social movements & europeanization

Donatella della Porta

Manuela Caiani
Social Movements and Europeanization
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Donatella della Porta and Manuela Caiani
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACLI</td>
<td>Associazione Cristiana Lavoratori Italiani (Christian Association of Italian Workers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIAB</td>
<td>Associazione Italiana per l'Agricoltura Biologica (Italian Association for Biological Agriculture)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AICCRE</td>
<td>Associazione Italiana del Consiglio dei Comuni e delle Regioni d'Europa (Italian Association of the Council ofCommunes and Regions of Europe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIMA</td>
<td>Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi sul Mercato Agricolo (State Agency for Intervention on Agricultural Market)</td>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance—Italian political party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCI</td>
<td>Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana (Italian Recreational and Cultural Association)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEUC</td>
<td>Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (European Consumers’ Organization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUND</td>
<td>Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz (Association for the Protection of the Environment and Nature)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCOO</td>
<td>Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras (Union Federation of Workers Committees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEI</td>
<td>Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (Italian Episcopal Conference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPR</td>
<td>Centre for Economic Policy Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFDT</td>
<td>Confédération Française Democratique du Travail (French Democratic Confederation of Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGIL</td>
<td>Confederazione Generale Italiana Lavoratori (General Confederation of Italian Workers)</td>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confederation General del Trabajo (General Confederation of Work)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Confederazione Italiana Agricoltori (Italian Confederation of Farmers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFE</td>
<td>Centro Italiano di Formazione Europea (Italian Centre of European Formation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIR</td>
<td>Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati (Italian Council for Refugees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISL</td>
<td>Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori (Italian Confederation of Labour Unions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLCV</td>
<td>Association Nationale de Consommateurs et Usagers (National Association of Consumers and Users)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COBAS-LATTE</td>
<td>Comitati Spontanei Produttori Latte (Spontaneous Committees of Milk Producers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSPA</td>
<td>Comitati Spontanei dei Produttori Agricoli (Spontaneous Committees of Agricultural Producers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOM-TOM</td>
<td>Départements d’outre-mer; territoires d’outre-mer (Overseas Departments; Overseas Territories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the Left—Italian political party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>European Economic and Social Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEB</td>
<td>European Environmental Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>European Preparatory Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETUC</td>
<td>European Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Forza Italia (Go Italy!—Italian political party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLAI</td>
<td>Confederazione dei Lavoratori dell’Agroindustry (Confederation of Agro-industry Workers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GISTI</td>
<td>Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Immigrés (Immigrant Information and Support Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Consorzio Italiano di Solidarietà (Italian Solidarity Consortium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOAM</td>
<td>International Federation of Movements for a Biological Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFE</td>
<td>Movimento Federalista Europeo (European Federalist Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medici Senza Frontiere (Doctors Without Borders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>Party of European Socialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Rifondazione Communista (Communist Refoundation Party—Italian political party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFH</td>
<td>Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe (Swiss Aid for Refugees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social movement Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Solidarité Sans Frontières; Solidarity Without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUD</td>
<td>Solidaires, Unitaires, Democratiques (Solidarity, Unity, Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro (Union of Christian and Centrist Democrats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEF</td>
<td>Union of European Federalists</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIL</td>
<td>Unione Italiana del Lavoro (Italian Labour Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNALAT</td>
<td>Unione Nazionale della Associazioni di Produttori di Latte Bovino (National Union of Dairy Producers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAS</td>
<td>Verdi Ambiente e Società (Greens, Environment, and Society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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<td>WIDE</td>
<td>Women in Development Europe</td>
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<td>WSF</td>
<td>World Social Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wide Fund</td>
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On 29 May 2005 the French referendum for ratification of the Treaty for the European Constitution saw the victory of the ‘no’ with 54.7 per cent of the vote. On 1 June a similar result emerged in another of the founding countries of the European Union, the Netherlands, where 61.6 per cent of the Dutch citizens who turned out at the polls voted ‘no’. Although a few months earlier (on 20 February) the Spaniards had supported the ratification, with 76.7 per cent voting ‘yes’, only 43.3 per cent of the electorate had participated in the referendum.

Defending what came to be known as a neo-realist approach to Europe, Andrei Moravcsik spoke of a fault in the style of the constitutional process: ‘the constitution contained a set of modest reforms, very much in line with European popular preferences. Yet European leaders upset the emerging pragmatic settlement by dressing up the reforms as a grand scheme for constitutional revision and popular democratization of the EU’ (*Prospect*, July 2005). He linked the failure of the Constitution to the attempt ‘to legitimize the EU not through trade, economic growth and useful regulation, as had been the case for fifty years, but by politicizing and democratizing it’. Other scholars stressed the limited potential impact of the Constitutional Treaty, given that the institutional reforms envisioned in the Treaty ‘could indeed have gone some way toward reducing the perceived problems of EU democracy.'
But they would not in any case have solved the real problem of democracy in the EU: the democratic deficit at the national level’ (Schmidt 2006: 1). Still others interpreted the results of the two referenda as testifying to a failure of the attempt to legitimize Europe as an apolitical institution, and to the increasing contestation of EU policies as ‘neo-liberal’ in nature (Mathers 2007).

In France, but also in the Netherlands and in Spain, some socio-demographic characteristics of the ‘no’-voters help to shed light on the dissent against the Constitutional Treaty. First, the European construction seems unconvincing to the new generations. Not only were younger electors less mobilized than the older cohorts in all three referenda, but they also voted more often against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. In fact, the ‘no’ was chosen by 62 per cent of French voters and by 74 per cent of Dutch voters between 18 and 24 years old. Also, in Spain, in the same cohort, the percentage of ‘no’ was significantly higher (38 per cent) than in the total population, and 73 per cent did not vote (Flash Eurobarometer 2005a, 2005b). Second, the European Constitution appeared as an elite project, less than convincing to workers. In the Netherlands, 78 per cent of manual workers voted against the Constitution, and in France the ‘no’ prevailed among citizens with a lower income (below 1,000 euros per month) and employment as blue-collar workers (79 per cent of whom voted ‘no’) as well as white-collar employees (67 per cent) (Ipsos 2005; see also Schmidt 2006, 189). If ‘nee’-voters were more numerous among the working class and the less educated, they were however also in the majority among white-collar and highly educated citizens (Binnema and Crum 2007).

The political values of the ‘no’-voters confirm a complex picture. In France, a large part of the opposition to the European Constitution came from the Left. According to an opinion poll carried out a few days before the vote (CSA 2005), among those who had declared their intentions to vote ‘no’ were 85 per cent of the electors of the radical Left, 91 per cent of those of the Communist Party, and 59 per cent of the Verts (Greens), but also 52 per cent of the electors of the Socialist...
Party—which had officially called for a ‘yes’ vote. To the right, 82 per cent of the electors of the radical *Front National*, but only 17 per cent of the moderate right declared their intention to reject the Constitution. Most of the ‘nonistes’ (70 per cent, versus 38 per cent of those who voted ‘yes’) declared their intention to support a socialist candidate against President Jacques Chirac in the next presidential election. Similarly, the Dutch ‘nee’-voters often followed their party’s cues to vote against the Treaty, but also often disregarded their party’s appeal to vote ‘yes’ (Lubbers 2008).

Domestic and European concerns are intertwined in the motivation of the ‘no’ vote. In France, the defence of the national welfare is linked to the rejection of a European Constitution accused of supporting free competition and privatization of the water supply. If the ‘non de droite’ is moved by xenophobic sentiments and the defence of national unity, the ‘non de gauche’ appears, instead, as mainly oriented against the weakness of a social Europe. Interestingly, debates on social issues occupied 24 per cent of discussion on the referendum on French television (versus only 4.5 in 1992), and a shift to a ‘no’ vote was noted especially among those who were concerned with social issues (Schmidt 2006; 189).

If social issues were in fact very relevant in the French debate, lack of information on the process as well as expected costs of enlargement for taxpayers were often mentioned by the Dutch ‘no’-voters (Eurobarometer, 2005a, 2005b). In the Netherlands, ‘no’-voters expressed their criticism of non-transparent and expensive institutions, but also of the weakness of a ‘social Europe’; they were mistrustful of the EU and the Dutch parliament alike (Lubbers 2008). During the debate on the Constitution, the Maastricht Treaty, often recalled in the electoral posters, becomes a symbol of the prevalence of austerity over solidarity; the ‘Lisbon process’ of the dismantling of the welfare state in the name of free competition.

In attributing responsibility for the ‘non de gauche’ that deeply divided the French socialist party, several commentators pointed at the ‘alter-mondialist’ Attac, which stated:
In the last two years a new public sphere has emerged in Europe. At its origins are not the consensus hunters sent by the Commission to look for a dialogue with civil society, but the opposition movement, the collective subjects that recognize themselves in the narrative path of the new internationalism, born with the protest in Seattle (‘La Convenzione Europea e i Movimenti Sociali’, Attac, 2003).

The results of the aforementioned constitutional referenda (to which we could add those of the Irish referendum on the new version of the Constitutional Treaty in 2008, which also ended with a majority of ‘no’ votes) are proof enough of a break in the popular ‘permissive consensus’ that had supported, in most EU countries, most steps towards European integration. They have prompted an intensification in the debate around Europe and the European institutions that is at the core of our research. As we will see, this debate has addressed not only the territorial dimension of the polity, but also the politics of Europe, with particular attention to the development of a democratic supranational system, as well as the policy dimension, with reference to the specific choices the EU has made (or not made) on various issues. The debate on the Constitutional Treaty was also multi-voiced, with strong participation from non-institutional actors. Particularly audible were the voices of civil society actors, social movements, and the like. Although hearing them so loudly was quite an exception in comparison with previous debates on EU issues, we think that if a European public sphere is ever to emerge, such actors might be expected to play a major role in it. It is for these reasons that we focused our research especially on those voices.

In our research, in fact, we consider the involvement of civil society and social movement organizations in the debates on European integration as a new trend, worth investigating in its size, forms, and effects. The position taken by Attac is not isolated among contemporary social movement organizations in Europe (della Porta 2007a). Quite the contrary: a critique of the direction of Europeanization (as a regional form of globalization) has been central to the organization of the several European marches against
unemployment, precariousness, and exclusion that have played an important role in the emergence of concern within the EU among civil society and social movement organizations (Chabanet 2002; della Porta and Mosca 2005). Since Amsterdam (1997), counter-summits have contested all major EU summits: in Nice, Gothenburg, Barcelona, and Copenhagen tens of thousands marched in protest against EU decisions. Since 2002, protesters have met annually in European Social Forums to debate Europeanization, developing alternative proposals for a European level of governance.

Although the social science literature on social movements and civil society is extensive and growing, when addressing their involvement with EU issues in a process of ‘Europeanization from below’ we felt the need to go beyond the boundaries of those disciplinary sub-fields. The transnational events we just mentioned have in fact only slowly attracted the attention of scholars concerned with social movements and civil society organizations. While the former mainly expected social movements to continue to be nation-bound, reflections on civil society tended to develop primarily at the normative level (della Porta 2007b).

As we will discuss in the remainder of this chapter, this limited attention to empirical research on social movements in the EU can be explained as resonant with some main hypotheses on political opportunities and resource mobilization that are widespread in social movement studies (Sect. 1.1). However, as we shall argue later on, some insights from the research on Europeanization might help in understanding a growing relevance of the EU for social movements, which follows different and complex paths. The first of these insights comes from the research on multilevel governance as a complex field of interaction among different actors at different geographical levels (Sect. 1.2). Second, inspired by constructivist approaches in international relations, we shall refer to the role of ideas and images of Europe as structuring the conflicts on the EU, its politics and policies (Sect. 1.3). We shall end by outlining the empirical research on which this volume is based (Sect. 1.4), and the book’s structure (Sect. 1.5).
1.1. Social movement studies and Europe

Notwithstanding the increasing relevance of European institutions and the growing visibility of the action campaigns targeting them, research into the effects of EU construction on social movements has produced inconclusive results. Early work in this area in fact reproduced fairly faithfully the debate on Europe as it has unwound in other areas of the social sciences, with two contrasting images: the intergovernmentalism of the realist approach, or transnationalism with institutional overtones. As Stefano Bartolini observed (2002; 1), the results of research on European integration ‘depend largely on the institution, on the policy, on the sector, and on the process that is taken up for study. Studying the intergovernmental conferences and their outcomes one concludes that these tend to be intergovernmental; studying the sentences of the Court of Justice their supranationalism comes to light’. In parallel, in the studies of protest, the empirically observed objects have often influenced the emerging images. Similarly, research on protest events reported in the (national) press has supported the realist-intergovernmental image of the dominant role of the nation-state, which remains the target of most protest. Research on the activities of public interest groups in the European institutions has pointed, instead, to the emergence of a new polity, but also to a selective inclusion of civil society organizations in it.

The prevailing image of low Europeanization of social movements fits well with some widespread hypotheses in social movement studies. In a frequently used definition, social movements are conceptualized as dense informal networks of collective actors involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents, which share a distinct collective identity, using mainly protests as their modus operandi (della Porta and Diani 2006; ch. 1). In this sense, they tend to overlap, at least in part, with civil society actors, usually identified with a set of voluntary associations, distinct from both the state and the market and sharing some common, civic values.

Looking at social movements as ‘challengers’ that mobilize for access into a ‘polity’ that excludes them (Tilly 1978), much
social-science research has related their strategic choices to the available political opportunities, as determined by institutional assets and available allies. To a certain extent, movement organizations adapt to the decision-making structure, mobilizing when and where channels of access open up (Tarrow 1989, 1994). Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous contrast between a ‘weak’ American government and a ‘strong’ French one is usually an implicit or explicit starting point for analyses linking institutional factors with social movement development (Kriesi 2004a; 71). In general, the more political decisions are dispersed, the more open (and less repressive) a system is considered. The prevalent assumption is that the greater the number of actors who share political power (the more the checks and balances), the greater the chance that social movements will emerge and develop.

Beyond the comparison of various institutions, the political-process approach has also stressed the role of institutional allies for social movements. A more dynamic set of variables—susceptible to change in the short term and the object of pressure from social movements—including aspects such as electoral instability or elite divisions (see, for example, Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1983, 1989; Jenkins 1985). In a comparative analysis of social movements in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan-Wilhelm Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni (1995) addressed what they called configuration of power—that is, the distribution of power among the various actors operating within the party or interest-group system—which interacts with social movements. Comparing Italy and Germany, Donatella della Porta and Dieter Rucht (1995) paid particular attention to the field of action within which social movements move, distinguishing an alliance structure composed of those political actors who support them, and an opposition structure composed of those who oppose them. If the political-opportunity approach is right, protest should be expected to be a misfit at the European level, as European governance is more open to conventional lobbying than to contentious and disruptive actions (Marks and McAdam 1999; 103–4).
Additionally, social movement studies have addressed social movement organizations as collective actors that mobilize resources and strategically allocate them in order to attain their aims (McCarthy, Zald, and Mayer 1996). At the EU level, the types of opportunity available should allow for a selective access of the collective actors that are better endowed with some type of material and symbolic resources. The capacity to organize at the European level has in fact been linked to the characteristics of specific actors and availability of material resources cited to explain the larger capacity of business interest groups to intervene here (della Porta 2003b). In reverse, a lack of material resources has been seen as responsible for the weakness of public-interest groups and social movement organizations such as environmentalist, women’s rights, and migrant-rights associations at the EU level (Branch 2002; Chabanet 2002; Giugni and Passy 2002; Rootes 2002). Indeed, in the consultation of civil society during the EU constitutional process, a bias in favour of more ‘civilized’, moderate, often EU-sponsored civil society organizations has been noted (Lombardo 2004).

If these two lines of explanation converge in forecasting low levels of transnational social movement activities, other considerations would instead lead one to expect more EU-level protest. First, the political process approach has stressed the need for social movements to address the territorial levels where decisions are taken. Tilly (1978) considered the development of the modern repertoire of protest to be linked to the shifting of decisions at the national level. In parallel, we might expect contemporary social movements to develop strategies for addressing power holders at different geographical levels. Therefore, the framing of the European level as a relevant (and potentially even more relevant) level of decision-making could be a main factor in the decisions of social movements to target it. We might expect a focusing of conflicts around Europe that would reflect the growing relevance of European institutions. Although in fits and starts and with both hope and disillusionment, the process of European integration has taken some important steps over the past few years. While the
introduction of a common currency had a relevant impact on national economic and social policies, other policies on salient issues such as migration have moved towards the second communitarian pillar, and the ‘open method of coordination’ has emerged, aiming at convergence in visible and contested policy areas such as education and pension reform. The importance of this evolution for collective actors—including social movements—working in the various member states of the European Union is great.

Second, concerning the resources needed to shift claims to a higher territorial level, in the past the need to address power holders at the national level pushed social movement organizations to creatively exploit new channels of communication (Tarrow 1994). New technologies are indeed available now to enormously reduce the costs of communication; research has already indicated that social movements make extensive use of them (della Porta and Mosca 2007). Using new channels of communication (among them the Internet), social movement organizations can reduce the cost of mounting Europe-wide protest campaigns (della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Beyond material resources, cultural traditions also play an important role in facilitating or jeopardizing the development of transnational strategies. From this point of view, social movement organizations could be expected to be more motivated to develop organizational networks and frames than are, for instance, political parties (della Porta and Kriesi 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2002; Lefebure and Lagneau 2002) or trade unions, which are traditionally more deeply rooted in the nation-states (Marks and McAdam 1999; Martin and Ross 2001).

In order to better conceptualize the alternative paths of mobilization and visions of Europe that the above hypotheses support, we shall introduce into the field of social movements some reflections from the research on Europeanization and European integration. First, we will consider the complex path of Europeanization of social movements as linked to the development of multilevel governance. Second, we will address the role of social movements in particular within a constructivist vision of Europe as an emerging polity that must address the challenge of democratic legitimation.
Social Movements and Europeanization

1.2. Social movements and multilevel governance

In the social sciences, research has moved towards a conception of Europeanization as not only the building of European institutions, but also the possible impact of the EU (institutions, ideas) on national systems of member states (Graziano 2004; 11). The study of Europeanization is therefore no longer limited to the ‘emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance’ (Risse, Green Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; 3), but also includes the impact of these changes at the national and even local level. Research on Europeanization has addressed, in fact, processes of resistance, transformation, and adaptation to European policies and norms in member states, shifting attention from the supranational level to multilevel governance. Linked to this is the notion that public policies are no longer the exclusive product of national institutions, but are instead part of a complex system where several norms and implementing agencies interact.

Interest in European integration has grown alongside interest in the processes of globalization. If cultural and economic globalization breaks down barriers, the construction of new supranational institutions (as with all types of institutional formation) has instead the effect of rebuilding them. Europeanization involves a complex process of transcending internal boundaries, as well as constructing new boundaries against the outside. The EU is in fact one of the various international actors that intervene in, and multiply, the modes of regulation (Héritier, Stolleis, and Scharpf 2004). As Stefano Bartolini (2004; 173) has pointed out, ‘regional European integration can in general terms be distinguished from globalization in its intensity, the significant institutional element involved in processes of transcending functional boundaries, and the consequences of the latter within the specific historical background of the European construction of these confines’. From this point of view, European integration casts increasing doubts over the existence of fixed boundaries between domestic and international politics, underlining instead the growing intertwining between the two.
Most observers agree that the process of European construction will not bring about the end of the nation-state, but will lead instead to a new form of multilevel governance, with complex interactions among different levels of government and related actors across various policy areas (Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter, and Streek 1996; Schmitter 2000). According to the notion of condominium, which suggests a ‘variable geometry’ in Europe with member states adopting ‘different speeds’ of integration, there are several European projects, with different coalitions of member states acting autonomously in order to resolve common problems and produce different kinds of public goods. The support for flexible alliances, with the experimentation with tighter forms of voluntary collaboration between several member states, grew in the public debates on such issues as the euro or the enlargement to the east.1 Different and flexible modes of integration have been recommended as a way to address the legitimation challenge of a EU defined as a ‘government of governments’ (Scharpf 2003).

In this vein, Europeanization is the product of the interaction of various actors. Adaptation to the acquis communitaire is not necessarily a linear process, as it is tied to the level of coherence between European input and the domestic situation, as well as to the changing configurations of actors and institutions which either promote or oppose Europe. Above all, in situations of incongruence (misfit) between Community choices and national traditions, a series of veto powers are activated alongside ‘norm entrepreneurs’, who adopt and adapt European schemes of reference (Borzel and Risse 2000), thus influencing the level of national adaptation in their public institutions and the content of national policies (Risse, Green Cowles, and Caporaso 2001).

In recognition of the relevance and complexity of Europeanization processes, comparative politics has begun to address the effects of European integration on national political systems. Although opinions diverge on the impact of European decisions at the domestic level (Hix and Goetz 2001), the focus on multilevel governance has grown

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1 On the principle of flexible integration see e.g. Centre for Economic Policy Research (1996).
and consolidated. In public-policy analysis, the concept of Europeanization has shifted attention from the ascending phase of EU decision-making (focused on negotiations between states) to the descending phase of implementing these policies at the national level (Radaelli 2000; Graziano 2004). This perspective usually reveals differentiated adaptation rather than full convergence (Morlino 2002), with a reorganization in the patterns of interaction between actors, resources, problems, styles, and rules for the collective resolution of problems at the respective levels (Radaelli and Franchino 2004).

These reflections also affect the way in which we look at protest and social movements at the European level. Protest has traditionally addressed the national level of government. Historically, a new repertoire of collective action—whose main features survive today—developed alongside the nation-state (Tilly 1984). Using protest as their main resource, social movements have been important players in the emergence and evolution of the nation-state, mobilizing for civil, political, and social rights. Social movements organized petitions and demonstrations on freedom of the press, religious freedom, and electoral rights (Pizzorno 1996; 972). The labour movement, in alliance with socialist parties, struggled for social rights: democracy developed when the ‘masses entered history’ (Marshall 1950; Bendix 1964). Indeed, Charles Tilly (2004; 125) has noted the existence of ‘a broad correspondence between democratisation and social movements . . . the maps of full-fledged institutions and social movements overlaps greatly’. If over the last two centuries ‘social movements generally flourished and spread where further democratisation was occurring and receded when authoritarian regime curtailed democracy’, by pushing for enfranchisement and the recognition of associational rights social movements have themselves contributed to democratization. At the national level, social movements have in fact constituted a critical public sphere, subjecting the public decisions of elected representatives to what Bertrand Manin (1995) called the ‘test of the discussion’. The European level can be seen as an additional lever for movement organizations, offering channels of access (or at least voice) to those actors that are weaker at home. In this perspective, Europeanized social movements could indeed increase
the transparency (and therefore public accountability) of European governance. At the same time, there is the expectation that social movements can build a critical public sphere that could contribute to making EU institutions accountable.

But are social movements able to adapt to multilevel governance, performing their functions as critical public spheres? Are they able to represent general interests, balancing the pressures of strong specific interests? Notwithstanding the relevant functions that social movements could play for a democratization of European governance, studies into the effects of the construction of European institutions on social movements and protest—and vice versa—are, as mentioned, still in their infancy. Simplifying somewhat; at the beginning, research on collective action seemed to assume that protest at the European level had to reproduce the national pattern. The expectation was that European challengers would target a European polity. As synthesized in Figure 1.1, while national actors were expected to continue to act at the national level, European actors were expected to emerge at the EU level.

Taking into account the multilevel nature of the European enterprise, however, we might develop more differentiated hypotheses on the interaction between the creation of Europe and social movements. If Europeanization is seen as producing more layers of decision-making, social movements might be expected to adapt themselves to a multilevel governance that includes variable networks of both territorial and functional actors. European integration has the predictable effect of multiplying both restrictions and

![Fig. 1.1. Europeanization of social movements: the nation-state model](image)
opportunities for the various movements, pushing them to increase their own range of intervention to overcome the first, and to take advantage of the second. For social movements, a ‘condominium Europe’ or a ‘Europe with a variable geometry’—based on various nets of member states—presents different opportunities, depending on the issue they focus upon as well as their domestic influence. As we shall argue in this volume, social movement organizations, like other actors using protest, seem to adapt their strategies to address simultaneously the various territorial levels of government. To do so, they have developed strategies of ‘crossed influence’; that is, pressure at the national level to change decisions at the European level, or pressure at the European level used to change national decisions. In what follows we shall highlight some of these paths.

First, since protest grows when institutions are accountable to the electorate, the relative inaccessibility of the supranational level to protest and the weakness of the European public sphere explain why the target of social movements continues to be predominantly national governments. However, the complexity of EU governance makes EU policies challengeable within the logic of a two-level game (Putman 1988; 434). In particular, movements that want to put pressure on the EU in favour of national interests might well choose a path of domestication; that is, they can use protest in order to pressurize national governments which, in turn, can negotiate better arrangements at supranational levels (Imig and Tarrow 2002). As indicated in Figure 1.2, domestic actors, especially if in direct

![Fig. 1.2. Domestication of social movements](image)
competition with other national interests represented in other member states, might in fact contest EU decisions but remain at the national level, targeting their national governments, in order to push them to resist those decisions. In their analysis of protest in Europe, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2002) stressed that, indeed, most EU related events (406 of the 490 they studied) were cases of domestication, and domestication characterized in particular many mobilizations of European farmers (Bush and Simi 2001). As we will see in Chapter 2, although targeting mainly domestic institutions, the collective actions that address EU issues tend however to affect the ways in which social movements frame their aims and strategies, helping the development of European identities and structures.

Using the strategy of domestication, protestors are often able to overcome the weak democratic accountability of EU institutions, while producing European structures and frames. In other cases, however, social movement organizations look at the EU as an additional arena for the mobilization of resources that may then be used at the national level. A strategy of externalization (Chabanet 2002) characterizes the mobilization of national actors targeting the EU in attempts to put pressure on their own governments (see Fig. 1.3). In these cases, actors that feel weak at home might try to mobilize allies at the supranational level: protest addresses EU institutions to push them to intervene upon domestic governments. This strategy has been used above all by movements that perceive the challenges as supranational, and have in fact appealed to the kinds of discourse and identity legitimized at the European level. This is the case, for instance, for some environmental campaigns (Rootes 2002), as well as the 1997 Euro-strike of Spanish, French, and Belgian workers, who accused Renault of having disregarded the European legislation on the right to consultation with the workers’ representatives in firms with factories in more than one EU member state (Lefèbure and Lagneau 2002). As we will

2 The typology of Europeanized protest proposed by Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2002) uses the national–international distinction in terms of both the actors of the protest and their targets.
argue in Chapter 3, this path moreover tends to produce multilevel networks of social movements, with effects that involve also, although not only, EU institutions.

Paths of domestication and externalization seem in fact to have facilitated the rise of social movements directly addressing the European Union. As indicated in Figure 1.4, challengers can target different levels of governance at the same time, involving loose networks of national (often even local) and transnational groups. The objectives of their protests tend to be increasingly general, with the participation of national and supranational collective actors that turn simultaneously to various governmental levels. As we will see in Chapter 4, European social movements express themselves, more and more often, through unconventional forms of protest involving loosely structured networks of European activists that address different polities.

All these considerations of multilevel governance bring us to expect different levels, paths, and forms of Europeanization in
different countries and on different policy issues. Following the political opportunity approach, one could expect that social movements would be more motivated to target the European level when they have less leverage at home, in an attempt to trigger ‘boomerang’ effects (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In this sense, social movement organizations in southern Europe should be more oriented to look for allies in the EU, while in central and northern Europe they may be more loyal to their nation-states (whose standards are higher). As social movements are part of their national polity, we might also expect them to adapt to their national environments, nearing the average level of Europeanization for collective actors in their own countries. As has been demonstrated in a large number of studies on social movements and political claim-making, national political institutions and the discourse of national political elites do exert a strong influence on other collective actors. Cross-national differences across social movement organizations (as well as other types of actors) might in fact be influenced by the positions that national governments take with regard to European integration, as national political elites set the tone of the public discourse on European integration (Koopmans 2008). However, all these expectations have to be tailored to the specific characteristics of various policy fields. Thus we might expect more of a tendency to address the EU in more communitarian policy fields, but also more contestation of EU intervention in traditional domains of the nation-state, such as social policies.

As for their resources, movements rich in assets may feel more at ease in addressing the supranational level, especially when they command the moderate repertoire that seems more welcomed in European institutions. If this is true, the well-structured, pragmatic, and lobby-oriented social movements of central and northern Europe should address European institutions more often than the fragmented, ideological, and protest-oriented social movements of the south (della Porta 2003a; 54–65, also della Porta 2007a). Here as well, however, we might expect different degrees and forms of Europeanization according to the different domestic systems of alliance and identities of specific social movements,
with, for example, more of a rootedness at the national level for the labour movement and larger degrees of cosmopolitanism in new movements (Marks and McAdam 1999).

1.3. Framing Europe/s

This takes us to the relevance of the framing of Europe. Not only is the European enterprise multilevel, it is also a symbolic (and symbolically contested) process. In our study we also built upon another suggestion coming, among others, from research on Europeanization: the relevant role of ideas, as precondition for the definition of interests. Departing from a conception of a regulatory Europe, which legitimizes itself based on its capacity to steer good governance and economic competition, recent debates have started to recognize the importance of a symbolic construction of Europe and European identities. In this approach, the steps and effects of the process of integration are not directly determined by the exogenous interests of the main actors, but are instead strongly influenced by their ‘imagined Europe’. Our choice reflects the belief that a merely instrumental vision of Europe is less and less able to sustain the process of European integration, while the construction of a European identity appears more and more relevant (as emerged in the debate on the constitutional referenda).

European integration was initially addressed within the discipline of international relations. Reflecting the (then dominant) realist approach, research focused on the interests of the main actors, the member states, in a process that was seen as essentially intergovernmental (e.g. Moravcsik 1998). The European institutions have long been considered as mainly oriented towards economic cooperation and regarding their assumed capacity to improve the international competitiveness of member states (e.g. Milward et al. 1994). Without denying that strong (national and/or economic) interests play a relevant role in shaping the process of European integration, we assume that the definition of an interest cannot be separated from the ideas, and identity, of individual and collective actors (Pizzorno 2007). In particular, with the evolution from the European
Common Market to the Constitutional Treaty, the realist approach appears as less and less sufficient to explain what has emerged as a ‘strange beast’, in part an international organization, in part a federation of a new kind. Attention to an ‘imagined Europe’ is all the more relevant if we recognize that states are only some of the actors that intervene in the process. In fact, critics of the realist approach have stressed the presence of various actors, other than states, in the international arenas, together with the unexpected capacity of the states to cooperate rather than compete, and the development of a complex system of international norms (Pierson 1996; Nicholson 1998: 131). In the social sciences this development has brought about increasing blurring of the disciplinary boundaries between international relations and comparative politics (Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel 2003).

Since the mid-1990s a ‘constructivist turn’ in the discipline of international relations has stressed the relevance of a multiplicity of actors (including non-governmental organizations) and their visions (beyond, or as filter for, their interests) (Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer 2004). If realists suggest an image of rational actors who calculate their utility with respect to given preferences, the constructivist approach we embrace here recognizes the impact of ideas (Quaglia 2004; 1097). An enhanced focus on the perceptions of national actors about the Europeanization processes is linked to the belief that ‘not only can Europe influence formal structures, but it can also influence values, norms and the prevailing discourse in member states. A cognitive transformation in turn can mutate the preferences of policy makers and thus influence the process of European integration’ (Radaelli 2000; 2; see also Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; 184). The constructivist approach assumes a neo-institutional ‘logic of appropriateness’, by looking at how institutions produce norms that in turn structure the identity of actors (Adler 2002).

This type of sensitivity resonates with the reflection on the potential role of a European civil society in the development of a critical public sphere. The crucial element of a European demos can be seen, in parallel to national identities, as linked to the formation of
institutions that promote territorial community, consciously through specific political symbolism (Anderson 1983) but also, more spontaneously, through the convergence of peripheral conflicts at the centre (Tilly 1984). Relevant for Europeanization, therefore, is the way in which Europe is framed in public debates. An aspect only recently addressed is the construction of a European public sphere through contestation of public decision-making (see, among others, Cotta et al. 2005). The analysis of the public discourse allows us to address the ‘soft pressures’ on processes of European integration, which come about because of changes in the beliefs and expectations of national actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999).

It is widely assumed that European integration has benefited, with some exceptions, from a broad consensual basis, or at least a low level of public contestation. Various elements converged to depoliticize the debate on European issues. Treated as a theme of international politics, the process of European integration has only occasionally received public attention, with rare moments of particular visibility. The high level of technicality involved in regulatory politics, a form said to be dominant at European level, has further shielded it from public attention, while a complex division of competences and functions between national governments and European institutions has made it difficult to identify responsibility at the supranational level (Klandermans et al. 2001; 78). Multilevel processes and nested games have contributed to depoliticizing the theme of Europeanization, which has been most heavily debated in those arenas with the least decision-making power on European themes (Mair 2000; 47). Additionally, in several European countries the process of integration has been perceived and presented as a break with a national past seen as embarrassing and uncomfortable—Nazism in Germany, Francoism in Spain (Díez Medrano 2003), or ‘real socialism’ in the countries of Eastern Europe (Brusis 2001). In southern Europe it has been presented as a modernizing force (Featherstone and Kazamias 2000).

Yet the era of ‘permissive consensus’ on Europe appears to have ended, given an increasingly demanding public opinion (Scharpf 2007). The conflict over European integration has been described as
a ‘sleeping giant’, still mainly unstructured within party systems but ready to explode when political entrepreneurs come forward and represent it. Although ‘at the moment in most countries the electorate is willing to freeze their preferences with regard to the EU, and choose parties on the basis of other considerations’, the question has been asked ‘how long this can last’ (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; 47). In fact, in many European countries opposition to integration is increasingly channelled through Euro-sceptical parties of various weights. The tendency of national governments to justify unpopular decisions, such as budget cuts, as due to restrictions imposed by the process of European integration has increased public criticism of choices made by European institutions.

Among others, the debate on the French and Dutch referenda highlights the changing nature of support for processes of European integration, raising questions about the legitimacy of EU institutions, a central concern especially within constructivist visions (Giraudi 2005). Criticizing those authors who state that negative integration policies do not need further democratic legitimation, as they increase democratic freedoms and therefore human rights, Fritz Scharpf (2007; 6) observed that ‘theoretically and empirically, it is of course fairly easy to punch holes in these affirmative arguments’, as the EU decisions that increase the freedom to import affect the property rights of previously protected producers, and liberalization of monopoly services destroys jobs. Moreover, permissive consensus no longer exists nor could indeed exist on hotly contested issues with high political salience (ibid.; 7). Negative European integration, with its constraints on public expenditures and support for privatization, has in fact also produced problems of legitimacy for national governments (Scharpf 2007), with consequential blame-shifting at the EU level.

When citizens of the member states start to perceive the EU as making political choices, the question of European democracy also comes to the fore. The social science debate on the ‘democratic deficit’ has long addressed the weak accountability of the European Council and, especially, the European Commission to the European Parliament as well as the parliaments of the member states.
Especially problematic for a democratic development of the EU is the construction of a public sphere, capable of holding the governors accountable through public debate on their decisions. Focusing on the strong, institutionalized publics, Eriksen and Fossum (2001, 2002) stressed the limits in the control capacity of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice on the power of the experts in EU comitology. As for the ‘weak publics’, many have observed that the construction of a truly European public sphere still appears difficult, particularly given the lack of a common language and the selectivity of participation in the debate on Europe.

If normatively the question has been posed of how to make European decision-making more transparent, visible, and comprehensible from the outside, empirical research has underlined that the public still speaks and knows little about Europe. Even if rarely in an explicit manner, studies of Europeanization in the public sphere have presented a tension between a (normative) approach that affirms the necessity of forming a transnational public opinion that democratizes international institutions, and a (descriptive) approach that confirms the prevailing national orientation of public debate and its arenas. The weakness of the public sphere has a spiral of negative effect: ‘While the Europeanised public sphere implies a community of communication and some level of reciprocal identification among those that participate, these in turn are social constructions that emerge through discursive practices’ (Risse 2003; 2).

Additionally, the growing public criticism of the EU has been linked to some characteristics of mass-media coverage of EU issues. While the EU is still rarely present in national mass media (Machill et al. 2007), the challenges of politicization of the debate on the European Union are increased by the episodic character of the coverage of EU politics and the lack of synchronization of EU debates in national public spheres (Esmark 2007; Fossum and Trenz 2007). Various research indicates, in fact, that due to growing public debate on Europe (e.g. Os and Jankowski 2007 and Vreese et al. 2007 on the 2004 EP elections) discontent towards the
European Union has grown, as issues of unemployment or environmental protection have increasingly been framed within a European dimension (Díez Medrano 2007; Schmitt 2007). Moreover, growing journalistic attention to EU issues has not been characterized by the use of rational arguments, but by an investigative or even scandalistic style in place of the traditional coverage that oscillated between the highly technical and the anecdotal (Meyer 2007).

