment of an entrepreneur is positively correlated with a voluntary decision to open a business, while those who enter entrepreneurship at or after 45 years of age are increasingly likely to have done so involuntarily.

For understandable reasons, respondents who are still only planning their business are significantly more optimistic than those who have already begun operations.

Approximately 90% of respondents in all categories of potential entrepreneurs and active entrepreneurs highly evaluate their own entrepreneurial abilities. The proportion of people who highly rate their entrepreneurial abilities increases in positive correlation with entrepreneurial experience. This self-evaluation does not depend to any significant degree on entrepreneurs' educational attainment or age, but displays a clear gender divide: on the whole, men are more confident than women in their abilities to run a business. The largest gender gap on self-evaluation of abilities is found among the owners of established business, while the smallest gap is found among potential entrepreneurs.

Almost a third of potential and early-stage entrepreneurs believe that fear and insufficient qualifications may impede them in running their new businesses.

Sources of income. Among early-stage entrepreneurs, the majority of respondents report that their primary source of income remains their salary from employment. In other words, a significant portion of people who are only just beginning entrepreneurship do not 'take the plunge' and dedicate their time completely to the development of their business, because the income from the business is either unstable or insufficient to support a normal lifestyle. Competition on Russian markets is growing, and free market share among established niches is harder to find. A large proportion of entrepreneurs who have just entered the market or who are planning to enter the market (from 55% to 70%) are preparing from the outset for a difficult competitive battle, knowing that products or services analogous to their own have already been launched by similar enterprises.

Sources of finance for early-stage entrepreneurship. A significant portion of early-stage entrepreneurial activity is financed from internal sources. At the same time, however, nascent entrepreneurs actively seek external sources of financing as well: thus, 51% of nascent entrepreneurs used external channels of financing in 2006, and that number grew to 65.2% in 2007.

Informal financing dominates external sources of funding. Loans from informal sources are most often relatively small, from 2,000 to 50,000 rubles, which is comparable in size to micro-credits.

Business angels are less important among informal investors than non-entrepreneurial categories. Nascent entrepreneurship is frequently financed by the recipients of social payments, including pensioners first and foremost.

Informal lending is most often seen as an investment of 'love capital', as a large portion of such investors does not expect to receive (or does not to expect to receive any significant) return on their investment. As a result, the size of the expected return does not has a statistically significant effect on readiness to invest personal funds in nascent entrepreneurship.

Innovative potential. Only a very small portion of potential and early-stage entrepreneurs, as well as owners of established business, have started or are planning to start businesses that will occupy new market niches (approximately 3-6%). These data underscore the relatively low potential for innovation among Russian entrepreneurs in recent years.

The methodology employed by the GEM, combined with the rather insignificant sizes of the groups of respondents who declare the intent to pursue innovative goods and services, does not allow us to draw any meaningful conclusions from the data in this area.

Discontinued entrepreneurs. While the number of discontinued entrepreneurs did not change significantly from 2006 to 2007, there were significant changes to their socio-demographic structure. There is as yet no basis for firm conclusions about the stability of observations, and thus for conclusions about causal factors as well.

In 2007, women and people with secondary and/or specialized secondary education were comparatively more often taking off than in 2006.

Rational explanations, such as unprofitability and problems with financing, were found relatively more frequently in 2007.

After closing their business, two thirds of 2007 respondents went back to salaried jobs (in various forms), compared to approximately half in 2006. Meanwhile, only 15% of unsuccessful entrepreneurs sought to reenter business in 2007, compared to almost 40% in 2006. Factors here included, evidently, growth in employment opportunities in large industry and the non-market sector on the one hand, and negative evaluations of opportunities for conducting entrepreneurial activities in the near future on the other hand.

Parallel entrepreneurs have a higher level of educational attainment and are more closely tied into entrepreneurial networks. As a result, they achieve more stable results in business (with a smaller proportion of respondents reporting failure) and a higher level of optimism vis-à-vis their own entrepreneurial skills.

Parallel entrepreneurs have more conservative financing structures than other early-stage entrepreneurs: they use fewer external sources of financing, including formal lending institutions. On the one hand, this reflects their access to certain resources that can be brought into play from another, already existing business. But on the other hand, this may also bear witness to the fact that the parallel entrepreneurs we find in the Russian survey results are primarily self-employed or the owners of micro-enterprises, who do not need (and in any case are not able) to seek loans from banks.

International context. In 2006, Russia, Russia was found almost exactly in the center of the TEA index (at a distance of 0.07 from the center) among the cluster of 18 countries with below-average levels of early-stage entrepreneurial activity. Russia’s TEA index, meanwhile, was only half of the average for all of the countries participating in the GEM consortium.

This group (of below-average countries by early-stage entrepreneurship) includes countries that have seen more success in the development of their market economies, as well as one of the overall leaders in economic development, Norway. At first glance, this would suggest that there is no direct relationship between levels of early-stage entrepreneurial activity and overall levels of economic development.

Support is fund for a statistically meaningful correlation between the level of entrepreneurial activity among the general population and levels of socio-economic development. In this instance, the quality of entrepreneurial activity is key, and specifically the proportion of voluntary or involuntary entrepreneurship. Statistical analysis of the levels of early-stage entrepreneurial activity among the population as found in the study, when compared to per capita GDP, supports the presence of a non-linear relationship.

After performing a cluster analysis of countries based on the established business indicator (the EB Index) using the k-means method, Russia's 2006 results place it not in the group of typical countries, but rather in the cluster with low EB Index levels.

The pace of development of early-stave entrepreneurial activity among the general population was found to be negative. In 2007, Russia's TEA Index was 3.5 times below average, and the indicator fell by more than 45% over the course of the year. That was the biggest drop experienced by any country analyzed.

Russia's neighbors in the low-TEA cluster included predominantly countries with developed industrial economies, primarily countries of 'Old Europe' (for example, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and Great Britain, but also Japan). Three new members of the EU also fell into this category (Romania, Latvia and Slovenia), as well as Puerto Rico.

The only statistically significant positive correlation found for all categories of early-stage entrepreneurs (nascent and new, voluntary and involuntary, male and female) was found with the GDP deflator.

The proportion of re-processing industry among Russian early-stage entrepreneurship is significantly lower than in other countries. The level of focus on economic activities oriented towards consumer markets among Russian early-stage entrepreneurship is comparable to that found in other countries with a middle level of development, a group that includes Russia.

The motivational structure of Russian early-stage entrepreneurship does not differ greatly from that found in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and is significantly more favorable than in Brazil, for example, with is important from the perspective of qualitative analysis of entrepreneurial potential in the Russian Federation.

Democracy and Human Rights

Chuck Hirt, Nina Belyaeva

Introduction by the group academic advisor

As the “Baltic Practice” is rapidly evolving, it includes new issues and new fields of studies, that are interesting to our young participants and its Academic Council.

In fact, it should be considered rather surprising, that the theme of Democracy and Human Rights had never before been named a special theme for a particular group work, given the fact, that many of the previous issues we have taken on board – were closely related to the issues of democratic governance and citizen participation. From the very first summer session in 2001 in Svetlogorsk, Kaliningrad region, when we dealt with local Law on Public Chamber and support to voluntary associations, we were considering all of our research work dedicated to further promotion of democracy in Russia. These were particularly, the issues of “Citizens expertise of Kaliningrad and Baltic region development” in 2002, Russian and the “new Europe”-cooperation with the Baltic States in Jurmala, Latvia, 2005 and the culmination, probably, was in 2007 in Witten University in Germany – when Russian and German young participants voluntarily formulated the key question for the final debate : what is more important for Russia-Europe cooperation–“oil prices” or “democratic values”?

The debate has shown to all the experts, that tis question happened to be really crusual and is not easy to answer: though in the cause of youth teams debate the winning party was the “democratic values” group, we are well aware of the fact, that it is not, regretfully, the case in the current intergovernmental relationships between the Russia and the EU. On the contrary, it is particularly because of the deep disagreement between EU and Russian authorities on Democracy and Human Rights issues it is so difficult to move on to the new Strategic Agreement, that is been so hard to consider.

So, by the time to prepare to the next summer session – in Sweden – we had a number of “brainstorms” with our young researchers, choosing, what would be the themes for the group work, that are really challenging. This is when “understanding democracy” was first raised. So, we decided to try.

In “opening a new theme” it is always hard to find a proper “focus”. In this chapter we have chosen an interaction between Democracy and Human Rights: Dmitry Zaitsev is exploring, how analysts and analytic centers – subjects of his prior study – are serving democracy, Seva Belchenko – career journalist – exploring “level of freedom” in the media coverage of “painful events”, and Kostya Baranov – leader of the “Young Europe” NGO from Rostov-on-Don – seeking to evaluate the role of the EU institutions in democracy promotion.

We very much hope that those contributions will lead to better understanding of the current status of democracy in Russia in terms of its “quality” – and that it would allow to continue those studies in the next “Baltic Practice” sessions.

Dmitri Zaytsev

Intellectuals' role in democratic development: European experience and Russian practice.

«…Joie est mon caractère,
C'est la faute à Voltaire,
Misère est mon trousseau,
C'est la faute à Rousseau…»[1].
V.Hugo, The Miserable Ones,
Gavroche's Final Song.

"Democracy is the worst form of government,
except for all those other forms
that have been tried from time to time."
Winston Churchill.

Abstract

In this article the author underlines five forms of think tanks' activities promoting democratization in the country: political education of citizens in the spirit of democratic ideas and principles; support and training of talented youth; studying and popularization of the history of democratic ideas; formation of a public political discourse on actual sociopolitical and economic problems; support of democracy development in "the developing" countries. The author argues the weakness in resources of the Russian advocacy tanks (the partisan and civil think tanks) which in Europe bring the considerable contribution to the processes of democratic development. The author bring to light the paradox: think tanks in Russia, on the one hand, one of few institutes and actors capable to act in a role of the "locomotive" of the further democratization; on the other hand, Russian think tanks are in a greater degree aimed at the justification of an existing political regime and support of a realised political policy, instead of development of alternative ideas, strategy of the further democratization, an effective political policy.

Problems of relations between intellectuals (scientists, experts) and political elite (the power, the state) were investigated different philosophers and researchers (from works of Ancient Greek thinkers to texts of modern researches). For example, in Plato's dialogue "The State" the first role in government of «the ideal state» were

[1] Joy's my nature
Because of Voltaire;
Misery's my trousseau
Because of Rousseau.

assigned to philosophers. Normative tradition in researches the intellectuals' role in policy making which had been based on the works of Antic thinkers, were continued in recent times. Voltaire, Sen. Simon, Kont, etc. in theirs works idealized the role of intellectuals in politics and policy making, proposed to assign to scientists a dominate role in government.

Followers of Marxism ideas in their works assign to the intellectuals secondary role in politics and policy making, the legitimization function of minority's rule, elite's policy (Gramshi, Fuko, Manheim, Bourdieu). However at the same time these thinkers and scientists recognize heterogeneity of the intellectuals as a class, their potential of an autonomous and independent political position.

However the political activities of intellectuals are not limited by the legitimization function of "ruling class" supremacy. The complication of decision making processes in modern states created demand for independent expert support. This demand has been satisfied by new institutes of intellectual political support – think tanks. Support, an estimation of political decisions and alternatives, generating of ideas, education and elite formation became their functions.

Because of complexity and scale of modern administrative problems the expert became an integral part of the decision making process. In differentiated social systems the policy makers to increase the efficiency of decisions and to maintain the social "feedback" mechanism involve experts, including think tanks, to work out new and to estimate old political decisions. For example, the state decisions in the modern states, as a rule, are directed on the satisfaction of majority's interests or certain groups of citizens. However frequently the effect from the accepted political decisions is shown in the course of their realization, therefore demands their permanent correction, updatings and, accordingly, estimation. In this processes think tanks are engaged, conducting researches and consultations for the decision makers. So in the modern states the mechanism of "feedback" is carried out.

The increase of intellectuals' role and influence on modern sociopolitical processes are fixed in researches of the scientists considering intellectuals and experts as autonomous political actors (T.White, Ch.P.Snow, P.J. Buchanan).

In the modern state and a society think tanks are built in democratic political process, are independent political actors, along with such institutes of a civil society as NGOs and social movements, interests groups, pressure groups, trade unions etc.

However institutes of intellectual support of a policy not always were the integral elements of modern democratic process. Expert institutes inherently are elements of «the authority's rule» (R.Dahl). Moreover, long time the idea of «the authority's rule» was opposed to democratic ideas. And in the role of authorities were philosophers (Plato) and theologians (A.Avgustin), the enlightenment monarchs (Voltaire), scientists at last (Ch.P.Snow).

Democratization have led to think tank's reorientation from work in elite interests on influence (independent, or in someone's interests). Think tanks became the organizational form of experts' participation in the competitive pluralistic political process, getting the status of independent influential political structures. Thus, the institute of intellectual policy support that initially had been alien to ideas of democracy has been co-opted in democratic political process.

However it should cause questions on degree of democratic character of a modern dynamical pluralistic society: «the power of the expert», possessing special knowledge and influence on political process can bring to nothing «the power of people» that does not possess expert knowledge. Thereupon the further democracy development is impossible without narrowing the knowledge gap between of experts and of people. This role, or even mission, think tanks of new type - advocacy tanks (partisan and civil think tanks[2]) – can get which main function is education and training of citizens.

What kind of experience in democratic development of their countries do European advocacy think tanks have? What kind of practice in intellectual support of a policy and democratic transformations do Russian think tanks have? What are the prospects of think tanks role as actors of the democratization in Europe and Russia?

It is possible to allocate some European think tanks' activities promoting democratization in the country, and all over the world:

- Political education of citizens in the spirit of democratic ideas and principles;
- Support and training of talented youth;
- Studying and popularization of the history of democratic ideas;
- Formation of a public political discourse on actual sociopolitical and economic problems;
- Support of democracy development in "the developing" countries.

Let's consider activities listed above on the examples of the several European think tanks. For example, ***political education in the spirit of democratic ideas and principles*** is the major and prime internal political activity of German partisan think tanks.

The civic education programs of Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation "aim at promoting freedom and liberty, peace, and justice". This think tank focuses "on consolidating democracy, on the unification of Europe and the strengthening of transatlantic relations, as well as on development cooperation"[3]. "Since its establishment on April 11, 1967, the Hanns Seidel Foundation has been practicing political education work with the aim of supporting "the democratic and civic education of the German people with a Christian basis" – as the foundation's statutes say»[4]. For these purposes German partisan think tanks have central academies, regional centers network and centers for conference abroad[5]. They offer conferences, seminars, and workshops which are attended about tens of thousands citizens every year.

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[2] About think tanks types see: Nina Belyaeva, Dmitry Zaytsev. Think tanks and public policy centers as subjects of expert support of politics. Politeia. №4. 2008. Moscow. The article compares in detail two types of expert organizations – "think tanks" and public policy centers. Having thoroughly analyzed the distinctive features of the two types of structures and having pointed out separate sub-types of expert organizations, N.Belyaeva and D.Zaytsev are building a "map" of subjects of intellectual support of politics that helps to orientate oneself in the sphere of "expert services"

[3] The Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation - http://www.kas.de/wf/en/71.3628/. See also: Comparative analyses of Russian and Foreign think tanks: case study. Textbook. Redactors Zaytsev D., Beliaeva N. The Higher School of Economics. Moscow. 2007.

[4] The Hanns Seidel Foundation - http://www.hss.de/homepage-e.shtml. See also: Comparative analyses of Russian and Foreign think tanks: case study. Textbook. Redactors Zaytsev D., Beliaeva N. The Higher School of Economics. Moscow. 2007.

[5] See: Pogorelskaya S. Non-government organizations and political foundations in foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Moscow. 2007. P. 49.

One more important direction of think tanks' work for democratic development is ***support and training of talented youth in the spirit of democratic ideas and principles***. For example German partisan think tanks awards scholarships to students and graduates of exceptional academic achievement and outstanding political or social commitment. German scholars are expected to endorse democratic social and political values. They provide financial support for thousands students. «Foundations' work with student's youth is not limited to grants: for grant-aided students seminars, including foreign are held, they are actively employed by Foundations too»[6].

Activities on studying and popularization of the history of democratic ideas can be expressed in creation of public archives of documents, libraries and the centers of historical researches. For example, the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation has Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy; the Hanns Seidel Foundation - Archives for Christian -Social Politics and Political and Historical Specialist Library; the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation-Archive of Democratic Socialism; the Friedrich Ebert Foundation – Center of historical research, Archive of Social Democracy and Library etc.

Integral part of modern democratic political process is public discussion of actual sociopolitical and economic problems. Thanks to it political «agenda» of the democratic governments of the different countries is formed. The think tanks directly participate in such public discussions and bring the contribution to state policy formation. During political discussions and debate the think tanks can offer such alternative ways of the problem decision which was not earlier in political «agenda». Forming thus a public political discourse, the think tanks increase efficiency of democratic political process. ***Formation of a public political discourse on actual sociopolitical and economic problems*** the major function of the think tanks as political phenomenon (without dependence from think tanks' type, where it's situated, their ideological views etc.). Therefore there are a lot of examples of this type of think tanks' activity (by quantity of the think tanks all over the world, and them by some modest estimation more than 5000 in the world[7]).

Just one example, European think tank Brussels European and Global Economic Laboratory or Bruegel that working in the field of international economics. «Established in 2005, Bruegel is independent and non-doctrinal. It seeks to contribute to European and global economic policy-making through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and debate…Bruegel has been building up its team and capacity to contribute to economic policy debate»[8]. Bruegel is engaged in working out of political recommendations to decision makers at the all-European level. And the main principle of Bruegel's work is multi-variant approach of offered political alternatives of the problems decision (significant problems for all European and even world communities). It in turn gives the chance to the think tank to publish their analytical product.

Support of democracy development in "the developing" countries is an activity of many European think tanks in the states of Latin America, the Eastern

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[6] Ibid.

[7] James G. McGann. THE GLOBAL "GO-TO THINK TANKS". Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program. International Relations Program. University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA USA 19104-6305. 2008.

[8] Bruegel - http://www.bruegel.org/about.html

Europe, in the Middle East, Asia and even Africa. To establish "interstate dialogue» on democratization problems in the state that is in «democratic transit», the special think tank or project can be created for given country, or regional mission or office of the European think tank in the given country can be created.

For Russia the example of special think tank is EU-Russia Centre in Belgium. It is "an independent information and expertise resource for anyone interested in modern Russia, its democratic status and the future of EU-Russia relations. It seeks to promote closer ties between the EU and Russia, to develop ideas about the future of the relationship, and to ensure that both sides adhere to international standards concerning the key elements of a civil society such as democracy, civil liberties and an independent judiciary"[9].

Many already mentioned German partisan think tanks have their offices in Russia. The general strategy of these offices is «support of democracy development», democratization. Foundations worked and work with politicians, members of parliament, officials of administrative and judicial structures, teachers of the higher school, journalists, students, and representatives of the non-government organizations, supported and support democracy oriented politicians and parties. Among types of work: lectures, seminars, conferences, trainings, courses on improvement of professional skill, consultations of experts, educational and information programs, grants, transfers of the special literature, projects of regional development, etc.

Some European think tanks work on two directions together: formation of a public political discourse and support of democracy development, carrying out activity on public opinion formation in Europe against «authoritarian tendencies». With reference to democratization in Russia it, for example, already mentioned EU-Russia Centre in Belgium, and also Foreign Policy Centre in UK. Public discussions, projects, conferences, seminars, publications including the Internet, open recommendations to the decision makers and to the international structures promote formation of negative image of modern Russia and are means of pressure of the European political elite for the Russia's government on purpose to induce a Russian side to continue the democratic reforms.

Passing to experience of Russian think tanks' activities in promoting democratization, first of all, it is necessary to argue the weakness in resources of the Russian advocacy tanks (the partisan and civil think tanks) which as we saw, in Europe bring the considerable contribution to the processes of democratic development. In many respects it is a consequence of institutional weakness of civil society structures in Russia (political parties and organized interests groups). Nevertheless, some Russian advocacy tanks give us examples activities in spheres of studying and popularization of history of democratic ideas (Liberal mission Foundation), formation of a public political discourse on actual sociopolitical and economic problems (INDEM Foundation), support and training for civil movements and initiatives (Interligal Foundation). However in general the Russian think tanks have considerable potential of activity diversification, making use of European think tanks' experience in spheres of democratic development support. Especially it concerns such perspective directions for our country as political education of citizens

[9] EU-Russia Centre - http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/?lang=en&ref=1

in the spirit of democratic ideas and principles, and also support of democracy development in the Union of independent states countries.

However experience of the Russian think tanks with reference to the theme of present article is interesting in other aspect: the Russian think tanks take functions of democratic institutes (like political parties, opposition, civil society, etc.) and, more can represent itself as one of the power of democratic transformations.

Specificity of the Russian think tanks is the fact that they quite often carry out not their functions. So in many respects occurred and occurs owing to weakness and inefficiency of political, including, state, institutes. In the conditions of scale state transformations when the state, especially business or structures of a civil society, were weak, think tanks catty out function, if not the power of modernization, but the developer of transformations strategy and tactics. So was in the early nineties when the expert community actively participated in the conflict of the President and the Supreme Soviet of Russia, searched for overcoming the crisis ways, developed Constitution projects (one of which was taken for a basis). Working out of bases of economic policy at various times attributed to the Institute of transitional economy, Council of defense policy, the Center of strategic development, the Institute of modern development.

Think tanks carry out the functions of political parties, aggregate interests of various social groups in specific proposals - alternatives to the state course (for example, long before acceptance and execution of national projects different think tanks officials supported necessity of the state projects and named their concrete directions).

Promotion and discussion by expert community of political alternatives happened at various meetings, seminars, conferences – «expert platforms» where the decision makers also are invited. As an example it is possible to mention, «Club on 4th of November», on the basis of the think tanks there are also known "expert platforms", for example at Institute of modern development, the Russian public policy centre, the State university – Higher school of economics, etc.

The given platforms, as a matter of fact, substitute inefficient institutes of discussion and working out of political decisions (parliamentary hearings and testimony, work in parliamentary committees and the commissions), participation in which western think tanks is extended enough, as is the effective way of influence on a state policy. In Russia «expert platforms» become the channel, helping to inform offers of experts directly to decision makers (state officials, government).

It is necessary to notice that a number of the Russian think tanks carry out function of political opposition, moreover there are also oppositional «expert platforms» (seminars of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, «Khodorkovsky's reading», etc.) where officials from think tanks argue there independent from state positions.

Efficiency of Russian think tanks' activities as the power of democratization is a subject of separate research.

However the majority of the think tanks in Russia prefer to take not an oppositional position in relations with authorities and the state power. In many respects it is connected with political conditions in which Russian think tanks have to function[10]. Not competitive character of political process leads to that a unique large

10 For more information see Zaitsev D. Influence of the institutional sphere on development of non-state political actors (example of comparison of analytical centers in the USA and in Russia). Law and

source of think tanks' financing is the state (and large business, which also can finance think tanks' activities, is depended from the state power). As a result alternative and oppositional projects and ideas are not claimed, are superseded on the periphery of Russian «political discourse». And the think tanks and their representatives, being do not agree with character of a political regime, against its authoritarian tendencies, at consultation of the power and support of the state course take of a position justifying the regime, add to the arsenal a principle of "small affairs" (the example of analytical product that justify regime is the report on democratization of the Center of political technologies).

As a result the paradox turns out: the think tanks in Russia, on the one hand, one of few institutes, capable to replace the inefficient democratic institutes, one of few subjects, capable to act in a role of the "locomotive" of the further democratization; on the other hand, the Russian think tanks are in a greater degree aimed at the justification of an existing political regime and support of a realised political policy, instead of development of alternative ideas, strategy of the further democratization, an effective political policy.

However the comparison spent in the present article allows drawing a conclusion that ally of the European think tanks in support of democracy development in Russia are the majority Russian experts and think tanks. Creation of the special think tank of EU and Russia, carrying out the projects promoting democratic development can become a concrete recommendation according conclusion given bellow.

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Vsevolod Belchenko

The media non-coverage: how national TV-channels hush-up the "uncomfortable" events

Abstract

The Russian media are believed to be censored, tightly controlled and manipulated by the government. As an evidence of such control analysts usually mention that Russian TV hushes up the events "uncomfortable" for the authorities or covers them with partiality. But whether this is true? May be the television in Russia does not cover certain events because they are not important or contradict their editorial policy? Until now we had no figures or statistics that can confirm any point of view in this discussion. In my essay I present such statistics concerning the TV-coverage of three important events (assassination of a lawyer Stanislav Markelov, financial crisis and dispersal of demonstration in Vladivostok). The figures confirm that the 3 national channels hush up or distort the important events and analysis of the coverage shows what mechanisms they use to do this.

Introduction: the objectives and the method

Critics of the Russian authorities usually accuse them of censoring the national television and forcing journalists to hush-up important events. But until now we don't have any reliable statistics of such a media "non-coverage".

In my essay I have gathered and analyzed such statistics concerning media coverage of the three "breaking news" stories: assassination of Stanislav Markelov, famous lawyer and civil rights activist, demonstration of protest that took place in Vladivostok on 14th of December and was violently broke up by the police; financial crisis and its impact on Russian economy.

These topics were chosen for the following reasons:

Importance

All of them with no doubt are issues of public interest. they were broadly covered by national newspapers, magazines, radio stations and minor TV-broadcasters

Time

All of them happened recently

Level of discomfort

All of them are "uncomfortable" in political sense for the authorities. The assassination in the center of Moscow demonstrates the weakness of the authorities, moreover, makes many to suspect them in standing behind the murder; violent dispersal of a peaceful demonstration shows the growing civil protest against domestic policy and loose connection between the authorities and the nation; the developing economic crisis within the country proves the economic policy of the state was wrong and mistaken. And all these events bemire the ruling power and spoil its glorious image of the most successful administration ever the current president and prime-minister are trying to maintain.

Hushed-up, but differently

All of them supposedly were almost totally ignored by national TV-channels: some were not covered at all, some were mixed with less important news, distorted and played down, some were partly covered.

What was done

I have measured length of the reports about the three stories in the prime-time news of the leading national TV-channels (in seconds), calculated their share in the news program (in per cent), noted down the newsmakers mentioned in each case, the words used to characterize the issue and the overall attitude towards it.

For each issue I analyzed news during a specific period of time that suits the story in hand:

Stanislav Markelov assassination

The period of 19th-25th January 2009 was taken. The assassination took place on Monday December 19th and was actively discussed during the week.

Dispersal of demonstration of protest in Vladivostok

The period of December 14th - December 28th was taken because the first demonstration itself took place on Sunday December 14th and the second one on Sunday December 21st and was violently dispersed by police. That was discussed the whole following week.

Financial crisis

The period of September 14th – December 4th was taken. The fist date is the day of Lehman Brothers collapse that signaled the acute phase of financial crunch start, the last date marks the program ‘Talk with Vladimir Putin”. In that program showed at prime-time at the Russia channel the prime-minister Vladimir Putin answered on the phone calls and letters of “common people”. In that program he recognized in public for the first time that the crisis has hit Russian economy hard and the country may be slipping into a severe economic downturn.

I analyzed the coverage of the stories in prime-time news of three leading national TV-channels that are watched by more then 3\4 of Russian citizens. They are 1st channel (98-98,8% of viewers), Russia (96,2-97% of viewers) and NTV (73,2-80,1% of viewers). The 4th most popular channel TV-Center is falling behind seriously: his programs can be watched only by 62,1 per cent of the viewers and the majority of them also have access to a few local or national cable channels[11].

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[11] Figures from the Concept of Television Broadcasting development in Russia for 2008-2015 by Ministry for Mass Communications, 29th November 2007

I have analyzed the evening prime-time news programs[12] (prime-time is the time-slot between 19.00 and 23.00) which are "Vremya" at 21.00 at the 1st channel, "Vesti" at 20.00 at Russia and "Segodnya" at 19.00 and at 23.00 at NTV on work days (Monday-Friday) and "Voskresnoye Vremya" at 21.00 at 1st channel, "Vesti Nedely" at 20.00 at Russia and "Segodnya. The Final Program" at 19.00 at NTV on Sundays.

The news reports for the analysis were taken from the video archive of these channels available at their web-sites.

Analysis

Case 1: Stanislav Markelov Assassination

What happened

Lawyer and civil rights activist Stanislav Markelov was shot in a broad daylight in the very center of Moscow half a mile away from the Kremlin right after giving a press conference. A journalist of Novaya Gazeta newspaper Anastasiya Baburova who accompanied the lawyer was also killed. The press conference was devoted to a parole of a former colonel Yuri Budanov who was sentenced to a prison term for rape and murder of Elisa Kungayeva, a young chechen woman. Markelov was known for several resonant trials such as Budanov trial, investigation of assassination attempt of Mikhail Beketov the editor-in-chief of Moscow region newspaper, a few trials against neo-Nazi groups and for protection of Chechens suffered from federal troops during the war in Chechnya. Markelov was a loud critic of a federal policy in "chechen issue".

The coverage

Time. The issue was covered – totally 10 television plots were shown, 4 of them on the 1st channel, 3 on Russia and 3 on NTV. Total length of plots reached 2031 seconds (a bit more the half an hour) and their share in news programs differed from 1,83% (brief report from the funerals, 1st channel, Friday January 23d) to 23,8% of time (Segodnya at 23.00 on Tuesday January 20th).

This is a pretty fair coverage from the point of quantity. Let's look at the quality of the coverage.

Newsmakers. Who appeared? 21 newsmaker participated in the TV-plots, 9 appeared at NTV, 4 at 1st channel and 8 at Russia. Among them the one was eye-witness of the crime, 4 were the representatives of police or prosecutors' office, 4 were the journalists of Novaya Gazeta, 6 were the relatives or friends of Baburova, the one was colleague of Markelov from the institute "The Rule of Law", 5 were the experts (lawyers Mikhail Barshevskiy and Anatoly Kucherena, Moscow Helsinki Group head Ludmila Alexeyeva, deputy of state Duma from United Russia party Nikolas Kovalev and president of Chechnya Ramsan Kadyrov).

How did they appear? 6 newsmakers can be defined as opposing to the authorities (They are Ludmila Alexeeva, collegue of Stanislav Markelov and journalist of Novaya Gazeta), 6 represented authorities (police, prosecutors, Kadyrov and UR deputy), 2 were the experts close to authorities (Mikhail Barshevsky was the

[12] The prime-time definition from the Central Election Commission of Russia recommendation on parliamentary election coverage, 2007

representative of the President at the supreme court and headed a “Gragdanskaya sila” political party believed to be supported by the administration, Anatoly Kucherena is the member of Public Chamber appointed by the president), the others such as Baburova parents of fellow-students made no public political statements in the past so they are seen as politically neutral.

Though the quantity of the opposing newsmakers was significant their presence on air was minimized and news producers have chosen the most neutral statements they made. For example Ludmila Alexeeva was shown twice on the 1st and Russia channels news but on the 1st channel only a short piece of her speech was given, when she was talking about “two children left without father”, and Russia just showed her outing the flowers at assassination sight with no comment. The journalists of Novaya Gazeta including editor-in-chief were given much more time but their political statements were not included in the news. The only statement concerning politics were Dmitry Muratov’s emotional words that the murder might be organized by the neo-Nazi groups. They were included into news plot at Sunday Vesti at Russia channel and followed by the comment of the journalist: “We can understand the tone of Muratov, Novaya Gazeta loses its journalists one by one – Baburova is the 4th correspondent killed in recent years”.

Words used. Resonant and impertinent crime (in 5 news programs), challenge to the authorities (2 programs), professional activity (4 programs), neo-Nazi (4 programs), grief, tragedy and connected words (3 programs).

