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WHY THE FASCISTS WON’T TAKE OVER THE KREMLIN (FOR NOW).
A COMPARISON OF DEMOCRACY’S BREAKDOWN AND FASCISM’S RISE IN WEIMAR GERMANY AND POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

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Why do democracies collapse? When does an authoritarian regression turn into a fascist takeover? Why do most democratic declines stop at authoritarianism whereas some proceed towards totalitarianism? This paper aims to shed some light on these crucial issues in contemporary politics by way of addressing them with regard to the recent history of Europe’s two largest nations.

Since first references to Weimar Germany in analyses of late Soviet Russia (e.g. Lukas 1990: 359), a growing scholarly literature has, in one way or another, juxtaposed German inter-war with Russian post-Soviet politics and society (Ferguson/Granville 2000, Kenez 1996, Kopstein/Hanson 1997, Misukhin 1998, Hanson 2006, Lukas 2008, Ryavec 1998, Shenfield 1998 & 2001, Yanov 1995). A number of obvious objections concerning the case selection and methodological foundations of such papers can be brought forward. Although these doubts are justified, from a world historical perspective, it remains interesting to juxtapose the two situations. Weimar Germany and post-communist Russia can be both classed as “crucial cases” within the cross-cultural study of democratic transition and collapse (Berg-Schlosser 1995, Gerring 2001: 219–221, Hanson 2006, Ryavec 1998, Shenfield 1998 & 2001, Yanov 1995). A number of obvious objections concerning the case selection and methodological foundations of such papers can be brought forward. Although these doubts are justified, from a world historical perspective, it remains interesting to juxtapose the two situations. Weimar Germany and post-communist Russia can both be classed as “crucial cases” within the cross-cultural study of democratic transition and collapse (Berg-Schlosser 1995, Gerring 2001: 219–221, Hanson 2006, Ryavec 1998, Shenfield 1998 & 2001, Yanov 1995).
governments – for instance, in Austria, Romania and Spain. Yet the only other cases where an indigenous fascist party entered, and achieved far-reaching control of the legislative and executive branches of power independently from foreign influences were Italy and the small state of San Marino (the latter to be neglected below). During his 20-year rule, Mussolini did not manage, however, to assume the amount of power that Hitler had secured already by the mid-1930s, i.e. a couple of years after the NSDAP’s self-styled “seizure of power” (Machtergreifung). The Monarchy and the Vatican were two among several politically relevant forces which preserved an influential position in Italian politics and society under Fascism.

A comparison between Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia may help us to understand better how young democracies become subverted. In particular, it may give us some indication what the causes for a further regression, of subverted democracies, towards fascism could be. An issue of previous writing on “Weimar/Russia” (e.g. Kopstein/Hanson 1997) is that this double relevance of Weimar’s case for the comparative study of contemporary history and politics has not always been explicated. That is, what needs to be clear is that Weimar’s fall has been the paradigmatic example for both, comparative analysis of the rise of fascism, on the one side, and cross-cultural research into the breakdown of democracies, on the other. The Nazi’s seizure of power has a narrower importance for the explanation of, among other things, totalitarianism, ethnic cleansing, the Holocaust and World War II, and a broader relevance for the large field of international transitology and consolidology.

Based on previous research on Weimar Germany and the comparative study of interwar democracies and post-Soviet-Russia we attempt to disentangle these two issues. First, we try to make an addition to a subfield of democratization studies that could be called “collapsology” by way of comparing why and how Germany’s first and Russia’s second democracy broke down. We argue in this part that, between inter-war Germany and today Russia, there are significant similarities that led, in both cases, to their transformation from more or less defective democracies (Merkel 2004) into – what we have chosen to call here – electoral autocracies, of some kind (Schedler 2006). In the second and third part, we address the question when an electoral autocracy faces the danger of being superseded by an even more radically anti-democratic regime, namely a fascist ideocracy. We argue, with regard to that question, that both countries met the preconditions for the rise of a fascist party, but that the various dissimilarities between the German and the Russian cases appear as greater than has been claimed in some of the more alarmist recent comparisons of these two failed democracies (Motyl 2007 and 2009).

2. Why democracy fell in Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia

2.1 It’s not (only) the economy stupid!

A popular explanation for democratic breakdown is that the respective regressing societies are not yet developed and rich enough to become democratic. Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1960) famous argument is that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”

2 In Austria an autocracy was established in March 1933 by Engelbert Dollfuss, the leader of the Christian Social Party. He led the country in coalition with the fascist Heimwehr.
3 Only in these countries, fascists assumed control without the intervention of a foreign fascist force as it later would be the case with Nazi Germany’s de facto instalment of the fascist regimes of the Hungarian Arrow Cross, Croatian Ustashi and North Italian Salo Socialist Republic. Concerning terminology, we follow here the general rule that we use “fascism” when referring to the generic concept, and “Fascism” when we have in mind only the Italian variety of the general phenomenon.
4 That these two fields are closely related to each other is illustrated, for instance, by the seminal contributions to both issues of Juan J. Linz (1978, 1979).
7 The results of this additional analysis will be presented in Kailitz’s forthcoming article “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Democratic Survival and Democratic Breakdown in the Interwar Period”.
8 We proceed from the fact that the so-called Provisional Government between February and October 1917 can classified as Russia's first democracy.
9 Lipset and others have shown that there is a significant statistical relationship between democratic countries’ socio-economic conditions and the survival of their polyarchic regimes.
The fates of most of the inter-war democracies seem to support this view: Democracy survived in Belgium, France, Denmark, Great Britain, Netherlands and the US, while electoral regimes broke down in Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain.

However, the Weimar Republic does not fit. Germany started sliding towards authoritarianism in the late 1920s, in spite of this country then having a relatively high GDP and an, in comparative terms, exceptional literacy rate. In terms of Lipset’s criteria – i.e. wealth, urbanization, education and industrialization – post-communist Russia is, of course, even more modern than Weimar Germany and, surely, further developed than, for example, India or Botswana when they transited towards democracy. When the late Soviet Russian transition towards democracy was gaining speed in 1990, according to official statistics, both GDP per capita and GDP per capita in PPP was higher in the USSR than it was, at that point in time, in Poland – a country which is today a full NATO and EU member (Behravesh 2002). Weimar Germany and post-communist Russia are thus paradoxical: They experienced authoritarian regression despite being relatively advanced countries – in contradiction to what both common sense and cross-cultural studies of the relationship between socio-economic development and democracy suggest.

A related approach of some studies on Weimar Germany and post-communist Russia is that they seek to explain the two countries’ failures to consolidate democracy by focusing more specifically on the political repercussions of socio-economic problems. Again, this seems plausible. For instance, David Easton’s (1965) system theory posits the simple proposition that a country’s political system unable to deal with situations of social stress will lack support by the people. Unsurprisingly, democratic systems under extraordinary stress experience authoritarian regression because the people are not willing to sustain a regime not satisfying their demands. At least, the reverse correlation between unemployment and democratic breakdown seems well established in comparative political science (e.g. Przeworski et al. 1996, 2000).

However, there have been numerous new democracies that faced extraordinary stress, but prevailed. All democracies of the interwar period were, to one degree or another, affected by the common external shock of the World Economic Crisis during the late 1920s and early 1930s (Saalfeld 2003; Zimmermann/Saalfeld 1988). Yet, the political repercussions differed significantly from country to country. Socioeconomic conditions alone cannot tell us why democracy broke down in Austria and Germany, whereas it survived in Czechoslovakia and Finland. When Mussolini’s Fascists took power in Italy in 1922, to be sure, there was also a deep recession in Italy – a calamitous situation that was in certain ways equivalent to the World Economic Crisis, some years later. Yet, while such an economic debacle seems to be a necessary condition for a fascist takeover, even a full-scale depression does not seem to constitute a sufficient condition for democratic breakdown.