The end of permissive consensus as well as the increasing politicization of the debate on European issues are conducive to the development of Europeanization from below. Our research confirms, in fact, as we will see in the following chapters, the difficulty of constructing a supranational public sphere, but also some developments that shed new light on the politicization of the debate and its potential consequences. Europe is in fact increasingly discussed, not only by European actors, but also by national actors at various territorial levels. Additionally, even actors that recognize (as in the referendum debates on the Constitution) the necessity of supranational institutions of governance disagree upon specific choices. They also have different images of Europe and its potential, often criticizing specific European policies rather than Europe in general.

Our research concentrates above all on the discourse on Europe, not so much as a justification of material (national) interest but rather as an expression of the construction of collective identities. We are interested, in particular, in the ways in which Europe and the opposition to and/or critique of the directions of European integration are framed by the actors of Europeanization from below. Focused on the discourses and practices of social movements, our research underlines the importance of the symbolic construction (discourse, communication) around Europe. As an imagined community, Europe represents different things for different actors, whose positions on Europe are linked to various themes, placing Europe within specific systems of values or ideologies. The image of Europe becomes intertwined with the concept of democracy and citizens' rights. National history is reflected in the
positions adopted vis-à-vis supranational identities, while the latter contribute to a redefinition of national identity.

In the debate on political parties and electoral behaviour various hypotheses have emerged on the relations between the division on Europe and the traditional left–right cleavage (see Marks and Steenbergen 2004 for a recent synthesis), which are presented either as perpendicular (Maore and Smith 1993; Hix and Lord 1997; Pennings 2002) or as superimposed upon one another (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). The process of European integration has mainly been interpreted as a territorial conflict between those who seek to devolve more competences to the international level, and those who seek to devolve fewer competences to the international level. Analyses of party electoral programmes, public-opinion surveys, interviews with Euro-parliamentarians, and research on European Parliament voting patterns have all suggested the continued relevance of the left–right dimension for a series of policies (above all economic ones), but also the inability of the traditional ideologies to explain differing views on European integration (Gabel and Anderson 2004; Gabel and Hix 2004; Thomassen, Noury, and Voeten 2004). In fact, in the mentioned constitutional referenda many electors did not follow the indication of their preferred party. The debates during those constitutional referenda indicate, however, that the increasingly salient controversies over the EU cannot be framed in terms of a simple return to the nation-state or a protectionist vision. They do not match a simplistic dichotomy between Euro-sceptic and Euro-enthusiast. It is not only (or prevailingly) a conflict between nationalists and Europeanists, but rather between different visions of Europe, real and imagined. Under contestation are the timing of European integration (gradual or rapid); the nature of the European institutions being built (political or apolitical); and the values that should define European policies (‘Europe of markets’ or ‘social Europe’).

On the basis of our research, we will in fact suggest that the analogy with territorial conflicts between centre and periphery, evident in the construction of nation-states, can be useful in explaining some dimensions of the conflict over Europeanization. However, the
terриториal dimension will appear as strictly intertwined with various identities, as territorial communities are in fact to various degrees imagined communities (Anderson 1983), and different images can be superimposed on the territorial ones. The relative support for the nation-state has been tied to a construction of meaning that varies according to the actor, linking up with other aspects of its identity and its position on other cleavages. The construction of the nation-state occurred through the interaction of conflicts over state formation (centre–periphery, church–state) and conflicts over the capitalist economy (cities–countryside, employers–workers) (Rokkan 1982). In parallel, the discourse on Europe is also closely linked to different visions of Europe presented by diverse actors. Support and opposition do not mainly focus on the necessity of integration, but rather on the forms it adopts. In the referendum debates on the European Constitution the defence of national competences was not the only (or even the main) dimension in a debate that also addressed the perceived failure to defend the values of social justice.

1.4. Studying Europeanization from below: research design, sources, and methods

We will discuss the aforementioned paths of Europeanization from below, presenting some new empirical findings. In this part of our introduction we explain the main choices in designing our research, starting with conceptualization and proceeding with sampling and method.

In our research we triangulated sources and methods in an attempt to overcome their specific limits and exploit their strengths in reconstructing the complex picture of Europeanization from below, which we defined as Europeanization of and by civil society. Acknowledging the complexity of the terminological debate, in what follows we define civil society as a ‘self organised citizenry’ (Cohen and Arato 1992), including grass-roots social movement organizations (SMOs) and more formalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that operate in the field of so-called diffuse interests. Civil
society constitutes what, in relation to European institutions, Young and Wallace (2000) call the *civic interests*—as opposed to the private or sectorial interests of economic groups—and includes groups active on environmental, gender, or social rights (Greenwood 2003). Looking at civic interests, a conceptual separation has been made between SMOs, which are produced by and have strong roots in civil society, and NGOs, which may have, but may also have no or only weak roots in civil society. While Doyle and McEachern (1998; 87) include under the NGO label formalized as well as informal (environmental) organizations, the World Bank defines NGOs as ‘private organisations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development’ (Operational Directive 14.70). In contrast to NGOs, which tend to work through more conventional political channels, SMOs take grass-roots organizational forms and rely more on protest.

Although conceptually different types of actors and empirically often in competition with each other, at the various territorial levels NGOs and SMOs have shared general aims and have allied in several campaigns (della Porta 2007b). Because of their normative commitment and reliance on voluntary work, civil society organizations as public interest associations have been said to differ from other interest organizations represented in Brussels (Ruzza 2004). At the EU level, the success of environmental NGOs has often been facilitated by the closeness, if not the symbiosis, of such organizations to social movements (Cotellesa 2005; 205). On social policies (that is, in the European-policy areas related to the social agenda), NGOs have also been conducive to strategies of ‘integration by stealth’ (Greenwood 2003; 216), above all through the inclusion of social movements and organizations active on human rights protection and the fight against social exclusion (Cotellesa 2005; 207). NGOs and SMOs have also taken an important role in the organization of counter-summits that have targeted EU institutional meetings, as well as in the European Social Forums. As we will explain in more detail in the following chapters (where other concepts will also be introduced and put to use), although our focus is mainly on social

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movements, in some parts of our analysis we will also consider the broader category of civil society organizations, including NGOs, as contributing to the process of Europeanization from below.

In our triangulation we used claim analysis, based upon the mass-media coverage of Europe; semi-structured interviews with representatives of different collective actors; and surveys of demonstrators at protest events addressing the EU.

Our investigation of the degree and forms of participation of civil society in European politics through paths of domestication (Ch. 2) and externalization (Ch. 3) builds upon two comparative data sets, collected within the framework of a cross-national research project on ‘The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in Europe’,\(^3\) which covered supranational actors at the EU level and national actors from six EU countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and one non-EU-member state (Switzerland). These countries were chosen in order to include the most important EU member states, and at the same time to provide for sufficient variation along potentially relevant dimensions such as size of country, date of entry into the EU, institutional system (e.g. federal versus centralized, majoritarian versus proportional electoral system), as well as party system.

Indeed, studies of Europeanization have explained cross-national differences in the support for Europe with reference to some of these factors. In realist theories (e.g. Moravcsik 1998) researchers consider mainly geopolitical interests and net gains from participation in the EU as influencing countries’ positions towards Europe. Scholars from functionalist and constructivist perspectives, on the other hand, emphasize the role of length of participation in EU institutions (e.g. Niedermayer 1995) as well as institutional isomorphism (Risse, Green Cowles, and Caporaso 2001) between domestic and European institutions (decision-making procedures, political culture, and so on). Finally, cross-national differences

proved to be influenced by differences in political institutions (e.g. degree of centralization, nature of electoral system), as well as the positions that national governments take with regard to European integration (for example, from widespread Euro-scepticism in the UK to a relatively strong pro-European elite consensus in Germany) (Koopmans 2008). Switzerland, as the non-EU-member state, constitutes a special case in this respect. Undoubtedly, political links between Switzerland and the EU do exist and consequently a certain degree of Europeanization of the Swiss public sphere might be expected. Furthermore, as has been emphasized, the question of the future of Switzerland within Europe and/or the EU divides the political elite as well as citizens, and in itself provokes the high visibility of Europe in public debate (Jochum and Tresch 2004). Moreover, the countries selected allow us to observe social movement families of different types: more or less moderate in their strategies, more or less aligned around the left–right divisions, and so on (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta 2007a). We expect all these characteristics to play a role in influencing the various paths of Europeanization from below.

Through our cross-country comparison we shall investigate whether, according to a political opportunity structure perspective, social movement organizations in different countries tend to adapt to the national mood towards Europe, or whether, to the contrary, organizational characteristics, namely the material and the symbolic resources endowing social movements across Europe, have more weight in influencing their attitudes. In addition to these national cases, the design includes a separate case study of transnational political mobilization and communication at the EU level. Cross-time as well as cross-issues comparisons are included in our research design (see below).

In order to measure the participation of social movements in public debates concerning Europe, the Europub.com project relies

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4 Not only does Switzerland maintain strong economic relations with the EU and its member countries, but the issue of Swiss integration in the EU has also been part of the Swiss national political agenda for more than a decade (see e.g. the debate on membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), in the early 1990s; the demand for accession, in 1992; the numerous bilateral negotiations and agreements with the EU; and so on (Jochum and Tresch 2004)).
upon political claim analysis (see Koopmans and Statham 1999, 2002), a quantitative method that takes individual political claims as units of analysis and uses newspapers as a source on the publicly visible part of this claim-making. A claim is defined as an instance of strategic action in the mass media. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action (statement, institutional decision, court ruling, protest, etc.) by different types of actors (media, governments, civil society actors, etc.). The claim analysis aims to integrate two methodological traditions of social movement research: protest event analysis (Tarrow 1989; Franzosi 1994) and frame analysis (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). By systematically coding discursive dimensions, claim analysis broadens the scope of attention from protest to all forms of claim-making in the public domain, including conventional and verbal actions. Moreover, it locates social movement organizations within a larger multi-organizational field by including institutional and non-institutional actors in the analysis.

Although the use of the daily press as a source of information on protest or public discourse has been criticized because of the selection biases introduced by the practice of journalism (that is, not all events that occur receive coverage), in our research this risk is limited, since we are interested specifically in public claim-making—thus, in the claims that reach the pages of the newspaper. Furthermore, in order to reduce the description bias, as events may be covered in a distorted way (McCarthy et al. 1996), besides focusing on quality newspapers, we based our coding only on the factual coverage of events, leaving out any comments and evaluations made by the journalists. By focusing on the (part of the) public discourse represented in the printed media, we do not imply that this is the only arena where claims are presented. Also, we do not deny that some actors are less dependent upon the mass media, as they enjoy direct access to decision makers, while others are less able to influence the mass media and therefore resort to alternative communication channels; nor that some may choose to address the public because their claims resonate with the dominant public opinion, while others may opt for less visible channels because
they have more support among the elite than in the wider population. Nevertheless, we assume that the printed media are one of the most important arenas of public claim-making, and that most actors will, at one stage or another, try to make their views public.

An act of claim-making usually consists of the following elements (Koopmans and Erbe 2002): an actor, the claimant, who makes a demand, proposal, appeal, or criticism; an addressee, who is the target of the criticism or support; an object actor, whose interests are affected by the claim; and finally the substantive content of the claim, which states what is to be done (aim) and why (frame) (see Table 1.1).

In order to analyse degrees of Europeanization, we coded the polity/territorial scope at which each claimant, addressee, object, and frame is organized—distinguishing among local, regional, national, transnational (multi/bilateral), European, and supranational (e.g. UN) actors. Although our data set covers the claim-making of detailed categories of actors (e.g. Italian unions, the Italian Green Party, etc.), our analysis in this book will focus on the characteristics of the claim-making of general categories of actors, in particular social movement organizations and NGOs. Simplifying somewhat, we shall use ‘civil society’ (NGOs and SMOs) to mean students’, peace, womens’, immigrants’, environmental, consumers’, and welfare organizations, unions, and so on, as opposed to institutional actors, parties,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who? (Subject actor)</th>
<th>How? (Form)</th>
<th>At whom? (Addressee or target)</th>
<th>What? (Issue)</th>
<th>For/Against whom? (Object actor)</th>
<th>Why? (Frame)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-immigrants</td>
<td>engage in</td>
<td>criticizing the</td>
<td>for the</td>
<td>arguing that respect</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>associations</td>
<td>a strike</td>
<td>Italian government</td>
<td>treatment of</td>
<td>for human rights is a core value of the European Union</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>some asylum seekers</td>
<td></td>
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Source: adapted from Koopmans 2002

5 Unions were included in the category of social movements because first analyses showed that in several dimensions they had the same trends and characteristics as other social-movement organizations. Farmers and agricultural organizations, however, display patterns similar to those of other economic interest groups.
business interest groups, and media and journalists. (On this classification see Koopmans 2004.) Our data set includes claims about European integration in general and claims in six other issue fields, selected according to the extent of the EU’s decision-making capability in policies: monetary and agriculture, where the EU’s role in policy-making is substantial; immigration/asylum and troop deployment, where it has an emergent but as yet limited role; retirement pensions and education, where it plays a more limited (although far from negligible) role.

In each of the seven countries two quality newspapers (one more left-oriented, and one more right-oriented) have been chosen as our main sources. In order to look for potential evolution over time, we sampled the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2002. Articles relating to our policy domains plus the topic of European integration were collected from two issues per week for 2000–2, and from one issue per week for 1990 and 1995. For the year 2000 we additionally include two other newspapers: a regional newspaper from an area with a specific regional identity, and a tabloid newspaper catering to a non-élite public (of which we coded one issue per week). Data were coded through a standardized codebook (Koopmans and Statham 2002). All articles in the news section and in the economic and business sections were checked for relevant acts. Culture and sports sections, letters to the editor, and supplements were excluded from the coding; articles in the regional and local sections (where present) were included only if referred to in the international or national sections of the paper. Inter-coder reliability tests were undertaken on both the selection of articles and the coding and, in addition, coders participated in regular online discussions about difficult cases (see Koopmans 2004). The Europub.com data set is thus based on the scanning of more than 2,500 issues of 28 different European newspapers, with a total of about 24,000 individual claims.

On half of the days for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2002 only claims with a European scope (in at least one of the basic aspects of the claim: actors, addressees, objects, or issues) were coded. This restriction also pertains to the whole year 2001. See Appendix for a list of the claims we coded.
We analysed the daily press as an important arena for public discourse on Europe; yet it is evident that this medium selects specific actors and themes. In order to capture a broader picture on the visions of and strategies towards Europe, we integrated this part of the research with semi-structured interviews with actors that emerged from the press analysis as particularly relevant for the debate on European integration, agricultural policy, and immigration—themes characterized, once again, by different levels of EU competences (Koopmans 2004). We refer here to 96 semi-structured interviews (see Appendix) with representatives of the most important social movement organizations and NGOs in the mentioned seven European countries and at the European level (out of a total of 345 interviews, the sum of interviews with the four most important organizations of each actor type—state actors, political parties, interest groups, and SMOs/NGOs). Interview subjects were selected according to two main criteria. First, we selected actors based on the frequency with which they appeared in the media, assessed by analysing the data set of political claims made on the issues of European integration, agriculture, and immigration for the years 2000 and 2002, using the print media as a source. We then integrated these lists of most influential actors in the debate about Europe, consulting academic experts for additional suggestions. Since there are fewer organizations at the European level compared to the national level, and since they often have a lower visibility in the national mass media that we analysed, the selection of interview subjects was completed by searching in EU-level databases as well as on the Internet (see Adam et al. 2004).

The interviews were carried out between 2003 and 2004 by members of the various national teams in the Europub project. The semi-structured questionnaire, containing closed and open questions, focused on changes in the communication and mobilization

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7 EU agricultural policy, part of the first pillar, has the highest level of institutional European integration. Immigration and asylum policy although an EU policy since 1999, is mainly discussed in an intergovernmental arena (Wallace 2000; 33).

8 The interviews were mainly face-to-face. The response rate is close to 90 per cent, thanks to the large degree of cooperation on the part of our interlocutors.
strategies of collective actors as related to the process of European integration (actions, targets, cross-national and supranational networks, and so on). Concerning the interview sample, in each of the three policy fields about four interview partners were identified within each of the four categories of collective actors (government/administration, political parties, economic-interest groups, and social movement organizations), giving a total of approximately sixteen interviewees in each policy field and country as well as at the EU level. Within each of the selected organizations, individual representatives were identified according to their functions within the organizational structure. The interviews focused on these actors’ visions of Europe—contrasting their opinions on its actual evolution with their more ideal perspectives—the relations between these actors, and their interaction with European (and non-European) actors and institutions. Finally, we addressed their strategies of intervention, from lobbying to protest and other forms of communication, with particular attention to the different strategic choices at the national versus the European level.

For the analysis of the emergence of European social movements (Chapter 4) we will refer to a third data set, containing the results of a survey conducted at the First European Social Forum (ESF), a transnational meeting of the global justice movement held in Florence in November 2002. Although the questionnaire is rarely adopted in research on movements, some attempts at analysing the individual characteristics of participants in various (especially transnational) organizational demonstrations through questionnaires have developed recently (see Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Fillieule and Blanchard 2006; della Porta 2009a). During the ESF in

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9 We aimed to interview those responsible for the organization’s policies in our three relevant areas. For social movement organizations, we interviewed the national president or chief national representative for our topic of interest. For state actors, we typically interviewed the spokespersons of the ministries, heads of the directorates under the minister, or senior civil servants. For political parties, we interviewed either Members of Parliament responsible for the policy area of our interest, or senior representatives from the party’s organizational structure (e.g. the head of the policy unit). For interest groups, we were able to interview presidents of the organizations or heads of the selected policy sector. Further details on the sampling of our interview partners and the questionnaire used are available on the project website (see also Kriesi 2004b; for a qualitative and detailed analysis of the interviews for the Italian case see Porta and Caiani 2006).
Florence, the Research Group on Collective Action in Europe (GRACE\textsuperscript{10}) administered 2,384 questionnaires over the various initiatives, to construct a sample that represented as much as possible the various components of the movement. The semi-structured questionnaires were distributed face-to-face, with a random sampling of participants at various events at the Fortezza da Basso, where the Forum took place. The questionnaire had been translated into English, French, German, and Spanish, and distributed also to other non-Italian activists. We selected seminars and workshops of the ESF according to the type of proponent organizations (ecologists, religious believers, pacifists, feminists, trade unions, left-wing political parties, and anti-capitalist groups). Interviewers were asked to distribute questionnaires at random, without discriminating by gender or age of the respondents. As for the nationality of the organizations at the ESF, we focused the analysis on the Italian, French, Spanish, German, and English ones. Of the total number of interviewees, 1,668 were Italian, 124 French, 77 German, 88 Spanish, 118 British, and 309 from other countries. The different sizes of the national samples are proportionate to their country’s representation at the ESF. The issues dealt with in the survey, through mainly semi-closed questions, concerned associative experiences, forms of political participation, trust in the institutions, and identification with the movement (della Porta et al. 2006).

1.5. About this volume

In the following chapters we will analyse the characteristics of different paths of Europeanization from below. We will pay particular attention to the ways in which both ‘domesticated’ and ‘externalized’ protests carry the potential to generate European social movements—leading to social mobilization and a nascent public sphere—which, in turn, holds the potential to increase the EU’s democratic quality.

\textsuperscript{10} From the Italian: \textit{Gruppo di Ricerca sull’Azione Collettiva in Europa}.
Chapter 2 addresses the path of domestication in Europeanization from below, as indicated by protest and organizations at the national level oriented to change decisions at the European level. We will focus on the degree and forms of Europeanization in social movement participation in domestic public debates. We shall address the extent to which collective actors operating within (national) public spheres are carriers of Europeanization, either by organizing at the European level, making demands on European institutions, or framing their demands within a European discourse. The (claim-making) analysis will allow us to observe the evolution of various indicators of the participation of social movements and NGOs in the development of public discourse on Europe. It will confirm the low representation of these types of actors in a Europeanized public sphere, but also indicate some forms of Europeanization from below. We will, moreover, discuss the attitudes of some civil society actors towards European integration. As we will see, civil society actors are not merely adapting to the changing political context but also bear specific visions of ‘what’ Europe is and should be about. At the same time, with the help of social network analysis, in this chapter we will also look at networks of alliance, disagreement, and targets among actors that mobilize on European issues (with special attention to the issue of European integration). In particular, we shall focus on the role that social movements and NGOs play in these networks.

The use of the European level as an arena for mobilization oriented to modifying national policies—that is, what we called Europeanization by externalization—will be at the core of Chapter 3. We will rely here mainly upon the interviews with representatives of civil society organizations, in order to address the subjective perspectives of collective actors on the importance of Europe and European integration for their strategic choices; their use of insider versus outsider strategies in dealing with European issues; their communication strategies; as well as their relations with the European institutions. As we will see, the picture emerging from our interviews with representatives of SMOs and NGOs indicates a high level of attention to Europe, which translates into transnational
networking and the use of multiple strategies to target EU institutions. Moreover, the interviewees stress changes in their communication and mobilization strategies relative to the process of European integration. Using network analysis, we will compare density of collaboration and conflict, specifying the prevalent logic of relations within each policy domain, as well as the cleavages around which the debate on Europe is structured and which can influence the path of Europeanization of national collective actors.

Paths of domestication and externalization facilitate the rise of European social movements. As we will see in Chapter 4, the construction of European institutions as well as the policies chosen by the EU are increasingly the object of lively responses by loose networks of local, national, and transnational actors. Focusing on recent EU counter-summits and European Social Forums as better-developed examples of a European social movement, we will stress the signs of a declining permissive consensus around the EU, nevertheless suggesting that criticism towards Europe is not oriented to rejecting the need for a European level of governance, nor the development of a European identity. Looking at the frames and discourses of activists participating in the first European Social Forum in Florence in 2002, as well as those of their organizations, we will find emerging forms of a European social movement made up of loosely structured ‘networks of networks’ of activists endowed with multiple associational memberships, and experiences with various forms of political participation.

In the last chapter we will return to some of the interpretations presented in this introduction, discussing in particular the role that ‘critical Europeanists’ can have in the development of European identities and structures, and therefore in improving the quality of European democracy.
2

Europeanization and the Domestication of Protest

2.1. Milk quotas and the domestication of protest

In January 1997 dairy farmers asked the Italian government to suspend the collection of fines relating to the years 1994/5 and 1995/6 because of irregularities committed by the responsible institutional organs, UNALAT and AIMA. The ensuing protest campaign of the Italian dairy farmers against the fines imposed for the violation of EU milk quotas in the mid-1990s can be taken as an illustration of the characteristics and the potential of Europeanization from below via domestication. For the protesters, the most relevant political actor was the national government, which they accused of betraying the interests of the Italian farmers it was supposed to protect. Indeed, the protestors asked whether ‘any authority in our national government concretely looks after the interests of the producers—together with those of the consumers—in a world dominated by globalization and, before that, by Europe’ (in Cocca 2001; 191). Additionally, the actors in the protest remained national or even, as we will see, local, as was the territorial location of their action. The protest campaign led, however, to a new organizational structure of representation, with a form of direct democracy evolving from the traditions of social movements of the past, as well as first attempts at transnational networking and a few actions at the EU level. As for its frames, the protestors focused attention and criticisms on EU choices, not only on the Italian government’s
implementation of them. If they did not stigmatize the European integration process itself, they did oppose specific policies, at the same time developing an image of European farmers as valuing ‘high quality’ over profit orientation.

First of all, the protesters stigmatized not only the policy of the government, accused of unfair and clientelistic management of the quotas, but also the very representative value of the traditional parties and unions. Spontaneous committees of farmers developed, mostly in areas of Catholic ‘white’ subcultures (in particular, the provinces of Padua and Verona). Many of the activists were disappointed members of Coldiretti, an organization that represented farmers’ interests and that had been very close to the (then majoritarian) Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC). Trust in the ‘collateral organizations’ of the DC had collapsed with the corruption scandals of the early 1990s. As an older activist explained: ‘those of my age believed in the unions. We were all proper members, active, and a lot of us, me included, lent a hand in local politics as well. But after the “Clean Hands” investigation, we all left’ (ibid.; 159). The activists soon came to believe that political institutions and farmers’ unions were incapable of understanding their claims and channelling them into the decision-making process: ‘you could ask for a regional assessor for a meeting, but they wouldn’t come. The ones from the union found face-to-face encounters hard going and after a couple of times they hadn’t the courage to go through it again’ (ibid.; 69).

The protestors then moved beyond the traditional structures of representation of agricultural interests. As an activist explained:

[A]t the beginning we had meetings with eight or ten dairy farmers at someone’s house. The fines had already arrived and some had paid up . . . We began spontaneously, a bunch of guys in their thirties. It was only afterwards that we found out, thanks to friends from other provinces, that there were similar groups that met in Crema. And so we decided to see whether they had perhaps decided to do something or even whether we could do something together. (ibid. 64)
Not by chance, the constitution of one of the organizations founded during the protest, the Spontaneous Committees of Milk Producers (Comitati Spontanei Produttori Latte, or COBAS Latte) embodies direct democracy—with a decentralized structure organized around assemblies that are open to all with no reliance on official membership—as a basic principle.

Along with the construction of a new organizational structure, attention was paid to the building of a collective identity as European farmers. The point of reference of the movement was the small and medium dairy farms, particularly the more dynamic ones. Those protesting were not the losers in Europeanization:

The dairy farmers who got the protests going first and with most determination were essentially from the farms with long productive histories, thriving and recently inherited or anyway taking off on the backs of the most dynamic members of the family. Usually there was some kind of corporate agreement between brothers and/or cousins. In other words, they were traditional or ‘historic’ farmers, as they loved to define themselves, who at the beginning of the 1990s had invested hundreds of millions or even billions [of lira] in the hope of being able to take on international competition in an efficient manner.

(ibid.; 145)

They mostly belonged to a new generation of farmers, often young and well educated.

In the course of the campaign the protestors proposed agricultural policies that were critical of both protectionism and neoliberalism, framing them as an adaptation to Europeanization and globalization. They asked for ‘appropriate state and community control and promotion of the quality, purity, and freshness of the products, especially when covered by marks with a protected origin’ (ibid.; 188). This would allow for the modernization of dairy farms as well as protecting ‘the environmental and qualitative singularity of our productions’ (ibid.; 189). While accusing market liberalization of reducing quality standards in the name of price competition, the mobilized farmers proposed a protection of product quality, binding tradition to innovation. For this reason, in the construction of a collective identity there was a focus on getting away from the stereotype of the poor and
ignorant contadino (small farmer): ‘We put effort into the image, in order not to be what some wanted us to be. “They are peasants, they don’t know how to speak, look how they dress.” We wanted to show who we really were’ (ibid.; 193).

While the protest campaign against the milk quotas tended to remain mainly national, it did indicate the limits of ‘domestication’, which works in fact only to the extent that national governments retain autonomous power, and for actors that are better protected at the national than at the supranational level. The organization of a march of Italian farmers (with their ‘live’ symbol, the Mucca Carolina—Caroline the cow) in Brussels confirms their perception of the need to address the EU level as well. Years later, in an interview we carried out on the Europeanization of the public sphere, the speaker from COBAS Latte stressed the importance of the European level for his organization and its support for the increased influence of the European institutions on agricultural policies (see below). In fact, the Italian farmers developed contacts with colleagues from other European countries, where globalization and Europeanization had created new collective demands—along with new organizational strategies and new identity discourses—related to production in the primary sector. The march in Brussels as well as the mobilization of European farmers against WTO-supported policies indicate the capacity of collective actors that emerge and act mainly at the domestic level to overcome national borders, framing their concerns within a broader social agenda. Especially after the shift in communitarian agricultural policies (with Agenda 2000) from subsidies to market liberalization and WTO-supported policies of competition, the Confédération Paysanne Européenne mobilized at the EU level against what they defined as neo-liberal stances (Delorme 2002), developing a European identity while criticizing the specific policies of reducing regulation of the use of hormones, genetically modified organisms, pesticides, and the like. ¹ On genetically modified food and other issues linked to the protection of the environment, farmers’ associations allied with environmental groups in Europe-wide protests.

¹ On the discourse of the Confédération Paysanne see Bové and Dufour 2000.
The story of the campaign of Italian farmers around milk quotas provides a perfect illustration of the path of domestication of protest that we shall refer to in this chapter. It shows the continued focus on national institutions, but also the way in which multilevel governance affects politics at home. As we will see in what follows, concerns about EU decisions have mainly been expressed at the national level, where elected political institutions are supposed to be more accountable to the citizens/electors. Prompted by EU policies in an area in which the EU is indeed quite influential, the protest of the Italian farmers addressed mainly national authorities. Their ‘domesticated’ protest was inherently multilevel and brought about changes in the organizational structures, action strategies, and discourses of the national organizations. In this process, as we will see in what follows, the European level of governance has various effects on social movements and protest at home, challenging existing structures and frames.

Using mainly results from claim analysis and interviews developed within the Europub.com project, in this chapter we will first discuss the normative implications of the participation of civil society actors in (inclusive and pluralistic) Europeanized public spheres, and their relevance for the quality of democracy in the EU (Sect. 2.2). As we will see, however, research in the mass-media public sphere confirms a very weak presence of civil society actors and their critical frames in debates on Europe. In particular, social movement organizations most frequently address European institutions via domestication; that is, the use of national publics and institutions as main channels of pressure upon the EU (Sect. 2.3). For particular paths and forms, however, Europeanization from below seems on the rise. In domestic debates targeting European issues, social movement organizations emerge as more critical and contentious, but also as bearers of a more identitarian vision of Europe. Additionally, paths of Europeanization through domestication foster the development of European identities and structures (Sect. 2.4). In various policy areas social movement actors organized at the national level show some capacity for networking, both
among themselves and with their external environment, in order to address European issues (Sect. 2.5).

2.2. Protest and the European public sphere

Protest event analysis has repeatedly concluded that concerns about EU decisions have been mainly expressed at the national level, where elected political institutions are considered more accountable to the citizen/electors (see Ch. 1). Relying upon Reuters world-news service and the Reuters textline, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001b) found a very limited number of such protests. Based on data collected from German newspapers, Dieter Rucht (2002) observed a low (and declining) proportion of protests aimed at the international level including EU institutions (with the high point coming in 1960–4) and/or whose actions were organized cross-nationally. Giugni and Passy (2002) as well as Koopmans (2004) noted how rarely protests on migrant rights targeted the EU, notwithstanding the increasing Europeanization of decisions on migration at least on issues such as access quotas and border controls. Even environmental action only very rarely turned on Brussels: a cross-national research project revealed that in the 1990s, environmental protest events with EU targets ranged from 0.8 per cent of total protests on environmental issues in Italy to 4.6 per cent in Germany, with no discernible increasing trend (Rootes 2002).

The limited number of protests directed at EU institutions can be linked to the undeniable deficit in representative democracy: supposing that protestors could produce disagreements and criticisms, these would be difficult to mobilize against an unaccountable and opaque target. Research on social movements has stressed that protest grows when not only grievances but also resources and opportunities are present; that is, when protestors believe their actions could have an impact upon decision makers (for a review, see della Porta and Diani 2006; ch. 8). The low presence of protest at the European level was explained by the political opportunities
available at various territorial levels of government (della Porta and Kriesi 1999).

The channelling of demands coming directly ‘from below’ appears all the more difficult faced with formally closed institutions. As is well known, the European Parliament is the only elective EU institution. Although its powers have increased, especially with the right to subject the European Commission to a binding confidence vote, the competences of the Parliament are still limited; and its electoral legitimacy is weakened by the low levels of participation in its elections, the absence during European elections of pan-European party programmes or actors, and the secondary role that Europe plays among the political interests of many Euro-parliamentarians (Blondel, Sinnott, and Svensson 1998; Bardi and Ignazi 1999). Democratic accountability is even more frequently debated in connection with the Council, composed of ministers from individual governments, responsible in principle to their electorates but rarely receiving a specific mandate on European policies. With respect to the Commission, the problem of its weak accountability to an electoral body is not solved (or limited) by the role played by bureaucrats and experts within various committees.

In order to assess the role of social movements and NGOs in the development of a European-level democracy, however, we must go beyond electoral accountability, taking into account in particular the importance of rendering decision makers accountable in the (more or less Europeanized) public sphere. The quality of democracy in the EU cannot be considered only (or mainly) in terms of constructing representative institutions, electorally accountable to their citizens. Beyond the dimension of electoral accountability there is another one linked to the construction of European public spheres, where the decisions of EU institutions can be discussed and assessed. In Jürgen Habermas’s definition (1989), a public

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2 The rate of participation in European elections is particularly low. In 2004 the average turnout was only 45%, around 5% lower than in the previous elections in 1999. Turnout was particularly low in the 10 new member states (26.7%), with an average of 49% in the other 15. (Source: European Parliament Statistical Databases, <http://www.scb.se/templates/Product_12361.asp>, accessed Sept. 2008).
sphere is an arena open to the public where issues that affect the collectivity and decisions made by state powers are discussed. The concept of the public sphere defines an area, not part of the state but publicly relevant, where discussions occur in public, and whose key features are the instruments used for political debate: public oratory and rationality (ibid.). In the past century the influence of political parties (politicization) on the mass media, but even more so their commercialization has challenged the autonomy of the public sphere. The crisis of the party as an instrument of identification and political socialization (della Porta 2001) has increased the focus on the media’s role in developing a ‘democracy of the public’ (Manin 1995; 295) by constructing plural arenas for the discussion of public decisions.

A European public sphere would consist of communication spaces that relayed input and demands from citizens in a process of decision-making that transcended national boundaries. It has in fact been defined as made of ‘new spaces of public communication . . . which emerge in the EU as a result of processes of political and economic integration’ (Schlesinger 2003; 9). Its development is regarded with both hope and apprehension, as the possibility of judging and criticizing public decisions in the public sphere becomes particularly important in the legitimation of institutions with weak electoral accountability. Normatively, the public sphere is ‘a precondition for the realisation of popular sovereignty, given that it allows everyone the possibility of limitless intervention’ (Eriksen 2004; 1). The public debate and political mobilization should provide policy makers with information on the demands, opinions, and interests of citizens, facilitating the development of more effective European policies. In a post-national democracy the debate on the future of Europe ‘must find resonance in a pan-European, public and political sphere, which assumes a European civil society complete with interest groups, non-governmental organisations, and movements of citizens’ (Habermas 2001; 103).

Attention to the construction of a public space on Europe is thus linked to conceptions of democracy that go beyond the representative element, or at least merge electoral accountability with...
participation and deliberation. In order to be truly representative, democracies must allow the electors to keep the elected accountable (Manin 1995). For this to occur, there must be places where citizens can freely discuss decisions taken by their governors through public debates on public issues. Equal access to these arenas and the quality of communication are themes underlined by the participatory and deliberative conceptions of democracy (Bobbio 2005; Gbikpi 2005; della Porta 2005). Beyond electoral accountability, the constitution of a European public sphere is seen as able to reinforce identification in Europe through the participation of citizens in public debates and collective action, as well as in the development of a common collective identity of the ‘politically relevant community’ at the supranational level. The perception of the indivisibility of risk leads to the search for supranational communities whose futures are bound together (Lorenzoni 2000; 93) based upon the development of a ‘global self’ (Pulcini 2001). Although we may expect these identities to remain less salient than those developed at the national level, it is precisely the weakening of references to a pre-political community that accentuates the relevance of legitimizing processes in politics. In the words of Habermas, ‘the strength of the democratic constitutional state is determined precisely through its ability to close the gaps of social integration by the political participation of its citizens’. In the ‘post-national constellation’, with a weak communitarian identity, it is necessary to ‘find a less demanding basis of legitimacy in the form of a system of international negotiations’ (Habermas 2001; 76–7, 109–10). In the definition of a cosmopolitan democracy, the quest for accountability of supranational institutions requires greater transparency and direct participation of citizens as ‘inhabitants of the world’ (Archibugi 1998; 211–12; 2003; 8; Archibugi, Held, and Koehler 1998; 4; Held 1998; 24).

The need for inclusive Europeanized public spheres is in fact stressed within different traditions. Thinking about post-national democracy, Habermas underlines the role of civil society actors in activating processes of communication from the periphery to the centre of a political system: ‘Despite a weaker organisational
capacity and less capacity for action, and despite structural disad-
vantages... they have been able to alter the circuit of communica-
tion in the political system and the public sphere. In this way
they may modify the capacity to resolve problems within the entire
system' (1996; 380–1). Looking at a system of multilevel govern-
ance, Fritz Scharpf stresses, alongside an electoral responsibility,
the increasing importance of ‘brakes and counter-weights between
different articulations and levels of government, authentic guaran-
tees of free communication and association, and a broad basis
of intermediary associations, competitive political parties, autono-
mous and credible means of mass communication. Where such
conditions exist, political power is exercised with reference to pub-
lic opinion and public debate’ (1999; 21). Various forms of partici-
pation by citizens through non-governmental organizations,
initiatives from below, and social movement organizations may
in fact indirectly influence EU decisions, giving them visibility,
resonance, and legitimacy in public debate (Koopmans and
Statham 2002; 4). The debate on Europe has per se a democratizing
function, as the criticism of institutions forms the foundation of
democratic legitimacy (Trenz and Eder 2004).