How the coverage changed. On Monday 19th all the programs have put the plot about Markelov murder on air as one of the top news. All the programs were neutral: they reported what happened, showed the police press-conference, presented the version connected with professional activity of Markelov as main, reminded the public about Markelov trials, civil rights activity and conflict with neo-Nazi groups.

On Tuesday 20th the Russia and 1st channels made accent on the tragedy. 1st channel reported that 2 children lost their father and friends of Markelov bring flowers to the assassination sight, the Russia reported that Baburova was an accidental victim, a brave girl who tried to stop the killer and was killed. A day later the same news piece was shown by the NTV channel: they concentrated on Baburov’s family tragedy and showed her parents, former husband, fellow-students and colleagues talking how they loved her, how brave, energetic and talented she was.

On the same day the 1st channel showed a news report from the press-conference held by chief of Moscow police gen, Pronin. He reported about resonant crimes investigation: the Markelov case, car burners, neo-pagans group that tried to explode the church, radikals who burned fur-coats on women and mysterious car-burner. As the correspondent said “Pronin joked and smiled a lot and talked about the new police uniform”. The Russia ignored the event.

On Thursday 22nd the news was ignored as well.

On Friday a brief news piece about funerals was on the 1st channels, the others ignored the event.

On Sunday the Russia and NTV channels included the news in their final programs summarizing the top news of the week, the 1st channel preferred not to mention it.

Both channels reminded the facts of the murder, gave a brief description of Margelov’s activity and then put an accent on this crime being “the challenge to the state”. The Russia said that the series of public assassinations may be coordinated to damage the reputation of the authorities and show they are unable to cope. “It seems that some ominous director stages a series of resonant assassinations to damage the reputation", said the correspondent.

The NTV mentioned that this is a challenge to the state and that the assassination has provoked "the gossips the police must stop by finding the killer".

The news pieces appeared under the heading "Criminal news" (3 programms, 1st channel), "accidents" (3 programmes, NTV and the Russia) and "Society" (2 programs, the Russia and the 1st).

Conclusion

The issue was covered by the channels almost all week. But the event was obviously played down and its impotence was artificially minimized: the accent was shifted from resonant murder to a human tragedy by all channels and the 1st channel tried to marginalize the assassination by classifying it as criminal news and giving it in one news piece with other crimes investigation.

At the end of the week accent shifted towards the damage to the state and its image. The purpose of the murder "to kill well known and irritating activist" was substituted in public opinion by the other to blacken the reputation o the state.

The presence of newsmakers uncomfortable for the authorities was minimized as well and their opinions were carefully edited.

A version of assassination by one of high-standing authorities that was discussed in the print media was not mentioned on TV at all.

Case 2: Dispersal of demonstration of protest in Vladivostok

What happened

The government decides to introduce new high import tariffs on used cars that make them too expensive. On Russian Far East up to one third of business was connected with import of cheap used cars from Japan. In Vladivostok local car dealers and drivers organized a demonstration of protest against the decision and have blocked major roads including the road to the airport. On the next Sunday the peaceful demonstration was violently suppressed, participants arrested, journalists of NTV and the 1st Channel were arrested as well, as journalists of many other media.

The coverage

Time. The issue was not covered at all. Not a single news report about both the demonstrations or the police suppression was broadcasted.

Instead all the channels showed on December 19th (Thursday) almost similar reports about visit of the prime-minister Vladimir Putin to KAMAZ automobile plant and special government meeting that was held there to discuss the measures to support local automotive industry.

Newsmakers. Vladimir Putin, head of the largest automobile plant AVTOVAZ Boris Aleshin, workers of KAMAZ, UAZ, AVTOVAZ plants.

The words used. Support, national industry, protect the local market, tariffs. Putin also mentioned that import of used cars brings super profit to a few and tariffs save jobs for many.

How the coverage changed. 1st and NTV channels showed only one report, but the Russia broadcasted two: one on the December 19th and one within the final weekly program on December 21st. Just a few hours later after the police suppressed demonstration in Vladivostok the Russia channel showed a report about Putin visit to KAMAZ and "spontaneous" demonstrations of support of new import tariffs at Russian state-controlled automobile plants.

Conclusion

This is the ideal example of hushing-up the event: the channels just didn't show it.

Case 3: Financial crisis

What happened

In September following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Russian stock-markets slipped in deep piqué. Russian banks closely interconnected with the stock exchange and the global capital market started wobbling and ceased credit, leaving industrial companies no chance to re-finance debt. At the same time a demand and prices for raw materials that constitute the majority of Russian export dropped seriously which created enormous pressure on the national currency. The state started to save the banks, the stock and the Rouble. On the next stage, at the middle of October industrial companies started to reduce output. It led to a dramatic drop in GDP and splash of unemployment.

The coverage

The data concerning the coverage of the economic crises in Russia is collected and is being processed. I will be able to provide the exact figures in a week, but some conclusions are already obvious:

1. All the channels covered the crises as a global, foreign issue, not a domestic one.
2. Domestic news, connected with the crises, such as sock market collapse or closure of plants, devaluation of the Ruble etc., in most cases were not covered. At the same time foreign news of the same type were broadcasted.
3. The crises was presented as the new opportunity, the end of unidirectional economic order,
4. Accent was made on governmental measures to strengthen the economy
5. Up to 90 per cent of all newsmakers are members of the government, ruling party, administration of the president and the president himself; the prime-minister Vladimir Putin and the president Dmitry Medvedev account for about one half of all the cases any newsmaker appears on the screen.

Preliminary conclusion

The issue is hashed-up when possible and strongly played down and distorted in other cases. The TV-Channels show not the event itself, but, as in Vladivistok case, the state reaction on it.

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Ambivalent role of European institutions in promoting Human Rights in Russia: declarations and reality

Europe as a socio-cultural project always had humanist values at its basis. During recent times they use top formulate these as a triad "Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law". Responsibility for promoting this triad was mainly taken over by the European institutions created after World War II – the European Union, the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

At present these intergovernmental structures, on the one hand, strive under their mandates to set and promote all over the continent rather high standards of observing Human Rights, but on the other hand they are not always able to follow and defend these standards in the face of modern challenges (such as migration, fighting terrorism, local conflicts, etc.) and more and more often make concessions and compromises with the states that violate human rights under the influence of various political and economic interests. This gives the floor to numerous accusations of these institutions in practicing "double standards" and leads to a significant loss of confidence in the European system of human rights defence and the very concept of Human Rights itself.

Russia, which in 1990s strived to join the "European gentlemen club" for legitimizing its young democracy, now tries to dictate European institutions its own game rules based on political bargain and blackmail. The issues of Human Rights are rather granted a role of a "token coin" in this so-called "dialogue", than that of a true value and ideological basis for cooperation.

Thus, the role of European institutions in promoting and defending Human Rights in Russia can be regarded as an ambivalent one. In this paper we'll try to analyse those mechanisms and instruments of influencing the Human Rights situation in Russia, which have been created under these inter-governmental organisations, and their effectiveness.

We'll focus on the mechanisms of the two most strong and famous European institutions – the European Union and the Council of Europe, leaving the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) beyond the framework of the paper, as in our opinion it deserves a separate analysis.

The European Union

The European Union, which is a strategic partner of the Russian Federation on the international arena, though initially created for goals of purely economic cooperation between the states, since 1990s is active in promoting human rights worldwide, and developed a wide set of instruments for fulfilling this task. As human rights, democracy and the rule of law have been declared core values of the Union, in 1990s the EU began consolidating a human rights policy towards third states. Human rights played a more prominent role in negotiations and agreements between the EU and the newly emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. By the mid-

1990s, the Commission began to be explicit in suggesting that respect for human rights should be among the key conditions attached to the "Europe Agreements" to be signed with countries seeking EU accession[1].

Being the basic document underpinning the relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) concluded in 1994 declares "the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly those of minorities, the establishment of a multiparty system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalisation aimed at setting up a market economy" as one of key principles of cooperation between the Parties. The EU and Russia agreed that "respect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of partnership and of this agreement".

In respect of practical implementation of human rights protection in Russia the EU has settled a number of instruments, primarily various summit meetings and regular bilateral consultations on human rights.

In formal and informal meetings at the heads of state and ministerial level, the EU has called repeatedly on Russia to take into consideration the violations of its international obligations in the sphere of human rights.

These concerns were also highlighted in the EU Annual Human Rights Report 2007 (jointly prepared by the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council)[2]. In respect to Russia the Report states, that *"Although human rights in Russia are guaranteed by the Constitution, and despite Russia's participation in many international human rights conventions, the EU continues to have concerns about the human rights situation in Russia, in particular regarding freedom of opinion and assembly, freedom of the press, the situation of Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society, respect for the rule of law and the situation in Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus".*

It should be noted, either, that the EU-Russia Summits and meetings at other levels are closed door affairs with limited opportunities for input from external organisations either to influence the agenda of the meetings, or to monitor and respond to the negotiation process. NGOs frequently bemoan the failure of the Summits to address sensitive issues such as human rights, and these issues are conspicuously avoided at the post-Summit press conferences.

Besides, the mentioned provision of respect for human rights and democratic principles in the PCA is not legally binding and there is no concrete procedure for sanctions in case of its violation. The EU has persuaded Russia that human rights matters should be included in the EU-Russia cooperation agenda, but it did not take advantage of the mid-1990s window of opportunity to push for a more legally binding agreement regarding human rights[3].

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[1] Klitsounova Elena. Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs: How to Improve EU Strategies / CEPS Working Document No. 287, April 2008, http://www.ceps.eu. – P. …

[2] http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/doc/report07_en.pdf.

[3] Klitsounova Elena. Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs: How to Improve EU Strategies / CEPS Working Document No. 287, April 2008, http://www.ceps.eu. – P. …

Russia has also resisted EU proposals to dedicate more time and space to human rights-related issues within the four "Common Spaces", announced at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003 and aimed at intensifying practical cooperation in important areas in order to bring down barriers and integrate Russia with the EU at an advanced level[4].

Of all the institutions of the EU the European Parliament remains one of the most attentive monitors of Russian politics and through its committees, particularly the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Human Rights, follows and voices to its concerns regarding the evolution of some of the thorniest topics in EU-Russia relations.

The defence of human rights in the world is declared a top priority of the European Parliament. It contributes to the formulation and implementation of EU policies in the field of human rights and democracy issues through its resolutions, reports, missions to third countries, human rights events, and oral and written questions. However, in a February 2006 report, the European Parliament expressed its frustration at what it perceived to be a lack of consultation by the Council in the development of EU foreign policy – with a particular focus on EU's failed foreign policy towards Russia. Particularly, the European Parliament laments the lack of focus on human rights and the rule of law, while dealing with economic and energy related issues.

In recent years the European Parliament has adopted a host of special resolutions on the situation on human rights and the rule of law in Russia, as well as addressed these issues in its general resolutions on the EU-Russia Summits. But it should be noted that the role of the European Parliament in EU-Russia relations is primarily one of consultation, not of a real decision-making.

Since 2005 the EU and Russia have held regular consultations on human rights every six months under the development of the Common Spaces. These consultations provide a forum for discussions about the human rights situation in both Russia and the EU, and their purpose is to discuss internal and international human rights issues in an "open, constructive and balanced manner". The first two meetings took place in 2005 (March and September).

Russia became the third country, after China and Iran, with which bilateral discussions on human rights were organised. Russia is represented by officials from the Department of Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and the European Union by officials from the EU Presidency (current and forthcoming), the European Commission and the Council. To date, there have been nine rounds of EU-Russia Human Rights Consultations (with the most recent being held in May 2009), which have addressed a wide range of issues. As these consultations are deemed to be held on a "reciprocal basis", their agenda includes discussions on human rights and fundamental freedoms not only in Russia but also in the EU and worldwide. Facing constant difficulties in drafting a joint press release, the Russian and EU sides issue separate press releases summarising discussions during the Consultations.

The EU appears to be making a serious effort to bring human rights NGOs into the EU-Russia human rights dialogue. In 2006, the EU proposed design changes to

4 These four are the Common Economic Space, the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space on External Security, and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture.

EU-Russia human rights consultations, namely to broaden the list of participants from Russian ministries. The other proposal was for Russian officials to take part in additional, less formal consultations during which human rights issues are discussed with representatives of international and Russian NGOs. To date, this initiative has not been realised, in large part because Russian officials insist on keeping these talks «conventional and professional» and for the sole purpose of directly and constructively discussing sensitive issues with their European colleagues without the presence of the press or watchdog NGOs. Nevertheless, a group of eminent Russian human rights NGOs[5] constantly participates in special briefings for the EU officials which are held before the official consultations and involve human rights defenders from Russia and EU member states.

At the moment it is clear that all parties involved feel the consultations are unsatisfactory. To the EU, the consultations continue to be important, as they help to keep the channel of communication open with regard to human rights, but they also seem to be ineffective and limited to repeating the same message year after year. Russian NGO representatives argue that the consultations have reached a dead end, mainly because EU representatives, Russian officials, and international and Russian NGOs have so far failed to hold joint talks. In the official Russian view, the effectiveness of the consultations is seriously undermined by the incoherence between EU internal and external human rights practices: human rights issues acquire a much more significant presence in the EU's Russia policy than they do internally. The EU has developed an effective structure of human rights scrutiny for external, including Russian, cases, but still lacks any systemic approach to address human rights problems within the EU. So, these bilateral consultations may become an effective instrument of promoting and defending human rights only in case of a sufficient redesign of their format.

In general, now the EU in its political relations with Russia takes a clear position of "bargaining", linking the issues of human rights defense with economic preferences and sometimes turning the blind eye to existent violations for the sake of its interests. When it comes to hard interests, there is little international pressure from the EU on Russia to protect human rights.

Russian human rights defenders pin some hopes for improving the situation on the negotiations on a new strategic agreement between Russia and the EU, which, in their opinion, should include a chapter on mutual obligations and cooperation in the sphere of defending human rights.

The EU and Russia were already keen to start negotiations on a new strategic agreement to replace the PCA in 2006, but vetoes by Poland and then Lithuania delayed the start of the planned negotiations. Only in May 2008 did the EU Council approve negotiating directives for this new agreement. This in turn paved the way for launching the negotiation process during the EU–Russia Summit on 26 – 27 June 2008 in Khanty Mansiisk, Siberia.

It was then recognized that both the EU and Russia have experienced many political, economic and social changes since the entry into force of the PCA in 1997,

5 Such as the Center for Democracy Development and Human Rights, the Moscow Helsinki Group, the "Memorial" Human Rights Centre, the "SOVA" Center for Information and Analysis, the "DEMOS" Center, the International Youth Human Rights Movement and others, which together formed the "Initiative Group of Russian NGOs for Human Rights Dialogue with the EU".

and thus the new agreement must reflect these changes. The aim of the new agreement is to *"...provide a comprehensive framework for EU/Russia relations for the foreseeable future and help to develop the potential of our relationship. It should provide for a strengthened legal basis and legally binding commitments covering all main areas of the relationship, as included in the four EU/Russia common spaces and their road maps which were agreed at the Moscow Summit in May 2005. The New Agreement will build on the international commitments which bind the EU and Russia"*[6].

However, the negotiations on a new agreement are expected to be a lengthy process and when completed it will require ratification by the European Parliament, the parliaments of each individual EU state and Russia. Until this process is finalised, the existing PCA is renewed on a yearly basis to allow the continuation of bilateral relations. At present there is no clear evidence that both negotiating parties (the Russian government and the European Commission) are willing to include any binding human rights provisions into the agreement draft text. But they encounter a significant lobby, as some actors and experts inside the EU advocate the inclusion of appropriate human rights and rule of law clauses in the new PCA[7], and the same position is being backed by a group of Russian NGOs involved in the process of EU-Russia human rights consultations[8].

Besides for various political mechanisms, another way by which the EU contributes to promoting and defending human rights in the third countries (including Russia) is financial support of the human rights projects of NGOs. The EU in general has spent and continues to spend considerable financial resources on a complicated variety of programmes and projects to assist NGOs.

For over a decade, the main instrument of EU assistance to Russia was the TACIS programme, which was launched to provide grant-financed technical assistance to support the transition of Russia (and all other former Soviet Republics with the exception of the three Baltic states) to a market economy, democracy and the rule of law. From 1991 to 2005, among post-Soviet countries, Russia received the largest amount of EU support: €2.7 billion, or about half of all TACIS funding. Human rights promotion and assistance to actors involved in fostering the rule of law in Russia was proclaimed as a TACIS priority. The EU implemented a number of TACIS-based programmes designed primarily to support Russian civil society. They include the LIEN (Link Inter-European NGOs) Programme and its successor IBPP (Institutional Building Partnership Programme), which aimed to link Russian NGOs and local/regional authorities with their EU counterparts.

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6 Joint statement of the EU-Russia summit on the launch of negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement, Khanty-Mansiysk, 27 June 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/101524.pdf.

7 See, for instance, the draft report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on relations between the EU and Russia (2008/2104(INI)), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rapporteur: Janusz Onyszkiewicz (24.04.2008), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-405.754+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN.

8 Initiative group of Russian NGOs statements.

From the very beginning, the process of offering EU assistance was confusing, particularly financing and project selection. But in 1994 many resources were categorised under one budgetary heading entitled the European Initiative for Democracy and the Protection of Human Rights (EIDHR). Created by a European Parliament initiative, the EIDHR uses a more thematic approach, offering assistance to NGOs active in democratisation and human rights. The EIDHR is unique among EU programmes because it does not require host government consent and offers assistance only to NGOs based in the recipient country. Thus the EIDHR can enable the EU to develop civil society support to some (albeit modest) degree in opposition to governments. Moreover, some European politicians see the EIDHR as unique among other EU human rights and democracy assistance programmes since it is "the single mechanism left for the EU to influence the Russian human rights situation as all other purely democratic projects have turned out to be almost totally fruitless".

Since its 1997 launch in Russia, the EIDHR has supported over 250 projects. From 1997 to 2000, it assisted Russia with approximately €8 million for projects covering a wide range of EU policy objectives including raising human rights awareness. The overall indicative amount available for Russia under the 2005 Call for Proposals was €870,000. For 2005, the European Commission received 94 applications and chose to fund 11 Russia-based micro-projects. For 2007, 15 Russia-based micro-projects were assisted with approximately €1.45 million. According to the Country Strategy Paper on Russia (2007-2013), the EIDHR will continue to be an EU financial instrument in support of enhancing respect for human rights and bolstering the role of civil society in the promotion of human rights. Funding will be provided to national and international NGOs and international organisations, including certain UN bodies.

Since January 2007, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), in liaison with the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP), has been the principal new tool for providing assistance to the EU's neighbouring countries. This instrument has been designed to finance activities that had previously fallen under TACIS budgetary lines. The ENPI will be the main EU financial instrument for supporting partnership implementation with Russia. External assistance under the ENPI is subject to a six-year programming cycle: every six years the European Commission drafts Country Strategy Papers, which elaborate assistance priorities for the following six years. In the spring of 2007, the Strategy Papers for 2007 to 2013 were released, according to which Russia's national allocation will be €30 million per *annum* – that is, less than half the average annual allocation to Russia in recent years under the TACIS programme. Certain proportions of the national allocation will support actions mentioned in the Four Common Spaces, the development of the North Caucasus and Kaliningrad Region and complement the so-called Russian 'national projects'. Although the Country Strategy Paper states that the Delegation in Moscow will take human rights issues into account when designing financial instruments for projects based in Russia, the amount of human rights assistance under ENPI is not clear.

These changes in EU assistance to Russia are certainly part of the broader reform recently launched to replace a complicated variety of external assistance programmes with a single, more effective and policy-oriented instrument: the ENPI. At the same time, they are also shaped by the dynamics of EU-Russia relations. It appears that previous assistance programmes largely failed to contribute to radical improvements in EU-Russia relations, at least with respect to human rights. The growing debate within the EU and the dramatic reduction of EU assistance to Russia planned for the budgetary period 2007-10 can both be seen as signals that EU policy-makers are dissatisfied with the result of Russia-oriented programmes implemented before 2007.

For many Russian human rights NGOs EU assistance provides additional but very important opportunities to gain access to European policy networks and to aggregate transnational (European) knowledge and competence. EU-sponsored initiatives provide both a rationale and an opportunity for NGO actors to come into contact with their EU counterparts, share common vocabularies, world views, professional knowledge and become involved in skills transfers. Thus EU assistance offers Russian NGOs at least three important opportunities: knowledge, network connections and funding.

But, as it was revealed in a survey of Russian NGO leaders in March 2008[9], the effectiveness of the EU assistance programmes and their availability to the NGOs in Russia is now far from being satisfactory. The procedure of getting the funding for projects is strongly bureaucratized, and the priorities of the existing programmes do not always respond to real problems and needs inside the country, in fact limiting the funding to certain topics determined by the EU officials in Brussels.

Driven by valid concerns over financial accountability and effectiveness, the EU has been using financial regulations that require stricter financial control than the usual standards of either the public or private sector. Consequently, given the complexity of the application and reporting requirements, EU assistance has not been easily accessible to local non-state actors lacking expert knowledge of EU systems. The respondent NGOs noted that local organisations have an extremely poor access to EU funding programmes. There is a significant "language barrier" as the full information on the procedure of receiving a grant is not widely available in Russian, and the proposal should be written and presented in English. Several local support offices of the EU-Russia partnership programmes are not able to cover all the regions of Russia by their activities, and their efforts in disseminating information and providing training on the process of writing and submitting proposals are obviously not sufficient.

As a result, grants are repeatedly awarded to organisations with a proven ability to follow EU procedures and reporting requirements (which created over-bureaucratic structures to comply with those rules), while newer, smaller NGOs with short grant histories are often left without funds. Subgranting opportunity (with proper limitations and transparent procedure) could be a good remedy in this case, giving the opportunity for small organizations to receive all the information in Russian, apply in Russian, easily consult the donor at any phase of the project cycle, etc.

Many respondents also noted that in the current situation the project approach is not very effective in Russia and speak about the need for institutional support, as now the NGOs' institutional stability is strongly dependent on the authorities and their policy. At least those organisations which already received funding for their projects from the EU could become recipients of such a support.

9 See: The implementation of the Partnership Principle in the EU Neighbouring Countries: Russia // Towards a Sustainable Europe-wide Civil Society, ECAS, Government of the Republic of Croatia / Office for Cooperation with NGOs, 2008, pp. 137-149, also available at: http://www.ecas-citizens.eu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=236&Itemid=.

More attention should be paid by the EU to supporting new initiatives (not only long-established), raising the role of Russian experts in assessing project proposals according to the first-hand knowledge of the situation and needs of the society, also the assistance programs should be adjusted to the changes in Russian legislation in order that beneficiaries could avoid problems with taxation. The thematic priorities of funding should also be adjusted to actual needs of the Russian civil society, not only the interests of donors themselves.

The amounts of the financial aid should not be lowered, as a number of important spheres of NGOs activities (such as human rights defense or environment protection) will not be a priority for national funding (neither state nor private) in the near future.

Besides, the EU long-term policy of promoting human rights and supporting civil society in the neighbouring countries (including Russia) should not be dependent on the short-term political interests. Thus, the initiative of the European Commission to cut the budget of the EIDHR country-based support scheme for Russia as one of the possible sanctions in response the Russian-Georgian conflict looks both illogical (as this support goes not to the state as the part of the conflict, but to the NGOs that are involved in monitoring its consequences and its transformation) and inconsistent with the declared objectives of supporting independent civil society organizations.

The Council of Europe

If in the case of the EU Russia since 1990s has been one of the major recipient countries (from the point of view of technical and humanitarian assistance), for the Council of Europe it is one of the major donors to its budget (as the annual payments of each country are calculated on the basis of its population, not economic indicators). And being a purely intergovernmental structure without its own sources of funding except for member states contributions (unlike the EU, the budget of which is partly formed by special taxes), the CE is totally dependent on the member states in financial respect. This fact seriously influences the shape of interrelations between the Council of Europe institutions and the Russian authorities on all the range of issues, including human rights defence, giving Russian officials an opportunity to blackmail the CE by a threat to withdraw from the organisation (as it was repeatedly done, last time – when PACE discussed the urgent issue of the Russian-Georgian conflict).

When Russia became member of the Council of Europe in 1996, it agreed to adopt the basic principles of the organisation, regarding this as a matter of prestige and a "quality sign" for its newly born democracy. But in several years, since the emergence of the "sovereign democracy concept", it started trying to change the rules of this long-established club adopting them to its own political interests.

Russia now sometimes behaves as if it does not recognize the jurisdiction of the CE institutions over its territory according to the Statute of the organisation and the key treaties adopted within it. Moreover, by its actions (or absence of such) in a number of cases it impedes the development of the European system of human rights defence in general.

Thus, the Russian Federation stays the only member state not to ratify Protocol 14 to the European Convention aimed at simplifying the procedure of appealing to the European Court of Human Rights. And it should be mentioned that it is no other country but Russia which is an absolute leader in the number of complaints being filed to the ECHR every year.

Russian citizens bring hundreds of cases before the European Court of Human Rights a year, and each year we see lots of judgments condemning the violations of the European Convention by the Russian state. But in contradiction to the very idea of the ECHR case-law, which is intended to serve as grounds for changing the national legislation and law enforcement practice to bring them in accordance with the European Convention (so-called "general measures"), nothing is being changed in this respect in Russia. Dozens of similar cases are being submitted to the ECHR one after another, which highlight the most problematic areas of the national legal system – execution of the courts' decisions, cruel treatment by the police, etc., however, the government prefers paying compensations to victims, but not trying to change the system. And the flow of these similar complaints leads to the situation when cases are regarded for several years, which in fact does not contribute to effective defence of human rights.

As a result, the effectiveness of such an important mechanism as the European Court of Human Rights for Russia looks doubtful. On the one hand, every year it makes dozens of decisions in favour of Russian citizens, whose rights have been violated, but on the other hand, up to the moment it is unable to achieve any systemic changes in national legislation and law-enforcement practice by this.

This finally led to the ECHR adopting a "pilot decision" on the problem of execution of the courts' decisions in Russia on January 15, 2009, which urges the Russian authorities to establish an effective mean of internal defence within 6 months and declares moratorium for a year on accepting appeals from Russia on the cases of failure to execute the decisions of national courts[10]. Up to the moment of this writing, 5 months after the pilot decision, there is still no visible changes in the national law enforcement system being taken by the Russian side.

Such Council of Europe institution as the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), the members of which are delegates of the national parliaments elected by their voters and dependent on their political attitudes and opinions, feels itself free to criticize the Russian authorities on the cases of mass or severe human rights violations. As a result, PACE repeatedly passed resolutions condemning unlawful violence in Chechnya and other hot human rights issues in our country, which always provoke furious reaction and accusations in political commitment and "double standards" from the Russian side. But these resolutions have no effect other then one more international scandal.

Unlike the PACE delegates, the CE officials making real decisions, are employed by the organisation and depend in their activities on the will of the member states. Accordingly, they demonstrate a lot more "modest" approach to human rights violations in member states, by making "compromise" decisions to please the governments.

A good recent example to illustrate this point can be found in the case of the so-called "3rd Regional NGO Congress of the Council of Europe" held in Penza, Russia, in December 2008. This event was organised by the Council of Europe jointly with the Russian parliament in Penza. Human rights and other independent NGOs of Russian and other countries in fact have been deprived of a real opportunity to influence the course of its preparation and as a result many of them had to refuse to participate in this event[11].

10 Case of Burdov v. Russia (No. 2), Judgment No. 33509/04, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=24525&sessionId=24891425&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.

11 Their position is reflected in the statement available at: http://nopenza.cs-nis.org/en.

Small Entrepreneurship

Prof. Dr. Alexander Chepurenko

Introduction by the group academic advisor

The presented part of this book contains some papers delivered as a result of group discussions dealing with Entrepreneurship.

After the systemic break, Russia's private sector is already 20 years old. The core group of actors, being responsible for economic growth and innovation, are entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, there are several indicators showing that the development of private entrepreneurship, especially on the grass roots level, has many constraints. Moreover, the share of adults who try to become entrepreneurial, is rather low, as several empirically based projects – among them the most important one, the "Global Entrepreneurship Monitor" (GEM) data show.

On the other side, Sweden – the country where the 2008 Summer school took place – has a long term tradition of successful development of private entrepreneurship, even under preconditions of the so-called Swedish socialist model. The State policy is focused on promotion of entrepreneurial spirit of population, there are several instruments to encourage and secure the entrepreneurial start-up process. However, the share of adults willing to start-up etc., is rather low – like in Russia.

Are low levels of entrepreneurial activity in both countries signalizing some errors in State policy? Or is it a sign of even deeper problems – starting with the perception of entrepreneurship, new priorities and values in the era of post-modern affluent societies etc.?

The main aims of the group work were as follows: to adopt some core knowledge about Entrepreneurship and it's theoretic interpretation in current literature. To compare the data on early entrepreneurship for Russia and Sweden. And, finally, to get convinced that researching entrepreneurship matters.

The questions which should be discussed during the workshop were formulated initially as follows:

Which are unique and which - common features of private entrepreneurship development in Russia and Sweden? What should neighboring states know about entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship framework conditions in Russia?

What can Russian government learn from Sweden (and other Scandinavian states) in supporting entrepreneurship?

What can universities do to support Entrepreneurship in their countries? Studying data of relevant empirical investigations and theoretical literature;

As every ambitious project, the entrepreneurship group realized these goals only partly. In presented papers we can find first attempts to prepare an overview of current state of empirically based entrepreneurship research in Russia (paper by Elena Nazarbaeva and Maxim Markin), to compare motivation of novice entrepreneurs in Russia and Sweden (paper by Angelina Grigorieva and Alice Kuznetsova) and the gender structure of early entrepreneurship in both countries (Anna and Vera Merculov).

These articles show intermediary results of students' interest to and research activity in entrepreneurship research which is a growing interdisciplinary field in the world, but only marginal one in Russia.

We are convinced that taking into consideration the very young age both of entrepreneurship as a social and economic phenomenon in Russia as well as of the researchers presenting their first results, the next steps will be made in developing a deeper insight into the types and strategies of entrepreneurs, role of different forms of capital and environmental factors (including policy, location, funding institutions and mechanisms etc.) in the success of new ventures, etc.

GEM based interdisciplinary studies help to improve analytical skills and abilities and drive Entrepreneurship research forward. In this context, it is hardly surprising that at the next Baltic Summer school to be held in Bruges in 2009 students of different departments of HSE (Business-Informatics, Economics, Management, Program Engineering, Sociology) will take part to make progress in endeavoring Entrepreneurship.

Angelina Grigoryeva, Alisa Kuznetsova

Entrepreneurial motivation: Comparative analysis of Russia and Sweden

Abstract

Entrepreneurs are the leading group which is responsible for innovations and economic development of the state. That is why it is quite important to investigate motivational factors encouraging people to start-up a business. In this paper we examine the structures of Russian and Sweden entrepreneurs according to the types of entrepreneurial motivations, and then we move on to discuss how these structures in both countries correlate with such social-demographic factors as gender, age and educational level using the data of the GEM for 2007 for Russia and Sweden. In addition to this according to the findings we propose some suggestions on development of the entrepreneurship motivation system in Russia.

Keywords: entrepreneurship; entrepreneurship motivation system; types of entrepreneurial motivations; Russia.

Introduction

Entrepreneurs are the leading group which is responsible for innovations and economic development of the state. There are not only economic factors which are to be taken into consideration when explaining reasons and causes of entrepreneurial activity of people. From this point of view it is quite important to investigate motivational factors encouraging people to start-up a business.

