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FACTORS OF POST-SOCIALIST STATENESS

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FACTORS OF POST-SOCIALIST STATENESS

Stateness is the capacity of the state to exercise its fundamental functions. The collapse of the socialist system prompted the former USSR countries to ‘re-invent’ their stateness. The paper focuses on factors that impede or smooth stateness transformations in post-socialist countries. First, the paper examines internal and external factors of state formation in our selected countries. Next, it introduces empirical research vehicles and empirical findings that present alternative patterns of stateness and outcomes of state formation. The paper concludes with a detailed review of certain cases that may be considered prototypes of state formation for the post-Soviet countries.

Keywords: stateness, statehood, state efficiency, socialist states, post-socialist transit, new independent states, post-communism, democracy, regime transformations, state formation, nation building.

JEL Classification: Y80
Introduction

Our research covers twenty-eight post-socialist states. They are fifteen post-Soviet republics, five countries of Central Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia), seven polities of the Balkan area (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia) and Mongolia. This selection of cases displays specific blends of similar and dissimilar factors that influenced their stateness. Our research questions are the following:

- What are the trends of consolidating stateness in post-socialist countries?
- How should stateness of post-socialist countries be described and measured?
- What factors impede or smooth the progress of stateness transformations in post-socialist countries?

This paper clarifies conceptual variables of stateness and statehood. An overview of vital aspects of socialist and post-socialist state formation is followed by our empirical research. We begin by examining internal and external factors of state formation in our selected countries. We then discuss options for measuring stateness and introduce our empirical research vehicles and the related hypotheses. Finally, we present empirical findings, alternative patterns of stateness, and outcomes of state formation. The paper concludes with a detailed review of certain cases that may be considered prototypes of state formation for this group of countries.

Conceptual Variables of Stateness and Statehood

Words like (the) state, statehood and stateness are not fixed and clear-cut concepts, but conceptual variables (Nettl 1968). They are umbrella categories that denote different phenomena or units of observation. They also connote or signify our changeable perceptions of the equally unsettled phenomena (Ильин 2008). We use the word state to refer to a variety of totally dissimilar polities. There are giant federations (USA, Russia, India, Brazil) and unitary powers (China, UK, Japan). There are secular France and clerical Iran, unique Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft (Swiss Mutual Pledge Camaraderie) with its assembly-independent system (Shugart & Carey 1992), a host of US-modeled presidential republics of Latin America, etc.

All of these different entities must be conceptualized differently. But their conceptualization is not arbitrary. As John Peter Nettl suggested, it must be based on definite parameters of conceptual variability. While accepting the state as a conceptual variable, we also have to acknowledge that statehood and stateness are conceptual variables as well. In other words, the properties of stateness, defined as the ability of states to fulfill their basic functions, fluctuate from state to state.
We define states and stateness in a dual way. On the one hand, we introduce an understanding of these terms that is shared by all the countries in the sample. On the other hand, we recognize that variability from country to country, and from one stage of development to another, has to be recognized as well. In other words, there is a broad and ‘universal’ range of comprehension of states and stateness that is valid for all the cases. But within this range we deduce ‘specific’ visions of states and stateness for a country or a group of countries that undergo a process of transformation. To do this, we examine the external conditions of formation and development of the post-socialist polities that caused similarities and differences between these countries and provided the conceptual basis of the project.

The development of the selected states is strongly influenced by the contemporary international context, as the international system contributed to the success of the state form of power organization over other forms of organization (Spruyt 1994). The international system established in the 20th century was based on the practices of European states, which were gradually supplemented by the norms of political regimes, human rights, etc. These rules, which were considered as criteria and obligations for the new states, were inevitably Eurocentric (Tilly 1975: 637-638). The proposed international standards and norms and each country’s existing institutional heritage interacted in unique ways that either facilitated or hindered the emergence of territorial polities. The most common characteristics of states include production and circulation of public goods and control of coercive violence.

In our project we used two words, statehood and stateness, to characterize essential properties of states and their institutional development (Ильин 2008). Stateness and statehood reflect two different aspects of being a state. Statehood connotes the statutory properties of a state consequential to its recognition by other states and by its own citizenry. Stateness conveys the idea of state compliance with its own status and statehood or its capacity to fulfill its functions and withstand the expectations of fellow states and its own citizenry.

Statehood primarily, though not exclusively, refers to polities’ places in the coordination network, in other words to their foreign-policy characteristics, while stateness refers to the state’s own, mostly domestic political capabilities. However, statehood has its own internal aspects, while stateness has its external features. At the same time, stateness and statehood are very closely linked characteristics of a state. It should be recognized that a high degree of polity efficiency and consolidation is one of the most important factors in gaining of status in the family of nations. External and internal recognition of a state is vital for empirical operationalization. Perhaps the only clear criterion for external recognition is membership in the United Nations. In internal recognition, it is important whether the population consents to
the state’s ‘founding questions’ (the nature of the state and nation, the criteria for membership in the nation, etc.) and the specificity of political identification.

Our major analytical tool is stateness, defined here as a capacity of the state to exercise its fundamental functions as well as to meet the practical implications of its recognition as a member of a state community or communities. On that basis and taking into account a few existing examples of conceptual and empirical operationalizations of stateness (for example Bartolini 2000; Bartolini 2007; Fritz 2007), we have chosen a limited number of correlated indicators because the concept we are studying has no direct or unique empirical equivalent. This is also due to gaps in data.

The evaluation of stateness and its various aspects (state capacity, state efficiency, administrative performance etc.) has been highly problematic ever since the introduction of the concept by John Peter Nettl (Nettl 1968). His scale describing its level of intensity, ranging from the prototype model of *stateness* (Germany and France) to *statelessness* (US and UK), aimed to prove the variability of the respective parameters rather than serve as a proper empirical research instrument. With all stateness research and important empirical findings to date (Bartolini 2000; Bartolini 2007), the task of measuring stateness and its various aspects (state capacity, state efficiency, administrative performance etc.) has not yet been augmented.