Although the emergence of a European public sphere is consid-
ered as potentially salient in the process of legitimizing European
institutions, and the public discourse on Europe as a crucial part of
the analysis of democratic quality at EU level (Morlino 2003), em-
pirical research has linked the weak legitimacy of European institu-
tions to the weakness of a European public sphere. The difficulty in
developing arenas of supranational debate has in fact often been
highlighted (Gerhards 1993; Le Torrec et al. 2001). Characteristics of
both EU politics and media systems have been noted as responsible
for the weakness of the European public sphere. Low degrees of
media coverage of EU policies and institutions have been linked to
the weakness of the European Parliament, the tendency among the
Commission bureaucracy to operate in a ‘secretive’ manner, the
intergovernmental nature of the Council, and the absence of a
common language. As for the media system, observers have identi-
fied the tendency for journalists to use traditional categories that
fail to account for innovations in the construction of Europe; the lack of a unified public; the prevailing national agendas in discussing European news; and the predominant symbolic image of an intergovernmental Europe guided by élites, with weak visibility of more ‘European’ institutions such as the Parliament (Gerhards 1993; La Torrec et al. 2001). As mentioned in Chapter 1, more recent studies have highlighted some increasing attention to European issues, but within a still fragmented and élitist public discussion.

As we will see in the following sections, our research confirms the difficulties for social movement organizations and NGOs to make their voices heard when talking about European issues in domestic public spheres. At the same time, however, it points out some specific paths of Europeanization of domestic movements, confirming their adaptation to multilevel governance but also their growing criticism of some aspects and decisions of EU institutions.

2.3. How much do social movements and NGOs take part in the public (mass-media) discourse on Europe?

As mentioned, research on protest events has pointed at the rarity of protests directly targeting European institutions. Similar results also emerged from our claim-making analysis, notwithstanding that, given the constraints of our source, we used a broad definition for SMOs and NGOs. As we will see, based on various indicators of Europeanization, the discourse on Europe is still dominated by institutional actors, even more than the domestic one (see also Koopmans 2004); the EU is rarely targeted ‘from below’; civil society actors seldom frame their object and issue scope as European. In sum, SMOs and NGOs emerge as least present in Europeanized policy fields and show less capacity to frame issues in European

---

3 In the category of SMOs and NGOs we have grouped: students’, consumers’, migrants’, womens’, environmental, welfare, solidarity and human rights, peace, and elderly people’s associations and groups, pro- and anti-European groups, religious organizations, think tanks and experts, educational and professional organizations, other civil society organizations, and the general public (on this classification see Koopmans 2004).
terms (see also della Porta and Caiani 2004, 2006). We can observe, however, that the participation of SMOs and NGOs varies by different indicators of Europeanization and by country (Table 2.1).

When looking at the scope of the claimant who enters the (mass-media) public sphere, in all countries and policy fields European actors account for a modest proportion of claims (from 6.6 per cent of European claimants in Britain to 19.9 per cent in Spain), a level that drops even when focusing on transnational European SMOs and NGOs (no more than 2 per cent in all the countries). Among non-institutional actors with a European character present in our sources, we find above all those that are better endowed with organizational resources to help them to deal with the shift of power towards the EU level. Unions, farmers’ organizations, and religious groups and churches are among them. Some of these European actors address European institutions directly, for instance when the Confederation of European Unions calls upon the EU to protect public services and to insert a social agreement in the future treaty (*Le Figaro*, 6/11/2000) or asks to constitutionalize social, political, civil, and union rights (*Le Figaro*, 17/2/1995); when religious organizations (such as Comece, Caritas Europe, European Justitia-et-Pax, etc.) opposed the EC Council proposals on common immigration policy, stating that illegal immigrants should not be criminalized (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29/5/2001); or when European farmers protested at a meeting of EC ministers of agriculture to decide about agriculture prices (*De Volkskrant*, 27/03/1990).

Looking at the choice of European institutions as the target of claims, in all our countries, although national (and subnational) actors are still the main targets of claims, the role of European actors and institutions is relevant (from 15.4 per cent of European targets in the British case to 32.8 per cent in the French one). Here as well, however, the presence of civil society in the debate declines when the target shifts from the national to the EU level. Relatively high scores for SMOs and NGOs are registered in France, Germany, and Italy, the lowest in the UK, followed by Switzerland, Spain, and the Netherlands. Among the examples of domestic actors’ involvement in demands and criticisms of European targets are French...
Table 2.1. Share (%) of claims with EU scope (actors, addressees, objects, issues) by actors and by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of EU scope</th>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>All countries</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claimant</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(1,444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>(12,358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressee</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>(1,033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>(8,101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>(1,203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>(9,335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>(1,297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>(9,471)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All-claim sample only. Row percentages

Note: The total for ‘All countries’ does not add up to the sum of the other columns because the data have been weighted in such a way that each country contributes equally to the total.

\(^4\) In order to avoid overestimating the claims with a European dimension, claims in the field of European integration are not included, since, by definition, they have a European-issue scope.

\(^5\) In the analyses based on claims data, we balanced the sample of claims from 1990 and 1995 by assigning their double weight. Furthermore, since only half of the sample (namely 26 days when claims were coded for 1990 and 1995 and 52 when they were coded for 2000 and 2002) contains all the articles found on the selected issues, while in the other half of the sample (again 26 days for the earlier years, and 52 days for the most recent) only claims with a European scope in at least one of the basic aspects of the claim (actors, addresses, issue) were coded, we based most of our analyses on full-sample issues only. By doing this we avoid over-representing claims with a European dimension, thus drawing a fair picture of the degree to which ‘Europe’ is present in the national public sphere. We indicate in the text when the reduced sample is added.
unions calling upon the EU to act in social and employment policy (L’Humanité, 6/12/2000); Dutch unions criticizing the European Council’s proposal to use the open method of coordination as a strategy for a better social policy, and pleading instead for a European basic income, the protection of employees with atypical contracts, and better child care (De Telegraaf, 6/12/2000); Swiss citizens’ associations calling for a broader definition of fundamental social rights for the European citizen (Leeuwarder Courant, 7/10/2002); and the Scottish Farmers’ Union asking the European Commission to ‘show a greater appreciation . . . of the special difficulties we face here in Scotland’ (The Scotsman, 25/7/2000).

When looking at the scope of the object of claim-making, we find a similar picture, with a significant presence of European objects in the public debates of all countries in general, but a sharp decline when we focus on civil society organizations. Another important indicator of the Europeanization of the public sphere is the issue scope, referring to the framing of claims. In the public debates on the issues we sampled in the European countries under study, about a quarter of all claims are framed with specific reference to Europe; once again, European reference remains less important in the claims presented in our sources by SMOs and NGOs, with especially low values in Spain, France, and Switzerland.

A cross-national look reveals that the civil society organizations tend to adapt to the general mood in their own countries (at least, to the mood as portrayed in the dailies we have used in our research). If we take the choice of a European target as reported by the media, French SMOs and NGOs emerge in the first position, and the same is true of the other French actors. At the other end, the published claims of British SMOs and NGOs appear (at least in the media debate) as addressing European targets less frequently; the same is true for the other British actors, followed by the Swiss.

More generally, while the degree of Europeanization of published claims is lower for SMOs and NGOs than for other actors (exactly one-tenth of institutional actors), the ratio improves if we look at the choice of European institutions as targets (more than one-third vis-à-vis institutional actors), a European scope for the object of the
discourse (about one-third), and the framing of the issue as European (almost half).

In fact, in the public, mass-media discourse the Europeanization of social movements takes different paths from those of institutional actors. We can build a typology that to a certain extent reflects the one presented in Chapter 1 by combining, for claims framed as involving European issues, the territorial scope of the claimant with that of the target. In a fully supranational polity all important claims would be made by European political parties, interest groups, social movements, and other collective actors targeting European institutions—as Imig and Tarrow put it, ‘with functional interests mobilised through European lobbies, territorial representatives organised in the EU Parliament, and state interests represented in the European Council’ (2001a; 16). National public discourses may also Europeanize when European actors exercise transnational pressure by intervening in national public discourses, criticizing national policies, or propagating European integration. A third path to the Europeanization of public discourse is domestication (Imig and Tarrow 2001a), where the EU or its policies are either the source or the indirect target of claims by domestic actors, but the direct target remains the nation-state. Finally, a form of externalization is present if and when the mobilizations and communications of national actors target the EU directly; this often takes place in an attempt to pressure the groups’ own governments (Chabanet 2002).

For the typology and the related analyses, in order to obtain a data set of claims launched in response to the policies or institutions of the EU (EU-based claims), we consider only claims framed as involving European issues; that is, those with a European issue scope. To operationalize the four types of Europeanization, for the scope of the claimant as well as the scope of the target, we focus on the two levels, national and European. Applying our typology on forms of Europeanization to our data on claim-making in the seven

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6 See also the typology of the Europeanization of collective action elaborated by Balme and Chabanet (2002).
European countries under study (Table 2.2), we can observe that, overall, the Europeanization of public discourse, as reported in the press, mainly assumes the forms of domestication (37.3%) and externalization (34%). Supranational dynamics are also relevant (18.7%), while transnational pressure applies to only 10 per cent of the cases.

A comparison of the different forms of Europeanization between civil society and other actors points to relevant differences. Focusing on claims made by the former, we notice that the prevailing type of Europeanization is domestication, although externalization is also relevant (even a little more than for all actors considered), while the frequency of European social actors addressing either the EU (8%) or national governments (2.6%) is lower. This means that, notwithstanding the difficulties in building supranational organizations, SMOs and NGOs try to adapt their claim-making to a multilevel governance. We have, in fact, claims made by national SMOs and NGOs and directed toward national targets (own-country targets as well as other-country national targets) but concerning European issues and framed with reference to European values and norms and frames. Many of these cases are to be considered as forms of Europeanization by domestication, in which national actors address national targets to apply pressure at EU level. This is the case, for example, when Polish farmers organize road blockades to prevent German grain transports, helping to dump a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope of the claimant</th>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Scope of the target</th>
<th>European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>Domestication</td>
<td>Externalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>Transnational pressure</td>
<td>Supranationalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of cases: SMOs NGOs (387); all actors (7,698)
Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European-issue scope. Cells show percentages calculated on the total
train load of grain on railway tracks while protesting against EU agriculture policy and declaring ‘we will use all the tools at our disposal to protect our land’ (*The Guardian*, 11/7/2002).

But we also have cases of claims resonating with the form of Europeanization by externalization, in which European institutions are called upon by national actors to intervene in national public spheres, as when the President of the UK National Farmers’ Union criticizes the French decision not to lift a ban on British beef, saying that ‘It is unacceptable that such a clearly illegal ban has been [imposed for so long without fines]’ and calling upon the Commission to act against further breaches (*The Guardian*, 3/10/2002). Similar multilevel actions emerge when Swiss civil-rights organizations criticize EU institutions—protesting at the increasingly ambiguous rights of asylum seekers due to the jungle of rules and laws more or less coordinated in Brussels—and ask the ECJ to intervene (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 3/10/2000); or when Amnesty International (Germany) accuses Turkey of torture, invoking European humanitarian values (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19/9/2002); or again, when the French coordinators of the human-rights organization Clic call on the EU to isolate Austria, supporting Austrian democrats in opposition to its extreme-right government (*L’Humanité*, 16/2/2000).

In the last example the intervention of the EU is asked for in and for another country from the country of the claim maker; there are also cases of Europeanization by supranationalism, in which social movements and NGOs from different member states protest together against EU targets. In these cases it seems that choosing European targets helps in the formation of European identities, which develop slowly from cross-national contacts between similar organizations in different European countries or by forms of mutual cross-national solidarity against the EU. For example, such a process occurred when French and UK farmers agreed to stop the ‘lamb war’, asking the EC to bring forward premiums to farmers, give special payments to hard-hit farmers, adjust the existing price safety net, and increase the premium for raising beef rather than dairy cows (*The Guardian*, 13/9/1990); or when Dutch and German
farmers protested together against European Commission proposals to cut the EU agricultural budget for member states, stressing that ‘EU enlargement is politically necessary but needs to be prepared carefully, including previous internal EU reforms’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6/3/1990). Similar processes developed when hundreds of neo-Nazis from various countries demonstrated in favour of Haider and the right-wing Austrian government, in order to defend ‘national sovereignty against EU dictatorship and to protect, above all, the jobs of German people’ (La Nazione, 13/3/2000).

In a more advanced form of transnationalization of actors’ identities we find claims made by social actors from various member states not only directed towards EU targets but also staged on European ground, such as for example the ‘peaceful demonstration of social movements from different European countries against the EU Summit’, ‘against the Charter which is “a load of hogwash”’, and for an EU which ‘enables asylum seekers to ask for asylum in any member country…for a more social Europe and against neoliberalism, against the European Council’ (Le Figaro, 8/12/2000).

One final remark, on historical trends. If we compare our data on claim-making over time, we can observe that while interventions in the debate by supranational actors remain extremely rare, there is a significant increase in the percentage of claims from civil society organizations addressing EU institutions as targets, and in the framing of issues in a European perspective. In general, the presence of supranational EU actors in the press is around 8 per cent in the 1990s, doubling to around 16 per cent in the year 2000; for SMOs/NGOs it emerges in 1995 with a very low 1.4 per cent that remains more or less stable later on (about 1.7 per cent). In contrast, the presence of EU targets (more or less stable for all actors, with about 13 per cent in 1990 and 1995, and 16 per cent in the year 2000) increases by five times for SMOs/NGOs (from 2 per cent in the 1990s to more than 10 per cent in the 2000s), as it does for the European scope of the issues (from 2.5 percent to 11 per cent). In sum, the increasing competences of EU institutions seem to have been recognized by movement organizations.
2.4. Framing Europe in domestic debates

If actors from below have less access to the mass media, and their Europeanization takes particular paths, we can add that when their voices are heard in the public sphere they are quite critical (Koopmans 2004; on Italy, della Porta and Caiani 2006). This emerges from the analysis of the several indicators we used for measuring support for Europe, both in the public debate (as reported in the press) and through interviews.

In our analysis of claims-making we coded actors’ general evaluations of the European integration process. A score of $+1$ was given if a claimant expressed support for the integration process, or if the claim implied a call for extension (or a rejection of restrictions) in the competences of European institutions. A score of $-1$ indicates opposition to the integration process or a call to restrict (or oppose the extension of) the competences and prerogatives of European institutions. A score 0 indicates neutral or ambivalent positions.\(^7\)

In Table 2.3 we report the score of the average valence position for each collective actor on Europe, calculated by aggregating the position scores of the claims of that type of collective actor. The attitudes towards increased European integration are only registered for claims that had a European dimension in the issue scope.

Overall, in the European countries under study (Table 2.3), when considering the evaluation of European integration in the press by various types of actors,\(^8\) state and party representatives show more clearly positive attitudes towards Europe. These are followed by interest organizations, and finally civil society organizations (among socio-economic interest groups, farmers’ organizations are particularly critical). Among SMOs and NGOs, the most critical towards Europe in the reported claim-making are religious associations. Also critical are environmentalists, consumers, welfare and human rights associations,

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\(^7\) Where we have aggregated data across countries, the data have been weighted so that each country makes an equal contribution to the overall result.

\(^8\) The six number totals for ‘All countries’, in parentheses, do not precisely add up to the sum of the other columns because the data has been weighted in such a way that each country contributes equally to the total number. This is because of the different numbers of cases in the seven countries, which reflect different newspaper styles and formats.
pro- and anti-EU organizations, as well as extreme-right groups (although the small number of cases for some of these categories requires caution in interpreting results). For example, a French representative of the Cimade (which defends the rights of immigrants) says he fears ‘European charter planes’ (to deport immigrants) because ‘the EU has not yet a coherent immigration policy’ (Le Figaro, 4/12/2002); the French consumer organization CLCV criticizes EU agriculture policy, arguing that consumers bear the brunt of the European Minister’s compromise (Le Figaro, 22/11/2000); the Italian branch of the environmental association Greenpeace opposes a directive by the European Court on patents, stressing that ‘this norm is a step back on European legislation’ and asking for ‘a renegotiation of the European directive’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 10/10/2001).

In general terms, in the debate in the domestic media SMOs and NGOs are more critical towards Europe than other groups in their country (Table 2.4), and this is true in each of the seven European countries we studied. However, in a cross-national analysis interesting differences emerge. In public debates SMOs and NGOs tend to show a

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### Table 2.3. Evaluation of the European integration process, by actor type (mean values; no. of cases in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>(No.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State and party</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>(10,185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic interest groups</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>(2,325)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>(108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer’s organizations</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>(304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers’ and agricultural organizations</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>(174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>(722)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches and religious organizations/groups</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific and research professionals and institutions</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>(229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students, pupils, their parents and educational professionals/organizations</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>(68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other professional organizations</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>(52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer organizations</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant organizations</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro- and anti European campaign organizations</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>(114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity, human rights, or welfare organizations</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental organizations</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other civil society organizations</td>
<td>−0.04</td>
<td>(60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General public</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown/unspecified actors</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>(13,233)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on both samples, but including only cases with a European-issue scope

---
Table 2.4. Evaluation of the European integration process (in general and concerning six substantive policy areas), by actor type and country (mean values; no. of cases in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>General position on Europe Mean</th>
<th>(No.)</th>
<th>6 policies Mean</th>
<th>(No.)</th>
<th>European integration Mean</th>
<th>(No.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.19 (110)</td>
<td>0.12 (43)</td>
<td>0.24 (67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.29 (2999)</td>
<td>0.16 (1303)</td>
<td>0.38 (1696)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.14 (51)</td>
<td>0.12 (26)</td>
<td>0.16 (25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.19 (1541)</td>
<td>0.14 (693)</td>
<td>0.23 (848)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.17 (102)</td>
<td>0.12 (34)</td>
<td>0.19 (68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.34 (1743)</td>
<td>0.28 (744)</td>
<td>0.38 (999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.09 (91)</td>
<td>0.00 (41)</td>
<td>0.16 (50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.19 (1935)</td>
<td>0.10 (1047)</td>
<td>0.30 (888)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.21 (99)</td>
<td>0.06 (49)</td>
<td>0.36 (50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.28 (1366)</td>
<td>0.23 (608)</td>
<td>0.33 (758)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.03 (119)</td>
<td>0.01 (83)</td>
<td>0.06 (36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.10 (1644)</td>
<td>0.07 (960)</td>
<td>0.14 (684)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.12 (129)</td>
<td>-0.03 (29)</td>
<td>0.17 (100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.29 (1897)</td>
<td>0.17 (541)</td>
<td>0.33 (1356)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All⁹</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.14 (722)</td>
<td>0.05 (314)</td>
<td>0.20 (408)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.24 (13233)</td>
<td>0.16 (5906)</td>
<td>0.31 (7327)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A moderate level of support for Europe (0.14); those in Germany, France, and the Netherlands are distinguished by higher levels, while those in Switzerland, Italy, and the UK show lower levels, with Spanish civil society associations displaying an average level. Considering all the actors, the most pro-European countries are Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (all above the general average), while the most critical ones are Spain, Italy, and the UK. Comparing civil society organizations’ support for Europe with the trends emerging from their respective countries, it is worth noting that civil society actors in Germany, France, and the Netherlands follow the pro-European attitude of their own countries, while those in Spain, Italy, and the UK reflect the more widespread criticism of their respective countries. Only Swiss civil society associations differ from the pattern of support in their own country, being more critical towards Europe than are other actors in Switzerland.

⁹ The six number totals for ‘All countries’, in parentheses, do not precisely add up to the sum of the other columns because the data has been weighted in such a way that each country contributes equally. This is because the different numbers of cases in the seven countries, which reflect different newspaper styles and formats.
Criticisms regarding European institutions also change with the issues at play. As mentioned above (see Ch. 1), in our content analysis we registered public claims about the general topic of European integration, as well as other claims with a European dimension (e.g. targeting European actors, or discussing issues within a European frame of reference) in six specific policy fields with different levels of EU competencies. When discussing European issues in general terms, claims expressing a positive attitude toward increased Europeanization are more likely than when discussing any of the six substantive policy fields (monetary policy, agriculture, migration, defence, pensions, and education) (0.31 vs. 0.16). This holds particularly true for civil society associations, whose support decreases from 0.20 on European integration in general, to 0.05 when Europe is addressed with regard to these six policy fields.

Considering that attitudes are also expressed by the form of action chosen to address authorities, we built a combined index of the content and form of claim-making. We have aggregated action forms in the following broad categories: political decision/executive actions, verbal actions (e.g. communication events such as press releases), and protest/direct-democratic actions. We consider as conflictual claims all those in which protest was used, accompanied by criticism of the targets. In Table 2.5 we show the distribution of conflictual claims by civil society associations versus other actors, in both domestic and ‘European’ claim-making. In the operationalization of domestic claims we consider only those with a national-issue scope; as ‘EU-based claims’ we consider only those

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>National debate</th>
<th>Conflictual claims</th>
<th>EU debate</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>EU debate</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and party</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>(1,779)</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>(6,508)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>(741)</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>(510)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>(3,296)</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>(8,531)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer’ V = 0.12***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer’ V = 0.13***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5. Conflictual claims in European and domestic debate (%; no. of cases in parentheses)
on the issue of European integration and/or with a European-issue scope.

In general, the level of conflictual claims is, again, lower in European (46%) than in domestic (55%) claim-making. SMOs and NGOs, however, are much more contentious than other types of actors, even in claim-making with reference to Europe: 62 per cent of claims by civil society actors are conflictual versus 46 per cent of those by all actors (42 per cent for state and party, 55 percent for socio-economic interest groups). Civil society actors are in fact more critical than states and parties: 56.8 per cent of their frames are critical towards European institutions (score −1); moreover, they used protest in 13 per cent of their claim-making when addressing Europe, against an average of 1.5 per cent, with especially high scores for Italy and France (data not shown but available on request). Trade unions above all are much more contentious in the domestic than in the EU debate. (The difference between the percentage of conflictual claims in the EU and that in the national debate is −15.2.) Civil society actors are only slightly less conflictual in EU debates than in national ones: for SMOs and NGOs, the difference between EU and national claims is −5.0 versus an average of −9.0 for all actors. Examples of conflictual claims in the printed sources we analysed include the numerous strikes of Italian civil servants against the plan to deregulate the European Commission and against the national-governmental reform on social welfare as conforming to the ‘European diktats’ (*La Repubblica*, 30/11/1995); the demonstration organized by Swiss Unions for a social Europe (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 8/12/2000); the several hundred German farmers protesting against the EU proposal to pay only a quarter of the EU standard direct payments to the candidate members after enlargement (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8/11/2002); the protest by 7,000 French farmers in Clermont-Ferrand, who called on the EU to give them full reimbursement for the economic losses related to the BSE crisis and to harmonize the measures against BSE at the European level (*L’Humanité*, 6/12/2000); the demonstration of Dutch farmers against the European Commission asking for the right to vaccinate animals against foot and mouth disease (*Le Figaro*, 28/3/2001); and,
finally, the march of Spanish farmers against the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (*Le Figaro*, 5/10/2002).

Although contentious politics is more present in national than in European politics, it still increases across time in Europeanized policy fields (data not shown). Overall, contentious claims in Europeanized debates increased from 37 per cent in 1990, to 45 per cent in 1995, 49.6 per cent in 2000, 43.6 per cent in 2001, and 46.4 per cent in 2002. For social movements, the increase is even more remarkable: from 42.9 per cent of contentious claims in the debate over Europe in 1990 to 63.4 per cent in 2002. To put this in context, we can consider that, in the same period, state actors pass from 34.1 to 43 per cent, and socio-economic interest groups from 50.9 to 56.6 per cent. Contrary to the expectation that channels for the inclusion of ‘civilized’ actors in EU policy-making would tame civil society organizations (see e.g., Mazey and Richardson 1997), non-institutional actors remain more contentious than institutional actors even when addressing issues with an EU scope, and they do not appear to have moderated their criticism.

2.5. Which Europe?—What do civil society actors mean when they talk about Europe?

Positions regarding European institutions are closely related to ‘imagined Europe(s)’. First, it is often observed that the process of European integration has from the very beginning been justified either in *instrumental* terms, underlining the necessity of widening the market and avoiding bloody (and economically damaging) wars, or in *symbolic* terms, supporting the foundation of a supranational identity and peaceful interactions among states. These different conceptions are still visible in our analysis when we look at the way in which Europe is framed. In the claim analysis regarding European integration we have coded the arguments used to frame Europe in four categories:10 identity frames (refer to the

---

10 We used lists of frames drafted on the basis of a pretest, but with the possibility of inserting new categories. For the lists, see the codebook for claim analysis (Koopmans 2002).
question: What is the EU and what does it stand for?), instrumental frames (answer the question: What is the EU good or bad for?), historical frames (linking the EU to the historical past, such as the Enlightenment or the Cold War), and frames internal to the European integration process (about causal linkages between one aspect of European integration and another, for example between enlargement and institutional reforms). Distinguishing among the different categories of actors (Table 2.6), we observe that civil society actors use identity frames more than all other actors do and use instrumental frames less than other actors do. SMOs and NGOs pay closer attention to the non-material aspects of the integration process, referring to an identity discourse (such as references to Europe as a community of values) and constitutional principles.

Table 2.6. Frames of civil society actors on European integration, by country, (%; no. of cases in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Type of frame</th>
<th>All identity</th>
<th>All instrumental</th>
<th>Historical</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>No. (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>(1046)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>(223)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>(722)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>(626)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>(627)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>(486)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>(362)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All¹²</td>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>(324)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>(4068)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Row percentages


¹² The total number for ‘All countries’ does not add up exactly to the sum of the other columns because data have been weighted for each country.
(especially democracy). At the other end, interest groups tend instead to underline the instrumental side of European integration, emphasizing its socio-economic dimension; state actors and political parties refer frequently to values, constitutional principles, and the economic effects of European integration. (Data for specific categories of actors other than civil society are not shown here, but see Díez Medrano 2007.)

In a cross-national comparison, civil society organizations in Switzerland and the UK less frequently use identity frames concerning Europe; in the Netherlands and Germany they are very close to the national average; and in Italy, France, and Spain they recur much more often to this type of frame (above the general average). The opposite appears to be the case for instrumental frames. Historical frames are mainly used by French SMOs and NGOs, while in Spain, Italy, and Britain civil society organizations rarely recur to this type of frame in relation to Europe. Swiss civil society organizations are those who most often use frames internal to the European integration process.

If we compare civil society actors in each country with the national average, as well as the civil society average across countries, we see that civil society actors in the UK, Switzerland, and Germany conform to the (national) dominant pragmatism, and vice versa in Spain and Italy, while the French and Dutch are more identity oriented than their countries’ averages. Therefore, the more ‘ideological’ Italian, French, and Spanish civil society actors use the most identitarian framing, while the more pragmatic Dutch, British, Swiss, and Germans utilize a more instrumental discourse.

As we will see in the following chapters, a complex process of symbolic appropriation of Europe as a theme has also brought about an extension of the definition of the ‘conflict over Europe’, layering various other cleavages over the original territorial ones, mainly concerned with the boundaries of the different polities. As in the formation of the nation-state, the subject of territory is articulated alongside others: support for and opposition to Europe are linked to different images of Europe as constructed by different actors. They address not only (or not very much) the integration
process itself, but its form and content. In this, too, our data help us to untangle these hazy, overlapping—sometimes clashing—images of Europe within the public discourse.

2.6. Networking on European issues—What is the place of social movements?

In order to analyse the impact of Europeanization on domestic actors, some studies have concentrated on changes in the political priorities and purposes of collective actors, looking at their initiatives on European issues and their organizational transformation as influenced by the EU (Constantelos 2004; 1023). In this section we will address Europeanization by domestication by looking at how Europeanization affects the configurations of power and coalitional dynamics (thus alliance and opposition structures) at the domestic level. By means of social network analysis we will look at the place of SMOs and NGOs in the networks built around mobilization on European issues in the three policy domains of European integration, agriculture, and immigration. In fact, processes of Europeanization can destabilize the configuration of power in public policy and the relative structure of policy networks, weakening stable and ‘dominant’ actors while strengthening others, introducing new styles of policy-making and new ideas (Hix and Goetz 2001; 10), and opening ‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon 1984; 173–204) for minor coalitions or oppositions.

Based on Europub interviews, we will look at the networks of alliance, conflict, and influence among actors who mobilize around European themes, focusing on the role of SMOs and NGOs in these networks. We shall focus on the Italian case, although in a

13 For the analyses we have used UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al. 2002).
14 Beginning with the list of actors interviewed for each policy domain, each interviewee was asked specific questions about the three types of interactions—collaborations, conflicts and targeting—with all the other actors listed in the policy field. In particular, each interviewee was asked with which other actors in the policy field they had: ‘closely collaborated’ over the past five years, had ‘some major disagreement’ over the past five years, and which they had ‘sought to influence’ over the past five years. The three matrices of ties thus obtained were analysed using network-analysis techniques.
comparative perspective. On the issue of European integration we concentrated on interactions of alliances and conflicts concerning the mobilization around the institutional construction of the EU, with particular reference to the European Convention. For agricultural policy the analysis concerned the agricultural subsidies, while for immigration policy it focused on EU policies for asylum. Observing these networks, our research recognizes the importance for mobilization, together with a multilevel structure of opportunities and organizational resources, also of the processes, interaction dynamics, and subjective interpretations at the meso-level (della Porta 1996; Kriesi 2002).

The specific coalitions in a given policy area determine the configuration of alliances and the conflict between political actors that operate strategically at a given moment in time (Kriesi 2002). According to the ‘advocacy coalitions’ approach (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999), policy-making is actually composed of several subsystems of policy, which operate more or less autonomously from each other. At a given moment, within a specific policy subsystem, we may find a limited number of coalitions that vary in their level of influence on public decision-making (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). In our analysis we look at the structure of networks in each policy area, with the goal of identifying the configuration of power within which various actors operate, and seeking to characterize the actors in terms of their relative centrality or peripherality in the given network. In line with a social capital approach, we argue that networks represent the relational resources of actors (e.g. Lin 2001), but, as suggested by the political process approach (Broadbent 2003; Diani 2003), they also represent a combination of ties and opportunities (on this point see Chiesi 1999; Cinalli 2006).

Focusing on the level of individual organizations, we will examine, respectively in the three policy fields, which types of actors occupy a central position and which are more peripheral. We will then explore the formation of specific coalitions between social movements and the other actors, looking at their composition (e.g. their homogeneity or heterogeneity) and at the relations
between them. Finally, we will characterize the overall configuration of these three areas of debates on Europe, looking at how dense, how conflictual or consensual, how ‘segmented’ or centralized they are (for specific social network measures used to single out these notions see below). We can expect that collective actions will be more likely within dense networks, where resources are more easily shared and a common culture built (Cinalli and Füglister 2008). In contrast, weak inter-organizational ties can lead to processes of pacification or latency (ibid.). For this section on network analysis we will focus on the example of Italy, locating it within a broader cross-national comparison.

There are several ways of measuring the position of single actors (nodes, in the language of network analysis) within a network and, therefore, their power.\(^\text{15}\) The simplest measure of centrality is the number of contacts (ties, links) an actor receives from the others (indegree). Those actors who receive information from many sources are considered prestigious (Diani 2003; 107). In order to analyse the overall network, we will refer to the measures of density and average distance between actors, which allow us to evaluate the cohesion of the different issue networks (Cinalli 2006). The density is expressed by the ratio of existing ties in the network to the total number of possible ties. The average distance indicates, in a specific network, the average length of the shortest path that connects two actors. The level of segmentation or cohesion in a network reflects the degree to which communication between actors is hindered by barriers. These may reflect ideological differences between various actors or may be due to varying levels of concern about a particular policy (Diani 2003; 306). In order to compare the three policy fields, we used standardized versions of each indicator.

The network diagrams below (Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) show the map of collaborative relationships among the main actors (25 each in European integration and agriculture; 23 in immigration) in the three areas under study. From the network graphs, observations can

\(^\text{15}\) For a detailed discussion of centrality, prestige, and power in social network analysis see Wasserman and Faust 1994, and Diani 2003.
be made about the centrality of the actors in the policy domains, and the distances between them.

A first analysis based on the measure of indegree of different types of actors confirms the remarkable importance, within all three policy fields, of the institutional actors, which prove to have a dominant position in the networks—indeed, these types of actors are by far the most frequently mentioned as partners of linkages of cooperation. The greatest concentration of power is found in the immigration policy sector, where institutional actors display a very high indegree (51); that is, they are central in the policy network. This is followed by agricultural policy, where power is divided between the institutional actors (indegree 45) and interest organizations (indegree 11), and finally European integration policy where power is dispersed among various types of actors (see Table A in the appendix). Our results on Italy are similar to those in the other European countries included in the Europub research, where, independently of the policy domain, state actors emerged as the most powerful category. Roughly, their average power is almost twice that of party and interest groups and three times that of social movement organizations (Kriesi et al. 2006; 354).

Coming back to Italy and focusing on European integration (Fig. 2.1), no actor appears to be central for the entire network, but only in relation to one part of it. Government actors (specifically the minister of foreign affairs and the minister for EU policies) appear to be less central than might be expected. Although no organizations are completely isolated from the network, the area of movement organizations occupies a more marginal position (top right on the figure). Here movement organizations (such as Rete Lilliput, Beati i Costruttori di Pace, Attac, Disobbedienti, and Tavolo della Pace) are close to each other, as well as unions such as CGIL and COBAS, and the main centre-left party (DS), then in opposition to the centre-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi, in power at the time of our interviews. The density of the overall network is 0.18; that is, for

16 For details on the computation of this measure see Kriesi et al. 2006.
European integration, only 18 per cent of the potential contacts between the actors of the network are activated. The indegree is 8.9 for SMOs/NGOs; 5.4 for interest groups; 10.8 for parties.\textsuperscript{17}

In contrast, \textit{agricultural policy} (Fig. 2.2) sees some actors distinguished by their centrality in the overall network, in particular the large economic-interest groups (e.g. Coldiretti, CIA, Confagricoltura) (indegree for interest groups: 11), and the Ministry of Agriculture. Although to a lesser degree, some SMOs and NGOs such as the environmental associations and the small producers (AIAB, Legambiente, WWF), are also fairly central to the network (overall indegree for SMOs and NGOs: 2.2). Moreover, also the movement organizations that are more peripheral in the network (including Altroconsumo and COSPA) are directly connected with at least one of the more central actors, and are characterized by an extensive web of

\textsuperscript{17} The values of density of an overall network can vary between 0 and 1; 1 and 0 indicate two ‘ideal’ situations of a network—one in which all the actors are linked to each other (density = 1), and one (density = 0) in which there are no ties at all between the actors.
linkages among them. In fact, no actor is more than two nodes away from any other actor in the network (average distance 2.15\textsuperscript{18}). Even the parties display a significant degree of centrality (indegree 3.8) and seem to connect more marginal actors to the network. The overall cohesion in this network is greater than in the network for European integration policy (the density is 0.25 versus 0.18).

On immigration and asylum policy (Fig. 2.3) some pro-immigrant associations (e.g. Caritas and CIR, Italian Council for Refugees) appear, alongside the Ministry of the Interior, among the most

\textsuperscript{18} As stated previously, the shorter the ‘average distance’, the more cohesive the network. The average distance in the case of the network on European integration is the highest: 3.
central actors in the network, thanks to their numerous ties with the diverse actors in the policy field. However, the overall indegree of SMOs and NGOS in this network is low (0.8), and the whole network is more loosely knit. Various semi-peripheral actors are not directly tied to each other, and many actors can only communicate with each other across long distances. The average distance between organizations is 2.75. In contrast with European integration, although in line with agricultural policy, the network of immigration policy sees political parties enter into strategic alliances with social movements. Nevertheless, in the field of immigration policy these alliances are more closely tied to the left–right cleavage. As evident in the figure, social movement organizations are distant from and have no relationship with centre-right parties, while they are close to and have relationships with centre-left parties. Networks in the sector of immigration and asylum are therefore relatively cohesive—indeed, the overall density of the network is 0.23.
In order to analyse the coalitional structures that are built up in relation to Europe in the three policy domains, with particular attention to the position of civil society organizations within them, we conducted a block-model analysis (Breiger et al. 1975). This analysis divides actors of the network into discrete subsets called ‘blocks’, placing actors within the same block if they are ‘structurally equivalent’; that is, if they have similar relations (sent and received links) to all the other actors. Therefore, a group (or block) that is identified in such a way can include actors who are very different from each other in typological terms (e.g. political parties and social movements), but which are grouped together by virtue of similarities in the structure of relations into which they are inserted.¹⁹ For each network in each country four blocks have been identified,²⁰ corresponding to a set of structurally equivalent actors that may or may not be a ‘coalition’, depending on internal density. For instance, there can be the so-called ‘zero blocks’, whose members do not have strong ties to each other, but who are grouped together simply because they have the same patterns of relations with all the other actors of the network. In order to interpret the configuration of coalitions, we must look at the composition of the different blocks and their pattern of relations through the ‘density matrices’ (Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9), which allow us to evaluate the density of relations within and between the blocks of actors.²¹

The density matrix for the relations of collaboration in European integration policy (Table 2.7(a)) shows (looking at the diagonal from top left to bottom right) the high number of contacts that exist, above all between organizations within blocks 1 and 2. Only these blocks have a dense structure of ties within them. The first block of

¹⁹ Usually scholars classify political collective actors using ‘a priori’ categories; that is, ‘logic’ types into which they group organizations similar in terms of ideology (e.g. centre-right vs. centre-left political parties) or organizational resources (e.g. political parties vs. SMOs and NGOs). The advantage of the block-model analysis is that it allows for the classification of collective political actors mobilizing on Europe through (their) ‘social relations/networks’.

