



# **Police Corruption and Moonlighting in Post-communist States: Comparative View**

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# Backgrounds

- Violence as a valuable economic asset in some societies
- D. North, J. Wallis, B. Weingast. **Violence and Social Orders** (2009): Limited Access Order vs. Open Access Order; Making wealthy by violence; Path to limit violence; Distribution of rent among powerful elite groups; Centralization of means of violence

# Backgrounds (cont.)

- **Modernization theory** (R.Inglehart. Ch.Veltzel): shift from values of survival to self-expression values
- Inglehart, &Veltzel. Development and Democracy: What We Know about Modernization Today (2009): This new version of modernization theory indicate the democratic peace phenomenon is more due to **cultural changes** linked with modernization than to democracy per se.

# Backgrounds (cont.)

- T.Gerber, S.Mendelson (2008). Public Experiences of Police Violence and Corruption in Contemporary Russia: A Case of Predatory Policing? & R.Weitzer (1995) & O.Marenin (1985)
- *Professional police (“functionalist” model)*
- *Police of “divided society”*
- *Predatory police*

# Powerful elite groups in the Limited access order

Different type of resources	Administrative resources	Economic resources	Violent resources
Administrative resources	X	Entrepreneurship of officials	Managing of violent actions by law enforcement agencies against competitors
Economic resources	“Corruption” buying of the posts	X	Paying for violent actions against competitors
Violent resources	Violent take-over of the posts	Violent entrepreneurship	X

# Global Peace Index

- 1 Iceland 1.148
- 53 **Bulgaria** 1.845
- 93 **Kazakhstan** 2.137
- 147 **Russia** 2.966
- 153 Somalia 3.379
- 23 indicators: Number of jailed population per 100,000 people; Level of violent crime; Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP etc.

# Aim of this study

- To examine how resource of violence converts into economic assets. In other words to understand how police develops economic activity and makes money at the market. Including:
- Analysis of this phenomenon in three transformation countries from the unified methodological standpoint; to compare country situations; to reveal common and special features; to analyze socioeconomic machinery of this activity; to evaluate perspectives and to elaborate some lines for reforming.

# Principal research tasks of the Project

- To reveal list of actual economic activities and compare by countries
- To evaluate approx. size of the “market” in each country; to estimate the distribution of incomes and to study special institutions for this
- To reveal “social machinery” – system of legal, economic, political, organizational and moral factors supporting these economic activities – common as well as special for each country incl. analysis of the specificity of the police’ economic activities at various levels
- To describe principal consequences of police’ economic activities for criminal situation and security, economic (incl. doing business) and political system



# Stages of the Project

- Preparatory stage (2009)
- Interviews with police officers in three countries (2010)
- Questionnaire survey and economic experiments (2011)
- Economic experiments, (cont.) interviews (cont.), survey in Georgia (?) and Writing up (2012)

# Countries

- **Bulgaria**
- **Kazakhstan**
- **Russia**
- Tanzania – study was failed
- Hope to add Georgia

# **“Economic activity” of police**

Extracting income from the market. There are two big sections inside economic activities of police:

- Conventional activity
- Unconventional activity

# **Samples of conventional economic activities**

- Second jobs (body guard, taxi driver)
- Teaching
- Arts and sciences
- Individual entrepreneurship (mostly retail trade)
- Attraction of sponsors

# **Samples of unconventional economic activities**

- Institutional entrepreneurship
- Lobbying laws to create new markets for police economic activities
- Paid duties
- Services for businesspeople
- Bribes
- Patronage of business entities
- Violent takeover of businesses
- Violent takeover of private apartments
- Opening/stopping criminal files
- Sales of datasets and other professional information
- Services for criminal groups
- Kidnapping, assassinations, drug dealership, smuggling, etc.

# Principal working hypothesis

There will be revealed **two various situations**:

- In spite of current economic activities institute of police carry out its main function providing social order and keeping professional ethics;
- There are embedded economic activities and police works as business entity often ignoring general population, providing services for business and political bodies. There is closed “pyramid” of distribution of incomes

# Specific projects in Russia

- Structure and mechanism of the informal economic activities of the policemen (Leonid Kosals)
- Position of the policemen: material well-being and lifestyle (Denis Strebkov)
- Price of the police services (Elena Berdysheva)
- Income of the policemen: wages vs. informal payments (Tatiana Karabchuk)
- Individual values and group norms in the regulation of the police informal economic activities (Anastasia Dubova)
- Police-business relations (Maria Kravtsova)
- Experiments on propensity to police corruption and moonlighting (Henrik Egbert, Alexis Belianin & Leonid Kosals)