A major factor that complicates the evaluation of stateness is the conceptual and empiric variability of states. If a polity develops a pragmatic operational form to make membership claims in state communities outside and to meet membership claims by the citizenry inside, the very nature of such a form is prone to vary significantly from case to case. The fluctuating abilities of such constantly changing units to fulfill their functions and respond to international and domestic challenges would naturally change the composition and resulting configuration of those abilities. To compare such assemblages, it is necessary to make a gross reduction. One is forced to replace highly individualized and alternating assemblages with a set of standard and hopefully measurable abilities that are common to all respective states.

The concept we are studying and its components have no direct or unique empirical equivalent. For example, there have been several attempts to capture state capacity through, for instance, GDP per capita (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Fearon & Laitin 2003). However, equaling state capacity to GDP per capita impedes addressing the issue of the relationship between them, which is certainly of great academic interest. For this reason, we avoid using any proxy variables to study stateness and look for a measurement model fit for our understanding of the concept’s structure.

As indirect indicators of the size of public goods, we have used the percentage of state revenue and expenditure of the GDP. The indicators of the state’s infrastructural capacity were taken
from the World Bank index (control of corruption and government effectiveness). In addition, we used expert judgment, characterizing the instability of game rules (dynamic of founding constitutional norms), and the use of the state in personal and group purposes (state capture or ‘privatization’ of the state). We have also used the variables that characterize the rule of the state throughout the country (civil war, the presence of paramilitary groups, terrorist acts) and indirectly characterize the public’s consent on ‘founding questions’, e.g. agreement among elite and masses on the fundamentals of the constitutional order as a characteristic of internal recognition of the state. Despite the fact that our sample did not include not recognized or semi-recognized territorial polities, we used variables that indirectly indicated the external recognition and the degree of state control over territorial boundaries.

**Internal and External Factors of State Formation**

The development of post-socialist states is influenced by a number of factors resulting from their common communist past and a set of nation-specific factors. They were shaped by center-periphery polarity.

The political arena is a space of ‘political production’ of common goods and redistribution of guaranteed rights by individual states. Thus, state-building is a process of consolidation of centers and borders of different kinds (political, judicial, cultural, economic etc.). Any discrepancies regarding borders allow states to realize their ‘exit’ options to the prejudice of ‘voice’ (Hirshman 1970) and reduction of the scope of ‘political production’ (Bartolini 2007).

As empirical research of the European experience has shown, the existence of many ‘internal’ centers or intense relationships with ‘external’ centers had complicated the state-building process. That is why the first factors that we use in our research are the quantity and characters of internal and external centers and the level of tension in relationships between centers and peripheries.

The importance of these factors results from the fact that most post-socialist countries have emerged from the disintegration of larger states (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia etc.). Some of these have had features of an imperial power organization. Moreover, the majority of post-socialist countries have been included in other states or depended on them until the end of the 19th century or the First World War.

New independent states of the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav space had to resolve problems of consolidation of their territorial, ethnic, cultural, political borders and strengthening of the centers of new polities. The former historical centers of empires to which new independent states belonged previously are still centers of influence. Their authorities tended to affect the
development of zones of their traditional influence by offering economic and cultural links, helping national minorities, etc.

The deconsolidation of borders in new independent post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian states has been shaped by administrative-territorial organization in the USSR and SFRY and their national politics. Due to repression and resettlement of ethnic groups, policies of indigenization (korenizatsiya), and positive discrimination of titular ethnic groups in USSR in national Soviet republics or arbitrary determination of ethnic borders of republics in Yugoslavia, the new independent states have had mixed populations prone to disagree on ‘founding questions’. Those disagreements were coupled with intensified regional and ethnic antagonisms (Meleshkina 2010; Мелешкина 2010). Other post-socialist countries experienced independent development in the interwar period. However, not all the issues of forming states and building nations were resolved in that period. These problems were partially preserved in the communist era and have sharpened after the disintegration of the socialist camp. From this perspective, the existence of many centers competing in influence in the internal political process is a factor complicating the consolidation of boundaries and the achievement of agreement on ‘founding questions’.

Due to the complications involved in expert evaluation of the competitive centers’ quantity and intensity of competition between them, we decided to use an index of ethnic fragmentation. It has been calculated according to Herfindahl’s formula and based on statistical data (Alesina et al. 2003: 159). This index indirectly indicates the existence and share of national minorities potentially capable of representing the interests of external centers. We suppose that a high level of fragmentation would complicate the state-building process in the post-socialist countries, with their weak tradition of representative institutions and democratic governance.

An important factor influencing state-building is a country’s tradition of stateness. The majority of post-socialist countries are polities with a problematic history of independent existence. We have tried to take this into account. However, we have taken into consideration different forms of shaping state traditions. As Philip Roeder has convincingly shown, the existence of ‘segment-states’ in the compound states has been a key factor determining the success of secession (Roeder 2007). For many post-Soviet countries, their development in the USSR as subjects of federation was a necessary condition for future independent existence in their contemporary borders. This experience promoted the formation of infrastructural bases and traditions of government, as well as the shaping of limits of political communities. In polities that had the experience of independent state-building in their contemporary borders, the conditions of state development were more favorable than in other countries. The same is true
for other post-socialist states that had the experience of independent development during the interwar period and after the Second World War.

We have scored state tradition between 1920 and 1990 on a scale from 0 to 2. We have given 2 for one year of independent existence and 1 for existence as a segment-state. We have given 0 to the polities that existed neither as segment-states nor as independent states or had lost their state institutes and autonomy under fascist occupation.

