13 SOUTH AFRICA

Head of state and government:
President Jacob Zuma
(since May 9, 2009)

Capital: Pretoria is the seat of government;
Cape Town is the legislative capital;
Bloemfontein is the judicial capital.

Total land size: 1,219,912 sq km

Population: 44 million

GDP at PPP: 491 billion US$

GDP per capita at PPP: $11,100

Human development index ranking: 121

INTRODUCTION

Why Study This Case?

True to its remarkable modern history of tragedy and triumph, South Africa is a nation of paradox. The contradictions that constitute South African history and the remarkable capacity of South Africans to face and resolve them make this a fascinating case to study.

South Africa makes for a fascinating study for several other reasons as well. Like Russia, it in fact presents to students of comparative politics two cases in one. Prior to the early 1990s, South Africa's politics, society, and economy were dominated by the racist authoritarian system known as **apartheid**, or "separateness." In **Afrikaans**, the language spoken by the descendants of the first white settlers, the term refers to policies imposed by the ruling minority regime from 1948 to 1994 that systematically segregated races and privileged white South Africans. But with the collapse of the apartheid regime, the "new" South Africa of the past decade has been a fascinating petri dish of unfolding multicultural democracy.

South Africa's remarkable and relatively peaceful transition from oppressive minority rule to a broad-based democracy is an even more compelling reason to study this case. Refuting the mid-1990s doomsday predictions of incendiary race wars, the overwhelming majority of South African citizens chose reconciliation over revolution, opting for ballots over bullets as a means of resolving seemingly intractable political differences. This political miracle not only stands in contrast to Africa's dismal record of failed democracies and even failed states but also offers a powerful example to other nations of the world plagued by racial, ethnic, and religious strife.

South Africa has taken remarkble strides since its return to democracy in 1994. Politically, its democratically elected legislature has written and revised a constitution with broad political rights and civil liberties, and its government has convened regular nationwide elections. Socially, South Africans vanquished the world's most elaborate and overtly racist authoritarian regime and forged a common nation from its ashes. Economically, the government confounded its critics by avoiding the "easy" path of populist redistribution, instead cutting government expenditures and debt while delivering impressive gains in access to basic necessities for the country's poorest citizens.

Make no mistake, however; this tale of two South Africas cannot yet boast a fairy-tale ending. The decades of political violence, social partition, and economic deprivation that victimized over 80 percent of the population have left horrible and lasting scars. Compounding the legacies of racism and authoritarianism are a host of pernicious social problems, such as rampant violent

crime, brooding racial tension, and the pandemic of HIV/AIDS. As if these challenges were not enough, the remarkable success of the new government has heightened expectations for rapid economic change and social equality, and there are concerns that democracy has been successful only because the postapartheid government faces no serious opposition.

South Africa's leaders must attempt to satisfy rising expectations and must balance decades of pent-up social and economic demands with the requirements of lenders and investors to maintain fiscal discipline and free markets. Without economic growth, the government will lack the very means to address South Africa's social and economic problems. The political temptation to promote affirmative action in the workplace must be weighed against the demands of the marketplace. Safeguarding the political rights of all groups in South Africa can at times necessitate overruling the will of the dominant black majority and resisting the temptation to dispense with democratic niceties.

How can the current government (or any government, for that matter) fare under such challenging circumstances? As one editorial asked, "How can a black revolutionary movement, forged by 40 years of struggle against white supremacy, transform itself into a multiracial ruling party, to run a sophisticated industrial economy? How can a new generation of leaders, without the aura of struggle, restrain the pressures towards populism and maintain a tolerant democracy when so many African governments have so noticeably failed?"[1] This case seeks to address these questions as well as the historical puzzle of why apartheid, enforced by such a small minority, managed to persist so successfully for so long and how its collapse and replacement came about under relatively peaceful circumstances.

Despite its unique history and political experience, South Africa faces many of the same issues and dilemmas as other developing countries. These include coping with the legacies of colonialism and racism, dealing with the policy trade-offs between freedom and equality, and managing the social and economic consequences of crime, poverty, and disease. The case of South Africa offers insights into these fundamental issues.

Major Geographic and Demographic Features

Historically, South Africa has been a harsh and isolated region. Ocean currents and the dearth of natural harbors impeded early European settlement of its coastline. Much of western South Africa (with the notable exception of the area around Cape Town) remains drought stricken and unsuitable for agriculture. South Africa's eastern coast and interior are subtropical and more suitable to agriculture, though the quality of the soil is generally poor. South Africa has no navigable waterways, a fact that until modern times made transportation and communication over the vast region very difficult. These factors limited the growth of a large population in precolonial South Africa.

Today, South Africa has about 44 million inhabitants. Unlike much of the rest of Africa, South Africa has seen its birth rates decline dramatically over the past twenty-five years, though considerable population growth is still created by emigration from South Africa's impoverished neighbors. Due to the experience of apartheid, it is common to think of South Africa's population as being neatly divided between blacks and whites. This gross simplification obscures a much more heterogeneous ethnic makeup. Three quarters of South Africans are black, but the ethnic composition of the black population is extremely diverse. About one quarter of black South Africans are Zulus, another one fifth are Xhosa (the ethnic group of former president **Nelson Mandela**), and about 18 percent are Sotho. The Tswana and Tsonga (and to a lesser extent the Venda and Ndebele) groups also have a significant presence in the South African population. Each of these ethnic groups has a different language and is concentrated in a different area. For example, Xhosas predominate in the western part of the country and in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. Zulus are the dominant group in Durban.

Whites constitute about 10 percent of the population, and that population is also divided ethnically. Over half are **Afrikaners**, descendants of the Dutch, French, and German colonists who arrived in the seventeenth century and developed their own language (Afrikaans) and cultural traditions. Another 40 percent of South Africa's white population are descendants of English settlers who arrived in the eighteenth century. Even today these "English whites" favor English over Afrikaans and view themselves as somewhat distinct.

South Africans of mixed race account for 9 percent of the population. This group, largely concentrated in the Western Cape Province and KwaZulu-Natal, is widely referred to as **colored**. The majority of colored South Africans speak Afrikaans as their first language.

This diversity of the people is also shaped by urbanization. About half of South Africans (including most whites, Asians, and colored people) live in an urban setting. South Africa has five cities with over 1 million inhabitants: Cape Town (2.8 million), Johannesburg (2.2 million), Durban (1.3 million), Pretoria (1.3 million), and Port Elizabeth (1.1 million). Soweto, a large black township outside Johannesburg, has between 600,000 and 2 million inhabitants.

South Africa is truly a complex, polyglot nation. The 1994 constitution recognizes eleven languages, nine of which (Ndebele, Northern Sotho, Sotho, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Swazi, Xhosa, and Zulu) are spoken exclusively by blacks, and some of which are very closely related to one another. One characteristic of quite a few of the languages is the distinct clicking sound that eludes nonnative speakers. Quite a few blacks speak more than one African language. If there is a common language among South Africans, it is English.

Virtually all whites, Asians, educated blacks, and coloreds can speak at least some English. Almost all Afrikaners are bilingual in Afrikaans and English, and many South Africans of English descent (as well as colored South Africans) also speak some Afrikaans.

But language has often bitterly divided the South African people. Blacks long resisted the imposition of Afrikaans by Afrikaners, and the 1976 Soweto Uprising was ignited by the Afrikaner authorities' attempt to make Afrikaans the official language of instruction in schools. Colored South Africans, on the other hand, have recently fought to preserve the role of Afrikaans in the schools.

South Africa's neighbors have been an important focal point for many South Africans. As illustrated in the map of the region, South Africa is bordered to the north by Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia). Zimbabwe's transition to majority black rule, in 1980, was an inspiration to black South Africans. Botswana, also to the north, has been one of the most economically successful African nations. On its eastern border, Mozambique and Swaziland are extremely poor. Throughout much of the twentieth century, apartheid leaders frequently pointed to these neighbors (as well as much of the rest of Africa) as proof that blacks were incapable of governing themselves. Sparsely populated Namibia, a former German colony and later a United Nations protectorate, was long dominated by apartheid South Africa.

Historical Development of the State

The telling of history often reflects the perspective of those in power, so it is not surprising that South Africa's history has usually been told from the perspective of whites. Afrikaners often contend that southern Africa was largely uninhabited when their Dutch ancestors arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. The truth is far more complex. Hunters and herders populated South Africa when the Dutch arrived in the mid-seventeenth century. The Dutch East India Company officials who first established a fort in what is today Cape Town encountered tribes of Khoisans, whom they soon enslaved. When these native Africans died from disease and slavery, the Dutch settlers imported slaves, mostly from Southeast Asia.[2]

In the interior of South Africa, a variety of Bantu-speaking tribes were ending their centuries-long migration southward from central Africa, integrating with hunters and herders who had long inhabited the region. Among the largest of these tribes were the Zulu, the Sotho, and the Swazi kingdoms.

DUTCH RULE

While most of the colonial "scramble for Africa" took place in the nineteenth century, European domination of South Africa began almost two centuries earlier. Cape Town was initially settled by the Dutch East India Company to resupply ships heading to and from Dutch colonies in Indonesia. The early

TIME LINE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Year	Event
1652	Arrival of the Dutch at the Cape of Good Hope
1795	Cape Town captured from the Dutch by the British
1880–81; 1899–1902	Boer Wars fought between the Afrikaners and the British
1910	Formation of the Union of South Africa, dominated by English-speaking South Africans
1948	Election of Afrikaner National Party and beginning of apartheid
1960	Banning of African National Congress (ANC)
1964	Nelson Mandela imprisoned
1990	Mandela released from prison
1990–93	Transition to democracy as the result of negotiations between Mandela and President F. W. de Klerk
1994	After historic multiracial elections, ANC majority government established under Nelson Mandela
1996	Democratic constitution approved
1999	Legislative elections won by ANC; Thabo Mbeki named president
2008	Thabo Mbeki replaced as president by Kgalema Motlanthe
2009	Jacob Zuma becomes president after ANC wins a fourth consecutive election

Dutch settlers, known as **Boers** (Afrikaans for "farmer"), quickly seized the fertile land of the Cape of Good Hope. The European residents of the Cape developed their own culture, based in their conservative Protestant **Dutch Reformed Church** and their unique language. The small and isolated Cape Colony was fairly prosperous until it was seized by the British Empire in 1795. The Dutch ceded formal control of the region to the British in 1814.