It has also been argued that there is a relationship between unemployment and the rise of antidemocratic forces in Weimar (e.g. Lepsius 1978: 51, 61; Peukert 1987). In the opinion of the late German historian Detlef Peukert (1993: 254), psychological consequences of unemployment contributed heavily to the Nazis’ rise. This, again, sounds plausible. The dynamics of the rise of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) seem to support the argument.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
<th>Votes for the NSDAP in parliamentary elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>15,3</td>
<td>18,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>30,1</td>
<td>37,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, double-checking the apparent connection between unemployment and democratic breakdown reveals that, for the latter to happen, a high unemployment rate was a certainly conducive, yet, again, by no means a sufficient condition, in the interwar period. Germany and Austria were the only democracies that collapsed against the background of this specific problem, while other democracies of that period survived in spite of facing social problem almost similar to those of Germany and Austria in the aftermath of the World Economic Crisis (Kailitz 2009). Jürgen Falter (1986) demonstrated, moreover, that there was no positive correlation between unemployment and a radically right-wing, including NSDAP, voting preference, on the individ-
national level. Unemployed workers preferred usually the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) to the NSDAP.

Within the post-communist context, Russia’s various economic dislocations too were not that peculiar compared to those of comparable transition countries in geographic proximity. The post-communist transformations where all, to one degree or another, characterized by the simultaneity of economic and property reforms with other dramatic changes including state formation, territorial re-division, nation building, liberalization and democratization, i.e. by a situation designed to create especially high stress within both the elite and broad population (Offe 1991: 872–874, Elster 1990). Some observers of that time concluded that it would, therefore, be difficult, if not impossible to quickly consolidate democracy in the post-communist area. Notwithstanding the plausibility of such propositions at their time, most of the post-communist democracies have by today become more or less consolidated (Merkel 2007). Even a country with as difficult a post-Soviet economic and social development as Ukraine has, as of 2009, a regime that can be classed as largely democratic (Umland 2009c). Against such a background, it appears insufficient to explain the authoritarian regressions in Weimar and Russia solely in terms of socio-economic stress.

2.2 Surprise, surprise – no democracy without democrats

According to Eastonian systems theory (Easton 1965) as well as in accordance with the political culture approach (Almond/Verba 1963), commitment to democratic values and support for the democratic system among the population are necessary conditions for the consolidation of democratic governance. Unsurprisingly, democracy faces problems when there are not enough people who prefer democracy to autocracy and if there is no hegemony of a democratic political culture, particularly, among those who are politically active (Dahl 1989: 264).

Counter-intuitively – in view of what we know today – in the late 2nd German empire and early Weimar Republics as well as in the late Soviet empire and early second Russian republic, there were, in terms of the attitudes of the population, serious chances for successful consolidation of democracy. In both cases, democratization started as the result of a revolution against an intensely disliked former state of affairs. After World War I, in Germany, the time to establish democratic rule had clearly come. The share of votes for democratic parties since 1907 had been constantly outweighing the number of votes for non- or anti-democratic parties. The democratic parties seemed to be on the winning side of history while the authoritarian camp appeared to be fading.

### Table 2: Vote share of the main German ideological camps in parliamentary elections, 1907–1933 (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptions of political order</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1924a</th>
<th>1924b</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932a</th>
<th>1932b</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fascist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing authoritarian</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical left</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers for 1907 and 1912 are from Lepsius 1978: 37, the other numbers are calculated by us. Fascist camp: Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei/ Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeitspartei; Right-wing authoritarian camp: For the elections in 1907 and 1912 these were the Deutsche Konservative Partei. Reichspartei, National-Liberale Partei, Bund der Landwirte, Deutsche Reformpartei. For the elections in 1919 and after they were the Deutsch-Christlich-Nationale Bauern- und Landvolkpartei, Christlich-Demokratische Partei, Christlich-sozialer Volksdienst, Deutsche Bauernpartei. Reichspartei. National-Liberale Partei, Bund der Landwirte. Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeitspartei. For the elections in 1907 and 1912 these were the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei, Deutsche Volkspartei, and the Christlich-Nationale Bauern- und Landvolkpartei (Deutsches Landvolk). Ambivalent: Regional protest parties and ambivalent parties like the Christlich-sozialer Volksdienst, Deutsche Bauernpartei. Reichspartei des deutschen Mittelstandes (Wirtschaftspartei). Democratic camp: For the elections in 1907 and 1912 these were the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei, Zentrum, Sozialdemokratische Partei. For the elections in 1919 and after these were the Deutsche Demokratische Partei (Staatspartei). Zentrum, Bayerische Volkspartei, Sozialdemokratische Partei. Radical left camp: Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei, Kommunistische Partei.

But, starting from 1920, this trend paradoxically reversed. The right-wing extremists more or less regained their pre-war share of the vote. Moreover, orthodox Marxists entered parliament (the Reichstag) and increased their electoral support. The growth of this radically left-wing camp was almost equiv-

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10 Inglehart/Welzel (2005) and Welzel (2002) argue that the wide spread of a preference for freedom is a precondition for democratization.
alent to the decline of the democratic camp. In contrast to the voters for the right-wing authoritarian camp, those Germans – largely from the working class – who voted for the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) – in 1920, the major far-left party – had mostly supported a pro-Weimar party before, namely the Social Democrats (SPD).

As a result, from the mid-1920s onwards, the so-called Weimar Coalition, i.e. the democratic camp, had to fight a two-frontier war – against the rising ultra-nationalists, on the right, and extreme (pseudo-)egalitarians, now consisting of the stalinizing KPD, on the left. Still, until 1932, the democrats had a serious chance to win this war of ideas. However, when, in the 1932 presidential elections, the democratic camp announced the incumbent head of the traditional authoritarian camp Paul von Hindenburg as their preferred candidate for Reichspräsident, this came close to a capitulation.11

While the German parliamentary elections ceased to have direct political consequences after Hindenburg’s introduction of presidential rule in 1930, they remained largely free and fair until December 1932. In Russia, in contrast, already the 1996 presidential elections were tainted by the massive inflow of illegal money into El’tsin’s campaign from both the state and so-called “oligarchs” who wanted to prevent a return of the communists (Umland 1996). Worse, the 1999 State Duma elections were characterized by the fact that they were won by a party, the pro-Putin organization “Edinstvo” (Unity), that had not even existed a couple of months before the vote. Without massive help from “political technologists” this would, obviously, not have been possible (Wilson 2005). During the following Russian elections on various levels, manipulation of information and financial flows as well as use of the so-called “administrative resource” by the powers-that-be grew by the year. Although democrats participated in the following votes too, election results were not any longer reflections of informed voters’ preferences and fair competition between different political programs, leaders or parties, and based on political information gained from independent mass media. Rather, as a result of increasingly skewed journalistic reporting on domestic and foreign affairs, anti-Americanism, nationalism and xenophobia, within the Russian population, started rising, in the second half of the 1990s, and have been especially prevalent since the middle of this decade (Umland 2009b, 2009c). While the election results data listed in Table 3 gives, because of the manipulated character of the polls, a heavily biased impression of voters’ preferences, it still characterizes a general trend, in Russia, during the last 15 years.

Table 3: Vote share of the main Russian ideological camps in the parliamentary elections (per cent of parties receiving more than 1% of the vote) in 1991–200712

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptions of political order</th>
<th>1993 (proportional part)</th>
<th>1995 (proportional part)</th>
<th>1999 (proportional part)</th>
<th>2003 (proportional part)</th>
<th>2007 (proportional part)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fascist</td>
<td>22,9</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11,4</td>
<td>8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing authoritarian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>36,6</td>
<td>46,6</td>
<td>64,3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>39,7</td>
<td>26,8</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>3,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists &amp; Agrarians</td>
<td>20,4</td>
<td>26,8</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>15,2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Arguably, one could add here the result (7.7%) of Spravedlivaja Rossiia (Just Russia) – a Kremlin-created organization that is difficult to classify, in ideological terms. This would bring up the overall sum for right-wing authoritarianism in 2007 to 72%. However, one could also add this party to the row “Communists & Agrarians”, as it poses as a left-wing force. Because of this ambiguity, we decided to leave out this number entirely, in the table.

Like in the case of post-World War I Germany, it is today, however, sometimes forgotten that, in spite of these recent developments, the Russians’ orig-

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11 We do not agree with Arends-Kümmel (2000: 212) that it was a mistake of the labour movement to reject Schleicher’s plans of a corporatist-authoritarian solution. Rather, the failure of the whole democratic camp was that it did not stand united against an authoritarian solution – whether Schleicher’s or another.

