Do CDS Spreads reflect default risks? 
Evidence from UK bank bailouts

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Abstract

CDS spreads are generally considered to reflect the credit risks of their reference entities. However, CDS spreads of the major UK banks remained stable in response to the recent credit crisis. We suggest that this can be explained by changes in loss given default (LGD). To obtain the result we first derive the probabilities of default from stock option prices and then determine the LGD consistent with actual CDS spreads. Our results reveal a significant decrease in the LGD of bailed out banks over the observed period in contrast to banks which were not bailed out and non-financial companies.

1 Introduction

Credit default swaps (CDS) are one of the most important innovations in financial markets in the last two decades. CDS provide an insurance against the loss by a company’s (reference entity’s) default, and the rate of the yearly payment for this contract is known as the CDS spread. It may be thus expected that the CDS spread reflects the soundness/riskiness of the reference entity. In fact, financial market practitioners use CDS

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spreads as a riskiness measure (see e.g. Ferguson, 2008). Hull et al. (2004) provide some evidence of the positive relationship between CDS spreads and credit ratings. More recent studies confirm that CDS spreads can be well explained by the variables that are commonly used as determinants of the credit risk (see Ericsson et al., 2009), and by individual firms’ volatility and jump risks (see Zhang et al., 2009), however they do not address directly the question of how well CDS spreads reflect credit risks. Although the link between the CDS spread and the credit risk of the reference entity seems quite intuitive and plausible, there is a certain gap in the literature on this topic. This paper contributes to covering this gap. In particular, we study how the credit risk of major UK banks is reflected in their CDS spreads during 2008-09. Our focus on this time period is motivated mainly by explicit defaults and government bailouts that took place in the UK’s banking industry during the recent financial crisis (table 1).

As figure 1 shows, the CDS spreads of the major UK banks remained relatively stable before October 2008. Moreover, the figure reveals that there was little quantitative difference in CDS spreads between financial (HSBC, Barclays, Lloyds and RBS) and non-financial (BT, BP and Tesco) companies. On the other hand figure 2 for US financial companies (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan Chase and Citi) demonstrates a larger difference between financial and non-financial CDS spreads, and a more significant change of the CDS spreads in response to the crisis. However, it is not the case that the major UK banks were sound and financially robust during this period. In fact the UK government bailed out Royal Bank of Scotland group (RBS) and Lloyds TSB group (LLOYDS) with capital injections and asset protection scheme (for details on UK bank bailout measures see e.g. Bank of England, 2009; Hall, 2009, and table (1)).

We focus on the role of the loss given default (LGD) in the analysis of CDS pricing mechanism. Brigo and Mercurio (2006) indicate that the CDS spread is approximately the product of probability of default (PD) and LGD. In the pricing of corporate debt based securitized products, market participants often calculated the credit risk assuming that the LGD is fixed at about 60%. It follows that with a constant LGD the value of

\[ \text{CDS spread} \approx \text{PD} \times \text{LGD} \]

A Standard & Poors (2006) report shows that the rating agency gave credit ratings to cash and synthetic CDO under the assumption that the LGD of most of the investment grade corporate bonds and CDS is about 60%.
CDS spread reflects the credit risk of the reference entity (at least as measured by the probability of default), which is inconsistent with our observations above. In this paper we show that a model of consistently priced CDS implies that LGD varies in time, which should be taken into account when determining the credit risk based on the CDS spreads.

The LGD inferred from CDS spreads is not, in general, the same as that inferred from the prices of loans and bonds. The debt of reference entities, especially loans, is not always tradable because of illiquidity. Therefore, different types of debt assets which sellers receive in the physical settlement of a CDS would imply different LGD as inferred from the respective CDS spreads. On the other hand recent CDS contracts are designed so that CDS dealers determine the LGD through an auction in the cash settlement to reduce the settlement cost. The LGD of CDS will be determined typically in a few weeks following the credit event, whilst it often takes months (or even years) to determine the LGD of loans and corporate bonds in the legal bankruptcy processes. Therefore, the LGD of CDS can diverge from those of loans and bonds, particularly under illiquid market conditions where it is difficult to construct an arbitrage position. As a result, the difference can sometimes become large if the market participants are particularly risk averse and unwilling to hold the reference asset until the legal determination of the LGD. In fact, Helwege et al. (2009) show that the LGD of Lehman Brothers was about 91% in October 2008 whilst the bond price was 13% of the face value on the day prior to the auction (approximately 30% difference between the debt price and the result of the auction). However, other auction results in 2008 were generally consistent with the bond

2There are three types of settlement in the CDS market. In physical settlement, CDS buyers deliver the debt of the reference entity (typically a loan or bond) and receive the same amount of money as the notional amount of the CDS. In a cash settlement, the sellers pay the difference between the market value of the debt and the notional amount of the CDS to the buyers. If the market value of the debt is not uniquely available, the dealers of the CDS will determine the market value in the auction. Finally, in a fixed amount settlement, the sellers pays a fixed amount of money to the buyers regardless of loss due to the credit event. British Bankers Association (2006) showed that the market share of CDSs which are designed to settle in cash settlement has increased from 13% to 26% in 2006 with the growth of CDS although the share of physical settlement is still 73%.

3In fact the International Swap and Derivatives Association (2009) suggests that all the existing CDS contracts should be transferred to cash settlement to improve efficiency and transparency in the CDS settlement process.
This motivates us to use a joint estimation approach, in which we derive the PD from the listed stock options of the reference entities and then use this PD to calculate the implied LGD from CDS spreads. There are three general approaches in the area of joint estimation of credit risk. The first approach, typified by Jarrow (2001), develops a joint estimation framework using stock prices. This methodology determines the probability of default as the probability that the stock price collapses to zero. However, since the stock price is a univariate time series, it is not possible to estimate the PD daily, but in some band (typically one month). This method also has the disadvantage of not being too responsive to changes in market conditions. The second approach, employed by Baba and Ueno (2006), Schlafer and Uhrig-Homburg (2009) and Norden and Weber (2010), estimates the PD from the relationship between senior CDS and subordinate CDS. However, this approach, although intuitive and straightforward to implement, is limited to those companies which have a traded market in both senior and subordinate CDS. The third approach which follows Linetsky (2006) and Carr and Wu (2009), develops a framework to estimate the PD implied in stock options. This methodology has the advantage that it can be employed to estimate the daily PD because option prices provide large cross section data for a large number of companies. It also has the advantage of being responsive to changes in market conditions. We use this approach to estimate the PD in this paper.

For the estimation of the unbiased PD we modify the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model. In particular, (1) we relax the assumption that the underlying stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion (no default and no jump) and allow for the possibility of default (the price can be zero), (2) we allow the interest rate to be stochastic and use the (non-flat) term structure of the compound interbank funding rate as the closest proxy for the instantaneous rate in continuous-time models, and (3) the volatility of the underlying stock price is stochastic and modeled with the singular perturbation method. A similar approach has been used by Bayraktar and Yang (2010), however we allow for more flexibility in modeling the term structure of the interest rates by adopting the Hull and White (1990, 1993) extension of the Vasicek (1977) one factor interest rate model. This captures the high instability in market conditions experienced during the
financial crisis.

In order to infer the LGD from CDS we derive a CDS pricing model which takes into account counterparty risk. Duffie et al. (2005, 2007) show the impact of intermediary activity on the price of OTC (Over the Counter) securities in contrast to listed securities. Moreover, Taylor and Williams (2009) and Wu (2008) agree that counterparty risk influenced the short term interest rate in money market during the recent financial crisis while they don’t agree with the effect of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity supply to ease the turmoil of financial markets. These theoretical and empirical studies imply the importance of counterparty risk in CDS pricing.

Finally, we calibrate the model with the actual data and the PD inferred from stock option prices in order to derive the LGD estimate. Our results suggest that the above puzzle of CDS not being able to reflect the default risk of the reference entity can be resolved if one takes into account the variability of LGD. In particular we show that the LGD of the bailed out UK banks decreased dramatically in response to market events, especially after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, counteracting the substantial rise in their implied PD. This interplay between the PD and LGD provides a clear explanation of the behavior of their credit spreads during this period of unprecedented turbulence in the markets. In addition we demonstrate that the LGD of banks and non financial sector companies are negatively correlated whilst the CDS spreads are positively correlated. These finding on the LGD of the non financial sector companies are consistent with Altman et al. (2005) and Zhang (2009) who show the influence of demand and supply of distressed assets, like defaulted bonds, and business cycles on the LGD of loans.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the option pricing model under credit risk and derive the approximation formula to estimate the PD implied in listed stock options using the perturbation method. In section 3 we develop the framework to calculate the LGD implied in CDS using the implied PD. In section 4 we consider the calibration method to derive the implied PD and LGD. In section 5 we discuss the results of the estimation and the relationship with other studies, which consider LGD and prices of defaulted bonds. Finally we provide our conclusions in section 6.
2 Listed Stock Option Pricing Model under Credit Risk

The first step in this paper is the estimation of credit risk (PD) implied from listed stock option prices. The original option pricing model (Black-Scholes formula) is derived under the following simplified assumptions; (1) the underlying stock price $S_t$ follows a geometric Brownian motion, (2) the volatility of the stock price $\sigma_t$ is constant at the current level $\sigma_0$ and (3) instantaneous risk free interest rate, $r_t (= r(t, t))$ is constant at the current level $r_0$ and the forward rate between $t$ and $t_1$, $r(t, t_1)$ is flat:

\[
dS_t = S_t (\mu_t dt + \sigma_t dW_t) \tag{1}
\]

\[
\sigma_t = \sigma_0 \tag{2}
\]

\[
r_T = r_t \text{ for } \forall T \geq t \text{ and } r(t, t_1) = r_t \text{ for } \forall t_1 \geq t \tag{3}
\]

We follow the approach of Carr and Wu (2009) and Bayraktar and Yang (2010) in relaxing the above three assumptions. In the first assumption, the stock price is continuous and strictly positive, which implies that the issuer of stock never defaults. Clearly, if the stock issuer defaults, then the stock price will collapse to zero. To capture the impact of credit risk on the stock price and its option prices, the underlying stock price process is extended to the credit risk embedded process using a Cox process, as suggested by Lando (1998). The second assumption (2) is relaxed by introducing additional stochastic processes into the option pricing model to describe the volatility fluctuation, as, for example, in Heston (1993).