BOER MIGRATION

As Britain quickly began to integrate this new colony into its burgeoning empire, the arrival of waves of British settlers was seen as a threat to Boer society. Bristling under British rule, many Cape Colony Boers (and their slaves) undertook a migration into the interior of southern Africa that would

later gain the status of heroic myth. During the **Great Trek** of 1835 the **voortrekkers** (Afrikaans for "pioneers") drove their wagons northeast to regain their autonomy and preserve their way of life. They met strong initial resistance from the Xhosa and other Bantu kingdoms, though whites had important technological advantages in these conflicts and were able to exploit the numerous divisions among the indigenous tribes.

A number of bloody battles ensued, most famously the 1838 Battle of Blood River between Zulu tribesmen and Afrikaners. During that conflict, a group of heavily outnumbered Afrikaners defeated the Zulus, with legend claiming that no whites were killed. Afrikaners still consider the Blood River anniversary an important religious holiday and celebrate it each year on December 16. By the early 1840s, Afrikaners were firmly ensconsed in South Africa's interior.

The exhausting exodus to escape British domination, along with the bitter fighting between Boers and blacks, was in the short term a Boer success. The Boers created two states, known as the Boer republics, in which slavery, strict segregation of races, the Afrikaans language, and the Dutch Reformed Church were protected by law.

Initially the British grudgingly tolerated the interior Boer republics. However, the discovery of massive deposits of diamonds (in 1870) and gold (in 1886) changed everything. English-speakers flooded into the interior, and the city of Johannesburg quickly became an English-speaking enclave in the Boer-controlled state of Transvaal. Transvaal President Paul Kruger attempted to limit the influence of the English by denying them the vote. In 1895, English diamond magnate Cecil Rhodes used the pretense of Boer discrimination against En-glish settlers and the presence of slavery in the Boer republics to incite a rebellion among the English. President Kruger declared war on England in 1899.

THE DEFEAT OF THE AFRIKANERS IN THE BOER WARS

Though outnumbered five to one, the Boers fought tenaciously to defend their independence during the **Boer Wars**. To defeat the well-armed and disciplined Afrikaners, the British pioneered the use of concentration camps, in which as many as 20,000 Afrikaners and 15,000 blacks perished. By 1902, the Boers had been defeated, and the Boer republics had become self-governing British colonies. In exchange for signing a peace treaty, the Boers were promised full political rights, protections for their language and culture, and the ability to deny blacks the vote in the former Boer republics. In 1910, these agreements were formalized in the **Union of South Africa**.[3]

THE RENAISSANCE OF AFRIKANER POWER

English and Afrikaners worked together to create a single British colony, and the first prime minister of the Union of South Africa was a former Afrikaner military leader. The Native Land Act of 1913 prevented blacks from owning land except in designated "reserves" (less than 10 percent of the total land of South Africa). Discrimination against blacks continued in the former Boer republics. Only in the largely English Cape Colony were coloreds and a small number of blacks allowed to vote. Nowhere in South Africa were rights of the black majority protected, and racial discrimination was the rule even in English-governed areas.

The first elections in the united country brought to power the South African Party (SAP), which included both English speakers and Afrikaners. But many Afrikaners, especially those in the former Boer republics, continued to deeply resent the English. The Afrikaners enjoyed full political rights, but the English controlled most of the country's wealth, especially its mineral profits and budding industry.

As has so often been the case throughout their history, the Afrikaners resisted this marginalization, but this time they did so within the political system. The formation of the **National Party (NP)** in 1914 was the most important step in their attempt to organize and mobilize the Afrikaner population. The NP demanded that Afrikaans be recognized alongside English and called for South Africa to secede from the British Empire. In the mid-1930s, NP leader Daniel Malan articulated the policies of white supremacy that later became the hallmark of apartheid. At the same time, Malan called for Afrikaner control of the state so that wealth held by the English could be redistributed to Afrikaners. Malan's goals appealed to the mass of poor white Afrikaner workers, who felt threatened by the better-off English as well as by the growing number of even poorer black workers (who vied for their jobs). The NP realized that if Afrikaners could be unified, they could not be denied power. In 1948, the NP was elected to office.

THE APARTHEID ERA

What distinguishes the apartheid era were the NP's two goals: consolidating Afrikaner power and eliminating all vestiges of black participation in South African politics. To a considerable degree, apartheid simply codified and intensified the racial segregation that existed in the mid-twentieth century. During an era when racial discrimination was being challenged in virtually every other country, Afrikaner leaders sought to construct elaborate legal justifications for it.

The Population Registration Act of 1950 divided South Africa into four racial categories and placed every South African into one of those categories (see "Hendrick Verwoerd and the 'Logic' of White Rule," p. 498). Once Africans were divided into races, the apartheid architects argued that blacks (about three quarters of the population) were not citizens of South Africa. According to the **Group Areas Act** of 1950, blacks were deemed to be citizens of ten remote "tribal homelands" (dubbed **Bantustans**), whose boundaries and lead-

HENDRIK VERWOERD AND THE "LOGIC" OF WHITE RULE

The leading ideologue and architect of apartheid was Hendrik Verwoerd, a professor at South Africa's leading Afrikaner university and prime minister from 1958 to 1966. Verwoerd argued that the population of South Africa contained four distinct "racial groups" (white, African, colored, and Indian) and that whites, as the most "civilized" racial group, should have absolute control over the state. Verwoerd and the advocates of apartheid further argued that Africans belonged to ten distinct nations, whereas the other racial groups belonged to only one nation each. By this logic, whites were the largest nation in South Africa and were therefore justified in dominating the state.

ers were decreed by the government. The Bantustans, somewhat akin to American Indian reservations, constituted only around 13 percent of South Africa's territory and were usually made up of noncontiguous parcels of infertile land separated by white-owned farms. The NP chose black leaders (often tribal chiefs) loyal to the party goals to head the Bantustan governments. All blacks in South Africa were in effect "guests" and did not enjoy any of the rights of citizenship. The 1971 Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act allowed the government to grant "independence" to any Bantustan, and though government propagandists defended the measure as an act of "decolonization," in reality it had little impact. Over the next decade, many Bantustans became "independent," though no foreign government would recognize them as sovereign countries.

Racial segregation in the rest of South Africa went even further. Members of each of the four racial groups were required to reside in areas determined by the government. The vast majority of blacks who lived and worked in white areas were required to carry internal visas at all times. Each year, failure to carry such a pass resulted in hundreds of thousands of deportations to a "homeland" that, more often than not, the deportee had never before set foot in. The apartheid authorities created new racial categories and designed separate residential areas for South Africans of Asian descent, or of mixed race, often forcibly relocating them. Other infamous laws reinforced racial segregation. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1950) banned relations across racial lines, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) provided the legal basis for segregating places as diverse as beaches and restrooms.[4]

The apartheid system retained many of the trappings of a parliamentary democracy. Apartheid South Africa had regular elections, a fairly vigorous press, and a seemingly independent judiciary. The vast majority of South Africans, however, were disenfranchised and utterly powerless. The regime

tolerated mild opposition on some issues but ruthlessly quashed individuals and groups that actively opposed apartheid itself.

FORCED RELOCATION AND THE BUILDING OF APARTHEID

One of the pillars of South African apartheid was the 1950 Group Areas Act, which prohibited South Africans of different races from living in the same neighborhoods. The practical implications were immediate and devastating: nonwhites were forcibly relocated to areas outside of South Africa's main cities. The most infamous example was Sophiatown, a vibrant black community in Johannesburg (often compared to New York City's Harlem) that was bulldozed in 1955. Its inhabitants were relocated to a settlement thirteen miles outside of the city that later became known as **Soweto**. Another example was District Six, a multiracial neighborhood in Cape Town with a large mixed-race (or colored) population. It was destroyed in 1966, and its colored inhabitants were relocated to the dusty Cape Flats fifteen miles outside of the city.

The apartheid regime met resistance from its very inception. The most important organization resisting racial discrimination was the African National Congress (ANC). Founded in 1912 it was a largely black organization that sought the extension of suffrage to blacks. The ANC was initially nonviolent and politically moderate in its calls for multiracial democracy. Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, it led a series of nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns against apartheid laws.[5]

Fierce repression of this protest by the apartheid regime had several consequences. First, some blacks tiring of the nonviolent, gradualist approach of the ANC, created more radical organizations, such as the Pan African Congress (PAC), founded in 1959. Second, the apartheid leaders, alarmed by the growing resistance, banned the ANC and the PAC. Third, the repression (especially the government slaughter of protesters during the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960) persuaded ANC leaders to initiate military action against the apartheid regime. The government countered by arresting Mandela and other top ANC leaders in 1963 and sentencing them to life in prison. The ongoing repression led to the incarceration and murder of thousands of South Africans who actively resisted apartheid.

Although not all whites supported the apartheid system, the NP skillfully retained the majority's allegiance. For Afrikaners, the NP dramatically improved their political and economic status, making them dependent on the perpetuation of the status quo. The NP played on English-speaking whites' fears of black rule. Moderate white critics of apartheid were mostly tolerated, as they generally held little sway among the white population.

