Заседание научного семинара, посвященного вычислительной теории коллективного выбора.

HSE Computational Social Choice Seminar

Заседание состоится 12 марта, четверг, 15:00 – 16:00 онлайн

Докладчик: Pierre Bardier (Paris School of Economics)

“The probability of satisfying axioms: a non-binary perspective on economic design”

For problems of economic design, voting and social choice, this paper aims at bringing the axiomatic theory of collective decisions closer to practice by proposing a general notion of degree of satisfaction which expresses the probability with which a rule satisfies one or several axioms. From welfare economics to the theory of voting, the multitude of impossibility results, constitutes a significant obstacle to effectively guiding collective decision-making. I propose and characterize a unique criterion to evaluate and compare rules, in any aggregation problem, on the basis of two components. The first one reflects the likelihood with which a rule satisfies several axioms separately, but also, crucially, the likelihood with which it satisfies them jointly. Yet, the distinction between separated and joint satisfaction additionally requires to account for the desirability of combinations of axioms. Not only can a normative requirement be more valuable to the eye of a researcher, a policy maker, or a lay citizen, than another one, but there may be synergies: conditionally on the satisfaction of a given axiom, the satisfaction of another one may be more or less valued, so that these axioms may be complementary or substitutable.

Ссылка на статью: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.13850

Рабочий язык семинара: английский

Онлайн: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/83756218781?pwd=prbATQVTP1yWLhZuwi6eDnel6yFFa4.1

Идентификатор конференции: 837 5621 8781
Код доступа: 384596 

С уважением,

Веселова Ю.А., Карпов А.В.