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Trajectories of Regime Transformation and Types of Stateness in Post-communist Countries

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ABSTRACT In this paper, we address the issue of what types of factors are crucial for regime transformation in post-communist countries. First, we test the relative importance of structural and actor-oriented factors using a specially constructed index of democracy. Cross-country regression analysis reveals that policy-related variables have higher statistical explanatory power: presidentialism vs. parliamentarism; opposition coming to power in the first founding elections; foreign policy orientation towards the West and state capture as the most significant variables. These findings are further corroborated and expanded by qualitative analysis. Following this we examine types of post-communist stateness as another possible explanation of differences in regime transformation results. We propose a vector measure of stateness which is based on both statistical data and expert evaluations. This measure allows us to develop a typology of stateness in post-communist countries which is used to assess the relationship between regime and stateness dynamics. We find that those post-communist states which fulfil a broad range of social functions are more successful in their democratic development.

KEY WORDS: Stateness, regime transformations, post-communist countries, democratization, dynamics modelling

Introduction

Why do some post-communist nations become democratic, while others do not? What is necessary for successful democratization? Are some specific preconditions, be they economic, social, or cultural, indispensable for democracy or do the crucial factors relate more to particular decisions and actions of political actors who seek or resist democratization?

State and stateness are among these supposed preconditions. It is almost commonplace in the literature that a sovereign state is a prerequisite to democracy. But not all states are alike, each having different resources, capacities, priorities, properties, and so forth. What
kinds of states and what particular features are conducive to democracy or autocracy? How do different types of stateness and their dynamics relate to different trajectories of regime transformation in post-communist countries?

We address these two major sets of research questions in this paper. Our approach is empirical, as we apply a combination of qualitative comparative and multivariate statistical methods to study a sample of post-communist countries in order to answer some of the abovementioned questions. For this purpose, we use an original dataset created specifically for this research project.

We start this paper by evaluating the existing theoretical and empirical literature, which serves as the basis for formulating our two hypotheses. Next we discuss the data, methods, and empirical results of our research. In conclusion we analyse and discuss our results, verify our hypotheses, and suggest areas for further research.

**Literature and Hypotheses**

In the literature on the origins of democracy and democratization, one can single out two major alternative explanatory models. One module focuses on the more objective structural preconditions for democracy, while another focuses on subjective procedural, actor-related factors, meaning the specific policies and decisions of major political actors involved in transitions.

Proponents of the first approach vary significantly in their arguments, but do share one basic feature: Democracy emerges more or less organically from a set of particular favourable preconditions, among which one can find the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society with a dominant figure of a ‘bourgeois’ (Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Many authors note a relatively high level of socio-economic development, with the primary focus being on GDP per capita (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Epstein et al., 2006). Another widespread argument stresses national identity and a sovereign state as prerequisite for democracy (Rustow, 1970; Fukuyama, 2004a; Tilly, 2007). Other scholars speak of the necessity of civic political culture or nonmaterial values (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005; Fish, 2009). Among other factors a non-rentier economy (Huntington, 1991; Ross, 2001; Treisman, 2010), absence of irreconcilable social, ethnic and religious cleavages (Chirot, 2009) are listed.

An alternative, policy-oriented approach is based on the assumption that democracy can be crafted through appropriate decisions (Linz & Stepan, 1978; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Di Palma, 1991; Huntington, 1991; Przeworski, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Colomer, 2000). Major themes within this approach include the role of interactions (‘games’) between actors before and during the different stages of transition from authoritarianism, the configuration of major players, types of ‘exit’ from authoritarianism or communism, attitudes towards the political opposition, use of violence for resolving political and other conflicts, whether old elites are replaced or preserved, rotation of power, institutional design for new democracies, and institutional constraints on the executive.

Of course, one should not exaggerate the polarity of these two explanatory models because objective structures are reproduced through subjective actions and policies, while political decisions have their own specific historical, socio-economic, and cultural grounds. However, recent empirical large-N studies (Teorell & Hadenius, 2007; Teorell, 2010) tend to support an ‘anti-structural’, ‘actor-oriented’, ‘no-preconditions approach’ to
democratization processes since the mid 1970s. We check and disaggregate this general conclusion using a specific sample of post-communist countries. Thus, our first hypothesis is:

- H1: Actors do matter. Structural factors, either favourable or unfavourable for democracy, do not predetermine the trajectories and outcomes of post-communist transformations and the policy choices of key political actors are crucial for defining these trajectories and their outcomes.

As for democracy and democratization in relationship to state and stateness, a basic consensus exists in the literature. As Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 17) claim, ‘Without a state, no modern democracy is possible’. Yes, modern states do emerge in violent and undemocratic ways, but, at certain stages of development, some were able to develop and maintain democratic institutions and practices (Weber, 1976; Tilly, 1992; Van Creveld, 1992). Democracy does require a state, but what kind of a state and with which properties?

Without disputing this consensus, we wish to stress that modern states are very different entities per se. Most of them are member states of the United Nations, but they differ profoundly in the level of their actual sovereignty, available resources and capacities, stages of development, the international and domestic challenges they face, the priorities they define for themselves, and so forth (for example, Melville et al., 2010). In this paper, we start with differentiating two conceptually different dimensions of the modern state: statehood (external and internal recognition of sovereignty) and stateness (the level and quality of the state’s basic functions).