Though the NP subdued most domestic resistance to apartheid, the system faced growing hostility from abroad. The end of colonialism created inde-

pendent African states that supported the ANC, and the United Nations condemned apartheid as early as 1952 and imposed an arms embargo on South Africa in 1977. Nevertheless, in the context of the cold war, South Africa was able to gain support (from the United States, in particular) by portraying its fight against the ANC as a struggle against Communism. Moreover, the world's major capitalist powers had lucrative investments in South Africa and were ambivalent about promoting black rule.

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

There was nothing inevitable about South Africa's transition from apartheid to majority rule. Five categories of factors need to be considered to explain the momentous political shift that culminated in South Africa's first free elections in 1994.

1. *Demographic pressure and growing unrest:* The growth of opposition to apartheid had at its core a demographic component. The proportion of whites in the population had dropped from a high of 21 percent in 1936 to only 10 percent in 1999. Not only was the black population growing more quickly, but it was increasingly concentrated in urban areas, which were more subject to political mobilization. Most of these newly urban blacks lived in squalid conditions in South Africa's townships, the population of which doubled between 1950 and 1980. These demographic trends meant that despite largely successful efforts to deny blacks political power, their economic power and significance were rapidly expanding.

As a result of these changes, opposition to apartheid during the 1980s assumed dimensions previously unknown in South Africa. The creation of the **United Democratic Front (UDF)** in 1983 effectively united trade unions and the major black and white apartheid opposition groups. The number of protests, strikes, boycotts, and slowdowns grew, requiring ever-greater levels of repression by the apartheid regime. In July 1985, the government imposed a virtually permanent state of emergency, leading to massive arrests of suspected opposition members. In 1988, the government banned the UDF and the largest trade union confederation. The ANC, whose leadership was either in prison or in exile, waged a guerrilla war against the apartheid regime. That struggle was never able to dislodge the heavily armed white regime, but nor could the regime destroy the ANC or stop the escalating violence.

2. *Economic decline:* By the 1980s, the deficiencies in the apartheid economic model had become increasingly apparent. During this decade, South Africa's economy was among the most stagnant in the developing world, growing at an average rate of only about 1 percent. The apartheid economic system had clearly raised the standard of living for South Africa's whites, especially Afrikaners, but it had also led to serious distortions that were by now beginning to take a toll.

The apartheid state, with its convoluted and overlapping race-based institutions and its subsidies to the entirely dependent black "homelands," was costly and inefficient. The mercantilist apartheid policies of self-sufficiency and protectionism led to the creation of industries and services that were not competitive. The system of racial preferences and job protection that was a cornerstone of apartheid clearly hindered economic development and economic efficiency.

3. *Internal reforms:* By the mid-1970s, even leading Afrikaner politicians were convinced that apartheid was an anachronistic system that needed reform if it was to survive. The reforms that followed paved the way for a future transition to democracy. Prime Minister P. W. Botha, who took power in 1978, promised to dismantle apartheid and enacted some minor reforms. However, Botha was unwilling to push the reforms very far. The next leader, President **F. W. de Klerk** (1989–1994), repealed the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Population Registration Act. De Klerk legalized black political parties, including the ANC and the PAC, and freed their leaders. The crisis of apartheid served to split the traditionally unified Afrikaner leadership, opening the window to reform.

4. *The changing international context:* During the 1980s, many countries imposed embargoes on South Africa, limiting trade and foreign investment, though powerful nations like the United States and the United Kingdom continued to trade with the regime into the 1990s. Of greater importance was the winding down of the cold war in the 1980s. On the one hand, it deprived the South African regime of a key source of international legitimacy: the decline of Communism weakened its claim that it was facing a Communist insurgency. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc weakened the ANC sectors that promoted Communist revolution in South Africa.

5. *Skilled leadership:* Finally, South Africa's transition would likely not have occurred (or at the very least would not have been as peaceful or successful) had skilled leaders not managed the transition. F. W. de Klerk's role in forcing Prime Minister Botha's resignation and his courageous decisions to free Mandela and legalize the ANC were essential to the transition. De Klerk used his unblemished credentials as a National Party stalwart to convince NP die-hards to accept the transition. He was able to convince most Afrikaners that their interests would be safeguarded during and after the transition.[6]

Likewise, Nelson Mandela risked a great deal by negotiating the terms of the transition with the NP government. Mandela and the ANC leadership agreed to power sharing and numerous guarantees in order to assuage white fears and were able to restrain radicalized blacks who wanted quick redress for decades of abuse. Mandela's knowledge of Afrikaner language and culture (gained through decades of study in prison) undoubtedly helped him negotiate with his Afrikaner opposition. His ability to eschew bitterness and revenge

NELSON MANDELA: DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA'S FOUNDING FATHER

The remarkable story of Nelson Mandela parallels the turbulent history of modern South Africa. Mandela's father was a Xhosa-speaking tribal chief in the Eastern Cape Province. Mandela was expelled from the University College of Fort Hare for demonstrating against racism but went on to earn a law degree and was one of the first blacks to practice law in South Africa. He became deeply involved in the ANC and was appointed one of its four deputy presidents in 1952.

Mandela helped move the ANC in a more radical direction after NP governments began construction of the apartheid regime in 1948. The ANC was banned in 1960 after it led nationwide protests against apartheid. In response to the Sharpeville Massacre of that same year (in which police massacred sixty-nine unarmed protesters), the ANC abandoned its strategy of nonviolent protest, and Mandela was named its first military commander. Mandela was sentenced to life in prison in 1964 and was held with other ANC leaders on Robben Island. From his cell, he was able to direct the antiapartheid struggle, learn Afrikaans, and write his autobiography.

When Mandela was released in February 1990, he immediately assumed the role of representative of the black majority in the negotiations for a democratic transition. After Mandela received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, his ANC won a landslide victory in the country's first multiracial elections; Mandela became South Africa's first black president. While in office, Mandela did much to heal the racial divide, taking special pains to respect the culture of the Afrikaners. His decision to step down in 1997 and make way for a younger generation of ANC leaders was another sign of Mandela's commitment to democracy.

after his twenty-seven-year prison term impressed even his strongest opponents. Still, the negotiations between the black leadership and the NP were protracted and difficult. De Klerk and Mandela faced serious opposition from radical sectors of their own camps. Nevertheless, an interim constitution was approved in 1993, paving the way for democratic elections and majority rule in 1994. In recognition of their important role in the South African transition, de Klerk and Mandela were awarded the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize.

POLITICAL REGIME

Political Institutions

During the apartheid regime, South Africa enjoyed a set of democratic institutions, but these applied only to the white population. Nonwhites had much more limited political rights or none whatsoever. As a result, few considered

the country to be democratic. After the political transition in 1994, however, political rights were extended to the population as a whole, regardless of race. South Africa is now a democracy with broad political rights and civil liberties commensurate with those found in advanced democracies. Ironically, South Africa's long tradition of democratic institutions, albeit highly restrictive ones, helped smooth the transition to multiracial democracy. The architects of the 1994 transition did not need to create an entirely new democratic system from scratch but merely reformed existing democratic institutions and extended them to the entire population.

THE CONSTITUTION

The new democratic regime is fundamentally enshrined in the South African constitution, approved in 1996. This document reflects the delicate nature of the country's transition to democracy, in which new democratic rights had to be provided to the black majority while those of the white minority had to be protected.

The constitution attempts to balance majority and minority concerns carefully, affirming the basic values of human rights regardless of "race, gender, sex, pregnancy, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth," a list far more detailed than that of most democratic constitutions. Eleven official languages are recognized. The constitution also upholds citizens' rights to housing, health care, food, water, social security, and even a healthy environment. Reacting to decades of apartheid authoritarianism, the constitution includes unusually detailed provisions limiting the powers of the state to arrest, detain, and prosecute individuals. Finally, it enshrines the principle of affirmative action, stating that in order to achieve greater equality, laws and other measures can be used to promote or advance individuals who have been discriminated against.

The constitution also firmly protects the rights of property, which ensured the white population that their property would not be seized by a black-dominated government. Perhaps most important, the constitution defines itself as the supreme law of the land: parliament must act within its confines, and the new Constitutional Court can strike down unconstitutional behavior. This is a departure from the past, when the parliament and the government reigned supreme and could

ESSENTIAL POLITICAL FEATURES

- Legislative-executive system: prime ministerial
- Legislature: Parliament
- Lower house: National Assembly
- Upper house: National Council of Provinces
- Unitary or federal division of power: unitary
- Main geographic subunits: provinces
- Electoral system for lower house: proportional representation
- Chief judicial body: Constitutional Court

change and reinterpret laws as they saw fit, with no higher legal power to restrain them.

The Branches of Government

The South African government is based on British institutions, with some variations. For most of the apartheid period, South Africa had a bicameral parliament and a prime minister, with a ceremonial president as head of state. Since 1994, the South African system has been transformed into one similar to that seen in many other democracies, with a bicameral parliament and a Constitutional Court. Interestingly, as a result of historic compromises between Afrikaner and English-speaking whites, South Africa has three capitals. The seat of government is located in Pretoria, the traditional heart of Afrikaner power and the center of the former Boer republics. Cape Town, where English influence was strongest, is the legislative capital. South Africa's judicial capital is located in Bloemfontein.

STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT



THE PRESIDENCY AND THE CABINET

The chief executive of South Africa is the president. This title is rather confusing, however, given that, like a typical prime minister, the president is chosen from the National Assembly, the lower house of the legislature, by its members and can be removed by a vote of no confidence. Yet, there is no division between the head of state and the head of government, as is found in most parliamentary systems, so the South African president serves in both capacities. Like most prime ministers, the president chooses a cabinet of ministers, signs or vetoes legislation presented by the National Assembly, and can refer legislation to the Constitutional Court as necessary. The president may also call national referenda, dissolve the National Assembly, and (in some situations) call new elections. If the president wishes to dissolve the National Assembly, a majority of the lower house must support the dissolution and three years must have passed since it was first elected. The president is unable to call snap elections as in other parliamentary systems.