One more important factor is the international context, including participation of states in integration and influence of international norms and practices on internal political development. For example, membership or candidacy in the European Union has been very important for determination of character and results of state-building (Galbreath 2005). We have used an expert evaluation of ‘adaptation to external audit’ and a four-point scale to evaluate this factor. 1 indicates the absence of the attribute and 4 indicates the highest level of manifestation of the attribute.

The influence of the international environment and its norms and requests raise the question of how institutes of modern state in post-socialist polities adopt to them. The success of this adoption depends on the institutional legacy of these countries. Institutional legacy, including different forms of power organization, causes differences between countries. As Eric Hobsbaum has noted, some institutional practices remain stable even in case of dramatic external events such as wars, revolutions, etc. (Hobsbaum 1997: 209-210).

It is difficult to formalize institutional legacy using appropriate hard data. That is why we have examined the character of institutional reforms, a factor that indirectly demonstrates institutional legacy. This factor could be very influential during periods of political changes and at ‘critical junctures’ (disintegration of states, regime change, wars etc.) where indeterminacy increases and actors are motivated to make institutional changes. We have supposed that any institutional change increases the gap between formal and informal norms. However, the level and duration of contradictions as well as the possibility of overcoming them are both related to reform strategies. Closing the gap between formal and informal norms was often considered an optimal reform strategy.

One reform strategy involves radical change of old institutions, systems of government, and rules from the socialist period. This strategy assumes significant resource investments and transactional expenses in the beginning. However, this strategy can decrease costs for overcoming contradictions between old and new institutions in the future.

Another strategy includes preservation of succession between old and new institutions. This strategy assumes the economy of resources for reform and formation of a new system of government and normative base. This strategy promotes decreasing transactional costs at the
beginning as actors follow former understandable and usual norms. However, contradictions between old institutes and new requirements may emerge. This may increase the gap between formal and informal norms, uncertainty, and transactional costs.

The worst variant for state-building is inconsistent institutional reforms. The coexistence of old and new norms, rules, and mechanisms that often contradict each other further uncertainty between formal and informal norms and procedures. This situation may persuade actors to utilize these contradictions in order to achieve their personal or collective goals.

As an empirical indicator of the character of reforms, we have used the average annual index of reforms calculated by Timothy Frye on the basis of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development data (Frye 2010: 77).

One more factor is the amount of a country’s resources that can be invested in government system formation and/or reforms (Pierson 2000). This factor is especially important for transitional countries, especially for new independent republics. The disintegration of old institutional structures in post-socialist countries has occurred when new state centers experienced resource deficiencies. The collapse of the USSR and socialist camp has been accompanied by economic difficulties, crises, and the breakdown of governmental infrastructures. These conditions have been unfavorable for state infrastructural capacity because the formation of a new governmental system demands many resources. In our research, we have used GDP per capita as an indicator of resources.

One of the influential factors is consolidation of political regime. Such factors as confidence in the stability of rules of the game, orientation to receiving long-term benefits, and existence of checks on arbitrary use of the state apparatus for personal or narrow group goals are very important for perspective of formation of modern state and for formalization and standardization of rules of game.

Regardless of its nature, a consolidated regime is likely to impel actors toward long-term subsistence and adjustment to existing rules. Clear and stable rules motivate actors to invest in public goods that can provide long-term benefits.

An unconsolidated political regime is marked by the absence of agreement among actors about rules of the game and power configuration. It is also characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Thus this regime promotes orientations mostly toward immediate material and political benefits. As a result, government structure may be used for personal or narrow group interests including combating political opponents. The phenomena of ‘state capture’ (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann 2009) hinder standardization, unification, and depersonalization of rules and practices. In this case, the state ceases to be an ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans 1995).
Both democratic and autocratic consolidated regimes have their own risks. An autocratic regime depends on the qualities of the autocrat, his understanding of the political process, and his intentions. There is often a danger of state capture by one person and his immediate environment. A democratic regime has a potential danger of populist promises for electoral victory (Fritz 2007). Nevertheless, one cannot compare these dangers to those of unconsolidated regimes.

As an indicator of political regime consolidation, we have used values of the Polity IV project, which includes valuations of our countries in both the 1990s and 2000s.

**Methods and Data**

As we have noted before, the concept we are studying have no direct or unique empirical equivalent. That is why we consider stateness as a latent variable that can be measured with correlated indicators. This latent variable encompasses several dimensions inherent in stateness. However, we do not impose strong theoretical restrictions on our model and follow an ‘exploratory track’ in its measurement. We do not impose a given structure of stateness. On the contrary, we let the data reveal the structure of stateness by extracting principal components from the whole set of state capacity indicators. There as many factors extracted as Kaiser’s rule (Kaiser 1960) suggests.

With the structure of the concept suggested by the dataset, we provide its theory-driven development and carry out principal component analysis in ‘confirmatory’ logic. Phrased differently, indicators of state capacity are divided into groups that reflect separate dimensions of the concept according to ‘exploratory’ principal component analysis. Then, the first principal component is extracted from each subgroup. Such a combination of two analytical logics verifies the results and provides for a deeper interaction between data and theory.

Thus, a vector index that reflects the multidimensional nature of state capacity was constructed with separate sub-indices for different aspects of the concept. The principal components in the final index are allowed to be correlated as they are produced separately.

Finally, we did not use structural equation modeling (SEM) here because the majority of methods related to SEM, being flexible and capable of adapting to numerous peculiarities inherent in data, require large datasets. Their application to small-N analysis like ours is both statistically undesirable and technically impossible. For this reason we chose principal component analysis as an alternative. Simulations and studies of asymptotics (Bentler, Kano 1990; Velicer, Jackson 1990; Widaman 1993) show that principal components frequently are proximate, though not identical, to factors extracted in exploratory factor analysis, and principal components are more difficult to generalize on confirmatory factor analysis. But the
main point in using principal component analysis is its low requirement for sample size. This property of the method was crucial for its choice.