In this paper we examine the motivation specific of Russian and Sweden entrepreneurs, and then we move on to discuss how these structures in both countries correlate with such social-demographic factors as gender, age and educational level. We begin with the review of the concept of an entrepreneur and turn to concept of entrepreneurial motivation as well as how it has been studied. Then we make a point about the analysis of socio-economic situation in the country on the basis of analysis of business motivation characteristics. After this we explore the states in both countries from the point of view of motivation enabling people to become entrepreneurs using the data of the GEM for 2007 for Russia and Sweden. Finally, according to the findings we propose some suggestions on development of the entrepreneurship motivation system in Russia.

Theories of start-up motivations

The concept of an entrepreneur

There are a lot of definitions for entrepreneur (F. Quesnay, A.Smith, A.Marshall, F. Knight etc.). We appeal to the classic type of entrepreneur described in literature and corrected by business practice in the most developed countries. The starting point is Max Weber's concept which emphasizes the role of the Protestant ethics; according to this concept an entrepreneur leads an ascetic life, and the wealth gives him only the sense of well-done duty within the bounds of his vocation. According to the standard concept of Schumpeter, a typical business motivation is the content from the process itself and the effects. Profit is the index of successful entrepreneurial activity; it is the rate of professional qualities and prestige of an entrepreneur in the society, which is very important for him.

Concept of entrepreneurial motivation

According to both considered concepts of the entrepreneur notion the society specifies cultural priorities of entrepreneurship by socio-cultural norms, values, social experience. Besides, however, the society should create all necessary conditions for the other important characteristic – freedom of action, regulated by social institutions. The phenomenon of business motivation forms at the intersection of these two constituents.

In contemporary literature it is accepted to distinguish between two main types of motivations of business activity.

- Opportunity choice, which is based on consideration of comparative advantages and various possibilities charges in own business start-up or employment. Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs try to use new opportunities and take advantages from entrepreneurship; their striving for own business start-up is caused by looking for advantages being given by entrepreneurial activity. Their entrance the business is a conscious and well-considered act. They could be described as high-qualified professionals tended to innovative activity and entrepreneurship. For innovational activities they have not only good knowledge, but motivations as well. With this going on, voluntary motivation factors include both uneconomic motives and economic interest;
- Forced choice, made under the pressure of external factors. Necessity entrepreneurs try to start-up own business owing to the fact that they do not have any better opportunities for earning or better jobs. They often have to change not only places of employment, but also their occupations. They are forced to entrepreneurship by negative factors.

Since any human activity is poly-motivated, there is a defined notion of combined motivation. From one side entrepreneurs with such a motivation are oriented to looking for business advantages, and from the other side – they do not have better opportunities for work.

Why study entrepreneurial motivation?

From the 1970s and onwards many western countries have shared the same experience: large established firms can no longer create a net increase in employment. This has resulted in permanently high levels of unemployment and/or in an increasing relative importance of small and new firms as creators of new jobs. This serves as the background to the current great political interest in the small firm sector, as well as the widespread hopes that small and new firms will solve problems of unemployment and economic development [3].

This turn was been reflected in rising academic interest in entrepreneurship, understood as the creation of new independent firms. In the early empirical research this interest was very much focused on the psychological characteristics of business founders. Going in mote detail, such studies focus on revealing what drives certain people to take on the risk, the uncertainty and the independent structure of business ownership. Early entrepreneurial research followed a similar path to the one of organizational psychology, focusing on identifying traits and characteristics that distinguished entrepreneurs from the general population, rather than developing process-based models. Beginning with McClelland, who argued that a high need for achievement was a personality trait common to entrepreneurs, a great deal of research has focused on characteristics of entrepreneurs [9]. Contemporary entrepreneurship models tend to be process-oriented, being focused on attitudes and beliefs and how they can predict intentions and behaviors.

Gilad and Levine [4] put forward two closely-related theories explained why people initiate business, namely the "push" theory and the "pull" theory. In particular, the "push" theory states that negative external forces, such as job dissatisfaction, difficulty finding employment, insufficient salary, or inflexible work schedule affect people's decision to become entrepreneurs. According to the "pull" theory various relatively desirable outcomes such as seeking independence, self-fulfillment, wealth, and so forth attract individuals entrepreneurial activity. Research reveals that "pull" factors are more influential since individuals become entrepreneurs primarily due to "pull" factors, rather than "push" factors [5].

A response to the limited success of the psychological approach has been to view firm creation in context. One way of doing this is to apply a more aggregate level of analysis and to look for regional or national level variables that can explain variations in the rate of new firm formation. This approach is believed to be relatively successful since strong and generalizable relationships have been established.

However, empirical studies of contextual factors aimed to identify the situational and environmental factors that predict entrepreneurial activity, such as job displacement, previous work experience, availability of various resources, and governmental influences, have demonstrated low explanatory power and predictive ability[6]. Thus, a direct relationship between these external forces and entrepreneurial activity is considered to be of dubious value. For instance, while job displacement may really bring about decision to set up business, displaced workers will not pursue this career unless there is a more direct, process-oriented linkage [9]. As a result, despite the fact that external factors provide a more conducive environment supporting entrepreneurship, other career option are quite likely to be pursued.

Analysis of socio-economic situation in the country on the basis of analysis of business motivation characteristics

The increased attention to entrepreneurship among academic researchers seems justified given the growing evidence that new firm creation is a critical driving force of economic growth, creating hundreds of thousands of new jobs, as well as enhancing federal and local tax revenues, boosting exports, and generally increasing national productivity [8]. Leibenstein(1968) firmly hold and prove the stand point that entrepreneurship is a significant variable in the development process [7]. Moreover, he states that in some cases small changes in the motivational state or in the reduction of market impediments may turn entrepreneurial scarcity into an abundant supply.

Revealing the motivational characteristics of entrepreneurship, types of motivations when starting-up new business is a significant issue for analysis of socio-economic entrepreneurship conditions, as well as for analysis of possible socioeconomic consequences from new business start-ups, owners of which are being driven by various motives. In a number of researches it was established that the larger share of opportunity entrepreneurs as compared to necessity entrepreneurs, the higher rate of economic growth in medium-term outlook, due to business activity of population.

Entrepreneurship structure by the type is the important indication of external environment condition and the rate of its favor to entrepreneurship development. The main constituents of entrepreneurship environment are as follows:

- Access to outside financing;
- Entrepreneurial activity regulation;
- Entrepreneurship supporting programs;
- Educational attainment of entrepreneurship;
- Opportunity to entry the market (barriers height);
- Intellectual property right guarantees, etc.

All the elements of business environment have equal influences on the entrepreneur groups. So, if there is no access to outside financing as well as no entrepreneurship supporting programs, difficult market entry due to high barriers and unfavorable business environment, in this case a number of high qualified professionals and experts who are capable to start-up their own business declines, i.e. the rate of necessity entrepreneurs in the structure of business potential increases. Thus, the entrepreneur group structure becomes worse – it is established that necessity entrepreneurs have, as a rule, lower standard of education; they start their business at the later age, and create less workplaces; this results in the attenuation of economic growth impulse. In case of favorable environment and effective measures of entrepreneurship supporting, opportunity entrepreneurship increases while the number of necessity entrepreneurs drops, and it creates an impulse for economic growth in the medium-term outlook.

Entrepreneurship Motivations Specifics in Russia and Sweden: comparative analysis

In our analysis, we use probably the most relevant source – the data of the 'Global Entrepreneurship Monitor', being the most important comparative research project examining the so-called Entrepreneurship Framework Conditions in respective countries as well as the structure of the entrepreneurial stratum of population. Speaking more concrete, we are going to compare and explain the data of the GEM for 2007 for both countries from the point of view of motivation enabling people to become entrepreneurs.

Table 1

Structures of Russian and Sweden entrepreneurs according to the types of entrepreneurial motivations

Entrepre neurs	Motivation					
	Opportunity		Necessity		Combined	
	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)a	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)

Potential	26[12]	77	60	17	10	7
Nascent.	26	80	54	15	13	5
New or Baby Business Owners	23	80	60	8	13	12

As a whole, in Russia the share of opportunity entrepreneurs is lower than in Sweden, and the share of necessity entrepreneurs, - higher. The index of necessity entrepreneurship indirectly characterizes the whole entrepreneurship supporting system in Russia as less developed in comparison to Sweden one. In Russia businesslike people often prefer wage labour to own business, due to lack of guarantees, infrastructure, institutions necessary for successful entrepreneurship. Thus, Russia compared to Sweden has weaker impulse of economic growth, due to entrepreneurial activity of population. In Russia the number of high qualified professionals and experts who are capable to start-up their own business has been decreasing, i.e. the rate of necessity entrepreneurs in the structure of business potential has been increasing. And as a rule they have lower standard of education; they start their business at the later age, and create less workplaces; this results in the attenuation of economic growth impulse. Necessity entrepreneurship, as researches display, is still a significant phenomenon in modern Russia, which is drawing the country into the developing countries group according to the structure of entrepreneurial potential of population.

Table 2

Motivation of Russian and Sweden Entrepreneurs by gender

Gender	Opportunity driven		Necessity driven		Mixed		Total	
	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)
Male	25	71	33	16	43	13	100	100
Female	36	71	32	17	32	13	100	100
Total	29	71	32	16	39	13	100	100

In Sweden there is no gender difference in types of motivation. According to the data, three quarters of early entrepreneurs – both male and female - are opportunity driven. In Russia motivations of female entrepreneurs are equally distributed (approximately one third for each type of motivation), while among men necessity entrepreneurship and mixed type of motivation prevail. So – taking into consideration that opportunity driven entrepreneurs are more often efficient when starting-up - it might be said that in Russia the female entrepreneurs are more ‘advanced’ than men, contrary to Sweden.

12 The GEM 2007.

Table 3

Motivations of Russian and Sweden Entrepreneurs by age

Age	Opportunity driven		Necessity driven		Mixed		Total	
	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)
18-24	37	100	16	0	47	0	100	100
25-34	35	77	25	14	40	9	100	100
35-44	27	77	34	10	39	13	100	100
Over 45	17	64	54	22	29	14	100	100
Total	29	71	32	16	39	13	100	100

In Russia the share of necessity driven entrepreneurs has been increasing from 16% to 54% (the older the entrepreneur is, the more likely he does not have better work choice). In Sweden, growth is less significant – from 0% to 22%. Consequently, in both countries tendencies correspond: the older a person is, the more problems he or she faces while seeking for a job, therefore, the more attractive entrepreneurial activity becomes for him or her. Yet, in Russia this rule is more obvious: half of entrepreneurs over 45 years organize business in the absence of appropriate alternatives, in Sweden – just every fifth. It should be noted, that in Russia even among young entrepreneurs (18-24 and 24-35 years) the share of opportunity ones does not exceed 37%.

Table 4

Motivations of Russian and Sweden Entrepreneurs by education level

Education	Opportunity driven		Necessity driven		Mixed		Total	
	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)	Russia (%)	Sweden (%)
Secondary degree or lower	18	63	63	22	18	15	100	100
Post Secondary	23	80	25	7	53	13	100	100
Graduate	44	78	21	14	36	8	100	100
Total	30	71	32	16	38	13	100	100

In Russia the higher the level of education, the share of opportunity entrepreneurs also grows significantly (18% to 44%), while at the same time necessity motivation role is decresing (63% to 21%). Practically half of graduates organize business to take advantage of its opportunity. Secondary degree entrepreneurs, apparently, in most cases despaired of success while looking for a job.

In Sweden it does not seem to be the same strong dependence of motivation from the education level. Though, the share of opportunity entrepreneurs slightly is increasing, too (from 63% to 80%), what is quite predictable.

To sum it all up, educational level and age are two significant factors, which influence the distribution of various types of entrepreneurial motivations in Russia. On the other hand, in Sweden age is less significant factor, influencing the motivation, whereas gender does not have any influence at all.

Suggestions on development of the entrepreneurship motivation system in Russia

In addition to the analysis of GEM data a comparative analysis of dominant values of entrepreneurs was conducted. During the ESS (European social survey) data analysis, values of Swedish and Russian employees and self-employed were been investigated (such as importance of thinking new ideas and being creative, being rich, have money and expensive things, showing abilities and being admired, making own decisions and being free, being successful and getting respect from others and even seeking fun and pleasure).

Two main tendencies were been disclosed: In Sweden the distributions of key values between employees and self-employed are identical, in Russia the situation is direct opposite. Supposing that motivation structure of a certain activity is completely determined by values, we came to conclusion that in Russia, in contrast to Sweden, entrepreneurs possess pronounced motivation for entrepreneurial activity, so-called “entrepreneurial spirit”.

Consequently, we have different strategies of supporting entrepreneurship in two countries. In Russia – we need to lower barriers and provide minimal support. In Sweden selection needs to be held in kinder gardens already and also programs devoted to growing of entrepreneurs to be introduced.

Pursuing the policy of start-up entrepreneurship support, the existence of various groups of potential and starting entrepreneurs should be taken into account more strictly. As for opportunity entrepreneurship it is necessary to pay more attention to selective measures to assist start-up activity of this "high growth potential entrepreneurs". Creating of technologies transfer centers, stimulating exhibition and presentation activity, expanding information recourses and places of meetings may ,make a core of such measures. As for necessity entrepreneurship, they should be engaged in less risky activities – becoming employees or self-employees in catering, other simple services etc. To do that retraining programs, more active labour policy of the government and microcredit institutions as a mutual assistance network should be used.

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Maxim Markin

Studying Entrepreneurship in Russia: Main Directions and Methods

Abstract

At the end of the 20th century the growth of development of theories connected with entrepreneurship began. It's supposed that good research is usually based on some theoretical assumption. Authors try to compare existing theoretical ideas with the contemporary studies of entrepreneurship and find out that only some spheres are widely studied when the others are not so popular.

Keywords: study of entrepreneurship, theories of entrepreneurship, Russian statistics, state and non-state researches

Introduction

Who is an entrepreneur? If you try to find the answer via the Internet or in relevant literature, you'll see, that there are different definitions. T most common is as follows: "An **entrepreneur** is a person who has possession of an enterprise, or venture, and assumes significant accountability for the inherent risks and the outcome"[1] And another source gives another idea: **entrepreneur** is "the owner of a business who attempts to make money by risk and initiative"[2]

Of course, every research needs, moreover, a definite approach on which it can be based on. Keeping in mind the problem with the defining the term "entrepreneur" we find it important to define some contemporary theoretical approaches to studying entrepreneurship and to compare them with contemporary researches. We've chosen only one country for our theoretical observation – Russia –and a definite period – from 1980th until nowadays. And if we speak about contemporary research we'll take into account only the projects conducted after 2000.

So the aim of this work is an attempt to correlate the main ideas in the field of entrepreneurship that appeared in the end of 20-th century with contemporary researches in this field in Russia.

Theoretical assumption to analysis of entrepreneurship

Usually, there are two main tasks when studying entrepreneurship:

1. To understand and predict the ability of appearing of new entrepreneurs and their ideas;
2. To understand and predict whether these ideas will be successful or not.

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[1] Entrepreneur // Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, URL: < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entrepreneur >

[2] Entrepreneur // The Free Dictionary, URL: < http://www.thefreedictionary.com/entrepreneur>

Later we'll move to description of contemporary research in Russia and see whether it is true or false for our country. But to achieve any goal of any research in the field of entrepreneurship one as we've already mentioned should know the meaning of the concept "entrepreneur". So let's start with discussing this notion and then move to the Russian researches, their aims and methodology.

According to Christiant Bruyat and Garry I. Willard the 80-th years of 20-th century were the period of accumulation of empirical evidence. And the building of the theory of entrepreneurship began in the 90-th. But from our point of view it can be said that the period of theory began a bit earlier - at the border of 80-th and 90-th, because already at that time some theories appeared. They tried to analyze entrepreneurial activities and to draw a distinction between entrepreneurs and "common" people.

In 1991 the first Theory Building Conference on Entrepreneurship was been held. The result of if it was the understanding that there were a lot of theories in different disciplines but there were no connection between them. And of course there wasn't any unified theory.

And in 1993 Bull and Willard tried to solve this problem and classify all existing papers into groups. By this there were five groups of works concerning entrepreneur ship:

Papers defining the concept of "entrepreneurship"

Cantillon was the first who used the concept entrepreneur in his work in 1755. It is also supposed that he was one of the four scientists who laid the foundation of contemporary understanding of entrepreneurship. The other scientists were Turgot, Say and Schumpeter. But we should notice that during more than 200 years there wasn't any common definition of entrepreneurship achieved. It is to mention that in this group of papers not only theoretical, but also empirical research can be found. For example there was Gartner's and William's research where they tried to understand who is entrepreneur from the point of view of politicians, scientists and entrepreneurs themselves.

Papers about the traits, that make people to become an entrepreneur

In this group the problem of predicting of appearing new entrepreneurs could be solved. But in 1988 Low and McMillan after analyzing literature involving psychological theories about the entrepreneur made a conclusion that there is no typical entrepreneur.

The other three groups of papers formed the theory itself. These groups are:

- success strategies.
- formation of new ventures.
- influence of environmental factors.

After analyzing works of these groups there were formed the preconditions for appearing of new entrepreneur:

- Task-related motivation (some vision or sense of social value embedded in the basic task itself that motivates the initiator to act),
- Expertise (present know-how plus confidence to be able to obtain know-how needed in the future),
- Expectation of personal gain (economic and/or psychic benefits),

- A supportive environment (conditions that either provide comfort and support to the new endeavor, or that reduce discomfort from a previous endeavor).

But even authors themselves point out that their theory was incomplete and there were a lot of open questions. And already in 2000 they changed some ideas. Now all scientists who study entrepreneurship agree that:

- personality of an entrepreneur is the main factor of creating value.
- The individual is not simply a machine reacting automatically to stimuli from the environment.
- Environmental resources can play a facilitating or stimulating role when increasing the number of entrepreneurs in a region.

Now we've indentified the concept of "entrepreneur" and we'll move on to the review of empirical research in Russia. We'll try to place these studies in the classification shown above and look if there some new themes appeared or some ones disappeared.

Review of empirical research

In this chapter we are going to study some empirical research of entrepreneurship in Russia. All of them can be classified in 3 categories:

1. the *official state statistics* of entrepreneurship;
2. *non-state investigations* of entrepreneurship which include:
- monitoring researches;
- pilot researches;
- other non-state investigations.
3. *public opinion studies* of entrepreneurship.

The official state statistics (especially the annual collection "Small Entrepreneurship in Russia" by the Federal State Statistics Service) is analyzed as a separate type because this source of information is very important in every country.

Monitoring and pilot researches of entrepreneurship are made by different centers and their customers are entrepreneurial organizations, state agencies or scientific institutes.

Public opinion studies are surveys in which Russians are questioned about their own opinion of various issues (sometimes several questions are about entrepreneurship).

The official state statistics of entrepreneurship

The official state statistics of entrepreneurship is published in the annual collection "Small Entrepreneurship in Russia" by the Federal State Statistics Service[3]. For preparing this collection, small businesses, peasant (farm) enterprises, individual entrepreneurs and households are studied.

Small businesses are investigated for collecting the data of economic situation and for prognostic possibilities. The aims of studying individual entrepreneurs and households are to determine the level of people's welfare, to get information for the Consumer Price Index and for the National Economic Accounting.

[3] Its editions of 2001-2007 are accessible on the official web-site of the Federal State Statistics Service (www.gks.ru).

Small businesses are questioned quarterly. The sample is random with the size of more than 2000 units. Peasant (farm) enterprises are studied annually. The sample is mechanical. There is also a big research of individual entrepreneurs and households with the sample size of 49.2 thousand units. They are questioned quarterly. The sample is random and two-stage.

So the official state statistics provides with a lot of quantitative information but its main disadvantage is the lack of the data of informal activity in the sector of small entrepreneurship.

Non-state investigations of entrepreneurship

We will start with the description of **monitoring researches**.

Main monitoring researches of people's entrepreneurial activity were made or ordered in the last years by the following organizations:

1. the Centre for Economic and Financial Research;
2. the National Institute of Systemic Researches of Entrepreneurship Problems;
3. the Russian Public Organization of Entrepreneurship "OPORA Rossii";
4. the World Bank.

Since 2001 the National Institute of Systemic Researches of Entrepreneurship Problems has been conducting the project "The Monitoring of the Development of Small Entrepreneurship in Russian Regions"[4]. Informational papers about the development of small entrepreneurship in Russia, in different federal districts and in Russian regions are quarterly published. The basis of this analysis is the official state statistics which is collected by the Federal State Statistics Service and the Federal Tax Service. So this information is also quantitative and provides with economic figures.

Since 2002 the Centre for Economic and Financial Research has been realizing the project "The Monitoring of Administrative Barriers of the Development of Small Enterprises"[5] which evaluates the results of the state policy of the economic deregulation. The aims of this policy are to simplify the procedures and to reduce companies' costs which they have while getting licenses, certifications, etc. and working with different inspections. The results of the research give a possibility to compare current situation with the previous one (in 2001 some new laws were introduced). This study is also useful for analyzing the business atmosphere in Russia.

Since 2004 the World Bank has been conducting the project "Doing Business"[6] which is concerned with business regulation too. It is possible to compare its results for Russia with the findings in other countries as this research is made in 181 countries. The investigation focuses on registration of business, employment, crediting, tax issues, long distance trade, infrastructure, etc.

Since 2005 "OPORA Rossii" annually conducts the research "Conditions and factors of the development of small business in Russian regions"[7]. Its goal is to study

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[4] Analytical reports of 2001-2007 are accessible on the official web-site of the National Institute of Systemic Researches of Entrepreneurship Problems (www.nisse.ru).

[5] Analytical reports of 2002-2007 are accessible on the official web-site of the Centre for Economic and Financial Research (www.cefir.ru).

[6] Analytical reports of 2004-2008 are accessible on the official web-site of the project (www.doingbusiness.org).

[7] Analytical reports of 2005-2006 are accessible on the official web-site of the OPORA Rossii

the conditions for small business in Russian regions. The project is aimed to put the attention of the government of all levels to the problems or entrepreneurs in Russia in the whole as well as in different regions. Owners and upper-managers are questioned; the results and conclusions are based on the opinions of the members of small entrepreneurship community.

Between 2002 and 2005 the Centre for Economic and Financial Research also hold the research “Entrepreneurial activity in Russia”[8] aimed to study the reasons for differences in the level of entrepreneurial activity in different countries. There were five factors under consideration: financial factors, state economic policy and institutions, cultural factors and factors concerned with economic environment. The analysis of households, legislation base, laws in different levels of government were used in the study.

Pilot research studies

The most well-known research projects of entrepreneurial activities were held (or ordered) by following organizations:

1. the National Institute of Systemic Researches of Entrepreneurship Problems;
2. the Russian Public Organization of Entrepreneurship “OPORA Rossii”;

In 2003 “OPORA Rossii” conducted the research “The estimation of the conditions of entrepreneurial activity and the effectiveness of state support of small business”[9] to find out and estimate separate factors of state governance and support, which are basic for shaping the conditions for existence and development of small and middle business in Russia. The study analyzed the situation in 34 Russian regions. 247 firms with different forms of ownership and entrepreneurs were questioned.

In 2004 “OPORA Rossii” conducted the research “Rating map of the violence of the entrepreneurs’ rights in Russian regions”. The rating was based on indirect figures such as infringements during work check-ups, time and money costs connected to overcoming administrative barriers, and entrepreneurs’ estimation of local authorities’ activities. There were 2709 questionnaires gathered, the research was hold in 48 regions.

In 2006 National Institute of Systemic Researches of Entrepreneurship Problems conducted the research “The estimation of the share of shady turnover in small entrepreneurship and the preparation of suggestions of its reduce in the context of tax-policy, policy if deregulation and reduce of the level of corruption”. There were two tasks: to analyze the factors that make small entrepreneurs to become “shady” and to analyze existing methods of estimation of share of small business in “shade” and to find out some figures that can help to make this estimation more realistic.

There were also been held several projects by National Institute of Systemic Researches of Entrepreneurship Problems in regions: “Working out the complex of organizational-legislative measures for small entrepreneurship development in the sphere of housing and communal services in Moscow”(2004) and “The analysis of

(www.opora.ru).

[8] Analytical reports of 2002-2005 are accessible on the official web-site of the Centre for Economic and Financial Research (http://www.cefir.ru/index.php?l=rus&id=82)

[9] Analytical report is accessible on the official web-site of OPORA Rossii (www.opora.ru).

state and perspective of development of small entrepreneurship in Tver region" (2003).[10]

The results of these research projects give the ability to characterize some problems of development and institutional restrictions of small business, but they don't give the ability to estimate the entrepreneurial potential of Russia. Their methods are usually unique and the results can't be compared with each other and other international research results. The unit of observation is usually a firm, not individual entrepreneur.

Other non-state research projects

The most important non-state research projects that touch upon the problems of entrepreneurial activities of the population are:

- "Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey" – RLMS[11];
- "National inquiry into welfare and participation of the population in social programs"[12]

Since 1992 RLMS is conducted to study social-economic figures of income structure of the population, welfare, education, migration etc, including ones that aren't gathered by state statistics, but are necessary for analysis. The sample includes the respondents from 38 Russian regions, 4500 households are questioned.

These research projects include some questions connected with entrepreneurial activities of the population. They help to estimate the scale of entrepreneurial activities (the number of entrepreneurs, their consumption strategies etc.), but they also don't touch upon the problem of entrepreneurial potential in Russia.

Public-opinion studies

Main public-opinion questionings in Russia in the past years were conducted by following organizations:

1. Russian Public Opinion Research Centre,
2. Fund "Public Opinion",
3. Analytical centre by Yuri Levada (Levada-centre).

In numerous questionings of the organizations listed above sometimes can be seen the questions about the scale of entrepreneurial activity, about the attitude of the population toward the entrepreneurship, about entrepreneurial potential of Russian society. But the collected data is too fragmentary, the questions are changing very fast, that doesn't give the ability to analyze the dynamics and the unique Russian methodology is used that also exclude the ability to compare the results with other countries.

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[10] The report by O. Shestoperov on the results of the research is accessible on the NISSE web-site http://www.nisse.ru/presentations/pr10.ppt)

[11] On the official web-site (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms) wide range of materials on the results and methodology can be found

[12] On the World Bank official web-site (www.worldbank.org.ru) all the information about the research, including database, can be found

Conclusion

We've described the main theoretical assumptions and the main Russian researches. First of all, the most widely studied theme is the influence of environmental factors on entrepreneurial activities. Maybe the reason for it is the fact that the environment can be influenced by state policy and some organizations. So the results of such research activities can be put into practice and are the most useful.

As regards the definition of entrepreneur and the typical traits, there are almost no research activities in this sphere. And the characteristic of the ventures are touch upon mostly with the connections with innovations. Maybe it can be also explained by the fact that innovation seems the most profitable and as a result the most interesting research field.

Merculova Anna, Merculova Vera

Entrepreneurship - male or female work. Gender structure of entrepreneurship in Russia and Sweden

Abstract

Gender is a factor that can influence people's behavior in different spheres. The question is whether becoming the entrepreneur also depends on gender. Using the data of Global Entrepreneurship Monitor authors try to answer this question comparing two countries – Russia and Sweden.

Keywords: gender structure of entrepreneurship, motivation of entrepreneurs, age structure of entrepreneurship

Introduction

Entrepreneurship is often defined as any form of economic and social activity to create and manage new business, including self-employment. There are a lot of structural elements and characteristics of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial environment: motivation of entrepreneurs to start their own business, gender and demographical structure, socio-economical conditions of functionality entrepreneurs, death rate of business etc.

The ratio "male:female" entrepreneurs is often used as an integral index of economic liberation and maturity of a society as well as important indicator of the entrepreneurship framework conditions.

In different countries one might find quite different share of women engaged in entrepreneurship. In the following presentation we will compare the gender structure in Russia and Sweden, based on the data of **Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)**. **GEM** is a recognized longitudinal international project on the state of entrepreneurial activity of population and it's impact on economic growth.

Now let's view basic definitions of our presentation. First, **gender** is a set of socio-cultural characteristics and roles which let us make differences between man and woman. Second, **gender structure** is a structure of roles, actions, attitudes and socio-cultural characteristics of man and woman in a society. Third, **entrepreneur** is a person, who has some resources – material and human – which he uses to combine to achieve certain goals, well aware of risks of such an activity.

Gender structure of entrepreneurship in Russia and Sweden

We will make comparison of gender structure of entrepreneurs in Russia and Sweden based on GEM Global Women's Report 2007 and GEM Executive Report 2007. Through this compare we want realize how gender structures differ from each other and where they are similar. After analyzing our date we make some hypotheses about reasons and characteristics, which determined the similarity and the difference.

In 2007 GEM divides countries into two low/middle-income groups – Europe/Asia low/middle-income group and Caribbean/Latin America low/middle-income group – and one high-income group based upon their GDP and global region. Russia ascribes to Europe/Asia group, whereas Sweden – to high-income group. On average low/middle-income countries have modest per capita income and faster growing economies compared to high-income ones.

First, we consider rate of entrepreneurial activity in Russia and Sweden by gender, using date of GEM Global Women's Report 2007.

Table 1

Prevalence rates of entrepreneurial activity across countries by gender.

Stages of entrepreneurship	Sweden		Russia	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Early stage entrepreneurial activity *(Nascent + New)*	5,78%	2,47%	3,79%	1,64%
Established business owners	6,87%	2,48%	1,63%	1,73%
Overall Business owners *(Nascent + New + Established)*	12,65%	4,95%	5,41%	3,37%

According to quote date observed similarity in early stage of entrepreneurship and stage of overall business owners: male entrepreneurial activity in both countries exceed female's one. Differences we can see in stage of established business owners – Russian women are more active than Russian men, while in Sweden situation the same as another stages of entrepreneurship. Date also show that both genders in Sweden demonstrate higher level of entrepreneurial activity, than men and women in Russia do.

Table 2

Ratio of opportunity to necessity early stage entrepreneurship by country gender[1]

Ratio opportunity to necessity	Sweden	Russia
Male opportunity to necessity ratio	6,00	4,66
Female opportunity to necessity ratio	2,93	1,54

Ratio "opportunity:necessity" represent ratio of entrepreneurs which starting their own business at will to entrepreneurs who begin business necessarily. The higher this ratio the more entrepreneurs are motivated by the desire to take advantage using different opportunities. Correspondingly country with high ratio of opportunity to necessary entrepreneurs has more right motivated entrepreneurs. The data show that situation is similar to both countries: men are often than women voluntarily start-up theirs own business, because of they want to embody some project or idea, whereas most of women initiate business of necessity.

[1] GEM Global Women Report 2007 p. 20

Table 3

Early stage entrepreneurial activity by gender for different ages[2]

Age	Sweden		Russia	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
18 - 34 years	9,3%	5,2%	10%	4,2%
35 - 44 years	9,7%	5,5%	10,5%	5%
55 - 64 years	6,5%	3,4%	5,8%	2,8%

In Sweden, men are about twice as likely as women involved in early-stage entrepreneurial activity. In Russia the gender gap is even more pronounced: men are 2,3 times as likely to be early-stage entrepreneurs as women. So, in Russia and Sweden there are big gap between men's and women's involvement into early-stage entrepreneurial activity.

Swedish women are more active in all ages from 18 to 64 than Russian women are. As for men satiation is similar to women's in old ages, 55-64 years, and opposite in young and average ages – Russian men exceed Swedish in starting business activity. This date correspond to fact of more rapid entrepreneurial growth in low/middle-income countries groups (Russia) comparing with high-income countries group (Sweden).