The president is stronger than a typical prime minister. As head of state and head of government, the president can not only exert authority over the cabinet and government policy (like a typical head of government) but also speak on behalf of the nation and represent the country on the world stage (as a head of state does). Moreover, South African presidents can be removed by the legislature, but only with great difficulty. A vote of no confidence requires the support of two thirds of the members of the National Assembly and can be taken only on the grounds of a substantial violation of the law or constitution, serious misconduct, or an inability to perform the functions of the office—circumstances akin to an impeachment in a presidential system. Theoretically, the National Assembly cannot simply dismiss the president because it opposes a given policy. This provision remains untested, however, as a vote of no confidence has not yet been attempted. To date, the overwhelming power of the ANC in the National Assembly, combined with the prestige of Nelson Mandela as the first president, has given the office a great deal of authority.

However, the limits to the power of the president were evident in 2008 when President **Thabo Mbeki** was forced to resign after he failed to win reelection to the ANC leadership. Mbeki was replaced by Kgalema Motlanthe, a caretaker president who served until the 2009 general elections. As is the case in all parliamentary systems, South Africa's head of government serves at the behest of his political party and can be replaced by the party at any time.

THE LEGISLATURE

South Africa has a bicameral parliament. The lower and more powerful of its two houses, the **National Assembly**, currently has 400 members. Members serve for five-year terms, and they are charged with electing and removing the president, preparing and passing legislation, and approving the national

budget. As in the United Kingdom, the lower house has a weekly "question time," when members can question the cabinet and the president. Question time can become a heated affair, with members of the opposition parties grilling the cabinet and casting aspersions on one another. Given the racial divisions in the country, however, such debate is also limited (for example, when one white member of parliament commented that a black member of the cabinet lacked intelligence, he was rebuked for using racial stereotypes).

The upper house is the National Council of Provinces. Its ninety members are indirectly elected by the nine provincial legislatures and include the premier of each province. Each province, regardless of its size or population, sends ten delegates. The power of the National Council depends on the type of legislation under consideration. When the National Assembly is dealing with national policy (such as foreign affairs or defense), the National Council has relatively little influence. When proposed legislation affects the provinces, however, the National Council can amend or reject measures, forcing the two houses to form a mediation committee to hammer out a compromise. Ultimately, the National Assembly can override the upper house with a two-thirds vote. In short, the National Council exists to ensure that local interests are heard at the national level, which is especially important when the provinces are distinguished by ethnicity, language, and culture.

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Another important component of the transition to democratic multiracial rule in South Africa is the Constitutional Court. This body hears cases regarding the constitutionality of legislation on the separation of powers among the branches of government. Its eleven members serve twelve-year terms and are appointed by the president on the basis of the recommendations of a judicial commission. The commission is made up of government and nongovernment appointees who evaluate candidates' qualifications and take racial and gender diversity into account. To date, the court has shown a tendency for activism; in 1997, for example, it struck down the country's death penalty despite public sentiment in favor of capital punishment, and in 2002 it ruled that the government was obligated to provide treatment for persons with AIDS.[7]

The Electoral System

The current electoral rules in South Africa mark a significant departure from the past. Under apartheid, the country used the British single-member district, or plurality, system. As part of the transition to democracy, South Africa had to decide what election method would best represent the needs of a diverse public and help consolidate democratic legitimacy by creating an inclusive system. The result was the creation of an electoral system based on pure proportional representation (PR). Voters now cast their votes not for individual candidates but for a party, which is designated on the ballot by name, electoral symbol, and the picture of the head of the party (to ensure that illiterate voters are not excluded). To ensure the greatest possible proportionality, representatives are elected from a single nationwide constituency, and there is no minimum threshold for receiving seats in the legislature. The number of seats a party wins is divided proportionally to reflect the percentage of the total vote it receives. At elections, voters are given two ballots: one for the national legislature and one for their provincial legislature.

Overall, the electoral system in South Africa has successfully created an inclusive political atmosphere and has averted conflict and violence.[8] Electoral turnout has been very high, and in the 2009 elections turnout was over 77 percent. However, some critics have argued that the use of PR has created a disconnect between the National Assembly and the citizens. Because members of parliament are tied to their party instead of their constituency, they are not accountable to local communities. Political parties can stifle internal dissent and limit the independence of legislators by threatening to remove them from the party electoral list if they stray too far from the party's wishes. Critics inside South Africa have suggested that the country consider adopting a mixed electoral system, in which some percentage of the seats are filled by plurality while the remaining are filled by PR. This would give voters a local representative with whom they could identify, as well as the ability to cast their vote for a particular party.[9] After some discussion on electoral reform earlier in the decade, however, such suggestions have faded and the current system has become institutionalized. The ANC, in particular, has been unwilling to change an electoral system that has so far delivered it a huge majority.

Local Government

Below the national level, South Africa is divided into nine provinces, each with its own elected assembly. Members are elected for a term of five years (with elections for the national and provincial legislatures occurring simultaneously) and, in turn, elect a premier to serve as the province's chief executive. The provincial assemblies have their own constitutions, pass legislation, and send delegates to the National Council of Provinces.

It is difficult to call South Africa a federal state, however, and the concept itself is a politically charged issue. During the transition to democracy, the ANC in particular looked upon federalism with a great deal of suspicion. At that time, the National Party (NP), architects of apartheid, favored federalism as a way to limit the ANC's power, while some Afrikaners in fact hoped that a federal right to self-determination could pave the way for outright secession.

The Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party also called for self-determination—and an independent Zulu state. The 1996 constitution reflects these concerns by supporting regional and ethnic diversity. Still, the constitution gives the central government the ability to overturn local legislation relatively easily, and any powers not delimited by the constitution reside with the central, not the local, government. Provinces also have limited power to levy taxes, giving them little financial autonomy.

Since democratization, municipal governments have become increasingly important.[10] The ANC has suffered its most important defeats at the local level, where complaints about the delivery of services have boosted the fortunes of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Democratic Alliance. In the 2009 provincial elections, the ANC lost control of Western Cape Province, and Democratic Alliance leader Helen Zille became premier.

POLITICAL CONFLICT AND COMPETITION

The Party System and Elections

During apartheid, few political parties existed, and the National Party (NP) dominated politics from 1948 until 1994. The main opposition was the weak Progressive Federal Party, which opposed apartheid laws and favored multiracial democracy within a federal framework. The enfranchisement of the nonwhite population has dramatically changed the political spectrum, though as in the past it remains dominated by one major party. National elections are held at least every five years, and those differences that do exist between the parties are driven as much by race and ethnicity as they are by ideology. Party identification is relatively weak in South Africa, and only about 60 percent of South Africans claim to identify with any party.[11]

Currently the dominant party, the **African National Congress (ANC)** led the struggle against white rule starting in 1912. During the ANC's long period underground and in exile, it developed an ideology strongly influenced by Marxism, favoring the nationalization of land and industry. Economic equality was seen as a necessary mechanism in overcoming racial discrimination. The ANC cultivated relations with Communist countries, such as the Soviet Union and China, and at home formed an alliance with the much smaller South African Communist Party (which still operates within the framework of the ANC). Many white South Africans, including some opponents of apartheid, were troubled by the ANC's demands for radical political and economic change. Since winning power in 1994, however, the ANC has stood for racial and gender equality and a strong state role in the expansion of economic opportunities for nonwhites, but it has also embraced property rights

to provide jobs, education, and social services to the much poorer black majority. As such, its ideology is unclear, encompassing a mixture of social democratic and liberal views, a lingering sense of militancy, and an emphasis on unity. The ANC increased its share of the vote in each of the first three democratic elections, but saw its share of the vote decrease slightly in 2009.

SOUTH AFRICA'S NEW PRESIDENT AND THE POWER OF THE ANC

South Africa's new president is likely to be very different from the aloof, intellectual Thabo Mbeki. Jacob Zuma is the ANC's most prominent Zulu politican, and has been the leader of the ANC left. Unlike the scholarly Mbeki, Zuma grew up poor and received no formal education. He became involved in the ANC in the 1960s, and was sentenced to ten years in prison in 1963 (he served time at Robben Island with Nelson Mandela). After his release, he became a top ANC leader in exile. After the return of democracy, Zuma quickly rose within the ANC hierarchy, culminating in his 1997 appointment as executive Deputy President (Mbeki's number two).

Zuma's rise to power within the ANC has been clouded in controversy. In 2005, Zuma was charged with raping a young woman in his home. Zuma admitted to having unprotected sex with the woman, whom he knew to be HIV-positive, but claimed the relationship was consensual. Zuma was acquitted of the charges, but his statement under oath that he had showered after sex to reduce his risk of contracting the HIV virus infuriated many South Africans.

In 2005, Zuma was fired after he was accused of corruption and racketeering in a government arms procurement scandal. Charges were brought against Zuma in 2007, but they were dropped in April 2009, shortly before the elections. Zuma has claimed that the corruption charges are politically motivated. Zuma has strong support among South Africa's labor unions, among Zulus, and generally among those frustrated with the pace of change under Mandela and Mbeki. Unlike Mandela and Mbeki, Zuma is considered an economic populist who is less likely to continue the pro-business and pro-growth economic policies pursued by the ANC to date.

In December 2007, Zuma easily upset Thabo Mbeki in elections for the ANC presidency (he won two thirds of the internal party vote). Zuma's victory virtually guaranteed that he would become president after the April 2009 general election. The prominence of Zuma points to a broader issue: the dominance of the ANC and the weakness of the opposition. This raises concerns about possible abuses of power. The ANC has generally acted with caution to avoid antagonizing opposition parties and South Africa's various ethnic and religious minority groups. South Africa has yet to experience political alternation. Other democracies, like Japan, have been dominated by a single political party. Nevertheless, the dominance of a single party may threaten democracy in the long run.