The set of indicators subject to principal component analysis was comprised of three types of variables coded for two decades (the 1990s and 2000s):

- Our expert judgments on a 4-point scale (likelihood of secessionism, presence of paramilitary groups, border indeterminacy, territorial claims to the country, aggression towards the country, propensity to civil war, extent of terrorist attacks, ‘privatization’ of the state, consensus on constitutional design fundamentals, and dynamics of founding constitutional norms);
- World Bank indices (government effectiveness and control of corruption from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators); and
- Statistical data (government expense and government revenues as share of GDP which are pooled data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Economy Watch Portal).

The estimation was carried out for two decades jointly. This approach allowed us to analyze dynamics in state capacity, as there were no differences in normalization of the two subsets.

Having revealed the structure of the latent variable and estimated correspondent sub-indices via principal component analysis, we proceeded with building a typology of state capacity. It is based on clustering states in the space of vector indices. Therefore, we treated each state as a point in 3-dimensional space and looked for natural groupings of points. We employed hierarchical cluster analysis with squared Euclidean distance and Ward’s method of agglomeration. The choice of Ward’s method of agglomeration is due to its superiority with respect to other methods of hierarchical clustering (Scheibler and Schneider 1985). Squared Euclidean distance is required when using Ward’s method. After that, the resulting cluster solutions are visualized using both dendrogram and spider-webs (radar charts). The latter are a nice tool for visualizing multidimensional spaces in two-dimensional planes and provide useful information about similarities and differences in stateness of different post-communist countries. If there are any dynamics in stateness in a country through decades, these are caught by spider-webs, as the web’s shape changes from one decade to another.

We also use mean values to single out general tendencies in the influence of factors on state-building in groups of countries and interpretive analysis to show country-specific variations in these factors.

**Patterns of Stateness and Outcomes of State Formation**

The application of principal component analysis in ‘exploratory’ logic reveals three principal components with eigenvalues greater than one (Kaiser’s rule). Thus, we have found three key
aspects of stateness that are further explored in a ‘confirmatory’ way. Table 1 shows results for ‘exploratory’ principal component analysis of stateness indicators with promax rotation. Components have been rotated in order to ease correspondence between ‘exploratory’ and ‘confirmatory’ logics of principal component analysis. Additionally, the orthogonality of components assumed if oblique rotation is not used seems not to be plausible.

The three principal components displayed in Table 1 account for about 76% of the total variance present in the data. This is quite a good result taking into account the diversity of indicators we use in the study. Furthermore, the pattern of factor loadings displays a clear picture of interrelations between the indicators and state capacity dimensions. All loadings less than 0.4 are assumed to be equal to zero and are not presented in Table 1.

Table 1 suggests that the first dimension can be interpreted as a lack of internal integrity or weakness of internal sovereignty. It includes propensity to civil war, consensus on constitutional design fundamentals, presence of paramilitary groups, dynamics of founding constitutional norms, extent of terrorist attacks, and aggregated value of the expenditure (% of GDP), though the latter is much more related to the second dimension. Thus, aggregated value of the expenditure is treated as an indicator of the second dimension when ‘confirmatory’ analysis is done. The set of indicators loading high on the first dimension allows us to treat it as weakness of internal sovereignty. Signs of loadings support such an interpretation. The component takes on high values if a country is highly prone to civil war, is menaced by terrorists, has no stable founding rules, and has no capacity to provide for the state’s monopoly on the use of force (factor loadings are positive). On the contrary, the higher the consensus on constitutional design fundamentals, the lower the component (factor loading is high in absolute value and negative).

The second dimension is treated as infrastructural capacity, as it comprises government expense as share of GDP, ‘privatization’ of the state and two indicators of governance provided by World Bank (control of corruption and government effectiveness). Territorial claims to the country are a variable with low factor loading and are substantively extraneous, so we do not include in the second dimension when ‘confirmatory’ logic is used. Except for territorial claims to the country, the only indicator with negative loading is ‘privatization’ of the state, which reflects an intuitive understanding of how the weakness of the state is linked to its infrastructural capacity.

Finally, the third component consists of four indicators with positive factor loadings. These indicators reflect the likelihood of secessionism, territorial claims to the country, border indeterminacy, and aggression towards the country. This component is interpreted as weakness of external sovereignty.
Confirmatory analysis was then conducted, producing the results given in Table 2. Here, each dimension was captured by a principal component extracted from the corresponding subset of indicators. This algorithm corrects the share of variances accounted for and shows that all three sub-indices are comparable in their explanatory power. The pattern of interrelations between indicators and components remains the same, allowing us to preserve the labeling of components proposed in the ‘exploratory’ analysis. Table 3 displays product-moment correlation coefficients for state capacity sub-indices. First, their absolute values are quite high, implying that orthogonality was correctly refused. Furthermore, the signs of correlation coefficients correspond to our intuitive expectations: that is, infrastructural capacity is negatively related to weakness of sovereignty (both internal and external).

These results provide a natural basis for building a typology of stateness in post-socialist countries, which is done through cluster analysis as described above. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results of cluster analysis with two and four group partitions. We were guided both by the analysis of the dendrogram (Figure 1) and interpretative reasons when deciding how many cluster to identify.

Two-cluster division. Cluster 1 (Table 4) consists of states that we have identified as polities with problematic stateness. This cluster includes Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan in the 1990s. These are generally post-Soviet, with some post-Yugoslavian states and the poorest country of Europe, Albania. Some post-Soviet (Belarus and Baltic states) and post-Yugoslavian countries as well as other states of Eastern Europe appertain to the second cluster, which is composed of states with relatively successful or at least less problematic state-building than in first cluster.

The number of states in cluster 1 in the 2000s is smaller than in the 1990s because some states improved their values of variables of stateness (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine).