To deal with the third assumption, Carr and Wu (2009) and Bayraktar and Yang (2010) model the term structure of interest rate using the Vasicek model. However, this model fails to adequately reproduce the significant curvature experienced in the term structure during the crisis experienced in 2008-2009. To overcome this shortcoming, we employ the Hull and White (1993) term structure model to fit the twisted term structure in 2008-2009. This model fits the data during this period completely and has the advantage (like the Vasicek model) of analytical tractability.
2.1 The Stochastic Processes of the Underlying Stock Price and Interest Rate

In this section we describe the modification to the standard Black-Scholes assumptions. First we introduce the Cox process (a Poisson Process of which intensity, $\lambda_t$, is time varying) $\tilde{N} = N_t \left( \int_0^t \lambda_s ds \right)$ and five correlated Brownian motions with the following correlation structure,

$$E[W^{(i)}_t, W^{(j)}_t] = \rho_{ij}t \quad i, j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}, \quad t \geq 0. \tag{4}$$

To model the time of credit event $\tau$ and the dynamics of the underlying stock price, we employ,

$$\tilde{N}_t = \begin{cases} 
0 & \tau > t \\
1 & \tau \leq t 
\end{cases}$$

where the intensity of the Cox process, $\lambda_t$, is defined

$$\lambda_t = f(Y_t, Z_t), \tag{5}$$

$$dY_t = \frac{1}{\epsilon} (m - Y_t) dt + \frac{\nu \sqrt{2}}{\epsilon} dW^{(2)}_t \tag{6}$$

$$dZ_t = \delta c(Z_t) dt + g(Z_t) dW^{(3)}_t \tag{7}$$

$f(Y_t, Z_t)$, $c(Z_t)$ and $g(Z_t)$ are respectively smooth and bounded functions on $Z_t$ and $Y_t$. The parameters $\delta$ and $\epsilon$ control the velocity of the processes which are characterized by $m$, $\nu$, $c(Z_t)$ and $g(Z_t)$. Thus the probability that “$\tau \leq T$ at $t$” is

$$P(\tau \leq T | \tau > t) = E \left[ \tilde{N}_T | \mathcal{G}_t \right] = E \left[ \int_t^T \lambda_s \exp \left( - \int_0^s \lambda_u du \right) ds \right] \tag{8}$$

We denote the credit event indicator process by $I_t = 1_{(\tau \leq t)} \ (t \geq 0)$ and define $\mathcal{I}_t$ as the filtration generated by $I_t$. Under this setting, the defaultable stock price process is defined as,

$$d\tilde{S}_t = \tilde{S}_t \left( r_t dt + \sigma(\tilde{Y}_t) dW^{(0)}_t \right) - d \left( N_t - \int_0^{t \wedge \tau} \lambda_u du \right), \quad \tilde{S}_0 = x. \tag{9}$$

The credit event indicator of (9) is the jump diffusion factor, where the jump magnitude is fixed at unity. This is the modification of assumption (1).
Secondly, the stochastic volatility function is defined as a smooth and bounded function of $\tilde{Y}_t$. The stochastic process, $\tilde{Y}_t$, follows a mean reverting process,

$$
d\tilde{Y}_t = \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon} (\tilde{m} - \tilde{Y}_t) + \tilde{\nu}\sqrt{\epsilon} \Lambda(\tilde{Y}_t) \right) dt + \frac{\tilde{\nu}\sqrt{\epsilon}}{\sqrt{\epsilon}} dW_t^{(4)}.
$$

(10)

This is introduced to modify assumption (2). The parameter $1/\epsilon$ is the rate of mean reversion of the process while $\epsilon$ also corresponds to the time scale of the process.

While the stock price drops to zero at the moment of the credit event (default) and thereafter stays at zero, the pre-default stock price dynamics has continuous paths.

$$
dS_t = S_t \left( (r_t + \lambda_t) dt + \sigma(\tilde{Y}_t) dW_t^{(0)} \right), \ S_0 = x \text{ and } \lambda_0 = \lambda.
$$

(11)

Finally the risk free interest rate, $r_t$ is assumed to follow the Hull and White (1993) model

$$
\frac{dr_t}{r_t} = (\alpha_t - \beta r_t) dt + \eta dW_t^{(1)}, \ r_0 = r.
$$

(12)

where

$$
\alpha_t = \frac{\partial f^M(0,t)}{\partial t} + \beta f^M(0,t) + \frac{\eta^2}{2\beta} (1 - \exp(-2\beta t))
$$

(13)

and $f^M(t,T)$ is the market forward rate from time $t$ to time $T$. This is the modification of (3).

The modifications to the assumptions of Black-Scholes (1)-(3) are now completed. This theoretical framework is now employed to derive the modified equations for both European call and put options.

### 2.2 Option Pricing under Credit Risk

In the framework described above, it is possible to construct the enlargement filtration $G_t$ of the filtration $\mathcal{F}_t$ generated by the vector of Brownian motions and credit indicator filtration $\mathcal{I}_t$ ($G_t = \mathcal{I}_t \lor \mathcal{F}_t$). We can calculate the price of the defaultable contingent claim $P(t,T)$ as the conditional expectation of the pay off, $h(\bar{S}_T)(= P(T,T))$ by proposition 5.1.1 in Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002):

$$
P(t,T) = E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_t^T r_s ds \right) h(\bar{S}_T) 1_{(\tau > T)} | G_t \right],
$$

$$
= 1_{(\tau > t)} E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_t^T (r_s + \lambda_s) ds \right) h(S_T) | \mathcal{F}_t \right].
$$

(14)
Duffie and Singleton (1999) obtain the same result for defaultable bonds.

Equation (14) provides some useful special cases. First, if $h(\bar{S}_T) \equiv 1$, then $P(t,T)$ is a (non-defaultable) risk free discount bond price, $B^0(t,T)$.

$$B^0(t, T) = E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_t^T r_s ds \right) \bigg| \mathcal{F}_t \right] \quad \text{(15)}$$

In the setting described by (12), it is possible to obtain the explicit solution of (15)

$$B^0(t, T) = \exp \left( a(t,T) - b(t,T) r_t \right) \quad \text{(16)}$$

where

$$b(t,T) = \frac{1 - \exp(\beta(T-t))}{\beta}$$

$$a(t,T) = f^M(0,T) \left( b(t,T) f^M(0,t) - \frac{n^2}{4\beta} (1 - \exp(-2\beta t)) b(t,T)^2 \right).$$

If $h(\bar{S}_T) \equiv 1_{(r>T)} + 1_{(r\leq T)}(1-l)P(t,\tau-)$ and $l$ is the rate of loss at default, then $P(t,T)$ is a defaultable discount bond price, $B^c(t,T)$.

$$B^c(t, T) = \left. E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_t^T r_s ds \right) \right| \mathcal{G}_t \right] \left[ \left. 1 - \exp \left( - \int_t^T (r_s + \lambda_s) ds \right) \right| \mathcal{F}_t \right] \quad \text{(17)}$$

Finally, if $h(\bar{S}_T) \equiv (S_T - K)^+$, $P(t,T)$ represents the price of a European call option with strike price $K$ ($K > 0$) which reduces to

$$\text{Call}(t, T) = \left. E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_t^T (r_s + \lambda_s) ds \right) (X_T - K)^+ \right| \mathcal{F}_t \right]$$

$$= xN(d_1) - K E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_t^T (r_s + \lambda_s) ds \right) \bigg| \mathcal{F}_t \right] N(d_2), \quad \text{(18)}$$

where $N()$ is the standard normal distribution function and

$$d_1 = \frac{\log \left( \frac{x}{xE_0^c(t,T)} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma(t,T)}{\sqrt{\sigma(t,T)}} \quad d_2 = d_1 - \sqrt{\sigma(t,T)}.$$
The price of put option is obtained by using put-call parity,
\[
\text{Put}(t, T) = -x N(-d_1) + KE \left[ N(-d_2) \exp\left( -\int_t^T (r_s + \lambda_s) \, ds \right) \right] \mathcal{F}_t \\
+ KE \left[ \exp \left( -\int_t^T r_s \, ds \right) - \exp \left( -\int_t^T (r_s + \lambda_s) \, ds \right) \right] \mathcal{F}_t. \tag{20}
\]

To illustrate in a simple way the qualitative effect of credit risk on the option prices; keeping the volatility of the underlying asset and interest rate constant as in (2) and (3), the impact of credit risk on the price of a call option is equivalent to that of a rise in interest rate. In the above condition, equation (18) is equivalent to the original Black-Sholes formula with the non defaultable interest rate \( r_t \) replaced by \( r_t + \lambda_t \). On the other hand, the impact of credit risk on put options is not as straightforward. As derived in (20), the last term is positive if \( \lambda_s \) is positive. Then, particularly for the out of money put option, this model produces a higher premium than the standard Black-Sholes one because the impact of the last term becomes relatively larger as the first two terms becomes smaller. From an economic point of view, this represents an insurance premium to cover the possibility of default.