The overwhelming preponderance of ANC power raises concerns. Some observers fear that the party has so easily embraced democracy after its long struggle in part because the party has done so well. Were the ANC to face losing power, it might not look upon the democratic process so favorably. These concerns were heightened in particular by Thabo Mbeki's tenure in office, as his rhetoric and that of the ANC grew increasingly intolerant of those who challenge it.

In general, however, the ANC's record in office has been positively evaluated by most South Africans, who give it high scores for managing the economy, improving health care, and promoting racial equality. South Africans have been most critical of the ANC's record on job creation, crime reduction, and reduction of the gap between rich and poor.

Since late 2007, the ANC has become badly divided between a populist wing, led current president **Jacob Zuma** (see "South Africa's New President and the Power of the ANC," p. 509) and backed by trade unions and the party rank and file, and the more technocratic wing, dominated by former president Mbeki. Zuma's successful challenge to Mbeki in the bitterly contested party leadership election of December 2007 led to the first significant split in the ANC. After winning the ANC leadership, Zuma began to replace Mbeki loyalists with his own supporters in key party posts. Zuma was able to force the resignation of Mbeki in September 2008, but Zuma could not become president because he was not a member of the legislature. The ANC appointed Kgalema Motlanthe, an ally of Zuma, as a caretaker president to serve until the 2009 general elections.

Zuma's rise to the leadership of the ANC, and his ablility to force Mbeki's resignation, prompted the creation of the **Congress of the People (COPE)**, a breakaway party led by Mosiuoa Lekota, a former defense minister under Mbeki. COPE has the potential of becoming the first genuine black opposition party to the ANC, but in the 2009 elections it was hurt by internal divisions and lack of funds. Despite these problems, COPE was able to win over 7 percent of the vote and thirty seats in the legislature, making it South Africa's third largest political party. Its success, along with that of the Democratic Alliance, deprived the ANC of a two-thirds majority in the lower house, weakening the ANC's ability to amend the constitution and pass some types of legislation.

The overwhelming presence of the ANC in parliament dwarfs the opposition parties. Among them is the **Democratic Alliance (DA)**, successor to the old Progressive Federal Party. The DA is primarily liberal, favoring a small state, individual freedoms, privatization of state-run firms, and greater devolution of power to local governments. In the 2004 elections, the DA won 12 percent of the votes and 50 seats. In the 2006 local elections, the DA beat the ANC in Cape Town (the only local municipal council not controlled by the

ANC), winning about 15 percent of the vote nationally. **Helen Zille**, a liberal journalist during apartheid and the white mayor of Cape Town, became DA leader in 2007. Under her leadership, the DA has been an increasingly outspoken opposition to the ANC. Public support for the DA has grown since the 1994 elections, but its primary base of support remains the white and mixed-race population. To become a viable challenger to the ANC, it will have to broaden this base dramatically. In 2006, only 3 percent of South Africans said they identified with the DA. In the 2009 elections the DA increased its votes to over 16 percent and won control of Western Cape Province (the only one not controlled by the ANC).

The **Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)**, played an ambiguous role in apartheid and post-apartheid politics. The IFP, founded in 1975 by Zulu chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, challenged apartheid institutions but also participated in local government in the KwaZulu "homeland," one of the remote areas created to remove blacks from desirable areas and deprive them of basic citizenship. During the 1980s, animosity grew between the IFP and the ANC: the ANC saw the IFP as having been co-opted by the government, while the IFP viewed the ANC as dominated by ethnic Xhosas who did not represent Zulu interests. The animosity soon erupted into violence, which was

South African National Assembly Elections, 1999, 2004, and 2009

	1999		2004		2009	
Party	% of Vote	Seats Won	% of Vote	Seats Won	% of Vote	Seats Won
African National Congress	66	266	70	279	66	264
Democratic Alliance	10	38	12	50	17	67
Congress of the People	–	–	–	–	7	30
Inkatha Freedom Party	9	34	7	28	5	18
New National Party	7	28	2	36	–	–
Others	8	34	9	36	7	21
Total	100	400	100	400	100	400

Source: Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, www.elections.org.za (accessed 25 April 2009).

abetted by the apartheid regime as a way to weaken both sides. After the first democratic elections, however, the ANC was careful to bring members of the IFP into the government cabinet, helping to diffuse much of the tension between the two parties. The IFP was embarrassed in 2004, however, having failed to do well even in the elections for KwaZulu's provincial legislature, and the party left the national government. Fears that the IFP could represent a threat to the stability of the country have disappeared. The long-term viability of a Zulu political party is doubtful since Jacob Zuma, a Zulu, became president in 2009. In the 2009 elections the IFP continued its steady decline, winning under 5 percent of the vote and only eighteen seats in the lower house.

Aside from those four main parties, few actors show much influence in South African politics. The now defunct National Party, which created apartheid and ran the country for over four decades, tried unsuccessfully to recast itself as a multiracial party and renamed itself the New National Party (NNP).

Voting in South African elections is still heavily influence by race.[12] In the 1999 elections, for example, 95 percent of blacks voted for the ANC, Inkatha, or other predominantly black parties, while 81 percent of whites supported the DA or other mostly white parties. Only colored and Indian voters more evenly split their votes among black and white parties (40 percent of coloreds and 34 percent of Indians backed white parties).

Civil Society

The exclusionary nature of the apartheid regime was built upon the policy of destroying black opposition, which it carried out by weakening any form of organized resistance. Black civil society in South Africa was crushed to an extent not seen elsewhere in colonial Africa, with traditional institutions undermined, co-opted, and repressed wherever possible. Yet even with such pressure, antiapartheid nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued to form and were vital in organizing the resistance that would help bring about democracy.

In the aftermath of apartheid, however, civil society in South Africa has remained weak for a number of reasons. One major problem is simply the legacy of the past: having had civil society effectively stifled for decades, South Africans have found it hard to create civic values. This is not unusual; with the fall of highly repressive regimes (like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union), new democracies often experience a civil vacuum, in which the public is unfamiliar with and mistrustful of civic participation. A second problem lies with the ANC itself. During the transition period, the ANC relied heavily on a variety of NGOs to build public support. After 1994, the ANC co-opted many of these formerly autonomous groups, bringing them under its direction. This, too, has stunted the emergence of an independent civil society.

With the exception of political protest, public activism remains low in South Africa. A 2007 study of seven southern African countries showed that the South Africans' civic and political participation was among the lowest in the region.[13] This may be an inevitable reflection of a relatively new democracy, but it may also point to a long-term detachment of South Africans from public life, a detachment that could hinder further growth of democracy.

Given these problems, what elements of civil society (if any) play a prominent role in South Africa? One is organized labor, in particular the **Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)**, formed in 1985 to promote workers' rights and oppose apartheid. In postapartheid South Africa, COSATU remains powerful in defending labor interests.[14] Like many other organizations that were involved in the battle against apartheid, COSATU is strongly tied to the ANC, through what is known as the Triple Alliance, which links COSATU, the ANC, and the South African Communist Party. In spite of this alliance, COSATU is openly hostile to the government's liberal economic policies, and this hostility has generated friction. COSATU has complained about the consistently high rate of unemployment that has weakened the union movement (only a small minority of South Africa's workforce is unionized). It has also been vocal in opposing the government's weak criticism of the Mugabe regime in neighboring Zimbabwe. COSATU has considered severing its ties to the ANC, but like other civic actors, it fears that doing so will result in its political marginalization.

A second important element of civil society is the media. Since 1994, electronic and print media have expanded substantially, making for a relatively well informed public. South Africans place a high degree of trust in the media, more so than they place in any of the state institutions, perhaps due in part to the ethnic integration of television and other outlets. In 2008, concerns



were raised when individuals close to the ANC leadership purchased one of South Africa's four main media groups.

Finally, the AIDS epidemic has recently led to the formation of numerous groups that have challenged the government's weak response to the crisis. Ironically, this horrible epidemic may help foster a new and positive wave of civil activism.

SOCIETY

Given the ethnic diversity of South Africa's inhabitants, as well as the colonial and national policies of systematic racial discrimination, it is no surprise that South African society has been (and in many ways remains) significantly divided along racial and ethnic lines. In fact, one of the most tragic effects of apartheid was that the social policy of racial segregation was compounded—indeed, was reinforced—by political persecution and economic discrimination.

What is surprising is the extent to which both groups and individuals in contemporary South Africa identify with the South African nation and express patriotism toward the state. Unfortunately, this shared national identity has not easily been translated into domestic peace or tolerance among the country's various groups. Despite South Africa's ability to avoid much of the ethnic violence and civil war that plagues other portions of the continent, there is much truth to former President Thabo Mbeki's indictment that South Africa remains in many ways two nations: one, wealthy and largely white; the other, poor and largely black.

Racism in the Rainbow Nation

Race relations have come a long way since Nelson Mandela issued his famous call for a multiethnic "rainbow nation." Public opinion research demonstrates that most South Africans think that race relations are improving, but a number of highly publicized recent incidents have challenged the idea of a rainbow nation. In 2008, after the administration of the formerly all-white Afrikaner University of the Free State decided to integrate dormitories, angry white students produced a video of a mock initiation in which black students (portrayed by black staff members) were humiliated. A discovery of a whites-only restroom in a police station, a shooting rampage by a racist youth gang (in which four backs were killed), and the barring of white journalists from a meeting with Jacob Zuma (the current president) are other disturbing examples that racism remains a potentially explosive problem in South Africa.

The challenge for South Africa as it moves from a political culture of racism to one of reconciliation is to forge the varying notions of South African identity into a common, multicultural concept of what it means to be South African, one that reconciles national unity with democratic pluralism.

