Выступление Штефана Напеля (Stefan Napel, University of Bayreuth, Germany) на тему "Borda vs. Condorcet vs. Plurality: The Power, Success and Size of Voter Groups"
16 ноября 2016 г. в НИУ ВШЭ состоялось очередное заседание общемосковского научного семинара "МАТЕМАТИЧЕСКИЕ МЕТОДЫ АНАЛИЗА РЕШЕНИЙ В ЭКОНОМИКЕ, БИЗНЕСЕ И ПОЛИТИКЕ".
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The talk considers collective decisions between more than two options by a fixed number of shareholders or homogenous voter groups. The respective voting weights or sizes of the groups differ. Collective outcomes are then known to be highly sensitive to the adopted collective choice rule. We seek to clarify the extent to which adoption of a particular rule can be said to benefit a given group ex ante, assuming that voting weights and the number of alternatives are known while the specific alternatives and hence individual preference rankings are still open. This task is complicated by big differences in the numbers of structurally distinct weight configurations across decision rules. The corresponding equivalence classes are identified and compared for the first time.