²⁰ The block-model analysis proceeds through subsequent stages, which create a hierarchical structure for the resulting blocks: the network is divided into two groups of structurally equivalent actors, each of which subdivides into two groups, and so on. Given the size of our network, we stopped often the second step.

²¹ The partition diagrams (not presented in the text, but available from the authors upon request) show how the subsets of actors are composed and how they are formed in two steps.
The Domestication of Protest

The Domestication of Protest

**Table 2.7. Density matrices of relationships of collaboration, influence, and conflict: European integration sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>(a) Collaboration</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 ‘Federalist forces’</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Social movements</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Interest groups and parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Institutional actors and governmental parties</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (b) Influence | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 'Federalist forces' | 0.089 | 0.071 | 0.313 | 0.417 |
| Social movements | 0.089 | 0.357 | 0.179 | 0.095 |
| Interest groups and parliament | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.083 | 0.250 |
| Institutional actors and governmental parties | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.125 | 0.167 |

| (c) Conflict | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 'Federalist forces' | 0.000 | 0.036 | 0.000 | 0.354 |
| Social movements | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.036 | 0.810 |
| Interest groups and parliament | 0.000 | 0.071 | 0.083 | 0.042 |
| Institutional actors and governmental parties | 0.125 | 0.405 | 0.000 | 0.133 |

(a) R-squared = 0.225; (b) R-squared = 0.148; (c) R-squared = 0.366

actors to emerge from our analysis (block 1) is rather heterogeneous, and includes institutional actors, associations, social movements, centres of study, and interest groups, united by their desire to advance pro-European positions with a strong federalist bent (della Porta and Caiani 2006)—the Conference of Italian Regions and the Italian Association of Communes and Regions in Europe (AICCRE) (both significant representatives of local government’s requests in the Convention); associations and study centres such as the European Federalist Movement, the Active Citizenship Association, CIFE (Italian Centre for European Formation) and the Italiani Europei foundation. To this constellation of actors are added the main party in the centre-left coalition (DS) and the national confederation of small and medium-sized enterprises (CNA). The greater part of social movement organizations are located in the more homogeneous second block, which groups together a series of organizations that rotate
around the global justice movement (della Porta 2007a): Tavolo della Pace, Rete Lilliput, Beati Costruttori di Pace, Disobbedienti, and Attac, as well as the trade unions CGIL and COBAS. The third block is dominated by interest groups: Confcommercio, Confartigianato, and ACLI (Catholic Association of Italian Workers), as well as the Italian Parliament. The fourth block is composed of institutional actors and governing parties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of EU Policies, and the main parties in the centre-right coalition (AN, FI, UDC, Lega Nord). The second block of movement organizations is characterized by the densest structure of internal ties (0.643), constituting a sort of ‘advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).

Through this extensive network of inter-organizational ties, movement organizations are able to access, contribute to, and produce a wide range of material, identity, and symbolic resources (Cinalli 2006). In instrumental terms, these ties are useful to increase the flow of information, allocate responsibility, and increase the flexibility of collective action (ibid.). Many organizations interviewed have given birth to collective actions on European issues (see interviews no. 534, 535, 542, 547)—for example, the Tavolo della Pace (‘Peace Table’) promoted a ‘Europe rejects War’ campaign to include a rejection of war in the European Constitution (547). A dense network also supports actions of solidarity with the poor and marginal groups, connecting even very different organizations and sustaining the continuity of ties (e.g. 535). The spokesperson for Tavolo della Pace explained that his organization worked actively to develop a common agenda in Europe, precisely through the amplification of alliance networks (547). Demonstrations such as the Perugia–Assisi march of 2003 (whose key theme was the inclusion of the rejection of war in the European Constitution) saw the participation of very heterogeneous actors—from organizations belonging to the global justice movement, trade unions, political parties (radical-left and centre-left), and even actors rarely active on these issues (ibid.).

Many interviewees underlined that the various inter-organizational contacts often continued beyond the single event,
developing in the course of time (534) and reproducing themselves from one initiative to another, with a progressive amplification of the range of actors involved (564). An example of the move from one mobilization initiative to another, through the exploitation of existing networks, is the campaign launched by Rete Lilliput for the peace march of 2003. This effort initially promoted an Italian and European network for disarmament, which later expanded to include other actors and thus evolved into the broader Arms Control campaign (564). An amplification of the range of actors is also mentioned in the Italian branch of the campaign against the Bolkestein directive (534), which began in November 2004 on the initiative of Attac, trade unions, and local social forums, and focused specifically on the directive, successively expanded in the European mobilization on 19 March 2005 in Brussels, where the protest against the Bolkestein directive was linked to the broader mobilization against the Iraq war (see Ch. 3).

With respect to the strategic alliances on European issues developed by SMOs and NGOs, the density matrix (of collaborations) shows that these organizations privilege ties with similar civil society organizations (relations with block 1 of federalist forces: 0.107) to those with institutional actors or interest groups (0.036 with block 3; 0 with block 4). The motivations of this choice are linked to the perceived institutional closure on European issues, ‘above all because a certain mistrust has developed in the capacity for absorption and understanding of demands which come from civil society. For several years we focused considerable attention on actions to influence decision makers, and in the end our balance was negative; so we decided to change tactic’ (Tavolo della Pace, 547). As an Attac spokesperson explains, ‘it is absolutely more important for our organization to inform and mobilize people on European issues, rather than public decision makers’ (534, also 547). Similarly, the Disobbedienti (542) note that ‘the issues of mobilization and aggregation are fundamental terrain on which we must work’; and for the COBAS spokesperson ‘there is no discussion on the greater importance of the public for our organization’ (505). If and when they develop ties with institutions, social movement organizations
privilege elected bodies or local institutions (block 1), rather than national governments (535).

This indifference is reciprocal, as evident from the density matrix of collaborations, which shows that institutional actors, governing parties, and interest groups (blocks 3 and 4) are only tied to each other, and not to blocks 1 and 2. Interviews confirm this picture by highlighting that institutional actors tend to adopt a top-down approach on European issues (della Porta and Caiani 2006). Despite the dense structure of internal ties, the block of social movements is not central to the overall network, and only in contact with organizations in the first block (0.179).22 Block 1, in turn, is the only block in the network that has ties with all three other blocks.23 The matrix for relations of influence (Table 2.7(b)) confirms a picture of segmentation.

In summary, the domestic network of actors intervening on European integration in Italy is rather polarized, with a clear fracture between the two opposing alignments of actors, which are distant from each other. On the one hand there are establishment actors, interest organizations, and Parliament (blocks 3 and 4), and on the other hand federalist forces and NGOs/SMOs (blocks 1 and 2). These two alignments are closely tied within each pair, but not to the other two. The entire sector is held together only through the brokerage role of a few actors, belonging mainly to ‘federalist forces’ but also to the ‘interest groups and Parliament’ group. Removing from the network only five actors, its compactness becomes severely reduced (see Fig. A in the Appendix). This configuration of ‘opportunity’ is very distinctive, as it marginalizes civil society actors from the policy-making on these issues, but also displays strong identities supported by dense peripheral networks.

The sector of European integration is indeed characterized by a polycephalous structure, that is both centralized and segmented.

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22 As indicated by the president of the European Federalist Movement, ‘there has been a strong alignment in recent years between the federalist area and the movement for globalization from below’ (501).

23 The organizations of this block prefer collaborative ties with Parliament, but also develop contacts with the ministries and governing parties. Centres of study and associations, as well as some local administrations, explain that they have promoted seminars and conferences on the Convention which also included representatives from the institutions (541, 539, 503).
Compared with the networks on agriculture and immigration policies (described later), this polycephalous network is partially segmented, in that the distance between some actors (civil society and institutional ones) is rather large. The presence of horizontal ties between peripheral actors (in this case SMOs) shows however an active desire for participation in this policy sector without delegating to a few central actors. The network is also relatively centralized, because some actors have more ties than others and are thus in a better position to control the flows (relational, cognitive, etc.) within the network. If the participation of SMOs and NGOs is rather limited in the European public sphere, this marginal role is thus balanced by the dense networks between these organizations that, in line with hypotheses on social capital, favour their mobilization and the emergence of a collective identity on European issues. In the field of European integration, above all the civil society actors from the federalist coalition, as well as the SMOs, develop the most dense and integrated structures, assuming the contours of a clique and denoting the presence of a certain ideological and cultural homogeneity, in a context of strong collective identification (della Porta and Diani 2006).

In contrast, the network structure for agricultural policy combines the characteristics of a centre–periphery model—with some actors (block 3 of institutional actors and large agricultural-interest groups; see Table 2.8(a)–(b)), to whom all others refer—with, a dense network of ties that connects with the periphery. A characteristic that distinguishes the agricultural-policy sector is that SMOs and NGOs (blocks 1 and 2) are equally involved in extensive contacts and exchanges with civil society and with institutional actors. The third block includes the most important Italian interest groups in the field of agriculture (Confagricoltura, Coldiretti, and CIA), the Italian Parliament, the Minister of Agriculture, and the Minister for EU Policies.

24 The third block includes the most important Italian interest groups in the field of agriculture (Confagricoltura, Coldiretti, and CIA), the Italian Parliament, the Minister of Agriculture, and the Minister for EU Policies.

25 The first block in made up of farmers’ associations such as COSPA (the Spontaneous Committees of Agricultural Producers), AIAB (the Italian Association for Biological Agriculture), and Altragricoltura; unions such as FLAI–CGIL; and the radical-left party RC. The second block is composed of environmental and consumers’ associations, such as Legambiente, Greenpeace, WWF, and Altroconsumo. The fourth block is made up of centre-right and centre-left political parties (DS, the Greens, and AN).
actors, among which they actively seek allies. This is evident for example from the densities of collaborations between the block of the environmental and consumers’ associations, and all other blocks in the network. Well connected with policy makers and large interest groups, SMOs and NGOs in this policy sector also develop horizontal ties between them (see density of blocks 1 and 2), thereby coordinating numerous initiatives to intervene in agricultural policy and develop common objectives (544). This type of configuration tends to promote an efficient flow of information between the different nodes of the network, strengthening ties of solidarity and a sense of belonging within a larger network (Cinalli 2006). This is confirmed from our interviews, where it emerges that numerous contacts between SMOs, NGOs, and parliamentarians active in this policy area develop ‘in a structured relationship with those more sensitive to these issues, above all with regional politicians, governments, and agricultural-development agencies’ (531), as well as frequent participation in government consultations (558).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>1 Farmers’ associations and radical left</th>
<th>2 Environmental and consumers’ associations</th>
<th>3 Institutional actors and interest groups</th>
<th>4 Parties (centre-right and centre-left)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>1 Farmers’ associations and radical left</th>
<th>2 Environmental and consumers’ associations</th>
<th>3 Institutional actors and interest groups</th>
<th>4 Parties (centre-right and centre-left)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>1 Farmers’ associations and radical left</th>
<th>2 Environmental and consumers’ associations</th>
<th>3 Institutional actors and interest groups</th>
<th>4 Parties (centre-right and centre-left)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) R-squared = 0.175; (b) R-squared = 0.145; (c) R-squared = 0.210
Contacts with policy makers in both centre-left and centre-right parties take place (558) and also with large agricultural-interest groups (552). It is recognized that ‘from part of the traditional agriculture interest groups, as well as from institutions, there is a new ability to listen to associational actors and their new issues, which then also become diffused among the public’ (548).

The network structure in immigration and asylum policy is also centralized around the institutional actors (block 2), but knitted more loosely at the periphery among SMOs and NGOs (blocks 3 and 4). The network thus closely resembles a star. This particular configuration highlights a situation in which there is a high degree of centralization accompanied by a low degree of segmentation. Some key nodes (actors) coordinate the exchanges across the network—in this case the institutional actors of block 2—act as a point of conjunction between the peripheral actors, which are weakly tied together. In this sector only some SMOs and NGOs, such as those of the pro-immigrant coalition (block 3) are closely tied, owing to contacts sent and received, with the entire network. Others, such as the movement organizations of block 4, are not so well tied within the overall network. Moreover, relations among civil society actors are not frequent, unlike in the other policy networks (see density between blocks 3 and 4).

While the communication and information flow between different actors is simplified in this type of structure (Cinalli 2006), it should be underlined that actors in peripheral positions have greater difficulty in exercising a substantial influence over the entire network (Diani 2003; 311). Indeed, the interviews highlight a sort of cleavage between the SMOs and NGOs active on immigration and asylum, with a specialization in their particular strategies for action. While those in block 4 are more focused on outsider strategies such as propaganda

---

26 It includes Parliament, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Foreign Minister. The first block consists entirely of right-wing party actors: AN, UDC, and the Northern League (Lega Nord).
27 The third block collects together pro-migrant SMOs, with unions (e.g. CISL, GGIL), religious organizations (e.g. Comunità di Sant'Egidio, Migrantes); solidarity and welfare groups (e.g. NGOs like Caritas, Croceroassa, CIR; and left-wing parties DS and RC).
28 It includes Amnesty International, Medici senza frontiere and ICS.
and demonstrations, those in block 3 play a greater role in the formulation and implementation of policies, although they also adopt some outsider strategies. These latter actors develop a tight web of ties with institutional actors (514, 563) which are reciprocated (550) (see density of relations between blocks 2 and 3). This confirms the importance of organizations close to institutional actors in opening direct channels of access in public policy-making for less influential organizations, but also the presence of a highly institutionalized and élite-dominated policy sector (Statham and Geddes 2006; 259).

Concluding, the configurations of power created at the domestic level on European issues are very different in the three policy areas, with varying degrees and forms of mobilization (and opportunities for mobilization) around European issues, both for institutional actors and for civil society actors.

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**Table 2.9. Density matrices of relationships of collaboration, influence, and conflict: immigration and asylum-policy sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Collaboration 1</th>
<th>Collaboration 2</th>
<th>Collaboration 3</th>
<th>Collaboration 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Centre-right parties</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Institutional actors</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Pro-immigrant coalition (associations, movements, NGOs, left, unions)</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Social movements, NGOs</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Influence 1</th>
<th>Influence 2</th>
<th>Influence 3</th>
<th>Influence 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Centre-right parties</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Institutional actors</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Pro-immigrant coalition (associations, movements, NGOs, left, unions)</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Social movements, NGOs</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Conflict 1</th>
<th>Conflict 2</th>
<th>Conflict 3</th>
<th>Conflict 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Centre-right parties</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Institutional actors</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Pro-immigrant coalition (associations, movements, NGOs, left, unions)</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Social movements, NGOs</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) R-squared = 0.220; (b) R-squared = 0.489 (c) R-squared = 0.251
2.7. Conclusion. How domestication favours transnational processes—back to the protest on the milk quota

A pluralistic public sphere has been called for as a (partial) solution for the weak accountability of the EU institutions. Even more, the participation of civil society actors in debates on European polity, politics, and policies could have a high legitimizing potential given the widespread image of Europe as an élitist project. Our data on claim-making in the national press indicate not only a slow development towards the formation of Europeanized public spheres, but also that this process has specific characteristics. In particular, it is selective, in so far as it involves some policy areas but not others, and it is mainly top-down: the more Europeanized a policy, actor, target, or issue, the less NGOs and social movements seem to have access to public discourse (at least in the mainstream media).

However, our research also allows for two specifications that complicate slightly the image of low Europeanization from below in the domestic public sphere. First of all, all the actors seem to adapt to a multilevel governance. They do not lose their roots in the national public sphere, but at the same time they tend to link local, national, and EU policy-making when defining their targets and framing their issues. This is what the Italian farmers did when vigorously pressuring their national governments, among other actions blockading roads and spreading milk and other less appreciated cow products in front of the headquarters of representative institutions. Our claim-making analysis, as well as the interviews, indicated that this strategy was far from unique to the case of the Italian farmers. Even when remaining within their domestic public spheres, social movements increasingly acknowledge the impact of European institutions. As the milk-quota campaign illustrates, ‘thinking European’ brings about action (also) in Brussels, and meeting and coordinating with other farmers and non-farmers from various countries. Moreover, our research also confirms this tendency for other actors of Europeanization from below.

In a similar vein, and with reference to the main categories used in studies on collective action, issue networks that form in the
domestic public sphere around mobilization on European issues also confirm that the organizational resources of actors matter in mobilization on European issues. National policy-making on Europe emerges as an arena where the actors with the most resources, such as institutional actors or strong economic-interest organizations, are most able to succeed. These actors are characterized as the most central and powerful in all three sectors analysed here, and in all countries (Kriesi et al. 2006). In contrast, SMOs and NGOs emerge as more marginal actors in policy networks, clearly ‘losers’ in terms of visibility in the public debate on European issues. The mobilization of social movements on European issues reflects the particular configuration of power in which they operate, appearing as polyccephalous in European integration policy, halfway between a ‘clique’ and a ‘star’ for agricultural policy and star-shaped for immigration policy. Our analysis highlights that networks count, both as opportunities and as resources for mobilization. If the participation of SMOs and NGOs is limited in the most Europeanized policy networks on European integration (disconfirming the hopes for a greater inclusion of minor coalitions in policy networks through processes of European integration), they nevertheless seem to compensate for their marginal role with a tight network of links among themselves that support mobilization and favour the emergence of shared goals and collective identities on European issues.

Moreover, our data stress that the development of forms of Europeanization from below is conflictual: the process of Europeanization is increasingly contested, with opposition focusing not so much on a European polity (that is, the building of new geographical borders), but on specific European policies (accused of following the instrumental vision of a ‘Europe of the market’) and European politics (the ‘democratic deficit’ is linked not only to the weakness of the elective EU body, the Parliament, but also to the lack of transparency of the European integration processes) (della Porta 2003b; della Porta and Caiani 2004).

In sum, our data indicate some changes across time, with a slowly emerging Europeanization from below, which predominantly takes
the path of ‘domestication’—where debate over EU decisions and institutions takes place at the national level, but the European arena is the indirect target of protest. Domestication might be seen as proof of the persistent relevance of the nation-state as the target for protest, as well as the permanent weakness of the EU institutions. Without denying the continued tendency of protest to address national governments, we have suggested that national protests against EU-induced policies show a potential for transnationalization of protest and the emergence of a transnational public sphere. While it is true that social movements are better able to organize and put pressure on decision makers via disruptive actions at the national level, the effects of national protests do not stop at national borders. In fact, a more careful look shows the rise, in the course of these campaigns, of innovations both in the organizational structure and in the frames of the protest, with the development of European networks and European identities.
3.1. The Stop Bolkestein campaign and the externalization of protest: an introduction

In January 2004 the European Commission, chaired by Romano Prodi, issued a draft directive named after the Dutch Commissioner for Internal Markets and former Shell manager Frits Bolkestein and focusing on the liberalization of the market for services within the EU. Soon a coalition of opponents formed, bringing together trade unions (initially the European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, which mobilized a few months after the directive), the European Platform of Social NGOs (or Social Platform), and a number of national and even local groups. At the centre of the protest, in addition to the lack of consultation of relevant social actors—or, according to Attac, the consultation of 10,000 firms but not a single union—was the so-called country-of-origin principle, requiring foreign service providers from EU countries to meet the law requirements of their home country rather than those of the country where they provided services. The lack of previous harmonization of related national legislation brought those critical of the directive to fear ‘social dumping’ and the flow of capital into countries with fewer controls on labour rights and environmental protection. Also criticized was the fact that, in line with the contested General Agreement on Trade in
Services of the WTO, the directive addressed all services, treating ‘mobile phone contracts in the same way as the relationship between a care-giver and an elderly person’ (Social Platform, 21/2/2005; quoted in Parks 2006; 1). According to protesters, the directive promoted a ‘minimal state’ vision, defining public restrictions and controls on service provision as ‘bureaucratic obstacles’ to the market.

Characteristic of this campaign—which we introduce as an example of externalization—is, first, its cross-issue and multi-level character. The first to fear the negative consequences of the directive were the Belgian unions and social movement organizations of the Belgian Social Forum, which called for a demonstration in June 2004. From Belgium, the mobilization soon spread at the EU level, through the involvement, via the Belgian socialists, of the European Socialist Party. Additionally, the ETUC and related confederations mobilized their national members, and EU-level associations for the protection of the rights of consumers and patients as well as of the public health system and public education also joined in (Parks 2006). When the European Commission sent the directive to the European Parliament following the co-decision procedure, protestors started to address MPs—as well as the EC and the heads of state and governments of the member states—through a multi-lingual Stop Bolkestein petition, eventually signed by over 100,000 individuals, 250 organizations (from unions and left-wing parties to international NGOs, transnational networks, and local as well as national grass-roots movements), and local governments alike. The petition defined the Bolkestein directive as ‘an atrocious attack on public services, workers’ rights, and democracy, seen as the place for common goods and collective participation’.

Unusual for protest campaigns targeting the EU was the frequent recourse to street demonstrations. Protesters organized marches at the EU level in November 2004, at the spring summit of the European Council on 19 March 2005 (with 75,000 participants), and during the European Parliament

vote in February 2006. (Some 50,000 marched in Strasbourg on February 11, and thousands more at the ‘No Valentine for Bolkestein’ union-led demonstration on February 14). During the whole campaign national demonstrations were organized to ‘Stop Bolkestein’, often linking the ‘no’ to the directive to other issues, such as the constitutional referendum in France.

The new Barroso Commission declared its intention to accept any decisions made by the EP, whereas the PSE and the European People’s Party (EPP) compromised to cancel the country-of-origin principle and exclude some services from the range of applicability of the directive. Part of the movement, however, criticized the agreement, denouncing the risk involved in the free-market principle (replacing the principle of country of origin) in the service sector, as well as the power assigned to the European Court of Justice in cases of contestation of the potential disruption of free competition caused by public regulations on service provision.

The Stop Bolkestein campaign is linked to the Lisbon campaign, launched before the mid-term review of the Lisbon agenda, after President Barroso had declared priority for economic growth over the other two pillars of the Lisbon Strategy (social cohesion and sustainable development) (see, again, Parks 2006). In this case, too, protest was led by a multi-issue coalition of unions, NGOs belonging to the Social Platform, and environmental groups. The language was neither moderate nor apolitical. The Social Platform declared: ‘Mr Barroso, you killed the European dream’, calling on political leaders to reject the Barroso approach to Lisbon (which they entitled ‘From a strategy to a tragedy’) and reaffirm the ‘European social model’. The ETUC called on citizens to ‘Oppose the erosion of social rights and the spread of neo-liberalism’, and European MPs signed a petition for a social Europe, supported by over 6,000 organizations. Lobbying was again accompanied by street demonstrations: beyond the mentioned march in Brussels on 19 March 2005, a day of action was organized on 21 March by the European antipoverty network. Again, the protest ended in a compromise, with the Luxembourgeois President of the
European Council confirming the commitment of the EC to all three pillars of the Lisbon strategy.

During the fourth ESF in Athens (see Ch. 4), in May 2006, a Stop Bolkestein campaign was relaunched by the first pan-European network for the public services joined by about forty unions and social movement organizations as well as local institutions, all calling for ‘Another Europe, with public services for all’. The network has a multilevel structure, with common decisions taken at the European level and implemented by the specific national and local ‘networks for the public services’. The lobbying of European institutions is combined with actions at the national (and subnational) levels, with coordinated and/or common initiatives taking place in various countries. The European network aims in fact at providing stable coordination to the many and varying actors mobilized in a campaign whose aim is to define at the European and national levels the cultural, social, and politico-institutional conditions for the implementation of a universal access to fundamental rights. Against privatization, it maintains that public services should be provided for by the public administration, public property, and free from any form of liberalization and commercialization (Marcon and Zola 2007).

Research on social movement organizations at the EU level has stressed the prevalence of single-issue actors, the technicality of their language, the moderation of their discourses and claims, and their adaptation to lobbying strategies. The campaign against the Bolkestein directive provides a good example of a path of Europeanization from below through the externalization of protest, which starts at the national level and extends to involve European social movement organizations, networks, and coalitions. The traditional image of social movement organizations active in Brussels as well-structured public-interest groups, engaged in lobbies rather than on the street, is not appropriate to describe the complex picture of these actors or their type of action. True, lobbying was used to put pressure on European MPs as well as representatives of other EU institutions (among them, the President of the European Council); and, true again, some of the actors
that played a pivotal role in the campaign were well-structured unions and NGOs, endowed with privileged channels of access to decision makers. At the same time, however, the campaign actors mobilized in a cross-issue and multilevel action that mixed lobbying with street protest and online petitions, addressing more territorial levels of governance and all EU institutions.

Looking at this campaign, we might recognize the challenges that multilevel governance, and especially protest addressing IGOs, presents for resource-poor actors such as social movements—challenges already spelled out by previous research—but we might also single out some evolution in the path we have called Europeanization by externalization to include multiple organizational strategies, various forms of conventional and non-conventional political participation, as well as critical frames. In this direction, in this chapter, we will first address the political opportunities for civil society organizations at the EU level (Sect. 3.2). Using mainly interviews with representatives of civil society organizations in several European countries and at the EU level, we shall then discuss the extent to which the Stop Bolkestein campaign reflects general trends in the way in which social movement organizations network at the EU level (Sect. 3.3); their interactions with other national actors that intervene in the EU (Sect. 3.4); their action repertoire in addressing EU levels of governance (Sect. 3.5); as well as their framing of Europe (Sect. 3.6). As in the previous chapter, we will stress in particular the processes through which a specific path of Europeanization of protest develops into the creation of European networks, strategies, and identities.

### 3.2. Civil society and the EU: setting the context

Several previous studies have indicated the difficulties that civil society organizations encounter when they want to act at the EU level (see, for most recent accounts, Schmidt 2006; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007). Channels of access at the EU level are in fact constrained by institutional characteristics such as limited
(although increasing) electoral accountability, the selective tradition of consultation of representatives of different interests, and the emphasis on expertise (Mazey and Richardson 2001; Balme and Chabanet 2002; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007).

Various studies on representation at the EU level have confirmed that for social movement organizations access is limited. First, business has found ‘going European’ much easier than have civil society organizations. In recent years, business interest associations still constitute more than half of the entire constituency of EU associations (around 1,300), compared to around one-third of ‘citizens’ interests organizations’ (see the 2006 edition of the European Public Affairs Directory, cited in Greenwood 2007; 11). Inclusion has also been selective, as only a few, larger, moderate and well-structured, civil society organizations have obtained some routine access, though usually of an informal nature, to supranational organizations (among others see Dehousse 1998; Marks and McAdam 1999; Guiraudon 2001; Balme and Chabanet 2002; Rootes 2002; della Porta 2003b). So as decisions are shifted to Brussels, actors intervening at the EU level tend to develop more institutionalized features and become embedded in epistemic communities (Ruzza 2004; 23).

Still, in contrast to business organizations, social movement organizations active at the EU level—such as the Platform of European Social NGOs, the European Anti-Poverty Network, the Human Rights Contact Group, the European Migrant Forum, United (against racism), and the European Network of Women—are usually loose and poorly staffed networks. Similarly, EU-level environmental organizations are, for the most part, little more than transnational alliances of various national groups. Although sometimes successful in raising issues and concerns, they have only very limited resources (Rootes 2002; 382).

2 According to the same source, among the organizations active in 2006 at the EU level, 122 were trade and professional associations, 38 employers’ federations, 40 chambers of commerce, 24 EU and global trade unions, 198 regions, 118 international organizations, 103 think tanks and training organizations, 115 law firms, and 153 public-affairs consultants.
Some channels of access have also become less open with the passage of time. If the European Parliament provided initially easier access, as it has gained in importance it has become increasingly more structured and less accessible to weakly organized interests (Rootes 2002). The Commission has set more and more hurdles in terms of the number of members and countries covered, while tending to co-opt a few groups (Schmidt 2006; 27). More generally, as European integration has progressed, a chaotic and open system of lobbying has developed into a more formalized, structured, and selective system of interest mediation (Mazey and Richardson 2001; see also Mazey and Richardson 1997; Bartle 1999; Greenwood 2003). So-called network governance (Kohler-Koch 1999) or ‘disjointed pluralism’ has been typified as more resonant with a US tradition than with the neo-corporatist agreements that had characterized some European countries (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; 227). The development of tripartite consultations has encountered frequent failures in the past (see the difficult life of the ECOSOC), and nowadays an ‘encapsulated tripartism’ (restricted in scope and unstable in structure) is limited to areas such as social policy (Falkner 2007; 230 ff.), where the competences of the EU institutions are narrow. As a consequence, the development of the EU level of governance has been said to have weakened the unions at the national level, especially in those countries where neo-corporatist assets were more widespread (Streeck 1999; Schneider and Grote 2006; Streeck and Visser 2006;).

These difficulties notwithstanding, some characteristics and changes in the European institutions seem to have given (or promised to give) some access to social movement organizations. Although selectively, as mentioned, (some) social movement organizations have recently been granted increasing participation in return for expertise and legitimacy. The Commission has biannual meetings with all NGOs involved in the social platform and holds frequent meetings with the environmental ‘group of 8’, plus various groups of experts. The largest environmental groups, making up the so-called ‘gang of four’—Greenpeace, WWF, Friends of the Earth, and the EEB—have close relationships with the Directorate
General for the Environment, which gives all but Greenpeace financial support (Rootes 2002). Indeed, in some policy fields there has been a convergence between the values of European élites (e.g. in the various DGs) and the values and issues raised by social movements and NGOs (e.g. on environmental issues) (Ruzza 2004). There, stable and effective connections have developed between civil society actors and Eurocrats, who sometimes act as ‘institutional activists’ (ibid. 35 and passim). So strong has been the support of the European Union for the European Trade Union Confederation that the Europeanization of trade unions has been described as ‘a story of interactions between European institutions seeking to stimulate Euro-level interest representation, a small number of unionists who perceived Europe as important, and the growing significance of European integration itself’ (Martin and Ross 2001; 57; see also Branch 2002). The European Parliament has offered a main channel of access to various organizations, especially in areas where parliamentary committees are more active (for instance environmental issues) and relations between movement organizations and the Commission more difficult. With regard to regionalist movements, Hooghe (2002) has observed the increasing power of the Commission for Regions. Feminists, environmentalists, and unions have also been able to obtain favourable decisions from the Court of Justice, especially with the increasing competence of the EU on environmental and social policies (Dehousse 1998; Balme and Chabanet 2002; Mazey 2002). Especially when substantial access is granted to civil society organizations, thanks to a strong division within the EU institutions, these insider–outsider alliances can sometimes counterbalance the bias in favour of strong lobbies (Ruzza 2004).

If the building of the EC as oriented to the creation of a common market explains the dominance of producers’ interests, with the progression of market-making legislation there has also been an increase in organized demands for market-correcting policies (with mobilizations of consumers, environmentalists, and so on). Indeed, the data from the European Public Affairs Directory indicate a significant growth in the number of citizens’ interest groups, from
about 20 per cent of all interest actors active in Brussels in 2000 (EPAD 2002 2001) to one-third in 2005.\(^3\) NGOs have lobbied EU institutions and participated in various projects sponsored by the EU (Kendall 2001). In particular, those involved in the not-for-profit third sector (or ‘voluntary sector’), providing services to social groups in need, have felt increasingly affected by EU policies of market liberalization, and reduction in public expenditures, as well as the risk of challenges, in the name of free competition, to their special status in national legislations (Kendall 2005). The anti-Bolkestein campaign is indeed part of a process of development of epistemic communities that intervene at the European level, including the network European Social Platform, scholars, and think tanks (Kendall 2005; also Anheier and Daly 2007). In this sense, the ‘Community method’ approaches, at least in principle, conceptions of associative democracy based upon the consultation of interest organizations. Since the 1990s, in fact, attempts have also been made at expanding consultation with representatives of organized interests in civil society (Kohler-Koch 2007a; 259–60).

These windows of opportunity for civil society actors have developed within the debate on the accountability of EU institutions, as well as on good governance and the broader concern with a political dimension of the European integration process (a ‘positive integration’) that is perceived as lagging significantly behind negative integration through the liberalization of internal flows of goods and people. Since Delors’s ‘social dialogue’ and especially since the Maastricht treaty the Commission has often been tempted to search for broader social acceptance of EU policies as well as for allies in power games with the Council. As Vivien Schmidt (2006; 9) recently stated, ‘what [the EU] is becoming . . . is not a nation-state but, rather, a regional state, given shared sovereignty, variable boundaries, composite identities, highly compound governance, and fragmented democracy split between government by and of the people at national level, and governance for and with

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\(^3\) The same source mentions a more modest growth in the number of EU representations of the regions, and a small decline in the number of both trade and professional associations and EU public-affairs offices for companies (Greenwood 2007; 10).
the people at the EU level’. Given in fact the clear deficits in the governance of and by the people, and the increasing challenges to EU capacity to govern for the people, the perception of a need for governing ‘with the people’ seems to be developing in the EU institutions, with an opening of channels of access to citizens as organized interest groups or even engaged individuals (rather than voters). Non-governmental organizations have been recognized as more or less formal partners in consultation on policy decisions and participation in policy implementation.

Already in 2000 the White Paper on European Governance (Commission of the European Communities 2001a) called for more transparency and openness in EU governance, with enhanced civil society participation through consensus forums set up by the Commission to generate ideas (on transport, high technology, telecommunications, energy, and so on); social dialogue on social policy; ad hoc meetings on trade and globalization; and the various channels opened by the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and Constitutional Convention (Schmidt 2006; 105). The experience of the Convention for the elaboration of the White Paper on European Governance as well as that of the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights are seen as examples of the involvement of ‘civil society’ in the system of the European Union (Schutter 2002). The drafting of the White Paper involved the academic community as well as the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) of the Commission, whose self-conception in the process shifted from a space for representatives of economic and social interests to an active broker between EU institutions and organized civil society (Kohler-Koch 2007a; 256). In this view, given their expertise and grass-roots knowledge, civil society organizations are expected to provide policy makers with information on the needs and demands of specific social groups and to contribute to communication processes in the European public sphere. In fact, at the end of the Lisbon summit in 2000 the European Council stated that ‘NGOs should be seen as “partners” in implementing the strategic goal of sustainable economic growth and social cohesion’ (European Council 2000; sect. 38, in Kendall 2005).
Civil society involvement is presented not only as potentially improving output, but also as an instrument for increasing legitimacy. Addressing concerns about the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU institutions, the EC White Paper on European Governance stressed participation, horizontality, and subsidiarity as key words for a democratic governance at EU level. The inclusion of stakeholders and civil society has been promoted, with the aim of rendering policy making ‘more inclusive and accountable’ (European Commission White Paper on ‘European Governance’ 2001). Similarly, within the context of the debate on ‘The Future of Europe’, the European Commission urged the identification of ways to constructively manage change by more actively involving European citizens in decision making, as ‘Failure to do so might fuel “citizenship” deficit, or even encourage protest’ (Commission of the European Communities 2001b; 10). Widespread among scholars is the impression that ‘The language of public political debate in the Convention on the future of Europe has included the voice “civil society” among its favourites’ (Lombardo 2004). Several documents have advocated the need to listen to citizens’ views and to establish ‘a genuine dialogue’ with civil society (ibid.).

Increasing attention to immediate channels for citizens’ participation is also expressed in the development of the Constitutional Treaty (ibid.; 257). The Convention for the EU Constitution has in fact been conceived as ‘an episode in a process of discursive development on governance and the role of European institutions therein’ (Lucarelli and Radaelli 2004; 4). The Convention has departed from the traditional intergovernmental method that has always characterized the revisions of EU treaties. With the explicit aim of bringing the EU closer to its citizens, representatives of the Economic and Social Committee, the ‘main interest groups’, and the Committee of the Regions were admitted as observers of the work of the Assembly. A parallel Convention of Youth and a forum composed of civil society organizations had the task of elaborating proposals to the Convention. The Laeken Declaration mentioned citizens’ demands for good governance, as ‘opening up fresh opportunities, not imposing further red tape’, and pleaded ‘for a clear,
open, effective, democratically controlled community’ (Pérez-Solórzano 2004), confirming the intention of using civil society’s contributions ‘as input into the debate’ (Laeken Declaration 2001).