Ethnic and National Identity

As should be clear, South Africa is truly a multiracial and multiethnic society. Under apartheid, government not only enforced policies of separate racial development but also used its "homelands" policy to divide and conquer the country's many ethnic and tribal groups. Although Bantustans (homelands) were legally dissolved in 1994, many citizens (particularly urban blacks) had never identified with or even visited their alleged homeland. Nonetheless, black Africans, particularly rural blacks, remain in many ways tribal in their social relations and political behavior, with tribe or ethnic group remaining their primary identification.

Like black South Africans, the white population has a long history of ethnic division, stemming from the colonial-era conflict between the Afrikaners and the British. A century of sporadic violence between the Afrikaners and the English culminated in the 1910 establishment of the Union of South Africa. The English minority dominated the Union politically, economically, and culturally. In fact, it was the fear of English dominance that inspired the formation and growth of the Afrikaner National Party (NP) and its policies of cultural and racial purity during the first half of the twentieth century. Apartheid allowed Afrikaners to separate the minority whites from the majority blacks and to culturally dominate the white English subculture.

But whereas racial and tribal groups were fastidiously segregated under apartheid, language has rendered the multiethnic fabric of South Africa far more complex. Indeed, linguistic differences have brought groups together and pushed them apart. Nine languages spoken exclusively by blacks are now enshrined in the constitution. Though violently resisted by blacks during apartheid, Afrikaans remains the preferred tongue of not only Afrikaners but also most colored South Africans. As is true in many polyglot former colonies, the English language serves to some extent to unify the country's citizens.

Similarly, religion has both unified and divided South African society. More than two thirds of all South Africans, including most whites and coloreds and nearly two thirds of blacks, identify themselves as Christian, and over three quarters describe themselves as religious.[15] The Dutch Reformed Church (sometimes called the National Party in prayer) played a particularly important role in unifying Afrikaners (first against the British, then against black Africans) and providing divine justification (at least in the eyes of its members) for their separate and superior status.

As with racial discrimination in America, the dismantling of legal racism in South Africa and the national strides taken toward reconciliation have not

fully eliminated racial prejudice or distrust. Levels of black-on-white violence and even black-on-black violence climbed during the 1990s, particularly in the townships, with murder rates in South Africa now nearly ten times higher than those in the United States.

Despite persistent racial tensions, South Africans enjoy a remarkably high level of nationalism and patriotism. And while the apartheid state essentially excluded all nonwhites from political life, citizenship is now universally shared. However, legacies of division and exclusion combined with a perceived inability of the African National Congress (ANC) government to deliver socioeconomic benefits have dampened citizen participation and increased levels of political apathy since the dissolution of apartheid. Recent polls show that support for democracy, trust in government, and satisfaction with government policy have all declined in recent years.[16]

Ideology and Political Culture

Although it may be troubling for the future of South African democracy, a relative decline in levels of political interest since the tumultuous early 1990s should not be surprising. Since the fall of apartheid, political ideologies have also become less pronounced and more pragmatic. In the old South Africa, Afrikaner politicians and intellectuals combined and refined political and theological ideas to form an ideology of racist authoritarianism. Like many other movements of resistance in colonial and postcolonial settings, the ANC and other revolutionary opponents of apartheid (including the South African Communist Party) adopted radical socialist principles of economic egalitarianism and revolutionary political violence. Now the ANC government has reached out to both white capitalists and black voters, embracing liberal capitalism, promoting electoral democracy, and handily winning two national elections.

Likewise, differences among the very disparate political cultures of apartheid South Africa—not just between ruling whites and oppressed blacks but also between the subcultures of Afrikaners and English and even between the Zulu and the Xhosa—have narrowed. Many South Africans have genuinely embraced the new culture of social inclusion and political participation and have supported efforts to integrate former adversaries and divided communities.

Certainly the highest-profile effort of bridge building was the **Truth and Reconciliation Commission**. Convened in 1995 and led by **Archbishop Desmond Tutu**, the commission was charged with two goals: (1) establishing the "truth" of crimes committed (on all sides) from the time of the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre through the outlawing of apartheid in 1994 and (2) using that truth as the essential foundation for healing the deep wounds of the era. The commission was given the authority to hear confessions, grant amnesty

Levels of Trust in South Africa, 2006

Percent expressing a lot or some trust in:

The President: 69%

Parliament: 55%

Electoral Agency: 57%

Ruling Party: 61%

Courts: 68%

Police: 48%

Source: Etannibi Eo Alemika, "Quality of Elections, Satisfaction with Democracy, and Political Trust in Africa," *Afrobarometer Working Paper*, no. 84 (December 2007), available at www.afrobarometer.org (accessed 13 June 2008)

to those who were deemed to have told the complete truth, and provide recommendations for promoting long-term reconciliation (including reparation payments). While the commission uncovered a great deal of horrific "truth," much controversy surrounded the final report. Though not surprising given the enormity of the crimes, genuine reconciliation has remained elusive.

Nonetheless, many observers remain optimistic that ANC-governed South Africa can overcome the tragedies of the country's history as well as its current social and economic woes, including endemic crime and violence. They argue that both the South African people and political culture have shown a remarkable capacity to avoid conflict even in the face of serious economic and social problems. Scholars note "countervailing sources of stability" in South Africa's political culture, including a pervasive tradition of collective decision making (known as *ubuntu*), the ANC's proven pragmatism and political discipline, and the "prudential caution" of whites and blacks forged during the period of transition. Perhaps most important, with the rise of a new black capitalist class, the country has seen the gradual emergence of a multiracial elite.[17]

There are many signs that South Africa's political culture supports democracy. According to a 2006 public opinion study, 64 percent of South Africans are satisfied with how democracy works, and a similar percent of respondents think democracy is preferable to all other systems.[18] South Africans express strong support for the protection of civil liberties and minority rights, and almost 70 percent of South Africans reject the notion of one-party rule. South Africans are split fairly evenly between those who believe the government is responsible for improving the well-being of the population, and those who believe that individuals are primarily responsible for themselves.

LABOR FORCE BY OCCUPATION (2007 est.)



POLITICAL ECONOMY

One cannot separate the political and social challenges confronting South Africa today from its economic challenges. Having vanquished the demon of apartheid, South Africa faces massive unemployment, growing income inequality, and persistent poverty among South Africa's poorest.

The African National Congress (ANC) government must adopt policies that can both ameliorate these problems without alienating its broad and disparate constituencies and preserve South Africa's nascent democracy and fragile civil liberties. Moreover, successful democratic transition has not guaranteed the economic transformation of South Africa's. In fact, it has in some ways made it more problematic, as issues of equality—delayed in the name of promoting political freedom—have taken on more significance.

To its credit, the government has made strides in improving the economy by curtailing debt, reversing inflation, and expanding exports. It has also improved employment opportunities and income for the growing black middle class; for South Africa's poor it has greatly expanded access to basic necessities, such as water, electricity, and housing. By African standards, the South African economy is highly developed. Its companies have also become major investors elsewhere in the region.[19] South Africa's economy is also highly diversified, although still fairly dependent on the country's large mineral resources, particularly gold and diamonds.

Historically, both British- and Afrikaner-controlled governments sponsored political economic systems that favored their own. In the early twentieth century, government policy facilitated English ownership and control of mines and other industries, even in Afrikaner-dominated regions of the country. Squeezed by wealthier and more highly skilled English workers from above and by cheaper black labor from below, Afrikaners sought political power in large part to redress what they saw as economic oppression.

With this power, the National Party (NP) promoted essentially mercantilist policies of import substitution to promote local, and more specifically, Afrikaner industry. Though those policies were initially adopted to nurture an Afrikaner capitalist class, by the 1970s the international economic sanctions imposed on South Africa gave the state little option but to substitute local production and markets for those lost abroad. During its tenure, the NP government intervened extensively in the marketplace, imposing high tariffs and other trade barriers on imports, bestowing lucrative government contracts on favored firms, establishing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in such key industries as weapons, steel, and energy production, and using oligopolist profits from gold and diamond exports to fuel industrialization.

Throughout the 1970s, the South African economy thrived and Afrikaners prospered. At the same time, the absence of economic opportunity for black Africans and the prohibition against the formation of black trade unions kept black labor costs artificially low, encouraging foreign investors eager to take advantage of the cheap labor and relative stability that authoritarian South Africa promised. During the 1980s, however, foreign firms and countries faced growing moral and legal pressures to divest their South African interests. At that time, too, multiracial trade unions (including the COSATU) were legalized and began demanding higher wages. Finally, the government began to face a shortage of skilled labor. Limiting access to education for blacks meant that the economy could not depend on a large pool of educated workers. These pressures dealt severe—and some would say ultimately fatal—economic blows to the apartheid state.

Given the history of policies benefiting the English and the Afrikaners, many observers expected that the victorious ANC would adopt interventionist policies to redress the discrimination and exclusion that blacks had experienced for generations. Not only would such policies promise to be popular with the ANC's majority black constituency, but this kind of progressive state intervention, designed to redistribute wealth and promote greater equality, would also be in harmony with the long-standing socialist ideological heritage of the ANC. White property owners feared that a great share of their economic assets would simply be seized by the state. This, then, would be state manipulation of the market by the left rather than the right—but state intervention all the same.

The ANC's approach to the economy was much less radical than expected, and in many ways it pursued a liberal political economic model. In 1994, Nelson Mandela announced the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), which focused on meeting the basic needs of South Africans living in poverty. The ANC argued that safe drinking water, housing, electricity, jobs, affordable health care, and a safe environment had to take precedence over economic growth.

Within two years, however, the ANC government had recognized that the huge costs of the RDP were unsustainable in the absence of substantially more foreign investment and more rapid economic growth. In addition, the recent failure of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the increasing popularity of neoliberal market solutions within international development circles helped turn the ANC leadership away from its socialist roots. In 1996, the government adopted a plan of liberal macroeconomic structural adjustment known as **Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Program (GEAR)**. GEAR called for opening trade, privatizing SOEs, and

otherwise limiting the role of the state in the marketplace in an effort to stimulate growth and attract foreign investment. These policies have paid dividends: growth rates under the ANC have been steady, if not spectacular, and a vast improvement over apartheid-era governments.