Four-cluster division. A more exhaustive vision can be achieved by dividing the countries into four clusters (see Table 5 and Figure 1). In contrast to binary division four clusters have become more homogeneous in stateness characteristics. At the same time, the groups are large enough for substantial interpretation.

Let us begin with cluster 2. Many countries of this cluster are impeded by civil war, secession, or threat of secession. This cluster includes Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine in the 1990s and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Serbia in the 2000s. In this group of countries, secessionist projects have been successful and led to emergence of unrecognized or semi-recognized states. As members of a
single cluster, those countries have common features of stateness that prevail over some other characteristics differentiating those countries.

Cluster 1 (Table 5) consists of states without very serious problems with consolidation of territorial boundaries or coercion monopoly. However, the infrastructural institutional capacity of these countries is not very developed and threats of state capture persist. In the 1990s this cluster includes Albania, Armenia and Asian countries bar Mongolia and Tajikistan. In the 2000s Russia and Tajikistan have joined it while Albania has left it. The changes in the composition of the cluster reflect improvements in Albania, Tajikistan and Russia.

Cluster 4 includes polities that are relatively successful in state-building. These are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia in the 1990s. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have joined in the 2000s. The last three countries have improved characteristics in the 2000s because of their European Union admittance, consistency of reform strategy, and democratic regime consolidation.

Cluster 3 includes countries with some success in state-building: Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, and Romania in the 1990s. They did not experience very serious problems, but some of them remain like the high level of corruption in Ukraine, threat of political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. The change in this cluster in the 2000s is caused by an improving situation in several countries. The Baltic states have become ‘members’ of the ‘club of successful states’. However, some countries have been included in the third cluster in the 2000s (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine).

Two-dimensional four-cluster set. Is there a better-structured and more coherent way to present our clustering? Yes, if we interpret the first and the second step in clustering as inaction of substantive parameters. The first step of dividing our sample into two groups made a very rough distinction between ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’, or rather ‘lucky’ and ‘unlucky’, countries. This distinction is evidently too imprecise. Probably it could be better defined as the opposition between countries with relatively advanced (advantaged, unimpeded) stateness and with deficient (disadvantaged, constrained) stateness. Such an interpretation is less impressionistic and somewhat more lucid.

The second step divides both clusters into two groups. What might be the gist of this division? Feeble stateness mobilization that is both unsteady and staggering is opposed to more resolute one that is persistent and solidifying.

Using this double distinction, we can draw a table based on two dimensions: the first one being advancement-deficiency and the second one feeble-resolute. Let us make the first one into a vertical column of a table and code it by A and D. Then the second one would make a horizontal row and be coded by F and R. Within the table, our four clusters could be coded
respectively as 1 – DR, 2 – DF, 3 – AF and 4 – AR. Each cluster would fit a cell of Table 6.

The two-dimensional four-cluster set helps to better visualize and comprehend states’ ‘migrations’ or rather the upgrading or downgrading of their stateness from the 1990s to 2000s. In Table 9 the states that ‘moved’ are marked in bold with arrows showing the direction of the change (↑, → or ↑ ←). The last ‘double arrows’ symbol denotes Albania’s contradictory trek from DR in the 1990s to FA in the 2000s. In all other cases there is a clear upgrading of stateness. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine move up from DF to AF. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania move right from AF to AR. Finally, Russia and Tajikistan also move right from DF to DR. As a result the ‘worst’ lower-left cell of DF has decreased from 8 members in the 1990s to 4 in the 2000s (in fact, even to 3, since Serbia is addressed only in the 2000s). The ‘best’ higher-right cell of AR has also increased from 5 to 8 members. The intermediate and ‘transitory’ AF and DR cells retain their size, albeit not their composition (Table 6).

**Radar charts (spider-webs) for individual states.** Distinctive and even unique configurations of stateness profiles for individual countries of our sample are provided with the help of three-dimensional radar charts comprising (1) infrastructural capacity alongside (2) internal sovereignty and (3) external sovereignty.

Such radar charts present the crucial dimensions and resulting configuration of stateness in a visual way. The very size of the ensuing figure is informative. The smaller it is, the more rudimentary is an individual stateness, and the other way around. The closer is the figure to the limits of the background triangle, the more confirmed and full-fledged is the stateness of a country.

The shape of a figure is also informative. Since the triangle is formed clock-wise by three respective angles, the one down-and-left highlights internal sovereignty, the one at the top brings to light infrastructural capacity and the one down-and-right draws attention to external sovereignty.

It is no wonder that configurations of individual spider-webs of the countries that make up a cluster of A-D-F-R coded groups look fairly similar. Let us review the groups as they stand in the 2000s.

The AR group for advanced and resolute stateness is made up of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The triangles we see are rather large and balanced. The Czech one is nearly maximal both for the 1900s and 2000s. Hungarian stateness looks very much the Czech triangle in the 1990s but shrinks at the down-and-right corner (internal sovereignty or consolidation of the state) in the 2000s. Polish stateness is nearly maximal and steady with very minor reduction at the top (infrastructural capacity) and negligible increase of internal sovereignty down-and-right. The Slovak triangle is
very much like the Polish one and is extremely steady with virtually no change from one decade to another. Finally, Slovenia is pictured by a virtually absolute triangle with small but ultimate progress in both kinds of sovereignty.

A specific sub-group is made of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Their triangles for the 2000s are approaching perfect ones, but their growth is evident compared to the 1990s. While the Lithuanian one moved in all directions, Latvia and Estonia enhanced internal sovereignty and infrastructural capacity.

Next, the AF group of advanced but feeble and staggering stateness brings together Belarus, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Mongolia, and Romania as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine. Their triangles for the 2000s are also large and solid but visibly ‘flattened’ with obtuse angles at the top. Their institutional capacity is relatively less advanced. Novices to the league clearly show an extraordinary increase. Particularly impressive is the success story of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It boosted stateness from a tiny and practically negligible triangle with some infrastructural capacity but with neither internal nor external sovereignty to a fairly solid and well-based triangle. Ukraine also extended the figure of its stateness but mainly in the right-and-down direction. Croatia’s progress is very similar to the Bosnian example but is somewhat less radical.