Openings to civil society organizations have been linked to sporadic attention to participatory models of democracy among European institutions. As Beate Kohler-Koch observed: ‘In recent years, a new discourse has been introduced to the academic and political debate on European interest intermediation attracting much attention in the media and scholarly debate. The focus is not any longer on the influence of interest groups on policy-making but on the democratic potential of closer public–private cooperation’ (2007a; 255). On the initiative of the European Commission in particular, a debate on the participative tools of governance developed (Grote and Gbikpi 2002). The White Paper on European Governance stresses ‘advocacy’ democracy as an adaptation to the ‘scientification of politics’ and the proliferation of transnational civil society and interest organizations, promoting ‘a wider involvement of civil society for the sake of efficient and democratic government’ (Kohler-Koch 2007a; 255). It also recognized the principle of participation by means of open consultation with citizens and their associations as one of the fundamental pillars of EU governance. According to the ECOSOC, participatory democracy exercised by social groups and citizens mobilizing in the European arena should complement representative democracy based on the classical modes of democratic representation through elections (ECOSOC 1999, cited in Lombardo 2004; 6). The assumption is indeed that ‘the type of representativeness that NGOs can have towards citizens is completely different from, and does not constitute a threat for, the political representation that characterises a democratic electoral process: citizens’ involvement is not “automatic”, but rather depends on individual decision, it is voluntary, and it privileges a particular perspective and interest over others’ (Lombardo 2004; 4; see also Schutter 2001). Some risks to democracy from this selective inclusion have also been highlighted, however. As Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2007; 7) remarked, ‘the shift from hierarchy and formal procedures to networking and informality—while
allowing for extensive input—undermines political equality and control’. In fact, ‘dense, though differentiated, patterns…have emerged that channel different interests in the political process’ (ibid. 8).

Since the Convention and the defeat of the proposal for a Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda, the EC has also sponsored experiments in ‘deliberative polling’ through a process of citizen consultation oriented to develop an informed public opinion on a specific issue. In the summer and autumn of 2007 a research consortium led by the French NGO Notre Europe conducted the first Europe-wide deliberative opinion poll, funded by the European Union through its so-called Plan D. The experiment addressed the future of European construction (<http://www.tomorrowseurope.eu> acc. Sept. 2008), through opinion polls among researchers in EU countries (in August–September 2007) and focus groups with a sample of about 400 citizens. A similar experiment is the European Citizens’ Consultations (<http://www.european-citizens-consultations.eu> acc. Sept. 2008), which includes first debates on contested issues by sampling citizens at the national level, and then an assembly of 732 citizens in Brussels (recalling symbolically the number of seats in the EP) called to debate the future of the European Union and make recommendations for European policy makers.

The extent to which rhetorical openings correspond to real capacity to influence EU policies is, as we saw in the Bolkestein campaign, an open (and contested) question, which has been particularly debated when assessing the constitutional process. Although some scholars have pointed at the deliberative nature of the Convention (Piana 2004), research on its proceedings shows limited mobilization of national publics.\(^4\) Based upon an analysis of the civil society consultation proceedings (through the Forums and Hearings), the main demands of civil society, and the outcome of

\(^4\) See Leon, Mateo Diaz, and Meseguer 2004 and Montero 2004 on Spain; Scott and Vergara Caffarelli 2004 on Italy; Torres and Fraga 2004 on Portugal; Yannis 2004 on Greece; and Xuereb 2004, Agapiou-Josephides 2004, and Kirisci and Capan 2004 on Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey, respectively.
Convention deliberations (draft and final Treaty), Lombardo’s research (2004) concluded that, despite some positive elements in the participation of civil society in the debate on the future of Europe, there exists a gap in the Convention’s discourse on civil society between rhetorical and action frames. ... the Convention’s emphasis on civil society is a rhetorical device to gain legitimacy rather than a genuine move towards a more pluralistic EU democracy capable of including mechanisms of active participation of citizens and social actors in the policy-making process that would complement and enrich representative democracy. (ibid.; p. 2)

The concern was not only that ‘civil society at large has not been successfully reached by the Convention’, since consultations were sporadic and selective (ibid.), but participants from civil society also felt that their participation was useless. Even though ‘the first stage of the Convention’s workings, i.e. the listening phase, placed from its beginnings a special emphasis on the need to hear the voices of civil society’, the current relationship with civil society developed more as a process of ‘hearing’ and ‘consultation’ (Laeken Declaration, CONV 14/02, CONV 167/02, cited in Lombardo 2004) than as a real debate, with no feedback activity from the Convention to civil society organizations. Although the Forum of a network of civil society organizations to provide input into the Convention’s debate was able to attract over 500 organizations, many participants seemed to share the impression that, in the words of one of them, the process ended in ‘“a black hole” from where no response ever came back (apparently, it was not even used as a database of the people concerned with the different issues, on the basis of which e-mailings could be organised)’ (Lombardo 2004; 11–12). Additionally, widespread among social movement organizations was the impression that the selection of participants to the hearing in the plenary session of the convention in June 2002 had been biased towards ‘domesticated’ civil society organizations (ibid. 16–17), such as those which received commission funds, and that groups from some countries (such as France and Germany) were heavily over-represented. In fact, the whole process has been
defined as a missed chance for democratic debate, especially when, after the conclusion of the work of the Convention, member states rushed into the next phase: ‘Thus, an opportunity to lay the ground for a common European will has been lost’ (Closa and Fossum 2005; 144–5). Similar frustration about the citizens’ involvement in EU policy-making has been voiced vis-à-vis the European Consumer Consultative Group as well as the European Consultative Forum on Environment and Sustainable Development (Kohler-Koch 2007a; 262).

As we will see in what follows, civil society organizations interviewed within the Europub.com project share a criticism of EU institutions as formally closed, selective, and unaccountable. Just as the groups that converged in the Bolkestein campaign did; however, they use the available channels of access to the European public sphere as well as promoting new ones. An effect of what we defined in the introductory chapter as Europeanization by externalization has been the development of supranational organizational structures and identities. The European arenas offer to representatives of different EU countries the opportunity to meet, build organizational networks, coordinate activity, and construct supranational discourses. Growing interaction facilitates the development of common, more or less European identity. While research on SMOs active in EU policies has stressed their preference for lobbying, a centralized structure, and focus on single issues, as the story of the anti-Bolkestein directive indicates, at this level civil society actors also take to the streets, build informal networks linking local, national, and transnational groups, and use increasingly political and cross-issue frames.

3.3. Organizing for targeting the EU

Notwithstanding the low presence of civil society voices in the domestic debate on Europe (see Ch. 2), the campaign against the Bolkestein directive tells a story in which protest is activated through existing multilevel networks and, at the same time, contributes to
generating a more or less stable coalition. Our evidence confirms that national SMOs and NGOs are developing transnational ties and coordinative bodies.

First of all, the results of our interviews, focusing mainly at the national level but asking about strategies to address the EU, indicate that civil society actors share a tendency to coordinate their actions transnationally and to address European institutions (especially, but not only, via lobbying).\(^5\) The data on membership in international organizations or associations, as well as on regular contacts with similar organizations in other countries, reveal a greater tendency for social movements and NGOs to network at the supranational level than emerged in the mass-media debate. In Figure 3.1 we show the average number of memberships in international organizations and of cross-national contacts per country, considered as indicators of transnational embeddedness.\(^6\) SMOs and NGOs appear as characterized by frequent transnational con-

\(^5\) Although it must be kept in mind that the organizations we have chosen are the most influential ones, and thus our results cannot be automatically extended to smaller NGOs and SMOs, these latter include highly influential organizations of different types.

\(^6\) In order to measure the level of ‘transnational embeddedness’, we asked our interview partners about their organizations’ regular contacts with similar organizations abroad as well as memberships in international organizations. The indicators count the number of contacts per organization, with a maximum of five mentions. State actors were not asked the question (see Europub report WP 5; Kriesi 2004b). The index presented in Figure 3.1 totals the numbers of cross-national and international contacts (ranging thus from 0 to 10).
tacts (both international and cross-national): they are particu-
larly well connected transnationally, even slightly more than the
general trend of all actors considered. This high degree of ‘trans-
national embeddedness’ might be related to the weak institution-
alization of supranational-movement actors, which pushes
national-movement organizations towards direct involvement in
multilevel pressures. Transnational contacts do not seem typical of
the most institutionalized and resourceful movement traditions,
but are most relevant for the more contentious southern move-
ments. A higher degree of transnational embeddedness character-
izes Italian, French, and Spanish social movement actors and a
lower one the British and the Dutch, with the German and Swiss
in between. Cross-national links seem therefore to develop through
protest, more than through lobbying.

The interviews indicate that this organizational dimension of
transnationalization can take different forms. Some of the analysed
SMOs and NGOs—especially environmental, consumers’, farmers’,
and labour organizations—have European offices. Among them,
the representative of the Italian branch of WWF (558) states, in a
similar manner to those of the other national branches of the same
organization, that: ‘the same actions that are carried out at the
national level are also performed at the European level: the themes
are the same, we coordinate actions between the European and the
national level of the various countries’. Similarly, the interviewee
for the British branch of Amnesty International comments that
‘anything at the EU level is dealt with by the Brussels office’ (736).

Even those movement organizations that lack an office in Brus-
sels still tend to act at the European level through European um-
brella organizations. For instance, the Italian dissident farmers’
association Altragricoltura-Foro Contadino and the Swiss Uniterre
(552, 146; see also Kriesi 2004; 35) work within the Confédération
Paysanne Européenne (the confederation of agricultural unions
belonging to the SMO Via Campesina): ‘Most of the actions at the
European level are carried out by this network, and we belong to
this network’ (552). Similarly, ‘the European activities for Altocon-
sumo are carried out through the BEUC—the organization of
European consumers—that has its office in Brussels’ (519; cf. Adiconsum 551), and ‘all the actions that AIAB [Associazione Italiana Agricoltura Biologica] performs at the European level pass through IFOAM [the International Federation of Movements for a Biologic Agriculture] which has offices in Brussels, and also mediates our contacts at the European level’ (531). The British organization Sustain (724), again, works at the EU level, mainly through partners such as the BEUC, the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), and Birdlife International; and the pro-EU campaign group Federal Union (716) works through the UEF (Union of European Federalists (Brussels)).

The scope of the target to which political actors direct their demands is an additional indicator of Europeanization, which presents different results for interviews and claim-making analysis. Figure 3.2 focuses on the perceived relevance of European and other international institutions for national actors, showing the high percentage of civil society organizations who claim to have attempted to influence at least one EU, supranational, or international target.

![Fig. 3.2. Supranational targets of social movements and NGOs (%), by country and at EU level](image)

7 Our measurements are based on the question about which actors—of a list of 40 we pre-selected on the basis of their presumed importance in an issue field—our interviewees tried to influence.
Overall, civil society organizations very often address European targets: as much as the other powerful actors do (around two-thirds of them targeted at least one EU institution in the last year); the type of actor does not affect the probability of focusing upon a European target (Cramer’s V for the correlation between type of actor and presence of EU target is not significant in any country or overall). If, as expected, EU-level actors more often address supranational targets, and this holds particularly true for SMOs and NGOs, national civil society organizations are also seen to target European-level actors and institutions very often—and certainly much more often than reported in the press. In a cross-country perspective, Spanish and British SMOs and NGOs more often target EU-level institutions and actors in comparison with the organizations of this type in other European countries. In this sense, and going back to the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 1, we might observe that targeting of transnational institutions is highest in both a country where public opinion largely supports European integration and in one in which it is more sceptical, as well as in a country characterized by a very moderate social movement sector and in one characterized by more radical positions. Understanding these results requires looking in more depth at motivations and forms of protest addressing the EU. For the moment, we can state that as far as Europeanization by externalization is concerned, by being the target of an increasingly Europeanized public discourse, European institutions appear to provide occasions for the creation of supranational networks and a European orientation. Europeanization is in fact acknowledged by our actors as very relevant; however, whereas more institutional actors direct attention to formal changes in organizational structure, civil society organizations stress, first of all, a cognitive process.

In our organizations there is in fact a broad ‘cognitive use’ of the European Union (Jaquot and Woll 2003), with effects on the framing of political action. The building of European networks is linked to the belief that the process of European integration had, has, and will have a strong impact on SMOs and NGOs—that ‘especially on some of the issues on which we struggle, the European level is very
important. We feel very involved with the EU’ (Attac Italia, 534), as ‘the Europeanization of politics requires a Europeanization of the movements...especially after the Schengen Treaty’ (Unterstützergruppen für abgewiesene Asylbewerber—failed seekers’ support group—268). The representative of Pro Asyl explained that since the mid-1990s his organization has ‘adopted a stronger orientation towards Europe and the standards there...Europe is an opportunity to shape—it is an important pillar of our work’ (266).

Action at a higher level of policy-making is therefore justified as a necessary adaptation to its increasing competence, as well as perceived wrong policy choices. Important steps in European integration such as the Maastricht Treaty are perceived by social movement representatives as endangering the welfare state: ‘The neoliberal turn that the EU has taken since the Maastricht Treaty was actually a major condition for the creation of Euromarches. Thanks to the institutional setting, there has been a democratization’ (Euromärscbe, 216). Similarly for environmental groups: ‘We began with the protection of nature and endangered species, then we again and again found that the structural guidelines of the EU are the problem’ (Euronatur, 255). And on immigration, according to the Dutch Raad van Kerken (Council of Churches, 645), ‘the EU has a lot of influence on immigration policy, almost nothing happens without European coordination, things like border protection, [control of] people smuggling, airport controls’.

In all our cases, however, we do not have so much a shift of scale (Tarrow and McAdam 2004) as the addition of another territorial level of action, which is seen as complementary to previous ones. The EU is in fact considered as still another level of governance, and involvement in a European mobilization derives from the perceived need to address that level. As the representative of the Italian agricultural association Altroconsumo confirms (519): ‘There is the need to act at different levels...The EU serves when it takes positions that we consider right with respect to the national norms and vice versa’. The speaker for Altragrícultura concurs, pointing out that ‘even if the European decision level prevails over the national one in agricultural policy, for us it remains very important to act
through national and local initiatives’ (552). Our interviewees share the belief that ‘you cannot avoid the European level, even if EU policies on immigration are even more restrictive than the Italian ones’ (Rete Lilliput, 564). Europe is looked at, quite pragmatically, as a level to be influenced: a potential ally when EU positions are more open than the national ones to social movements’ demands, and an opponent with which to engage when they are not. As the speaker for Tavolo della Pace (547) told us, there is a perceived need to intervene at different levels, focusing upon the level where decisions are taken: ‘It depends upon where the power is and where we can intervene in it’. 8

Cognitive shifts, and related action, can eventually be seen to influence informal organizational structure, as the more the collective actors target EU institutions the more they network transnationally (della Porta and Caiani 2006, on the Italian case). Some civil society organizations mention the positive impact of material support from the EU in their process of Europeanization. The representative of a German regional Flüchtlingsrat (Refugee Council, 265) observes: ‘The impact on our organization was very concrete: the money we get from the European Refugee Council allows us to employ people on a steady basis’. Similarly, the Italian Adiconsum declares the importance of European economic support for its activities (551), and the Spanish Global Nature (346) assesses the influence of the EU as very important for their organization, especially in respect of funds received.

Beyond material support, however, European campaigns have been especially helpful in consolidating European networks of activists. On this subject, the representative of the Italian ‘new global’ Rete Lilliput (564) declares: ‘All our actions at the EU level are organized as a net . . . We believe in transnational networks and there are continuous relations with international activists that occasionally translate into campaigns that pressure the members

8 ‘If the EU stayed as it is from the institutional point of view, for some years our work would continue to focus at the national level. This is so because Europe is an intergovernmental organ, where decisions are actually still taken by the member states, and it is therefore important to continue to work on the national governments’ (ibid.).
of the European Parliament’. The debate around the Convention is defined as an occasion for ‘approaching our potential partners in other European states’, and ‘the positive effect [of targeting the EU] is that the COBAS is now forced to interact with those who think like it at a European and international level’ (COBAS 505). Similarly, the representative of Attac Germany stresses: ‘Because of the European integration process, Attac sympathizers in different countries have met each other and have developed common claims, whether they are positive or negative towards the EU’ (213). Implicitly acknowledging this process, the representative of the Italian Movimento Federalista Europeo (501) explains that he has often taken part in supranational protest forums (such as the European Social Forums) and marches (such as the Perugia to Assisi peace march), organizing information stands on European issues—following his belief that interest in Europe depends upon the ways in which Europe is presented: ‘For instance, at the European Social Forum in Florence the MFE presented a document that discussed some topics related to Europe and federalism. We should do that in all protests on the streets’.

Concluding: at the European level, similarly to the national one (Tilly 1984), a cognitive shift, which has brought about a recognition of a specific territorial level of governance (or compound government) as relevant, has produced adaptation in terms of strategies, with a shift of level in protest action and protest strategies.

### 3.4. How to influence Europe: movement strategies in addressing EU institutions

Embedded in transnational networks of various types and densities, social movement organizations—like the ones we saw in action against the Bolkestein directive—seem able and willing to employ a variegated repertoire of political participation. In general, we can expect poorer actors to have more difficulty in developing insider strategies, tending instead to influence decision makers by addressing public opinion via disruptive (and newsworthy) tactics
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(Lipsky 1965). Social movements should therefore use protest more often than other actors do. On the other hand, the mentioned low democratic (especially electoral) accountability and the tendency towards consensual decision-making that permeates European institutions (Balme and Chabanet 2002; see also Hooghe and Marks 1995) would be expected to promote the use of insider strategies.

According to the Europub interviews, SMOs and NGOs targeting the EU use a rich repertoire of collective action. This finding emerges if we look at insider versus outsider strategies and compare their use at the national and supranational levels. With the first dimension, we distinguish between strategies attempting to influence the policy process within the administrative and parliamentary arena from those intervening in the public sphere. With the second, we single out strategies that are purely national from those that are EU-oriented. The Europub.com project developed six indicators for the action repertoire at the national and the EU level (see report WP 5; Kriesi 2004b): (1) *nmedia/eumedia*, which refers to the media-related repertoire, including activities such as distributing press releases or giving interviews to the media; (2) *ninform/euinform*, which includes strategies aimed at informing the public or getting informed about the preferences of the public; for example, via opinion polls; (3) *nmobil/eumobil conventional*, which refers to campaigning and to strategies of mobilizing the public such as fundraising by mail, letter campaigns in newspapers, referendum campaigns, and public assemblies; (4) *nmobil/eumobil unconventional*, including petitions, marches, boycotts, and strikes; (5) *noutside/eoutside*; that is, outside-oriented action calculated as the sum of the previous three indicators; and (6) *ninside/einside*; that is, inside-oriented lobbying, including contacts with authorities as well as participation in consultation procedures and the like. All of these indicators are based on the sum of ‘yes’ answers to each form of action included in the broader index, weighted by the claimed frequency of use (‘regularly’, ‘occasionally’). Table 3.1 presents the standardized means (0–1) of

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9 Each indicator is standardized to the 0–1 range by dividing the resulting score by the maximum possible value. Note that state actors do not have mobilization strategies in their repertoire. The other indicators are not based on exactly the same set of measures for state and
the use of several forms of action for each category and the intensity in their use for the EU level.

While it is true that national civil society organizations—as well as the other actors in each country—still focus their strategies primarily at the national level, a significant share undertake activities at the EU level as well. Their degree of European activism is actually not much different from that of other collective actors: 0.12 for outsider strategies—specifically, 0.25 for media-related actions; 0.09 for informing, and 0.13 for mobilizing (0.05 for conventional forms of mobilization and 0.08 for unconventional forms)—and 0.22 for inside lobbying (versus respectively 0.45, 0.82, 0.40, 0.30, and 0.68 at the national level). Even if a little less active than parties when looking at the aggregate values for outside and inside lobbying (as was predictable, due to parties’ high level of institutionalization at the EU level, through their European federations), social movement organizations are more active than interest groups at the EU level in conventional forms of mobilization (and they are more active than parties and equal interest groups in unconventional forms). As hypothesized, the style of decision-making at the European level seems to influence action strategies.

Table 3.1. EU-level action forms of national and European SMOs and NGOs (standardized mean values; no. of cases in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Outside lobbying</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Inform</th>
<th>Mobil conventional</th>
<th>Mobil unconventional</th>
<th>Inside lobbying</th>
<th>(No.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>(69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>(78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>(77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>(224–97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EU-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Outside lobbying</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Inform</th>
<th>Mobil conventional</th>
<th>Mobil unconventional</th>
<th>Inside lobbying</th>
<th>(No.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>(24–37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In this sense, we can say that when intervening at the EU level SMOs and NGOs tend not only to be less numerous than at national level, but also to use strategies for addressing the EU traditionally considered characteristic of interest groups. Overall, for civil society organizations in all countries, lobbying (especially for German and Spanish organizations, but also, to a lesser extent, for British and Italian ones) and media-related strategies (especially for British, Spanish, and German organizations) are more important at the European level than at the national level.

Although at the European level virtually all the social movement organizations and NGOs we surveyed use some insider and some public-related strategies to influence public policy-making, we do find interesting cross-country differences. Civil society organizations from Germany (0.24), Spain (0.18), and Italy (0.13) distinguish themselves by a more frequent use of public-related strategies (outsider strategies, above the European average), while those from Switzerland and the Netherlands show the least Europeanized outsider-oriented action repertoire (under the average), with British organizations in a central position. In general, SMOs and NGOs from Spain, Italy, and Germany appear particularly active at the EU level: they are highly engaged in both lobbying and mobilization in Germany and Spain, and less engaged in France, Switzerland, and the UK; they are involved mainly in lobbying in the Netherlands and mainly in mobilization in Italy. By and large, the low scores in Switzerland and the UK reflect the low(er) interest in Europe in those countries, and vice versa for Germany and Spain. As for the forms chosen, attention to mobilization strategy in Italy and Spain reflects the more radical forms of social movements in those countries, while the preference for lobbying by the Dutch resonates with the widespread moderation in the protest repertoires there.

Looking at EU-level organizations, it is no surprise that EU actors are much more active at the EU level than at the national one. This holds not only for ‘weaker’ actors like SMOs and NGOs, but also for institutions, parties, and interest groups. Overall, the two central strategies used at the European level are media-oriented (0.78) and insider-lobbying strategies (0.71), which are of crucial importance
for all actors. These also remain the two most important strategies for SMOs and NGOs at the EU level, although they make more use of media-oriented than of lobbying-oriented ones. The strategies of informing and mobilizing the public seem of lesser importance for EU actors (respectively 0.34 and 0.09 for conventional mobilization actions and 0.18 for unconventional ones), a finding that might reflect the distance from Brussels of the national electorates or a division of labour with national organizations (Adam, Berkel, and Erbe 2004). Nevertheless, civil society organizations are more active than other types of actors in mobilizing the public (in particular, more than interest groups for conventional mobilization actions and more than parties for unconventional ones) and informing, even at the EU level. At the national level, EU actors focus on media-oriented activities and especially lobbying.

More generally, media-oriented activities seem to be a crucial component in the strategic repertoire of all actors. As the representative for the immigration sector of Caritas (514) explains, ‘the links with the media are of fundamental importance, because with even the best product, if you have no strategy, you cannot sell it’. Media strategies appear as even more relevant for those actors that are less endowed with resources—and are able to address public opinion through the media. In the words of the speaker of the Comitato Spontaneo dei Produttori Agricoli (COSPA, 502), ‘public decision makers are sensitive to the media. Before taking a position, they want to know what the media says, and through them, what the public says. By influencing the media, COSPA knows that—indirectly—it influences the decision makers’. For resource-richer, more powerful actors as well, however, media resonance is perceived as useful in order to access decision makers. According to the British Consumers’ Association (729), ‘the fact that we have a very high media profile increases our influence when lobbying. They’re going to take us much more seriously’. Similarly, the speaker for the Spanish Amnistia Internacional (329) declares that his organization aims at influencing the media and, through them, to have a larger governmental influence; and the representative of the Dutch Vrienden van het Platteland
(Friends of the Countryside, 631) states: ‘The media are being used to put pressure on policy makers. Media strategies are important, because they help to create a certain climate and allow one in a second step to undertake work with political decision makers’. Along the same lines, the representative of the Neue Europäische Bewegung Schweiz (Swiss New European Movement, 125) confirms that ‘media-related strategies and lobbying have the same importance because they mutually reinforce each other. One strategy is not sufficient without the other’ (see also Schweizerische Vereinigung zum Schutz der kleinen und mittleren Bauern—the Swiss organization for the protection of small and medium-sized farms, 145 and the British Refugee Council, 741).

Informing the public is, however, also valued as an aim in itself. The representative of the Swiss Stiftung für Konsumentschutz (Foundation for Consumer Protection, 147) states that ‘media-related strategies are very central, since they are the means of access to the general public’. Communication is thus relevant in order to educate the public: it ‘gives us more force towards the public, our associates, our supporters. It is of fundamental value in order to orient citizens’ (Legambiente environmental association, 557). On agricultural issues, where insider strategies often prevail, the necessity of balancing communication with the public and the lobbying of decision makers is also stressed as part of a multilevel strategy: ‘there are topics’, says the speaker for the Italian Altroconsumo (519), ‘on which actions oriented towards the media and the decision makers go together, others on which decision makers are allies but not the media and others on which Altroconsumo has to struggle against both’.

In order to put EU-level actions into perspective, we also considered the number of forms of action used at the national level. Thus, Table 3.2 shows, for each specific strategy, the ratio of EU-level actions to national-level actions. The index allows us to compare not only which strategy social movement organizations tend to ‘Europeanize’

10 For instance, the value of 0.27 for the index of outside activities for British social movements and NGOs means that for them outside European actions represent 27% of outside activities performed at the national level. In other words, for British social movements outside actions at the national level are around four times more frequent than at the EU level.
more in each country, but also (reading the table vertically) the degree of Europeanization of each strategy across countries.

Overall, civil society actors ‘Europeanize’ particularly through lobbying, but also through media-related actions (overall, the insider and media-related EU-level actions account for about one-third of the insider and media-related national actions), while informing actions are the least Europeanized (overall, informing actions at the EU-level are one-fifth the number of informing national actions). Mobilization actions of both conventional and unconventional types are in between (around one-quarter). Thus, in shifting from the national to the European level, the most preferred strategy seems to be lobbying decision makers.

Comparing civil society organizations with the overall trend of all actors, it is worth noting that media- and insider-lobbying strategies are of crucial importance for all actors. Nevertheless, for SMOs and NGOs media-related strategies at the EU level appear more important than for other actors: indeed, they involve the media as often as they exercise lobbying, while overall actors rely more on lobbying than on outsider strategies at the EU level. The media seem then to be a crucial component in the strategy mix for actors with fewer material resources working at the EU level.

In sum, civil society organizations, although adapting somewhat to the type of political opportunities that are dominant at the EU level, have developed a multi-faceted repertoire of collective action, thus making European issues more accessible to the public.

Table 3.2. Degree of Europeanization of national actors’ strategies (EU-national action ratios; no. of cases in parentheses)¹¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Outside lobbying a</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Inform</th>
<th>Mobil conventional</th>
<th>Mobil unconventional</th>
<th>Inside lobbying</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.37 (−)</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.52 (+)</td>
<td>(69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.24 (−)</td>
<td>0.54 (+)</td>
<td>(78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOs NGOs</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.30 (+)</td>
<td>0.22 (−)</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.32 (+)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.29 (−)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.47 (+)</td>
<td>(224)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (+) = action form most Europeanized; (−) = action form least Europeanized
a Outside lobbying is calculated as the sum of the three indicators media, inform, and mobil

¹¹ Only data for non-state actors are shown.
3.5. Civil society in broader (conflictual) networks

The path of Europeanization by externalization is influenced by the types of cleavages developed within each national context. Through network analysis, and in line with the political-process approach, we can in fact locate civil society actors within a broader set of political relations by looking, in particular, at the types of interactions among actors. Returning to the network analysis of the previous chapter, and comparing the density of collaborative relationships between actors with the density of conflictual relationships between actors, we can more clearly specify the logic that prevails within each policy sector and outline the potential cleavage lines that structure the debate on Europe (Kriesi et al. 2006). On the basis of the specific combination of the density of interaction of cooperation and disagreement a distinction is proposed between a ‘consensual logic’ (with high levels of collaboration accompanied by low levels of conflict); a ‘pragmatic logic’ (with high levels of collaboration and conflict); and a ‘conflictual logic’ (with high levels of conflict and low levels of collaboration; Cinalli 2005).

Applying this typology to our data, we observe that in the European integration sector the debate on Europe is characterized by a spread ‘conflictual’ logic, with a high density of conflict and a low density of collaboration. Returning to the Italian example (ch. 2, Sect. 6), the main criticisms on European integration emerge from the coalition of movement organizations (block 2), and are chiefly addressed to the institutional actors and governing parties (block 4). Between these two blocks emerges the highest level of disagreement. Interestingly, the block of institutional actors also displays strong disagreement with federalist forces (block 1). The role of broker played by the federalist block is confirmed, as they develop ‘consensual’ relationships both with the second block, of

12 Tables summarizing the data, showing the prevailing structure of relations between the coalitions in each sector (for Italy), are contained in the Appendix (Tables B, C, and D). To compare the specific density of conflict and cooperation, see the density-matrices tables in Ch. 2.
13 The relations between the block of social movements and the third block, of Parliament and interest groups, appear instead to follow a logic of ‘indifference’, given the low densities of both cooperation and conflict.
movement organizations, and with the third block, of interest groups and parliament; while with institutional actors a more ‘pragmatic’ logic prevails, with numerous instances of collaboration but also sharp disagreements.\(^{14}\)

In the sector of agricultural policy, the debate in Europe is characterized instead by a prevailing climate of consensus. Although, as the density matrix demonstrates (Table 2.8(c)), all the actors show some disagreements with the agricultural establishment (block 3), the strongest criticisms emerge from the block of agricultural-movement organizations, unions, and the radical Left (0.567). The coalition of environmental associations and consumers alternates between relations of conflict and instances of collaboration with actors of the agricultural establishment (block 3), in line with a logic of ‘pragmatism’. As a representative of the Altroconsumo association states: ‘there are no a priori positions of disagreement vis-à-vis a particular group or institution, as it depends on how they confront individual matters. For example with the Minister of Agriculture there is agreement on some things and disagreement on others’ (519).

As with European integration policy, the sector of immigration and asylum policy is rather conflictual. It is once again civil society actors (blocks 3 and 4) who express the strongest form of criticism. In this sector, however, their criticism is focused on the centre right of block 1, with whom the conflict is intense. As a representative of the CGIL union explains, ‘we would like immigration and asylum policy to be more closely tied to social policies in the employment ministry. But since the Lega [Nord] arrived this ministry has adopted an attitude of total closure’ (561). With the institutional actors of block 2 more ‘pragmatic’ relations prevail, as conflict on principles is accompanied by collaboration in different circumstances. The actors of the centre-right-parties block (and those

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\(^{14}\) The actors of the federalist block do not spare their criticisms of the Italian government. As the President of the European Federalist Movement explains, ‘for the first time the foreign policy of the Italian government is clearly anti-European’ (MFE, 501). Political élites are criticized for not having done much in the Convention (CNA, 17), and for ‘adopting a pushy attitude towards their European partners’ (503).
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government ministries controlled by them) tend to enter into conflict with the pro-migrant coalition (block 3), thereby introducing an ulterior element of polarization in this sector. Institutional indifference in relations with social movements (block 4) seems to suggest the relative weakness of the latter in this policy sector. Between the various civil society actors (blocks 3 and 4), there are no sharp contrasts. The only significant exceptions are occasional disagreements with some organizations that are closer to the state (e.g. the Red Cross). As previously underlined with reference to immigration policy in the United Kingdom, a situation of this type could indicate the existence of a division within civil society between ‘state clients’ and organizations more oriented towards protest activities (Statham and Geddes 2006; 260).

In summary, the domestic debate on European issues is conflictual in all three policy sectors, even if they do not align in pro- and anti-Europe coalitions (Kriesi et al. 2006). Conflict on European issues are greater in the sectors of European integration and immigration policy, while in agricultural policy the Europeanization of the debate is rather consensual. The data confirms that left-wing movement organizations and trade unions constitute the principal source of criticism in all three policy areas.

Italy has many similarities with other European countries. In particular, in all the countries of the Europub research, European integration and immigration tend to be more conflictual than agriculture (Kriesi et al. 2006; 352). However, there are also large cross-country variations in the level of conflict and bargaining from one policy domain to the other, and, particularly concerning the conflict in the field of European integration, varying types of opposition to Europe are visible. The block models of the domestic power structures in the field of European integration in the other Europub countries confirm these conflict constellations. In Figure 3.3 the blocks (numbered and described below in terms of their internal composition) are represented by circles and the ties by arrows. The circles are shaded according to the calculated power of the block: very powerful blocks (mean power > 0.60) are dark; moderately powerful blocks (mean power between 0.30 and 0.60)
are grey; and weak blocks (mean power < 0.30) are white. The arrows refer to the type of tie (bold arrows indicate cooperation, normal arrows bargaining, and interrupted ones conflict), whereas the absence of an arrow indicates that there is no relationship between two blocks (the source is Kriesi et al. 2006).

The Swiss and British networks in this domain are the most conflictual of all; this result is not very surprising, given the widespread Euroscepticism in these two countries (see Kriesi 2005). However, the most important thing to underline is that in those countries with fundamental conflicts over European integration (Switzerland and the UK) there are clearly identifiable pro-EU and anti-EU coalitions, among
which the power of the field is shared. The pro-EU coalition in Switzerland includes the pro-integration establishment and the pro-European left; in the UK the state actors plus the Labour Party. Conversely, the anti-EU coalition in Switzerland is dominated by the SVP (Schweizerische Volkspartei—Swiss People’s Party), which is the single most powerful actor in the field of EU integration in Switzerland; in the UK, the main sources of critique and opposition towards the integration process come from opposition parties (e.g. the Conservative party) (Kriesi et al. 2006; 356). Business interest associations emerge as a third important block in the European integration domain in both countries, but they play different roles. In Switzerland business-interest associations serve as brokers between distant actors in a conflictual network: they cooperate with the integration establishment, reject the pro-EU Left (including the unions), and bargain with those unwilling to join the EU. In the UK business-interest associations (here including the unions and the Confederation of British Industry) are particularly close to (cooperate with) state actors and the Labour Party, while having disagreements with all other blocks (ibid.).

In Germany, too, the EU-integration-policy network is characterized by conflicts regarding Europe. As in Italy, however, we encounter a different kind of opposition to Europe than in the UK and Switzerland—an opposition that neither rejects the project of European integration per se, nor raises the issue of the boundaries of European polity. Indeed, Germany is normally characterized by a strong élite consensus on the integration project and lively support for a European Constitution that can strengthen European polity. For most of the German élite the EU is an extension of their national constitutional system that does not lead to fundamental problems of legitimacy (ibid.; 357; Jachtenfuchs 2002; 283, cited in Kriesi et al. 2006; 356). Here, similarly to Spain and France (see again Fig. 3.3), criticism towards Europe originates for the most part from left-wing movements and opposition parties. In all

15 Of all conflictual relations in the German EU-integration-policy network, 75 per cent originate from the Euromärscbe and the unions (both part of block 2), and the conservative and liberal opposition parties (both part of block 1) (Kriesi et al. 2006; 357).
three countries there are conflicts about the form of EU integration that, however, lack the fundamental character expressed by the existence of pro- and anti-EU coalitions (Kriesi et al. 2006; 356). The main conflict line regarding the process of EU integration in these three countries refers in fact to the question of a neo-liberal versus a social Europe. In all of them, as the block-model analysis shows, the unions and Left NGOs constitute the focal point of conflict, although the Left challengers are powerful actors in Spain, whereas in France they lack substantial influence (ibid.; 357).

3.6. Externalization and the framing of Europe

The many images of Europe that have emerged in our claim analysis are confirmed, and actually deepened, by the qualitative data generated from our interviews, in relation to both perceptions and evaluations of the present state of affairs in the European integration process and possible future scenarios. The interview partners in the Europub project were asked about their general perceptions and evaluation of the process of European integration, and their value judgement of the role and performance of EU institutions in this context. (‘How do you perceive the process of European integration more generally?’ ‘What direction is it taking?’ ‘Do you agree with this development?’ ‘How do you see the role and performance of EU institutions in this context?’) The analysis of the attitudes of various national actors on Europe confirms widespread support for European integration, but also extremely different conceptions of Europe. Europe emerges as an ‘imagined community’ that means very different things to different collective actors. Support or opposition to Europe are positions usually considered as pertaining to territorial identity, pitting nationalists against Europeanists—or intergovernmentalists against federalists. However, at various points in time and on various policies national actors have symbolically intertwined their positions on Europe with those held on other issues, some using their veto powers, others fashioning themselves as Europe’s ‘entrepreneurs’.
The groups that took part in the anti-Bolkestein campaigns were not the only ones critical of the EU. Confirming the results of the analysis on claim-making, the interviews with representatives from civil society associations reveal that even before the French and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution several civil society organizations already conceived the current developments in the process of European integration as being characterized by deep tensions.