12 Needless to say that the meaning of the categories and numbers in Table 3 is, for an array of reasons (conceptual, political, ideological, historical etc.), less clear and more ambivalent than for the case of pre-war Germany in Table 2.
inal enthusiasm for Western political values was high. It had been, for instance, demonstrated by the remarkable results which pro-democratic candidates received in the semi-free and still unfair, yet already partly meaningful 1989 USSR and 1990 RSFSR Congresses of People’s Deputies elections. The support in the population for the democrats was, at that time, so strong that pro-democratic tendencies managed to manifest themselves in spite of various hindrances created by the still existing Soviet state and CPSU apparatuses, for the nomination and campaigning of reform-oriented candidates. Moreover, support for outspokenly nationalist-authoritarian politicians was remarkably low, at the beginning of the Russian transition. True, the 1990 RSFSR parliamentary election held according to the SMD system brought mostly CPSU members into the Russian parliament as Russia was still officially a one-party state during the first round of these elections. Yet, the so-called “national patriots” (i.e. ultra-nationalists of various kind) and their empire-saving program suffered a stunning defeat, in these elections, as only a couple of their numerous and, sometimes, prominent candidates made it into the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies (Laqueur 1993).

In June 1991, the Russians’ devotion to genuine democracy was again confirmed by the result of 60.7% that democrats received in Russia’s first presidential poll – perhaps, the most democratic Russian national election ever. Boris El’tsin, then with the profile of a “radical democrat,” got 57.3% while the moderate Gorbachev assistant Vadim Bakatin, also to be counted as a democrat, received 3.4% in the first and only round of that poll. Contrary to what even some Western commentators on Russia’s political traditions and culture purport (Rahr 2008), democracy was genuinely popular in Russia, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and was a positively connoted term shortly before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The initial support for El’tsin and Ebert as leaders of the democratic movements in Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia was substantial. But soon the rating of the democrats, in both countries, declined while the popularity of the nationalists rose. In the Weimar Republic, the initial support dropped from 76% to 48% from 1919 to 1920. And in Russia, there was a plunge from 60.7% for democratic presidential candidates in 1991 to 39.7% for democratic parties in 1993. After the initial decline in the support for the democratic camp of the Weimar Republic, moreover, there followed a further gradual weakening of the democratic camp throughout the 1920s. This decline was even more pronounced in Putin’s Russia where the democratic camp received as little as 3.6% in 2007. To be sure, the initial electoral effect of the World Economic Crisis on the Weimar Republic was not overwhelming: the right-wing camp grew from the 1928 to the 1930 elections by only 5% while the democratic camp declined by 6.6%. However, within the right-wing camp, there happened a significant internal shift of votes from the traditional authoritarian right (approx. –10%) to the fascist right (approx. +15%).

The effect of the August 1998 ruble collapse in Russia was, perhaps, less devastating and prolonged than the repercussions of the inter-war Great Depression. Yet, the influence of the economic crisis on Russians’ relation to democracy was aggravated by other salient events such as NATO’s continuing enlargement to the East, and its bombing of Serbia in spring 1999, as well as by the start of the Second Chechen War in summer 1999. Above all, El’tsin introduced Vladimir Putin, a former, unreconstructed KGB officer, as his chosen successor, in that year. Surprisingly, a large part of the democratic camp decided to support Putin, in the 2000 presidential elections – a development reminiscent of the German Social Democrats’ strange decision to support Hindenburg, in the 1932 presidential elections.

2.3 Wrong constitution – no consolidated democracy?

Ever since the rise of German fascism, political scientists have argued that semi-presidentialism was a, if not the main problem of inter-war Germany (e.g. Rüb 1994, Skach 2005). In his discussion of the Weimar constitution, Karl Dietrich Bracher (1962), for instance, claimed that the dual legitimacy of two elected bodies, the president and parliament, largely independent from each other, undermined government stability and eventually transgressed into an electoral autocracy. Obviously, however, the particular challenge of semi-presidentialism was only relevant until 1930 when Weimar Germany ceased

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13 The exception were the November 1917 elections to the Constitutional Assembly – a poll that, however, had an only symbolic significance, as the Assembly was dissolved by force, at its first session, by the Bolsheviks in January 1918.

14 As stated above, we are aware of the fact that the 1999 parliamentary elections and 2000 presidential elections were the last Russian national polls that can be called partly fair. Still, democratic opposition parties took part in the following elections too. If one assumes that direct falsification (e.g. ballot stuffing) was not a major source of the skewed results, the democratic vote in the elections after 1999 still has some relevance.

15 Linz (1994) made this point later a part of his general argument against presidentialism. See also Kailitz 2004.
to be merely a non-consolidated democracy with certain defects (Möller 1997). When, in that year, Hindenburg took the road towards autocracy, he clearly ended the semi-presidential system through his excessive use of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution.\textsuperscript{16} Already in 1930, there appeared thus in Germany an, in Fred Riggs’ (1994) terms, essentially pseudo-presidential system with increasingly authoritarian, para-monarchic features.\textsuperscript{17} Two years later, only seven per cent of German laws were passed by the Reichstag. The remaining 93 per cent were passed as emergency decrees by the President (Lepsius 1978: 49). As there were no more parliamentary governments, but one presidential cabinet after the other, it was clearly not any longer semi-presidentialism that was the Weimar Republic’s main problem (Hoppe 1998).

In post-communist Russia, the design of her 1993 Constitution – also formally semi-presidential – made the country even more vulnerable to autocratic subversion. Compared to Weimar, already early post-communist Russia, i.e. from December 1993 onwards, had a presidency with potentially authoritarian features. According to the 1993 Constitution still valid today, the President of Russia has disproportionally extensive powers. In particular, he can rule and has been ruling via decrees without a legislative majority – something that the President in Weimar Germany could only do in a state of emergency provided by Article 48. Thus, in 2000, it was – in purely constitutional terms – an only relatively small step from the deeply defective democratic order created by El’ı’sın to the electoral autocracy of Putin.

Arguably, under the 1993 Constitution, it would have been difficult for Russia to become a stable liberal democracy, in any way.\textsuperscript{18} In post-communist

\textsuperscript{16} This does not mean that, consequently, Article 48 was the fundamental problem of Weimar Germany. Article 48 did allow the President to rule by decree. Yet these decrees had to be signed by the members of the government. As long as, with Friedrich Ebert, a democrat was Germany’s President, Article 48 worked in favour rather than against democracy (Kurz 1992). Finland had a similar institutional design, yet electoral democracy survived, while Italy was a parliamentary semi-democracy and the Fascists took over already in 1923.

\textsuperscript{17} The term pseudo-presidentialism refers here to a system that lacks the checks and balances of a truly presidential system. It is thus essentially authoritarian and to be located outside the spectrum of democratic regimes (Riggs 1994). Several post-Soviet states are “pseudo-presidentialist” in this sense, and have become so because of early post-Soviet democratization’s “superpresidentialism” (Fish 2005). “Super-presidentialism” is here used for political systems that have still some essential democratic traits, but within which power is, only at first glance, shared between a prime minister and a president. Instead, the president has all executive power and considerable further prerogatives making the political system an unbalanced one (Kailitz 2007).

\textsuperscript{18} A further conclusion would thus be that, before Russia gets the chance to become a stable liberal democracy, there has to be a constitutional change, perhaps, similar to that in Ukraine.

Russia like in other post-Soviet states (e.g. Belarus), the proto-democratic system of the early and mid-1990s took the form of “superpresidentialism” (Fish 2005) camouflaged with a semi-presidential arrangement. The Prime Minister – was (except for extraordinary situations, such as Russia after the ruble collapse of August 1998) to such a degree dependent on the President that the label “semi-presidentialism” is a misnomer, for this form of government (Colton/Skach 2005; Kailitz 2007). The purpose of democratic presidentialism, as practiced, for example, in the US, is to provide for a clear separation of powers. Post-Soviet super-presidentialism has, in contrast, been designed to secure a high concentration of power in the executive.