### 2.3 Modeling the Volatility Surface of Stock Options

In this section we model the volatility surface of the listed stock options using the singular perturbation method. As Fouque et al. (2000, 2003) demonstrate the singular perturbation method provides an accurate approximation of the model without the need to specify individual parameters.

The perturbation method is divided into two steps. First, we formulate the model as the modification of the simple model, which is analytically solved. It is possible to derive the analytical solution of the option price, \( P_0 \) when the volatility of underlying stock price process \( \sigma(\tilde{Y}_t) \) and the intensity of the hazard rate \( \lambda(Y_t, Z_t) \) are fixed at \( \tilde{\sigma}_t^2 \) and \( \tilde{\lambda} \) respectively. Denote \( \text{Call}_0 \) if \( P_0 \) is the price of a call option,
\[
\text{Call}_0(t, T) = x N(d_1) - KE \left[ \exp \left( -\int_t^T (r_s + \tilde{\lambda}) \, ds \right) \right] \mathcal{F}_t N(d_2), \tag{21}
\]
where
\[
d_1 = \frac{\log \left( \frac{x}{K E^0(t, T)} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\sigma}(t, T)}{\sqrt{\tilde{\sigma}(t, T)}}, \quad d_2 = d_1 - \sqrt{\tilde{\sigma}(t, T)}.
\]
\[
\bar{\sigma}(t, T) = \bar{\sigma}_1^2(T-t) + \eta^2 \int_t^T b^2(s, T) ds + 2\eta \bar{\sigma}_1 \int_t^T b(s, T) ds
\]

\[
\bar{B}_0^2(t, T) = E \left[ \exp \left( -\int_t^T (r_s + \bar{\lambda}) ds \right) | \mathcal{F}_t \right].
\]

Similarly the price of a put option \(\text{Put}_0\) is

\[
\text{Put}_0(t, T) = -x N(-d_1) + K E \left[ N(-d_2) \exp \left( -\int_t^T (r_s + \bar{\lambda}) ds \right) | \mathcal{F}_t \right] + K E \left[ \exp \left( -\int_t^T r_s ds \right) - \exp \left( -\int_t^T (r_s + \bar{\lambda}) ds \right) | \mathcal{F}_t \right].
\]

The second step is to calculate the approximation of (18) and (20) using the asymptotics of (21) and (23) to correct the error between the original model and simplified model. We calculate the model option price \(\tilde{P}_{\epsilon, \delta}\) using the first order asymptotics on \(\sqrt{\epsilon}\) and \(\sqrt{\delta}\) to approximate the actual option price \(P\),

\[
\tilde{P}_{\epsilon, \delta} = P_0 + \sqrt{\epsilon}P_{1,0} + \sqrt{\delta}P_{0,1}.
\]

Fouque et al. (2003) prove the validity of the approximation, in particular that there exists a constant \(C\) such that \(|P - \tilde{P}_{\epsilon, \delta}| \leq C\) when the payoff function \(h(S_T)\) is smooth, and \(|P - \tilde{P}_{\epsilon, \delta}| \leq C (\epsilon \log \epsilon + \delta + \sqrt{\epsilon \delta})\) when \(h(S_T)\) is the payoff of a call or put option. The model price of stock option, \(\tilde{P}_{\epsilon, \delta}\) is expressed explicitly (See Appendix A for the derivation),

\[
\tilde{P}_{\epsilon, \delta}(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z), V) = P_0(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{1,0}^\epsilon g_1(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{2,0}^\epsilon g_2(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{3,0}^\delta g_3(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{4,0}^\delta g_4(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{5,0}^\delta g_5(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{6,0}^\delta g_6(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{7,0}^\delta g_7(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{8,0}^\delta g_8(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)) + V_{9,0}^\delta g_9(T, K, \bar{\lambda}(z)).
\]

As shown in Appendix A, all coefficients \(V = (V_{1,0}^\epsilon, V_{2,0}^\epsilon, V_{3,0}^\epsilon, V_{4,0}^\epsilon, V_{5,0}^\delta, V_{6,0}^\delta, V_{7,0}^\delta, V_{8,0}^\delta, V_{9,0}^\delta)\) in (24) are the products of the parameters of (5)-(12). It follows that it is possible to estimate the option price under credit risk without specification of the individual parameters, but rather the coefficients, \(V\) (see Bayraktar and Yang (2010) for detail).

In Appendix A we show that equation (24) approximates \(\tilde{P}_{\epsilon, \delta}\) using the Greeks (risk sensitivities) of the analytical solution \(P_0\). Moreover, equation (24) is independent of two state variables, \(Y_t\) and \(\bar{Y}_t\) due to averaging. It depends only on the level of \(Z_t\) through \(\bar{\lambda}(z)\). As \(P_0\) is a function of \(x\) and \(\bar{\lambda}(z)\), we can calculate the model free approximation, \(\tilde{P}_{\epsilon, \delta}\), on \(Y_t\) and \(\bar{Y}_t\) except the mean reversion defined in (6) and (9).
3 Valuation of CDS using the PD implied in the Listed Stock Options

The second step in this paper is to calculate the LGD of CDS which is consistent with the PD implied by the stock options. We introduce counterparty risk into the CDS pricing model for this calculation. Counterparty risk arises when the protection seller cannot compensate the loss from a default of the reference entity if the seller and reference entity default simultaneously. Hull and White (2001) formulate a CDS spread pricing model incorporating counterparty risk. However we are not aware of any empirical studies on the impact of the counterparty risk on CDS spread. This is mainly because the individual transaction data on CDS is difficult to obtain.

3.1 CDS Pricing with Counterparty Risk

Bluhm et al. (2002) show that it is possible to determine the no arbitrage CDS spread without counterparty risk as the spread to balance the expected cash flow of the protection seller and that of the protection buyer. That is the expected value of the protection buyer’s cash flow (premium leg), $C_{F}^{buy}(t,T)$, equals that of the protection seller’s cash flow (default leg), $C_{F}^{sell}(t,T)$, under the fair CDS spread.

Suppose that $CDS_{F}(t,T)$ is the CDS spread, where the contract starts at t and matures at T, and $T_{m}$ is the time of the premium payment ($m = 1, \cdots, M$ and $T_{M} = T$), the expected payment of the CDS premium, $C_{F}^{buy}(t,T)$ is

$$
C_{F}^{buy}(t,T) = E \left[ \sum_{m=1}^{M} \exp \left( - \int_{t}^{T_{m}} r_{s} ds \right) 1_{(\tau > T_{m})} CDS_{F}(t,T) \bigg| G_{t} \right] 
$$

and the expected payment triggered by the credit event, $C_{F}^{sell}(t,T)$ is

$$
C_{F}^{sell}(t,T) = E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_{T_{m}}^{T} r_{s} ds \right) 1_{(\tau \leq T_{M})} l \bigg| G_{t} \right] 
$$

Therefore, when $C_{F}^{buy}(t,T)$ equals $C_{F}^{sell}(t,T)$, the no arbitrage CDS spread is

$$
CDS_{F}(t,T) = 1_{(t<\tau)} \frac{E \left[ \int_{t}^{T} \exp \left( - \int_{t}^{u} (r_{s} + \lambda_{s}) ds \right) \lambda_{u} du \bigg| F_{t} \right]}{\sum_{m=1}^{M} E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_{t}^{T_{m}} (r_{s} + \lambda_{s}) ds \right) \bigg| F_{t} \right]} .
$$
Next we extend the Cox process into a multidimensional process to consider not only the reference entity’s default but also the counterparty’s default. There are three types of approaches to study the impact of the counterparty risk on CDS spread. First Hull and White (2001) consider three cases, default of the reference entity, that of the protection seller and no default. They focus on the credit event of the reference entity and the cancellation of the contract on the seller’s default. Hull and White (2001) do not, however, model the simultaneous default of the reference entity and the counterparty explicitly. Second, Leung and Kwok (2005) analyze not only the impact of the default of the seller but also that of the buyer. Finally, Crépey et al. (2010) analyze not only the impact of the seller’s default but also the impact of the simultaneous default of the reference entity and the seller.

Leung and Kwok (2005) show that the buyer’s default does not influence the CDS spread if the buyer’s default is not highly correlated with the sellers and the reference entity. This allows us to focus on the default of the reference entity and that of the seller, as well as their simultaneous default, omitting the buyer’s default possibility.