In Table 3.3 we examine attitudes towards Europe among civil society organizations across countries, using four indicators: (a) *position towards Europe*, referring to the position of the organization or institution with respect to an increase in the EU’s influence and competences (for or against); (b) *level of involvement* of the organization in a European policy area (immigration, agriculture, etc.); (c) *current importance* for the organization/institution of European policy at the national level; (d) expectation of the *future importance* for the organization/institution of European policies in affecting the national level.16

Regarding positions towards Europe, we note a generally supportive attitude towards European integration (0.77 for both civil society actors and other actors). The existing cross-national differences in the degree of support for Europe tend to resonate with the general positions of their own countries. Overall, Great Britain and Switzerland show the lowest levels of support for Europe (both under the European average), while Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands show the highest, and France and Germany occupy a middle position. In parallel, British and Swiss civil society organizations

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16 The first indicator refers to the question: ‘Is your organization generally in favour of an increase in European influence in — [e.g. immigration] policy or is it opposed?’ Scale: 1 (strongly against) – 4 (strongly in favour). The question used for the second dimension of European attitudes is: ‘How involved has your organization been in European — [e.g. immigration] policy?’ Scale 1 (not at all) – 4 (a lot). For the third dimension the question is: ‘How important would you say is the European — [e.g. immigration] policy for your organization compared to — [e.g. immigration] policy at the national level today?’ Scale 1–4. Fourth question: ‘And thinking about the role of the European — [e.g. immigration] policy for your organization relative to — [e.g. immigration] policy at the national level: is its role becoming increasingly important compared to the national level, less important compared to the national level, or does it not change at all?’ Scale 1–3. The four indicators have been thus standardized (min = 0; max. = 1). See Europub report WP 5, Kriesi 2004b.
Table 3.3. Positions of civil society actors towards Europe (mean values; no. of cases in parentheses), by country and at EU level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National level</th>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Support for EU</th>
<th>Level of involvement in EU policy</th>
<th>Importance of EU policy (present)</th>
<th>Importance of EU policy (future)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (No.)</td>
<td>Mean (No.)</td>
<td>Mean (No.)</td>
<td>Mean (No.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.82 (9)</td>
<td>0.91 (11)</td>
<td>0.83 (10)</td>
<td>1.00 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.75 (35)</td>
<td>0.91 (12)</td>
<td>0.79 (32)</td>
<td>0.95 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.78 (10)</td>
<td>0.54 (12)</td>
<td>0.66 (11)</td>
<td>0.97 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.87 (39)</td>
<td>0.73 (43)</td>
<td>0.66 (28)</td>
<td>0.92 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.84 (5)</td>
<td>0.57 (7)</td>
<td>0.79 (6)</td>
<td>0.90 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.78 (27)</td>
<td>0.65 (30)</td>
<td>0.77 (21)</td>
<td>0.94 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.88 (12)</td>
<td>0.71 (12)</td>
<td>0.79 (12)</td>
<td>0.92 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.91 (47)</td>
<td>0.77 (48)</td>
<td>0.78 (35)</td>
<td>0.96 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.87 (9)</td>
<td>0.63 (10)</td>
<td>0.70 (10)</td>
<td>0.90 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.84 (39)</td>
<td>0.68 (42)</td>
<td>0.65 (34)</td>
<td>0.93 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.60 (11)</td>
<td>0.65 (10)</td>
<td>0.67 (9)</td>
<td>0.83 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.63 (35)</td>
<td>0.72 (35)</td>
<td>0.71 (21)</td>
<td>0.84 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.62 (9)</td>
<td>0.67 (9)</td>
<td>0.44 (9)</td>
<td>0.93 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.58 (44)</td>
<td>0.61 (44)</td>
<td>0.43 (33)</td>
<td>0.92 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.77 (65)</td>
<td>0.66 (72)</td>
<td>0.70 (67)</td>
<td>0.92 (70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.77 (266)</td>
<td>0.73 (286)</td>
<td>0.68 (204)</td>
<td>0.93 (256)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European level</td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.83 (7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.83 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.83 (20)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.75 (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

117
appear to be the most lukewarm in their support for the EU, while those from the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Germany are the most pro-European.

If we compare the scores of national SMOs and NGOs with the average of civil society associations across countries, and with the average of all other national actors, we observe that British civil society actors appear to be conforming to their own country’s pessimism towards Europe, while the French, Dutch, and Germans each reflect their country’s pro-European permissive consensus. Swiss civil society seems more pro-European than other Swiss actors, while in Spain and Italy civil society seems more pessimistic than other actors. This means that while civil society actors are certainly influenced by the general climate in their own countries, the more protest-oriented ones are also more critical of the EU (della Porta 2007a).

However, the less supportive positions on Europe among SMOs and NGOs are not accompanied by neglect for the European level (as far as involvement is concerned—even if in this case the obstacles are greater for powerless actors) or by the perception of the latter as less important (in the present and the future) than other territorial levels of governance. Concerning involvement in EU policies, Italian and German civil society associations are characterized by a high level of engagement at the EU level (0.71 and 0.81 versus a European average of 0.66), while French, Spanish, and Dutch ones are characterized by a slightly lower degree of involvement. This could have different explanations in the different countries, reflecting a more national orientation in France and the Netherlands, with a larger role for local and grass-roots groups in Spain. Compared with the general trend of their countries, civil society associations from Germany and Switzerland show above-average involvement in EU policy.

Overall, the expectations of civil society towards the future importance of the EU remain high (reaching the value of the general European mean), while the evaluation of the current importance of the EU is even slightly more optimistic among SMOs and NGOs than among other collective actors (0.70 vs. 0.67). In particular,
these types of actors in the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Germany appear to be more convinced of the current importance of the EU than are other actors in their respective countries. Civil society associations in Spain and Germany appear the most convinced among their European counterparts (and more than other actors in their own countries) of the growing importance of European policy. At the EU level, the degree of support from actors for the process of European integration is very high (0.83), and civil society associations do not differ from this general mean. Furthermore, the perceived importance of the EU is also very high. This suggests that their criticism focuses not on the process of integration per se, but largely on its forms and content.

If our interviews confirm that the identitarian vision of Europe predominates in civil society, they also show an emerging critique not of ‘too much’ Europe, but of ‘not enough social Europe’. Complaints from SMOs and NGOs specifically address the prevalence of ‘neo-liberal’ policies and weak solidarity policies. Even while expressing their support for European citizenship, they criticize the European institutions’ policy choices, seen as designed to protect the market rather than citizens. Criticism of EU policies is severe, addressing in particular what is perceived as scarce attention to positive integration, especially in terms of social rights.

In general, the instrumental justification of European integration is considered as insufficient. The speaker for the Swiss Pro Natura (138) sees socio-ecological and democratic questions as not adequately addressed. Similarly, the German Attac representative (213) states that

in principle, we have a critical position: even those who see the process positively note clear failures, and the others feel that EU integration is not really corresponding to a pan-European integration/unification/agreement. I perceive the European integration process as an economic process, where the role of the EU is to improve the competitiveness of member states versus other competitors. And this is the direction in which it’ll go in the future. . . . We want an alternative European integration, which is not dominated by economic interests.
Similarly, according to the Spanish Amnistia Internacional (329) the EU ‘has focused on market elements and the economy, and very little on political and citizenship elements . . . this leads to resources not being focused on essential issues: health, education, social action for diversity, human rights’. European integration has enhanced the neo-liberal process (Espacio Alternativo, 315), while ‘there is no development of social rights and citizenship’ (Amnistia Internacional, 329).

Above all, present EU policies on social rights, immigration, and consumer protection are bitterly criticized. In our interviews SMOs and NGOs fault the weakness of a social Europe. European integration gives rise to fears ‘that the neo-liberal economic model will gain influence in even more countries and thus in the EU. I fear that there will be a deterioration of social rights, of democracy and the rights of free movement of non-EU citizens’ (Attac Germany, 213). The increase in the competence of the EU is perceived as producing a move towards ‘a minimum standard that is very low’ (Euromärsche, 216). In addition, European integration ‘has had a modernizing impact, but with social deficits. There is more wealth, but it is more poorly distributed’ (Spanish Espacio Alternativo, 315); the actual developments in the EU are seen as ‘rather negative; monetary union and stability pact are being used to undermine the welfare state’ (Swiss SSF, Solidarité sans frontières, 132), European institutions as gradually moulded to meet the needs of international global capitalism, and to enable a much freer flow of capital around the world and around Europe in particular (the British Democracy Movement, 714).

Movement organizations active on issues of immigration more specifically criticize the absence of recognition of migrants’ political and social rights. Among others, the Swiss NGO Aid for Refugees (SFH, 131) stresses the necessity of a common policy, but also criticizes the choices made up to now: ‘the EU is absolutely central; it is very important to reach a harmonization of asylum policy at a very high standard; at the moment one can observe a negative competition to become the worst place to go to as a refugee (to become unattractive)’. In these circumstances, Europeanization of
migration policies is described as a dangerous trend: ‘First, it has meant a rise in immigration-control policies. Second, asylum harmonization has meant a loss of guarantees for people, it has tended to eliminate asylum seekers’ rights’ (Spanish Amnistía Internacional, 329). Even outside the EU the representative of the Swiss Solidarité sans frontières (132) expects very negative consequences in the domain of asylum (e.g. the UK’s proposals for refugee camps in asylum seekers’ regions of origin), and according to Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe (SFH, Swiss Refugee Help 131) the great danger is that stronger border controls will increasingly close off Europe.

In synthesis, the EU is accused of raising a ‘fortress Europe’, to the point of having ‘consolidated and normalized apartheid. There’s a contradiction: the EU knocks down borders and raises them up, opening up to free circulation and establishing citizenship at an EU level, but there are 13–15 million non-EU citizens who don’t have social rights . . . the EU is helping neither social integration nor civic attitudes and commitments, access to citizenship and rights’ (Spanish SOS Racismo, 332). The risk, perceived, among others, by the representative of the French Amnesty International (30), is that ‘instead of one repressive minister, we have 15 repressive ministers’. Similarly, the German Unterstützergruppen für abgewiesene Asylbewerber (failed asylum seekers’ group, 268) considers that ‘the integration process allows for better control possibilities through the cooperation of the ministries of the interior and the police. The standards of social security will be lowered’. And the interviewee from the British Asylum Aid (734) assesses a negative impact of European integration ‘in terms of giving real meaning to the phrase fortress Europe, so making it much more difficult for immigrants in general and asylum seekers in particular to get into Europe in the first place’. If ‘there is no alternative to Europe: EU institutions should principally be strengthened’, there is the widespread belief that ‘unfortunately, very often the lowest denominator is shaping the process’ (German Pro Asyl, 266).

In addition to those concerning specific policies, open discussion—partly interlinked with the previous one—develops on the
issue of what the European *polity* should look like: on its competences and decision-making procedures. If civil society associations express criticism of the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ (especially the limited role of the Parliament), they also tend to see at the European level an opportunity to move towards a politics ‘from below’.

While on the right there is fear of excessive regulation (della Porta and Caiani 2006), on the left we found a tendency to underline the EU’s weakness in terms of democratic accountability, proposing a model of supranational European integration with strong support for the Parliament. Thus the representative of the Italian Attac (534) mentions the ‘democratic deficit’ in connection with the limited powers of parliaments (both national and European), criticizing in particular the fact that the European Constitution gives more power to the executive than to the Parliament. More generally, SMOs and NGOs tend to trust the European Parliament more than the other EU institutions: according to many interviewees ‘The European Parliament . . . has not enough influence’ (Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz—Association for the Protection of the Environment and Nature—BUND, 252), and it ‘should be more important’ (Euronatur 255), playing a central role for the democratization of Europe (331; see also 615). In parallel, strengthening of the European Parliament is often perceived as a principal step towards democratic participation: ‘To get the public more involved, we have to strengthen the European Parliament’ (European Movement, 750).

As an elected body, the EP is in fact considered as more open to civil society. According to the representative of Beati i costruttori di pace (‘Blessed are the peace makers’, 535), ‘we believe much more in our capacity to influence elected bodies, such as the parliaments, than governing bodies’; but in the EU, ‘the only democratic institution, the Parliament, has ever smaller powers and we would like to see a reorganization that moves democratically elected and much more powerful structures to centre stage’. Electoral accountability is thus considered as facilitating responsiveness to demands ‘from below’. The representative of the French GISTI (an immigrants’ information and support group) praises the positive
contacts with the Euro-parliamentarians (29; see also L’Union des Fédéralistes Européennes, 8).

The ‘democratic deficit’ is, however, stigmatized within a broader discourse than the limited power of the EP (Europese Beweging Nederland—referendum campaign—616; Amnistia Internacionale, 329). The EU is considered as ‘not transparent for the citizens’ (Euronatur, 255) and ‘out of touch with NGOs’ (Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek, 615). In the words of the spokesperson of the Italian Tavolo della Pace (547), ‘the EU, from an institutional point of view, still remains distant from civil society. We can make proposals, and use funds, but there is no listening’. More occasions for participation are, therefore, asked for. According to the Spanish SOS Racismo (332): ‘There should be a bottom-level debate, not just of the experts, but with referendums and more participation, as there is little participation’. Even in the view of the more Euro-optimist EU-level associations, there is a general ‘critique on the lack of democracy and the need for more political scrutiny on decision making by the EU parliament’ (Friends of the Earth Europe, 584), within the belief that ‘Europe should be a public thing, not just for diplomats and specialists; language (or jargon) is also important, it should be more accessible for citizens’ (Union of European Federalists, 751).

Despite criticisms—even the most radical—levelled at the ‘Europe of markets’, most of the civil society organizations we interviewed expressed support for the construction of ‘a different Europe’—a Europe built from below, from ‘a European movement’ (Attac Germany, 213). In the language of the Italian Disobbedienti, the debate on the Constitutional Treaty ‘has the merit of posing the constituent problem of Europe and the European political space as an inevitable space for new democracy’. The necessity of building a Europe from below is also underlined by the representative of the Movimento Federalista Europeo (501), who, while claiming to be highly in favour of European integration, also supports ‘participation from below in European life, considering this the only way to build the European Union’.

In conclusion, it is not Europe that is rejected here, but specific EU policies: the criticism does not target the construction of a European level, but the specific direction of the process. The repre-
sentative of the network of associations active on global justice issues explains that ‘Rete Lilliput is in favour of the integration process, but does not share the political direction that is being taken’ (564), hoping for an ‘expansion of global integration and a higher level of protection of rights’. Similarly, the representative of the Italian branch of Attac states that his organization is ‘strongly in favour of Europeanization’; and even the interviewee from the Disobbedienti (542), often presented as the most radical wing of the global justice movement, declares, ‘we are profoundly Europeanist’. In the same direction, the representative of Uniterre (146) believes that the European Union includes elements with which his organization is ‘not at all happy, such as the great market, competition, or the dismantling of public services; but leaving aside these negative elements, it is important that countries come together’. And that of the Spanish Espacio Alternativo (315) declares: ‘We feel more European. We are more concerned with “another Europe” than thinking about existing Europe. But a different Europe to the one that is being designed by conservatives and neo-liberals. . . . It will be negative if the process ends up constitutionalizing neo-liberal processes which delay social and public issues’.

In a certain sense the representatives of civil society organizations even present themselves as ‘entrepreneurs of Europe’, declaring that against ‘a profoundly anti-European Berlusconi’, ‘the movements have worked hard to get these [European] themes into the common parlance, even if, to be honest, they do not rouse much interest in themselves alone’ (Disobbedienti, 542); and that if ‘the public is not very interested in the theme of the European Convention’, ‘we seek to make them more interested’ (Beati i costruttori di pace, 535). In fact, protest campaigns are perceived as occasions to build a European identity. The concept of a ‘Europeanization from below’ emerges during the protests that address the EU—as the German speaker for the Euromärsche (Euromarches) (216) recalls: ‘Euromarches were the first to develop the concept of Europe from below, and now we want others to take over this concept. We have a pioneering role because for the first time criticism is brought forward not only nationally’.
The attitude towards the European institutions is, therefore, quite pragmatic, in the sense that they are judged on the basis of perceived performance in relation to specific values. As underlined by the representative of the Italian Tavolo della Pace (547): ‘If we must build a Europe equivocal on the question of peace and conflict in the world, which reduces democratic spaces instead of increasing them, that type of Europe will not help’. European integration is instead evaluated by its perceived effects. In the words of the representatives of Spanish NGOs: ‘The current influence is rather negative and only partial. But the increase in influence is natural and as it should be because immigration is no longer a local issue’ (Andalucía—Acoge Andalucía Welcomes, 331). In a multilevel governance ‘we don’t care which is the EU or the national competence, as long as those competences have to do with respect for human rights; at the moment on neither level is this focus happening’ (Amnistía Internacional, 329). In this spirit, the representatives of civil society organizations that we interviewed called for a European Constitution comprising the rejection of war (Rete Lilliput, 564 and Beati i costruttori di pace, 535); recognition of ‘the centrality of people, not profit’ (Rete Lilliput, 564); and including ‘residential citizenship, not European or national, where migrants may move freely’ (Disobbedienti, 542).

3.7. The EU as coral reef for movements? Back to the protest against the Bolkestein directive

Summarizing: if social movement organizations and NGOs are the clear losers in terms of visibility in the Europeanized mass-media public sphere, we cannot say that they are indifferent to Europe. To the contrary, there are clear signs of an adaptation to multilevel governance, especially in terms of a growing targeting of EU institutions, framing issues as EU-related, and transnational networking of domestic organizations. In particular, paths of Europeanization by externalization involve multilevel organizational networking and experimentation with various forms of
action, as well as a growing politicization of the discourse on Europe and the EU.

Although their repertoire of action is more limited at the EU level than at the national level, civil society organizations seem to try to compensate for the low level of direct mobilization with a dense network of transnational contacts. Indeed, we noticed a division of labour between the national SMOs/NGOs and the European umbrella organizations—confirmed by other research, on migrant organizations (Guiraudon 2001) and trade unions (Martin and Ross 2001). However, we also found that not only the resource-richer organizations expressed a relevant interest in addressing EU institutions and acted on it.

In the path of Europeanization by externalization, actor resources combine with the characteristics of a multilevel political-opportunity structure. Following a trend already noted for collective actors involved in agricultural policies, our research confirms widespread use of multilevel and variegated repertoires. A cross-country comparison indicates that social movement organizations tend to follow a national pattern in their degree of attention to EU institutions, as well as in the action strategies they choose. In line with the hypothesis that policy style influences collective action form, there is indeed at the EU level a frequent use of insider strategies conforming to the institutional preferences for dealing with ‘polite’ lobbyists rather than disruptive protesters (Marks and McAdam 1999). Nevertheless, as emerged from our data, various types of actors are able to adopt and adapt different strategies, as an effect, among others, of the enlargement of citizens’ repertoires of political participation and of growing interest in transnational issues (della Porta 2007b).

If the mobilized actors tend to align themselves along various cleavages (Rokkan 1982), our data highlights that the left–right cleavage is more relevant in the debate on Europe in the immigration policy sector. On more Europeanized issues such as agricultural policy or the process of European integration this cleavage interacts with a territorial one focused around the question of devolution of powers to the supranational level (della Porta 2005). In the field of
European integration (as seen in Chapter 2) federalist groups tend to align themselves with social movement organizations. Yet differences emerge between civil society organizations and institutional actors, with privileged alliances created between the latter and the strong interest groups or governing parties. Analysing networks and the configuration of power within domestic settings is in turn useful for understanding the ideological debate on Europe. In general terms, social movement organizations represent the main source of criticism, a characteristic of all countries covered in this research and all three sectors analysed. Yet in immigration policy and in the European integration domain these movements display a more conflictual Europeanization, whereas on agricultural policy they seem to generally adapt themselves to the consensual climate surrounding this debate in Europe.

Especially during the 1990s, a series of steps in European integration (from Maastricht to Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon) have been the targets of supranational protest campaigns, during which national SMOs and NGOs started to network at the European level. By governing, the EU institutions attracted conflicts and contestation—as the nation-state institutions had done. As a by-product, they also helped in forming supranational nets and norms. The formation of European identities seems indeed to develop not on the bases of abstract norms, but through the continuous and contentious interactions of various political and social actors around EU institutions (Imig and Tarrow 2001a; 23).

As with other international institutions (Tarrow 2005), the EU works as a sort of ‘coral reef’ favouring the construction of supranational organizations by offering in some cases material and symbolic (legitimacy) resources, in others a target for common mobilizations. From a neo-functionalist perspective, this evolution in NGOs and SMOs could be defined as a spillover effect of European integration (Schmitter 1971). Advocating power and competences at the supranational level, EU institutions are increasingly less able to sustain a high degree of permissive consensus. Legitimation through output, via an efficient and apolitical governance, appears more and more difficult faced with decisions that affect the lives of citizens on
the most delicate (and political) policy fields such as the welfare state, pensions, migration, or education.

European mobilization helps, then, in a process of transnational diffusion and networking that goes beyond merely instrumental aims. In fact, a structural and symbolic Europeanization is linked to specific alliances and campaigns. To use the expression of an Italian Disobbediente, Europe is ‘the space within which we want to move, and we realistically believe that Europe is an opportunity to redefine—as is happening with Latin America—the imperial and global structure of interests’. So much so that ‘European involvement is more and more important in our political involvement’ (542). Our research confirms, therefore, that social movement organizations recognize a growing function in European institutions, participating in the creation of European-level structures (organizational nets) and norms. From this point of view, as Benedict Anderson (1983) observed for nationalism, institutions tend to favour, more or less consciously, the formation of an imagined community, reproducing the values and symbols that are necessary for their rise and survival. However, this process is neither harmonious nor consensual, developing from the contestation of EU institutions and then the creation, together with a polity, of a democratic polis.
4

The Emergence of European Movements

4.1. EU counter-summits and European Social Forums: an introduction

On 16–17 June 1997 in Amsterdam, notwithstanding the approval of a new Treaty, the summit of the European Council failed to deliberate on the large institutional reforms for which the European Commission was hoping. On the first day of the summit the European March Against Unemployment—a coalition of NGOs, SMOs, unions, and squatted centres—mobilized 50,000 people from all over Europe to ask for policy measures against poverty, social exclusion, and unemployment. In symbolic protest, about 500 marchers reached Amsterdam on foot, having departed from various European countries on Labour Day. During the days of the summit, groups of young activists distributed joints in a call for free drugs throughout Europe, and gay associations marched in the red-light district demanding equal rights.

Three years later another important step in European integration was met by protest. On 6 December 2000, the day before the opening of a European Summit, 80,000 people gathered in Nice, asking for more attention to social issues. The event was called for by an alliance of 30 organizations from all over Europe, among them the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), associations of unemployed, immigrants, and environmentalists,
‘alterglobalists’ such as Attac, progressive and left-wing parties, communists and anarchists, Kurdish and Turkish militants, women’s collectives, Basque and Corsican autonomists. In various French cities activists built collectives asking for free transportation to the summit. The Global Action Train, transporting about 1,500 Italian activists from squatted youth centres, Ya Basta, White Overalls, and the youth association of the Communist Refoundation Party, was blocked at the border in Ventimiglia, where sit-ins were staged. The Mayor of Ventimiglia asked: ‘Which Europe is this, that closes its borders when there is a summit?’ (La Repubblica 8/12/2000, Genova section). In the following days the press contrasted the ‘street party’ of the peaceful demonstrators with the ‘street battles’ staged by a minority of radical ‘no globals’. On 7 December an assembly of the Cross Roads for Civil Society group met to develop a ‘true constitution’, while a sit-in of European federalists was charged by riot police (Indymedia, 09/12/2000; <http://www.indymedia.org/it/index.shtml>; accessed Sept. 2008).

The following year protest escalated in Gothenburg, where the Swedish Old Left and Euro-sceptic groups met with new social movement activists. On 14 June 2001 a ‘mass mooning’ (with activists showing their naked bottoms) greeted the visit of US President Bush, and some of the protesters clashed with the police. On 15 June thousands marched on the headquarters of the summit, with some members of the non-violent network climbing fences around the congress centre to contest what they defined as the exclusion of the people from a meeting focused on policies to reconcile environmental protection and economic growth. In the evening three demonstrators were seriously wounded by police bullets during a clash that was alternatively described as protest riot or police riot (Peterson 2006), while the dinner of the European Council was cancelled due to protest. On 16 June, in what was defined as the largest protest staged by the radical Left in Sweden, 25,000 marched ‘For another Europe’. Against a ‘Fortress Europe’, defined as a ‘police superstate’ and ‘a Europe of the Market’, the leading banner proclaimed that ‘The world is not for sale’. Sit-ins followed in front of the Swedish embassies in Britain, Germany,
Spain, The Netherlands, and other European countries, protesting against the deployment of masked police carrying semi-automatic rifles with lasers (Indymedia, 17/6/2001; ibid.). During the following year three EU summits would be met by protest. On 14–16 March 2002 three days of protest targeted the EU summit in Barcelona, whose main focus was market liberalization and labour flexibility, later to be presented in the media as ‘an exit to the Right’ from the Lisbon strategy (notwithstanding the promise of EC President Romano Prodi to reconcile solidarity and free-market competition). On Saturday the sixteenth 300,000 people marched behind the slogan ‘Against a Europe of capital, another Europe is possible’ from Plaça de Catalunya to the Mediterranean harbour front, in the largest demonstration against EU policies. Initially called by the Confederation of European Trade Unions, with representatives from the fifteen EU countries, the event was joined by new unions, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ environmentalists, anarchists and independents, anti-capitalists and various civil society organizations. Following a leading banner proclaiming that ‘Another world is possible’, protestors called for full employment and social rights against free-market globalization (Global Civil Society Yearbook 2003). A few months later, during the EU summit held in Seville on 20–22 June, the Seville Social Forum organized two days of conferences, seminars, and grass-roots discussions on issues relating to immigration, social exclusion, and the casualization of labour. So the protestors not only contested the EU policies in the street but discussed alternatives during a counter-summit. While the opening day was marked by a general strike organized by the Spanish trade unions, with reports of up to 85 per cent participation, the counter-summit conference ended with a demonstration of about 200,000 marching ‘Against the Europe of capital and war’. At the same time, 300 international activists and immigrants locked themselves into the Salvador University to protest against the ‘anti-immigrant initiatives of the EU’ (ibid.).

Six months later, on 13–15 December, a counter-summit was organized in Copenhagen by the Initiative for a Different Europe. Protesting a Europe that ‘does not like democracy’,
the coalition of grass-roots movements, social and students’ organizations, trade unions, and left-wing political parties asked for a Europe without privatization, social exclusion, unemployment, racism, or environmental destruction. While the summit discussed civil rights, the protestors called for a right to free movement and dissent. The counter-summit included lectures, discussions, and demonstrations against attacks on the welfare state, the economic and social consequences of EU plans for eastward expansion, and the process of growing militarism, as well as EU policies on migration. On 13 December about 2,000 people marched on the summit, denouncing racism; the next day, 10,000 marched behind the leading banner ‘Our World is Not for Sale’ (ibid.).

The ideas emerging during the counter-summits developed within a different form of protest that began in the year when our story on the counter-summits ended: the European Social Forums (ESFs). In contrast to a counter-summit, which is mainly oriented towards public protest, the Social Forums were set up as a space for debate among activists. Although originally indirectly oriented to ‘counter’ another summit—the World Economic Forum (WEF) held in Davos (Switzerland)—the World Social Forum, which inspired its European counterparts, presented itself as an independent place for encounters among civil society organizations and citizens. The first WSF, in Porto Alegre in January 2001, was attended by about 20,000 participants from over a hundred countries, among them thousands of delegates of NGOs and social movement organizations, who discussed ‘Another possible globalization’ (Schoenleitner 2003). Since then the number of organizers and participants as well as the organizational efforts of the successive WSFs (in Porto Alegre in 2002 and 2003, in Mumbai in 2004, again in Porto Alegre in 2005, in Bamako in 2006) have increased exponentially. The WSF also gained significant media attention. According to the organizers, in 2002 the WSF attracted 3,000 journalists (from 467 newspapers and 304 radio or television stations), a figure that doubled to more than 6,800 in 2005 (Rucht 2005; 294–5). Notwithstanding some tensions about the decision-making process as well as the financing of the
initiatives (Rucht 2005; Pleyers 2007; Smith et al. 2008), the idea of open arenas for discussion, not immediately oriented to action and decisions, has spread among the broader global justice movement (della Porta 2007a).

Since 2001, social forums have been organized also at the macro-regional, national, and local levels (Sommier 2005; 21; Smith et al. 2008). Among them, the European Social Forum played a most important role in the elaboration of activists’ attitudes towards the European Union, as well as in the formation of a European identity. The first ESF took place in Florence on 6–9 November 2002. Sixty thousand participants—more than three times the expected number—attended the 30 plenary conferences, 160 seminars, and 180 workshops organized at the Fortezza da Basso; even more took part in the 75 cultural events in various parts of the city. About one million participated in the march that closed the forum. More than 20,000 delegates of 426 associations arrived from 105 countries. Up to 400 interpreters worked without charge in order to ensure simultaneous translations. Since then, activists have met yearly in European Social Forums to debate Europeanization and its limits. The second ESF was held in Paris in 2003, involving up to 50,000 individuals and 1,800 organizations (of the 300 organizations that had signed up, 70 were unions), in 270 seminars, 260 working groups, and 55 plenary sessions (with about 1,500 participants in each). According to the organizers, 150,000 participated in the final march. In 2004 the third ESF, in London, involved about 25,000 participants and 2,500 speakers in 150 seminars, 220 working groups, and 30 plenary sessions, as well as up to 100,000 participants at the final march. The fourth, in Athens in 2006, featured 278 seminars and workshops and 104 cultural activities listed in the official programme, with 35,000 registered participants and up to 80,000 at the final march. ¹

The success of EU counter-summits and the ESFs is the result of networking among groups and individuals with somewhat different identities, reflected in the differentiated attention paid to how globalization affects human rights, gender issues, immigrant

conditions, peace, and ecology. These various streams converged in their demands for social justice and ‘democracy from below’ as the master frames of the protest, capable of recomposing the fragments of distinct cultures. A multilevel public intervention oriented towards reducing the inequalities produced by the market, and the search for a global ‘democracy from below’ are in fact the central themes of this emerging European movement. Counter-summits and ESFs presented themselves as important moments in the construction of a critical public sphere for the discussion of EU policies and the development of alternatives. Together with the democratization of the European institutions, the activists demanded recognition of civil, political, and social rights that go beyond the commitments written in the Treaty of Nice.

As we will see in this chapter, more and more, Europeanized protest addresses the lack of concern for social equality at the EU level. In fact, it is precisely against European economic and social policies that many campaigns focused at the supranational level, with some early mobilizations that, although rare, nevertheless represented an important signal of change (for instance, in the European marches against unemployment in 1997 and 1999; see Chabanet 2002). Although what took form during counter-summits and ESF events is not the only potential European social movement, it is now the only one that expresses such a strong focus on Europe and capacity to organize Europe-wide mobilizations. In what follows, we will first develop some ideas about the main mechanisms at work in the development of European social movements (Sect. 4.2). Based mainly on the survey conducted during the first ESF, we will then look at the relational focus of European Social Forums as emerging structures of a European social movement made of loosely coupled ‘networks of networks’ of activists endowed with multiple associational memberships and experiences with various forms of political participation (Sect. 4.3). Cognitive mechanisms will be identified while looking at the frames and discourses of these activists, as well as their organizations; we will discuss in particular the development of a form of ‘critical Europeanism’ that is fundamentally different from the
populist Euro-scepticism on which research has focused in the past (Sect. 4.4). Affective mechanisms will also be stressed as relevant for the formation of alternative European identities (Sect. 4.5). As we will discuss in our conclusions (Sect. 4.6), protestors expressed strong criticism of the forms of European integration, but no hostility to the building of supranational, European identities and institutions. They can therefore be seen as a critical social capital for the emergence of a European polity.

4.2. Eventful protests in Europe

Social movement studies have focused on the rarity of protest events at the EU level. While admitting this, we shall however point at the relevant, transformative effects of these protests. Notwithstanding their significance for social movements, protest events have been mainly studied as aggregated collective action (for example, in protest cycles). In social movement studies, protest has in fact usually been considered as a ‘dependent variable’ to be explained on the basis of political opportunities and organizational resources. In this chapter we want instead to stress the effects of protest on the social movement itself by focusing on what, inspired by the historical sociologist William H. Sewell (1996), we would call eventful protest. Sewell defines events as a ‘relatively rare subclass of happenings that significantly transform structure’, and an eventful conception of temporality as ‘one that takes into account the transformation of structures by events’ (ibid.; 262; emphasis added).\(^2\)

Especially during cycles of protest, some contingent events tend to affect the given structures by fuelling mechanisms of social change: organizational networks develop; frames are bridged; personal links foster reciprocal trust. In this sense, protest events constitute processes during which collective experiences develop through the

\(^2\) This differs from ‘teleological temporality’, which explains events based on abstract transhistorical processes ‘from less to more’ (urbanization, industrialization, and so on), and from ‘experimental temporality’, comparing different historical paths (revolution versus non-revolution, democracy versus non-democracy).
interactions of various individual and collective actors that take part in them with various roles and aims. These events have a transformative effect, in that ‘events transform structures largely by constituting and empowering new groups of actors or by re-empowering existing groups in new ways’ (ibid. 271). They put in motion social processes that ‘are inherently contingent, discontinuous and open ended’ (ibid. 272).

With reference to eventful temporality, the concept of transformative events has been developed. As McAdam and Sewell observed, ‘no narrative account of a social movement or revolution can leave out events . . . But the study of social movements or revolutions—at least as normally carried out by sociologists or political scientists—has rarely paid analytic attention to the contingent features and causal significance of particular contentious events such as these’ (2001; 101). The two scholars therefore (with little resonance) call attention to the way in which events ‘become turning points in structural change, concentrated moments of political and cultural creativity when the logic of historical development is reconfigured by human action but by no means abolished’ (ibid. 102). Moments of concentrated transformations have been identified especially in those highly visible events that ultimately symbolize entire social movements—such as the taking of the Bastille for the French revolution or the Montgomery Bus Boycott for the American civil-rights movement. Each represents an important turning point ‘that dramatically increases or decreases the level of mobilization’ (Hess and Martin 2006; 249).

In our conception of eventful protest (as developed in della Porta 2008b), we share the focus on the internal dynamics and transformative capacity of protest, while looking at a broader range of events than those included under the label of transformative protest. Our assumption is that protests have cognitive, affective, and relational impacts on the very movements that carry them out. Some forms of action or specific campaigns have a particularly high degree of ‘eventfulness’. Through these events, new tactics are experimented with, signals about the possibility of collective action are sent (Morris 2000), feelings of solidarity are created,
organizational networks are consolidated, and, sometimes, public outrage at repression develops (Hess and Martin 2006).

Focusing on counter-summits and ESFs, we shall look at the transformative capacity of protest more than at the characteristics of prominent events: not at what produces protest, but at the ‘by-product’ of the protest itself. We will reflect in particular on what makes these protests eventful. As mentioned previously, protest events have been analysed as the ‘dependent variable’ in most social movement literature, with an attempt to explain their size and form based on macro, contextual characteristics. Recently, however, two different theoretical developments have brought about a shift in perspective. On the one hand there has been growing attention to the cultural and symbolic dimension of social movements (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Flam and King 2005). On the other hand, a more dynamic vision of protest has been promoted, with attention to the social mechanisms that intervene between macro-causes and macro-effects (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

If protest is a resource that some groups utilize to put pressure upon decision makers, it should not be viewed in purely instrumental terms (see for this Taylor and van Dyke 2004). Collective action is not only an activity to which resources are committed. Although both time and money are invested in risky activities, resources are often created (or re-created) in action. Many forms of protest ‘have profound effects on the group spirit of their participants’, since ‘in the end there is nothing as productive of solidarity as the experience of merging group purposes with the activities of everyday life’ (Rochon 1998; 115). Protest promotes a sense of collective identity, which is itself a condition for collective action (Pizzorno 1993). For workers, strikes and occupations not only represent instruments for collective pressure but also arenas in which a sense of community is formed (Fantasia 1988); the same occurs during student occupations of schools and universities (Ortoleva 1988) or in the squatted youth centres. Additionally, in social movements the means used tend to be very closely tied to the desired ends: ‘Tactics represent important routines, emotionally and morally salient in these people’s lives’ (Jasper 1997; 237).
what follows, we shall look at the capacity of Europeanized protest events to produce relations, by facilitating communication as well as emotions, thus contributing to Europeanization from below.