Contrary to some claims, the post-communist “semi-presidential” systems were not primarily designed with the French model of government in mind. Instead, the relationship between the President and Prime-Minister, as defined for instance in the 1993 constitution, continued the Russian imperial tradition as laid down, for instance, in the Tsarist Basic State Laws of April 1906 (Luks 2009: 203). In much of the post-Soviet area it was introduced, as for instance Matsuzato (2005) shows for the Ukrainian case, as a covered continuation of the Soviet model in which the almighty First or General Secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee was in full control of the activities of the alleged head of government, the so-called Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Some observers even think that the powerful post-Soviet presidents are not merely a Russian or post-Soviet phenomenon, but continue broader traditions of a strong executive – in an often weak state – in Eastern Europe. According to Schopfelin (1993: 11), the “discretionary power of the state” in the East origins in the idea “that the ruler has the right to take action in any area of politics unless he is expressly prevented from doing so by law.”

3. The fascist potential in Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia

We now switch from the most different systems design (MDSD) to the most similar systems design (MSSD) thereby separating the issues of democratic decline and fascist takeover. When applying the most different systems design, we showed how obviously dissimilar preconditions (“different systems”) in the Weimar Republic before 1930 and post-Soviet Russia before...
2000 exhibited enough functional equivalents and configurative similarities to produce an analogous outcome – democratic collapse. We shall now use the most similar systems design and try to show that resemblances between these two electoral autocracies as well as other parallels between modern German and Russian history (i.e. their “similar systems”) are, nevertheless, insufficient to warrant the expectation of a fascist takeover in Russia.

In doing so, we proceed from Roger Griffin’s familiar interpretation of generic fascism. Griffin (1993, 1995) defines fascism as “palingenetic ultranationalism” by which he implies the idea of an integral nationalist revolution that is understood, by the fascists themselves, as a rebirth, rejuvenation or re-creation after a period of the nation’s almost fatal decline and degeneration. While being clearly revolutionary, the deeper transformation that fascists aim for is more of a cultural and political rather than economic and social nature. While left-wing and right-wing revolutionarisms are both anthropological in that they want to create a “new man,” they differ in their views on human nature and in the societal models they aspire for (though less so concerning the results of an implementation of their officially dissimilar aspirations). Proceeding from a highly pessimistic view of human nature, fascists, like other extremely right-wing activists, explicitly aim for a hierarchical organization of the nation and whole world. Some parts of humanity may have to perish altogether in order to secure a total cleansing of the country or planet from “destructive” elements.19

3.1 Imperial traditions and post-traumatic psychopathologies

Unlike other new democracies – whether of the inter-war or post-communist periods – the Weimar Republic and the Russian Federation (RF) were new nation-states20 that had come into being through radical shrinking of two once powerful empires, the German Empire (Deutsches Kaiserreich) and Soviet Union. Weimar and the Russian Federation emerged as a result of the Wilhelmine and Soviet empires’ defeat in two of human history’s most dramatic international confrontations: World War I and the Cold War (Hanson 2006). Germans and Russians were, in different ways, humiliated by their former adversaries’ conduct after their defeats. The Germans felt disgraced by the conditions and accusations laid down, by the victorious Entente powers, in the Versailles Peace Treaty. Many Russians perceived the West’s behavior in post-communist Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia to be triumphant and disrespectful concerning post-Soviet Russia and her interests. The latter concerns NATO’s expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, the Alliance’s bombing of Serbia, or the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state – actions, it might be added, not even regarded universally as fully legitimate, in the West (Umland 2002a).

The domestic effects of the West’s deeds in the Weimar Republic and RF were aggravated by the fact that the new democratic governments made compromises with sections of the old elites. Important parts of the state apparatus remained under the control of unreformed representatives of the ancien régime. In the German case, large parts of the bureaucracy, many university chairs, and most of the army remained, among other sectors, in the hands of anti-democratic elites. In the Russian case, the military, security services, and various cultural organizations, in particular, were left under the control of officers basically disloyal to, or, at least, ambivalent towards, the new regime.

Furthermore, both nations had to deal with the problem that parts of their former populations were now living – under, sometimes, problematic circumstances – abroad. There were about 8.6 million so-called “ethnic Germans” (Volksdeutsche) in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, after 1918, and about 25 million so-called “ethnic citizens of Russia” (etnicheskie rossiiane) in the former Soviet republics after 1991. The two new nation states found themselves in the strange situation of having exclaves, the cities/regions of Danzig/Gdansk and Kaliningrad/Königsberg, that had once belonged to these nations’ empires, but were now separated from their “homelands” through territories of more or less hostile states (Poland and Lithuania, respectively). The nationalisms within both countries have an irredentist as well as pan-German/-Slavic dimension. In the Weimar Republic, there was the issue of Austria’s Anschluss to Germany finally resolved by Hitler in 1938. In today Russia, the idea of a “union” with Belarus and – at least, parts of – Ukraine continues to be a major feature of daily political and intellectual discourse.
3.2 The anti-democratic “special path”

It is almost tautological to state that a vital nationalist subculture is a necessary precondition for the rise of fascism (Griffin 1993). For decades, German public discourse had been infected with the belief that Germany has an unfulfilled historic mission and that the German road to Modernity had to be different from the Western one. In the opinion of many intellectuals, Germany had to follow a Sonderweg, a special path (Faulenbach 1980) – an idea especially popular among the antidemocratic right (Sontheimer 1962). The Sonderweg idea implied that the German imperial state should have the power to lead the nation without making compromises between conflicting interests in society. This ideology was by itself neither fascist nor ultra-nationalist. Yet, once economic crises shattered the German population’s trust in the new republic, it helped paving the way to the erosion of the democratic camp’s electorate.

The destructive effect of the Sonderweg ideology on the legitimacy of Western institutions in Germany was aggravated by the related Dolchstoßlegende (literally: “legend of the knife-stab”) – the notorious legend of the “stab in the back.” In 1918, the German Empire’s two foremost military leaders Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937) and Hindenburg acknowledged that Germany would, sooner or later, be beaten and conquered by the Entente. To prevent the embarrassment of a defeat in the battlefield and an occupation of Germany, the Emperor’s army leadership agreed to end the war in spite of the fact that no foreign troops had yet entered German territory. Ludendorff, Hindenburg and Co. managed to shift public responsibility for the start, conduct and results of the peace negotiations to politicians of the democratic camp. Short-sightedly, the Entente powers imposed severe conditions on Germany in the Versaille Treaty. As a result, the destruction of the German Empire’s military and its population at large, but in a different way. In view of the stronger, than in Germany, authoritarian tradition of the Tsarist and Soviet periods, one of the Russian democrats’ main problem, after 1991, was that were not willing or able to present themselves as rooted in Russian history. For these different reasons, the Russian and the German democrats both failed to form a catch-all party.

As the economic and social crisis of the 1990s went on, the Russian democrats’ program appeared, in the public mind, as less and less suitable for the country, and more and more as a destructive import from the West. This was, among others, a reason for the democrats’ decreasing appeal among the emerging middle class, and limited their support to a small sector of society, namely to intellectuals, students and business-persons – and even here to only parts of these milieus. In the late 1990s, democracy’s declining allure opened up a discursive field for Vladimir Putin who presented himself not only as a more dynamic administrator than El’tsin, but also as a less foreign-influenced and more independent-minded leader than Russia’s first President. With Putin’s rise something of an equivalent of the German legend of a “stab in the back” started to gain popularity in Russia. Most Russians today still think that the Soviet system needed to be changed and the planned economy to be reformed. But many Russians also belief that the larger part of the CPSU Secretaries and current regime, Russia has been understood to be both, a part of the “civilized world” (the popular Russian term for the community of industrially and socially advanced countries), on the one side, and a separate country or even unique civilization, on the other. Reminiscent of the German Sonderweg idea, it was the emphasis on the central, almost “divine” role of a largely unaccountable state in Russia’s past, present and future that dominated in all three antidemocratic regimes, before, during and after the Soviet experiment.