The stopping time $\tau_1$ and $\tau_2$ are respectively the time of default of the reference entity and the CDS counterparty, which are characterized with the intensity $\lambda_1$ and $\lambda_2$. There are four possible types of payoff in the CDS contract with counterparty risk.

1. The reference entity defaults earlier than the expiration of the contract and the default of the counterparty ($\tau_1 < T, \tau_1 < \tau_2$). The payment of the premium will terminate at $\tau_1$ and the counterparty will compensate the loss by the reference entity’s default, $l_1$ of the notional amount.

2. The counterparty defaults earlier than the expiration of the contract and the default of the reference entity ($\tau_2 < T, \tau_2 < \tau_1$). The contract will be cancelled at $\tau_2$. It is normally necessary to settle the net value of the contract, which is equal to the reconstruction cost of a new contract on the same reference entity, in the cancellation. However, the protection seller can settle some proportion of the net value, $1 - l_2$.

3. Neither the reference entity nor the counterparty defaults earlier than the expiration of the contract ($T < \tau_1, T < \tau_2$). The protection buyer pays the premium until the

13
The default leg incorporating counterparty risk, \( C_{\text{buy}}(t, T) \) is

\[
C_{\text{buy}}^{\text{buy}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{m=1}^{M} \exp \left( -\int_{t}^{T_m} r_s ds \right) 1_{(\min(\tau_1, \tau_2) > T_m)} \text{CDS}(t, T) \bigg| \mathcal{G}_t \right] 
\]

\[
= \text{CDS}(t, T) \sum_{m=1}^{M} \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\int_{t}^{T_m} r_s + \lambda^1_s + \lambda^2_s \right) ds \bigg| \mathcal{F}_t \right] 
\]

(28)

The default leg incorporating counterparty risk, \( C_{\text{sell}}^{\text{sell}}(t, T) \) is

\[
C_{\text{sell}}^{\text{sell}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\int_{t}^{T_1 \vee T_2} r_s ds \right) \left( 1_{(\tau_1 \leq T, \tau_1 < \tau_2)} l_1 + 1_{(\tau_1 = \tau_2, \tau_1 < T)} l_1 (1 - l_2) \right) \bigg| \mathcal{G}_t \right] 
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp \left( -\int_{t}^{T_1 \vee T_2} r_s ds \right) \left( 1_{(\tau_1 \leq T, \tau_1 < \tau_2)} l_1 + 1_{(\tau_1 = \tau_2, \tau_1 < T)} l_1 (1 - l_2) \right) \bigg| \mathcal{G}_t \right] 
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ l_1 \int_{t}^{T} \exp \left( -\int_{t}^{u} r_s du \right) d(F_1(s)(1 - F_2(s))) \bigg| \mathcal{F}_t \right] 
\]

\[
+ \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_{t}^{T} \exp \left( -\int_{t}^{u} r_s du \right) l_1 (1 - l_2) d((F(s) - F(s - \gamma))(1 - F(s - \gamma))) \bigg| \mathcal{F}_t \right] 
\]

(29)

4 This is a reasonable approximation as the majority of the CDS are contracts between financial institutions. In fact Sorkin (2009) shows that AIG requested government support because AIG had to fund money not for the settlement of the credit derivatives but for the additional collateral of the credit derivatives.
where $F(t)$ is the joint probability distribution function that $\tau_1$ and $\tau_2$ are less than $t$, $F_1(t)$ and $F_2(t)$ are the marginal distribution function of $\tau_1$ and $\tau_2$, $\gamma$ is the time between a credit event and the auction of the CDS, in average two weeks, and

$$S_1(s) = \lambda^1_s \exp \left( - \int_0^s \lambda^1_u \, du \right),$$

$$S_2(s) = \lambda^1_s \exp \left( - \int_0^s \lambda^1_u \, du \right) \int_t^s \lambda^2_u \exp \left( - \int_0^u \lambda^2_q \, dq \right) \, du,$$

$$S_3(s) = \lambda^2_s \exp \left( - \int_0^s \lambda^2_u \, du \right) \int_t^s \lambda^1_u \exp \left( - \int_0^u \lambda^1_q \, dq \right) \, du,$$

$$S_4(s) = \left( \lambda^1_s + \lambda^2_s \right) \left( \exp \left( - \int_{s-\gamma}^s \left( \lambda^1_u + \lambda^2_u \right) \, du \right) \right),$$

$$S_5(s) = \left( \lambda^1_s + \lambda^2_s \right) \left( \exp \left( - \int_{s-\gamma}^s \left( \lambda^1_u + \lambda^2_u \right) \, du \right) \right) \times \left( \int_t^{s-\gamma} \left( \lambda^1_s + \lambda^2_s \right) \exp \left( - \int_0^u \left( \lambda^1_q + \lambda^2_q \right) \, dq \right) \, du \right),$$

$$S_6(s) = \left( \lambda^1_s + \lambda^2_s \right) \left( \exp \left( - \int_{s-\gamma}^s \left( \lambda^1_u + \lambda^2_u \right) \, du \right) \right) \times \left( \int_t^{s-\gamma} \left( \lambda^1_s + \lambda^2_s \right) \exp \left( - \int_{u-\gamma}^u \left( \lambda^1_q + \lambda^2_q \right) \, dq \right) \, du \right).$$

Finally the fair CDS spread under counterparty risk is

$$\text{CDS}_C(t, T) = \frac{C_{\text{sell}}^\text{sell}(t, T)}{\sum_{m=1}^M E \left[ \exp \left( - \int_t^T (r_s + \lambda^1_s + \lambda^2_s) \, ds \right) \right] \mathcal{F}_t}$$

where $l_1$ and $l_2$ are respectively the LGD of the reference entity and the counterparty. We omit the accrued premium on default following Brigo and Chourdakis (2009). Equation (36) implies that higher counterparty risk decreases the CDS spread. This intuitively means that a guarantee by a less credible entity is less valuable and reliable.

### 4 Data and Estimation Method

We now have the theoretical framework to analyze the cause of the relative stability in the UK bank CDS spread shown in figure (1). As discussed above it is conceptually possible to divide the CDS spread into PD and LGD. These risk factors are interpreted as the “likelihood” of default and the “depth” of the loss on default respectively. Our model can identify the impact of the individual risk factors. Therefore, even if the CDS spreads of two companies are close, the credit risk implications may be very different.
4.1 Data

The sample period, July 2008-December 2009, contains Lehmann Brothers’ bankruptcy, the subsequent financial crisis and the bank bailouts by the UK government. The credit derivatives markets have been exposed to the most challenging and volatile conditions during this period.

We calibrate our stock option pricing model and CDS model to actual data of four major UK banks (HSBC Holdings, Barclays Bank, Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland Group) and three major UK non financial sector companies (BP, BT and Tesco) over the period of 1 July 2008-31 December 2009. The sources of data we use are:

- Daily stock price data from Datastream.
- Daily listed stock option price data also obtained from Datastream. The data contains options of all expiration dates and strike prices which were traded on Euroclear over the sample period. It covers both call and put options with expiration periods of 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24 months. We follow Bayraktar and Yang (2010), 1 month and 2 months options are not used in calibration because these short maturity option prices behave irregularly. To evaluate option prices based on our model, we convert the data into European options by extracting the early exercise premium as Bayraktar and Yang (2010) and Carr and Wu (2009).
- The term structure of the funding rate is derived from 3 months LIBOR and interest rate futures traded in Euroclear.
- CDS spreads are obtained from Datastream. We focus on the CDS of senior debts.

4.1.1 The Term Structure of the Funding Rate

As discussed in section 2.1, the risk free interest rate is modeled as in Hull and White (1993). Moreover, we model the term structure of the compound interbank funding rate and not the term structure of spot rates such as government bond yield or swap rate. The reason for this is that the term of the funding rate in the replicating portfolio of listed derivatives is short regardless of the maturity of the derivative due to daily settlement.
That is the value of the listed derivatives is zero after the daily settlement although the price of these derivatives is not zero. Under these settlement conditions, the funding rate is the continuous roll of short term interest rate from current date \( t \) to maturity date \( T \).

To construct the term structure of the compound interest rate, we employ the prices of interest rate futures instead of the spot rate. In the interest futures market, the futures of 3 month Libor are available in 3 month interval until December 2015 (as at December 2009). Under the expectation hypothesis of the term structure one would expect that the implied forward rates generated by the spot rate are equivalent to the term structure of the compound short rate, i.e. the forward rate, \( r(t,s,T) \) at time \( t \) between \( s \) and \( T \) \((s \geq t)\) would be equal to the compound short rate,

\[
\int_t^T r_s \, ds = r(t,t,T) (= r(t,T)).
\] (37)

However, as Campbell et al. (1997) surveyed the expectation hypothesis (37) rarely satisfies actual data. As a result, the implied forward rate cannot be used as the funding rate process in listed option pricing. In contrast, the term structure based on interest futures is not only theoretically consistent with listed option pricing models and can be used to determine the funding rate in listed option pricing but also it is a relatively unbiased estimator of the expectation of the future term structure.

4.2 The Estimation Methodology

The estimation of the parameters involves two steps. First we calibrate the volatility surface and estimate the implied PD. Secondly, we calculate the implied LGD from CDS spreads based on the implied PDs obtained from the first step.