Together with attention to protest as an emergent phenomenon, there is a growing reflection on processes and the role of temporality. In macro-analyses, causal mechanisms have been linked to systematic process analysis (Hall 2003) and ‘causal reconstruction’ that ‘seeks to explain a given social phenomenon—an event, structure or development—by identifying the process through which it is generated’ (Mayntz 2004; 238). Adapting Renate Mayntz’s definition (ibid. 241), we might look at mechanisms in the concatenation of generative events linking macro-causes (such as contextual transformation) to aggregated effects (such as the development of a European social movement) through transformation at the individual and organizational levels. Mechanisms therefore refer to intermediary steps between macro-conditions and macro-outcomes. With more or less awareness, some research on social movements has gone beyond causal macro–macro inferences, looking at mechanisms such as the construction of identity (Melucci 1996), the processes of networking (Diani 1995), framing (Snow et al. 1986), or the escalation of action strategies (della Porta 1995). The following analysis will build upon this literature by distinguishing relational mechanisms, which bring about protest networks; cognitive mechanisms, with protest conceived as an arena of debate; and emotional mechanisms, through the development of feelings of solidarity ‘in action’. 3

4.3. Networks of networks: relational mechanisms

Counter-summits and social forums alike develop through a logic of networking within open and inclusive public spaces. From

3 In a similar vein, Melucci (1989; 35) argues that, considered as a process, ‘collective identity involves at least three fundamental dimensions, which are in reality closely interwoven: Formulating cognitive frameworks concerning the goals, means and environment of action; activating relationships among the actors, who communicate, negotiate, and make decisions; and making emotional investments which enable individuals to recognize themselves in each other’. 138
Amsterdam onwards the counter-summits involved a growing number of social movement organizations—networking networks of activists that had developed specific campaigns on EU issues: along with the European marchers were environmentalists active on genetically modified organisms, NGOs promoting a social vision of Europe, pacifist organizations protesting against the wars in the ex-Yugoslavia and the Middle East. During the (often long-lasting) preparation of these events, interactions developed between different actors, mobilized on different issues and in different countries.

During long campaigns successful networking is demonstrated by the steady growth in the number of organizations involved in the protest, as well as their diversity by country of origin and focus of concern. The first March against Unemployment was promoted by activists of two French organizations—Agir Ensemble Contre le Chômage (AC!) and the rank-and-file union Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocratiques (SUD)—which, during the mobilization of the French unemployed in the mid-1990s had started to reflect upon the European dimension of the problems of the unemployed (della Porta 2008a). According to the ‘thick description’ of the campaign provided by Andy Mathers (2007), the first meeting of 25 representatives from organizations promoting a European march was held in Florence, on the occasion of an EU summit in June 1996, a few months after a proposal had emerged in Turin. In November 40 participants from eight countries met in Paris, in what an activist described as ‘a climate of co-operation…’. There were people from different ideological positions and they entered into a dialogue and found a form of working together’ (ibid. 57). After the success of the rally in Amsterdam, about 100 people from 11 countries met in Luxembourg in October 1997, forming a European Marches network, defined as a loose net of groups committed to deciding by consensus.

With the organization of the counter-summits the mobilization extended to involve different types of actors at different territorial levels. During the preparation of the first march ‘the various committees that sprang up to support the marches at European,
national and local levels were notable for the plurality of participating organisations and for generating a discernable spirit of goodwill for the project’ (ibid. 56). While the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) was initially very critical—to the point of sending a memo to its affiliates stating that groups opposed to ETUC policy were among the supporters of the marches—‘the Amsterdam campaign had enabled cross-national links between unions such as SUD (France), COBAS (Italy), and CGT and CCOO (Spain)’ (ibid., 73). During the preparation for a subsequent march to Cologne, left-wing factions of the Italian CGIL, the German IG Metall and IG Medien, the French CFDT and CGT also joined the protest. Even the ETUC agreed to participate with the European marchers in a rally organized for the ‘jobs summit’ in Luxembourg and then, in Nice, mobilized with a rainbow coalition of different groups. The march in Barcelona, initially called by the ETUC with representatives from the 15 EU countries, was then joined by new unions, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ environmentalists, anarchists and independentists, anticapitalists and various civil society organizations. Protest therefore produced relations among once-disconnected individuals and groups, and networking developed ‘in action’.

The logic of the network as an instrument for the coordination of activity facilitates the involvement of different political actors. The networks, especially in the beginning, were kept together mainly through an emphasis upon mobilization for concrete goals. In the European Marches, coordinated action was promoted above all for being instrumentally useful. According to an activist, ‘the concept of the European Marches Network has always been to say that even if there are tensions, it is necessary to find the spaces where we can work together’ (ibid. 56). Beyond this instrumental aim, however, the preparation of common protest campaigns is seen as intensifying relations between participants. The European Marches ‘produced new personal and collective identities amongst the unemployed, as well as new representations of them as an international and internationalist social and political force’ (ibid. 87). They developed social ties primarily by facilitating an exchange of knowledge, as relations with other activists induced cognitive changes.
Many of those links were strengthened within the Social Forums, which also stressed inclusion and diversity as organizational values (della Porta 2009a). In the ESFs participation is open to all civil society groups, with the exception of those advocating racist ideas and those using terrorist means, as well as political parties as such. The charter of the WSF defines it as an ‘open meeting place’, and the ESF also sees it as mainly a space for networking and mobilization. Vittorio Agnoletto, spokesperson of the Genoa Social Forum (which organized the anti-G8 protest in 2001), described the ESF as a ‘non-place’:

it is not an academic conference, even though there are professors. It is not a party international, even though there are party militants and party leaders among the delegates. It is not a federation of NGOs and unions, although they have been the main material organizers of the meetings. The utopian dimension of the forum is in the active and pragmatic testimony that another globalization is possible. (Il manifesto, 12/11/2003)

Similarly, writing on the ESF in Paris, sociologists Agrikoliansky and Cardon (2005; 47) stressed its pluralistic nature:

even if it re-articulates traditional formats of mobilizations, the form of the ‘forum’ has properties that are innovative enough to consider it as a new entry in the repertoire of collective action. . . . An event like the ESF in Paris does not indeed resemble anything already clearly identified. It is not really a conference, even if we find a programme, debates, and paper givers. It is not a congress, even if there are tribunes, militants, and mots d’ordre. It is not just a demonstration, even if there are marches, occupations, and actions in the street. Nor is it a political festival, even if we find stands, leaflets, and recreational activities. The social forums concentrate in a unit of time and space such a large diversity of forms of commitment that exhaustive participation in all of them is impossible.

What unifies these different activities is the aim of providing a meeting space for the loosely coupled, huge number of groups that form the archipelagos of organizations and individuals mobilizing within what came to be known as a global justice movement, or a movement for another globalization (della Porta 2007a). Its aims include enlarging the number of individuals and groups involved
but also providing the ground for a broader mutual understanding. Far from wanting to eliminate differences, the open debates should help increase awareness of each other’s concerns and beliefs. The purpose of networking (through debating) was in fact openly stated in the first ESF in Florence, where the Declaration of the European social movements reads:

We have come together to strengthen and enlarge our alliances because the construction of another Europe and another world is now urgent. We seek to create a world of equality, social rights, and respect for diversity, a world in which education, fair jobs, health care, and housing are rights for all, with the right to consume safe food products produced by farmers and peasants, a world without poverty, without sexism and oppression of women, without racism, and without homophobia. A world that puts people before profits. A world without war. We have come together to discuss alternatives but we must continue to enlarge our networks and to plan the campaigns and struggles that together can make this different future possible. Great movements and struggles have begun across Europe: the European social movements are representing a new and concrete possibility to build up another Europe for another world.

In this sense, social forums belong to emerging forms of action that stress, by their very nature, plurality and inclusion. Diversity is also reflected in the conceptions of internal decision-making as well as the forms of interactions with the external environment. Democracy in the forum is an important issue of discussion, with tensions between different models of internal decision-making (horizontal versus vertical) but also the preferred strategies for changing the world (more or less political versus prefigurative) as well as the more or less radical changes desired. Degrees and forms of structuring, inclusivity, and representation are always at the centre of the discussion.

The networking capacity of counter-summits and social forums is reflected in the overlapping membership of their participants. According to our survey at the first ESF, participants are deeply rooted in dense organizational networks that range from Catholic to Green, from voluntary social workers to labour unions, from
human rights to women’s organizations: 41.5 per cent are or have been members of NGOs, 31.8 per cent of unions, 34.6 per cent of parties, 52.7 per cent of other movements, 57.5 per cent of student groups, 32.1 per cent of squatted youth centres, 19.3 per cent of religious groups, 43.1 per cent of environmental associations, 51.3 per cent of charities, and 50.9 per cent of sport’s and recreational associations (Table 4.1; see also della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006). Although the weight of the different types of groups varies country by country, reflecting the specificity in the national origins and development of the respective global justice movement, all types of groups are present in all countries, testifying to the pluralist and varied nature of the movement.

While respecting existing differences, however, the activists share a common set of values. Although doubts about liberalization of markets and cultural homogenization may also be expressed in religious fundamentalism or conservative protectionism, these expressions of anti-globalization are not present in the movement, which has a clear left-wing profile. Activists interviewed at the first European Social Forum generally defined themselves as ‘left’ (Table 4.2), with a significant component saying ‘extreme-left’ and

**Table 4.1. Participation (present and past) in associations, by country (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Others non-Italian respondents</th>
<th>Total non-Italian respondents</th>
<th>Total ESF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student groups</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth squats</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental associations</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movements (in general)</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary groups (charities)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational associations</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>2,411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
limited presence of the category ‘centre-left’. With the exception of British activists, the great majority of which were extreme-left (67.2 per cent, followed at a distance by the French at 37.1 per cent), placement on the left ranges from 44.3 per cent of Germans to 53.4 per cent of Spaniards, confirmed at around 50 per cent of Italians. In the various countries the movement emerged in fact from a critique of national governments’ policy choices—including those of left-wing governments—as well as of intergovernmental organizations (della Porta 2007a).

### 4.4. Critical Europeanists? The cognitive mechanisms

Counter-summits and European Social Forums have networked a broad set of organizations and individuals that expressed dissatisfaction with European institutions. Especially after the French constitutional referendum, the position of movement organizations such as Attac has been highlighted as a sign of the (re)emergence of a left-wing-leaning Euro-scepticism, after years in which research after research had noted more support for the EU on the left than on the right end of the political spectrum. In what follows we challenge this vision by suggesting that, first, the social movement criticisms addressed not the necessity of an EU level of governance
but more specific policy choices and different aspects of the democratic deficits. What is more, the very fact of organizing at the EU level, instrumentally oriented at first, has contributed to the development of European identity and, indirectly, promoted Europeanization. In this sense, protest such as the EU counter-summits and the ESFs had strong cognitive effects, among them the development of a European identity.

In the course of the counter-summits, alongside an increase in the number of organizations involved and the structuring of the protest network, the definition of what was at stake also evolved: from a focus upon unemployment to a broader range of EU policies, and participation of activists from various movements. This shift accompanied the development of a European identity that the several successive meetings of the ESF contributed to strengthen. The functioning of the Social Forums, with hundreds of workshops and dozens of conferences (with invited experts), demonstrates the importance given, at least in principle, to cognitive processes. Already, the WSF has been defined as ‘a market place for (sometimes competing) causes, an “ideas fair” for exchanging information, ideas and experiences horizontally’ (Schoenleitner 2003; 140). In the words of one of its organizers, the WSFs promote exchanges in order ‘to think more broadly and to construct together a more ample perspective’ (ibid. 141). This applies also to the ESF—in the already quoted document of the Assembly of the social movements at the first ESF, we read: ‘We have come together to discuss alternatives’. In fact, the importance of the Forum as space for exchange of ideas is often stressed by Forum participants as well as by the organizations that support it (della Porta 2009a and 2009b).

The reference to ‘another Europe’ re-emerges at each and every successive meeting of the ESF. The Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the Fourth European Social Forum, held in Athens on 7 May 2006, thus bridges the criticism of ‘neo-liberal Europe’ with the call for ‘another Europe’:

Although the EU is one of the richest areas of the world, tens of millions of people are living in poverty, either because of mass unemployment or the
casualization of labour. The policies of the EU based on the unending extension of competition within and outside Europe constitute an attack on employment, workers, and welfare rights, public services, education, the health system, and so on. The EU is planning the reduction of workers’ wages and employment benefits as well as the generalization of casualization. We reject this neo-liberal Europe and any efforts to relaunch the rejected Constitutional Treaty; we are fighting for another Europe, a feminist, ecological, open Europe, a Europe of peace, social justice, sustainable life, food sovereignty and solidarity, respecting minority rights and the self-determination of peoples.

This statement does not reject the need for a European level of governance, nor for the development of a European identity, but rather criticizes the EU policies and calls for ‘another Europe’. Additionally, it links different specific concerns within a common image of a feminist, ecological, open, solidaristic, just Europe. In a similar mood, the document approved by the Assembly of the Movements held at the third ESF, states:

We are fighting for another Europe. Our mobilizations bring hope of a Europe where job insecurity and unemployment are not part of the agenda. We are fighting for a viable agriculture controlled by the farmers themselves, an agriculture that preserves jobs, and defends the quality of environment and food products as public assets. We want to open Europe to the world, with the right to asylum, free movement of people, and citizenship for everyone in the country they live in. We demand real social equality between men and women, and equal pay. Our Europe will respect and promote cultural and linguistic diversity and respect the right of peoples to self-determination and allow all the different peoples of Europe to decide upon their futures democratically. We are struggling for another Europe, which is respectful of workers’ rights and guarantees a decent salary and a high level of social protection. We are struggling against any laws that establish insecurity through new ways of subcontracting work.

The participants at the Forum shared mistrust of the EU as well as interest in the construction of ‘another Europe’. Our survey indicates that trust in representative institutions tended to be low, although with significant differences regarding the individual institutions (see also della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006). Distrust of the
institutions of representative democracy is cross-nationally spread, although particularly pronounced where national governments were either right-wing (Italy and Spain at the time) or perceived as hostile to the movement claims (as in the UK). This lack of trust does not only focus on national governments, which even if left-wing obtain the trust of not more than 10 per cent of activists (with barely 2.2 per cent of activists expressing at least reasonable trust in Spain, but even among Germans a very low 8.6 per cent); not even parliaments are trusted (only 15 per cent trust national parliaments a lot or enough). There is decisively greater trust in local bodies (especially in Italy, France, and Spain), and, although lower, for the UN (especially in Germany). The EU scores a trust level barely higher than national governments: only about a quarter of the activists trust it a lot or enough (except the, in this case, more trustful Italians).

The common location on the left is associated with a high interest in politics, defined as politics ‘from below’. There is indeed great, spatially fairly homogeneous trust in the social movements and the voluntary associations as actors of a ‘different’ politics (ranging from some 85 per cent among the Germans and British to 95 per cent among the French). By contrast, there is little trust in political parties, in which a bare 20 per cent of interviewees from the European Social Forum have reasonable or great trust.

### Table 4.3. Actors’ trust in political participation and representative institutions, by country (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>UK non-Italians</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Other non-Italians</td>
<td>Total ESF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISL/UIL</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CGIL</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grass-roots unions</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Movements</td>
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<td>92.4</td>
<td>84.4</td>
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<td>88.5</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
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<td>46.8</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>41.3</td>
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<td>46.2</td>
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<td>National government</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Parliament</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similar data on the second and fourth ESFs confirm the general mistrust of representative democratic institutions and the trust in organizations ‘from below’, although with some specification (della Porta 2007b). Activists continue to trust social movements (and, though not so much, NGOs) as actors of a democracy from below. A lower level of trust in the UN in the ESF in Athens as compared with the earlier one in Florence also testifies to the growing dismay among more moderate NGOs that had once trusted that institution. Similarly, decreasing trust in the EU reflects the growing criticism of EU policy and institutions, with a politicization and polarization of positions during and after the French referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006; della Porta and Caiani 2006, 2007).

The reasons for a low and declining trust in the EU are explained in the organizational documents and minutes of discussions posted on ESF-related websites. Already at the first ESF the EU is mainly accused of using competences on market competition and free trade to impose neo-liberal economic policy, while the restrictive budgetary policies set by the Maastricht parameters are stigmatized as jeopardizing welfare policies. Privatization of public services and flexibility of labour are criticized as worsening citizens’ well-being and job security. Under the slogan ‘another Europe is possible’, various proposals were tabled at the first ESF, including ‘taxation of capital’ and, again, the Tobin Tax. Demands were also made for cuts in indirect taxation and assistance for weaker social groups, as well as for the strengthening of public services such as education and health care. The same issues were discussed at the second ESF, where the European Social Consulta stated:

we have learnt to recognize the strength of coordinated action and the vulnerability of the ‘untouchable’ organizations of capitalism. We need to deepen our contact and communication with society, decentralizing our struggle and working in local and regional contexts in a coordinated way with common objectives . . . the European Union is being shaped under the neo-liberal politics. The European Constitution comes to reinforce it
In the debates at the second ESF, the Constitutional Treaty is feared as ‘constitutionalization of neo-liberalism’. Referring to the Constitutional Treaty, a participant at the seminar ‘Pour une Europe démocratique, des droits et de la citoyenneté’ claimed that the first part of the text is similar to a constitution. But the third one, which focuses on the implementation of concrete policies, goes beyond the normal frame of a constitution. It constitutionalizes competition rights. Making rigid the policies to be followed, it takes away from the citizens all possibilities to change the rules. It is an unacceptable practice because it is anti-democratic. Anyway, all changes are made impossible by the need to obtain a unanimous vote by twenty-five states.

In the third part ‘everything is subordinated to competition, including public services, the relations with the DOM-TOM [départements d’outre-mer/territoires d’outre-mer; overseas departments/overseas territories] and the capital flow (something that, by the way, make any Tobin Tax impossible)’ (<http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/> accessed Sept. 2008).

In particular, the lack of democratic accountability is criticized, because—in the words of an activist—not only ‘at the local level we have very low influence in the decision-making process, but our influence becomes null in questions regarding the European constitution or the directives of the WTO or the IMF. We are even criminalized when we attempt it’ (ibid.). During the encounters at the second ESF, the WIDE-European NGOs Network, together with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, asked for basic goods and services, such as education, health, and water, to be subject to democratic decisions involving the local community, articulating a vision of public services as the basis of fundamental rights and stressing the need to democratize their provision (ibid.). Beyond the concrete policy choices, criticism also addresses the secretive, top-down ways in which these policies are decided.

Criticism of conceptions of democracy at the EU level is also addressed towards security policies, with a call for a ‘Europe of
freedoms and justice’ rather than sécuritaire et policière. In the first ESF, EU stances on foreign policy are considered as subordinated to the USA, in environmental issues as dominated by the environmentally unfriendly demands of big corporations, in migration policy as oriented to building a xenophobic ‘Fortress Europe’. In the debate at the Paris ESF the construction of a European judicial space is advocated as a way to control police power. In particular, EU legislation on terrorism is criticized as criminalizing such categories as youth, refugees, and Muslims. EU immigration policies are defined as obsessed with issues of security and demographic needs, with Muslims considered as potential terrorists. The official lists of ‘terrorist organizations’ are considered as arbitrary (even including groups funded by European institutions). Repressive measures are also criticized as ineffective, and the need for political solutions stressed. While terrorism is stigmatized, there is a call to ‘take a clear stand for international law, including the right of peoples to fight occupation’, but also to ‘defend national sovereignty’. As for EU foreign policy, there is criticism of the subordination of humanitarian politics and developmental aid to commercial and security aims. Solidarity groups denounce the role of European states and corporations in Haiti, Latin America, Africa; aggressive EU trade policies; and asymmetric negotiations of commercial treaties. In terms of defence policies, proposals range from ‘a Europe without Nato, EU army and US bases’ to multilateralism and refusal of a nuclear Europe, more resources to the UN, and the introduction in the Constitution of an article 1 stating that ‘Europe refuses war as an instrument of conflict resolution’.

The survey data confirm that activists present at the ESF share a critical view of the European Union as strengthening neo-liberal globalization and express a shared mistrust in its capacity to mitigate the negative effects of such globalization and safeguard a different social model of welfare (see Table 4.4). While Italians expressed greater trust in the EU and British activists were more Euro-sceptic (followed by French and Spanish activists), the differences were altogether small. The data from a more recent survey at the 2005 demonstration in Rome against the Bolkestein directive
confirm this image (with even stronger disagreement on the capacity of the EU to mitigate the negative consequences of economic globalization).

When moving from existing institutions to imagined ones, however (see Table 4.5), the activists of the first ESF expressed very

Table 4.4. Responses to three statements about Europe’s relationship to the neo-liberal project (%), in terms of degree of agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ESF total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) The European Union attempts to safeguard a social model that is different from the neo-liberal one</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The European Union mitigates the most negative effects of neo-liberal globalization</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) The European Union strengthens neo-liberal globalization</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2,124</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(a) Cramer’s V = 0.10***; (b) Cramer’s V = 0.07*; (c) Cramer’s V = 0.18***

Table 4.5. Responses to four suggested necessary means of achieving the goals of the movement (%), in terms of degree of agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of agreement</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ESF total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) strengthen national governments</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2,097</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) strengthen the EU and/or other regional institutions (Mercosur, Arab League, etc.)</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>No.</td>
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<td>122</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2,114</td>
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<td>(c) strengthen the United Nations (giving them power to make binding decisions)</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>No.</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) build new institutions of world governance</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2,133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Cramer’s V = 0.11***; (b) Cramer’s V = 0.23***; (c) Cramer’s V = 0.22*** (d) Cramer’s V = 0.13***
strong interest in building new institutions of world governance: 70 per cent of the respondents are quite or very much in favour of this, and strengthening the United Nations is an option supported by about half of our sample. Furthermore, about one-third of activists agree that in order to achieve the goals of the movement a stronger EU and/or other regional institutions are necessary (with higher support for the EU among Italian activists and very low support among British activists). Following the trends already observed on the battery of questions regarding trust in institutions, between the first and the fourth ESF there is a decline in those who support a strengthening of the EU (from 43 to 35 percent) and/or the UN (from 57 to 48 percent), with a widespread belief in the need to build (alternative) institutions of world governance (93 per cent of respondents) (della Porta 2008a). Respondents in Athens confirmed a widely shared scepticism that strengthening national governments would help in achieving the goals of the movement (only about one-fifth of the activists responded positively).

Not by chance, the activists of the first European Social Forum expressed quite a high level of affective identification with Europe (see Table 4.6): about half felt moderate or strong attachment to Europe, with less support in this case from British and Spanish activists and more from French, Germans, and Italians.

The activists of the ESFs therefore do not seem to be Eurosceptics, wanting to return to an almighty nation state, but rather ‘critical Europeanists’ (or ‘critical globalists’), convinced that transnational institutions of governance are necessary but should be built from below. Statistical analyses (available on request) show

Table 4.6. Degree of attachment to Europe amongst first ESF participants (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of attachment</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ESF total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that opinions about the strengthening of different institutions are not greatly influenced by gender, age, or occupation (although support for the EU is lower among manual workers and employees, trust in Europe and attachment to Europe is lower among the unemployed, attachment to Europe is lower again among workers). However, the younger and the better-educated activists are more in favour of the building of alternative institutions of world governance. Activists who locate themselves at the radical left are more sceptical about the utility of strengthening the EU as a way to achieve the movement’s aims (the same applies to the strengthening of national governments) and are more convinced that the EU strengthens neo-liberal globalization, trust the EU less, and feel less attached to Europe. Significantly, according to the data on the anti-Bolkestein protest, the belief that the EU strengthens neo-liberalism and does not defend the social model is especially widespread among those who work in education and the third (voluntary) sector.

These positions are also in line with the debates at the ESFs. At the first ESF, in Florence, specific proposals for changes in EU policies came from networks of social movement organizations and NGOs, often already active on specific issues. The European Assembly of the Unemployed and Precarious Workers in Struggle stresses the importance of developing claims at the EU level; a network of unions of white-collar workers proposes a code of conduct for functionaries at the European level; groups involved in the promotion of Esperanto as well as associations from ethnic minorities make proposals for linguistic and cultural rights; the European Social Consulta asks to ‘strengthen and widen the European social fabric in a network that should be participatory, horizontal, and decentralized, as much in the taking of decisions as in the realizations of actions’ (<http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2303/doc448>, accessed Sept. 2008). Proposals for economic reform are developed by the European Union for Research in Economic Democracy. Humanitarian NGOs debate measures against religious and ethnic discrimination, including the potential of EU directives and national legislations.
Concrete proposals to improve the quality of democracy are also suggested. During the second ESF they ranged from the establishment of an annual day of action devoted to media democracy to the building of alternative media (with a workshop on ‘Reclaim the channels of information: media campaigns and media protest’); from the reduction of import taxes on medicines to the increase in the use of non-conventional medicine (with a seminar on ‘Health in Europe: equity and access’); from the introduction of the right to asylum into the European Constitution to the regularization of all ‘no-papers’ migrants (with a workshop on ‘Right to migrate, right to asylum’); from a European social charter that recognizes the right to decent housing to the occupation of empty buildings (with a workshop on ‘Housing rights in Europe: towards a trans-European network of struggles and alternatives’); from dialogue with local authorities to participation of the people in the development of international experiences of cooperation (with a workshop on ‘Decentralized cooperation: a dialogue between territories as a response to global challenges’); from quality control on hard drugs to liberalization of soft ones (with a workshop on ‘Perfect enemies: the penal governance of poverty and differences’). The Call of the European Social Movements in Florence frames all these themes under the label of a struggle against neo-liberalism:

We have gathered in Florence to express our opposition to a European order based on corporate power and neo-liberalism. This market model leads to constant attacks on the conditions and rights of workers, social inequalities, and oppression of ethnic minorities, and social exclusion of the unemployed and migrants. It leads to environmental degradation, privatization, and job insecurity. It drives powerful countries to try and dominate the economies of weaker countries, often to deny them real self-determination. Once more it is leading to war. (<http://www.resist.org.uk/?q=node313> and <http://fse-estf.org/spip.php?article45>, accessed 2008)

Thus the forums’ participants seem aware of the need for supranational (macro-regional and/or global) institutions of governance,
and split on the need to strengthen national governments. At one of the plenary assemblies of the second meeting of the ESF Italian activist Franco Russo stated: ‘There is a real desire for Europe . . . but not for any Europe. European citizens ask for a Europe of rights: social, environmental, of peace. But does this Constitution respond to our desire for Europe?’ And the representative of the French federation of unions G10 Solidaires, Pierre Khalfa, declared that the Constitutional Treaty ‘is a document to be rejected . . . [but] the discussion of the project is the occasion for a Europe-wide mobilization’ (Liberazione, 14/11/2003).

The image of ‘another Europe’ (as opposed to ‘no Europe’) is often stressed in the debates. During the second ESF the Assembly of the Unemployed and Precarious Workers in Struggle states: ‘for the European union, Europe is only a “large free-exchange area”. We want a Europe based upon democracy, citizenship, equality, peace, a job and a revenue to live on, an “Another Europe for another World”’. And also: ‘To build another Europe requires putting the democratic transformation of institutions at the centre of elaboration and mobilization. We can, we should have great political ambition for Europe . . . Cessons de subir l’Europe: prenons la en mains’ [Let’s stop Europe suffering: let’s take it into our own hands] (<http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2223>, accessed Sept. 2008). Unions and other groups active on public services proclaim ‘the European level as the pertinent level of resistance’, among others, against national decisions. The ‘No to the Constitutional draft’ is combined with demands for a legitimate European Constitution, produced through public consultation, ‘a European Constitution constructed from below’. And many agree that ‘the Europe we have to build is a Europe of rights, and participatory democracy is its engine’.

Not by chance, the debates often focus on Europe, building an alternative vision of Europeanization. Taking the titles of the workshops at the second ESF, we find issues such as EU policies on commercial agreements; youth rights in Europe; Christianity, Islam, and Judaism in Europe; national extremism in Europe; financial markets and welfare; the contribution of the Churches
to the construction of a new Europe; European employment policy; Europe seen through African eyes; ecological crises in Europe; the place of Islam in Europe and Islamophobia. Europe remains similarly central at the fourth Forum, where seminars (which in large majority have ‘Europe’ in the title) discuss at the European level issues as diverse as the fight against poverty, institutional racism, the Charter of Principles for another Europe, the restriction of liberties, health systems, NATO, camps for migrants, the Öcalan case, education, relations with Southern Mediterranean countries, corporate politics, labour rights, relations with Latin America, relations with the UN, the populist Right, new oppositional actors, left-wing journalism, housing problems, the Bolkestein directive, precarious workers, the Lisbon and Bologna strategy, constitution building, local governance, the WTO, taxation, Islamophobia, violence against women, students’ mobility, linguistic equality, basic income, Roma rights, the US military bases, agricultural policy, psychiatric institutions, human trafficking, sanctions against Israel, monotheistic religions, and positions towards Cuba.

Although bitterly criticizing EU policy and weak democratic development, the participants in the Forum tend to present themselves as ‘entrepreneurs of Europe’, through the promotion of a different image of Europe. In this vision ‘the European Social Forum constitutes the peoples as constitutional power, the only legitimate power’. In a report on the seminar ‘Our vision for the future of Europe’, we read:

Lacking a clear and far-reaching vision the EU governments are stumbling from conference to conference. In this manner the EU will not survive the challenges of the upcoming decades! Too many basic problems have been avoided for lack of a profound strategic position. In our vision we outlined an alternative model for the future of Europe. It contains a clear long-range positioning for Europe making a clear choice for the improvement of the quality of life for all and for responsible and peaceful development. (<http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2106/doc295>, accessed Sept. 2008)

The discourse on the defence of public goods (such as water) is framed as oriented to overcome the culture of merchandizing, but
also a national sovereignty that rejects solidarity with the external world. At the same time, there is an attempt to enlarge the notion of Europe beyond the European Union and the fear of an exclusive European identity as representing the ‘civilized’ culture in contrast to non-Europeans. Criticizing ‘the arbitrary decision of the EU to cut funds to the National Palestinian Authority’ as one that ‘is unacceptable and exacerbates the whole situation’, the Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the Fourth European Social Forum focused attention on the dangers of a polarization of global citizens with further discrimination against the people of the south. It stated, in fact, that: ‘Conservative forces in the north and the south are encouraging a “clash of civilization” aimed at dividing oppressed people, which is in turn producing unacceptable violence, barbarism and additional attacks on the rights and dignity of migrants and minorities’.

Activists present themselves, in fact, as representing the European peoples. The Assembly of the Third ESF asked, among other requests, for more participation ‘from below’ in the construction of ‘another Europe’: At a time when the draft for the European Constitutional treaty is about to be ratified, we must state that the peoples of Europe need to be consulted directly. The draft does not meet our aspirations. This Constitutional Treaty consecrates neo-liberalism as the official doctrine of the EU; it makes competition the basis for European community law, and indeed for all human activity; it completely ignores the objectives of ecologically sustainable society. This Constitutional Treaty does not grant equal rights, the free movement of people, and citizenship for everyone in the country they live in, whatever their nationality; it gives NATO a role in European foreign policy and defence, and pushes for the militarization of the EU. Finally it puts the market first by marginalizing the social sphere, and hence accelerating the destruction of public services.

In sum, cognitive processes worked ‘in action’: through long-lasting protest campaigns, different actors from different countries came together, bridging their main specific concerns in a vision of ‘another Europe’. Reciprocal interactions in protest events that
were consciously constructed as critical and open public spheres facilitated the recognition of similarities as well as reciprocal understanding. If national characteristics, influenced by national cleavages and opportunities, remained visible, participation in transnational events increasingly involved a growing number of activists, with a shift not only in their targets but also in their concerns. Europe is not rejected—far from it: there are constant appeals to the construction of a Europe of rights, a social Europe, a Europe from below. The activists not only feel quite attached to Europe but perceive themselves as promoters of a cosmopolitan vision, part of which is an open European identity. The strength of a European dimension is demonstrated by the presentation of the Forum as addressing EU issues in a global perspective rather than global issues in a European perspective—a position that developed into the refusal to present the fourth ESF as part of the polycentric meeting of the WSF in 2006 (della Porta 2009a).

4.5. Intense European protests: the emotional mechanisms

Relational and cognitive mechanisms link up with emotional ones in determining the transformative effects of European protests. As mentioned, protest repertoires are often chosen, or at least justified *ex post*, as instrumentally useful. Despite the risk of stigmatization, direct action is perceived by activists as an instrument that raises the visibility of a protest otherwise ignored by the mass media. Beyond the instrumental dimension linked to increased visibility, however, the important effect of protest action on the closer circles of protestors is the strengthening of motivations through the development of feelings of solidarity and belonging.

If emotions have long been viewed with suspicion (not only in social movement studies, but in political sociology and political science at large), attention to their role has recently (re-)emerged. The emotional intensity of participation in protest events as passionate politics has been stressed (Aminzade and McAdam 2001;
Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001) together with the role of subversive ‘counter-emotions’ in cementing collective identities (Eyer- man 2005). Research has thus pointed to the mobilizing capacity of ‘good’ emotions (such as hope, pride, or indignation), and the movements’ work on potentially dangerous emotions (such as fear or shame) (Flam 2005). Reciprocal emotions (such as love and loyalty, but also jealousy, rivalry, or resentment) have especially important effects on movement dynamics. The role of dramaturgy, narrative, and rituals in intensifying commitment has been investigated for protest events in general (the effect of an ‘emotional liberation’; see Flam 2005) as well as for specific critical emotional events. All of these elements emerge in our cases.

In counter-summits and ESFs an emotional dimension is indeed strongly present. The development of affective ties is mentioned by the participants at counter-summits. Going back to the marches on unemployment, an important element has been singled out in the opportunity they provided for experiencing a sense of fellowship through sharing elements of everyday life such as food and entertainment, and for collectively tackling common practical and political problems. During the marches the activists met with participants in local struggles related to employment issues (e.g. Liverpool dockers, Renault workers from Vilvoorde). In the words of an activist, ‘what was extraordinary about this first march were the networks that formed out of it. That’s to say that the people who crossed over Europe gave their addresses to the people who they came in contact with and since then have been corresponding amongst themselves’ (ibid.). The sharing of common experiences and common problems helped to establish a sense of camaraderie amongst the marchers, as well as friendship ties ‘that were cemented through exchange visits and contact by mail between the continental events’ (ibid.).

At the personal level, participation in protest campaigns helps to develop reciprocal knowledge and thus trust ‘in action’. Again, during the European marches informal networks were created along with the more formalized ones. As an activist stated: ‘In France in ’97 I followed the activists for one week and we became
friends... With some people you become friends and then it becomes normal to see them and to call them and to ask them what they are doing? And to say “we are doing this, why don’t you come?”’. The development of friendship ties is often facilitated by the playfulness of the protest. Although speaking a language of anger (la colère was mentioned in several, especially French, slogans), the activists of the marches remember action as parties, festivals, and Christmas events. ‘Collective action also enabled the unemployed to emerge out of the misery and solitude of everyday life and share in an episode of collective existence and solidarity that was on occasion a joyful experience’ (ibid. 90).

Also, the emotional content of the social forum process has been stressed by several authors, who presented ‘the Forum’s lively sounds and colors; the exhilarating mix of different languages and cultures; and even the uncanny and ubiquitous presence of a sense of magic and possibility’ (Osterweil 2004; 495). During the meetings, seating arrangements are designed to favour non-confrontational relations, while the final march stresses the feeling of common belonging. Activists have presented the forum as an epistemology of the South, stressing the ‘power of open, free and horizontal structures’ and the ‘different kind of movement’. The emerging repertoires of protest tend in fact to produce ‘high-powered social drama’ through, for example, the powerful images of the samba dancer of the Pink Block or the protective shield-and-turtle tactics of the White Overall movement (Juris 2004). The Social Forums are in fact defined as ‘an opportunity for diverse networks to physically converge, generate affective ties, communicate alternative messages and physically represent themselves to each other and the public’ (Juris 2005; 260). Participation in them is described by activists as ‘an amazing experience. You really felt part of a huge global movement’ (ibid. 261). Informal linkages of trust and solidarity and the building of a common identity are indeed at the basis of the continuation of the history of the forums, beyond and behind the challenges that we have identified.