Albania could have stood out in the group due to the odd curve of ‘migration’ from the 1990s to 2000s, but its initial right-and-down pointed shape of stateness developed into a triangle typical of the group.

The DR group of deficient but resolute stateness includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as well as Russia and Tajikistan. Their triangles are visibly more ‘leveled’ and obtuse then those of the other transitory AF group. The triangles for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are probably prototypical of the group. The shapes of novices Russia and Tajikistan are pointed down-and-right towards external sovereignty, but have nothing like the solidity of the prototypical shapes of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. They are smaller and their shapes for the 1990s and 2000s noticeably differ.

The triangle of Kyrgyz Republic clearly stands out. It has shrunk from the 1990s to 2000s and pointed more sharply down-and-right.

The most problematic DF group of deficient, feeble, and staggering stateness includes four countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Serbia. They are all down-and-left pointed (Georgia changed its down-and-right incline of the 1990s for down-and-left of the 2000s) not because of great internal security, but rather due to the relative weakness of the other two parameters. The figures themselves are rather small, particularly that of Azerbaijan. The Moldovan triangle looks comparatively bigger as well as the Serbian one.
Thus, spider-webs for individual states visually show that with all the variance and diversity of stateness patterns, distances calculated clusters can also be supported by triangular images of radar charts.

**Factors of Stateness**

Factors influencing stateness of post-socialist countries vary in different national contexts. Nevertheless, we try to reveal some generic tendencies common to the majority of countries under study through comparing mean values of factors within identified clusters. More advanced statistical methods (like multiple regression analysis) are not, however, used because of power considerations (small-N sample).

A picture corroborating our initial expectations emerges from Table 7. Means for the second cluster are somewhat higher for international adaptation, GDP per capita, years of independent stateness, regime indicator, and intensity of institutional reforms and are lower for ethnic fragmentation and Gini index. These findings are stable over decades and statistically significant. We tested significance of differences in means with both a t-test and a Mann-Whitney U-test. Though the latter compares two distributions rather than testing means directly, it is nonparametric and does not require normality. It also has good power properties in small samples. As both tests give similar results with respect to statistical significance of differences, we give t-test results substantive interpretation.

Table 7 shows that on average, the level of social and national fragmentation within the first cluster is higher than in the second one. As we have already noted, it is one of the causes of fundamental disagreement between elites and citizens, as well as political instability. On average, states from the first cluster have fewer resources for institutional transformation and reforms. They have a less developed tradition of independent stateness. They are not as receptive to international norms and audits. Nor did they implement radical and consistent institutional reforms. Their mean value allow us to treat them as unconsolidated regimes (or anocracies according to Policy IV). Meanwhile, states from the second cluster tend to have a democratic regime with a high annual average score on the institutional reforms measure. There is, of course, some individual variation among our cases, but the tendency seems to be clear.

Since the composition of clusters changes over decades, it is worth highlighting some differences between the 1990s and 2000s. Table 7 indicates an increasing gap in the mean value of GDP per capita, international adaptation, years of independent stateness, and political regime indicator between the two clusters identified. This may evidence long-term and/or deferred effects of these factors. At the same time, a higher level of ethnic fragmentation and a lower mean for independent stateness tradition are found in cluster 2 in the 2000s. This can be
explained by changes in cluster composition and inclusion of new states in the second cluster (though these differences observed over decades are not statistically significant).

The variance in factors influencing state formation can be supported by examples of three ‘prototype’ groups of post-Soviet countries.

The first group consists of the Baltic states. Here, relatively consolidated political regimes have been formed, and deep institutional reforms have been implemented. These countries have been included in the European Union. The influence of the former imperial center (Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin) is relatively weak in Lithuania and compensated by policies of exclusion of national minorities in Latvia and Estonia. That helped consolidation of political communities and promoted state-building.

These countries have used their interwar experience in legitimization of state authorities, lawmaking, and creation of institutes of governance. For example, Latvia and Estonia have declared constitutional succession. Baltic states have revived some government bodies that existed before the Second World War. Such a government body was the State Control (supreme audit institution) that emerged in 1919. There are more questions in the competence of this body in comparison with some other post-Soviet countries (for example, in Ukraine). It controls expenses and incomes, traces the results of privatization, and inspects all organizations disposing of state funds, including the central bank and enterprises with large state share of investment. The use of interwar state-building allowed states to decrease the costs of ‘invention’, adoption, and legitimization of new government bodies and to promote the effectiveness of public administration.

The impact of civil consensus about rules of the game and of regime consolidation on the formation of an effective government system can be demonstrated using the example of Lithuania. In this country there are no influential political forces that have opposed or now oppose independence of the republic or change of the democratic political regime. There is no dramatic disagreement of the people about the nature of the state. There are few ethnic minorities and a moderate nationalizing policy has promoted the absence of serious ethnic conflicts. The existence of institutes of democratic accountability and their relatively acceptable quality has had a beneficial effect for state functioning and development. The entry of Lithuania into the European Union has been accompanied by reprises des engagements and requirements for an internal audit system in ministries, state agencies and by formation of an audit committee in Seim, etc.

In spite of some difficulties, including corruption and the population’s low level of trust toward political institutes, the development of Lithuanian state is evaluated as quite satisfactory (Fritz 2007). For example, according to Transparency International, Lithuania has improved its rate in
the beginning of 2000s. In 2000 the situation remain stable (the 1999 Transparency; Corruption 2011).

We can also identify the positive influence of EU admittance and the beginning of democracy consolidation in Estonia and Latvia. Besides this, the most radical government and social-economic reforms have been implemented in Estonia. The totality of these factors has promoted the success of state-building, which has been reflected in its high level in international ratings.