3.3 The democrats’ political impotence

One reason that the German democrats failed in the Weimar Republic was that were unable to sufficiently transcend their particular milieu. The Social-Democratic Party remained until the very end of the Republic an almost labor-only party. In Russia, democrats suffered also from a disconnect from the population at large, but in a different way. In view of the stronger, than in Germany, authoritarian tradition of the Tsarist and Soviet periods, one of the Russian democrats’ main problem, after 1991, was that were not willing or able to present themselves as rooted in Russian history. For these different reasons, the Russian and the German democrats both failed to form a catch-all party.

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21 Some genuinely Russian democratic traditions were revived after 1991 when, for instance, the name “State Duma” was reintroduced for the lower house of the parliament of the Russian Federation.
Soviet Union and thus most of the Russian empire, should and could have been preserved. In the expanding nationalist discourse in Putin’s Russia, the primary causes for the cracks in the allegedly centuries-old “friendship between the people” of the former Russian empire are increasingly interpreted as results of the treacherous behavior by the Russian democrats and of covered Western interference into late and post-Soviet affairs. The metaphor of a “stab in the back” appears only within the radically nationalist discourse. Yet, when Vladimir Putin formulated in April 2005 that the break-up of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” he expressed widespread public mood (Umland 2009b).

3.4 Existence of a relevant fascist actor

If there is a vital nationalist subculture in a country and a myth of an anti-democratic national way, usually there will be a fascist actor in this country, too. Zhirinovskii’s ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), founded in late 1989, is no full equivalent to the NSDAP. But post-Soviet Russia’s oldest political party plays, in more ways than is usually acknowledged, a role similar to that of the Nazi party in Weimar Germany. Zhirinovskii’s plan of a “last dash to the South”, outlined in his principal political writing and autobiography of the same name of 1993, can be seen as representing a Russian counterpart to the Nazi program of “living space in the East” (Lebensraum im Osten; Umland 1994, 2002b, 2008b).

The Nazis’ eliminationist anti-Semitism was and remains a unique phenomenon in world history. If one, however, disregards for a moment the particular virulence of German fascism’s racism, one can detect structural similarities with Zhirinovskii’s world view. As outlined in detail elsewhere (Umland 1997, 2006b, 2008b), Zhirinovskii’s plan of a “last dash to the South,” for all its seeming silliness, constitutes a genuine permutation of palingenetic ultra-nationalism, and thus a full-blown variety of Russian fascism. While Hitler defined as the main enemies of the German nation “the Jews,” Zhirinovskii is obsessed with the role of the so-called “Southerners” (iuzhane) in Russia’s past and present. There remain a number of weighty differences between the German Nazis’ Nordic racism and the Russian “Liberal Democrats’” Northern jingoism. Nevertheless, the core of Hitler’s belief system was a racial Darwinism of which elements can be found, in a less explicit form, in Zhirinovskii’s ideology too.

Hitler wanted to create a “new Germany” within new borders. Zhirinovskii too wants to form a “new Russia” of hitherto unknown territorial dimensions. His new Russian empire would include not only the former Soviet republics, but also Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (as well as, by implication, Pakistan). For Zhirinovskii, it is Russia’s historic duty to take control of the Asian part of the Muslim world. The ultra-nationalist wants to bring about Russia’s resurrection and palingenesis less by internal cleansing than by outside expansion beyond the former borders of both, the Tsarist and Soviet empires. Zhirinovskii doctrine is thus neither restorationist nor nostalgic, but a form of revolutionary (rather than reactionary) imperialism. By “soothing” the instable “South,” i.e. Central Asia, the Caucasus, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan through occupation, Russia will save both herself and the entire world. Russia, in Zhirinovskii’s world, would be born anew by the military operation to subjugate the “South” and by the final solution of her major problem of the last 800 years – “Southern” destructiveness. As a result of her “last dash to the South,” a “new,” “cleaner” and “happier Russia” would finally find its peace.

In both Russian and Western assessments, Zhirinovskii is often seen as a mere media clown and political outsider. It might be worth remembering, however, that Hitler was often also seen in this way, before January 30, 1933. On September 29, 1930, London’s The Guardian wrote that Hitler is “the ranting clown who bangs the drum outside the National Socialist circus.” Another respected British newspaper, The Observer, called the Nazi leader in February 1932 still a “mere agitator and rank outsider” (as quoted in Kershaw 2007). This is not to say that Zhirinovskii and his party correspond in every regard to Hitler and the NSDAP. But the LDPR is more of a genuinely political and less of a merely cultural phenomenon than is often assumed in both journalistic and scholarly assessments of this party.

4. Why Germany became fascist while Russia has not (yet)

An obvious argument can be and has been made that Zhirinovskii’s partly Jewish biological family background and political clownishness had the effect of corrupting the emerging fascist niche in post-Soviet Russia’s party spectrum, at an early stage (Umland 2002c). The steep rise of Zhirinovskii’s party in 1993–1995 was doubtlessly a factor contributing heavily to the fragmentation of the Russian ultra-nationalist movement during the El’tsin presidency. Actor-centered arguments, like the last one, focusing on political con-
tingencies and discursive peculiarities of Russia’s post-Soviet public life have considerable explanatory power. However, “accidental” developments like the appearance of this or that popular ultra-nationalist only gain relevance within the context of deeper structural factors determining the (de)formation of post-Soviet Russian party politics, in general.

4.1 Particularistic versus clientilistic party system

A critical difference between Weimar Germany and post-communist Russia is that Germany, by the time the Weimar republic was founded, had already developed an ideologically differentiated and socially entrenched party system (Kopstein/Hanson 1997). When the Russian Federation became an independent state in late 1991, there were only a few and unconsolidated proto-parties not to mention a proper party system (Fish 1995, Stoner-Weiss 2001). This legacy resulted in a situation, under El’tsin, that has been labeled “feckless pluralism” (Golosov 2004, McFaul 2001, Rose 2001, Rose/Munro 2002). In Russia, only parties that were “radically left-wing” and “right-wing” constituted programmatic parties (Hanson 1997) while the remaining, with their vague programs, constituted a so-called “swamp.” In Weimar, in contrast, all relevant parties had well-defined political programs (Bracher 1955: 64–95).

The initial Weimar Coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), German Democratic Party (DDP) and Catholic Center – i.e. the alliance of relatively liberal parties that brought about the republic – has no equivalent in post-communist Russia. Democratic Russia, the late Soviet pro-democratic umbrella organization assembling a variety of groups, fell apart after the common enemy – the CPSU – disappeared in the aftermath of the ancien régime’s unsuccessful putsch attempt of August 1991. As the various democratic grouplets became increasingly engaged in quarrelling among themselves, there remained few prospects for a strong party with a democratic manifesto to emerge. It also did not help that El’tsin refused to associate himself with a party. Arguably, he himself did not have any specific political vision – whether social-democratic, liberal or conservative – going beyond vague notions about joining “the civilized world.” The Russian equivalent of Weimar’s authoritarian camp started regrouping after it had overcome the shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union. At first, however, the anti-democratic spectrum too remained divided, for a number of historical reasons briefly outlined elsewhere (Umland 2002c).

The lack of programmatic parties in early post-Soviet Russia was a typically totalitarian legacy, and obviously rooted in, among other factors, the absence of well-defined social cleavages in post-communist society. While traditional cleavage theory (Lipset/Rokkan 1967) can be helpful in explaining electoral results in Weimar Germany, it is thus less useful for analyses of post-communist Russian elections. The main political cleavage in Russia until well into the Putin presidency, it has been argued, was based on the fuzzy division between pro- and anti-Kremlin forces – whatever this has meant, at a certain point in time (Folkestad 2005).

In Weimar Germany, the subcultural fixation of parties on certain milieus made it difficult for parties to compromise. The Zentrumspartei (Center Party) spoke for Germany’s Catholics, while the Social Democrats represented almost only the working class. It was less weakness of the democratic camp, than its fragmentation that made it easy for the NSDAP to gain voters and, eventually, power (Lepsius 1978: 41). While pro-democratic parties were already well established before Germany got a democratic regime, the Nazi party emerged only in Weimar. In the framework of the second German empire of 1871–1918, the democratic parties had become used to put forward maximalist claims in lieu of their supporters. When the authoritarian state did not fulfill these claims, their supporters could not hold the parties accountable. Yet, after 1918 the political environment changed while some of the most important parties did not. Weimar remained in so far an “unfinished” party democracy as, among other reasons, the democratic parties were unwilling to adapt to the new situation (Vogt 1984, Stürmer 1980). Now the democrats could actually take part in real government and lead the state. Yet, they failed to change their behavior accordingly. Many in the democratic camp preferred to stick to maximum claims and keep an oppositional stance rather than to take part in government and make compromises with other parties.

