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Состоялось очередное заседание МЛАВР НИУ ВШЭ

17 февраля 2015 года в рамках заседания лаборатории был заслушан доклад профессора Мишеля Ле Бретона (Michel Le Breton)(Университет Тулузы) на тему “Electoral Bargaining in Runoff Elections: A Cooperative Game Theory Analysis and an Application to the French Regional Elections”.

Адрес:  ул. Шаболовка, д. 26, корп. 5, ауд. 5306.

17 февраля 2015 года в рамках заседания лаборатории был заслушан доклад профессора Мишеля Ле Бретона (Michel Le Breton)(Университет Тулузы) на тему  “Electoral Bargaining in Runoff Elections: A Cooperative Game Theory Analysis and an Application to the French Regional Elections”.

Abstract: This paper is an exploration in coalitional politics motivated by the French regional and municipal elections (but with a possibly larger scope of application). Elections of French regional and municipal councils proceeds as follows Two round elections, proportional representation with a "winner premium", and possibility of merging lists between the two rounds (under some conditions).Our primary objective is to try and account for how parties negotiate/bargain between the two rounds of such an election To this end, we build a model of bargaining in such a setting, where the analytical/structural framework we use is based on cooperative game theory, and derive its implications. We contrast these predictions to the Gamson predictions and actual outcomes observed in the 2010 French regional elections.




 

Адрес:  ул. Шаболовка, д. 26, корп. 5, ауд. 5306.