The second group includes Moldova and Ukraine. These countries have had a succession of unconsolidated political regimes, a high level of influence of external and internal centers, an inconsistent strategy of institutional reforms, and large contradictions between formal and informal institutions. They have made relatively little progress in state-building. State capture and use of the state apparatus for struggle with political opponents is widespread.

Moldova is an example of the influence of competition between different centers on internal political life including state-building. Three type of centers tended to affect Moldova: old imperial centers (Moscow and Bucharest), various internal centers (Kishinev, Tiraspol, and Comrat) and a relatively new external center (European Union). Competition between these centers has led to the emergence and freezing of the Transdniestria problem as well as to explicit contradictions about state and national identification, international orientation and even the existence of the Moldavian state.

Disagreements on ‘founding questions’ between political forces and citizens in the 1990s, contradictions between power branches, high fragmentation and instability in party system, and the use of government institutions for personal or narrow groups goals have caused weak stateness (Way 2003) and inefficiency of the system of government.

In the early and mid 2000s, a degree of political and economic stabilization was achieved. The Communist government managed to establish an imposed consensus with the help of party and administrative resources (Боцан 2006). However, the results of the Communists’ policies have not been controversial. The unresolved Transdniestria problem, conflicts with Gagaus autonomy, an increasing portion of citizens desiring Romanian citizenship, and other problems still exist. As the political crisis in 2009 showed, the imposed consensus was temporary. Contradictions between political forces about base problems of political life are very prominent. These contradictions have a negative impact on the decision-making process and the effectiveness of government.

Repeated political crisis, state capture by economic actors (mostly regional clans), and low effectiveness of government are also conditioned by the existence of several competing internal
and external centers, disagreements about ‘founding questions’ and rules of the game, the absence of interwar experience as an independent state, and an unconsolidated regime.

In Ukraine, the influence of region-based economic clans on the decision-making process is fully accepted (Мальгин 2005; Дергачев 2007; Попов 2009 etc.). It was clan competition that provoked a clash between Ukrainian president Viktor Yuschenko and prime minister Yulia Timoshenko about “gas conflict” management between Russia and Ukraine in 2008-2009.

One of the results of state capture\(^6\) is political instability. For example, there have been several political crises after the Orange Revolution. These have included confrontations between the president, the cabinet of ministers, and parliament in 2006, confrontations between the president and prime minister in 2007, and two crises in 2008 on the bases of contradictions about membership in NATO and reduction of presidential powers.

Experts note a certain degradation of public administration after the Orange Revolution. They observe that in the end of 1990 to the beginning of 2000, the discipline and level of qualification of the bureaucracy was higher. ‘Dekuchmization’ in 2005 and competition between Viktor Yuschenko and Yulia Timoshenko have negatively influenced the quality of government (Солонская 2007).

The third group of post-Soviet countries includes Belarus, which is distinguished from the previous two groups by its high level of institutional succession and consolidated autocratic regime. However, Belarus had limited interwar experience of independent statehood. The significant influence of the external former imperial center (Moscow) has been set off by a widespread Soviet identity that has been a result of policy of sovietization (Woolhiser 2001 etc.).

The victory of the consolidated autocratic regime has allowed Belarus to concentrate resources and decrease the number of influential actors engaged in redistribution of state income and state properties. The high level of institutional succession\(^7\) has reduced transactional costs. However, the regime of personal rule and exclusion of the opposition from the political process create a potential threat to political stability. In the example of Belarus, we can see the gradual exhausting of regime possibilities for good governance.

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\(^6\) For example, in 2000 364 Ukrainian deputies had official income from commercial structures. Deputies were heads of 202 enterprises and founders of 473 enterprises. These deputies have relationships with the economic activity of 3105 enterprises (Коррупция 2002).

\(^7\) For example, though he recognizes problems in Belarus, Verena Fritz notes the positive influence of institutions (Fritz, 2007).
Conclusion

The post-socialist transition handicapped the stateness of many countries. Its reconstruction and reshaping was not an easy task. Empirical clustering based on three dimensions of stateness – infrastructural capacity, internal sovereignty, and external sovereignty – encompassed divergent trends. In the 1990s, countries with relatively strong traditions of state-building were fairly quick to revitalize their stateness. This group included the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, an exceptionally prosperous republic of Yugoslavia. A group of countries that did not cope with this problem adequately included Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. They were either war-ridden or had problems of state identity. Two other clusters comprised countries of mixed performance.

The situation changed in the 2000s. The group of countries exhibiting advanced and resolute stateness increased to 8 and included three Baltic states. They initially had relatively strong stateness traditions but were particularly consistent and dynamic in consolidating it during the 1990s. In contrast, the group of countries with deficient and staggering stateness diminished to 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine moved into the transitory cluster of advancing but still staggering stateness. Russia and Tajikistan drifted into the transitory cluster of still deficient but resolute stateness.

This general and somewhat imprecise grouping was in many ways clarified by the unique combination of influencing factors in each individual case. Specific interpretations allow us to explain our cases better. This grouping is also supported by spider charts of the three-dimensional configurations. It has demonstrated that even within the groups, with the possible exception of the leading cluster, there is still great divergence of stateness patterns and configurations. This finding has confirmed the validity of the Tolstoy dictum “All happy families resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way” for post-socialist states. It has also proved that war, conflict, and zest for exceptionality are demolishers of stateness.

References


Bartolini, Stefano. 2007. Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union. N.Y.: Oxford
University Press.