This was one of the reasons that, in the distinctly particularistic political environment of Weimar Germany, the Nazis were able to attract supporters not only from the traditional authoritarian camp, but also from the democratic camp. The Nazis, with their distinctly populist, pseudo-equalitarian form of nationalism, developed a novel trans-class appeal (Breuer 2005). In view of their ethnically exclusive, yet socially inclusive nationalism, the Nazis, in distinction to the democratic and communist parties, were not limited by class or religious boundaries. Instead, the Nazi party became, in terms of its social

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22 For analysis of the party system of Weimar see Bracher 1955: 529–558 and Neumann 1977.
23 In Prussia, parliamentary democracy worked better then on the national level, because the Social Democrats, the Zentrum and the DDP continuously worked together. See Möller 1985.
Foundations, a catch-all party (Childers 1983, Falter 1991). It satisfied the quest for a national integration of all Germans as well as the longing for a strong state by the supporters of a German “special path” from different groups and layers of society. The ideology of an “ethnic community” (Volksgemeinschaft) attracted people from all classes, Protestants as well as Catholics (Broszat 1984: 207–219).

The democratic camp, in contrast, failed to assemble sufficient electoral support as, among other reasons, it had no catch-all party. The Social Democrats kept focussing almost solely on workers. There was little that the SPD offered to democratically inclined parts of the bourgeoisie, peasants or middle class. Also unlike the Social Democrats, the Nazis, moreover, had the advantage that they could make compromises with capitalists and workers concerning economic issue the reason being that Hitler had no genuine interest in the capitalist-socialist cleavage. The peculiar “Weimar scenario” of a democratic decline is thus characterized by strong programmatic parties unprepared to compromise.

To be sure, from the standpoint of general democratization theory an institutionalized party system with programmatic parties fosters democratization (Kitschelt 1995). Few political scientists would disagree that a well-institutionalized party system, like Weimar’s at the end of the 1920s, is a higher barrier against degradation towards an electoral autocracy than a fragmented system of non-institutionalized parties, like in Russia, at the end of the 1990s. However, this configuration changes once a political regime has, nevertheless, made the transition to electoral autocracy. Paradoxically, the absence of broadly representative party structures, as was the case in Putin’s Russia, appears to diminish rather than enhance the chances of an already non-democratic regime’s further centralization, radicalization and ideologization through fascist takeover, such as in Weimar in 1933. 24

In post-communist Russia there has – in distinction to Weimar – always been considerable clientelistic pragmatism of the parties and factions. Even before Russia turned into a full-blown electoral autocracy under Putin, factional conflict in the Duma was often less determined by different party policy positions then by the question whether the Duma should follow the President, on this or that issue – or not. In such cases, sometimes archenemies voted together. Numerous deputies of the Duma, especially independents, but also entire party factions in the 1990s, could be “convinced” to vote in a certain way in exchange for wealth or positions for these deputies. The clientelistic element in Russian politics fostered the strength of the President, lowered the salience of party-political conflicts, and decreased the relevance of all ideologies – including fascism. Even the leaders of the most clearly programmatic parties (Hanson 1997), LDPR’s Zhirinovskii and the CPRF’s Gennadii Ziuganov, showed opportunistic behavior when they, for instance, both voted in favour of El’tsin’s budget in 1997.

A story similar to that of political society’s effects on regime change goes for the role of civil society in inter-war Germany as distinct from post-Soviet Russia (Umland 2002c, 2009a). Weimar had, by both historical and comparative standards, an exemplary robust civil society. Inter-war Germany was characterized not only by a highly developed Vereinswesen (associationism), but even by Vereinsmeierei (pathological associationism). A common German joke was that, whenever three Germans get together, they will draw up by-laws and found an association. The second Russian republic, in contrast, emerged under conditions of an organizationally weak, morally corrupted and insufficiently entrenched civil society.

Within the neo-Toquillian approach to modern politics informed by Robert Putnam’s seminal Making Democracy Work (1994), a strong Third Sector is regarded as constituting a (if not the) foundation of sustainable democracy. However, among others, the inter-war German case illustrates that a differentiated civil society can be not only an unsuitable safeguard of young democracies suffering from substantial defects. As, for example, Sheri Berman (1997) has shown, the German clubs and societies provided the Nazis with channels through which they spread their ideas and recruited their followers. Thus, Germany’s vigorous associational life paradoxically facilitated rather than hindered the rise of fascism in the Weimar Republic. In inter-war Italy too, such a mechanism was at work: the Fascist movement emerged first in the societally well-developed North with its strong civic traditions, and only later spread to the traditional South with its familistic social structure. The Nazis in Germany and Fascists in Italy were thus profiting from highly developed civil society.

In the Russian case, apparently the reverse argument applies. Contradicting the civic intuition of pro-democratic observers, Russia’s fascist groups may – as much as pro-democratic groupings – have been suffering rather than benefiting from the lack of self-organization in Russian society, and from the dominance of state institutions in public life. At least so far, Russia’s “uncivil society” has proven to be insufficiently strong to foster a transformation of electoral autocracy into a fascist ideocracy.

24 This is an argument that Hanson/Kopstein made already in 1997 and that we are paraphrasing here somewhat.
A somewhat similar observation has been made by Hanson and Kopstein (1997) years ago when they argued that “while the legacy of totalitarianism indeed poses significant obstacles to the formation of a post-communist ‘civil society’, social atomization may also simultaneously pose obstacles to the creation of a workable authoritarianism” (277). We disagree here in so far as social atomization is, in fact, an excellent breeding-ground for the subversion of democratic institutions as well as the establishment and functioning of an authoritarian regime. It is, however, also a circumstance that, in modern societies, can put obstacles to ideologically-driven groups, in general, and a fascist takeover and the establishment of a totalitarian regime, in particular. For the same reasons that it is unlikely that Russia will any time soon become a liberal democracy it is also improbable that Russia turns into a fascist state, in the foreseeable future. For both paths to travel, parties with coherent party manifestos and with grass-roots in society are necessary. And, in both cases, such parties would be in need of a developed Third Sector or, rather, a differentiated “uncivil society” in order to efficaciously spread their values and build up support among the population.

4.2 Weak president/strong contender vs. strong president/weak contender

Among others, Roger Griffin (1991) argues that fascism has only a chance to take off in a situation where there is no alternative “strong non-fascist ultra-right to take over.” Historically speaking, firmly established, ultra-conservative authoritarian regimes seem indeed to represent an effective safeguard against fascist takeover (Payne 1995). As mentioned, there were only two independent transfers of power to fascists – in Germany and Italy. In both cases, it was the legitimate head of state of a hybrid and instable rather than of a consolidated authoritarian regime who handed power to the fascists.

In the Weimar Republic, in early 1933, the traditional authoritarian actors came to believe that they need the support of the NSDAP to provide for continuing legitimacy of their right-wing regime, and that they could “tame” and “frame” Hitler (Jasper 1986). No democrat at all (Pyta 1999), Hindenburg – under the pressure of the public – wanted to end the phase of provisional presidential cabinets with their emergency regimes (Notverordnungsregime; Mommsen 1998: 657). The novel form of rule by presidential cabinets introduced by Hindenburg between 1930 and 1933 had brought no improvement of the economic situation. It failed to calm society and lacked popular support. As Hindenburg’s new regime could not legitimate itself through performance, it needed to be replaced by another form of government. Hitler thus came to power when, oddly, Hindenburg wanted, in a way, to “re-democratize” his electoral autocracy in reaction to the lack of economic success and popular support of his presidential cabinets.