In the first step, the parameters of (24) are calibrated with actual daily data. There are 10 unknown parameters, \((V_1^\epsilon, V_2^\epsilon, V_3^\epsilon, V_4^\epsilon, V_5^\epsilon, V_6^\epsilon, V_7^\epsilon, V_1^\delta, V_2^\delta, \bar{\lambda}_1)\) to estimate in equation (24). We estimate the parameters based on the algorithm of Papanicolaou and Sircar (2008). In this procedure we minimize the weighted mean squared error to avoid the bias caused by the difference of the number of options, \(N_{i,t}\), at individual maturities.

\(^5\text{Black (1976) pointed out the funding term is 1day. However, the settlement is not always executed every business day in practice. If the net value of the derivatives are less than margin call rate (usually 5% or 10%), it is not cleared to save the cost of settlement.}\)
1. First, we estimate parameters $V = (V_1, V_2, V_3, V_4, V_5, V_6, V_7, V_1^\delta, V_2^\delta))$ with $\bar{\lambda}_{t-1}^1$.

$$V = \arg \min_V \frac{\sum_i \sqrt{\sum_j (P(t, T_i, K_{i,j}) - \tilde{P}_{\varepsilon,\delta}(T_i, K_{i,j}, \bar{\lambda}_{t-1}^1, V))^2}}{N_{i,t}}$$ \hspace{1cm} (38)

where $N_{i,t}$ is the number of the maturity $T_i$ options traded at $t$.

2. Second, we estimate PD with the parameters $\tilde{V}$ from (38),

$$\bar{\lambda}_{t}^1 = \arg \min_{\bar{\lambda}_{i}^1} \frac{\sum_i \sqrt{\sum_j (P(t, T_i, K_{i,j}) - \tilde{P}_{\varepsilon,\delta}(T_i, K_{i,j}, \bar{\lambda}_{t}^1, \tilde{V}))^2}}{N_{i,t}}$$ \hspace{1cm} (39)

The second step is the estimation of the LGD implied in CDS by using the implied PD from listed stock option. As a proxy for the “average” counterparty risk we take the UK TED spread, which is an indicator for the funding condition of financial institutions and the degree of risk aversion by investors.\(^6\) The only free parameter in (36), $l_1$ is calibrated with daily actual CDS spread by the minimization of the error function,

$$\hat{l}_1 = \arg \min_{l_1} \sqrt{(CDS(t, T) - CDS_C(t, T, l_1, \hat{\lambda}_1^1, \hat{\lambda}_2^1))^2},$$ \hspace{1cm} (40)

where

$$\hat{\lambda}_1^1 = \bar{\lambda}_1^1 + CDS^*(t, T)$$ \hspace{1cm} (41)

$$r_t^* = r_t - CDS^*(t, T)$$ \hspace{1cm} (42)

and $CDS^*(t, T)$ is the CDS spread of the government, $\hat{\lambda}_1^2$ and $\hat{l}_2$ are calculated from the UK TED spread using (17) and $r_t^*$ is the credit risk adjusted interest rate from the compound interest rate calculated from 3 months interest futures, $r_t$.

\(^6\)The initial value of the probability of default, $\bar{\lambda}_0^1$, is given as the CDS spread divided by the a constant LGD of 60%, $CDS(t, T)/0.6$. To eliminate the dependency on the initial value we ignore the first 20 days results.

\(^7\)TED spread is the abbreviation of Treasury and Euro Dollar spread. It is originally defined as the spread between 3 months US Treasury bill and 3 months euro dollar rate. Now it is generally used to denote the spread between interbank interest rate and government bond yield. In fact Taylor and Williams (2009) defined the spread between OIS(overnight index swap) of FF (Federal Fund) rate and 3 month LIBOR as TED spread.
We modify the credit risk embedded in the funding rate $r_t$ using (41) and (42). Our option pricing model with a defaultable stock assumes $r_t$ to be a non-defaultable interest rate. However, the calculated funding rate, $r_t$, obviously contains two kinds of credit risks, the credit risk of the government and that of financial institutions. Thus the estimated value $\bar{\lambda}_1^t$ in (39) is possibly biased.

We adjust the estimation result by accounting for the first type of credit risk, the credit risk of the government. No government is perfectly free from credit risk. The CDS spread of the UK government, which was rated AAA, has been non-zero even before the financial crisis. This implies that $\bar{\lambda}_1^t$ estimated in (39) can be lower than the true value, $\lambda_1^t$ if the government bond yield is assumed to be the risk free interest rate. That is the calibration optimizes the level of the sum, $r_t + \bar{\lambda}_1^t$ regardless of the credit risk embedded in $r_t$. To modify the bias of the credit risk contained in the funding rate, we estimate the intensity of the Cox process, $\hat{\lambda}_1^t$ using the estimated value, $\bar{\lambda}_1^t$ and CDS spread of the UK government, $CDS^*(t,T)$. Therefore, even if $\bar{\lambda}_1^t$ is zero, it implies that the credit risk does not influence the stock option prices explicitly and the implied PD of the company is identical to the CDS spread of the government.

However, we do not adjust for the credit risk of financial institutions because the swap spread, the spread between the government bond yield $R^G(t,T)$ and the swap rate $R^S(t,T)$ represents frictional costs. Clearly the swap rate and LIBOR are not free of credit risk, because they are the interest rates of the contracts between financial institutions. In fact, in any transaction such as the construction of replicating portfolio and risk hedging to hold securities as inventory, LIBOR and swap rate are the possible lowest funding rates for market participants. Therefore, the swap spread does not imply the credit risk of the underlying assets but the friction cost of market makers and dealers.

### 5 Estimation Results and their Implications

To make clear the implication of the PD implied in stock options ($\hat{\lambda}_1^t$) on the market valuation of credit risk, we compare it to the simple calculation of PD obtained from CDS spreads under assumption of a constant 60% LGD using (27). Although the simple calculation may not be a reliable estimator of PD as there is no guarantee that the
expectation of LGD is around 60%, it is still a useful benchmark for comparison. Next we consider the implication of the LGD implied in the CDS. As we will demonstrate, the implied PD moved in a different direction to that of the CDS spreads, the implied LGD is far from constant and reflects the situation of the individual entity.

5.1 Probability of Default Implied in Listed Stock Options

We now illustrate the numerical result for the implied PD. As shown in figure [4], the implied PD of the “bailed out” banks, LLOYDS and RBS, and Barclays are higher than the simple calculation following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (September 2008) and the UK government’s bail out with the capital injection and the Asset Protection Scheme (January 2009). This in contrast to the implied PD of HSBC and the non financial sector companies (see figure [5]), which are generally higher than those of the simple calculation in the third quarter of 2008 and the second half of 2009. On the other hand the implied PD of these entities are approximately equal to those obtained by the simple calculations in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009.

It is clear from the figures that the implied PD of the UK banks were not much higher than non financial sector in the third quarter of 2008. Although the CDS spreads of the UK banks temporarily spiked up at the end of September, the implied PD of the UK banks did not change significantly. As summarized in the table 1, European banks such as Fortis and Bradford&Bingley were nationalized and US congress rejected TARP, the capital injection and problematic asset purchase plan at that time. To ease the turmoil, the UK government implemented the capital injection measures for RBS and LLOYDS and raised the limit of the bank deposit guarantee. As a consequence, the CDS spreads declined but stayed at a higher level than before Lehman’s bankruptcy. As the implied PD remained relatively low during this period, the movement in the CDS spreads is due more to the general rise in risk aversion and not due to specific company concerns.

In contrast there are significant differences among the implied PD of the UK banks in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009. These results are consistent with the recapitalization actions taken by the banks. The implied PD of LLOYDS and RBS are significantly higher than those obtained via the simple calculation and those obtained for the non financial companies (whose CDS spreads were at approximately the same
level as those of the banks). At their peak in March 2009, their implied PD were around 70%. This implies that the impact of the financial crisis on their financial soundness was much more significant than their CDS spreads indicated. Thus investors were reluctant to invest additional money. Both RBS and LLOYDS raised capital, not in the financial markets, but from the UK government, three times in the fourth quarter 2008 and 2009. As a result, the banks became partly state owned banks, avoiding bankruptcy or full nationalization. In contrast, the implied PD of HSBC was at almost the same level as that of the simple calculation. HSBC raised capital through the issue of ordinary stock during this period (March 2009). Finally, the implied PD of Barclays demonstrates behavior between those of the partly state owned banks and HSBC. The implied PD of Barclays peaked at around 25% at March 2009. In fact they issued preferred shares to the Qatar government (November 2008). Although, Barclays did not raise capital via public offering like HSBC, it did not need the explicit government support in raising capital in contrast to RBS and LLOYDS. An important implication is that with RBS and LLOYDS having an implied PD of just under 70%, it was impossible for them to follow HSBC, whose implied PD was low during this period, in raising capital via the issue of common or preferred stock. Barclays only issued preferred stock to recapitalize. This implies that credit risk is not only a determinant for debt prices but also a determinant of a company’s ability to raise capital in the financial market.