Table 4

Age distribution of women entrepreneurs by country groups and business stage[3]

Age	Early entrepreneurship Stage		Established business ownerships	
	High-income countries (Sweden)	Low/Middle-income countries(Russia)	High-income countries (Sweden)	Low/Middle-income countries(Russia)
18-24 years	2,5%	8,7%	0,5%	1,0%
25-34 years	6,4%	10%	2,4%	4,3%
35-44 years	5,5%	8,8%	4,7%	5,8%
45-54 years	4,1%	6,2%	4,9%	6,8%
55-64 years	2,3%	2,8%	4,0%	4,4%

The GEM 2007 data confirm results found in the past and reveal that patterns in entrepreneurial activity do not vary greatly from country to country with respect to age. Further, the pattern of age distribution of men and women entrepreneurs is similar

2 GEM Global Executive Report 2007 p. 23

3 GEM Global Women Report 2007 p.28

and comparable regardless of country or stage of entrepreneurship. We have no date about exactly Russia and Sweden, but have date about groups of countries, so can compare them.

Table 4 shows female entrepreneurial prevalence rates by age groups and stage of entrepreneurship in the Sweden and Russia. In Russia, women are most likely to be early stage entrepreneurs between the ages of 25 to 34, and to become established business owners between the ages of 35 to 54. In Sweden, most women became entrepreneurs in 25 - 34 years, and from 45 to 54, they grow to business owners. So, in both countries women prefer to star business from 25 to 34, and became business owners in 45-54years. Moreover we can observe Russian women are more active in starting and owning business, than Swedish women.

Hypotheses

Russia and Sweden have different gender gap in sphere of entrepreneurship. We can do some supposes about why it so and what factors influence on entrepreneurial gender structure in both countries.

All stages of entrepreneurship characterized by higher level of activity of Swedish men and women comparing with Russian ones. We can explain by some versions.

First, Russia for a long period of time – Soviet Union – has no market system and entrepreneurship. Then after it collapse Russian market formed, was developing of entrepreneurship and foundation of new political, social and legal norms. These important society systems formed with difficulties and may be go on developing to present days, so today in Russian has a lot of gaps in her market and not in full measure suitable for entrepreneur socio-economical and legal conditions.

Second version, is that Sweden as developed country has effective economic, social and legal system for starting and owning business. Moreover, Swedish Government provides great support to women-entrepreneurs: special additional education, developing programs and conferences. In Swedish situation for entrepreneur in much more stable for entrepreneurs, for both men and women – they can not only great opportunities, for example to work part time in business sphere, to initiate business, but also to realize it. In Russia both male and female entrepreneurship have no government support, proper education and stability, consequently Russia has such rations.

We can observe in Russia low level of entrepreneurial female activity comparing with Russian men and both Swedish genders. Russian women truly less involved in business than Swedish ones and than Russian men, what can be explained by three factors - bigger amount of opportunities for women in Sweden and possibility to realize it, also different systems of attitudes and stereotypes, loss Russian women when entrepreneurship formed in Russia.

Swedish women have equal rights with Swedish men not only in paper, but also in reality. Sweden is Scandinavian developed countries, it has long story of feminine fight from equality of rights. Swedish society almost has no stereotypes about women entrepreneurs and has positive attitude to business women, which is differ from Russian attitude. In Russian Federation entrepreneurship to present days consider male work. There was no such zoom feminine movement in our country and in fact our women have no equal rights with men.

Third, we can suppose that women in Russia are less active, than men, because of unequal distribution of property. After collapse of USSR was privatization of property, and the way of privatization help to men to take a lot of business into their own property, and women have no opportunities to have it. Absents of property prevent from tacking credits, so, historically, women have less comfortable conditions in starting their own business.

Age structure of early entrepreneurship is very different: in Sweden older cohorts prevail while in Russia younger cohorts prevalent. As is customary in Sweden first get high education, and then work to profession, getting experience. Business education in Sweden starts in old ages; accordingly people initiate their own business in older cohorts. Russian society meanwhile has no such traditions in opening business, and Russian people can do it at once after graduating from university.

Corporate Governance

Olga Melitonyan, Israel Mensah

Introduction by the group academic advisor

Issues of corporate governance, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate culture become even more essential in the current situation of a global crisis. To a general belief of many economists it will result in structural changes both for the global economic system and national economies all over the world. What began as a crisis for individual markets and institutions has now undermined the foundations of the entire global financial system. Unlike in the wake of earlier crises in the post-war period, the world economy and its markets will not resume their former pattern.

John Maynard Keynes said, "When facts change, I change my mind". Economic systems and institutions should look beyond mere survival mode, accept that the facts have changed and focus on working out a sustainable competitive strategy in the newly emerging environment. They must deal with the same group of stakeholders, i.e. business, governments and civil society, which are also trying to adjust themselves, their interests and activities to the new "rules of the game". Meanwhile, all these actors follow different approaches in their attempt to resolve social, economic and cultural problems of countries and regions. In this situation the on-going dialog and systematized interaction between them becomes essential.

Russia is not an exception. It is obvious that current principles of how the economic system is functioning and how it is influenced and determined by various groups of stakeholders will inevitably change, and the on-going crisis brings the horizon of this change as close as it ever could be.

The essays presented in this section got their subjects, structures and key ideas long before the first glimpses of the crisis. But their authors unwillingly touched three areas that now are put to considerable changes in Russia. Tatiana Milacheva, a student of the HSE Journalism Faculty, presents an interesting research of strategies that various groups of investors use working on the Russian media-market. The paper is mostly focused on the activities of foreign investors in Russia, their business opportunities and risks. Tatiana makes a good update of her research data using recent reports on how global crisis has influenced investment activity in our country and in its media-industry.

The HSE Public Policy Department's candidate student Alena Filyushina focused her research on the issues of interaction of big businesses and regional administrations in the context of attracting investments to regions and strengthening their competitiveness. She participated in a regional consulting project and most of the data she used for putting together a paper, is received from personal interviews with companies' and authorities' representatives and practical surveys. The research, although it is not updated in accordance to the on-going economic and structural changes and does not provide any prognosis, is quite interesting in a sense that it gives a good description of the business-government relations that existed in many Russian regions.

Another paper of the section is written by Vsevolod Sharov, a graduate of the State University of Management in Moscow. He makes an attempt to build an integral indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of a company's Executive board. It is quite possible that such an indicator will become important for companies put to serious management changes or an owner's change. Many recent articles and publications in Russian and Western academic communities were focused on issues of corporate governance and how they were influenced by global bankruptcies and poor companies' management under the conditions of the crisis. Vsevolod Sharov's paper provides us with one practical tool to assess these factors.

Tatiana Milacheva

Strategies of Foreign Investors on the Russian Media-market

Introduction

Media-business in Russia develops rapidly, approaching the Western standards. There is a considerable growth of investments in last years. Year after year the Russian market of mass-media becomes more attractive for investors both Russian and foreign.

Regardless of the financial crisis this topic is essential. Hypothesis of this research includes two positions. First, the author of the paper supposes that strategic investors and media holding companies more then other groups of investors are interested in the Russian media business. Second, it is necessary to verify that foreign investors especially in times of financial crisis choose cautious strategies.

The object of this research is foreign investors interested in the Russian media-industry, its subject includes strategies used by foreign investors in Russia.

Methods of the research combine analysis of the theory, documents dedicated to strategies of foreign investors and a survey of media specialists' opinions.

Theoretical basis of this scientific work includes investment theory, media economics and elements of the investment management.

Unfortunately, there are not many papers and fundamental works, describing contemporary situation in the Russian media business. It is possible to get precise information about large-scale deals in the analytical reports and such business media like "Rbc Daily", "Kommersant", "Vedomosti" and some others. Attention was paid to the statistical data collection. An expert questionnaire was formed on the basis of all these texts.

Determinations of "foreign investments" and "foreign investors" are in the theoretical part of the work. Also the author of the work considers the classification of foreign investors and investment strategies which they used.

The author draws attention to the investment theory related to media. There are special features of media-business. Many rules which work in different economic sectors can not be used in the media-business, because of some additional factors.

For goals of the work it is necessary to observe investment tendencies and reveal biggest players in the field. It was important to analyze positive and negative sides of this topic, to study legislation and possible restrictions for foreign investments. The author will make conclusions on the basis of financial reports, official information from the web-sites, companies` documentation and results of the expert survey.

1.1 Types of foreign investment and investors

The word "investment" can be defined in many ways according to different theories and principles. In economics, investment is the production of goods in a certain period of time, which are not consumed but are to be used for future production. According to the Business dictionary, finance professionals define an investment as money utilized for buying financial assets, for example stocks, bonds, real properties, and precious items[54].

There are several categories of investors: portfolio investors and strategic (direct) investors. In economics and finance, portfolio investment represents passive ownership of securities such as foreign stocks, bonds, or other financial assets. Strategic, or direct, investor has an investment of 10 percent or more in an enterprise with the capital divided on shares (that is, a subsidiary, associate or branch) and operating in an economy other than the one in which the direct investor resides. In this work we mean that direct investors are strategic. Strategic investor is an individual or firm that adds value to the money it invests with its contacts, experience, and knowledge of market thus brightening the invitee's prospects for additional investment and success[55].

According to the Federal law "Foreign investments into the Russian Federation" (with changes from the 8th December, 2003), the foreign investor - is a legal foreign person, the foreign organization, the foreign citizen, the person without citizenship, the international organization which have the right to invest on a territory of the Russian Federation according to the order defined by federal laws where they live or have been founded.

In this work the author divides foreign investors in the following way:

- individuals;
- private companies of industrial sector and services;
- state companies of industrial sector and services;
- media holdings;
- private companies of banking and financial sector;
- state companies of banking and financial sector;
- the nonprofit organizations.

To avoid the ambiguity it is necessary to comment the investors' classification. Individual is a citizen participating in the economic activity. In most cases he/she invests money (savings) in securities, for the purpose of getting benefit (income).

Investments can be divided in private and state according to the source of money origin. Private investments are given by the private companies and citizens of one country to economic agents of the other country.

The author of the paper pays special attention to companies of banking and financial sector and also companies of industrial sector and services.

There is no unified opinion among experts about the place that media holdings occupy in this list. So, in this paper it is decided to distinguish media companies from any others.

The state investments (or official) include money from the state budget which go abroad according to the decisions of the governments or the intergovernmental organizations. In this work considered two types of the state investors: the state companies of bank and financial sector and the state companies of real sector and services.

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[54] BusinessDictionary.com strategic investor is..

http://www.finance.mapsofworld.com/investment/meaning.html

The special type of investors are nonprofit organizations (NPO). Whereas for-profit corporations exist to earn and distribute taxable business earnings to shareholders, the nonprofit corporations exist for providing programs and services to the public.

It is important to remind that in Russia legislative restrictions for foreign investments amount 50 % of the company's authorized capital stock. According to the 19th item of the "Law in mass-media" of the Russian Federation foreign individuals do not have the right to establish organizations carrying out telecasting, which "zones cover a half or more than a half of regions of the Russian Federation, or a territory on which a half or more than a half of population of the Russian Federation" lives.

Investors which are going to work in the Russian media-industry could meet some obstacles caused by specific characteristics of media products. These are the double nature of mass-media product, competition for advertising, audience's money and time. It is important to notice that the media company's value is partially defined by ability to make profit. As E. Vartanova marks in her book "Media economics in the foreign countries", "mass-media is not only a business sphere, it is also an important public institute. The economic value of it can be defined by its ability to exert influence on the political and public life of the society".

In summary, it is important to say that the demand for media products forms as a result of many factors' influence, and economic reasons not always play the main role.

1.2 Types of strategies and tactics used by foreign investors

Investment strategy is a plan, which an investor is following in order to make profits and to achieve financial stability. Based on this investment strategy the investor identifies areas where money can be invested safely and will bring maximum profits.

There are several strategies classified according to the types of investment behavior. Conservative strategy is common for investors interested in the risk minimization and in the stable income in a long period of time. Dividends, or percentage payments, are preferable in this case. Aggressive strategy presumes investing in highly remunerative, but risky assets. A combined strategy includes best features of the aggressive and conservative approaches. It provides higher income than in case of a conservative strategy, with lower risks, than in case of an aggressive strategy.

Investors reach their goals by means of certain tactics which are applicable in a short-term period. The tactics of "urgent investments" means that the investor should enter the media business or to increase already existing investments as soon as possible. The income prognozed to be high enough under these conditions. The tactics of "planned investments' continuation" means that volumes of investments in this case remains at a former level, without change. The tactics of "gradually reduction of the investments' volume" presumes that the investor reduces planned level of investments without leaving the business. The tactics of "stop investments" means that the media asset is no longer interesting for the investor, its profitability has considerably decreased, or risks exceed possible benefits.

2.1 Biggest players in the Russian media-business. Basic trends.

From the expert survey it becomes clear what attitudes foreign investors have about the Russian media business. In many cases foreign individuals own shares of the

Russian media companies through foreign companies. Exception to this rule is CTC media. After the IPO 25% shares of this company are traded at the NASDAQ stock exchange. The situation is described at Scheme 1.

Scheme 1. Foreign individuals in the Russian media-business

The Russian media company X, n% of which belongs to the foreign company Y	=>	The foreign company Y which shares are traded at the stock exchange	=>	The individual who has bought shares of the company Y at a stock exchange

The companies of banking and financial sector own shares of the Russian media companies through the branch establishments as shown at Scheme 2.

Scheme 2. The companies of banking and financial sector in the Russian media-business

The Russian media company X which has borrowed money at the branch of the foreign bank Z	=>	Russian branch of the bank Z	=>	Bank Z

For example, Unicredit Securities own about 17 % of RBC media – holding's shares. Company Unicredit Securities (earlier "UniKredit Aton") is a part of the international financial group UniCredit Group; it works in the area of financial services and products for institutional investors.

The companies of industrial sector and services are potential investors in the media sphere. However, after the analysis of media market it becomes clear that in most cases investors prefer to work with companies engaged in similar kinds of business (related diversification of business). There are few cases when companies specializing in other areas pay attention to mass-media. Most investors, as a rule, are media holdings.

The expert survey showed that state companies of industrial sector and services and state companies of banking and financial sector do not direct considerable investments into the Russian media business.

The NPO can not be investors in the true sense of this word because they initially should not be interested in commercial profit. They can give grants for creation and development of different mass-media entities reflecting the needs of society. Usually these are small magazines and the Internet - media. Foreign NPO could promote democracy, civil society, social activities, initiatives and so on.

The largest and the most significant block of investors are media holdings which usually have significant portions of Russian media companies.

The table "Largest investors in the Russian media business" allows to reveal the most significant players in this field. After the analysis of numerous official reports for shareholders, press releases, analytical reports, the author of the work managed to classify countries in which investors work, media assets in which they invest; spheres of interests, assets in Russia and time period of their activities' start in Russia.

Table №1. Largest investors in the Russian media business

The investor / The country	**Number of countries where investor works / Number of its media assets**	**Investor's basic spheres of interests**	**Year of activities' start in Russia/ Significant assets in Russia**
Conde Nast, USA	15/74 magazines	Glossy magazines	1998/ Publishing House Conde Nast: Magazines: "Vogue", "GQ", "Glamour", "Architectural Digest"/AD
Hachette Filipacchi Medias, France	40/262 magazines and newspapers	Glossy magazines	1995/ Publishing House Hachette Filipacchi Shkulev: "Elle", "Marie Claire", "Maxim", "Psychologies", "Elle Girl", "Elle Décor", "Psychologies"
Sanoma WSOY, Финлянди я	13/300 magazines and newspapers	Publication and distribution of periodicals	1995/ Publishing House Independent Media: Magazines for women: "Cosmopolitan", "Harper's Bazaar", "Seasons", "Yoga Journal", "Gloria"; Magazines for men; "Men's Health", "Esquire", Business Magazines: "Agrobusiness", "Harvard Business Review", "Novy sadovod i Fermer", "SmartMoney Newspapers: "The Moscow Times", "The St. Petersburg Times", "Vedomosti", "Na Roublevke"; Publishing House: "Alpina Business Books"

Hubert Burda Media/ Germany	More then 30/262 magazines	Magazines	1987/ Publishing House Burda. Female editions: “Liza”, “Mini”, “JOY”, “Girl”, “Madame Figaro”, “Oops!” Man's editions: “Chip”, “Playboy”, “Quattroruote”, “Auto world”. Thematic: “Dobrie sovety”, “Moi prekrasnyi sad”, “Moi rebenok”. Entertaining editions: “Dasha, dobrye sovety”
Trader Media East, Nitherlands 67% shares quoted at LSE bought by Turkish Hurriyet Invest BV (Dogan Yayin Holding)	8/256 magazines and newspapers	Internet and classified advertising	1996/ Publishing House “Pronto-Moscow”: Newspaper “Iz ryk v ryki”, Magazines “Optovik”, “Auto”, “Rabota segodnya”. Internet web-sites: www.job.ru, www.job-today.ru
Edipresse Group, Switzerland	15/200 magazines	Female magazines. Editions on knitting, needlework and sewing, b2b editions in the field of the fashion industry.	2003/ Publishing House Edipresse-Konliga ZAO (85,4%) “Samaya”, “Sabrina”, “Mama, eto –ya”, “Stilnye pricheski”, “Viva”, “Rysskoe iskysstvo”, “Kollekciya idey”, “Diana creative”, “Lubimaya dacha”.
Modern Times Group, , Sweden	29/ more then 50 channels, 9 radio networks (Radio MTG), 7 internet-portals	Free and pay TV, radio	2006/ CTC Media (39,5%) (TV channels: “Domashny”, “CTC”

RTL Group, Германи	10/38 TV channels, 32 radio stations	Production TV and radio-content	2005/ TV channel Ren TV (30% shares) Content Union S.A. (50% shares): thematic chanels: Russkiy Illusion (Russian movies), Illusion Plus (international classic movies), Detskiy (a children's channel) and Zoo Park (an animal channel).
«Naspers Limited», South African Republic	50/15 Internet portals, 7 paid channels, 4 newspapers	Electronic mass-media, including paid TV, Internet-services and services in accompanying technologies. Printing mass-media (including publishing, distribution and the press of magazines, newspapers and books).	Internet-portal Mail.ru, (30%)
Viacom Inc., USA	More then160/ 145 TV channels	Cable and satellite television networks (MTV Networks and BET),film production and distribution (Paramount Pictures and Dreamworks).	1998/ TV channels "MTV Russia" и "VH1 Russia"
A-Pressen, Norway	2/ 52 newspapers, 48 interactive newspapers, 9 TV channels, 30 radio stations, 48 portals,13 printing houses	Publishing and polygraphic directions, TV and Electronic news media	2002/ Till August, 2007 it owned 25 % shares + one share in the Publishing house "The Komsomolskaya Pravda" (newspapers "Komsomolskaya Pravda", "Sovietsky sport" and "Express newspaper". 6 Russian printing houses

Bonnier Group, Sweden	25/ Newspapers, television, magazines, radio actives, film studios and sound recording companies	Business Press (publishing house of the business press), Newspapers (publishing house of newspapers), Books (publishing house of books), Magazines (publishing house of magazines), Entertainment production and Business Information	1993/ Publishing House "Bonnier Business Press": Newspaper "Delovoy Peterburg", "Business-Afisha", "Byhgalterskye vesti", "Restorannyi alfavit", Internet portals: dpmoney.ru (till May 2009), DP.ru

Here is a short description of the most important companies involved in the Russian media business. Foreign founders and companies or legal entities registered in Russia with foreign capital successfully work in a magazine industry. They produce Russian versions of popular glossy magazines. One of the brightest representative in this group is a publishing house «Independent Media», founded by Dutch journalists in 1994. It has become the first foreign company in Russia with a license on magazines` publication. Independent Media has present women glossy magazine "Cosmopolitan" and such international editions as "Harper's Bazaar", "Marie Claire" and others. In 2005 Dutch shareholders of Independent Media announced about the purchase of this publishing house by Sanoma Magazines International B.V. (SMI), a part of the Finnish media-holding SanomaWSOY. Sanoma Magazines International (SMI) is responsible for Sanoma Magazines' activities in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Throughout this region Sanoma Magazines International has created a platform for geographical expansion. SMI´s objective is to become a leader in the segment of consumer magazines. Sanoma WSOY was aspired to enter the Russian media business and to increase profits of the group, when the Russian market was actively developing. According to experts, it is much better to buy an already existing promising business unit in a country and pay a considerable market price, then to establish it from scratch.

American corporation Story First Communications, the founder of media holding "TV Alpha" has played an important role in the development of the Russian media business. The company founded by Peter Gervi, became the largest western investor in the Russian TV industry, broadcasting and Internet technologies. Among Story First Communications`s successful projects are radio "Maximum" founded in 1991 and television channel "CTC", first aired in 1996. Channel CTC is similar to the European and American channels such as Pro7, Sat1, Fox, M6. Story First Communications` strategy includes building local television broadcasting stations, expanding the national broadcasting network and creating domestic high-quality original programs.

Swedish company Modern Times Group (MTG) became the next owner of TV channel CTC. It has a monopoly for public TV in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. In the end of the 1990s this media-holding bought different media assets, including newspaper Metro and TV channel – Viasat. MTG`s strategy includes development of the fast-growing markets, the company often interacts with local monopolists.

According to the table "Largest investors in the Russian media business", investors paid special attention to a magazine sector. This media sector requires significant investments and is appropriate to middle and large investors. Thematic magazines allow to exert targeted influence on audience.

The competition in the field of glossy magazines and quality newspapers is quite high. It is necessary to offer new models of development, because Russian versions of popular and world-famous editions are already available to the audience. According to the table, the biggest players in Russia are representatives of the Scandinavian countries and the USA.

2.2 Strategies used by foreign investors in the Russian media business

In an expert survey one of the questions has been directed to the description of investors` interest in the Russian media business. It is necessary to understand that interest means not only the fact of shares' possession, it includes also investment intentions and plans. Financial crisis has considerably reduced interest to the Russian mass-media.

Media-experts have estimated degree of interest using a 10-mark scale. The greatest degree of interest was demonstrated by media holdings (from 7,5 to 10), and when the financial crisis has come there was a significant decrease of it (to 5,9). The most considerable fall of interest (from 2,5 to 0,8) is registered in case of companies of banking and financial sector that prove inability of many banks to give out credits which is caused by the financial crisis. Individuals lost their interest too (from 2,5 to 1,5). Negative tendency is registered for all groups of investors: companies of real sector and services (from 2,1 to 1), state companies (from 1,8 to 1,4). The interest of NPOs has decreased from 2,6 to 1,8 apart from the financial instability explained by changes in the Russian legislation regarding foreign grants.

Table 2

Level of the foreign investors' interest
in the Russian media business



Interest in the Russian media business is closely connected to strategies of foreign investors. One of the questions in the survey has been directed to the definition of foreign investors' behavior before and during the financial crisis. It is precisely clear that with the world financial crisis' come almost all investors switched on more conservative strategies, they are ready to reconcile with low, but stable incomes.

Investors also pay attention to the duration of work in the Russian media business. Portfolio investors in most cases use the strategy of "bought-and-hold". It is obvious that efficiency of this strategy depends on the difference between the shares` real and today's prices. So, portfolio investors now expect to hold shares approximately for five years; which will allow them to sell shares when the price will go up.

Companies of banking and financial sector more often prefer the short-term investment period (less then five years). It is more interesting for them to return money plus percentage as soon as possible. Though it does not mean that all banks want to get profit in a short period, the bank also can be the owner of the control package of shares.

Companies of industrial sector and services invest for the period of 7-10 years on average. Media holdings direct to Russia strategic investments and the investment period is measured in 10 years.

Under the conditions of crisis investors should be ready for long-term investments. There is a very low probability of short-term investments when most part of Russian media companies are up to mischief.

It is important to consider foreign investors' attitudes about different types of media assets. So, most part of large investors intends to continue planned investments in TV and the Internet-media. At the same time they would like to gradually reduce and even stop investing in press and radio.

In this situation an investment barrier for entering the Russian media business dropped significantly. Investments in TV main channels with the come of the financial crisis were reduced from 128 to 96 million dollars. The minimum level of investments for other media sectors has changed in the following way: the press (from 2,9 million. dollars to 50 thousand dollars), radio (from 7,3 to 2,7 million dollars), the Internet-media (from 80 to less than 30 thousand dollars). Injections of the foreign capital to the press were always more considerable than to the radio, but the general amount of these investments usually is less. Unfortunately, there are very few investors ready to increase their investments or to be engaged in new projects.

There are some specific features of the Russian media business. Minor investors prefer to work with newspapers. But there is a high probability of their bankruptcy and close accompanying all advantages. There are middle-sized investors which are ready to overcome all the technical and juridical barriers in the radio business.

The subject of special interest for big investors is television. There are excellent opportunities to get good revenues and to influence a large number of people. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account a serious control of the government.

Web-resources in Russia are evaluated cheaper than anywhere in the world in spite of a rapid development of the Internet. But this is a temporary tendency, because prices of Russian internet-portals have a rising trend.

It is important that the majority of foreign investors act as strategic ones. Therefore, such companies have an experience. It is a good opportunity to adopt foreign models of work and to raise quality of an information product of Russian companies. At the same time there is a danger that foreign investors can be biased.

They can control public opinion and to propagandize their own ideas.

It is easier and safer for media-company in Russia to be far from politics then to have a neutral position especially in case of holding a non-governmental channel with a considerable portion of foreign investments. For example, channels owned by CTC Media do not attract their viewers by political coverage. The CTC Network is oriented on entertainment programs for the whole family.

Conclusions

The author of the work on the basis of the numerous information sources and empirical data analysis made research confirming the initial hypotheses. Various types of investors are interested in the Russian media market. However strategic investors have the most serious plans for media assets. The biggest players are media holdings from the Scandinavian countries such as Sweden. Norway, Finland. USA and other European countries are on the 2nd position. They are ready to develop media products and to build new models of business, using Western standards adapted to the Russian conditions.

In spite of its active development the Russian media market represents certain risks for investors: restrictions at the legislative level, the state control, high probability of ruin. Because of it foreign investors choose more cautious business strategies. The majority of investors especially with the come of the financial crisis change their investment behavior on more conservative. They are ready to reconcile with low, but stable incomes. It is much less risky and less expensive for foreign investors to participate or purchase an existing fallen in price project, rather than to start it from scratch. At the same time the potential of the Russian media business remains high enough in the long-term prospect. But in a short run investors will try to save their assets. They will invest very cautiously and more often in the electronic mass-media. In the up-coming research works dedicated to this topic it will possible to find in which media assets foreign companies and individuals are aspired to invest.

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Alena Filyushina

Cooperation of a Big Investor and the Irkutsk Regional Administration in the Context of Attracting Investments to the Region

Introduction

As a new economic model is emerging across the country, the relationship between businesses and the state start to play an important and sometimes a crucial role in the development of corporations. Russia has many problems in this area, these problems reduce businesses' and government agencies' effectiveness, slow down the investment process. Furthermore, many Russian regions suffer from the lack of financial resources and administrative employees' qualification for self-dependant regional development and competent G2B[1] networking.

In this respect, the process of working out recommendations for the improvement of business-regional government interaction system is becoming quite important.

In this work, the author presents a specific example of cooperation between big business and regional authorities (the Irkutsk region). The output of the study are recommendations about the improvement process of the Irkutsk region's investment and innovation support system, formulated by the author while working in the project of "Scientific Grounds for Designing a Program of Economic Rehabilitation of the Irkutsk Region's Deprived Areas" as a member of a working group (see below, page 7).

Individual cases of G2B relations

In this part we will describe individual cases of G2B relations and define the level examined in the work. For this purpose, let us consider two illustrations. The simpler one is a matrix with levels of business presented vertically and levels of authorities presented horizontally (Table 1).

[1] Here and further in the text G2B an B2G are equally concerned as a bilateral interaction between government and business.

Table 1. Cases of G2B relations in Russia.

\authority business\	State government		Municipal government
	Federal level	Regional level	Local authority
Big business			
Small and medium business			

We have divided businesses into two levels – big businesses (so called business elites) and small and medium businesses (SMB). Such division – for two and not three levels, – is conditional upon two facts. The first one is Russian legislation, according to which small and medium businesses are regulated by the same law[2], and the second is the fact that in the process of interaction with the state authorities SMB face general problems that differ from the problems that big businesses face. Mechanisms and means of solving those problems are different as well[3].

As far as government authorities are concerned, marking out three levels is generally accepted. These are federal, regional and municipal levels (according to the Russian legislation, local authorities (municipal level) is not part of the state government).

The shaded zone shows the level of relationship examined in the work. These are relationship between big business and regional authorities.

The scheme on Picture 1 (page 5) is a more specified presentation of how and at which levels G2B relations can occur. There is also a specification of investments concept in terms of the examined subject.

Abbreviations on the Picture1:

CSR	Corporate social responsibility
HUI	Housing and utility infrastructure
NPO	Non-profit organization
PPP	Public private partnership
SMB	Small and medium business

2 The Federal Law on Small and Medium Enterprise Development NO. 209-FZ of Jule 24, 2007.

3See e.g. Perediriy Y.Y. Business subjects impact on policy decision making: benchmarking study of All-Russian and regional levels: master's thesis – Krasnodar, 2006.

Picture 1. Levels of consideration objects in the work



The examined levels of research objects are highlighted in grey on Picture 1. The considered kind of relationship is interaction, which in the work is understood as an equitable relationship without suppressing the interests of any party. The level of business is big business – a big investor that finances strategic enterprise in the Irkutsk region. The level of government authority is, consequently, the regional authority.

Finally, the type of investments is “investments in the regional economy with a town-forming enterprise”.

Process of Interaction of the Irkutsk Region’s Administration and a Big Investor

Let us follow with the analysis of an examined situation in the Irkutsk region. Here we will describe the process of G2B interaction by developing the “Scientific Grounds for Designing a Program of the Economic Rehabilitation of the Irkutsk Region’s Deprived Areas” which had to be taken as the basis for developing a “Complex Long-Run Socioeconomic Development Program” of the Irkutsk region.

For a long time Tulun hydrolysis plant (THP) was one of the key enterprises in the Irkutsk region. The factory's production was making up to 97% of the overall city industrial output[4]. In the late 90s the plant sank into degradation, was brought to stop due to its unprofitability and in March 2007 declared bankruptcy. On May 7th, 2007 the administration of the Irkutsk region and a non-profit organization “Fuel and Energy Corporation” (FEC) signed a protocol of intentions on the issue of developing a program of cooperation regarding the investment project’s implementation. The project presumed production of the ethanol fuel, heat and electrical power in the Irkutsk region. This protocol regards foremost to the THP. As it was mentioned at the meeting, the entity which is subject to insolvency proceedings is a town-forming enterprise of social significance[5].

On December 5th, 2007 FEC acquired THP for 49,5 million rubles by auction. The sold THP property consists of a hydrolysis plant, a carbon dioxide department, a mechanical repair department, a thermal power plant and an administration building[6].

The Administration of the Irkutsk region and FEC have also negotiated a contract under hand for developing a long-run socioeconomic development program for the Irkutsk region. In exchange for FEC’s investments and developing of THP the Administration of the Irkutsk region committed itself to considering FEC’s interests while working out a socio-economic development program, laying special emphasis on the THP as a strategic enterprise of the region.

Investor’s claims generally resulted in legislative preferences, tax incentives and other sanctions that would simplify industrial group’s activity within the Irkutsk region. For developing the “Scientific Grounds for Designing a Program of the Economic Rehabilitation of the Irkutsk Region’s Deprived Areas” specialists from a number of consulting companies were involved. The document was being developed in cooperation with FEC’s representatives, the governor of the Irkutsk region as well as the mayor of Tulun, as the new program would firstly affect the economic scheme of this city.

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[4] The Scientific Grounds for Designing a Program of the Economic Rehabilitation of the Irkutsk Region’s Deprived Areas // led by Mikheev V.V. // Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations Research Centre – Moscow, 2007.

[5] Nechaeva A. The project of ethanol fuel production has been considered in the Administration of Angara region // press service of the Governor Administration of Irkutsk region, May 8th, 2007.