Мелешкина, Елена «Исследования государственной состоятельности: какие уроки мы можем извлечь?» Политическая наука. 2: 9 – 27.
Appendix

Table 1. Factor loadings for principal component analysis of the joint set of stateness indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators:</th>
<th>1st principal component</th>
<th>2nd principal component</th>
<th>3rd principal component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propensity to civil war</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus on constitutional design fundamentals</td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary groups presence</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of terrorist attacks</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of founding constitutional norms</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>–0.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregated value of the expenditure (% of GDP)</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Privatization’ of the state</td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption by WB</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness by WB</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial claims to the country</td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.45</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of secessionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression towards the country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border indeterminacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model fit:

- Rotation sums of squared loadings: 5.37, 4.85, 4.31
- N: 55, 55, 55

Note: Promax rotation. Factor loadings less than 0.4 are not shown.
### Table 2. Factor loadings for principal component analysis of subsets of stateness indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Weakness of internal sovereignty</th>
<th>Infrastructural capacity</th>
<th>Weakness of external sovereignty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propensity to civil war</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus on constitutional design fundamentals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary groups presence</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of terrorist attacks</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of founding constitutional norms</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregated value of the expenditure (% of GDP)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Privatization’ of the state</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption by WB</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial claims to the country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of secessionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression towards the country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border indeterminacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model fit:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of explained variance</th>
<th>66.36%</th>
<th>76.83%</th>
<th>71.59%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Principal components are extracted by subsets of indicators separately.*
Table 3. Product-moment correlations between sub-indices of stateness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weakness of internal sovereignty (A)</th>
<th>Infrastructural capacity (B)</th>
<th>Weakness of external sovereignty (C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weakness of internal sovereignty (A)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>– 0.56**</td>
<td>0.60** (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural capacity (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>– 0.48** (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakness of external sovereignty (C)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Number of observations in parentheses.
Table 4. Clusters of countries with different types of stateness (two-cluster solution, by decades)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Albania</td>
<td>1. Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Armenia</td>
<td>2. Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3. Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Croatia</td>
<td>5. Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Kazakhstan</td>
<td>7. Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Russia</td>
<td>10. Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Tajikistan</td>
<td>11. Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Turkmenistan</td>
<td>12. Slovak Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Ukraine</td>
<td>13. Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>14. Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Armenia</td>
<td>1. Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2. Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Georgia</td>
<td>3. Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td>5. Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Moldova</td>
<td>6. Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Russia</td>
<td>7. Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Serbia</td>
<td>8. Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Turkmenistan</td>
<td>10. Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Uzbekistan</td>
<td>11. Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Mongolia</td>
<td>12. Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Poland</td>
<td>13. Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Slovak Republic</td>
<td>15. Slovak Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Ukraine</td>
<td>17. Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Clusters of countries with different types of stateness (four-cluster solution, by decades)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
<th>Cluster 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Turkmenistan</td>
<td>5. Moldova</td>
<td>5. Lithuania</td>
<td>5. Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Tajikistan</td>
<td>7. Mongolia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Ukraine</td>
<td>8. Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Croatia</td>
<td>5. Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Mongolia</td>
<td>7. Slovak Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Romania</td>
<td>8. Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 1. Dendrogram of stateness classification (dashed lines correspond to two- and four-cluster solutions).
Table 6. Upgrading and downgrading of stateness (1990s to 2000s)

**1990s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stateness</th>
<th>F - feeble, unsteady and staggering (16)</th>
<th>R - resolute, persistent and consolidating (11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A - relatively advanced (advantaged, unimpeded) (13) | AF 3  
9. Belarus  
10. Bulgaria  
11. Estonia  
12. Latvia  
13. Lithuania  
14. Macedonia  
15. Mongolia  
16. Romania | AR 4  
6. Czech Republic  
7. Hungary  
8. Poland  
9. Slovak Republic  
10. Slovenia |
| D - relatively deficient (disadvantaged, constrained) (14) | DF 2  
9. Azerbaijan  
10. Bosnia and Herzegovina  
11. Croatia  
12. Georgia  
13. Moldova  
14. Russia  
15. Tajikistan  
16. Ukraine | DR 1  
7. Albania  
8. Armenia  
9. Kazakhstan  
10. Kyrgyz Republic  
11. Turkmenistan  
12. Uzbekistan |

**2000s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stateness</th>
<th>F – feeble, unsteady and staggering (13)</th>
<th>R - resolute, persistent and consolidating (15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A - relatively advanced (advantaged, unimpeded) (17) | AF 3  
10. Albania [↑ ←]  
11. Belarus  
12. Bosnia and Herzegovina [↑]  
13. Bulgaria  
14. Croatia [↑]  
15. Macedonia  
16. Mongolia  
18. Ukraine [↑] | AR 4  
9. Czech Republic  
10. Estonia [→]  
11. Hungary  
12. Latvia [→]  
13. Lithuania [→]  
14. Poland  
15. Slovak Republic  
16. Slovenia |
| D - relatively deficient (disadvantaged, constrained) (11) | DF 2  
5. Azerbaijan  
6. Georgia  
7. Moldova  
8. Serbia | DR 1  
1. Armenia  
2. Kazakhstan  
3. Kyrgyz Republic  
4. Russia [→]  
5. Tajikistan [→]  
6. Turkmenistan  
7. Uzbekistan |
Table 7. Mean values for factors of stateness (by clusters and decades)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster 1</td>
<td>Cluster 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fragmentation</td>
<td>0.42 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>3866.36 (2842.43)</td>
<td>8919.64 (3923.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>65.50 (42.24)</td>
<td>78.62 (39.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International adaptation</td>
<td>1.43 (0.65)</td>
<td>2.85 (0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index</td>
<td>33.94 (4.04)</td>
<td>28.23 (4.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of independent stateness</td>
<td>66.50 (19.46)</td>
<td>97.08 (35.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>–0.99 (4.53)</td>
<td>6.16 (2.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of institutional reforms</td>
<td>6.44 (1.20)</td>
<td>8.07 (1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard deviations in italics in parentheses. Two-cluster solution is used.
Stateness radar charts of individual countries for 1990s and 2000s
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