The implied PD of the non financial companies obtained during this period implies that additional factors contribute to their CDS spreads. Throughout the sample period of the analysis, their implied PD is greater than or equal to the PD obtained via the simple calculation, and the difference varies over time (figure 6). The difference with the simple calculation is at a minimum for the non financial companies between the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009. This cyclical movement indicates that the LGD implied in CDS can vary over time even if the reference entities are not subject to external credit support like RBS and LLOYDS.

5.2 Loss Given Default Implied in CDS spread

As discussed previously, the implied PD is used to determine the implied LGD. Figures 7 illustrates that the implied LGD of the UK banks increased immediately after
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy followed by a rapid decrease (during September 2008). After September 2008 the implied LGD of UK banks (except HSBC) continued to decrease. In particular, the implied LGD reached minimum levels, less than 10% for RBS and LLOYDS, and 10-20% for Barclays after January 2009. The implied LGD of these banks remained at these low levels until the third capital injection to RBS and LLOYDS in the fourth quarter of 2009. The LGD of HSBC and the non financial companies (see figure 8) were negatively correlated with those of Barclays, LLOYDS and RBS, while the CDS spreads were positively correlated with each other during this period. These results are interpreted as follows.

The sharp rise in the implied LGD of the UK banks shortly after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy implies that the rise in CDS spread in September 2008 was caused not by the specific credit risk in a single name, but rather a shift of investor risk preference due to the turmoil of financial market. In fact this is the period in which the UK TED spread showed significant turbulence.

The low implied LGD of LLOYDS and RBS, subsequent to January 2009, is interpreted as the debt investors’ expectation of the bailout by the UK government such as capital injection and loss protection to underpin troubled assets. In other words, investors in the debt and CDS markets did not expect significant potential loss due to the actions and support of the UK government for RBS and LLOYDS. In fact the UK government supported these banks by injecting capital three times to strengthen their capital base (October 2008, February 2009 and November 2009; see Hall (2009) for the details). These government actions supported the credit of RBS and LLOYDS which were under significant financial strain. In contrast, however, the stock and stock option market recognized the present value of the shareholders’ equity of LLOYDS and RBS almost zero or negative during this turbulent period.

Debt investors are indifferent as to what extent and what particular scheme the UK government would adopt to support RBS and LLOYDS. The nationalization of banks may trigger a credit event. For example, the determination committee of ISDA agreed that the nationalizations of Fannie May and Freddie Mac in September 2008 were credit events, however the final settlement of the CDS contracts resulted in 0-8% loss. In contrast, due to the difference in the legal status of the state control, Northern Rock did not trigger a
credit event as a result of its control by the Bank of England in February 2008. Moreover, the support by the UK government of LLOYDS and RBS did not trigger a credit event as the UK government did not take over these banks completely after the third capital injection (the government holds 41% of LLOYDS and 70% of RBS after the capital injections in November 2009). This contrast to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, in which the LGD of the CDS settled at 91%. Therefore, debt investors recognized that the risk of RBS and LLOYDS was quite limited and they were confident that the UK government would support both RBS and LLOYDS although they were not certain whether these banks could avoid triggering a credit event.

Finally the rise in the implied LGD of HSBC and the non financial companies, between the fourth quarter of 2008 and mid 2009, is a contributing factor to the rise in their CDS spreads. These results are consistent with empirical studies on the LGD of bonds and loans. Altman et al. (2005) show that the LGD of corporate bonds and the price of other distressed asset are sensitive to demand and supply. In fact, during the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009, most financial asset prices declined. As Duffie et al. (2005, 2007) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model, this is not only due to the fall in the expected future cash flow of the assets but also due to the decline in the demand through investor’s risk aversion and the shortage in liquidity shown in the record TED spread (figure 3). In addition Zhang (2009) points out that the LGD of loans is negatively correlated to business cycles. Therefore, our results imply that the LGD of CDS without specific government support can move consistently with that of loans and bonds. This is evidence that their CDS is, to some extent consistent with the arbitrage pricing with the underlying bonds or loans.

6 Concluding Remarks

The recent financial crises had a devastating effect on the UK banking system, forcing the UK government’s partial ownership of RBS and LLOYDS. However, the CDS spreads for all the major UK banks were stable during this period and similar to those of non-financial companies. In order to explain this anomaly, we have determined the implied PD from a calibration of the implied volatility of listed stock options, careful to include
an appropriate model for the funding term structure. The implied PD is then employed to derive an implied LGD from the quoted CDS spread using a model for CDS spreads that incorporates counterparty risk.

Our result explains the stability of the UK bank CDS spread as being due to the interplay between implied PD and LGD. In particular the LGD of RBS and LLOYDS dropped below 10% while their implied PD derived from the listed stock options peaked at around 70% in March 2009. This strongly indicates that the participants in the listed stock option markets saw significant risk in the full erosion of existing shareholders equity, whilst debt investors were confident that the government would support any losses to bond holders. Therefore, although UK bank CDS spreads were relatively stable during this period, this did not imply the soundness of the UK banks.

In contrast both the implied PD and LGD of the non-financial sector companies, and the non bail-out banks (HSBC), which could recapitalize without explicit public support, gradually rose in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009, following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. This is consistent with empirical studies on the LGD of bonds and loans. It means that the traditional arbitrage pricing works in the pricing of CDS. However, we have not explicitly examined the relationship between the CDS and the underlying debts, bonds and loans although the LGD of CDS moved consistently with those of bonds and loans. We have investigated the equilibrium between the equity and credit derivatives and its implications. It is left as future work to analyze the equilibrium between these derivatives and their associated debt instruments.

It is, furthermore, worth stating here that the implied LGD is a potential measure of the risk appetite implied by the credit derivative market, in analogy to an implied volatility index such as the VIX. We note that the LGD implied in CDS can also reflect additional risk factors not covered by the methodology, in addition to the expectation of the LGD. We have, for example not included the effect of liquidity on the CDS market. This is also left as future research.
A The Derivation of Equation (24)

A.1 Feynman-Kac formula for option pricing model

Here we denote the price of contingent claim of defaultable asset $h(x)$ as $P_{\epsilon,\delta}$ to emphasize the parameters, $\epsilon$ and $\delta$. From the Feynman-Kac formula (See Karatzas and Shreve (1988) for detail), $P_{\epsilon,\delta}$ is a solution of

$$L^{\epsilon,\delta}P_{\epsilon,\delta}(t, x, r, y, \tilde{y}, z) = 0,$$

$$P_{\epsilon,\delta}(t, x, r, y, \tilde{y}, z) = h(x),$$

where the operator $L^{\epsilon,\delta}$ is defined as

$$L^{\epsilon,\delta} = \frac{1}{\epsilon}L_0 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{\epsilon}}L_1 + \frac{\sqrt{\delta}}{\sqrt{\epsilon}}M_1 + \delta M_2 + \frac{\sqrt{\delta}}{\sqrt{\epsilon}}M_3,$$

in which respective operators are listed below,

$$L_0 = \nu^2 \frac{\partial^2}{\partial y^2} + (m - y) \frac{\partial}{\partial y} + \tilde{\nu}^2 \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \tilde{y}^2} + (\tilde{m} - \tilde{y}) \frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{y}} + 2\rho_{24}\nu\tilde{\nu}\frac{\partial^2}{\partial y \partial \tilde{y}},$$

$$L_1 = \rho_2\sigma(\tilde{y})\nu\sqrt{2}x\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x \partial \tilde{y}} + \rho_{12}\eta\nu\sqrt{2}x\frac{\partial^2}{\partial r \partial y} + \rho_{14}\sigma(\tilde{y})\tilde{\nu}\sqrt{2}x\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x \partial \tilde{y}} + \rho_{14}\nu\tilde{\nu}\sqrt{2}\frac{\partial^2}{\partial \tilde{y} \partial r} - \Lambda(\tilde{y})\nu\tilde{\nu}\sqrt{2}\frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{y}},$$

$$L_2 = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(\tilde{y})x^2\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2} + (r + f(y, z))x\frac{\partial}{\partial x} + (\alpha_t - \beta r)\frac{\partial}{\partial r} + \sigma(\tilde{y})\eta\rho_{13}x\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x \partial r} + \frac{1}{2}\eta^2\frac{\partial^2}{\partial r^2} - (r + f(y, z)),$$

$$M_1 = \sigma(\tilde{y})\rho_3g(z)x\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x \partial \tilde{z}} + \eta\rho_{13}g(z)\frac{\partial^2}{\partial r \partial \tilde{z}},$$

$$M_2 = c(z)\frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{z}} + \frac{1}{2}g^2(z)\frac{\partial^2}{\partial \tilde{z}^2},$$

$$M_3 = \rho_{23}\nu\sqrt{2}g(z)\frac{\partial^2}{\partial y \partial \tilde{z}} + \rho_{34}\nu\sqrt{2}g(z)\frac{\partial^2}{\partial y \partial \tilde{z}}.$$