[6] See, e.g: Shirokov A., Vorontsova D. Alcoholic business // Expert-Siberia №45(187), 3-9 December 2007; Former Tulun hydrolysis plant will be the first to produce biofuels in the Irkutsk region // The official site of RAO “Bumprom” www.bumprom.ru, March 20th, 2008.

The working group had to find the point of balance of interests, which was complicated by different points of view of the three parties involved and specifically by the conflict of interests between the Irkutsk regional administration and TEC on one side, and the mayor of Tulun on the other side. Furthermore, in the process of the Scientific Grounds' developing the 2005 on submission of the President Vladimir Putin, has signed a resignation[7]. Igor Esipovsky, a State Duma delegate and a former CEO of "AvtoVAZ", was appointed as a temporary Governor of the Irkutsk region[8]. This fact caused problems as well, as all the agreements were made with the former governor. Nevertheless, the Scientific Grounds were successfully developed. Unfortunately, this document has not transformed into the "Complex Long-Run Socioeconomic Development Program", as it should have been according to expectations. And this is an illustrative example of political factors' influence.

The following part of the work is devoted to the main developments in the field of the Irkutsk region's investment and innovation support system's improvement. Those recommendations bear specific character with emphasis on deprived areas maintenance.

Let us analyze current activities aimed at the Irkutsk region's investment and innovation supporting and point out problems that investors in Irkutsk region face.

Principles of Improvement of the Irkutsk Region's Investment and Innovation Support System

For purposes of the "Scientific Grounds for Designing a Program of the Economic Rehabilitation of the Irkutsk Region's Deprived Areas" a model of principles of the Irkutsk region's investment and innovation support system improvement was developed (Picture 2 omitted)[9]. This model was created on the basis of an existing project of the regional target program "Development of Investment Activity in the Irkutsk region for 2007-2009".

The structure of the Irkutsk region's investment and innovation support system is considered in the system Innovation development priorities – Organizational and financial support – Application possibilities. This system theoretically should be provided with legal regulation, municipal marketing and permanent monitoring, analysis and development.

Aspects that need a significant revision are written in italics:

innovation development priorities;

application possibilities;

analysis and system development;

legal regulation

[7] Irkutsk governor Alexander Tishanin has gathered in resignation // fin-rorex.com, April 4th, 2008; Kornya A., Glinkin M., Latukhina K. The first to step out // Vedomosti newspaper №61 (2083), April 4th, 2008.

[8] Deputy instead of governor // Rossiyskaya gazeta newspaper №4639, April 16th, 2008.

[9] Here we used workgroup's drafts of the "Scientific Grounds for Designing a Program of the Economic Rehabilitation of the Irkutsk Region's Deprived Areas" (Moscow, 2007), not added to the final version of the paper (author Alexey Tanikov).

Municipal marketing is partly described but also needs revision because in the above-mentioned program's project it does not currently reflect the specificity of the Irkutsk region's deprived areas.

SWOT-Analysis of the Irkutsk Region's Investment and Innovation Support System

Subsequent to the results of the SWOT-analysis of the Irkutsk region's investment and innovation support system, disadvantages and capabilities of this system were revealed.

Among disadvantages:

- insufficient development of the municipal marketing system;
- lack of focus on the specificity of the Irkutsk region's areas and on the global strategy of the region's marketing;
- low quality of suggested investment projects;
- low standard of basic production infrastructure (energy supply, heating, roads);
- lack of information available to potential investors regarding opportunities and advantages of investing in the Irkutsk region;
- lack of investments in high value-added production.

As far as opportunities are concerned, they are primarily relevant to:

- infrastructural elements of innovations' support;
- unused financial and land resources;
- good ratings of Standart&Poors and Expert RA.

Problems that Investors Face in the Irkutsk Region

Among the problems that investors face in the Irkutsk region the following are especially important[10]:

- lack of complex and system legislation on investment and innovation activities;
- low financial capability of budgets on all levels;
- limited budget resources for developing and supporting investments and innovations;
- absence of effective mechanisms of investors' remedy;
- instability, unpredictability and non-transparency of the activities of the Irkutsk region's governmental authorities in the sphere of investments, inconsistency of earlier made decisions's execution;
- weak practical work of regional authorities with investors;
- poorly explored federal and regional innovation policy;
- underdeveloped of the innovations' infrastructure;
- high expenses of the investment projects' realization;
- qualified work force drain and others.

[10] The Scientific Grounds for Designing a Program of the Economic Rehabilitation of the Irkutsk Region's Deprived Areas // led by Mikheev V.V. // Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations Research Centre – Moscow, 2007.

Based on the model of the Irkutsk region's investment and innovation support system analysis, after considering the results of the system SWOT-analysis and analyzing investors' problems, a number of recommendations were made. Those are general recommendations regarding the system's improvement, as well as special recommendations for protecting and stimulating investments in the Irkutsk region.

General Recommendations for the Improvement of the Irkutsk Region's Investment and Innovation Support System

1. General recommendations are usually resulted in:
2. development of an effective regional investment policy that should include main priorities of areas's investment development;
3. development of an adequate investment legislative basis at the regional level as well as at the municipal level with region's direct help and support;
4. creation of favorable conditions (special economic zones, investment climate support, tax incentives etc);
5. elimination of administrative barriers;
6. development of a constant dialog with business through establishing B2G network institutions;
7. comprehensive support of municipalities' initiatives concerning investment attraction etc.

Special Recommendations for Protecting and Stimulating Investments in the Irkutsk Region

Special recommendations related to the specificity of the Irkutsk region's deprived areas generally result in the need for complex development of a consistent legislative basis that should reflect investors' interests as well as socioeconomic and ecological aspects.

There should be a detailed preliminary analysis of the situation in the region. Investment legislative acts should be stable, but also flexible and adaptable enough to create no restrictions or barriers for investors. It should also ensure the transparency of investment sector of the region's economy.

Among practical instruments we should mention:

organizing an investment agency as an institute that

stimulates innovation activity;

attracts investments in innovation projects;

ensures innovation projects expertise (USA model of ARPA[11]);

facilitates the utilization of existing buildings, equipment (German model);

provides the work of innovative projects work;

determines personal responsibility of project managers for the result;

provides G2B networking system;

developing municipal marketing concept in accordance to the specificity of areas;

[11] the Advanced Research Projects Agency

developing a special legislative basis that should create investment incentives (temporary reduction of tax rates, normalizing property and land rights' documents etc.), its constant actualization;

providing high quality projects proposed;

quick reaction on investors' claims, providing a support needed etc.

Conclusions

If the given recommendations are fulfilled with the involvement of skilled experts and specialists, it is possible to achieve positive results for the region's economy, as well as for the corporations functioning on its territory. In this work we showed a positive example of how a corporation can lobby favorable conditions for itself by concluding a deal with the region's administration and, investing in its own business, as a result, the socioeconomic situation in the region has improved.

The developed recommendations can be used in other regions as well because most problems described are common for all territories of the Russian Federation. Such measures as creating an investment agency, developing a necessary infrastructure, constant maintenance of contact with potential and present investors at all stages of projects' implementation – can and should be used in all regions of Russia. This will improve the investment climate in the country and the activities' efficiency for most companies working in the Russian regions.

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Sharov Vsevolod

The Integral Indicator of the Executive Board's Effectiveness

Vsevolod Sharov is a graduate of the State University of Management, Moscow, and works as a business-consultant at the Premium Consulting, JSC. In 2007 V. Sharov participated as a leading expert in an annual project of the Russian Institute of Directors «The research of corporate governance practice in Russian companies 2003-2006». His studies and practical work resulted in the creation of an integrated indicator, which combines quantitative component and quality evaluation of the Executive board's effectiveness. According to the author this indicator creates a large field for future research work in management and corporate governance and probably have a potential to be developed in a new tool for economic analysis.

This research paper draws your attention to a new method of evaluation of the Executive board's effectiveness. Executive board is a body which executes the function of managing a corporation and is responsible for short-term and medium-term goals' achievement. The core of the method described is a formula of the Integral indicator of Executive Board's effectiveness, which is based on quantitative component **S** (effectiveness by an hour) and quality estimation of Executive Board's working process (**k**). This formula will be useful for investors, shareholders, stock analysts, members of Boards of Directors and researchers interested in corporate governance.

1) Quantitative component S. Calculation of the component S is based on two principles of an effective manager:

An effective manager gets profit D for investments on capital K which brings him/her return on investment X% higher than an average market level of this sector. X is an acceptable number set by a shareholder according to the market information, which is provided by any qualified stock analyst. Management of the company (first of all, members of the Executive Board) is responsible for achievement of this profitability level.

An effective manager should plan his/her time so that to reduce working hours T spent on controlling the business. So, we can say that T tends to 0.

According to the points below we can work in two activities:

1. $ROI = \frac{D}{K}$ where ROI is the return on investment. In this case target value ROI* will equal to ROIav + X, where ROIav is an average return on investment of this sector, which is known to stock analysts. In other words, a value of the first index is strongly limited.

2. $S = \frac{D}{T}$, where S is effectiveness by an hour of "participating in managing

the company" and T is time spent by top-managers to control the business, which creates profit D. This index is unlimited.

After several mathematic operations we will extract:

$$S = \frac{K \times ROI^*}{T} \qquad S = \frac{K \times (ROIav + X)}{T} \qquad X = \frac{\Delta D}{K}$$

$$D = K \times ROI$$

K (share capital) = const in the medium-term perspective. Target value of ROI is also known – **ROI***. T is calculated empirically.

Now we shall work with a formula of integral indicator of Executive Board's effectiveness:

$$\mathbf{U_{mgmt}=k_{mgmt} * S}$$

where k_{mgmt} – quality rate of Executive Board's working process.

2) Quality rate $\mathbf{k_{mgmt}}$. To calculate $\mathbf{k_{mgmt}}$ it is necessary to build a group of indicators, which allow to fully describe the quality of Executive Board's working aspects and also the effectiveness of time spent by company's managers on their duties. For this purpose I have brought in **10** indicators of effectiveness of Executive Board's working process. Each indicator has its own scale from 0 to 2. After marking an indicator with number *i* like m_i, let us write the formula for calculation $\mathbf{k_{mgmt}}$ as a simple average amount:

$$\mathbf{k_{mgmt} = \sum_{1}^{10} m_i / 10}$$

Quality estimation of the Executive Board's working process indicates its level of effectiveness, "value" of time T that top-managers have spent on performing their duties. The higher the indicator $\mathbf{k_{mgmt}}$, the higher effectiveness of time T spent by managers is. It is necessary to outline that k_{max}=2 and k_{min}=0,5, so quality rate $\mathbf{k_{mgmt}}$ can not increase, or decrease, integral indicator $\mathbf{U_{mgmt}}$ more than twice. It is a key issue of the method described.

Let us bring in 10 indicators of the Executive Board's working process for disclosing the methodology of $\mathbf{k_{mgmt}}$' calculation:

1. Existence of Executive Board	
Executive Board manages and leads routine activities	2
CEO manages and leads routine activities and Executive Board does not exist	1
2. Existence of regulation documents (except organization charter), which determine the activity of company's top-management	
There are regulation documents (except organization charter), which determine the activity of top-management	2
Such documents do not exist	1
3. Existence of documented procedure of declaration by top-managers if they have a conflict of interests at the corporation and a procedure of an obligatory informing of corporation's authorities about cases of such conflicts	

These procedures do exist and are clearly described and documented	2
These procedures do not exist at the corporation	0
4. The internal documents of the corporation include duties of members of Executive Board (top-managers) or CEO, including the duty to disclose the information about corporation shares' ownership, buying and selling shares	
Such duty is fixed in the internal documents of the corporation	2
Such duty is not fixed in the internal documents of the corporation	0
5. Dependence of top-managers' compensations on the results of corporation's performance	
Top-managers' compensations depend on results of corporation's performance	2
Top-managers' compensations do not depend on results of corporation's performance	0
6. Existence of candidates for moving to top-management positions in a corporation	
Such candidates do exist	2
Such candidates do not exist	1
7. The procedure of the CEO's assignment	
The CEO of a corporation is assigned by the Board of Directors	2
The CEO of a corporation is assigned by the Annual meeting of shareholders	1
8. Participation of top-managers in the Board of Directors' activity	
¼ of the Board of Directors is represented by top-managers of the corporation or a control organization	2
More than ¼ of Board of Directors is represented by top-managers of the corporation or a control organization	0
The chairman of the Board of directors of a corporation is its CEO	0
9. If the duty of Executive Board's members to attend the Annual meeting of corporation's shareholders is fixed in the organization charter or internal documents of the corporation	
Yes, it is fixed	2
No, it is not fixed	1
10. If the duty of Executive Board's members to provide information about company's activities on a regular and complete basis, in proper time is fixed in the internal documents of the corporation	
Yes, it is fixed	2
No, it is not fixed	0

The importance of an integral indicator $\mathbf{U}_{\mathbf{mgmt}}$:

It allows to track the dynamics of the Executive Board's effectiveness from year to year;

The planning and stimulation functions include planning of a certain value of $\mathbf{U}_{\mathbf{mgmt}}$ in order to link top-managers' compensations with the level of $\mathbf{U}_{\mathbf{mgmt}}$;

We can develop a scale of integral indicator $\mathbf{U}_{\mathbf{mgmt}}$ for any economic sector in order to describe effectiveness of the Executive Board of a certain corporation and to compare $\mathbf{U}_{\mathbf{mgmt}}$ levels of various companies or with an average $\mathbf{U}_{\mathbf{mgmt}}$ level of a sector.

IT and Youth: new opportunities for education and research

Christine Cromwell-Ahrens, Natalia Beketova

Introduction by the group academic advisors

Our research group really has a wonderful history, that is, probably, not less important, than the research texts, presented in this chapter – so we would start the introduction with "how it all began".

The very idea of such a research group was "born" by the joint initiative of the Yaroslavl State University, Technical University and MUBINT students, lead by Vladimir Yudin, also representing his university colleague Natalya Beketova, during the Baltic Practice "winter session" in the city of Rostov-the-Great, Yaroslavl oblast. It should be mentioned, that the very idea to have a legitimate theme and a recognized research group, totally focused on "technology" - for a humanitarian project like "Baltic Practice", dealing with Russian-European integration – was not easily accepted. It was due to the fact, that the reports and presentations, prepared by Yaroslavl students on this theme were so clearly structured and so well introduced, that the project leader Nina Belyaeva, after some hesitation, decided "to give it a try".

Since then the group – and the theme – have to struggle through the great number of difficulties, beginning with the format of the joint project, which combined research and practical part, consolidated by the effective "soft leadership" of Ruslan Voronov, to the organizational troubles of visas and tickets for the participants, who had hardly ever been abroad before.

Despite of all this – or, probably, as a result of all this – we believe we had the most wonderful working group in "Baltic Practice" in Stockholm: most international, most interdisciplinary, most "diverse" in terms of covering different backgrounds and cities we all came from - and this was a beauty of it!

Diversity provides for the deep interest to each other's positions and stimulates lot of discussions – we were never breaking a conversation if the "session time" was over – our endless evenings were the most productive part for creativity.

How can one explain, what it "IT"? This the same difficult, as to explain "Youth"…

But for those, who deals with "IT" and who are "youth" themselves – there is no need to explain this, so we were dealing with the other question: what can the modern IT technology provide for its users – particularly for the young people, as they are most "quick learners" – in communicating ACROSS THE BORDERS – both for the reasons of self-learning, "systemic education" and advanced research.

Olga Valova

Bologna process

The process of modernizing higher school, of its reorganization on the principles of enterprise can't affect traditional approaches to the education. Now the view on knowledge and on ways of its getting changes. The forms of getting of the education change too. Today Russian higher school enters into Bologna process which brings the mobility in the process of education. Many actions are done to break external barriers. But main problem consists in student. Students are not consumers, don't request education. Restraining factor is student's school. European standard of high education views a graduating student as a creative individual person which may go own way and realize own projects. There are selected courses in study plan that give students opportunities to choose the depth and form of learning material and methods of control. In this fact subjective position consists.

As a whole universities become the institutions offering services, students answering to various needs for sphere of education. But the tendency restrains "school" orientation of the student, the position of the customer (consumer) of educational service. As consequence, educational process is reproductive and also reduced to a development of the fixed knowledge and the offered samples of an activity.

In the work I will examine a degree of readiness and drawing in Bologna process of HSE - students in Nizhnii Novgorod.

In work I will examine the basic criteria of quality of higher school education from a position of the student, such as will be appreciated:

- the Practical importance of a material taught in HIGH SCHOOL,
- the Opportunity of passing an examination
- the Opportunity of passage in High school of practice
- Awareness of students on additional forms of education in HIGH SCHOOL
- Awareness of students on forms of non-learning work of high SCHOOL
- Vision of the future: whether Claimed they see workers after the ending of high SCHOOL?

The data given in work are results of my research spent within the framework of studying of how image HSE NN is perceived by the students, trained in it. Would be more true to study cumulative image of university into which the data received from students HSE NN would enter, its entrants and students of other HIGH SCHOOLS. I have investigated recognition of image only students HSE NN owing to deficiency of time.

During realization of research sample was made by me on V.I.Paniotto's way with an assumption of 5 % of a mistake.

Sample has made 305 people that are 30 % from number of pupils.

During research I have created the questionnaire in which took into account objective and subjective criteria. Examples of objective criteria are progress of students, a rate on which students study, a basis of training: payment / free-of-charge.

That information which displays as the student perceives any parameters concerns to subjective criteria. In my research by subjective criteria were:

· Interest of the student to study
· Rating HSE in a rating of high SCHOOLS of city, in opinion of the student,
· Allocation of leaders - high schools of Nizhniy Novgorod
· The Attitude of high School to students, in opinion of the student,
· The Attitude and an estimation of teachers
· The Opportunity of passing an examination
· The Importance of a taught material
· Security of high School computer engineering, the educational, methodical literature.

Interrogation was carried out among students of management, the right, economy and business - computer science faculties. Students 1, 2, 3, 4 rates and different progress were interrogated: honors pupils, the one who studies well and is satisfactory also those who frequently go on re-examination. Their number was determined in an identical proportion.

Estimating results of research, I considered students of all faculties, as 100 %. Then expected the general interest of the students who are holding the opinion 1, of opinion 2, opinions 3. The interest of the students, who are holding the opinion 1, was distributed then between students of various faculties. Calculations concerning other variants of the answer to questions were similarly made.

As showed research, 63, 67 % of students to study interestingly *(see Table 1)*. It is possible, for this reason 57, 42 % of students receive estimations perfectly and well *(see Table 2)*. The biggest interest to study is shown at guys at faculty of the right, the smallest interest to study - at faculty of management, not looking that they have well time in educational process. It is important to notice, what exactly at faculty of management is students in whom to study absolutely not interestingly, but interest their very low (0, 39 % from 100 %). At guys at faculties of business - computer science and economy interest to study about identical (16, 02 % from 63.67 %).

Table 1 Interest of students to study

To study interestingly?	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer	In total %
Yes, very much	13,28%	17,96%	16,41%	16,02%	63,67
Study is not so interesting	11,33%	7,04%	8,59%	8,98%	35,94
Not interestingly	0,39%	0	0	0	0,39

Table 2 As students at different faculties study?

Estimations	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer	In total %
Perfectly	7%	6,3%	3,9%	7,41%	24,61
Excellent - good	9,3%	9,4%	7%	7,11%	32,81
Good - will satisfy	4,7%	4,7%	8,6%	5,43%	23,44
I go frequently on re-examination	3,9%	4,7%	5,5%	5,04%	19,14

It is more than half of students HSE NN (52,73%) consider, that half of the knowledge taught in HIGH SCHOOL, it is absolutely not necessary. The strange tendency turns out: « Teachers are excellent, but the knowledge transmitted by them is not necessary ». Probably, it is possible to explain it to that knowledge have a high theoretical orientation and do not give practical skills which so are to be received to students. 35, 55 % of students consider, that knowledge have a high practical orientation, and, in opinion of 11, 72 % of students: the main thing - to receive the diploma, on work all the same it is necessary to be retrained. According to the received data, faculties of the right and economy of all appreciate the practical importance of taught subjects more. If to speak about a parity of opinions, for faculty

BC: «Teachers not bad know the subject and can inform is accessible a material, but half доносимых them of knowledge is absolutely not necessary»;

Rights: «The same opinion, as well as at BC, besides in their opinion «Teachers HSE are the excellent people perfectly knowing the subject»;

Economy: «Teachers - the excellent people perfectly knowing the subject, going in a leg with youth, they give the knowledge having a high practical orientation»;

Management: in spite of the fact that, in their opinion « teachers are the excellent people perfectly knowing the subject and going to a leg with youth », but knowledge have no high practical orientation, half of them is absolutely not necessary. *(See Table 3)*

Table 3 The Practical importance of a material taught in HIGH SCHOOL

Practical The importance of a material	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer	In total %
I	8,98%	10,55%	10,55%	5,47%	35,55
II	11,71%	12,11%	10,16%	18,75%	52,73
III	4,3%	2,34%	4,3%	0,78%	11,72

58,59% of students receive examinations by the automatic device, well being engaged in a semester. More and more at faculty of the right (19,92%), and it is less than such students at faculty of business - computer science (9,38%), the difference is essential and makes 10,54 %. In general, by the received data, delivery by the automatic device - the most widespread form of a passing examination at university for all faculties, except for faculty of business - computer science. Guys from faculty of business - computer science prefer to prepare for examination day prior to delivery.

12,11% of students long prepare for examinations. A lot of students from faculty of economy prepare for examinations (3,51%), and smaller - from the right (2,34%).

28,52% of students prepare for examination day prior to delivery. As shows research, the students preparing for examination for day prior to delivery, in 2,4 times it is more, than the students allocating significant time for preparation for examinations.

0,78% of students believe, that «estimation will put all the same, the main thing - to be on examination». This figure is formed due to faculty of the right, other faculties so do not consider.

The fact is consolatory, that students do not express opinion, which « estimation it is possible is simple to buy ». *(See Table 4)*

Table 4 the Opportunity of passing an examination

Passing examinations	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer	In total %
I	15,63%	19,92%	13,66%	9,38%	58,59%
II	3,13%	2,34%	3,51%	3,13%	12,11%
III	6,25%	1,95%	7,82%	12,5%	28,52%
IV	0	0,78%	0	0	0,78%
V	0	0	0	0	0

As showed research, 22,26% of students go on practice on directions of high SCHOOL, the smallest interest of pupils from this number (only 2,73%) are students of faculty of management, managers other ways, apparently, are arranged on practice. The most greater interest of the students receiving directions on practice on the part of HIGH SCHOOL at faculty of economy (7, 42% from 22,26%).

49,22% of students (almost half) are arranged on practice who - where can, however, if not have found where to pass practice, the high SCHOOL helps. Leaders on this position - students of faculty of management (14,45% from 49,22%). They resort to the help of high SCHOOL in the latest turn, being guided it is more on themselves.

For 16,41% of students all the same where to pass practice, the main thing - the report. Knowledge and the experience, received during practice, are the greatest value for students of faculty of the right, they in the least degree are located to such opinion on practice (2,73% from 16,41%). For students from faculty of business - computer science, practice is more formality, the main thing the report (5,86% from 16,41%).

At 12,11% of students of practice yet was not, this interest is formed due to students of 1-st and 2-nd rates. *(See Table 5)*

Table 5 the Opportunity of passage of practice in HIGH SCHOOL

Practice In HIGH SCHOOL	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer	In total %
I	2,73%	6,25%	7,42%	5,86%	22,26%
II	14,45%	12,11%	10,94%	11,72%	49,22%
Ш	3,91%	2,73%	3,91%	5,86%	16,41%
IV	3,91%	3,91%	2,73%	1,56%	12,11%

As shows research, guys know about all forms of additional education in HSE NN. One faculty knows more about one forms of additional education, others about others. Within the limits of one faculty knowledge of students of forms of additional formation in HIGH SCHOOL also is non-uniform. Guys from faculty of management, the right and economy are better informed on an opportunity of reception of formation on several specialties (35,63% from 100%), (34,83% from 100%) and (37,29% from 100%) accordingly. And the faculty of business - computer science owns better the information on an opportunity of reception of formation in Moscow. On the second place on culture:

- Management - reception of formation (education) in Moscow (24,14% from 100%)
- the Right - reception of formation (education) in Moscow (25,89% from 100%)
- Economy - reception of formation (education) in Moscow (27,12% from 100%)
- Business - computer science - an opportunity of reception of additional formation (education) on other specialty (23,53% from 100%).

The highest knowledge of students of postgraduate study at faculty of business - computer science, and about MBA at faculty of management.

As a whole there is a picture of culture of students about opportunities of reception of additional formation (education) in HSE: guys know that in HIGH SCHOOL it is possible to receive additional formation (education) and know what its forms are present at HIGH SCHOOL. From ignorant about what forms of additional formation (education) are in HIGH SCHOOL, the most greater interest, make business - computer science (8,82 % from 100 %), the least managers (2,3 % from 100 %). There are no students who would not know, that in ВШЭ НФ there are additional forms of formation (education). *(see Table 6).*

Table 6 Awareness of students on additional forms of formation (education) in HIGH SCHOOL

Addition Forms Formations(educations)	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer
Formation(education) In Moscow	24,14%	25,89%	27,12%	26,47%
Additional formation	35,63%	34,83%	37,29%	23,53%

on several to specialities				
Postgraduate study	14,94%	16,96%	15,25%	22,06%
MBA	22,99%	15,18%	16,95%	19,12%
do not know	2,3%	7,14%	3,39%	8,82%
Such is not present	0	0	0	0
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%

43,36% of students consider, that they not underreceive during training practical techniques and engineering in sphere of the chosen specialty. Apparently from the tablet, and technical more all does not suffice practical models lawenforcers (14,06%), but less others feel their shortage guys from faculty of business - computer science (7,42%).

In opinion of 29,30% of students, during training there is no theory. As shows research, theoretical knowledge does not suffice students from faculty of economy more, than to other guys. Students from faculty of business - computer science are to the greatest degree satisfied with taught theoretical base.

17,18% do not suffice students of practical skills as expert. Especially sharply shortage of practical skills is felt by guys from faculty of management. And 10,16% give the unanimous answer to the given question, answering, that they do not have not enough grant. *(see Table 7)*

Table 7 That students do not get during training, in opinion of students

Half-received In Training	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer	In total %
I	7,78%	7,73%	8,17%	5,56%	29,30%
II	8,59%	7,03%	8,59%	7,81%	43,36%
III	5,58 %	4,06%	4,12%	3,42%	17,18%
IV	3,03%	1,05%	3,02%	3,06%	10,16%

48,44% of students speak that practically each month in HIGH SCHOOL will be carried out(spent) action, most less this opinion adhere guys from faculty of economy (7,42% from 48,44%).

40,23% consider, that ВШЭ invite other HIGH SCHOOLS more often, than itself will carry out such actions. Adherents of this opinion are guys from faculty of economy (14,84% from 40,23%).

In opinion of 11,33% of students, the high SCHOOL does not organize non-learning actions. *(see Table 8)*

Table 8 Awareness of students on forms of non-learning work of high SCHOOL

Non-learning Work	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer	In total %
I	11,72%	14,06%	7,42%	15,23%	48,44%
II	9,77%	7,42%	14,84%	8,2%	40,23%
III	3,52%	3,52%	2,73%	1,56%	11,33%

In opinion of 62,14% of students, they, certainly, will be claimed experts on a labor market after termination HSE. It is necessary to take into account, that the majority of guys hold this opinion from faculty of business - computer science (20,4% from 62,14%).

35,88% interrogated are at a loss to reply to the data, and 1,95% of guys think, that other experts will be at that time claimed. It is necessary to note, that to this opinion adhere exclusively правовики. *(See Table 9)*

Table 9 Opinion of students on, whether workers claimed they will be after the termination of high SCHOOL

It claimed on The market	Faculty of Management	Faculty Rights	Faculty Economy	Faculty Business-computer	In total %
I	16,49%	12,63%	12,62%	20,4%	62,14
II	8,66%	10,63%	11,81%	4,78%	35,88
III	0	1,95%	0	0	1, 98

Thus, in work the basic criteria of quality of high school formation Nizhniy Novgorod HSE are considered and their estimation is given by students HSE. Research shows, that students HSE NN have high interest to study (63,67%). Practically equal high results of progress: 57,42% of students study on «excellent»/ «perfectly - well». This fact proves that the Nizhniy Novgorod students can be considered as persons with the advanced individuality which aspires to mastering by new knowledge and achievement of the purposes put by them.

Guards circumstance, that there is more than half of students HSE NN (52,73%) consider, that half of the knowledge taught in HIGH SCHOOL, it is absolutely not necessary. Most likely, guys do not know how to put into practice the theoretical data received by them. The interest is high enough. It is necessary for branch to train guys better to put into practice the theoretical data to train to work with the information the most effective way. It turns out, that guys can not isolate the information necessary and useful to from offered to their attention.

With the organizational point of view, HSE NN gives a choice to students of educational opportunities that are shown available various faculties, specialties, various forms of the control of knowledge, the option students of investigated subjects, forms of examination.

Students HSE NN are informed on forms of additional formation in the high SCHOOL, many of students besides the first higher education receive additional formation in walls of high SCHOOL, or in the other HIGH SCHOOL of city. The most claimed forms of additional formation are: the second higher education on other specialty, MBA, and also a magistracy in Nizhniy Novgorod, Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

HSE NN enables receptions of two-level formation which so is distributed in Europe. Guys take a keen interest in practical activities. Many of them work in projects, a part combine work and study. Research has shown, that among students there is an opinion what exactly practice in sphere of the chosen specialty does not suffice. It once again proves that fact, that guys HSE NN are active, they are ready to work on result and to go in the chosen way. The Magistracy of innovational management Fiyaksel allows guys to combine work study, and also independently to conduct innovational projects, притворяя conceived in life.

Students besides occupations in High schools conduct active non-learning activity. There is a student's Advice which is always ready to listen and whenever possible to realize to student's initiatives. Polit-club, Club "manager ", club « the Aesthetics and design », dancing collective "Albion", chorus - student's organizations HSE NN. Student's society "КоМоТос" the organization which cooperates with children's shelters and preschool establishments shows charities, socially - directed.

Thus, in general HSE NN grows the independent dynamic personalities ready to new life, dynamical, demanding enthusiasm, the initiative, activity. The high SCHOOL aspires to create all conditions for development of young generation. Certainly, there is a line of problems for a way to success on entry in Bologna process, but the administration of high School is ready to make flexible decisions to listen to the initiative of students and to make necessary changes to activity.

Приложение

Анкета для студентов ВШЭ

1. На каком факультете Вы учитесь в ВШЭ-НН?

2. На каком курсе?______________________

3. Вы учитесь:

a) на бюджетной основе

b) на коммерческой основе

4. Какие оценки у Вас встречаются чаще:

a) отлично

b) отлично и хорошо

c) хорошо – удовлетворительно

d) разные, часто иду на переэкзаменовку

5. Учиться здесь Вам интересно?

a) да, очень

b) учеба особого интереса у меня не вызывает

c) не интересно

6. Определите, где находится Ваш ВУЗ в рейтинге ВУЗов города от <u>1-высшего</u> до <u>10-низшиго</u>

1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10

7. Какие другие ВУЗы, по Вашему мнению, в городе занимают лидирующие позиции:

1

2

3

8. Если бы вам предложили определить образ вашего ВУЗа, то на какое животное это было бы похоже(подчеркните)? Объясните в двух словах почему?