Transnational protest events also contribute to the building of relations of cooperation all along the complex process of the
mobilization. In the case of the ESF, the months between one meeting and the next are filled by the continuous process of the European Preparatory Assemblies (EPAs), which meet in various European locations in order to organize the ESF encounter. Open to the participation of all, EPA meetings, although criticized for far-from-perfect inclusivity, are able to foster personal relations of trust among participants (della Porta 2009a). Meetings at the forums produce new campaigns and smaller networks among groups and individuals that share concerns. As was noted for the WSF, using a jazz-ensemble metaphor,

the performance itself represents just a fraction of the effort and capabilities of participating musicians, and time spent practicing and preparing for a given performance can itself generate new relationships while inspiring new ideas and initiatives. This continued activism assures that future social forums are new iterations revisiting the concerns established in earlier meetings but moving the agenda of the social forum forward. . . . Over time, and through multiple interactions across cultural, class, and national divides, people learn new ways of thinking and acting in response to global challenges. (Smith et al. 2008; 108)

The preparation of protests helps therefore the development of mutual trust. Italian activists involved in transnational protest campaigns stressed the growing dialogue between leaders (or spokespersons) of various organizations as an effect of better reciprocal understanding:

after several years of developing common actions, you meet in the same movement, talk, you start understanding each other, you find codes of communication, methods for resolving problems . . . in the different mobilizations you meet different organised and non-organised actors with whom you had nothing to share before . . . there you start to enter into dialogue and to discover that you can do things together. (cited in della Porta and Mosca 2007)

Common campaigns are in fact perceived by rank-and-file members as enabling a mutual familiarity that favours the construction of shared objectives, that allows them to overcome prejudice. As an Italian interviewee notes: ‘we have also got to know each other and
to soften some attitudes, and there is trust and respect for every representation within the committee’ (cited ibid.).

Solidarity ties can also be intensified by more negative, but still highly emotional experiences such as police repression: the counter-summits were made ‘eventful’ by the frequent encounters with police. Going back to our initial narrative of the counter-summit addressing the EU, we can recall that in Amsterdam the headquarters of the Central Bank where heads of state, ministers, and dignitaries met were protected by five thousand police. In Nice, on 7 December 2000, attempts by a few thousand activists to block the avenue to the summit ended in police baton charges, with the use of tear gas. According to the accounts, notwithstanding the deployment of special riot police armed with flash-ball guns and rubber-bullet pistols, the work of the summit was disturbed by the protest—among others factors, the tear gas entered the summit avenue, making Mr Chirac sneeze. The following year the protest escalated in Gothenburg. On 14 June 2001 some of the protesters clashed with the police, who had surrounded their sleeping and meeting spaces. On 15 June, notwithstanding the arrests of bus travellers at the borders and strict controls on the 2,025 protestors identified as dangerous by Swedish police, in the evening a ‘Reclaim the City’ party escalated into street battles that ended with three demonstrators seriously wounded by the police. In 2002 in Barcelona, while the long march (far exceeding the organizers’ expectations) proceeded peacefully, at the end some more militant groups clashed with the police, deployed en masse (8,500 strong) to protect the summit (della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter 2006). Once again, demonstrators were rejected at the borders, after passport controls had been re-established between France and Spain. While Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi stigmatized the ‘professional globetrotters in search of a reason to party’, the Minister of the Interior of the Spanish centre-right government justified the rejection of peaceful marchers at the borders: ‘Some people think that they can do things that do not meet the approval of the vast majority of the population’ (Global Civil Society Yearbook 2003).
The memory of participation in intense and, at times, conflictual interactions during EU protest events is in fact another element that facilitates the development of common identities and commitment to the social forum process.

4.6. A European social movement: how protest produces structures and frames

Our analysis on the European Social Forums has shown the emergence of a European social movement that is innovative in terms of the development of identity, strategies, and organizational structure that go beyond the boundaries of the nation-states, addressing the institutions of the multilevel European governance. It is characterized as loosely structured networks of networks of organizations and activists, with frequent overlapping membership at the micro-level as well as interlocking campaigns at the organizational level. Although critical of the European institutions, activists promote through their action and campaigns a European identity.

Looking at the frames and discourses of these activists, as well as those of their organizations, we have observed the development of a form of ‘critical Europeanism’ that is fundamentally different from the traditional ‘nationalist’ Euro-scepticism on which research on Europeanization has focused so far. According to our survey, activists from various countries express strong criticisms of the actual politics and policies of the EU, but they also show strong identification with Europe and a certain degree of support for the European level of governance. Consistent results emerged from the analysis of the documents and minutes of the debates at the ESF. In this chapter we have reflected on what made this (unexpected) movement possible and suggested that counter-summits as well as ESFs had relational, cognitive, and affective impacts on the very movement that organized them (della Porta 2009a).

As for the relational mechanisms, networking ‘in action’ is instrumentally important in increasing the influence of each organization and individual. Coordinations and umbrella organizations
tend to emerge with the pragmatic aim of facilitating mobilization, but then consolidate themselves through the development of inclusive norms (Andretta 2006). In what was less a scale-shift process (Tarrow and McAdam 2004; Tarrow 2005) than a scale-multiplication one, during transnational campaigns activists begin to identify themselves as part of a European or even a global subject. Action in transnational networks also enables the construction of transnational identities through the recognition of similarities across countries.

The format of the European Social Forum epitomizes the cognitive processes that develop within protest events as arenas for encounter. An element also present in many previous forms of protest (see below), the cognitive dimension of protest events as spaces for exchanges of knowledge and ideas is strongly emphasized in the social forum process—in fact, the development of inclusive arenas for the creation of knowledge emerges as a main aspiration. The brief history of the Social Forums clearly testifies to the difficulties that the implementation of those aspirations has brought about. The tensions between those who perceive the forum as mainly a space for exchanging ideas and networking, and those who privilege the constituting of a unitary actor capable of political mobilization has characterised not only the WSF, but also its European counterpart. The degree of inclusiveness of the European Preparatory Assembly is often discussed, and various groups have preferred to organize autonomous spaces outside the official forums. The constant restructuring of the organizational format testifies to the perceived gap between norms and practices (see on the ESF della Porta 2007b; on the WSF Smith et al. 2008).

Yet the very continuity in time of the ESF, with declining media attention but sustained participation of individuals and groups, indicates a search for spaces where communication between groups with very different organizational forms, issue focus, and national background can develop, free from the immediate concerns of choosing strategies and actions. This is nothing new, although the internal heterogeneity and the transnational nature of these mobilizations give a special character to this search. Cognitive
exchanges develop during various forms of protest, used by various movements. The assemblies have developed as (more or less) formalized and ritualized spaces of encounter and debate. Marches have usually been closed by speeches with a more or less ideological content. What seems to make cognitive exchanges especially relevant for the global justice movement in general, and the social forums in particular, is the positive value given to openness towards ‘others’, considered in some activists’ comments as a most relevant attitude in order to build nets from the local, to the national and the supranational.

In this sense, counter-summits and social forums belong to emerging forms of action that stress, by their very nature, plurality and inclusion. Similar forms of protest that favour cognitive cross-fertilization are the ‘solidarity assemblies’, a series of meetings where multiple and heterogeneous organizations active on similar issues are invited to participate with their particular experiences;4 or the ‘fairs of concrete alternatives’, whose aim is to link various groups that have developed alternatives to the market economy ranging from fair trade to environmental protection (della Porta and Mosca 2007).

The content of the exchanges that take place during forums and other similar gatherings is usually less ideological than informative. This reflects attention to the construction of an alternative specialized knowledge that now seems to characterize many local as well as global protests. For instance, in campaigns against high-speed railways, airports, roads, or bridges, a main activity of protestors is the collection, elaboration, and diffusion of information on the projects, based on technical knowledge obtained and ‘internalized’ through the participation of ‘experts’ (economists, engineers, urban planners, and so on) (della Porta and Piazza 2008). If the use of technical information has a legitimizing effect on the elaboration and implementation of public policies (Lewanski 2004), technical ‘counter-knowledge’ is in fact considered a fundamental

4 An Italian activist defined these solidarity assemblies as ‘a “logistical pot” in which everyone puts their ingredients’ (in della Porta and Mosca 2007).
resource for those who protest. Beyond this instrumental use, knowledge can also transform the form and content of the protest, as the various actors who participate tend to adopt a specialist language. In the course of the mobilization, technical knowledge also becomes appropriated, transformed, and transmitted by the activists.

Finally, affective mechanisms have been at work. The creation of mutual knowledge, trust, and friendship through protest is, of course, nothing new. In his research on labour conflicts, Rick Fantasia (1988) challenged the widespread idea of a lack of class-consciousness among US workers. By looking at intense moments of protest (such as strikes and occupations), he developed the concept of a ‘culture of solidarity’, as a more dynamic substitute for ‘static’ class-consciousness. In the past, the preparation of some symbolically relevant protest events could take many months, as in the history of the first of May, which played a most important role in the labour movement. In countries such as Italy, France, or Germany, relations between labour movements and other social movements developed during the preparation of the demonstrations for Labour Day (which often took up to a year). What makes networking particularly relevant in contemporary European movements is, together with the already mentioned plural background of their activists, the transnational level of the action. Together with the European marches, the European Preparatory Assemblies for the European Social Forum, as well as the meetings to prepare the EuroMayday represent moments of reciprocal knowledge-sharing among activists from different countries and backgrounds (Dörr and Mattoni 2007). Affective processes then interact with cognitive ones in the development of alternative, and critical, European identities.
5

Euro-sceptics or Critical Europeanists?
Some Conclusions

One can be against a Europe that supports financial markets, and at the same time be in favour of a Europe that, through concerted policies, blocks the way to the violence of those markets... Only a social European state would be able to contrast the disaggregative effects of monetary economy: so one can be hostile to a European integration based only upon the Euro, without opposing the political integration of Europe.

(Bourdieu 1998; 62)

Contestation is a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of a European public sphere rather than an indicator for its absence. The more contentious European policies and politics become the more social mobilisation occurs on European issues, the more we should observe truly European public debates. If political issues are not contested, if European politics remains the business of élites, the attention level for Europe and the EU will remain low. European issues must become salient and significant in the various public debates so that a European public sphere can emerge.

(Risse 2003; 6)

As these quotations from two European social scientists clearly illustrate, positions on Europe and on the path of Europeanization are not only empirically diverse, but also normatively contested. As we will discuss in this concluding chapter, collective action oriented to European institutions can take, and has taken, different and multilevel paths. Social movement attention to the EU does
not automatically translate into either approval or disapproval, as support for Europe emerges as a polymorphous term that refers not only to different processes, but also to different ‘Europes’.

A first set of conclusions addresses the characteristics of what we have called ‘Europeanization from below’. If European integration has long been an élitist project, its evolution involves growing pressures ‘from below’—from social movement organizations and NGOs. In this sense, our research sheds new light on the long-lamented weakness of social movements at the supranational level. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there have been two ways of viewing the evolution of protest and European integration. Looking, above all, at protest reported in the national press, several studies have emphasized the persistent targeting of national or even sub-national levels of governance. Research on pressure groups has pointed instead at the mobilization of social movement organizations at the European level.

In our research we have measured and discussed various indicators of Europeanization: relevance of supranational institutions in the political debate, reference to them as a target of claims from national (and non-national) actors, degree of support for European institutions, but also political and semantic conflicts on the desired Europe. The evidence presented in this volume has partially supported some of the findings from previous studies but also spelt out, in a very different direction, their interpretations and assumed consequences.

The first concern in our work has been to assess if and to what degree social movements Europeanize. First, the claim analysis in particular confirmed that, if looking at the national press, SMOs and NGOs appear only very rarely to target EU institutions. In this sense, they remain deeply rooted at the national or even the local level, organizing and acting there. The (domestic and mass-media) European public spheres emerged as very selective. The presence of purely European actors is still limited and unequal here, concentrating on public policies where the formal competences of the EU are greater. More generally, the levels of Europeanization of the public discourses are different on different issues, as they tend to reflect the distribution of (EU) competences on the various policies.
In addition, the more Europeanized policies are those where the voices of actors from civil society are less audible. Not only are the ‘European actors’ that succeed in becoming visible in the domestic public spheres almost exclusively institutional ones, but civil society actors, above all social movement organizations, tend to direct their demands much less often to the European level than to the national one.

Interviews also confirmed that for social movements the European level of governance seems to introduce more obstacles than for other types of actors; when they mobilize at this level, they in fact employ lobbying more often than protest, even though our results confirm more frequent use of outsider strategies by non-institutional actors, and particularly by those powerless in resources. Indeed, domestic policy-making on European themes emerged as especially closed to actors less endowed with organizational resources. Network analysis converged in indicating that institutional and business actors are the most powerful in all three areas we analysed, but especially, and in all countries, on European integration (Kriesi et al. 2006). In contrast, SMOs and NGOs are the weakest and least central actors with respect to the policy-making process. Civil society actors appeared as particularly isolated in the policy networks on European integration. The closure of political opportunities at the EU level, with the broadly acknowledged democratic deficit, the material costs of mobilizing transnationally, cultural and structural path-dependency, with frames and organizational structure historically anchored in the nation-state, can all contribute to low levels of protest organized in Brussels or by European social movement organizations.

We also observed, however, that paths of Europeanization of social movements do exist and are indeed increasingly visible, as this type of collective actor also tends to adapt to multilevel governance. If the national level remains central on several of the dimensions considered in our study (presence of supranational actors in national debates, reference to European targets, construction of supranational organizational structures, identification with Europe), the Europub data from claim-making and interviews point
at a trend of growing Europeanization. In a cross-time perspective there is indeed an increasing Europeanization in the discourse and praxis of civil society actors as well. Besides, if many of the interviewed actors primarily concentrate their actions at the national level, most nevertheless act with increasing frequency at the European level too. Also in the claim analysis, Europe increasingly emerges as the target of demands of the various actors and, even more, as the frame of reference for these demands. These paths of Europeanization have grown over time, despite cycles of attention focused on specific moments and issues (such as the EMU or enlargement) and, above all, on those thematic decisions with a more immediate effect on the life of citizens.

Signals of an increasing Europeanization from below have thus emerged—a Europeanization that takes particular forms. The characteristics of Europeanization in a multilevel polity are in fact reflected in multilevel strategies on the part of social movements. In particular, we have described a path of domestication of collective action, where pressure on national governments is used to challenge EU policies. We have also seen externalization; that is, protests at the EU level with the aim of changing national policies. The former type of strategy is preferred by actors whose interests are traditionally entrenched in the nation-state, and the latter by movement organizations addressing emerging divisions. Both paths, however, have helped in creating new structures and frames for collective action. The intensification of the interactions produces a Europeanization of both organizational structures and identities. Indeed, we have observed the emergence of a transnational, European social movement addressing EU politics and policies. Looking at recent EU counter-summits and in particular at the European Social Forums, our data from surveys of ESF participants and document analysis have stressed the existence of emerging structures of a European social movement, made of loosely coupled networks of networks of activists endowed with multiple (overlapping) associational memberships and sharing a common set of values.
Europeanization, therefore, has relevant consequences for social movements. Among others, a European social movement seems to be emerging in the form of loose networks of organizations and individuals that increasingly organize common protest campaigns. It will be for future studies to determine the extent to which the characteristics of the social movements family at the national level and domestic political opportunity will impact on those of the (multilevel) movement ‘for another Europe’. However, it is already possible to delineate some elements of an emerging European movement in which a series of organizations and discourses interweave in extremely flexible organizational structures with identities that are tolerant of difference. Common denominators of such mobilizations include demands for social rights and a democratization of European institutions, not least through the creation of a supranational, critical public sphere. These characteristics seem anything but a ‘passing fad’.

Concentrating on causal mechanisms, our research indicated that the growing Europeanization of social movements is cognitively driven: as with the nation-state, social movement organizations and actions tend increasingly to move towards EU institutions due to a growing acknowledgment of the increasing competences of the EU, as well as a preoccupation with the direction in which these competences are used. Cognitive processes include not only the increasing shifting of the target (and therefore of prognostic and diagnostic frames) towards the EU, but also a growing recognition of similarities among national causes and, therefore, the construction of a shared European identity. Vertical integration has created horizontal processes that, while recognizing and thus legitimizing the European institutions, have also contributed to politicizing the European public sphere by contesting public decisions.

As we saw, however, cognitive processes have gone with relational ones, as the paths of Europeanization by domestication as well as by externalization have intensified the interactions between national, or even local, organizations. Initially driven by instrumental concerns, the more frequent occasions to meet and act together have brought about increasing trust as well as various
structures of coordination. National and even local actors of various types have thus started to address the EU. While those richer in resources have been the first to open headquarters in Brussels, resource-poor actors have also started to network supranationally and to frame European issues. These processes intensified during the organization and performance of protests at the European level, when affective mechanisms also intervened through the production of intense emotions. Even if rare in comparison with protest at the local or national levels, EU-level protests tend to be particularly ‘eventful’ in the sense of not only breaking routines but also constructing shared identities, through long-lasting preparation and emotionally intense performances.

Europeanized protests at the EU level also seem to have had an effect—which further research should better investigate—on the transnational organizations active at the EU level. On this topic, our research confirmed the specificity of some transnational social movement organizations in terms of larger availability of material resources, but also more moderate repertoires and frames than social movement organizations active at the national and, especially, the local level. However, these organizations seemed much weaker in terms of structure and influence than other types of collective actors such as interest groups and political parties. In contrast to previous research, however, we found indications not only of the presence at the EU level of more informal and flexible networks that make larger use of protest, but also of a process of gradual ‘SMO-ization’ of NGOs active at the EU level, with a growing tendency to participate in less conventional forms of collective action and to express increasingly explicit criticism of EU policies.

More generally, and turning to the second broad question of social movements’ attitudes towards Europe, we observed that Europeanization from below clearly takes a critical tone. In our research, in fact, we have measured and discussed various indicators of support for Europe, as well as the different visions of Europe—as it currently stands and as our interviewees would like it to be. Despite not rejecting European integration _tout court_, however, the activity of civil society actors is rather critical of the ongoing
process of Europeanization. Our data on claims-making have shown that, in all countries under analysis, when SMOs and NGOs intervene on Europe in the public sphere they are typically more critical than other actors (e.g. institutional, economic interest groups). Additionally, support for Europe is decreasing above all regarding specific choices of the European institutions: the presence of conflictual demands increases, even if not linearly, through time (after 2000). Furthermore, civil society support for Europe decreases when the debate shifts from European integration in general to (our six) European substantive policy fields. Although with cross-national differences, as confirmed by the survey of European Social Forum participants, mistrust and criticisms of the EU are coupled with demands for ‘another Europe’—a social and democratic one. The ideology of a regulatory Europe legitimized by good outputs performances appears less and less convincing: in producing policies, the EU became a target of claims and protest.

Indeed, two main grievances emerged. The first addresses the weakness of EU social policy and, even more, the increasing functioning of the EU as an agent of neo-liberalism, understood as dismantling the welfare state through deregulation of the market, privatization of public services, cuts in social services, and the like. In this direction, our research signals growing concern with a ‘Europe of the market’ and at the same time a demand for a ‘social Europe’. The EU focus on the control of inflation, through stringent limits to public expenditures, is criticized for the constraints it imposes on social policies, which are still formally under the domain of national public institutions. In a cosmopolitan vision, ‘another Europe’ is invoked, but with an inclusive definition of citizens’ rights, which are demanded for all the citizens of the world, while ‘Fortress Europe’ as well as EU military defence policy are strongly criticized. In this sense, the social movements and NGOs we have analysed challenge the EU productivist redefinition of solidarity as ability to face economic competition (employability) (Streeck 1999), promoting instead a Europe of citizens’ rights.

The issue of a ‘social Europe’ has not only been central in the European Social Forums, but also favoured some convergence
between social movement organizations and the NGOs active at the EU level, as our narrative of the protests against the Bolkestein directive indicated. That campaign also reflected the frustration of NGOs in addressing an EU that appears to them as increasingly oriented towards neo-liberal policies. The debate during the constitutional process seems to have stressed this belief via more conventional means, among others during the convention for the EU Constitution. As reconstructed by Lombardo (2004; 9), when, following a proposal of the Social Platform of the European NGOs, the Convention established a working group on ‘Social Europe’, ‘issues and perspectives that accepted the existing neoliberal trend were prioritised, while social issues that challenged this model were marginalised and actors defending them were constrained to adopt “realistic” (i.e. within the dominant neoliberal paradigm) standpoints to participate in the debate’.

Beyond social issues, a second central concern of civil society organizations addresses the democratic dimension (or lack thereof) of the EU. The social movement organizations and NGOs we have studied share first of all the traditional criticism of the democratic deficit of the EU, in terms of limited accountability of the executive to the Parliament. Additionally, however, they stress other elements, on which the reflection on supranational democracy has more recently focused, among them, the lack of a demos, of common spaces, and of a public sphere (Scharpf 2007). What is more, as mentioned, they present themselves and their own function as agents of the democratization of Europe, through the construction of critical public spheres and the development of shared identities.

In the activists’ discourse, in fact, the criticisms addressed towards a ‘Europe of the market’ and a ‘Europe of the élites’ do not bring about a resistance to Europe as a general value, but rather an attempt to challenge and modify the decisions that are taken at the EU level. As both interviews and surveys have shown, even the less supportive positions on Europe among our civil society organizations are not accompanied by neglect for the European level (even if this commitment is not visible in the mass media) or by the
perception of the latter as less important (in the present and the future) than other territorial levels of governance.

The growing dissatisfaction is therefore oriented not towards the process of integration per se, but towards the weaknesses of EU institutions in terms of promotion of social rights and the welfare state, as well as ‘democratic deficits’. Although influenced by the general attitudes not so much of their national government but of their own national environment, civil society actors tend to be more critical towards EU policies than other types of actors are. Looking at the networks that emerge at the domestic level around the debate on Europe, we saw that in all our countries and in all the covered policies SMOs and NGOs close to the Left and the unions are developing a critical vision of existing policies as well as alternative proposals for ‘another Europe’. Their criticism is particularly acute in the areas of European integration and migration, while agricultural policy emerged as more consensual. In no country (even the UK and Switzerland, where pro- and anti-EU coalitions are more visible) did this conflict focus on the opportunity to remain in or join the EU (Kriesi et al. 2006). In addition, looking at the frames and discourses of the activists participating at EU counter-summits/European Social Forums, we found the development of a form of European criticism that is fundamentally different from the populist Euro-scepticism on which research has focused in the past.

Our ‘critical Europeanists’ cannot indeed be classified as Euro-sceptics. Consistently asking for ‘another Europe’ but also systematically criticizing the EU institutions in form and content, they are difficult to locate within the existing distinctions of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Euro-scepticism (Taggart and Szczeriak 2002) or in those between Euro-sceptics and Euro-rejects (Kopecky and Mudde 2002; on this difficulty see also Heine 2008). Locating themselves squarely to the left, and supporting typically new-social movement concerns such as environmental protection and gender equality, but also ‘old Left’ concerns with social inequalities, they also represent a counter-tendency vis-à-vis the observed trends of decreasing Euro-scepticism on the left (Gabel and Hix 2002) as well as a
‘post-materialist’ support for the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2007). Moreover, our research indicates that conflicts on EU politics and policy are not to be defined simply as pitting the centre against the peripheries, or national interests against supranational ones. Instead, they mainly address different dimensions—the social division among them (see also Lacroix and Coman 2007).

Going back to the debate about the referenda on the European Constitution, we can say that our research confirms that criticism of European politics and policies takes increasingly differentiated forms. In different countries, different national cultures filter opposition to the EU within a defence of the (perceived) specific national characteristics: for example, transatlantic and imperial relations in the United Kingdom (Harmsen 2007), civil liberties in the Netherlands (Binnema and Crum 2007), the fusion of ethnos and demos within the social-democratic tradition in the Scandinavian countries (Hastings 2007). Additionally, within each country, opposition to specific EU decisions can stem from very different concerns and visions of the world. So in the French referendum the ‘no’-vote was composed of the xenophobic nationalism of the Front Nationale, but also a conservative souverainisme and a ruralist localism to the right and cosmopolitan altermondialisme to the left (Rozenberg 2007). In parallel, in the Netherlands, the ‘nee’-voters were moved by a feeling of threatened identity, frustration with the lack of transparency of EU institutions (and specifically, lack of information on the Constitutional Treaty) and a (utilitarian) opposition to a European money-sucking bureaucracy, but also by discontent with the weakness of a social Europe.

As observed in the two epigraphs to this chapter, support for the process of European integration cannot be measured in terms of (more or less permissive) consensus over the decisions of European institutions. Even supporters of the construction of supranational institutions might stigmatize, even radically, a Community treaty considered as too intergovernmentalist or too neo-liberal. Those who criticize free-market Europe could support—as Bourdieu did—a social Europe. A contested public debate is indeed—as Thomas Risse recalled—the only path towards the creation of a supranational
democracy. It is not a silent consensus with the governors that signals a democratic process, but instead the submission of their decisions to the ‘proof of the discussion’ (Manin 1995). It is not agreements upon borders, ideologies, and various divisions but the public debate about them that indicates the existence of a European public sphere (Habermas 1981; Risse 2003; 6–7; also Risse 2000). Civil society actors appear in this frame as critical Europeanists, in favour of deeper integration but through policies very different from those that have so far characterized the ‘negative integration’ they see as dominant in the EU. In line with the results of other studies, based upon an analysis of party positions by means of expert evaluations, our data confirms that a call for more integration on environmental, labour, and cohesion policies tends to meet with demands for more European integration (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004), but integration of another type.

While research on political support for Europe singles out Euroscepticism as increasingly coming from the Right, with more Euro-enthusiasm from the Left, the movement for another Europe shows a ‘cosmopolitan’ critique of the EU. Criticisms from social movements are in fact directed towards what is perceived as the survival of the prevalently economic nature of European integration, linked to the idea of Europe as part of the Western world and thus emphasizing Western values. The stability pact in particular is stigmatized as one of the principal examples of the neo-liberal policies that advantage already privileged groups and reduce welfare for the poor and disadvantaged. The demands are, however, not for a return to the nation-state, but for a process of Europeanization from below.

In this development we singled out some similarities to the history of the nation-state in Europe. Since its origins the EU has been a reaction to the bad performances of the European nation-states in certain key areas: from the military defence of the frontiers to the expansion of markets. As Bartolini (2002; see also Bartolini 2004) put it, the process of territorial dedifferentiation that is at the base of European integration was driven by evidence of the intolerable consequences of historic rivalry among the European states as
well as the growing risks of European economic marginalization in the world economy. However, the deepening of this process demands the creation of a cultural identity and citizenship that can sustain the social sharing of risks and legitimate political decisions (ibid.). The EU’s launch of campaigns on general ethical issues (such as gender equality, anti-racism, human rights) (Trenz 1999; see also Ruzza 2004) is evidence of the search for a moral basis for collective identity—an equivalent to what the nation had represented in the construction of the state. One of the main instruments in the construction of the nation-state, however—citizens’ rights—is still weak at the EU level. The process of European integration advocated at the European level the tools of economic policies, necessary for the implementing of social policies, although without investing in the latter. Therefore, as at the national level, protest actors emerge to ask for (more) social rights and democratic quality.

In this sense, we can state that if multilevel mobilization presents the greatest challenge but also some opportunities for European social movements, the recent protests seem to represent a challenge and an opportunity for European institutions as well. Civil society actors are, at the same time, critical towards the EU, but also (potential and actual) entrepreneurs of Europeanization. They legitimize Europe while criticizing it.

The development of a Europeanization from below seems to be more and more important given recent EU developments, which are symbolically synthesized in the (failed) Constitutional Treaty. The plans for European integration, which moved initially mainly through objectives of economic cooperation, have become slowly more ambitious. While the internal market was being liberalized, regulations emerged that were increasingly complex and, with them, institutions that were increasingly powerful. The growth of competition, the introduction of mechanisms of qualified-majority voting for decisions, and the dominance of European laws in many areas are all elements that strengthen European institutions. But they also make their legitimization more problematic. Due to the weakness of a supranational public sphere, the increasing competences of
the European Parliament are hardly an effective solution to the deficit of democratic accountability in Community institutions. At the same time, functional interest representation, through mechanisms of consultation and dialogue, is not sufficient to legitimize EU institutions, particularly given the different organizational capacities (especially at the supranational level) of the different actors. The search for legitimization through output, at least in the technocratic sense of consensus obtained thanks to economic success, seems less and less credible in view of the growth of unemployment and, in general, of inequality in Europe.

By explicitly pointing to this failure, attributing it to a political system that is hardly democratic and that relies on neo-liberal policies, emerging protest campaigns have flagged one of the central problems of European integration. That problem is the weakness of a European identity able to carry out the function that the nation carried out in the construction of nation-states. European social movements can indeed contribute, through their critiques, to the building of this identity: as with the nation-state, protest can stimulate citizens’ integration, eventually contributing to institutional democratization as well as legitimacy. And, as with the construction of the nation-state, the focusing of protests at the national level accompanied the centralization of decisional power (Tilly 1978). Similarly to what is happening today, social and political actors moved on multiple territorial levels: alliances with the state builders targeted local governors, but there were also alliances among the periphery against the centre (Tarrow 2005).

As mentioned, the end of a permissive consensus brings about increasing difficulties in legitimizing EU institutions as benign regulatory entities, capable of improving economic performance and maximizing everyone’s preferences. Given also the difficulties of developing parallel forms of democratic accountability and legitimacy at the supranational level, the involvement of civil society (whether organized or not) has been seen from inside the EU institutions as a possible innovation. Considering the difficulty of linking through representative processes the demos to the kratos via a (representative) government by the people, the path of governing
with the people (Schmidt 2007) appears more and more often in the rhetorical discourse of the EU institutions.

Beyond indicating the difficulties of realizing such ideas, our research points at the potential problems in the implementation of this strategy (at least in the perception of civil society organizations). First, it highlights the difficulties linked to the different languages spoken by our organizations and the EU when talking about the potential role of a civil society. As observed by Beate Kohler-Koch (2007b), the role of civil society is framed in the EU in quite diverse, and even competing, terms. The White Paper on European Governance conceptualize the involvement of civil society as instrumental in improving European governance though the involvement of stakeholders. In this sense, ‘the suggested reforms placed the involvement of the stakeholders in the forefront. “Stakeholders” were understood in a broader sense, encompassing not just target groups but also actors from the civil society and experts that have a stake in view of the wider implications of any policy regulation’ (ibid. 7). The involvement of a civil society would mean, therefore, the presence of a broader range of stakeholders than those usually present and influential in Brussels. Similarly, while some frame-bridging is going on between European institutions and civil society organizations around concepts such as environmental sustainability or citizens’ consultation, these tend to be interpreted by the institution within a neo-liberal vision that is, in contrast, criticized by civil society organizations (Ruzza 2004).

Our results point instead at another conception of civil society that is emerging among our actors of a Europeanization from below. As mentioned, our rising European social movement, as well as the various actors mobilized through paths of domesticated and/or externalized Europeanization from below, call for ‘another Europe’, addressing a strong and broad critique to existing EU institutions. They conceive of a civil society as simultaneously the producer and the product of processes of constructing a polity, through the creation of a demos, or at least what Fossum and Trenz (2006) called a ‘social constituency’. This resembles what Beate Kohler-Koch (2007c; 12) called, a ‘collective action frame’
of civil society, which has ‘the potential to mobilize popular support against those in power’. Given their self-understanding as bearers of alternative visions of Europe, they would therefore not be easy to incorporate into EU governance as just ‘stakeholders’ among other ‘stakeholders’.

As conceived within the ‘collective action’ frame, a Europeanized civil society could perform an even more relevant role in the construction of the EU polity. Historical sociologists have often stressed that the construction of the nation-state has been a conflictual process. Citizens’ rights resulted from social struggles that targeted the national governments (Marshall 1950; Bendix 1964), and democracy emerged with the contestation of public decisions: criticism of national governments contributed to legitimizing the state as the main decisional level (Moore 1966). Even avoiding pushing too far the parallel between nation-building and the construction of peculiar and anomalous supranational institutions such as the European Union, our research appears to confirm the development of a ‘Europeanization by contestation’. Although the extent to which we can speak of a European demos—or even hope to be able to speak about it in the future—is still debated, the process of Europeanization from below still seems a contribution to the construction of a critical European public sphere. As Vivien Schmidt (2006; 268) observed, at the EU level ‘More democracy most certainly entails devising more avenues for interest consultation with the people’. Our research indicates, however, that civil society tends to raise a critical voice. To what extent are EU institutions able to listen to these critical voices, without classifying them, by default, as conservative Euro-sceptics? Looked at from this point of view, much will depend on the ability of European institutions to construct civil, political, and social rights that can stand as the foundations of supranational citizenship. On this, more research is clearly needed.

Research is also needed on another aspect of Europeanization from below, not addressed in our project. In an ‘enlarged’ Europe, the question of the potential role of civil society in a supranational democracy should also take into account Eastern European trends
that our research, focusing on Western Europe, has not covered. Studies on civil society in Eastern Europe have addressed the limited role of ‘actors from below’ in the top-down process of accession of Central and East European countries (Lindstrom 2006). Civil society in these countries has been described as still significantly affected by limited citizen participation and widespread civic disillusionment (Howard 2003) as well as by a strong financial dependence on various donors, including the EU (Carothers 1999; Carothers and Ottaway 2000). Indeed, recent studies have shown that since the heyday of the civil society mobilization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which contributed to the breakdown of the authoritarian regimes, most Central and Eastern European countries have seen a decline of citizen participation in civil society activities despite steady economic growth and epochal events (Fioramonti and Heinrich 2007; 4).

However, there are also some counter-trends. The EU-accession process has been singled out as an important incentive for developing institutionalized dialogue (in European terms, ‘social dialogue’) with civil society, since the principle of partnership between public administration and civil society organizations is a major tenet of the EU’s structural policy and must be applied to all levels of government (ibid. 29). Besides a potential direct impact of EU policies, transnational influences as well as horizontal networking with West European SMOs and NGOs seem to provide some domestic movements in Eastern and Central Europe with various resources. In the case of the Hungarian environmental movement (Kerényi and Szabó 2006), for instance, the intensification of transnational interaction gave rise to new mobilization patterns and further networking. Indeed, an increasing number of protest actions in the region have been observed, including protests against the EU’s current economic and political trajectory; against particular EU policies; and against the alleged ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU (ibid. 2). Research on EU contestation in the new EU states, mapping and categorizing various kinds of domestic party-based opposition to the EU or public-opinion trends (Kopecky and Mudde 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002), has underlined that
the nature of resistance to Europe in the post-communist member states has changed strongly since accession (Henderson 2007; on Estonia see Pettai 2007), although paths of domestication seem dominant (Lindstrom 2006; 2).

Finally, we have to keep in mind that the transnationalization trends of social movements are not only ‘European’: quite to the contrary, the construction of Europe-wide networks and a European discourse has proceeded together with a wider trend towards a ‘globalization from below’. In fact, the European social movement organizations we have addressed up to now have interacted especially within the global justice movement in general and the European Social Forums in particular (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006; della Porta 2007a). Multilevel campaigns have addressed the EU, but also (and often simultaneously) other international governmental organizations. If some trends are therefore global, the process of Europeanization does seem to take on some specific characteristics. Not only, in fact, is the EU the most advanced experiment in the construction of macro-regional institutions (competences are higher and interactions more intense), but European social movements bring with them their distinctive history (della Porta 2007b). If we can state that globalization and Europeanization happen to feed each other but are not phenomena of the same type, comparative research on social movements’ involvement in similar processes of construction of macro-regional institutions in North and Latin America, Asia, and Africa is urgently needed in order to understand the peculiarities of the European paths, as well as for drawing a more complete picture of the impact of transnational phenomena on social movements, and vice versa.
Appendix

Newspapers used for claim-analysis

In each of the seven countries, two quality newspapers, one more left-oriented and one more right-oriented, have been chosen as Europub main sources: Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (D); El País and Abc (E); Le Monde and Le Figaro (F); La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera (I); De Volkskrant and Algemeen Dagblad (NL); The Guardian and The Times (UK); and Le Temps (appearing from 1998 onwards), Journal de Genève (which was taken instead of Le Temps for the years 1990 and 1995), and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (CH).

Additional analyses

Table A: Average normalized indegree (centrality measure) for institutional actors, political parties, interest groups, and social movements, by policy field: Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy field</th>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Indegree (cooperative relations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European integration</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMOs/NGOs</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. A: Network of collaborative relationships between actors in the field of European integration with and without the main brokers
### Appendix

**Table B:** Prevalent patterns of relationships between coalitions in the field of European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indifference</td>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cooperation/indifference</td>
<td>Conflict/indifference</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 ‘federalist forces’; 2 movements; 3 interest groups and Parliament; 4 institutional actors and governmental parties

**Table C:** Prevalent patterns of relationships between coalitions in the field of agricultural policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Conflict/pragmatism</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cooperation/indifference</td>
<td>Conflict/pragmatism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Conflict/pragmatism</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 farmers’ associations and radical left; 2 environmental and consumers’ associations; 3 institutional actors and interest groups; 4 parties (centre-right and centre-left)

**Table D:** Prevalent patterns of relationships between coalitions in the field of immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
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