A.2 Asymptotic Expansions

We use an asymptotic expansion for the approximation of $P_{\epsilon,\delta}$ (see Bayraktar and Yang (2010)), as both $\sqrt{\epsilon}$ and $\sqrt{\delta} \to 0$, to derive an expansion of $P_{\epsilon,\delta}$ in powers of $\sqrt{\delta}$ and $\sqrt{\epsilon}$ respectively. First we expand $P_{\epsilon,\delta}$ in powers of $\sqrt{\delta}$

$$P_{\epsilon,\delta} = P_0 + \sqrt{\delta}P_{0,1} + \delta P_{0,2} + \cdots$$

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By substituting (46) into (43),

\[
\mathcal{L}^\varepsilon \delta P_{\varepsilon, \delta} = \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \mathcal{L}_0 P_{\varepsilon, 0} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}} \mathcal{L}_1 P_{\varepsilon, 0} + \mathcal{L}_2 P_{\varepsilon, 0} \right) \\
+ \sqrt{\delta} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}} \mathcal{L}_0 P_{\varepsilon, 1} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}} \mathcal{L}_1 P_{\varepsilon, 1} + \mathcal{L}_2 P_{\varepsilon, 1} + \mathcal{M}_1 P_{\varepsilon, 0} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}} \mathcal{M}_3 P_{\varepsilon, 0} \right) \\
+ \left( \sqrt{\delta} \right)^2 \left( \mathcal{L}_2 P_{\varepsilon, 2} + \mathcal{M}_2 P_{\varepsilon, 0} + \mathcal{M}_2 P_{\varepsilon, 0} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}} \mathcal{L}_1 P_{\varepsilon, 2} + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \mathcal{L}_0 P_{\varepsilon, 2} \right) + \cdots \\
= 0 \quad (47)
\]

Since \( \mathcal{L}^\varepsilon \delta P_{\varepsilon, \delta} = 0 \), the first term of (47) is

\[
\left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \mathcal{L}_0 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}} \mathcal{L}_1 + \mathcal{L}_2 \right) P_{\varepsilon, 0} = 0 \quad (48)
\]

and given \( \sqrt{\delta} \neq 0 \), the second term is also zero,

\[
\left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}} \mathcal{L}_0 + \mathcal{L}_1 + \mathcal{L}_2 \right) P_{\varepsilon, 1} = - \left( \mathcal{M}_1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{\varepsilon}} \mathcal{M}_3 \right) P_{\varepsilon, 0} . \quad (49)
\]

Secondly, we expand the solution of (48) and (49) in powers of \( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \),

\[
P_{\varepsilon, 0} = P_0 + \sqrt{\varepsilon} P_{1, 0} + \left( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \right)^2 P_{2, 0} + \left( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \right)^3 P_{3, 0} + \cdots \quad (50)
\]

\[
P_{\varepsilon, 1} = P_{0, 1} + \sqrt{\varepsilon} P_{1, 1} + \left( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \right)^2 P_{2, 1} + \left( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \right)^3 P_{3, 1} + \cdots \quad (51)
\]

Inserting (50) into (48), we obtain

\[
\left( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \right)^{-2} \mathcal{L}_0 P_0 + \left( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \right)^{-1} \left( \mathcal{L}_0 P_{1, 0} + \mathcal{L}_1 P_0 \right) + \left( \mathcal{L}_0 P_{2, 0} + \mathcal{L}_1 P_{1, 0} + \mathcal{L}_2 P_0 \right) \\
+ \sqrt{\varepsilon} \left( \mathcal{L}_0 P_{3, 0} + \mathcal{L}_1 P_{2, 0} + \mathcal{L}_2 P_{1, 0} \right) + \left( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \right)^2 \left( \mathcal{L}_1 P_{3, 0} + \mathcal{L}_2 P_{2, 0} \right) + \cdots \\
= 0 . \quad (52)
\]

Since \( \sqrt{\varepsilon} \neq 0 \), the first term of the equation (52) implies that \( P_0 \) is independent of \( y \) and \( \tilde{y} \). As a result \( P_{1, 0} \) is also independent of \( y \) and \( \tilde{y} \) (\( \mathcal{L}_0 P_{1, 0} = 0 \)) from the second term and the independence of \( P_0 \) on \( y \) and \( \tilde{y} \) (\( \mathcal{L}_1 P_0 = 0 \)).

Next we can reduce the the third term using the independence of \( P_{1, 0} \) on \( y \) and \( \tilde{y} \) (\( \mathcal{L}_1 P_{1, 0} = 0 \)),

\[
\mathcal{L}_0 P_{2, 0} + \mathcal{L}_2 P_0 = 0 . \quad (53)
\]

This is a Poisson equation for \( P_{2, 0} \) (see Fouque et al. (2000)). The solvability of the equation requires the centering condition,

\[
\langle \mathcal{L}_2 \rangle P_0 = 0 , \quad (54)
\]

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where \( \langle \cdot \rangle \) denotes the average with respect to the invariant distribution of \((Y_t, \tilde{Y}_t)\), which have joint density

\[
\Psi(y, \tilde{y}) = \frac{1}{2\pi \nu \tilde{\nu}} \exp \left( -\frac{1}{2 (1 - \rho_{24}^2)} \left[ (y - m_y)^2 + (\tilde{y} - \tilde{m}_y)^2 - 2\rho_{24} \frac{(y - m_y)(\tilde{y} - \tilde{m}_y)}{\nu \tilde{\nu}} \right] \right). \tag{55}
\]

Let us denote the averaging of \( L_2 \) as

\[
\langle L_2 \rangle = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} + \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\sigma}_2(y) x^2 \frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2} + (r + \tilde{\lambda}(z)) x \frac{\partial}{\partial x} + (\tilde{\alpha} - \beta r) \frac{\partial}{\partial r} + \tilde{\sigma}_1(y) \eta_1 x \frac{\partial^2}{\partial x \partial r} - (r + \tilde{\lambda}(z)), \tag{56}
\]

where \( \tilde{\sigma}_1 = \langle \sigma(\tilde{y}) \rangle, \tilde{\sigma}_2 = \langle \sigma^2(\tilde{y}) \rangle, \tilde{\lambda}(z) = \langle f(y, z) \rangle \) and \( \tilde{\alpha} = \langle \alpha_t \rangle \). Under the terminal condition

\[
P_0(T, x, r, z) = h(x), \tag{57}
\]

equation (54) defines the leading order term \( P_0 \). Using (55) we can also define the solution of the Poisson equation,

\[
P_{2,0} = -L_0^{-1} (L_2 - \langle L_2 \rangle) P_0. \tag{58}
\]

Finally the fourth term of (52), term of \( \sqrt{\epsilon} \) yields a Poisson equation

\[
L_0 P_{3,0} + L_1 P_{2,0} + L_2 P_{1,0} = 0. \tag{59}
\]

For the complete identification of \( P_{1,0} \), the solvability of this equation requires

\[
\langle L_2 P_{1,0} \rangle = -\langle L_1 P_{2,0} \rangle = \left\langle L_1 L_0^{-1} (L_2 - \langle L_2 \rangle) \right\rangle P_0 \tag{60}
\]

under the terminal condition

\[
P_{1,0}(T, x, r, z) = 0. \tag{61}
\]

Next, we will express the centoring condition (60) more explicitly. Using (56), we can rewrite \( L_0 P_{2,0} \) as

\[
(L_2 - \langle L_2 \rangle) P_0 = \frac{1}{2} \left( \sigma^2(\tilde{y}) - \tilde{\sigma}_2 \right) x^2 \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} + (\sigma(\tilde{y}) - \tilde{\sigma}_1) \eta_1 x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x \partial r}
+ \left( f(y, z) - \tilde{\lambda}(z) \right) \left( x \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial x} - P_0 \right) + (\alpha_t - \tilde{\alpha}) \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial r}. \tag{62}
\]
This is identical to equation (3.20) of Bayraktar and Yang (2010) except for the last term. Therefore,

\[
\mathcal{L}_0^{-1} (\mathcal{L}_2 - \langle \mathcal{L}_2 \rangle) P_0 = \frac{1}{2} \kappa(y, \tilde{y}) x^2 \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} + \psi(y, \tilde{y}) \eta \rho_1 x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x \partial r} \\
+ \phi(y, \tilde{y}, z) \left( x \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial x} - P_0 \right) + \varsigma(y, \tilde{y}, r) \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial r} 
\]

where \( \psi, \kappa, \phi \) and \( \varsigma \) are the solutions to the Poisson equations

\[
\mathcal{L}_0 \psi(y) = \sigma(y) - \bar{\sigma}_1, \quad (64) \\
\mathcal{L}_0 \kappa(y) = \sigma^2(y) - \bar{\sigma}_2, \quad (65) \\
\mathcal{L}_0 \phi(y, z) = \left( f(y, z) - \bar{\lambda}(z) \right), \quad (66) \\
\mathcal{L}_0 \varsigma(y, \tilde{y}, r) = \alpha_t - \bar{\alpha}. \quad (67)
\]