лев, осел, медведь, мышь, конь, бобер, волк, пегас, баран, гиена, заяц, крыса, ехидна, лиса, слон? Другое животное и интерпретация

____

9. Какое отношение к студентам со стороны ВУЗа:

a) постоянная опека – контроль

b) больше говорят, чем делают

c) всем все равно, как нам в нем учиться

10. Что Вы можете сказать о преподавательском составе Вашего ВУЗа?

a) это отличные люди, прекрасно знающие свой предмет, идущие в ногу с молодежью

b) неплохо знают свой предмет, могут доступно донести материал

c) процесс преподавания скучен, на занятиях совершенно неинтересно

11. Как Вы можете сказать о практической значимости преподаваемого материала?

a) знания имеют высокую практическую направленность

b) половина, получаемых знаний, совершенно не нужна

c) главное – получить диплом, на работе все равно придется переучиваться

12. Как Вы сдаете экзамены?

a) можно получить автоматом, хорошо занимаясь в семестре

b) долго приходится готовиться

c) готовлюсь к экзамену за день до сдачи

d) поставят оценку все равно главное явиться на экзамен

e) оценку можно просто купить

13. Как Вы можете оценить в ВУЗе:

обеспеченность компьютерной техникой

a) отличная

b) так себе

c) плохая

обеспеченность учебной литературой

a) всегда есть необходимая литература в наличии

b) очень часто нет необходимых книг

c) я сам себя обеспечиваю необходимой литературой

обеспеченность методической литературой

a) отличная

b) средняя

c) плохая

14. Как организуется практика в ВУЗЕ

a) все идут по направлениям ВУЗа на практику

b) в основном устраиваются кто-где сможет, однако, если не нашли, ВУЗ поможет

c) кто где проходит практику ВУЗу все равно, главное отчет (заполненная документация)

d) практики у нас не было

15. Имеются ли в ВУЗе дополнительные формы образования? *(возможно несколько вариантов ответа)*

a) наш ВУЗ дает возможность продолжить образование в Москве (магистратура, аспирантура)

b) можно получить еще одно высшее образования по нескольким специальностям

c) есть аспирантура

d) есть MBI

e)я не знаю какие дополнительные формы есть в нашем ВУЗе

f) в нашем ВУЗе нет дополнительных форм образования

16. По Вашему мнению, что Вы недополучаете в ходе обучения? *(нужное выделить)*

a)теорию(конкретизировать)

b) практические техники и методики работы в сфере выбранной специальности

c) практические навыки как специалиста

d)Другое____

17,Какая внеучебная работа ведется в ВУЗе?

a) почти каждый месяц в ВУЗе мероприятие

b) чаще нас приглашают другие ВУЗы, сами проводим редко

c) ВУЗ не организует такого рода мероприятий

18. Как Вы считаете: после окончания ВУЗа вы будете востребованным работником на рынке труда?

a) да, безусловно

b) затрудняюсь ответить

c) думаю, что в то время будут востребованы другие специальности

19. Если бы все начать сначала, в какой ВУЗ Вы поступили бы?

a) в этот же

b) ____________________

20. Готовы ли Вы позиционировать (продвигать) свой Вуз?

a) да

b) нет

21. Посоветуете ли Вы учиться по Вашей специальности в Вашем учебном заведении? *(нужное выделить)*

а) безусловно, посоветую всем

b) мне это всё равно

c) ни за что не посоветую

Ruslan Voronov, Victoria Gershman, Vitaly Tupitsyn

«ISECS – next step to intensify information and experience exchange between Russian and European young scientists»

The epigenetic of the IT and its penetration into different areas of human activities such as business, education, public administration etc. enable the representatives of universities especially students and postgraduates to receive information at first hand. One would think that huge quantity of web-sites can satisfy every young man, researching or working on some project and looking for partners. But routine of cooperation of Russian and European students, postgraduates and young scientists shows that there are too many deficiencies in this communication.

Objective of the project: Creation of the model of the universal multipurpose information system for science and education is directed to the assurance of the information cooperation between universities, research centres, lecturers and professors, students and scientists (especially young) from Russia and Europe together with business and industry interested in training and employing of highly skilled specialists.

To achieve the goal the following tasks were set:

- analyze existing scientific and educational information sources;
- determine their principal substantial components;
- reveal main shortcomings of the sites under consideration in case of the cooperation or Russian and European students, postgraduates and young scientists;
- outline basic components of the future ISECS's architecture.

The following search terms (Russian and English equivalents) for web-search engines were used in research:

- academic, research, educational institutions;
- educational, scientific web-site;
- university site;
- international research cooperation, etc.

Hereafter there are some results of our web-search.

1) http://www.edu-all.ru/

Vast information about universities, catalogue of educational web-sites, on-line e-library, vacancies for students and graduates.

Most interesting features are Detail survey of Russian and foreign Universities, News of the education world, Forum, links to the projects being realized.

2) http://www.orenport.ru/

Internet-resource with large amount of survey and practical information, e.g. areas of research, scientific schools, research centres, dissertation councils, scientific material, experience exchange, scientific and educational contests and grants, educational projects, data bases, innovative educational techniques and demonstrations and modelling of processes.

3) http://www.finanzinstitut-online.eu/

Site represents issues on different areas of research activities, daily science news, scientific materials and surveys of research centres.

This is the International portal of the Financing problems Institute, which provide support in solving of the problems with financing of different projects on the basis of European practice and knowledge (Germany, Austria, Switzerland).

4) http://www.idea-news.ru/

Site is devoted to cover the contest "South-West idea fair" and all the events dealing with the participation of researchers and developers in it. Site contains new, photos, video archive and forum. It can interest people taking part in the contest and those who didn't know about it.

5) http://www.uchsib.net/

On-line reference book of educational institutions. Site contains full and recent information about colleges and other educational institutions.

6) http://www.edunews.ru/

The most full to our opinion reference of Russian universities.

7) http://pedsovet.org/

Site contains analytical and information materials. It is a kind of all-education-in-internet resources. News, issues, bill of events, comments and discussions on forum are available. It is also possible to give own information via publication of news, events posters, experience exchange, placing of the issues, links, files. Registration required.

8) http://www.globaldialog.ru/

Specialized site for education abroad. Site contains information about different educational programs. It may help in choosing a program for each.

9) http://www.e-graduate.ru/

International site for unification of young promising specialists and employers.

10) http://www.abroad.ru/

Data base of foreign educational institutions, educational programs and language courses.

Joint Russian-European educational projects have very promising future, though there are factors which hinder the progress of cooperation in this field. One of them is decline of prestige of Russian education in Europe. Because of widening of the links between Russia and Europe as well as USA the necessity of advertising of Russian education. Still Russian universities pay little attention to it. The idea that everyone can just buy a diploma in Russia in spite of getting real knowledge is becoming very popular in Europe.

Every university in Russia and abroad has its own website, which is devoted to give all interested people introductory information about the university. The quality of maintenance of sites is very different, only several of them support English. Generally sites cover only one university and contain e-libraries with different filling.

In Russia surely there are preconditions to creation of united source. Federal university computer network of Russia - RUNNet (Russian UNiversity Network) - is the basis of the telecommunication infrastructure of the united educational infomedia. RUNNet was created in 1994 within the bounds of government programme “Universities of Russia”. It is an IP-net uniting regional networks as well as networks of big research and educational centres.

General characteristics of RUNNet:

- number of universities and research centres connected to net – 320;
- number of regions of Russia – 57;
- number of backbone sites in Russia – 8;
- backbones outside - Stockholm, Amsterdam;
- overall number of users – more then 1 800 000;
- other research and educational nets using the infrastructure of RUNNet - RBNet, RASNet, FREEnet, RUHEP, RSSI and others.

This IP-net also covers other countries and has a sufficient bandwidth for different tasks of free communication and information exchange between people in different cities. Because of lack of unity and agreement universities don’t use this net at the maximum level. Thus there are only specialized sites which contain information on one area or just introductory sites.

http://uisrussia.msu.ru

University information system RUSSIA (UIS RUSSIA) was created and is developing as a subject e-library for research and education in fields of economy, management, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, philology, international relations and other humanities. Positive side of that site is a deep database on subjects and demarcation between different user accounts for different tasks.

http://www.mpei.ru

This is the internet portal of Moscow Energy University. It contains not only introductory information in two languages but also services such as e-library and encyclopedia. The distinctive feature is availability of students’ and postgraduate students’ scientific works for registered users at least.

http://agora.guru.ru/display.php?conf=msu2001&page=item005

Scientific and educational resources of Moscow State University contain information on different areas of research and education, yet not detailed enough.

http://www.ox.ac.uk

University of Oxford website has very few differences in filling with Russian sites.

http://www.cam.ac.uk/

University of Cambridge website has very much in common with Oxford’s site.

Brief analysis of universities’ websites indicates that they more function as corporate portals then provide the needs of cooperation between universities in different areas of activity such as education, science, research, designing and international cooperation. It can mostly be seen in cooperation of Russian and European universities.

Creation of the universal multipurpose information system for science and education “International Scientific and Educational Cooperation System (ISECS)” is directed to provision of the information cooperation between universities, research centres, lecturers and professors, students and scientists (especially young) from Russia and Europe together with business and industry interested in training and employing of highly skilled specialists, as well as with all the organizations, institutions and people interested in Russian-European cooperation in Education, Science, Research and Culture. Starting up of the information system “International Scientific and Educational Cooperation System (ISECS)” should provide generation of common information field of Education, Science and Research of Russia and Europe.

Providing the information cooperation and information needs of participants of the educational and research cooperation of Russia and Europe should be achieved through the next steps:

- maximum automation of dataware processes to achieve efficiency and credibility of spread information;
- free accessing to general-use information sources for interested parties;
- interactability of users among themselves and with system resources.
- Principal objectives of the realization of “International Scientific and Educational Cooperation System (ISECS)” project:
- more profound cooperation of Russian educational and research institutions with European ones and among themselves;
- deeper drawing of students and young scientists into the process of integration of Russia and Europe;
- free accessing for students, university entrants, teachers and all interested parties and institutions to information about educational and research programmes, Russia-European cooperation programmes among universities and research centres;
- creation of database of Russian and European educational and research institutions;
- creation of database of CVs of active and promising young scientists, students as well as distinguished and established teachers and scientists with opportunity for users to interact with them;
- give an opportunity to find interesting, promising job for human participants of the system, and to find promising and highly skilled specialists for institution participants;
- creation of e-library of issues, books, research works (or links to them) on all the branches of science and technology, journalistic issues and legal acts dealing with education and science;
- creation of a debate ground for discussion of the urgent problems of education, science and technology, economy etc.;
- creation of the instrument providing most active interaction between participants of all-European educational community among themselves and with potential investors and employers.

Universal multipurpose information system for science and education “International Scientific and Educational Cooperation System (ISECS)” is oriented on participants of educational and research spheres, structures supporting the education and science activity, authorities regulating education and science, commercial and non-profit institutions, all interesting in development and advance of education and science. The purpose of ISECS' creation is providing the users with truthful information necessary to choose the education or research programme, programme of cooperation with European educational and scientific institutions. System should provide the opportunity to participate in such programmes for users, to find interesting and promising job for graduating students and highly skilled specialists for employers.

Information users of the project are participants of educational and research spheres of Russia and Europe including educational institutions, research centres, scientists, teachers, students, authorities, commercial and non-profit institutions in spheres of education and science, and all interested people and organisations.

Suggested structure of the "International Scientific and Educational Cooperation System (ISECS)" consists of the following thematic sections:

- database of Russian and European educational institutions and their programmes;
- database of educational and research projects being planned and realized in Europe and Russia, as well as of programmes of international and interregional cooperation, conferences etc.;
- database of CVs of people participants of European educational and research community;
- e-library of issues, books, research works (or links to them) and journalistic issues on all the branches of science and technology;
- forum for discussion of the urgent problems of education, science and technology, economy etc.;
- international, European and Russian legal acts dealing with education and science;
- section for placement and search of vacancies;
- reference information section;
- news section;
- interesting facts, events, dates section;
- schedule of future events;
- FAQ.

The realization of this project will undoubtedly call for considerable financial and intellectual expenses.

Who could be interested in realization of the "ISECS"?

Students and young scientists are sure interested in it. But they are not able to do that because of lack of organizational and financial opportunities. Participation of institutions and organizations is surely necessary.

Universities may be interested in creation of such an interactive system because it may bring benefits to them. What kind of benefits? Cooperation with each other may provide them opportunities to solve their problems faster and more effective then if all of them act for their own. Cooperation as well as competition is a key to faster progress in education, research and science. Universities and research centers are surely competing with each other. They compete for students, for achievements in research and so far. But it is very important for the progress of the world education and science that no one should try to re-invent a wheel. That means that sharing of invents and technologies is necessary for the advance not of a single inventor, university or research centre, but of the humanity as a whole.

Cooperation with foreign students and young scientists is very important for each other. One can know something new while cooperating. He can educate himself and find out some things that are not usual for his country. Communication and experience exchange between people can benefit their professional skills and knowledge. That is vital not only for people but also for institutions and organizations they are working for. This is another one point for institutions to participate in such kind of system as "ISECS".

Nowadays human resources became a thing of vital importance for all the companies, institutions and organizations. Training of high skilled employees is one of priority tasks for every company. Another one is search for high skilled specialists. Today the nationality of employee is not important. His professional skills a far more useful. Especially in situation of the world economic crisis. Crisis is a high time for the best specialists, best professionals. Only they can find ways out from the problems. "ISECS" in that case can become a very useful means of headhunting. How can it work? The idea of "ISECS" imply that best students, most promising of young scientist, most respective and professional teachers and scientists will participate in it. That gives the opportunity for companies' headhunters to look through the profiles of student and young scientists from all around the Europe and find the right specialist for the job they have.

So, it is obvious that such a system can be very useful for many people all around Europe.

Who will be the leader of its realization?

We think that it can be an international group of universities and research centres. Sometimes it is difficult for universities in one country to agree with each other. They are the direct competitors in their area. Their interests intersect each other. In such kind of undertaking as "ISECS" non-competitive universities are more likely to work together. They can think about the common interests but not about competing each other. Non-competitors can be situated in the same city but work in different areas of education and science. But it is even easier for universities in different countries to cooperate in such kind of system. That's why we suggest that an international group of universities should be created in case of realization of the project.

The group should consist of one or several universities from some European countries. It is necessary that universities should be well-known and respective in case of the effectiveness and faster growing of the system. It is easier for big universities to invest necessary financial, infrastructure and human resources into the project than for small ones.

What universities can become the founders of the system?

Such kind of universities as High School of Economics, Moscow, Russia and University of Paris, France can become members of that group. Leading universities of Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain, Sweden and all the other European countries can become the founders of the system. We think that the starting group should consist at least three participants.

But not only universities can become part of the system. It is also important that government and non-government organizations, such as Council of Europe, UNESCO and others, should take part in the system.

The bigger and more powerful will the founders of the system be the faster it will grow and better it will work.

That means that it is important to negotiate with the best universities, to get the well-known scientists and probably politicians involved in this work in case that such an ambitious project can become successful.

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Formal Concept Analysis of the US Blogosphere during the 2008 Presidential Campaign[1]

Introduction

This paper presents an application of formal concept analysis to the study of political blogs in the context of the 2008 US presidential elections. Formal concept analysis (FCA) is a framework for data analysis and knowledge representation that has been proven useful in a wide range of application areas such as medicine and psychology, sociology and linguistics, information technology and computer science [1]. The FCA approach is to represent the structure of the domain under consideration as a concept lattice. In this paper, we aim at building lattice-based taxonomies to represent the structure of bloggers' interests, and by so doing, to identify the most widely discussed politicians at certain periods of time and to track the changes in the discussions over time.

The Data

Our primary data (made available by RTGI SAS/LINKFLUENCE[2]) is built upon the posts published in a selection of 1066 political blogs in the context of the 2008 US presidential elections[3]. The data was collected from November 1, 2007 to February 29, 2008 by LINKFLUENCE and consists of blog entries each containing the title of a post, its full text, and an associated list of hyperlinks appearing in the post. The data was processed as described in [4]. After some linguistic preprocessing (keyword extraction) and taking into account tags specified by authors of the posts, 79 terms were selected for describing the blogs. Bloggers are identified from the data by their unique blog URLs, and for each of the 79 terms, the dates are specified when this word was used by each blogger.

Formal Concept Analysis

In this section, we briefly recall the FCA terminology and show how it could be applied in our domain.

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[1] This work has been supported by the Scientific Foundation of the State University-Higher School of Economics (project 08-04-0022).

[2] http://linkfluence.net - LINKFLUENCE is "a research institute specializing in the conversations of the social web".

[3] http://presidentialwatch08.com/

Def.: A (formal) context is defined as a triple $K=(G,M,I)$, where G is called a set of objects, M is called a set of attributes and the binary relation $I \subseteq G \times M$ specifies which objects have which attributes, i.e. gIm - the object g has the attribute m. For $A \subseteq G$ and $B \subseteq M$ the derivation operators are defined as follows:

$$A' = \{m \in M \mid \forall g \in A : g\,Im\}, \qquad B' = \{g \in G \mid \forall m \in B : gIm\}.$$

Put differently, A' is the set of all attributes common to all objects of A and B' is the set of all objects sharing all attributes of B.

Contexts are usually represented by a binary matrix:

	1	2	3	4
1				
2				
3				
4				

Def.: A (formal) concept of a context (G,M,I) is a pair (A,B), where $A \subseteq G$, $B \subseteq M$, $B'=A$ and $A'=B$. In this case we also have $A=A''$ and $B=B''$. The set A is called the extent and B is called the intent of the concept (A,B).

In the context, a formal concept corresponds to a complete submatrix. For instance, a pair ([g2,g4],[m2,m3]) forms a concept in the example above.

Def.: A concept (A,B) is a subconcept of (C,D) if $A \subseteq C$ (equivalently $D \subseteq B$). In this case $D \subseteq B$ is called a superconcept of (A,B). All concepts, ordered by subconcept-superconcept relation form a lattice, which is called the concept lattice of the context K. Each vertex in the lattice corresponds to a formal concept. The lattice corresponding to the context above:



In application to our data, out of the set of all entries corresponding to a certain period of time, we construct a set G of bloggers and a set M of terms. Then, we count the number of times each term occurs in each blog and construct an object-attribute matrix Q where q_{ij} is equal to the number of times a blogger i uses a term j. In order to obtain a context, which is essentially a binary matrix, we apply a certain threshold to the matrix Q: if the number of term occurrences in a blog is above the threshold, then we can say that this blogger is active in discussing a certain topic. This technique reduces noise in data such as accidental occurrences of terms in blogs. In the end, we have a context corresponding to a certain period of time. Then, for a set of bloggers $A \subseteq G$, A' represents terms used by every user from A in this period, while, for a set of terms $B \subseteq M$, B' is the set of all bloggers who used every term from B. The intent of a concept in this context is a subtopic and the extent is the set of all users active in this subtopic. The concept lattice represents the structure of bloggers' interests with more populated and less specific subtopics closer to the top.

Stability-based pruning

As the number of concepts exponentially depends on the size of the context, the structures we get are very complex. The diagram below is indeed rather complicated, although it is derived from the context corresponding to the one-day-long period, November 1st, and contains only 49 bloggers and 65 terms. To quote [1], "even carefully constructed line diagrams lose their readability from a certain size up". The lattice built from this context consists of 202 formal concepts.



It is very hard to interpret even this diagram, but lattices built upon longer periods, for instance, a week, may contain more than 1 million concepts. In fact, diagrams are more complex than they should be due to noise in data. As a result, many groups of users identified by the lattice turn out to be irrelevant. It is desirable to prune the less important concepts in order to build a concise and intelligible representation of a lattice. The pruning technique we describe here is based on the notion of stability, first introduced in [2] in a slightly different form than the one we use here.

There are two types of the stability index - intensional stability and extensional stability.

The extensional stability index of a concept indicates how much the concept extent depends on a particular object of the intent. For a formal context $\mathrm{K}=(\mathrm{G},\mathrm{M},\mathrm{I})$ and a formal concept (A,B) of the context K, it is defined as follows:

$$\sigma(A,B)=\frac{\left|\{D\subseteq B: D'=A\}\right|}{2^{|B|}}$$

The intensional stability index of a concept indicates how much the concept intent depends on a particular object of the extent:

$$\sigma(A,B)=\frac{\left|\{C\subseteq A: C'=B\}\right|}{2^{|A|}}$$

In application to our data, the latter shows how likely we are to still observe the subtopic *B*, if we ignore several bloggers. As we are first of all interested in intents of formal conceptы, that is, the words appearing in blogs, we apply the intensional stability index to the lattice and remove all concepts with stability below a fixed threshold.

Blog Analysis

We computed the stability indices for concepts of the lattice corresponding to November 1. There are 17 concepts (out of 202) with the stability index above 0.9. They form a lattice, which is shown in Fig.1. Numbers in squares indicate an extent size of each concept. According to the lattice there were 49 bloggers active at that day and the most widely discussed issue was “war”. Apart from being an important topic on its own, it is also a parent for several associated topics such as “soldiers”, “gun”, and “bush”. The concept {“war”, “bush”} corresponds to the group of people who discussed the war politics of President Bush at that time.

Fig. 2 shows the lattice corresponding to the 100th day. There are already 396 bloggers active on that date. There are two mostly popular themes according to the lattice: the first is war and topics connected to it (on the right-hand side of the lattice diagram) and the other is upcoming elections (the left-hand side of the lattice).

To track the evolution of bloggers' preferences during the race, we construct a context containing only the names of the candidates as attributes. There are seven of them: Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, John McCain, Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee, and Rudy Giuliani. The dataset has been divided into 17 successive periods of seven days each. Then, a context has been built for each of these periods.



Figure 1. Day 1.



Figure 2. Day 100.

The lattice in Fig. 3 corresponds to November 2007. One can notice a clear partition of the candidates into two groups – democrats and republicans. However, Hillary Clinton, unlike other democrats, was also discussed in the same context as republicans. It might have been so because she seemed the most likely democratic candidate in the beginning of the race. Among republicans the most popular candidate was Giuliani.



Figure 3. November.

Strong changes in structures appear in the beginning of February: during the first week Giuliani and Edwards lost their positions in the diagrams and the same happened to Mitt Romney in the middle of February (Fig. 4). This reflects the fact that these candidates withdrew from the race at that time. Obama, Clinton, and McCain were widely discussed by bloggers, while Huckabee was significantly less popular. This may be interpreted as an indication that he would be the next to leave. Indeed, his campaign was over in a month, on March 4.

Thus, it is possible to see from the lattices when a certain politician withdrew from the presidential campaign with an accuracy of a week. It would be interesting to see which candidates the bloggers who discussed them switched their attention to. To answer this question, we compare two contexts: a context corresponding to the period when the candidate is still in the race and a context corresponding to the period when he or she has withdrawn are compared using the notion of extensionally related concepts described in the next section.

Dynamic mapping

In order to capture the difference between two time points, a technique has been proposed based on the notions of extensional and intensional relations [6].



Figure 4. The beginning and the middle of February.

Def.: Let $K_1=(G,M,I)$ and $K_2=(H,N,J)$ be two contexts describing the same domain in two different time points (or periods). Consider two concepts (A,B) and (C,D) of the lattices derived from K_1 and K_2 respectively. If the closure of $A \cap C$ equals A in K_1 and C in K_2, that is $(A \cap C)'' = A$ in K_1 and $(A \cap C)'' = C$ in K_2, then we say that (A,B) and (C,D) are extensionally related.

In the case of blog data, concepts extensionally related to (A,B) represent the evolution of the group A between two time periods in terms of what happens to its members. This means that, if all users dealing with topic B during one period switch to topic D in the next period, B should be then considered as the equivalent D, even if B is still an active topic.

In application to the real data, we consider two concepts to be related if the size of the intersection of their extents is above a fixed threshold, for instance, 0,5 of the extent size. We compare all the concepts from each context according to this technique and find extensionally related pairs.

In Fig. 5, there are two lattices corresponding to the time periods before and after the withdrawal of Rudy Giuliani. According to the results, the concept with intent “Giuliani” is extensiollay related to the concept with intent “John McCain”, while the concept with intent “John Edwards” is extensiollay related to the concept with intent “Barack Obama”. This means that people who earlier discussed Giuliani switched to McCain after his withdrawal and those who discussed Edwards switched to Obama. The former relation makes sense because Senator McCain and Mr. Giuliani are longtime friends and they frequently complimented each other at debates. When Rudy Giuliani formally dropped his presidential bid, he endorsed John McCain[4].



Figure 5. Extensionally related nodes.

Conclusion

This work introduces a possible application of Formal Concept Analysis methods to the study of political blog data. FCA methods make it possible to represent visually the structures of interests of bloggers, which helps to concentrate on the most important and interesting events.

In a dynamic perspective, this approach enabled us to characterize the processes taking place during the 2008 U.S. presidential election in terms of how they were reflected in the American blogosphere.

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Cooperation opportunities in the fields of culture, economics and political development

Silvia Geise, Shota Kakabadze

Introduction by group academic advisors

This chapter needs a somewhat special introduction, because it appeared much later than the others, long after the summer session in Stockholm was already over, but we all in the Academic Council were still thinking, how to accommodate the wonderful piece of work by Liana Gavrilova, comparing cultural heritage of Russia and Sweden, that did not really "fit" in any other "themes" or "chapters".

This is an interesting case in itself, how "Baltic Practice", providing for a creative environment, is stimulating young researchers to come up with completely new themes of studies, that did not have a tradition in previous sessions. Recognizing our commitment to keep our creative and all-inclusive format, we should be capable of encompassing new themes into existing "list of topics".

What is important, though, that at the same time we do not lose the specific character of our project and do not become just a "collection of articles", not related to our main goal – interdisciplinary studies of Russia-European integration. Therefore, the three major rules we established for all the studies to "qualify" for our research purposes, stay firm: the research theme for a working group should be: a) interdisciplinary, b) be important and currently relevant both in Russia and the "European country" or the "Europe at large", and c) – very importantly – demonstrate the potential to serve the goal of IMPROVING RELATIONS between Russia and Europe. And the theme chosen by Liana is perfect in all the three senses – it is CULTURE, more specifically – cultural heritage, that may become a "uniting force" when shared, particularly in such a specific field as historical environment of the small old cities, or "ancient cities", that are plenty in Europe and some – in Russia, one of those, with true European heritage, been Yaroslavl, that is preparing to celebrate its millennium.

The whole idea of comparing "ancient cities of Europe" and , in particular, how those cities are using their cultural heritage to build their contemporary life – both for in-country tourists and for the international exchanges – was suggested by prof. Stepanov, vice-rector of MUBINT in Yaroslavl, who had been the partner of "Baltic Practice" winter school in January of 2008 in Rostov-the Great. After Prof. Stepanov's brilliant presentation of this issue research prospects, the number of potential group participants had doubled, and for the whole year we were hoping, that this would result in a collective group study. Regretfully, this was only Liana alone, who finally managed to complete her own research on this subject, comparing methods of "using the heritage for the future" between Yaroslavl and Sigtuna – once an ancient capital of Sweden.

So, we could not miss to publish her paper, and we agreed to have a “special chapter” to accommodate it, also searching for other materials, that could fit together with some common “general idea” behind them. This search led us to recall the paper by young sociologist Maxim Markin, who is a “recognized veteran” of Baltic Practice project for a number of years, and worked with the “Financial markets” group in Germany last year. Maxim explores different variants of financial behavior in the light of coming integration between Russian and Western financial markets, which also leads to variants of possible cooperation between Russia and Europe, that in the age of Global markets is becoming practically inevitable.

Final paper, that we are including into this chapter, is by young political analyst Daria Grineva, who explores the experience of “dominant party” in Sweden – compared to «Edinaya Rossiya» party in Russia. This comparison is interesting both in terms of «formal similarities» and “substantial differences” that both parties have – in terms of their origin, methods of work and role they play in social-political development. This paper also suggests some ideas of how Russia can benefit from Swedish experience.

So, what is the common idea, that lies behind all the three papers? We believe, we expressed it in the title of this chapter – “Cooperation opportunities”, as we see all those comparative studies in a light of “how can we learn from each other”, that in the final end means – prospects for possible future cooperation.

Liana Gavrilova

Historical parallel Yaroslavl – Sigtuna as the basis for the development of economic and cultural Russian-Swedish cooperation

Abstract

The major aim of this work is to show that tourism is one of the is one of the most clear and perspective directions of economic and cultural cooperation for all participants of the world community. The great experience of the effective historical cooperation of the cities of Russian and European countries is a rial basic for this. At first I want to display that the historical parallel Yaroslavl- Sigtuna can become one more basic stimulus for the Russian-Swedish improvement of cooperation today. The second target of the work is to display that tourism is appreciated more and more as a serious economic resource in Yaroslavl Oblast.

Keywords: Yaroslavl Sigtuna, historical ways of development, economic and cultural Russian-Swedish cooperation, tourism development, economic priorities in Russia

The accelerating globalization requires from countries more and more activity in the search of ways and resources not only for their own improvement but also for the progressive movement of the world community. It particularly concerns the countries, which are in the same cultural paradigm. For example, the European countries. The geographical closeness, the similarity of historical ways of development, the belonging to the Christian tradition and other consolidating factors give the opportunity for the close economic and cultural cooperation beneficial for all participants of this process. **Tourism is one of the optimal forms of this cooperation. Its development is one of the economic priorities in Russia today.** There is a Federal Law № 132-FL of the Russian Federation from 24.11.1996 «About foundations of tourist activity in the Russian Federation» [V]. In 2004 the President Vladimir Putin signed a decree about The Federal agency on tourism.[III] On July 1, 2007 the Federal Law № 12 – FL from 05.02.2007 «About emending the text of the Federal Law «About foundations of tourist activity in the Russian Federation»» came into force.[V] During The International tourist exhibition «Fitur-2008» which was held in Madrid at the end of January of 2008 Sergey Naryshkin, the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation at that time, said: *«Russia intends to develop foreign tourism, a tourist branch as a whole actively and cooperate in this sphere with various countries of the world»*. [II] This means the attitude to tourism in the country has changed vitally with transition to the market economy. Tourism wasn`t regarded seriously as «a way of making money» (there was a system of granted trade-union tourism, the streams of tourism were less active in the country, there were few visitors from abroad) in the USSR in the 60s-80s of 20-th century. In modern Russia tourism is regarded as the most important tool for the flow of investments. There are several reasons for it. At first these are international relations improving and gradual integration of Russia into European society, economic increase in the country and improvement of citizens well-being, constant increase of internal and international streams of tourism and so on.

In Sweden the attitude to tourism is the similar. Foreign tourists bring more income than the Volvo and Saab cars export there. In 2007 income of hotels, cottages and camping-sites reached the index of beyong 18 billions Swedish crowns - by 10 % higher than the level of 2006. [X]

The Yaroslavl Oblast is situated in the central part of Russia. It has always been one of the tourist centers of the country. Under new economic conditions tourism in the oblast began to develop more actively and first of all the entry tourism. It is confirmed by the words of the Governor of The Yaroslavl Oblast Sergey Vakhrukov: *«Currently we are doing our best to ensure the best facilities and opportunities for a world standard rest. New hotels and entertainment centers are being developed in the region. The region actively develops all sorts of cultural tourism: museum tourism, event tourism and ethnographic tourism. Business tourism and congress tourism are steadily growing. Additionally to traditional kinds of tourism, ecological tourism is becoming more and more popular. The Oblast offers appropriate conditions for holding All-Russia and International competitions.»* [I] The particular stimulus for tourism development in the Oblast is a great jubilee. In 2010 Yaroslavl is going to celebrate its 1000th anniversary.

The problem in this case **is that the great experience of the effective cooperation of the city and the Oblast with the cities of over countries has not been used to the full extent.** For example, mutual relations between the Swedish town of Sigtuna and Yaroslavl existed in the X-XIII centuries. They had a positive importance for the both countries. However this experience hasn`t been practically used at present.

