• A
  • A
  • A
  • АБВ
  • АБВ
  • АБВ
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Обычная версия сайта

Новости

Состоялось очередное заседание общемосковского научного семинара "МАТЕМАТИЧЕСКИЕ МЕТОДЫ АНАЛИЗА РЕШЕНИЙ В ЭКОНОМИКЕ, БИЗНЕСЕ И ПОЛИТИКЕ"

Автор доклада: Элле Эндрис (Университет Амстердама)
Тема: Voting as Selection of the Most Representative Voter

21 мая 2014 года в рамках очередного заседания общемосковского научного семинара "МАТЕМАТИЧЕСКИЕ МЕТОДЫ АНАЛИЗА РЕШЕНИЙ В ЭКОНОМИКЕ, БИЗНЕСЕ И ПОЛИТИКЕ" был заслушан доклад на тему "Voting as Selection of the Most Representative Voter".

Авторы: Элле Эндрис (Университет Амстердама)


Аннотация:

Voting is the process of choosing a "best" alternative in view of the preferences of a group of voters over a set of alternatives. In this talk I will present recent work based on the following simple idea: to determine the winner of an election, first identify the "most representative" voter in the group and then implement the will of that voter. I will explore this idea in the context of binary aggregation, where each voter expresses yes/no choices regarding a number of possibly correlated issues and we are asked to decide on a collective choice that accurately reflects the views of the group. We will see that certain rules based on our idea, namely the average-voter rule and the majority-voter rule, have surprisingly good properties. In particular, they allow us to approximate the theoretically attractive but practically intractable distance-based rule up to a small constant factor.