Applying the differential operator \( \mathcal{L}_1 \) to the last expression, we can calculate \( P_{1,0} \) explicitly,

\[
\langle \mathcal{L}_1 \mathcal{L}_0^{-1} (\mathcal{L}_2 - \langle \mathcal{L}_2 \rangle) \rangle P_0 = \sqrt{2} \left( \rho_2 \nu \langle \sigma \phi_y \rangle (z) - \frac{1}{2} \nu \langle \Lambda \kappa_y \rangle \right) x^2 \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} \\
+ \sqrt{2} \left( \rho_{12} \eta \nu \langle \phi_y \rangle (z) + \bar{\nu} \langle \Lambda \kappa_y \rangle \right) \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left( x \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial x} - P_0 \right) \\
+ \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \rho_1 \tilde{\nu} \langle \sigma \kappa_y \rangle x \frac{\partial}{\partial x} \left( x^2 \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} \right) + \sqrt{2} \rho_1 \rho_4 \tilde{\nu} \eta \langle \sigma \phi_y \rangle x \frac{\partial}{\partial x} \left( x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x \partial r} \right) \\
+ \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \rho_{14} \eta \tilde{\nu} \langle \kappa_y \rangle \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left( x^2 \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} \right) + \sqrt{2} \rho_1 \rho_{14} \eta^2 \tilde{\nu} \langle \psi_y \rangle \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left( x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x \partial r} \right) \\
+ \sqrt{2} \left( \rho_2 \nu \langle \sigma \phi_y \rangle + \rho_4 \tilde{\nu} \langle \sigma \phi_y \rangle - \bar{\nu} \langle \Lambda \psi_y \rangle - \bar{\nu} \langle \Lambda \kappa_y \rangle \right) x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x \partial r} \\
+ \sqrt{2} \left( \rho_{12} \eta \nu \langle \phi_y \rangle + \rho_{14} \eta \tilde{\nu} \langle \phi_y \rangle \right) \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial r^2} 
\]

It is possible to get the explicit expression of \( P_1^t \) by inserting (51) into (49). Discussed above, \( P_{0,1} \) is independent of \( y \) and \( \tilde{y} \) and satisfies

\[
\langle \mathcal{L}_2 \rangle = - \langle \mathcal{M}_1 \rangle P_0, \quad P_{0,1}(T, x, r; z) = 0 
\]

Using the proposition 3.2, 3.3 and Remark 3.1 in Bayraktar and Yang (2010), the first order expansions on \( \sqrt{\epsilon} \) and \( \sqrt{\delta} \) are derived respectively

\[
\sqrt{\epsilon} P_{1,0} = -(T - t) \left( V_1^t(z) x^2 \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} + V_2^t x \frac{\partial}{\partial x} \left( \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} \right) \right) 
\]
\[ V_1^\varepsilon(z) \left( -x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x \partial \alpha} - \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial \alpha} \right) + V_4^\varepsilon x^2 \frac{\partial^3 P_0}{\partial x^2 \partial \alpha} + V_5^\varepsilon x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial \eta \partial x} + V_6^\varepsilon x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x \partial \alpha} \] 

\[ V_2^\varepsilon \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial \alpha^2} \] 

\[ \sqrt{\delta} P_{0,1} = V_1^\delta(z) \frac{(T - t)^2}{2} \left( x^2 \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} - \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial \alpha} \right) - (T - t) \left( x \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial \alpha \partial x} - \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial x} \right) \] 

\[ \frac{(T - t)^2}{2} \left( x^2 \frac{\partial^2 P_0}{\partial x^2} - \frac{\partial P_0}{\partial x} + P_0 \right) \] 

in which

\[ V_1^\varepsilon(z) = \sqrt{\varepsilon} \left( \rho_2 \nu \sqrt{2} \langle \sigma \phi_y \rangle (z) - \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\nu} \sqrt{2} \langle \Lambda \kappa_y \rangle \right), \]

\[ V_2^\varepsilon = \frac{\sqrt{\varepsilon}}{2} \sqrt{\varepsilon} \rho_4 \tilde{\nu} \langle \sigma_k \rangle, \]

\[ V_3^\varepsilon(z) = \sqrt{\varepsilon} \left( \rho_{12} \nu \sqrt{2} \langle \phi_y \rangle (z) + \sqrt{2} \tilde{\nu} \langle \Lambda \kappa_y \rangle \right) \]

\[ V_4^\varepsilon = -\sqrt{\varepsilon} \left( \frac{1}{2} \rho_{14} \tilde{\nu} \sqrt{2} \langle \kappa_y \rangle - \rho_4 \tilde{\nu} \sqrt{2} \langle \psi \rangle \eta \right) \eta \rho_1 + \rho_{14} \tilde{\nu} \sqrt{2} \langle \psi \rangle \tilde{\sigma}_1 \rho_1^2, \]

\[ V_5^\varepsilon = -\sqrt{\varepsilon} \left( \rho_{14} \eta \tilde{\nu} \sqrt{2} \langle \psi \rangle \rho_1 \right) \]

\[ V_6^\varepsilon = \sqrt{\varepsilon} \left( -\sqrt{2} \rho_4 \tilde{\nu} \langle \psi \rangle \eta \rho_1 + \sqrt{2} \rho_{14} \tilde{\nu} \langle \psi \rangle \tilde{\sigma}_1 \rho_1^2 \right) \]

\[ -\sqrt{2} \tilde{\nu} \langle \Lambda \psi \rangle \rho_1 \rho_2 \eta \langle \sigma_g \rangle + \sqrt{2} \rho_4 \tilde{\nu} \langle \sigma_g \rangle - \sqrt{2} \rho_4 \tilde{\nu} \langle \Lambda \kappa_g \rangle \]

\[ V_7^\delta = \sqrt{\delta} \left( \sqrt{2} \rho_{12} \eta \langle \psi \rangle + \sqrt{2} \rho_{14} \tilde{\nu} \langle \psi \rangle \right) \]

\[ V_8^\delta(z) = \sqrt{\delta} \lambda(z) \tilde{\sigma}_1 \rho_3 g(z), \]

\[ V_9^\delta(z) = \sqrt{\delta} \lambda(z) \eta \rho_{13} g(z). \]

As Fouque et al. (2000) showed, the first order expansions, \( P_{1,0} \) and \( P_{0,1} \) are independent of the level of \( Y_t \) and \( Y_t \). The first order expansion in \( \varepsilon \) and \( \delta \),

\[ \hat{P}_{\varepsilon, \delta} = P_0 + \sqrt{\varepsilon} P_{1,0} + \sqrt{\delta} P_{0,1}, \] (72)

is given by the 10 parameters \( (\bar{\lambda}, \nabla^\varepsilon \text{and} \nabla^\delta) \) approximation.

**References**


Table 1: Major Events of the Financial Crisis (2008-2009) in the Financial System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03/14/2008</td>
<td>FRB set the lending facility for Bear Sterns</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/16/2008</td>
<td>JPMorgan Chase take over Bear Sterns</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/06/2008</td>
<td>Freddie Mac &amp; Fannie May were nationalized.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/15/2008</td>
<td>Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/15/2008</td>
<td>Bank of America decided to take over Meril Lynch.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/16/2008</td>
<td>FRB set the lending facility for AIG.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/18/2008</td>
<td>Lloyds announced to take over HBOS.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/21/2008</td>
<td>Goldman Sachs &amp; Morgan Stanley became Bank Holding Company (BHC)</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/28/2008</td>
<td>Fortis was nationalized.</td>
<td>Benelux countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/29/2008</td>
<td>Bradford&amp;Bingley (B&amp;B) was nationalized.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/30/2008</td>
<td>US congress rejected TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program)</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/03/2008</td>
<td>UK raised the limit of bank deposit guarantee.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/12/2008</td>
<td>Capital injection to RBS, Lloyds and HBOS.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/14/2008</td>
<td>Capital injection to the US major banks.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/31/2008</td>
<td>Barclays announced capital raising.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/18/2008</td>
<td>Barclays announced the details of the capital raising. (existing shareholders and Qatar)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/23/2008</td>
<td>Capital Injection (2nd) and Asset Garantee (Citi Group)</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/16/2009</td>
<td>Capital Injection (2nd) and Asset Garantee (Bank of America)</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01/17/2009</td>
<td>UK announced the asset protection scheme (APS).</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/17/2009</td>
<td>UK announced to replace the preferred share with common stock (RBS).</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/26/2009</td>
<td>Capital Injection (2nd) and the APS (RBS)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/02/2009</td>
<td>HSBC issued common stocks to shareholders</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/07/2009</td>
<td>UK announced to replace the preferred share with common share and the ASP (Lloyds)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/30/2009</td>
<td>Barclays announced not to adopt the APS.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/03/2009</td>
<td>Capital Injection (3rd, RBS &amp; LLOYDS).</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: CDS Spread (United Kingdom, 1Year)

UK BANKS (bp)

UK non financial sector companies (bp)
Figure 2: CDS Spread (United States, 1 Year)

US Financial Institutions (bp)

US non financial sector companies (bp)
Figure 3: UK TED spread

UK TED spread (2008-09, bp)

UK TED spread (1997-2009, bp)
The solid curve depicts the PD implied from listed stock options and the dashed curve shows the PD calculated using (27) assuming 60% LGD.
The solid curve depicts the PD implied from listed stock options and the dashed curve shows the PD calculated using (27) assuming 60% LGD.
Figure 6: Ratio between the implied PD and the PD obtained from (27) assuming 60% LGD
The solid curve shows the LGD implied from the CDS spreads with counterparty risk and the dashed curve is the implied LGD without counterparty risk.
The solid curve shows the LGD implied from the CDS spreads with counterparty risk and the dashed curve is the implied LGD without counterparty risk.