The first target of this work is **to display that the historical parallel Yaroslavl- Sigtuna can become one more basic stimulus for the Russian-Swedish improvement of cooperation today.** Tourism is one of the most clear and perspective directions.

The second target of the work is **to display that tourism is appreciated more and more as a serious economic resource in Yaroslavl Oblast.** (The data of the tourism committee of the Department of Culture and Tourism of the Yaroslavl Oblast, information of the official Web-site of the Yaroslavl Oblast Administration and also of some Internet-sites are used in this work as the basic materials.)

Sigtuna is the town in the central conglomeration of Stockholm, in 47 km to the west from the capital. It is situated on the bank of Lake Malaren, which is joined to the Baltic Sea by the strait. The town was founded approximately in 980. Various sources claim King Eric VI the Victorious as the founder while others claim King Olof Skötkonung. Sigtuna is the first Christian town and the most ancient town of Sweden.

It operated as a political and religious centre in the early Christianization epoch, and was the most commercial centre of the country in the XI—XII centuries. Sweden's first silver coin was minted there in the 990-th. They were called “Sigtuna Dei” (God's Sigtuna).

As well as Sigtuna, **Yaroslavl** arose at dawn of the second millennium, in the period from 988 till 1024 years. However the 1010-th is considered to be a date of birth. In that year a young prince Yaroslav Vladimirovich (the Wise) established a fortress on the Volga River – the great Russian river - to provide the security of the northeastern boundaries of Kiev Russia. Yaroslavl emerged as the first Christian town on the Volga. During its 1000-year history Yaroslavl has been one of the strongholds of the Russian statehood. The rulers of Russia, the Ryurikovichs and the Romanovs reigning dynasties and later the Soviet leaders attached great importance to the city. Yaroslavl became the first faithful ally of Moscow in bringing the Russian lands together under the patronage of the ancient capital. In the XV-th century after joining the Moscow State, Yaroslavl was assigned an honorary role of "the Sovereign's estate". In 1612 a volunteer army lead by Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky to fight Polish-Lithuanian intervention was being stationed in Yaroslavl, and Yaroslavl was made the capital of Russia for several months. [VII] Subsequently the status of one of the industrial, cultural and educational country centres firmly consolidated on Yaroslavl.

Saint prince **Yaroslav the Wise** (978 – 1054), grand Kiev prince, the son of prince Vladimir, the Baptist of Russia, played a great role in the destiny not only of Yaroslavl, but of all Russia. He did a lot for the forming of a feudal lawful system, for the ancient Russia education, for the reinforcing of its significance on the international arena. (To strengthen his power and provide the order in social and legal relations in his realm, Yaroslav arranged for the collection of laws called «Pravda Iaroslava» (Yaroslav's Justice), the oldest part of the «Russkaya Pravda») [VI] Yaroslav the Wise actively developed relations with European states.

The diplomatic relations between ancient Russia and Sweden started to be built actively during the reign of Yaroslav the Wise.

In 1019 Yaroslav the Wise, being the prince of Novgorod, married Ingegerd Olofsdotter, the daughter of the king of Sweden Olof Skötkonung. She was baptized by the name Irina. (Children of this alliance were married to representatives of the ruling European families. In particular Yaroslav arranged marriages for his daughters Yelysaveta Yaroslavna, Anna Yaroslavna and Anastasia Yaroslavna with King Harald III of Norway, Henry I of France, and Andrew I of Hungary respectively.) [VI]

Novgorod merchants constantly lived in the Swedish capital since that time. Orthodox churches were built there. It is known that one of the ancient Sigtuna churches was consecrated in the name of saint Nicolay, the navigators` protector. [VIII]

About 8 thousand people live in **Sigtuna today**. (According to the information of 2005 year there are 7204 people in this town.) [VI] The Romanic tower of Sant Lars (1100 year), the Gothic brick church Santa Maria Kyrkan (of XIII century), the castle of Skokloster (the former convent), the Rosersbergs Palace (of XVII c.), (the royal residence since 1762) belong to Sigtuna sights. The town hall of Sigtuna is the smallest in Sweden, possibly in all the Europe. It was built in 1744. [IX] There is a Palace Steninge Cultural centre with a theatre under the open sky and with exhibitions of handicraft and also the Royal Palace of Rosersberg (of the XVII c.) in Sigtuna. There are a lot of conference centres, places for rest and entertainment in the town.

The largest airport of Sweden Arlanda is in 15 km from the town. As a result, Siguna is travelled through by 18,300,000 visitors annually. That is why the number of hotel places in Sigtuna yields only to those in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo. [VI] During last time the number of Russians attending Sweden increases. 80 % of them come by plane. [X] The number of Russian tourists in Sigtuna goes up as well.

Yaroslavl is situated in 282 km from Moscow. 604 thousand people live in Yaroslavl today. There are a lot of tourist resources in Yaroslavl and Yaroslavl Oblast.

The principal natural wealth of the area is the Volga River. The old Russian cities and towns: Yaroslavl, Rostov the Great, Pereslavl-Zalessky and Uglich – the finest pearls in the lace of the touring Golden Ring of Russia. (This route arose during the Soviet period. Today it is popular with Russians and visitors from abroad as before.) Other cities and regions of Yaroslavl Land also have some historical and cultural sights, which are interesting for tourists.

The Yaroslavl Land has rich cultural traditions. It is in Yaroslavl where the first professional theatre raised its curtain in 1750. Then Demidov Law Lyceum, the first professional lyceum in the province, was set up in 1803. The following great names are inseparably connected with Yaroslavl: the founder of the first Russian theatre Fedor Volkov, the Russian poets Nikolay Nekrasov and Leonid Trefolev, the opera singer Leonid Sobinov, the founder of the Russian scientific methods of teaching Konstantin Ushinsky, and the first spacewoman Valentina Tereshkova.

Today the Yaroslavl area counts more than 5,000 historical and cultural monuments. The major part of them are the masterpieces of the Yaroslavl architecture dating back to the 17th century. The Oblast has more than 250 functional museums, which collections house more than 800,000 exhibits. The Yaroslavl Oblast has an eventual cultural life. There are 6 theatres and the Governor`s symphonic orchestra in the Oblast.

For a long time the cities of Yaroslavl Land have been famous for trades. Its crafts: enamel, silver filigree, woodcarving, bell casting and embroidery - are popular with Russians and visitors from abroad. There are 48 out-of-town leisure centres, 8 active tourism territories in the Oblast.

The common form conducting tourist territory resources of List as a basis for entry tourism development started in Yaroslavl Oblast in 2005.

The **special purpose regional programme of public support of Yaroslavl Oblast entry and internal tourism development** is written for every two years and it confirms the gravity of attitude to tourism. Every year financial volumes increase.

Today **more attention is being paid to marketing in tourism** in the Oblast [IV], **first of all – to event-marketing**. In particular the tourist calendar of events for 2008 year has been worked. Some attractive measures for tourists (all in all there are about 120 of them) go on during a year in the whole Oblast. "Romanov Sheep is the Russian Golden Fleece Festival" (Tutaev), "Russian Golden Ring Aeronautics Festival" (Pereslavl-Zalessky) and also the holiday "Yaroslavl Shrovetide is the Principal National Shrovetide" are among the most successful annual «event»-brands for today. The last one has entered the list of the 1000th anniversary events, and since 2008 it will be included in the Culture Federal programme of Russian holidays by the Russia Federation Ministry.

One of the leading indexes of the region tourist sector development is tourists intake. The first Research of the tourist streams and tourist reputation of Yaroslavl Oblast was organized in 2004, the second was in 2006. The accounts of tourist firms, hotels, museums, municipal administrations working on the Oblast area were the basis for them.

The main Oblast tourist centres are the cities of: Yaroslavl, Uglich, Rostov the Great, Pereslavl-Zalessky and Myshkin. They get about 95% of tourists from general tourist stream into the region (the city of Yaroslavl gets 30%). According to the tourist firms and hotels data for the last few years the tempo of tourist stream has been about 10 %. [IV] (In particular in 2005 824 thousand tourists came into the Oblast (228 thousand of them – visitors from abroad), in 2005 there were 908 thousand tourists

(230 thousand of them were visitors from abroad), in 2007 year 1 million 19 thousand tourists came into the Oblast (286 thousand of them were visitors from abroad), in 2008 there were 1 million 216 thousand tourists (256 thousand of them were visitors from abroad). In 2007 the biggest part of foreign tourists come from Germany (29%), France (27%), the USA (22%). In 2008 the biggest part of foreign tourists come from the USA (27%), France (24%), Germany (21%).

The number of tourist companies increases in Oblast (in 2006 there were 122 entities, in 2007 - 140, in 2008 there were already more than 160 tourist companies).

The hotel sector is a very important part of infrastructure of the Oblast. The number of hotels increases too. In 2006 there were 41 hotels on the Oblast`s territory, in 2007 there were 46 hotels (with general numbers of beds about 3200), in 2008 - 53 hotels (with general numbers of beds about 3900). The hotel`s capacity on average was 40% in 2005, 42% in 2006 (in the city of Yaroslavl for the first time during long years the hotel`s capacity exceeded 50 % in 2006), 45 % in 2007, 51% in 2008 (in the city of Yaroslavl - 69%). (In 2007 the tempos of overnight visitors quantity increased by comparison with 2006 rose nearly by 15 %, and in Yaroslavl - by 19 %. The quantity of staying for in Rostov the Great rose 3 times.)

New hotels are being built very actively in the Oblast. The resources come from investors. The combined project of Moscow Government and Yaroslavl Oblast Administration on building of the hotels net in the main Oblast tourist centres has entered in the completing stage. Recently the hotels in Rostov the Great and Uglich were put into commission. The work on various stages of realization is being done on 30 building sites yet. (In particular in Yaroslavl to 1000th anniversary it is planned to build a hotel by the cinemaconcert complex.)

The principal missions in development of hotel sector of the Oblast today are:

1. increase of general quantity of places,
2. replacement of insufficiently comfortable reserves of rooms
3. increase of the budget accommodation (of the 2-3* level)
4. as far as there is an increase of out-of-town hotels segment which even outstrips an increase of quantity of city`s hotels it is essentially to found the special recreation zones,
5. well-trained staff preparation.

The tourist firms and hotels bring into the Oblast`s economic considerable share of all tourism revenue return. Then, in 2005 they gave tourist`s services worth 550 million rubbles, in 2006 - worth 680 million rubbles, in 2007 - worth 790 million rubbles, in 2008 - worth 1 milliard 150 million rubbles.

In the autumn 2008 an independent research of three more directions of investment in tourism, i.e. transport, souvenirs production preparation, catering was putted in practice firstly. The income size of each of them into the Oblast budget was determined. It will permit to define the possibilities of tourism as an economic resource more exactly and to form its development strategy for the nearest years.

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This information confirms, that the ancient cities Sigtuna and Yaroslavl, which are of the same age, are interesting to each other in tourism development. In the same time it is possible to interact in other directions. For example, both cities are educational centres. Some well-known in all Europe educational institutions work in Sigtuna. Sigtunaskolan Humanistiska Läroverk is one of them. There are more then 50 educational institutions in Yaroslavl. Students from various countries study there. Relation development between Yaroslavl and Sigtuna and wider – between Russia and

Sweden on this basis is perspective. **The Organization of Russian-Swedish friendship society in Yaroslavl would be very effective as a cooperation tool. It is particularly actual within the framework of future 1000th anniversary of the city.**

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Markin Maxim

Probable Variants of Russians' Financial Behavior in Conditions of the Integration of Russian and Western Financial Markets (the Case of the Stock Market)

Abstract

In context of Russian integration into international society the question of possible changes in some institutions as a result of it becomes very important. Using the data connected with stock markets the author tries to analyze the possibilities of establishing new institutions and transplantation of European institutions. The author comes to conclusion that all the attempts of bringing foreign institutions into Russia can be successful only in case of good state policy.

Keywords: Stock market, institutional changes, financial behavior

Introduction

Modern Russia is near to the integration with the international community. It has been spoken about it for a long time, but our country was never so close to this event before. The integration intends the transfer different spheres of social life to the similar formal (and theoretically informal) rules both in Russia and in the West.

Current situation intends making series of changes that are needed in our country to make it satisfied the requirements of the international standards. So in the nearest future there will be introduced new foreign institutions in Russia. I will not pay much attention to this point (the issue about the advisability of integration), but I will describe the prospects of introducing of the international standards in Russia with the relation to the possibility of their adaptation in our country.

Economic sphere is one of the spheres of social life where Russian and Western integration is planned. In this work I will describe the problem of the transfer to new "rules of play" in the financial markets, and the stock market will be taken as an example.

With the relation to economic-sociological point of view, the stock market can be analyzed at least from two different directions[1]:

1. Analyzing the work of players (traders and etc.) acting in the market, making their business strategies, their forming conception of control and so on[2].

2. Analyzing people's financial behavior (for example, what makes a person become a stockholder, why he makes such decision instead of taking his money to a bank, opening an account and getting definite interest)[3].

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1 I thank the candidate of sociological sciences, an associate professor of the economic-sociological department of the State University – Higher School of Economics T.Kalimullin for the idea of this classification.

2 For more details see, for example: [Кнорр-Цетина, Брюггер, 2004, Аболафия, 2004].

Above-stated points of view can intersect in several aspects, so I can not say that there will be only one of them described in this work, but I will pay much more attention to the second direction (to analyzing people's financial behavior).

So the *problem* of this theoretical research is the uncertainty of the outlook of leading of the international standards in Russia with the relation to the possibility of their adaptation in our country. Private investors were taken as the *object* of the study, and the financial behavior is the *subject* of the investigation.

This work consists of three main parts. The first chapter includes the economic descriptions of Russian stock market. The description of this point does not claim to complete the issue. It is important for us to mention only that economic aspects of the development of the equity market which are necessary for the further economic-sociological analysis.

The second chapter of this work relates to analyzing the financial behavior of people for the purpose of the possibility and prospects of taking part in the work of the stock market. In this chapter I will consider why the population becomes interested in putting up money in securities, what makes them come to the stock market and than mention basic myths and prejudice of Russian people due to the stock market.

In the third, concluding, chapter possible models of financial behavior of Russians in conditions of integration of Russian and Western stock markets are proposed. And it is also attempted to choose the most probable variants.

There are also the main recommendations about the adaptation of Russian stock market to the international standards (with the relation to possible changes in people's financial behavior).

Economic descriptions of Russian stock market

The majority of the experts now point to the impetuous development of Russian stock market. Special attention is paid to the increase of the interest of private investors to the stock market.

Series of the data, defining the present situation on Russian stock market are shown below[4]. Here the Broker service, Unit investment trusts and Initial public offerings (IPO) are consequently described.

1. Broker service

By the beginning of 2007 there were opened more than 231 000 accounts of persons in the stock sphere of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (for comparison - by the beginning of 2005 there were only 60 000). They are the persons who form the basic mass of the clients, registered by broker companies in the Auctions Act of Stock Exchange of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (their portion is appreciated as about 87%).

Besides the amount of private investors, amounts of business and volumes of transactions, accomplished by players in the stock exchange, are also increasing rapidly. Cumulative size of 80 largest investment companies exceeded 720 milliard dollars in 2006, and the greater part (about 689 milliard dollars) accounted for the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange.

3 For more details see, for example: [Радаев, 2002; Стребков, 2007].

4 For more details about this issue see: [Стребков, 2007: 12-15].

So now the stock market adds up to the extremely fast escalating segment of financial market.

2. Unit investment trusts

By the beginning of 2007 the amount of Russian shareholders was more than 500 000 people, and the average rate of account was about 200-250 thousand rubles. For comparison - by the end of 2005 this category included only about 70 000.

As in the case with clients of broker companies the growth of amount of shareholders has been extraordinarily rapid during the several previous years.

3. Initial public offerings

When describing the statistical data in this chapter it is worth giving several concrete examples.

About 115 000 people took up shares of “NK Rosneft” during their public distribution that took place in 2005. And in course of IPO investors took up securities for the general sum of 20.3 milliard rubles, and the investments of small investors aggregated 4 milliard rubles.

About 30 000 people took up shares of Sberbank in February of 2005. It happened in spite of the utterly high admission barrier – the cost of one share was positioned on the 90-thousand rubles level. Total volume of funds invested by private investors into the shares of Sberbank came to 13.7 milliard dollars during their additional disposal.

So the experience of last Initial public offerings was also a success.

The data, mentioned above, indicates the growing number of clients of broker and management companies, increasing amount of Unit investment trusts and the increase of cost of their net wealth, increase in turnovers on the largest Russian stock exchanges, Russian people’s participation in IPO. This shows the active increase in interest of private investors to the stock market for the last years.

Now let’s move from quantitative notion of current situation in Russian stock market to qualitative describing of several aspects[5].

The most convenient way of analyzing stock market is viewing from two sides – from the demand-side and from the supply-side.

Demand-side

Native institutional investors count very little in mobilization of capital (they accumulate at the most 25% of national savings). The other 75% account for the banks that accumulate the deposits of natural persons. But all over the world the main players in the market of capitals are institutional investors. And the banks work for securitizing their assets by shifting off the requirements for covers to the institutional investors. For example, in Russia securitizing mortgage credits became accessible to Russian banks only at the end of 2005 after the adoption of legislation and necessary standard acts.

In our country the rate of investment savings necessary for maintenance of the increase of investment is moderate, but the role of foreign capital is essential, that when incorporating economy into the global marketplace of capital, causes preserving backwardness of national financial sector, because margin will go away to global investors.

[5] This issue was widely discussed: [Вьюгин, 2007].

So the capitalization of banking system is rather small and infrastructure of the stock market is retarded in its development from acknowledged world centers. Banking system accumulates 75% of all national savings. But in the market of capital, where Russian companies receive the investment, the main role is played by institutional investors, among which foreign funds accumulating foreign for our country savings prevail. That is why the development of institutional investors and institutions of financial mediation, corresponding to the international standards of rendering of service should become one of the main aims of public policy. This is the only way to change Russian stock market into the basic instrument of getting investment reserves, to raise the rate of saving, to engage wide circle of population in investment process.

Supply-side

There took place 17 primary distributions in Russia in 2006 (for comparison – there were only 3 in 2000). 21.6 billion dollars were drawn including private distributions (in 2000 – only 0.5 billion dollars).

Since 2005 the majority of well-prevalent companies chose the way of diversification the base of shareholders and began using the market of capital for the purposes of acquisition assets and financing investments into the fixed capital, i.e. development of business. This adds up to qualitative turn in the strategic behavior of shareholders from Russian companies.

Aggregating the economic characteristics of Russian stock market I can mention that it is developing very quickly but, first of all, the quantitative indices are rather large for Russia but not for the leading world equity markets, and the second – at the qualitative level there are a lot of problems there.

Characteristics of the financial behavior of Russian people

Nowadays in Russia the equity market exists which lets the private investors make money. As an example I will quote following figures[6] - in 2006 the cost of shares of Sberbank increased by 145%, Rostelekom - by 209%, RAO "EES" - by 135%, and the Russian Trade System Index that shows the general dynamics of Russian stock market, increased by 70,7%. But nowadays we can not see mass arrival of Russians into native equity market ("today in Russia only about 1% of aging population are anyhow concerned with the stock market" [Стребков, 2007: 14]). What is the reason?

Before directly answering this question, let's describe the general structure of Russian's motives of coming to the stock market. It is convenient to divide all the motives into five groups: economic, cognitive, social, status and emotional motives.

Economic motives

Under economical motives I will mean lucre, achievement of financial wishes and financial safety.

Cognitive motives

It means the aspiration for knowledge, self-actualization and evolution of self.

Social motives

Under social motives I will mean the motive of intercourse and the corporative motive.

[6] For more details see: [Стребков, 2007: 17].

Status motives

It is the desire for showing high social status, power, management and control and also self-assertion.

Emotional motives

Under emotional motives I will mean the aspiration for recreation and play, vehemence, fervor and pride.

Just listed motives of coming to the equity market are typical not only for Russians, but for people from different countries. But I suppose, that in Russia economic and status motives (widely distributed in the West) play lesser role but the cognitive and emotional motives are of great importance. Social motives are equally important both in Russia and abroad. Using the terminology by D.Strebkov this fact can be explained by close interweaving of thee types of personality in Russian people's consciousness – traditional Russian orthodox, deep-rooted soviet and new bourgeois. It is not unnatural that in the West the last type plays the greatest (and even maybe the only) role, but in Russia the two first types are still important.

The result of this difficult system of the perception of reality is that Russians have created a number of myths about the stock market. The main of them are inexpediency, technical difficulty, intellectual difficulty, non-existent restrictions, false stereotypes and cultural aims.

I also consider that the bad experience of financial play of Russians in the 1990th is explained such attitude to the stock market. Privatization, financial pyramids, the crisis of 1998… All of these played a bad role in perspectives and expediency of taking part in such tools of earning money (maybe it is also the reason of the weakness of economic motives of taking part in work of the stock market).

In the first chapter there is a quite positive picture of the developing of Russian financial markets. Here you can see the difficulties in our stock market. But according to the opinion of many experts the dynamic is positive – the sock market in Russia is developing quite well.

Nowadays in our country introducing of the international standards on the local stock market and its integration with Western stock market are planned. The method of importing of foreign institutes will be describe in more details in the third chapter but in this part I give one example of the events which are possible in terms of introducing the international standards in our country.

But before this it is necessary to have one more theoretic part. The main models of investment behavior[7] may be classified according to the following criteria: the role in the play and the approach to the play.

1. The classification according to the role in the play

The stuff of the players (the participants of financial operations and who are in risk to loose their money) is first of all stockholder-amateurs and second-hand-dealer-professionals and stockbrokers.

Among stockholder-amateurs there are investors (who buy shares and do not sell them at once waiting for the increasing of their price) and speculators (who usually sell shares immediately playing with quotations).

2. The classification according to the approach to the play

[7] About this issue see in more details: [Стребков, 2007: С. 34-38].

Here there are three models of playing behavior: heated players, circumspect players and imitators.

So according to the first classification there are stockholder-amateurs and second-hand-dealer-professionals on the market. The special method of their interaction is forming now on Russian stock market but nowadays here there are only members of network investors (innovators were before and mass-consumer will be later)[8]. These network investors and professionals have created special schemes of interaction which are quite good for our law and the method of regulation of Russian stock market. Introducing the international standards in Russia is very probable to be when mass-consumer appears on the market. What difficulties can be?

Nowadays the term "unprofessional" on the stock market is understood in different way in Russian law and in the international standards. The rights of unprofessional participants are defended better according to the international standards but during the transitional period (while new rules are in practice first time) a great number of amateurs can loose there money. It will intensify many myths which are described above.

More over some difficulties may appear as there can be great success of some participants (for example, heated players) with financial problems of others (for instance, circumspect players). I mean that the problem may be in adaptation of institutes in our country but people can think that the first strategy is good and the other is bad. As a result the problem of "moral money"[9] can appear again like it was at the end of 1980th – at the beginning of 1990th. The public opinion may be that the money earned on the stock market is unfair. This can lead to the decrease of status and emotional motives. As a result there may be bad future developing of Russian stock market. The similar situation can be among investors and speculators. Here the interweaving of different types of personality may play an important role. There can be other variants too.

So Russian stock market is developing. But the problem is in different myths created by Russians about it. According to the opinion of many experts mass-consumer will come to the Russian market soon. Introducing of the international standards may be in the same time. If the transitional period is long this positive event (as it seems to be) can stop the developing of Russian stock market. This shows that the decision of introducing the international standards in Russia is a great questionable problem.

The probable institutional changes of Russian stock market

As in my work I speak about the integration of Russian stock market in the international financial markets, about introducing the international standards on our financial markets it is necessary to analyze the probable methods of realization of this process. To do it I use the book "The sociology of markets: to the forming of the new trend" created by V.Radaev [Радаев, 2003: 113-148]. Here, first of all, I am interested in the analyzing the issue of institutional changes of markets.

So there are two main methods of institutional changes of markets:

1. appearance and selection of institutes;

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[8] About this classifications see in more details: [Радаев, 2002].

[9] About this issue see in more details: [Зелизер, 2004].

2. enrollment of institutes.

Appearance and selection of institutes may be done by:

1. institutional invention;
2. import of institutes;
3. transformation of institutes.

In our case (introducing the international standards on Russian stock market) there are no institutional invention – Russia should take Western models. It is (if we use the terms by V.Radaev) the import of institutes. It may be done by three methods:

1. free-will taking;
2. political obtrusion;
3. “missionary work”.

In spite of opinions of many experts that introducing the international standards is profitable for Russia and our country takes Western models by free-will, I agree with another point of view that this process is being done by political obtrusion (the negotiations about the entrance of Russia into the World Trade Organization are very good example of it). It is not the barrier to the possible appearing of some missionaries for more successful adaptation of the introduced institutes in our country.

The import of institutes is in close connection with serious problems. Among the main of them are:

1. choice of models (in our case there is not this kind of problem – Russia takes the international standards);
2. adaptation of the institutional model to the local conditions (Western rules might be “build” in using norms but it is connected with some its transformations – will our foreign partners agree?);
3. myth connected with institutional models (some people believe that introducing international standards on Russian financial (and not only financial) markets will increase the rate of growth of the Russian economy, their role is often idealized that is one of the reason of the next discredit).

It is important to mark the fact that participants of markets don’t usually want any great transformations because:

1. previous investments in special assets (Russian traders have already done a lot in Russian stock market and the transformations of rules threaten their capital);
2. adherence to the existing structures and institutes (there are problems of philological changes and the conformity of human (and not only human) capital to the new conditions which is connected with new investments);
3. inclination to the avoidance of risks (many traders want to avoid the risk connected with new changes).

There are some variants of introducing new formal rules. The order of this process may be:

1. common (new rules become obligatory for all the participants of the market);
2. experimental (the participants of the market begin to use new rules by free-will).

In our case there is a common order of introducing the new formal rules on Russian stock market, but are every participants of it ready?

So there is no question about the probability of introducing the international standards. What will be the result?

There are two possible variants:

1. parallel existing of old and new rules;
2. their ousting.

The main clause of the international community is the using only the international standards on Russian financial markets. It is not the possible variant to use both old and new rules. If our Government realizes its project there will be two possible variants:

1. fastening of habitual informal norms in the form of new laws and contracts;
2. ousting of habitual informal norms by new formal rules.

Here there is the question: are the international standards the informal norms which used by the participants of the stock market? It means that the rules which the Government is going to introduce are like the prevalent opinion of the traders of the market who can not realize them as there is an opposition to the old rules. In this case introducing of Western models will be quite easy and their adaptation in Russia will be successful. But it is such an optimistic variant. Russians traders think about our stock market in other way. For instance, in Russia the scheme of work of regulation ministries which falls short of the international standards is used (some other examples are marked above in my work).

So it seems very important for our Government to pay great attention to forming the opinion of effectiveness of introducing the international standards as the main opinion by the participants of the financial markets. The appraisal of effectiveness of rules is formed by the following elements:

1. expediency / expenditure of observance of a rule;
2. degree of formalization of a rule (the degree of detailed elaboration of terms of its observance);
3. clarity of a rule (its consistency and intelligibility for the participants of the market);
4. conformity of a rule to the long-term interest of the participants of the market;
5. effectiveness of sustenance of a rule (the strength and regularity of formal and informal sanctions of non-observance of work practices);
6. embeddedness of a rule (the degree of its conformity to the habitual work practices);
7. justice of a rule (the satisfaction of the participants of the market in the public opinion as moral appeal).

So the Government should use different methods of influence on the opinion of the participants of the market (including potential participants) for the increasing of their estimation of effectiveness of introducing the international standards. The possible variants of it are negotiations between the Government and businessmen, social advertising and other methods.

Speaking about enrollment of new institutes I can mark the following factors that increase the degree of formalization of the rules:

1. completeness (fullness and consistency) of formal rules;
2. comparative levels of costs of observance of formal and informal rules;
3. probability of becoming the object of selective control;
4. possibility of agreement of the degree of observance (non-observance) of rules with the main participants of the market;
5. convincingness of public substantiation which aimed at support or devaluation of formal and informal rules.

All these points should be taken into consideration by the Government while it is introducing the international standards in Russia.

So the international standards will be introduced in Russia be import of the institutes. Every import has its difficulties and Russian stock market will have them too. It is very important to carry out good state policy aimed at the change of the estimation of effectiveness of introducing the international standards in our country and also at the increase of popularity of the stock market as one of the main financial tool. The motives which should be stimulated for the successful adaptation of Russian stock market are described in the second part of our work.

Conclusion

The international standards on Russian financial markets will be probably introduced into practice. The problem is how make the adaptation of these rules the most successful.

O.Viyugin marks that now there are a lot of problems in Russian stock market which must be solved for the successful integration on Western financial markets[10]. The most important of them are: incompleteness of regulative laws (the lack of effective methods of the defense of investors from the unfair using of in-side information and from the manipulation of prices), the gap in the developing of trade and discount systems (the lack of the single registration of bargains of securities and the possibility of confirmation of ownerships in one place, the lack of standard exchange technology and many others), weak development of institutional investors. Some of these problems should be solved by introducing the international standards.

In my work I analyze the method of introducing of the international standards on Russian stock market, mark the main motives of Russian private investors and the myths created by Russians about the financial markets. These points give me the possibility to predict the most probable variants of Russians' financial behavior in terms of integration Russian and Western stock markets and so the perspectives of the adaptation of the international standards in our country. Without good state policy these perspectives are not very optimistic – the actualization of some myths about Russian financial markets, the decrease of the rate of growth of Russian stock market and possible bad situation are very probable. Of course, there are other points of view. For example, D.Strebkov consider that there is no great problem of introducing of the international standards in Russia as our financial markets are created under Western model and the adaptation to the new rules successfully used in Europe won't be very difficult[11].

I think that introducing of the international standards will be more successful if there is good state policy of the increasing of the person's perception of the effectiveness of the using of the international standards in Russia as it is profitable for Russian participants of the stock market. It is also necessary to have great campaign of exposure of the myths created by Russians about the financial markets.

About this issue look in more details: [Вьюгин, 2007].

[11] I thank the candidate of sociological sciences, an associate professor of the economic-sociological department of the State University – Higher School of Economics D.Strebkov for this comment and also for other important comments to my work.

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Daria Grineva

“Dominant party" in political life: is Swedish experience applicable for Russia?

This work is the first stage of the research devoted to the dominant party institution and it is role in the political regime and the political system. Reviewing the cases of The United Russia (Russia) and The Social Democratic Party of Sweden (Sweden) getting to know the nature and the key peculiarities of both parties the attempt is made to conduct some brief comparative analysis of the situation. In the framework of this analysis two dominant parties in the context of totally different political regimes and systems are examined. Thus there is an attempt to reach the answer to the following question: can we consider the existence of a dominant party in the country a sign and a factor of the undemocratic political regime? Or are there such essential characteristics of dominant parties which let us distinguish them as democratic and undemocratic?

At this stage of the research an intermediate conclusion can be made that within the democratic regime the lasting dominance of one party is possible as a result of relatively stable prevailing of certain social sentiments and views, which in itself does not conflict the principles of democracy. In this case the emphasis is laid not on the quantity of the active political forces but on the possibility to maintain the actual and free political competition whether it is the regime with a dominant party or not.

So we can conclude that it makes sense for the Russian dominant party at least to try to import the experience of its democratic Swedish counterpart. Speaking about the experience we mean also getting support from various social strata and close and intense connection with the society. It can consolidate the party United Russia as the active, independent and more or less autonomous institution and make it more democratic.