Not surprisingly, this dramatic shift in redistributive priorities and interventionist policies has angered the ANC's longtime allies on the left, COSATU and the South African Communist Party. In labor protests against GEAR, COSATU leaders have called the GEAR privatization of the SOEs "born-again apartheid" and have predicted devastating consequences for South Africa's working poor. The government finds itself in the position of, on the one hand, being praised by the International Monetary Fund for promoting GEAR privatization and delivering steady rates of economic growth (about 5 percent in 2007) but, on the other hand, being under attack from its erstwhile anti-apartheid allies.

Facing this catch-22, the government is trying to please all sides: The ANC government remains committed to land reform and basic health care and funds programs to provide water, electricity, phones, and housing to the poor; the government also continues to woo foreign investment by cutting inflation, lowering taxes, and keeping a lid on its spending in order to promote economic growth. It has targeted key industries and manufacturing sectors, offering low-interest loans and other incentives for investment. As in other developing economies, the government has promoted microcredit, or small-loan initiatives designed to assist the very poorest in starting businesses. So far, GEAR and related policies have borne some fruit, in the form of increased growth rates that, it is hoped, will help reduce unemployment over the coming decade. But there are still serious obstacles to be overcome.

Chief among these is persistent income inequality. Despite the ANC government's affirmative action efforts and the emergence of a small but growing black middle and upper class, the white minority still dominates the economy. South Africa has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. Moreover, while the rising income of some blacks and the government's redistribution efforts have led to a decline in inequality between races, overall inequality among all South Africans continues to increase. The danger is that a white economic elite will simply be replaced by a black one, with income redistribution no better (and perhaps worse) than before apartheid. The ANC has been especially unsuccessful in redistributing land, which remains overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the white minority; by 2007, only 5 percent of land had been redistributed to blacks, far short of the goal of 30 percent initially established by the ANC.[20]

South Africa continues to suffer from extremely high rates of unemployment. In 2007, that rate was about 25 percent, but the figure for young blacks was closer to 40 percent. While some have blamed South Africa's rigid labor laws, COSATU and others have questioned the government's commitment to

job creation. South Africa's growth rate has simply not been high enough to generate enough employment. The persistence of massive levels of poverty is an equally vexing problem facing South Africa. About half of all South Africans are below the official poverty level. When asked to identify the greatest problem facing South Africa, the largest percentage of respondents (39 percent) cited unemployment, followed by the persistence of poverty (11 percent).[21]

The ANC's main approach to affirmative action has been its policy of **Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)**.[22] The goal of BEE is to increase the presence of disadvantaged South Africans (including coloreds and Asians) in a number of areas of the economy, including ownership of business, access to corporate management, training, and access to government procurement. Beginning in 2007, the government adopted a number of codes creating targets for each of these areas. State organizations and enterprises, and private sector firms that wish to do business with the state, must show progress on meeting some combination of these goals. New state agencies have been developed to rate organizations and enterprises using "scorecards" that award points for meeting individual targets.

To date, the results of BEE have been mixed. A small group of blacks (called "BEE-llionaires") with close ties to the ANC has benefited enormously from the policy, but this has only served to increase the gap between wealthy and poor blacks. Critics of the policy claim that inequality in the educational system and massive unemployment are the root cause of inequality in South Africa. Others fear the system will become cumbersome and a burden on the private sector.[23]

A final challenge worth noting is the loss of human resources through the emigration of skilled workers. The brain drain is sometimes called "white flight" because a high proportion of those leaving are young white professionals who are increasingly skeptical of their prospects in their native South Africa. The brain drain is particularly noticeable in the English-speaking population, whose ties to the country are not as old as those of the Afrikaners. It is estimated that nearly 50,000 whites have emigrated from South Africa since 1994.[24] To develop and diversify its economy, South Africa needs not only to create but also retain its most skilled workers, both black and white.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE WORLD

As South Africa's domestic institutions and politics are still in transition, so, too, are its relations with the outside world. Under apartheid, South Africa was largely isolated from the outside world, limited in its economic and diplomatic ties. This isolation helped reinforce a siege mentality among the white population and directed much of the politics of the country inward. Relations with the rest of Africa were particularly hostile, often limited to military skir-

mishes with neighboring countries that harbored or supported the African National Congress (ANC). With the move to multiparty rule, South Africa was able to break out of its isolation, rebuilding ties in the region and in the international community as a whole.

As can be expected, however, the realities of this transition have been somewhat more complicated. For most observers, this has been most obvious in the often prickly relationship between the ANC and members of the international community, whether they are other governments, intergovernmental organizations, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Former President Thabo Mbeki bristled at suggestions that his government was derelict in its response to the AIDS crisis and in addressing some of the main issues involved, such as sexual assault. ANC leaders (including Nelson Mandela) have accused the international community of double standards and racism, treating South Africa as if it were still a colony of the imperial powers. Ironically, in some ways this defensiveness is reminiscent of the rhetoric of the apartheid-era National Party (NP), which also angrily rejected criticism from the international community. Perhaps this should not be surprising. In spite of the wide ethnic, economic, and other divisions among South Africans, surveys have found a deep vein of patriotism that has persisted over the past decade, with more than 90 percent of those surveyed saying that they are proud to be South African.[25] Such strong patriotism is less likely to tolerate external criticism, especially if it originates in the developed world.

Yet when we shift our focus from the international community to Africa alone, our perspective of South Africa changes. In the international community, South Africa is still a struggling country that confronts a series of major obstacles. But in Africa, South Africa is a regional powerhouse. On the economic front, its economy alone makes up nearly 45 percent of all of sub-Saharan Africa's GDP. By virtue of this large GDP and its vibrant private sector, South Africa has become central to trade and investment on the continent. South African exports to other African countries have risen substantially over the past decade, fostered in part by the lowering of trade barriers across the region. South Africa has also become a major investor in many neighboring countries. South African multinationals now play an important role in retail, banking, telecommunications, and other sectors in the region. As a result of this dominant economic presence, there has been a growing resentment of what is seen as a kind of South African imperialism, the effects of which are thought to be undermining local African businesses and increasingly controlling the regional economy.[26] Inside South Africa, these actions have also been criticized as running counter to the goals of economic development within South Africa itself. Furthermore, at the other end of this relationship, the far better economic conditions in South Africa have attracted millions of illegal immigrants over the past decade, fueling xenophobia among

the South African population and mistreatment of immigrants by the police, immigration officials, and the public as a whole.

South Africa's regional power has expanded in the diplomatic sphere as well. An important element of this growing influence is the country's role in the formation of the **African Union (AU)**, which replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002. In many ways inspired by the European Union, the AU seeks to depart from the OAU in pursuing greater political and economic integration across the continent. As the first head of the AU, Thabo Mbeki sought to position the organization as a mediator between African states and the advanced democracies. Mbeki also helped create the **Southern African Development Community (SADC)**, a thirteen-member body that is also concerned with regional economic integration and cooperation in southern Africa.

A cornerstone of regional integration and cooperation has been the **New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)**. NEPAD proposes that the developed world's support for African countries would, unlike past aid or loan programs, be tied to commitments to the rule of law and democracy. Progress toward this goal is to be monitored by the AU. If the AU is able to show progress in tying aid to economic and political progress in the region, it will no doubt boost the organization's power and with it the regional and international authority of South Africa.

Finally, South Africa has been directly involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking in the region. In recent years, the South African government has worked at brokering an end to civil conflicts in the Congo, Angola, Liberia, and Burundi, and it has troops on the ground as peacekeepers or observers in several African countries.

Thus South Africa's role in the region has been transformed from pariah to continental leader and mediator with the advanced democracies. But this power comes with its own costs. In many ways, South Africa has become a regional hegemon: that is, a dominant power that is able to set the rules for the region, adjudicate disputes between countries, and punish those who fail to go along. That South Africa has not only the most powerful army on the continent but also a sophisticated arms industry (as a legacy of apartheid) only reinforces this authority.

That power comes with a certain degree of contradiction is true for any important actor in the international system; in that respect, South Africa is no different from any other country with more power than its neighbors. What complicates matters for South Africa, however, is the way in which its new regime has been built on moral authority: that is, the need for democracy, multiethnicity, and tolerance. As a result, South Africa has been at the forefront of promoting democracy in the region through its own diplomatic efforts and through participation in the AU and the SADC. Yet its efforts have often been viewed in the region as patronizing, not unlike the behavior of the

advanced democracies toward South Africa that Mbeki often condemned. This view is reinforced by the perception of double standards. In the economic realm, some observers see South Africa's economic relations with the continent as one of domination. NEPAD, too, has been criticized by some Africans as an attempt to bring a neoliberal version of GEAR to the rest of Africa, thereby primarily benefiting South African economic interests.[27]

In the diplomatic sphere as well, South Africa's calls for greater democracy in the region have rung hollow in the face of its support for Zimbabwe, whose deepening authoritarianism was faciliated, in part, by South African diplomatic and economic support (see "Current Issues," below). As with many other countries around the world, South Africa has found that its increased international power has led to a clash of morality, stability, and self-interest.

CURRENT ISSUES

CRIME AND CORRUPTION

Crime is regularly cited by South Africans as among the most serious problems facing the country. Crime rates skyrocketed after the transition to democracy, but rates started to drop after peaking in 2003. Pernicious inequality and endemic poverty have certainly contributed a serious crime problem. The rate of violent crime in South Africa, including murder, rape, and vehicle hijackings, is extremely high. Nearly 20,000 South Africans are murdered each year, a rate nine times greater than the U.S. average. Carjackings, often resulting in death or serious injury, are commonplace and have increased dramatically since 1994. Unemployment and poverty, particularly in the townships, and corruption in the police force exacerbate this problem. Crime not only undermines the social fabric but also deters domestic and international investment and diverts to security resources that could be spent elsewhere.[28]

Public opinion research has shown a steady growth of public concern about corruption since 1994, fueled in part by a number of high-profile corruption scandals that affected the governing ANC.[29] The data show that local governments are viewed as particularly corrupt (almost half of respondents view them as corrupt), while about a quarter of respondents view the president and the legislature as corrupt.