# Studies done in 2010-2011

- Questionnaire survey of police officers in Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Russia - 2011
- Series of interview done in three countries - 2010
- Survey of high ranked police officers in Moscow region, 368 complete questionnaires (managed by Ilia Gorelov, MA student) - 2010
- Economic experiments with Russian students and police people - 2011



# Questionnaire survey of police officers in Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Russia - 2011

- Russia – 450 questionnaires
- Kazakhstan – 450
- Bulgaria – 500
- Total: 1400
- Regional differentiation: various regions of the country; big, medium-sized and small cities (no rural areas)

# Scale of the informal economic activity (estimation)

- **Russia:** there is 36% of the police officers polled have additional income.
  - It was 42% ten years ago
  - Conclusion: there is no significant change during last decade in Russia
- **In Kazakhstan: 29%**
- **In Bulgaria this is 25% now**

# Widespread (occur) activities,%

	Russia	Kazakhstan	Bulgaria
Low-skilled employee	34	23	31
Violent take-over of businesses	21	15	17
Foundations under police departments	36	16	19
Entrepreneurship	55	51	34
Opening/stopping criminal files	36	31	20
Sales of datasets and other professional information	23	20	24
Payment to officer in lieu of penalty	55	32	25
Mediation in business-conflicts	28	19	19
Private investigation	49	21	20
Security for business	44	25	22

# Material well-being (est), %

Income estimations	Russia	Kazakhstan	Bulgaria
Not enough money for food	1	3	8
Enough for food, not enough for clothes	9	24	37
Not enough for household appliances	38	32	35
Not enough for new car	43	17	9
Not enough for new home, apartment	5	5	1
Can buy new home, apartment	1	4	1
Hard to answer	3	15	9

# Trust of population to police

- There is obvious overestimation of this trust at the side of the police
- Comparison of the answers of police on question about their idea whether people trust police in their city and people answers on question about their trust to police (ESS, 2010) – 10 point scale, from 0 (no trust) to 10 – full trust.
- Russia: people 3,5 < 5,6 police
- Bulgaria: people 3,8 < 5,5 police
- Kazakhstan: people ? 5,6 police

# Changes in work during last year: excess positive or negative estimations - Russia

- **Significantly better (near 20%)**
  - Opportunities to vocational training
  - Wages
  - Career promotion
- **Slightly better (near 5-10%)**
  - Relations with colleagues
  - Relations with boss
  - Image of police in media
- **No changes actually**
  - Working conditions (cars, computers, etc.)
  - Attitudes people towards police
  - Social benefits

# Changes in work during last year: excess positive or negative estimations

- Slightly worse
  - Regime of work
  - Opportunities for decision-making
  - System of evaluation
  - Opportunity to keep post
  - Insecurity in duties
- Significantly worse
  - Extra-jobs
  - Paper-work, reporting
  - Working load

# Reform of police, Russia - I

- There was no real reforms purposed to change the systemic traits of Russian police:
  - Extra-centralization and militarization
  - Opaqueness
  - Commercialization
- There was Law on police and measures on centralization, more control and discipline, staff reduction



# Reform of police - 2

- **Positive estimation**
  - Hiring per open competition
  - More severe control and discipline
  - Higher wages
  - Social security
  - Personnel appraisal
- **Negative estimation**
  - Personnel reduction

# Reform of police – 3: Who was fired?

- Those who
  - Clerks 20%
  - Served people (beat cops, etc.) 19%
  - Making provisions 15%
  - Making analytical job 10%
  - Making managerial job 8%
  - No reduction (or only “empty”) 40%
  - Don’t know 17%

# Reform of police – 4:

## Expectation on further changes

- **Optimism about**
  - Increase of professional competence
  - Purposing of police system on the interests of population
  - Centralization of control over police system
  - Providing order during parliament and president elections

# Reform of police – 5:

## Expectation on further changes

- **No optimism about**
  - Reduction of corruption in the police system
  - Recruiting of senior police officers loyal to authorities
  - Better serving of interests of politicians and political system

# Conclusion

- Informal ec. activities: highly presented in all polled transformation countries, both conventional and unconventional
- Informal ec. activities: the highest in Russia, than Kazakhstan, than Bulgaria
- This is the same for estimations of material well-being
- Police overestimate trust of population to police

# Russian police - reform

According to answers on questionnaire it is possible to expect:

- Continuity in general of the current social contract between police and authorities (relative autonomy of the police enjoying making money at the market in exchange on service of the political needs of the authorities)
- Some flaws in this contract because of lack of loyalty of police officers