Introduction

In late eighties – early nineties Russia made an attempt to begin the transition to the democracy. The institutional design of the political system underwent certain changes. However, the introduction of the democratic institutions such as general alternative elections, president with limited term of office, publicly elected two-house parliament, free mass media, political parties and so on did not lead to the consolidation of the full-fledged democratic political system and political regime. The regime in Russia continues to transform in the post-Soviet period. According to the assessment of many Western experts (e.g. Freedom house) Russia is swerving from the way to democratization more and more and the authoritarian tendencies are becoming more and more evident. As the arguments in favor of this point of view the following factors were named: V. Putin – oriented political system, not fully free mass media, the tendency to control business on the part of the state, the abolition of the governors` elections, and, in general, the establishment of the «power vertical». To these factors they also refer only partially free elections, the possibility of the falsification of the election results and also the significant dominance of the pro-power party «United Russia» along with considerable weakening of other parties` positions.

«The United Russia» (UR) appeared on the political arena in 2000 when V. Putin came to power and the transition to the «monocentric regime» (the regime with the dominant actor) started. UR became one of the main forces supporting the new regime and implementing the policies of the government as the party had the majority both in the State Duma and in many regional legislatures.

We can see the regime with a dominant party not only in Russia where UR is still quite new and its role and significance are not so unequivocal. We know the examples of such countries as Mexico, Japan, Italy, Sweden. The last case is of particular interest because Sweden has had a long-standing reputation of a developed democratic country on the international arena. In this connection there is the following question: can a dominant party in the country be considered the sign and the factor of the non-democratic political regime? Or are there such characteristics of dominant parties that refer them both to the democratic and undemocratic ones which in turn affects the characteristics of the regime in this or that country in general.

The Swedish experience is interesting for Russia partly because of the fact that being a close neighbor of the Russian state Sweden quite often historically competed with Russia. It is also interesting to note that moderate left-wing ideas became especially popular in Sweden at the beginning of the XX century which lead to the long-standing dominance of the left-wing block (The Social democratic working party of Sweden in particular) on the political arena. So Sweden was ideologically closer to Russia than many other Western countries although many of them underwent the period of the formation of a social state in the post-war years. However in these circumstances Swedish left forces continued to keep power up to the recent period (2006) when the lost to the «New moderate» (opposition conservative right centrist coalition). The Social democratic party was not in power only for 9 years since 1932. However, at the last parliamentary elections in Sweden the gap between the left and conservative opposition was insignificant – 2%.[1] It is necessary to note that as opposed to Great Britain e.g. it is not the left (like the Labor party did in late nineties) but the right that had to change which is reflected even in the name of the opposition coalition – the «New moderate» and also in their refusal to fully privatize such areas as education and health care.

In Russia throughout the XX century as well as now the social demand for the paternalism of the state was and still is very strong. Despite the euphoria connected with perestroika and relatively sharp increase in the popularity of liberal ideas and sentiments in late 80-s – early90-s, the hopes that were not largely justified revived the demand for a social state in Russia.

From the very beginning in the post-Soviet Russia there was a threat of the restoration of the Communist regime from the Congress of People's deputies at first and then from the Communist party of Russia which was very popular. In the course of the 90-s the authorities made attempts to create the so-called «power parties» but they failed to become really stable and successful political actors being able to provide the long-standing presence of the authorities in the parliament. They managed to establish a party of the stable majority only in the 2000s concurrently with the transition to the new monocentric regime.

In Sweden the Social democratic working party which has a 100-year old history started more as a people's movement and that is why it ensures not the representation of the authorities in the legislature but in the first place the representation of specific social strata and then specific ideas and views of the significant part of the population on the political process and political system. “The Social democratic movement has left its mark in the development of Sweden in the last century. It is mainly explained by the fact that our party is not just a political structure but a people’s movement. 100 years ago the trade unions, sobriety societies, youth organizations, cooperatives – all contributed to forming of the idea that people should live in cooperation with each other. That is how the people’s movement in Sweden started”. [2]

It is important that the government in Sweden is formed on the basis of parliamentary elections that is a choice that is realized and made carefully which reduces the possibility of manipulations and does not let the parliament and the elections to it acquire a purely «technical» character. And that is exactly how the current Russian parliament and the dominant party The United Russia are characterized.

It is possible to explain the differences between the two dominant parties with the help of examining the features of their genesis.

The United Russia as the instrument of the regime consolidation

In 2001 the State Duma started the consolidation process of the centrist political forces representing both the regional interests and the interests of the federal center. The organizations The Unity, The Fatherland and The whole Russia were authorized to start work on creating a joint political party on their basis. Later it was called The United Russia.

UR was formed as the party consolidating the regions and the center. It had the aim of integrating the regional elites inhomogeneous by themselves into the “power vertical” being built by Vladimir Putin. The alliance of the elites and the Kremlin was not something new for the post-Soviet Russia, however, this union was quite different from what we had observed before. In the early post-Soviet period the relationship between the Kremlin and the elites (primarily business elites) were based mainly on the classical vertical patron-client relations; in the period of the polycentrism these relationship became horizontal and more conflicting. However despite these changes there was something in common - these relations did not have organized, systematic and institutionalized character. The elites did not act unanimously, there were a lot of coalitions, everything was based on the personal connections of the actors. The relations between the actors were poorly organized, and the efficiency was achieved through informal institutions, the engagement of the players in multiple informal networks. The formal institutions did exist but since the middle of the 90-s they practically did not work and were becoming more and more alien to the current Russian political reality. This destroyed the system from within, the level of uncertainty was increasing, the actors did not trust each other, the contracts were not full and were badly drawn up and their observance was based only on personal connections and informal agreements. This lead the system to the crisis the way out o which was eventually found but president Putin had to start a long, hard and in many ways undemocratic process of reforming the formal institutional basis of the post-Soviet system.

UR became one of the new institutions aimed at strengthening the whole system and ensuring the relatively smooth implementation of the further reforms. The party is quite highly centralized; all the major decisions are approved by the Center. The communication between the branches is carried out through the delegates at the congresses. That is the horizontal connections at the level of the regional offices are not well-developed. This is written in the party charter and arises from the logic of the goals of its creation. It was safer and more convenient to transfer the conflicts between the elites at a higher level in order to settle them more effectively. It is important that with the help of UR the elite conflict was moved from the public sphere to the area hidden from the electorate. The famous Russian economist Evgeny Yasin wrote: «From now on the threat could come only from the internal disagreements in the Kremlin administration itself which totally controlled both party structuring and the two houses of the parliament» [3; 129-130].

The voters had less and less opportunity to affect the outcome of the struggle between the elites as the election tool does not work in case of the inside party struggle. Thus, having made the UR a universal party for those «who really wants to participate in the political life of the country and in the distribution of the resources», the Kremlin narrowed the public policy field still more.

After the collapse of the USSR the system inherited from the Soviet times the tendency to the extremely closed settlement of the conflicts inside the elites. In early 90-s it was mitigated by really competitive elections but the practice of informal relations and the struggle between the scenes always took place. But Putin decided to maximally reduce the gap between formal institutional and informal arrangement of these processes. However the president could not cancel the alternative elections for many reasons.

The connection established between the president and the society underlay Putin`s regime. It was this contact with the society and the credit of confidence from it that allowed the federal center with Putin at its head to change the situation to their favor, to come out of the crisis of the polycentrism and to occupy the most advantageous position. The arrangement of forces changed. At first the old elites were forced to acknowledge the priority of the center becoming stronger and stronger, and then Putin gradually to some extent changed the elites themselves. Meanwhile Putin did his best to maintain his high rating. The authorities felt the mass sentiments and the social demand acutely and correctly. The society tired of the vague ideology of the 90-s wanted to see the real fruits of the reforms and painful changes. Throughout the 90-s the electorate witnessed the unscrupulous war for the resources that the elites conducted ignoring any rules. At least the rules specified by the Constitution and the entire formal institutional base. The post-Soviet institutional design was sort of a screen not very successfully and not very long covering the elite struggle and the redistribution of the property inside the elites. Largely because of this the democratization could not turn from the elitist into the mass one and reach its successful completion. The growing inequality of the 90-s with their oligarch phenomenon irritated and frustrated the majority of the society. The people were not yet ready to liberalism in its extreme manifestations especially under so unequal starting conditions: the transition to democracy was initiated by the elites and they made sure to create more favorable positions for themselves under the new system. Besides that it is not very easy and almost impossible to achieve the successful liberal market economy taking into account the level of the legal nihilism in the society.

E. Yasin notes that the period of the emerging democracy is characterized by «the contradictions between economic and political processes. <….> Market reforms are extremely painful inevitably leading to the social crisis and to the drop of the production and the living standards. <…> There appears some discontent which is quite justified». [3; 85-86] Quoting Psevorsky Yasin continues his thought getting to

Putin and to the social demand which he faced after coming to power: «When you achieve paradise in every day life you feel disappointment. There is a temptation to improve things at one stroke: to stop the disputes, to replace the politics by administering, anarchy by discipline, to act rationally – it is a temptation of the authoritarianism». [3; 96]

By the first Putin's presidential term of office the significant part of the society wanted to get help and support from the state. People were tired of the wild process of the initial accumulation of the capital in the early 90-s and the oligarchization of the second Boris Eltsin's term of office, of the shameless appropriation and distribution of the resources between various centers of power and influence. «The tough hand» of V. Putin who promised to establish order came in handy at that moment. In response to the social demand which had been formed the authorities sanctioned the development of priority national projects that UR was closely associated with.

«The UR achieved its success <at the Duma elections of 2003> due to the support of the popular head of state and the use of the resources of the state in the course of the campaign. The result of this in combination with the latent coalition policy in the single mandate constituencies was the following: having received 37.8% of votes in the all federal constituency the UR was able to ensure in the Duma «the fabricated supermajority» exceeding 2/3 of the mandates».[4] Thus due to the UR Putin`s political line was sure to be followed.

On the other hand, using the UR as well as the ministers from his team as the conductors of his course let Putin keep somewhat away from the policy of decentralization and to simulate to some extent the appropriate work of all the democratic institutions fixed in the Constitution. The changes were not pronounced enough to be noticed at once by the inexperienced majority of the electorate.

As it turned out the voters did not think much about many things concerning the new course and regime for a long time and may be the still don`t think about it. And even if people criticize these things, Putin is for the most part excluded from their criticism. It was the UR and the elites which received all the burden of blame with regard to the policies carried out in the country and all the failures and disappointments connected with it. This, however, did not prevent the head of state from being №1 on the favorite party list (UR) at the Duma elections in 2007 which undoubtedly gave it some extra point

The Social Democratic party of Sweden as the factor of modernizing the society

The Social Democratic party of Sweden was founded in 1889. As universal suffrage was not introduced until 1921, the party was under-represented in parliament because the workers did not have the right to vote constituting the basis of the party electorate. The absence of the universal suffrage in Sweden and Belgium prevented the political self-expression of the working class with the help of the party. And on the contrary the trade union and cooperative activities allowed to improve the living conditions of workers. Thus we have the developed trade unions and cooperatives in Sweden and Belgium respectively. In both countries in the course of the struggle for the universal suffrage trade union weapon was used: a strike (the general strikes of 1891 and 1893 in Belgium; those of 1902 and 1908 in Sweden). The Socialist party naturally had to form on the basis of existing class organizations and to become indirect.

The Social Democratic party of Sweden can be named indirect. «Within indirect parties there are two types of them. Some of them appeared due to the formation at the local level of some active political core through the unification of all the existing groups; the basic element of the others was created by the representatives of such groups. We can refer the British Labour Party to the first type, the Belgian workers` party and the Social Democratic party of Sweden – to the second one. But strictly speaking only the first party can be called indirect».[5; 48-49]

However any individual and also association: in reality trade unions, cooperatives and so on may join a local section of The Social Democratic party of Sweden (arbetarekommun). [5; 52]

In 1917 The Social Democrats cooperate for the first time in a coalition government with the Liberals to implement the democratization of the country. Beginning with 1930s The Social Democrats for the most part headed the government. Throughout this period there were as a rule from five to seven parties in the parliament. So the long-standing dominance of The Social Democratic party of Sweden did not lead the elimination of multi-party system in Sweden. According to The Social Democrats themselves it was the ability of creating coalitions that helped the party to win a victory over the conservative bloc.

In accordance with the Swedish electoral system the amount of parliamentary mandates received by this or that party is defined exclusively by the percentage of the people who have voted for the given party. In order to have the absolute majority in the parliament the party should get no less than 50% of the votes. For such a multi-party country as Sweden the election results throughout a long period of time have been surprisingly stable. The Social Democrats usually formed minority governments receiving the support in parliament by creating coalitions. Certain instability in the position of The Social Democrats in the 1990s can be explained by the unwillingness of the socialist supporters to accept the idea of the openness of the Swedish economy to the world markets and international capital flows. For the first time in the contemporary history unemployment became one of the problems in the political life of Sweden. The growth of unemployment was followed by the increase of the national debt. When The Social Democrats came to power again in 1994 there had to reform the unbalanced system of social security by reducing the level of some payments which in 1998 led to the significant losses of the left party supporters' votes. But in 2002 The Social Democrats regained the trust the electorate to the great extent.

The Social Democratic party of Sweden has the pronounced and clear ideology. Both the party ideology and program is regularly changed and edited in accordance with the changes in the current political and economic situation and the sentiments of the electorate.

In the last party program of 2001 such main values as liberty, equality and solidarity were proclaimed. "The conditions for the universal well-being

This common good presupposes solidarity. Solidarity is the unity that originates from the insight that we are all mutually dependent on each other, and that the best society is the one that is built on cooperation… Solidarity does not exclude striving for individual development and success. Social Democracy wants these ideals of democracy to characterise society as a whole… Our aim is a society without divisions into lower and higher orders, without class differences, sexual segregation or ethnical divisions" [2] At present The Social Democratic party of Sweden focuses not so much on the problems of workers and clerks as on the unity solidarity of the society in the spirit of the corporatism and also on the equality which is an urgent problem in the society which is becoming less and less homogenous ethnically. Besides that the ideology still reflects the opposing with the right-wing ideas. The important thing for the Swedish social democracy is distinguishing democracy and capitalism which The Social Democrats speak against. “The main task: the protection of democracy from the forces dominating at the market, that is opposing the ideas of neoliberalism” [2]

The dramatic character of the political competition in Sweden does not give the party a chance to stagnate even under the most favorable conditions. It can be explained by the fact that both for the country and the social democrats the lowest political level is of the greatest importance. It is the local level at which the most urgent problems for the electorate are solved. The party underlines the significance of this basic level at which the direct connection with the society is carried out and the most important agenda is drown up. The Social Democrats also stress the importance of the internal party discussion and the decentralization in the party (both ideological and territorial including financial: “Each branch of the party solves the question of membership fees independently”). [2]. “For the Social Democratic Party it has become natural to seek contact when new popular movements show up and help them to give a political profile to their message… All this means that there are times when party members and local organizations find themselves in opposition to their own party, especially when the party is in government. It should be noted that from the local organization up, independence from higher organs is the rule. This of course gives the party a lively internal debate”. [2]

“The Social Democratic party’s long-term strength in Swedish politics rests on the following pillars: co-operation with the trade unions, strong local self-government combined with a good party organization on all levels, a certain capacity of being in opposition to itself and keeping a lively internal debate going” [2], – this is how the Swedish Social Democrats themselves define the formula of their long-term success.

The parties represented at the national, regional and local levels get the subsidies from the state depending on the amount of the mandates they have (it reflects the Swedish vision of political parties as the vital part and instrument of the parliamentary democracy).

“The most important co-operation with other actors in society is, however, the close links between the party and the trade unions… However, this co-operation has guaranteed wage earners a voice in Swedish politics”. [2] It is also important for the party that trade unions provide significant including financial support during election campaigns.

In early 1990s the unfavorable economic situation and also the strong influence of the American and British neoliberalism caused the short-term defeat of The Social Democrats in Sweden. However soon after that they got the lost positions but only briefly as in the 2006 they were beaten by the conservative coalition of The New Moderate.

Conclusion

On the basis of this brief overview of the dominant parties in Russia and Sweden it is possible to make some conclusions on their similarities and differences. The fundamental and in many ways determinative difference is in the genesis of the parties, in their social basis. The Social democratic party was created to express the interests of the growing in late XIX – early XX workers` movement which had to fight for their political rights. This movement was already structured as the network of trade unions which on the one hand helped the workers in their struggle, but on the other hand could become an obstacle to the formation of the really strong party organization of the workers. In principle the signs of this could be seen in the decentralized character of the Social democratic party. Thus, generalizing we can say that the initiative of creating the party came from "the bottom" i.e. from the society itself, from its less politically able strata to be more exact.

As it is seen from the genesis of the party United Russia it was created as the tool of political struggle of the ruling elite against system opposition. The unexpected success of the spoiler project called The Unity and the consolidation of the society around the figure of Vladimir Putin gave the chance to develop the potential of this media quasi-party project and turn it into the majority party in the parliament. However one can doubt the independence and autonomy of this political actor which more and more resembles a purely technical instrument in the hands of the authorities. The lack of the accountability principle of the government to the parliament only enhances this tendency.

Though both parties address the idea of the national unity the Swedish rhetoric comes to the practice of real public cooperation, corporatism including the fundamental cooperation between the labour and the capital throughout the history of Sweden of the XXth century. The United Russia addresses the ideas of national restoration and revival but it is not such an important agenda for an everyday life.

The considerable centralization and the absence of the clear ideological position make UR less useful for solving everyday problems of the voters. Moreover since the party program is too vague it is difficult for electorate to have distinct opinion about it. People can not clearly formulate their needs and preferences and also have opportunities for the direct connection with the party. It prevents the practical realization of the real interests of the electorate.

It is remarkable that having a relatively short history the Russian dominant party has practically no serious rivals. This represents a sharp contrast to the stable Swedish multi-party system and real political competition.

In this connection we face the following question: can a party become a real independent and able subject of the political process if the source of its origin and further existence is the ruling elite and not some mass social forces whose interests it expresses and defends? The answer to this question requires a much more detailed and extensive comparative research. However the possibility of existence of the dominant party within a democratic regime can be confirmed by the long-standing Swedish experience. Such party dominance may serve as an indicator and consequence of the long-term dominance of certain social sentiments which in itself does not contradict the democracy. It is the question of maintaining real and free political competition that seems the most essential and significant one when we speak about the democracy no matter whether we take the dominant party regime or not.

It is very important for the Russian parties including the dominant one to learn from its democratic institutional counterparts. As for Swedish case we can propose the Russian dominant party to follow its example by getting support from various social strata and maintaining close and intense connection with the society. It can strengthen the institution of political parties in Russia which in its turn may be useful for democratization process in general.

Literature

1. http://www.gazeta.ru/2006/09/18/oa_216377.shtml

2. web-site of The Social Democratic party of Sweden: http://www.socialdemokraterna.se/

3. G.Yasin Will democracy in Russia survive?, 2005

4. V.Gelman Transformation of the Russian party system: monopolization of political market, 2005

5. M. Duverger Political parties, 2002

Appendixes

Sweden Foreign Ministry Invitation

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Ms. Nina Belyaeva, President of Interlegal
International Public Foundation, Moscow

Invitation to the Opening of the Summer School 'Baltic Practice', 4 August 2008

Dear Ms. Belyaeva

The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the pleasure of inviting you and the enlisted participants (in accordance with the attached list) to the opening session of the summer school 'Baltic Practice' on Monday the 4th of August, 2008 at 3 pm to 5 pm. The opening session will take place in the conference room 'Vinskänken' at the premises of the ministry on Fredsgatan 6, Stockholm.

Program
- Opening of session by Mr. Jan Nyberg (moderator), Head of the Division for Russia and Central Asia, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

- Introduction by Ms. Nina Belyaeva, President of Interlegal International Public Foundation, Moscow - "8th season of monitoring the Russia-Europe Dialogue : what have we learned"

- Presentation by Ambassador Åke Peterson, Special Representative in Ukraine of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.

- Speech by Mr. Vladimir Petrovskiy - Professor at State Institute of Foreign Affairs Moscow and Moscow State University,
Chairman of the Board of the Russian Association of Political Science - "New Paradigm of Multilateralism : Challenges of Leadership for the EU and Russia"

- Presentation by Ms. Hanna Hallin, President of the National Council of Swedish Youth Organisations – *tbc*.

- Presentation by a Member of the Swedish Parliament - *tbc*

- Discussion

- Closing remarks by the moderator.

Sincerely yours,
Mårten Ehnberg
Deputy Head of the Division for Russia and Central Asia, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PROGRAMME Of the VIII International Youth Summer School "Baltic Practice" By SU-HSE

Moscow – Stockholm. August 3-10, 2008

TOPIC OF THE SUMMER SCHOOL:
Russia – Europe: A New Phase of the Dialogue.
Issues of the new Russia-EU Partnership Agreement

	AUGUST 03, 2008	
13.00	Gathering at the Sheremetyevo-2 Airport	
18.00 – 19.20	Arrival, accommodation	
19.20 – 20.00	Organizational meeting of the participants	
20.00 – 21.00	Getting acquainted within the groups	Group supervisors
21.00 – 22.00	Introduction of the experts and participants from abroad	
	AUGUST 04 ,2008, MONDAY	
	TOPIC OF THE DAY **Russia – Europe: Political Dialogue**	
9.00 – 10.00	Breakfast	
10.00 – 11.00	General meeting of participants Introduction on Summer School working plan and tasks for the working groups	School Academic Director
11.00 – 13.30	*Work in Thematic Groups* - *Entrepreneurship culture and environment* - *IT and Youth :communication beyond borders* - *Bologna Process* - *Corporate Governance* - *Human Rights and Democracy Dialogue*	Group Academic Advisors
13.30 – 14.30	Lunch	
14.30	Leaving for Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (REGERINGSKANSILET)	
15.00 – 17.00	Official Opening Ceremony and Plenary session	

	Mr. Jan Nyberg (moderator) Head of the Division for Russia and Central Asia, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ms. Nina Belyaeva Summer School Academic Director Ambassador Ake Peterson, Special Representative in Ukraine o the Secretary General of the Council of Europe Mr. Vladimir Petrovskiy – Chairman of the Board of the Russian Association of Political Sciences Hanna Hallin, President of the National Council of Swedish Youth Organisations Presentation by a Member of the Swedish Parliament – tbc Discussion Closing remarks of the Moderator	
20.00 – 22.00	"Evening tea" for everyone – Debate Club "Sweden role in the European Family"- invited guest Mr. Petrovsky's shares his ideas and leads general discussion of future relations between Russia and the European Union	At the Hotel Lobby Hall
	AUGUST 05, 2008, TUESDAY	
	TOPIC OF THE DAY. **Russia – Europe: Economic Cooperation**	
10.00 – 12.30	Plenary meetings of the School *Chepurenko A.Yu.*, Dean of the Sociology Department of SU-HSE, "Entrepreneurship Conditions in Russia and in Sweden – Comparative Analysis", presentations of the group members (Markin Maksim), *Melitonyan O.A.*, Centre for Corporate Governance by SU-HSE, "Corporate Entrepreneurship and Corporate Culture: Swedish Lessons for Russian Corporations", presentations of the group members (Nalaya Churkina, Sharov Vsevolod, Milachova Tatyana)	
12.30 – 13.30	Lunch	
14.00 – 16.30	Work in thematic groups	
16.30 – 19.00	Information visits to government institutions and non-governmental organizations and agencies	
20.00 – 22.00	"Evening tea" for everyone –Debate Club "Ancient Cities of Europe. Presentation of Yaroslavl city, preparing for the Celebrations of Yaroslavl's 1000-Years Anniversary. Old Swedish Towns – Sigtuna	
	AUGUST 06, 2008, WEDNESDAY	
	TOPIC OF THE DAY.	

Russia – Europe: Common Educational Environment

10.00 – 12.30	Plenary meeting of the School The "Bologna Process" group, Silvia Geise, Vice-President of INGO Conference CoE, Germany, "Bologna Process in Europe – Students' Choice"; *Belyanin A.V.*, Professor of ICEF, "Institutional Problems of the Development of Bologna Process in Russia", presentations of the group members (Bige Denis, Maltseva Polina); *Beketova N.E.*, the "IT and the Youth: European Dialogue over the Borders" group, presentations of the group members (Voronov Ruslan, Tupitsyn Vitaly)
12.30 – 13.30	Lunch
14.00 – 16.30	Work in groups
16.30 – 19.00	Information visits to government institutions and non-governmental organizations and agencies
20.00 – 22.00	"Evening tea" for everyone – Debate Club Topic: Common Legal Environment for Europe and the World - Stockholm Arbitral Court. Introduction and discussion lead by Professor Yu. Fogelson

AUGUST 07, 2008, THURSDAY

TOPIC OF THE DAY.
Russia – Europe: Dialogue on Democracy and Human Rights. Questions to the new Strategic Agreement

10.00-12.30	*Chuck Hirt* (Banská Bystrica, Slovakia), "European Networks of Citizen Initiatives – The Enforcement of the Citizens' Right to Participate in Governance"; *Christine Cromwel-Ahrens (Great Britain)* "Experience of national NGOs working for Human Rights on the international level *Izrael Mensah* How Russia-UE Dialogue is vewed from the Global Distance *Nina Belyaeva* Exploring mechanisms of using the NGOs as mediators in the inter-governmental dialogue – case of the INGO Conference. Group members presentations (Mihail Dmitriev, Polina Grigorieva)
12.30 – 13.30	Lunch

14.00 – 16.30	Work in thematic groups: forming debate groups
16.30 – 19.00	Information visits to government institutions and non-governmental organizations and agencies
20.00 – 22.00	Preparations for the final debates between the groups on the following topic: Power Resources Costs vs. Common Democratic Values: What Brings Russia and Europe Together, and What Sets Them Apart

AUGUST 08, 2008, FRIDAY

TOPIC OF THE DAY.
Oil and Gas prices vs. Common Democratic Values: What Brings Russia and Europe Together, and What Sets Them Apart

8.30-9.00	Breakfast
10.00-12.30	Debates between the groups on the topic of "Power Resources Costs vs. Common Democratic Values: What Brings Russia and Europe Together, and What Sets Them Apart" Participants: representatives of the thematic work groups Jury: Silvia Geise (Germany), Cristine Cromwell-Ahrens (UK), Israel Mensah (France), Chuck Hirt (Slovakia), Katarina Sundberg (Sweden)tbc The debates are conducted by Prof. Belyaeva , Academic Director of the Summer School "Baltic Practice" Format of the debate provides for three rounds of votes by the audience on whose position was more convincing and final rates by the jury, followed by their comments
12.30 – 13.30	Joint picnic lunch and compliments for the winners
14.00 – 16.30	Sea trip around Stockholm
16.30 – 19.00	For the School Participants – free time For the thematic groups Academic Advisors: consultations for the final grading, based on the daily grading, filling in the School Sertificates
20.00 – 24.00	Student-Professor Final Ball: "Remembering this School"-humorous concert, music, gifts, discotheque

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About Summer School "Baltic Practice"

Baltic Practice is one of the most vivid and efficient student projects of the State University Higher School of Economics started in 2001. Every year more than 50 students decide to spend their time at the Summer School There are students from different Universities: from Moscow ones such as HSE, Lomonosov State University, Moscow University of International Relations, Culture Institute, and the regional ones (St. Petersburg, Perm, Nijni Novgorod, Ufa, Krasnodar and many others). More over as the School is called international there are students coming from Germany, Austria, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

Baltic Practice is aimed at realization of the Public Civic Expertise model. The School unites students' initiative, politicians' experience and experts' knowledge: there are well-known professors, politicians taking part in the School's work.

The Summer school is an annual activity that gives students an opportunity to solve practical problems for concrete customers and to develop such an atmosphere that all the students can really show their creative potential. That can only be reached through productive combination of work and rest-time.

The work of Summer School "Baltic Practice" is organized as a full-year self-activity of students and professors. On two seminars held in winter and spring summer school team develop work plan and decide all organizational and substantial issues.

We have initiative students from different faculties working together with politicians and experts (often they are outstanding public figures) to solve the most imperious problems and cases and form recommendations for a special client or government structures. Interfaculty integration and active international university cooperation allows us to use interdisciplinary approach to produce highly–professional analytical material.

Thus, participation in Summer Schools will help students to acquire special skills of:

- individual and team work
- formulating the recommendations
- communication skills
- making analytical reports
- project presentation
- public speech

Research Topics of the previous «Baltic Practice» summer sessions

- 2001: Cooperation between society and government - Svetlogorsk
- 2002: Citizens expertise of Kaliningrad-Baltic region development – Kurshskaya Kosa
- 2003: Russia and Europe cooperation through contact point – Kaliningrad

- 2004: Russian routes to Europe: educational, cultural and economic cooperation- Peterghof
- 2005: Russia and "new Europe": Baltic States – ways for cooperation – Jurmala, Latvia
- 2006: North-West Pipe-line: North corridor of resources exchange- Viborg+Helsinki, Finland
- 2007: Russia and EU cooperation: case-study of Germany – Witten-Herdeke, Germany
- 2008: Russia-Europe dialogue: democratic values vs oil and gas prices - Sweden

The School Program is based on research projects that are developed by the multidisciplinary group consisting of students, ph.d. candidates, administrators and chaired by the scientific leader, , public experts.

The Projects of Summer School 2008 in Sweden

- "Democratic values vs oil and gas prices":
- The Bologna Process – students' impact on university;
- Democracy: values, culture, institutes;
- IT & Youth;
- Corporate Governance;
- Ancient Cities of Europe;

Young scientists that aims to participate in the Summer School is to:

- choose one of the projects;
- find information about the topic using any sources;
- contact the group leader or student's curator;
- participate in the group work;
- write an essay (2-3 pages) on the following topic;
- send an essay not later then it is needed (April) to the group leader and to bring the essay copy to the department of Public Policy or to send it via e-mail to the group leader or student curator and to summerbaltika@mail.ru.

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УДК 327(470+570)(485)(06)
ББК 66.4(4)'6ж
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Российско-Европейские отношения: взгляд из Швеции. Научные доклады. Восьмая Международная летняя школа ГУ-ВШЭ «Практика на Балтике», Стокгольм, Швеция, 1-8 августа, 2008 / Научное издание / Текст: на англ. яз. / Отв. ред.-сост. Н.Ю.Беляева; Международный общественный фонд «Интерлигал». - М. – Издательство «ИНТЕЛКОРП». – 2009. – 197с. – 500 экз. - ISBN 978-5-91769-001-8

Издание содержит научные доклады участников Восьмой Международной летней школы ГУ-ВШЭ «Практика на Балтике». Школа проводится с 2001 г. в разных странах Балтики на базе партнерских университетов в рамках развития академической мобильности и международного научного сотрудничества по общей теме «Россия – Европа: пути взаимодействия». Научные доклады включают работы российских ученых, зарубежных экспертов, их молодых коллег – аспирантов, магистров, студентов. Структура книги включает предисловие научного руководителя Школы и шесть разделов, в которых помещены вступительные статьи научных руководителей исследовательских групп Школы и статьи участников Школы, отражающие результаты работы групп. Издание ориентировано на специалистов по Российско-Европейской интеграции, а также на всех, кто интересуется вопросами академической мобильности, Болонским процессом и организацией международного научного сотрудничества.

УДК 327(470+570)(485)(06)
ББК 66.4(4)'6ж
R95

Научное издание

Научные доклады. Восьмая Международная летняя школа ГУ-ВШЭ
«Практика на Балтике», Стокгольм, Швеция, 1-8 августа, 2008

Редактор Ш.Ш. Какабадзе
Компьютерная верстка Б.Б. Опастный

Подписано в печать 27.07.2009. Формат 70 х 100 1/16
П.л. 16,00. Уч.-изд. 12,50
Тираж 500 экз. Заказ №

Издательство «ИНТЕЛКОРП»
Москва, ул. Шипиловская, д. 64, корп. 1, офис 147

Отпечатано ООО «КНТ Синема Принт»
Москва, ул. Мосфильмовская, д.1, корп. 3