This condition is fundamentally dissimilar to that of the electoral autocracy that has emerged in Russia since 2000. Putin and Medvedev have, at least as of 2009, sufficient popular support for their rule – even if it needs to be added that their popularity has been heavily doctored by cunning “political technologists.” Whatever the exact source of their support among the population, so far, they do not need the help of other political forces – and certainly not of Zhirinovskii’s LDPR. To be sure, the Russian political system continues to be under considerable stress as indicated by numerous political assassinations, enduring social grievances, or ongoing fighting in the Northern Caucasus. Yet, Putin was able to take credit for an impressive economic development after the turn of the century. After ten years in power, he continues to appear as a strong leader. In contrast, Hindenburg’s rule was, after an equally successful initial phase, characterized by a steady decline in terms of its economic performance and public support. Actors do matter and it seems likely that a younger and healthier President in Weimar Germany could have, even in view of the Great Depression, preserved or reformed Germany’s electoral autocracy and prevented a fascist takeover.

One could also mention that the major Russian fascist party, the LDPR, was, among others, different from the NSDAP in that Zhirinovskii has been – for a variety of reasons – acting (or forced to act) more opportunistically than Hitler who, at times, was remarkably stubborn in defending his idiosyncratic political stance and confrontational public behavior. Not the least because of Hitler’s seemingly “principled position,” the vote share of the NSDAP in Weimar has been continually rising throughout the history of the Weimar Republic. Only in the last free elections of December 1932, it slightly decreased. The vote share of Zhirinovskii as presidential contender and the LDPR as a parliamentary party showed different dynamics. It, first, rose rapidly from approx. seven percent in 1991 to 22.9 percent 1993, then fell to 5.7 percent in 2003, and lately stabilized around 10 percent. While in the elections of 1993 the LDPR was the strongest party, it had by 1999 fallen to fifth place, and under Putin established itself as Russia’s third party. While Zhirinovskii’s endurance over the years was, in some ways, remarkable, it looks more likely that the LDPR will, in the future, stagnate or decline rather than revive.
Not only the political ideology, style and location of the NSDAP and LDPR, but also the dynamics of Hitler’s and Zhirinovskii’s – in comparison to their parties’ electoral performances show differences. In the 1932 presidential elections, for instance, Hitler won 36.8 percent of the vote against Hindenburg and scored thus only marginally less than his party in the same year’s parliamentary elections. Zhirinovskii as a person, in contrast, never received as high a degree of support in national elections. The Russian fascist leader mostly scored lower in presidential elections than his party in parliamentary polls.

On the basis of his considerable electoral successes in 1932, Hitler felt justified to play an, in terms of both inter- and intra-party competition, risky game that continuously increased the stakes of his political engagement and easily could have failed. He refused every offer of mere participation in government and kept demanding appointment as Chancellor. In summer 1932, many Nazi party leaders became unsatisfied with this strategy. Gregor Strasser proposed NSDAP participation in government without Hitler while the SA wanted a violent takeover. After losses in the elections in November 1932 and increasing financial problems, the party was in danger of falling into oblivion, or of a split. Yet Hitler stubbornly continued claiming the post of the Chancellor – a strategy that was by no means destined to be successful.

Zhirinovskii’s less impressive electoral performances never put him in a position to plausibly make such claims. His most remarkable electoral performance of December 1993 was immediately (and, as turned out later, correctly) interpreted as an exception. Zhirinovskii thus chose to agree that LDPR functionaries occupy federal or regional governmental positions. A high executive position for the LDPR leader himself has, however, as far as is known, never been seriously discussed though there were repeatedly rumors that Zhirinovskii might be offered a government position.

Since 1999, the LDPR leader has, moreover, been confronted with an increasingly popular non-fascist authoritarian and nationalist contender, Vladimir Putin, who is younger than Zhirinovskii and whose public image is that of a resolute administrator and vigorous national leader gifted with charismatic traits. These were qualities that Zhirinovskii himself had been claiming for years for his political leadership. Putin’s authoritarianism, moreover, presumed that Zhirinovskii would either join the informal pro-Putin coalition or have to leave party politics. The latter happened to another charismatic ultra-nationalist leader, Dmitry Rogozin. Rogozin’s Kremlin-created Rodina (Motherland) bloc had become too independent, uncontrollable and popular after its impressive performance in the 2003 State Duma elections (9 per cent). Obviously, on Kremlin orders, the organization was subsequently neutralized and merged into the new Spravedlivaia Rossiiia (Just Russia) party. Zhirinovskii did not need this lesson as he had transformed his party from a fundamentally anti-systemic force into a more or less pro-governmental actor, already before Rodina went into troubles in 2006. The Nazis never had to be as opportunistic. The NSDAP only started supporting the government after Hitler had become the head of a coalition cabinet composed of representatives of various nationalist forces, on January 30, 1933.

It is not too far-fetched a speculation that, if, in Weimar, there had been a political leader, within the authoritarian camp, equivalent, in terms of age and charisma, to Russia’s Putin, or a popular democratic leader, then Hitler’s move into the Chancellor’s office would not have happened. Yet, Friedrich Ebert and Gustav Stresemann, the most admired leaders of the early Weimar democratic camp, had both died, by the late 1920s, while the leader of the traditional authoritarian camp, Hindenburg was getting senile. Hitler benefited from the absence, in the early 1930s, of sufficiently young non-fascist politicians with charismatic qualities. In contrast, post-Soviet Russian politics has been and is characterized by an abundance of both pro- and antidemocratic non-fascist and, often relatively, young charismatic political figures who – from liberal Boris Nemtsov to nationalist Dmitry Rogozin – are trying, more or less successfully, to present themselves as potentially resolute national leaders.

A related difference between the German and Russian cases is the structure of the ideological spectrum with regard to both party politics and public discourse. Although the democratic forces have been getting weaker every year, Russia’s main line of polarization, nevertheless, has remained that between pro-Western democratic and nationalist anti-democratic forces. In spite of the salience of socio-economic issues in post-Soviet Russian public and private life, the confrontation between groups representing free market and socialist policies has remained until today subordinate to the more fundamental question of whether Russia should follow the post-war European, or her own “special” path of political development (Luks 2005). Weimar, in contrast, remained even during its semi-autocratic phase of presidential cabinets characterized by the salient polarization between the economically right and left.

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25 Even so, given merely these circumstances in early 1933, Hitler would have not succeed – at least not on the semi-constitutional road on which he eventually got power – without the intrigues of Papen, Hindenburg’s son Oskar as well as the Reichspräsident himself (and some other actors) who arranged for the Hitler chancellorship behind the scenes.
wings (Wirsching 1999). The capitalist-socialist cleavage had at least the same importance as the cleavage between democratic (pro-Weimar) and anti-democratic (anti-Weimar) forces in parliament and society. In such a situation, Hitler was able to re-define the situation in particularly existential terms. He and his party acted as if the Germans had only one choice: either his “Third Reich” with its partial preservation of market mechanisms and private property rights, or communism with its wholesale expropriation and planned economy. A growing number of Germans – including some of those who were otherwise opposed to Hitler – agreed to this definition of Germany’s alternatives, in the early 1930s.26

Apart from Russia’s juxtaposition to the “South” by Zhirinovskii, it is the Russian encounter with, and reaction to, the West that plays a major role in his as well as in virtually all other Russian nationalisms’ daily propaganda. In recent years, this definition of Russia’s current situation has become popular among many, if not most ordinary Russians whose views have become anti-Western and especially anti-American (Umland 2009b). Nevertheless, the radical anti-Westernism of the LDPR and other right-wing extremists has, so far, paid off little in view of the political rise and gradual radicalization of Vladimir Putin. In spite of being the El’tsin’s protégé, Putin, at least so far, appears as more attractive, to the anti-Western electorate, than his more extremist nationalist contenders.

Whereas for many Russians, the West, the “South” and even the Russian democrats nowadays constitute a threat to Russian national security of some sort, the alleged danger that these factors entail are, so far, rarely felt to be acute. To be sure, leading Russian anti-Western political commentators, like prominent TV journalist Mikhail Leont’ev or Moscow State University professor Aleksandr Dugin, are nothing less than hysterical in their accusations of the US. As a result, feelings of paranoia seem to spreading among both elites and the population at large. Yet these pathologies are still a far way from the civil war-like situation in the late Weimar Republic where hundreds were killed and thousand wounded during frequent street fights between the radical right and left. While a Bolshevik revolution was never a real threat to the Weimar Republic, many middle class Germans, in the inter-war period, considered the takeover of a fundamentally hostile force – the communists – to be a serious immediate menace, or, at least, a possible future scenario.