Faced with growing public concern over corruption, in 1999 President Mbeki established an elite crime-fighting unit: the Directorate of Special Operations, popularly known as the Scorpions. The unit was well funded and highly trained, and it had its own staff of investigators and prosecutors. Its motto became, "loved by the people, feared by the criminals." It quickly became a popular and highly effective unit, achieving conviction rates much higher than the regular police force. The Scorpions ran into trouble, however, when the force began to investigate corruption within the ANC government.

When they brought corruption charges against then former vice president Jacob Zuma, which led to Zuma's firing, Zuma's supporters claimed that the Scorpions were merely attempting to limit opposition within the ANC. A bitter political rivalry and turf war broke out between the police and the Scorpions. Despite widespread public opposition in 2008 Zuma's supporters passed legislation that reintegrated the Scorpions into the police force, effectively disbanding the unit.

ZIMBABWE: SOUTH AFRICA'S TROUBLED NEIGHBOR

Since the fall of apartheid, South Africa has sought to develop a role as an important regional actor, leading both by economic example and by moral example. But over the past decade, this position has been caught up in the politics of its neighbor Zimbabwe.

Like South Africa, Zimbabwe (formerly known as Rhodesia) is a former British colony in which a small white elite once dominated the black majority. Just as the African National Congress (ANC) fought a guerrilla campaign against the South African government, in Zimbabwe a movement known as Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe, struggled to end white rule. After years of violent conflict, the government agreed to open elections in 1980, which ZANU won. As in South Africa, the transition from white rule was predicated on allowing the white minority to maintain its economic domination over the country. Unlike South Africa, however, the transition led to conflict among different indigenous African ethnic groups and thousands of deaths.

The ZANU victory served as an inspiration for South Africans opposed to apartheid. Over time, however, it also became a more negative example. During the 1980s, ZANU (merged with its main rival, the Patriotic Front, to become ZANU-PF) consolidated power in the hands of the party and President Mugabe. Economic mismanagement and corruption followed, undermining political authority. In the late 1990s, as public opposition grew, a new party rose to challenge ZANU-PF, known as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Fearing the MDC and seeking to shore up his own authority, Mugabe turned on both the MDC and the white landowners, who controlled most of the farmland in Zimbabwe. Mugabe encouraged his supporters to seize white-owned land and to harass and kill members of the MDC. The international community condemned these tactics, but Mugabe dismissed the criticism as the machinations of imperialist oppressors.

The South African government, however, took a different position. President Thabo Mbeki and the ANC expressed its support for Mugabe even in the face of increasing repression, and the South African government extended financial support when the rest of the international community had withdrawn its aid. In 2005, Zimbabwe held parliamentary elections that were widely regarded as rigged. Yet the South African government declared the

elections free and fair, as it had done in response to similar elections in 2002. After Mugabe refused to accept his apparent defeat in the 2008 presidential elections, Mugabe inisted on a second round of elections and again began to harass the oppposition. In response, South Africa's government continued to advocate constructive engagement and quiet diplomacy and appeared to many to be coddling Mugabe.[30] When the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the second round of presidential elections because of state-sponsored violence against his party, South Africa opposed United Nations sanctions against its neighbor.

South Africa has long received immigrants from its poorer neighbors, and the flow increased after the end of apartheid. The crisis in neighboring Zimbabwe resulted in the arrival of hundreds of thousands of new immigrants: an estimated 3 million to 5 million who reside mostly in South Africa illegally, and who find employment in the informal sector. The growing visibility of immigrants has caused resentment among South Africans, and in 2008 a wave of anti-immigrant violence shocked the nation. Dozens of immigrants were killed, and foreign-owned shops were destroyed.[31]

Why would democratic South Africa coddle a neighboring dictatorship? Different factors may be at work. Some observers argue that the ANC and the ZANU-PF share a bond in the struggle against white rule. Both have since chafed at what they see as the lecturing of the international community, a reaction that also characterized Mbeki's intransigence on AIDS. Others emphasize that the South African government, concerned about the complete breakdown of authority in Zimbabwe, would rather back Mugabe than face chaos on its border.

But the South African government's position is not shared by everyone in the ANC. The COSATU has strongly supported the MDC and condemned Mbeki's support, whereas such national figures as Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu have called for Mugabe to step down and have indirectly or directly challenged ANC policies on the matter.

THE DEVASTATION OF HIV/AIDS

It is estimated that nearly 12 percent of South Africans over the age of two are HIV positive, one of the highest rates in the world, and some 600 South Africans die of the disease every day. Despite increasing access to affordable drugs, most of those infected will die of the disease. Besides being a human and social tragedy, this situation will and already has had huge consequences for the economy. The AIDS pandemic will cut an estimated 5 percent from South African GDP growth each year over the next ten years. The health-care system is underfunded and grossly inadequate, and corporations are increasingly wary of investing in personnel, given the mortality odds facing their employees. Compounding this problem is a high degree of stigma attached to those with AIDS, as well as the questionable handling of the issue by Thabo Mbeki and other ANC politicians: They questioned the causal link between HIV and AIDS and resisted conventional drugs and drug protocols prescribed in the West, citing scientifically dubious theories and charging the West with racist views of African sexuality. Pressure from international and domestic activist groups and from Nelson Mandela (whose son died of AIDS) is slowly raising awareness and the level of treatment, but treatment remains limited in the face of this devastating epidemic.[32]

Only in 2003 did the government develop a comprehensive strategy to test and treat those affected. Mbeki's firing of deputy health minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, who played a major role in changing government AIDS policy, raised new doubts about the president's commitment to fighting the epidemic. Madlala-Routledge was fired because she traveled to an international AIDS conference without government permission.

NOTES

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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

African National Congress (ANC) South Africa's major anti-apartheid liberation movement, and the governing party since the return of democracy in 1994.

African Union (AU) An organization of African nations pursuing greater political and economic integration across the continent.

Afrikaans The language of South Africa's Dutch settlers (Afrikaners).

Afrikaners White South Africans who speak Afrikaans and are descendants of the Dutch, French, and German colonists.

apartheid The Afrikaner-dominated racist authoritarian regime in South Africa that was in power from 1948 to 1994.

Bantustans Tribal homelands established by the apartheid regime to deprive the black majority of South African citizenship.

Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) South Africa's affirmative action program that aims to create a new class of black owners and management through a series of quotas and targets.

Boers Term describing the early Dutch settlers in South Africa; also used to describe Afrikaners.

Boer Wars Epic battle between the Boers and the British that culminated in the defeat of the Afrikaners and their integration into the Union of South Africa.

colored Widely used term in South Africa to describe citizens of mixed race, largely concentrated in and around Capetown.

Congress of the People (COPE) A new South African political party formed by defectors from the ANC.

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) South Africa's most important trade union confederation, closely linked to the governing ANC.

de Klerk, F. W. Last president of the apartheid regime; he negotiated the transition to democracy with the ANC.

Democratic Alliance (DA) South Africa's main opposition party.

Dutch Reformed Church Conservative protestant church that has historically been central to Afrikaner culture.

Great Trek Epic migration of Afrikaners into the interior of South Africa to escape British colonization.

Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Program (GEAR) The 1996 liberal macroeconomic structural adjustment plan that moved the ANC toward a more market-friendly political policy.

Group Areas Act Centerpiece of apartheid legislation that divided South Africans into four racial categories and required strict segregation of housing along racial lines.

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) Small Zulu political party that is currently party of the opposition to the ANC.

Mandela, Nelson Long-imprisoned leader of the ANC who became South Africa's first post-apartheid president.

Mbeki, Thabo South Africa's former two-term president who was forced to resign in 2008 when he failed to win the election as the ANC leader.

National Assembly South Africa's legislature.

National Party (NP) Now defunct party that created apartheid and dominated politics during the apartheid era.

New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) The African Union program that attempts to tie foreign development aid to a commitment to democracy and the rule of law.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) A thirteen-member African regional economic and cooperation community, of which South Africa was a founding member.

Soweto A township created during apartheid to house blacks who were forcibly removed from Johannesburg.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission Post-apartheid body established to document apartheid-era human rights abuses and to give reparations to victims and amnesty to perpetrators who confessed to crimes.

Tutu, Archbishop Desmond Anti-apartheid activist and leader of South Africa's Anglican church who chaired the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Union of South Africa The 1910 name given to the British colony that integrated British and Afrikaner colonists after the Boer Wars.

United Democratic Front (UDF) Unified anti-apartheid coalition created in 1983 from the major black and white opposition groups.

voortrekkers Afrikaner pioneers who migrated into South Africa's interior to escape British colonists.

Zille, Helen Current leader of South Africa's main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance.

Zuma, Jacob Current president.

WEB LINKS

African National Congress **www.anc.org.za**
African Studies Internet Resources: South Africa, Columbia University Libraries **www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/africa/cuvl/SAfr.html**
The Democratic Alliance **www.da.org.za**
Inkatha Freedom Party **www.ifp.org.za**
Institute for Democracy in South Africa **www.idasa.org.za**
Overview of Soweto township **www.soweto.co.za**
South African Government **www.gov.za**
Truth and Reconciliation Report **www.gov.za/reports/2003/trc/index.html**

14 NIGERIA

Head of state and government:
President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua
(since May 29, 2007)

Capital: Abuja

Total land size: 923,768 sq km

Population: 138 million

GDP at PPP: 292.7 billion US$

GDP per capita at PPP: $2,000

Human development index ranking: 158