Undeniably, Russians as well have become increasingly nationalistic during the last decade – a development that has been further aggravated by the frantic media campaign during and after the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Already before this event, Putin has – in reaction to, above all, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in late 2004 – introduced a number of measures designed to purposefully increase the anti-Western radicalization of Russian society (Umland 2009b, 2009c). This included the creation, since 2005, of various new state-sponsored youth organizations, media outlets and other front organizations that led to a significant overall modification of the functioning of his authoritarian rule.27 Moreover, Russian anxiety with regard to imagined and real internal and external threats is likely to further rise in connection with various social repercussions of the current world financial crisis. Yet, as transition theory tells us, a regime does not collapse unless and until some viable alternative to the ideology of the powers-that-be is present and able to attract large sections of the political elite and population (Przeworski 1986: 52). As long as there is no real alternative, even a regime with as vague a political ideology as that of the current Russian electoral autocracy can enjoy “inverse legitimation” (Valenzuela 1992: 78).

5. Conclusions

In the first part, we attempted to show that neither grave socioeconomic conditions nor the resulting considerable “stress” were the most fundamental problems – and certainly not sufficient causes for the collapse – of Weimar Germany and the Second Russian Republic of 1991-1999. Young democracies can handle the problem of stress, as inter-war Finland illustrated, if there is enough support for political pluralism among the elites and the population. We came, as others before, to the tautological conclusion that the major problem of inter-war German and post-communist Russian democracy was the lack of elite support for democracy. To be sure, in both cases, the initial democratic revolutionaries had mass support. However, the democratic leaders of

26 There are some researchers who think that this definition of the situation was basically right. Most prominent among them is, probably, Ernst Nolte (2006: 335–350). Yet, in 1933, there was no real chance for the communists to take over, in Weimar Germany. Instead, the emergence of an explicitly authoritarian regime of the traditional right seemed more likely.

27 One of us went so far as to label, in earlier publications, Putin’s peculiar post-Orange political innovations as “para-totalitarian.” See Umland 2009b, 2009c.
Weimar and Russia chose to make compromises with sections of the elites of the ancien regime.

Not only were other young democracies, such as those of post-communist East-Central Europe, more consistent than the Weimar Republic and post-Soviet Russia in purging their state apparatuses, mass media and education systems from old elites. The public servants of the German and Russian ancien regimes were or are also initially more critical towards democracy than their counterparts in other parts of the world. For instance, many communist party and state apparatuses of Central and Eastern Europe perceived the revolutions of 1989–1991 as liberations from foreign rule, and reunification with Europe. Being representatives of formerly powerful empires the territories and international status of which had been significantly reduced, the old elites remaining within the German bureaucracy after 1918 and Russian state apparatus after 1991 associated their countries’ democratizations with national humiliation. They saw their post-revolutionary orders as disgraceful copies of the political system of those countries that were claiming victory in World War I or the Cold War, respectively.

Many positions of power and influence remained in the hands or fell back under the control of these fundamentally disloyal actors. The resulting partisanship or ambivalence in the backing for the new regimes, by these decision- and opinion-makers constituted the, in our view, most fundamental problem of both countries after they had formally transitioned to proto-democracy in 1918 and 1991. The experience of other inter-war democracies has shown too that a young democracy cannot – or, at least, will have serious difficulties to – survive without sufficient pre-democratic back up, within the post-revolutionary state’s elite strata. In other words, an either explicit illustration or implicit rejuvenation of political institutions, public administration, academia and other parts of society was necessary, but did, for the various reasons that we listed, not take place. As the new elites of Weimar Germany and post-communist Russia were unable to enact, or refrained from pushing through, such purges, their democracies collapsed after economic crises hit them in 1929 and 1998, respectively.

With a lack of support for democracy among the elites, the emergence of a political system without accountability becomes probable. Within Russia’s “super-presidential” system, the weak institutions of democracy – most notably, of political parties – together with long-established informal practices hindered political accountability of the president, from the beginning, and eventually led to its virtual disappearance under Putin (Brown 2005). In contrast to Russia, in Weimar Germany, crucial institutions of democracy – especially, parties – were initially stronger. Yet, Hindenburg, like Putin, managed to establish an, in democracy-theoretic terms, quasi-presidential system without accountability to the parliament – even though he had do that via proclamation of an emergency situation. While, in distinction to the effects of the Russian already semi-authoritarian constitution of 1993, Germany’s turn away from democracy was not a priori a probable outcome, the Weimar constitution too made such a development possible.

In the second part of the paper we showed that there was fertile ground for fascism in the Weimar Republic as well as in today’s Russia. In both countries we found that the post-imperial legacy combined with post-traumatic collective psychopathologies. As a result, both countries developed vital nationalist subcultures. Unsurprisingly, both countries gave birth to a variety of essentially fascist actors some of whom entered the national political stage.

In the third part we tried to explain why, notwithstanding these resemblances, Russia has not become fascist, and does not seem to face a fascist takeover – at least, not one fundamentally similar to the German one of 1933. We discovered an irony in post-Soviet Russian political affairs: Russia’s transition towards electoral authoritarianism was facilitated by an underdeveloped party system, rudimentary civil society and rise of a charismatic non-fascist authoritarian actor representing the ancien regime. These same facilitating factors, however, made/make it also improbable that Russia became/will become a fascist ideocracy. It would take an additional major disruption of post-Soviet Russian political development – for instance, a serious war with a large country (e.g. Ukraine) – fundamentally reconfiguring once more domestic affairs and political discourse in Russia to make our assessment invalid. As long as such fundamental shattering of the current status quo remains absent, it seems more likely that Russia – in some ways, reminding Mexico during the second half of the 20th century – will remain an electoral autocracy with some, but not much room for opposition, for the years to come.

In connection with this, we disagree with Gregory Luebbert (1991) who concluded, in his structural analysis of interwar Europe, that “leadership and meaningful choice played no role in the outcomes [i.e. whether an inter-war country turned to liberalism, fascism or social democracy]” (Luebbert 1991:

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28For a discussion of the general importance of this factor see Burton/Higley 1989; Burton/Gunther/Higley 1992.

29For a comparison of Russia and Mexico, see Konitzer 2005.
According to our findings, actors and their ideologies do matter. That surely does not mean that socio-economic and institutional conditions are irrelevant. But especially under conditions of deep political crisis, institutional structures become malleable and the space of maneuver for the main actors broader then in normal times (Dobry 1986). When actors play a crucial role, it becomes difficult to predict an outcome. If one wants to know where Russia is going these days, one has, therefore, to do both, follow survey results on attitudinal change among citizens, and study the behavior as well as attitudes of Putin and his entourage.

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В работе показывается, что социально-экономические факторы лишь в малой степени объясняют феномен «авторитарного отката» (authoritarian regression) в Веймарской Германии и посткоммунистической России. В качестве альтернативного объяснения предлагается, во-первых, недостаток демократических лидеров в элите; во-вторых, неправильный дизайн институтов государственной власти, позволяющий главе государства управлять страной без участия парламента и допускающий такие выборы, благоприятствующие переизбранию нового президента. Результатом взаимодействия этих причин является феномен «авторитарного отката».

В работе обсуждаются также условия возникновения опасности превращения выборных авторитарных режимов в фашистские режимы. Для современной России, как и для Веймарской Германии, характерно наличие фашистски ориентированных политических акторов, а также широкое распространение среди населения националистических идей. Однако, в отличие от Германии, партийная система России жестко регулируется, а третичный сектор экономики недостаточно развит. Существующий сегодня в России режим с сильным авторитарным, но не фашистским «национальным лидером» Владимиром Путиным создает серьезные препятствия для движения государства как в сторону либеральной демократии, так и в сторону фашистского режима.
Кайлитц Штеффен, Умланд Андреас

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