In the existing literature, stateness, as specific quality of a state, is widely perceived as one of the criteria used to evaluate levels of democracy (see, for example, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2011). We assume that states with different political regimes may perform their functions in different ways (Schmitter et al., 2005, makes a similar point), and we add to this assumption a dynamic aspect in which we take into account how different types of stateness change during periods of post-communist transformations.

Our arguments are drawn on the existing literature dealing with modern states, state-building, and nation formation, particularly focusing on transitional contexts, democratization and stateness, and state capacity (Nettle, 1968; Tilly, 1975, Evans, 1992, 1997; Spruyt, 1994; Fukuyama, 2004a; Schmitter et al., 2005; Roeder, 2007; Fritz, 2007; Back & Hadenius, 2008; Fortin, 2010; Charron & Lapuente, 2010; Moller & Skaaning, 2011a).

Bäck and Hadenius (2008) consider stateness as the capacity of state organs to maintain sovereignty. This is better described within a notion of statehood in our particular conceptual framework. Hendrix (2010) proposes to define state capacity in terms of military capacity, bureaucratic or administrative capacity, and the quality and coherence of political institutions. Fortin (2010) suggests five measures of state capacity, consisting of corruption, contract intensive money, infrastructure reform, protection of property rights, and tax revenue. Charron and Lapuente (2010) simply equate state capacity with the quality of government.

Taking into account both our research questions and the debates in the literature over the functions of the modern state and how these correspond with patterns of democratization, we assume that there are different types of stateness, each with its own dynamics. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is as follows:

- H2: Stateness does matter. The trajectories and outcomes of post-communist transformations correspond to different types of stateness and their dynamics.
Both hypotheses are tested empirically using an original dataset and a combination of quantitative (multivariate statistical) and qualitative comparative (cross-national) methods. Then, we discuss clusters of post-communist transformations and types and dynamics of post-communist stateness and their relationship.

Data and Methods

Dataset

Our dataset consists of variables from statistical sources, widely used cross-national indices, and expert evaluations specially collected for this study, which are necessary for capturing some attributes of the countries under study. Our dataset includes socio-demographic, economic and other variables from different sources as well as expert evaluations.

These variables are organized as a panel describing 28 post-communist countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) from 1989 to 2008. Several expert judgments are provided only for certain decades, meaning that they are invariable within a given decade.

Operationalization of Transformation Trajectories: PCADI, Principal Component and Cluster Analysis

Testing our hypotheses requires the operationalization of trajectories for regime transformation in order to make them suitable for comparing a wide range of processes in post-communist countries that occurred during the past two and a half decades. This also helps us accomplish other research tasks. A trajectory can traditionally be described as a sequence of numerous decisions and actions leading to certain observable institutional results. If we were to use a qualitative approach to accomplish this task, then we would end up with a collection of individual stories on the transitions of almost three-dozen post-communist countries. Instead, we have assumed that a trajectory of regime transformation can be presented as a sequence of values of a unified index of democracy taken on an annual basis from 1989 to 2008.

We construct a unified index from the Polity IV and Freedom House indices (for similar attempts see Teorell & Hadenius, 2007; Bäck & Hadenius, 2008). However, we forego the arithmetic mean and prefer extracting the first principal component. Principal component analysis is preferred as a reduction technique because of its flexibility. It allows one to verify whether the information in raw indicators is sufficiently homogenous for constructing an index. It also helps to ascribe a reasonable weight to each raw indicator. Principal component analysis of the two indices produces our Principal Component Analysis Democracy Index (PCADI), which is linearly related to the corresponding arithmetic mean. Despite this linear relationship, we lean towards PCADI because of the aforementioned methodological advantages of the principal component method. We have checked the correlation of PCADI with four other democracy indices (Polity IV, Freedom House index, Unified Democracy Score, and The Economist Intelligence Unit Index), and found a high level of consistency in TSCS data. The results are shown in Table 1.1 (Appendix 1). We interpret these results as evidence suggesting the validity of PCADI.
We use cluster analysis to identify types of trajectories of regime transformation (hierarchical cluster analysis with squared Euclidean distance and Ward’s method as an agglomeration procedure). The choice of Ward’s method is stipulated by its optimal properties revealed in computer simulations (Gore, 2000; Scheibler & Schneider, 1985). When using cluster analysis, countries are viewed as points in a 20-dimensional vector space using PCADI for a particular year in the 20-year timespan from 1989 to 2008. Thus, points in close proximity correspond to countries with a similar regime change trajectory.

*Stateness: Empirical Model*

Based on the abovementioned literature, we propose an empirical model of stateness, implying a modern social state’s ability to fulfil its basic functions, with a set of available and appropriate indicators:

**External security:**
- Aggression on the territory of the country (expert evaluation);
- Territorial claims (expert evaluation);
- Border disputes (expert evaluation).

**Domestic order:**
- Terrorist threats (expert evaluation);
- Civil war (expert evaluation);
- Anti-government paramilitary groups (expert evaluation);
- Disappearances of citizens (CIRI);
- Extrajudicial killings (CIRI).

**Legitimacy:**
- Changes in founding constitutional rules (expert evaluation);
- Public consensus on founding constitutional rules (expert evaluation);
- Political prisoners (CIRI).

**Administrative capacity:**
- Extent of state capture by organized or informal interest groups (expert evaluation);
- Government effectiveness (WB);
- Control of corruption (WB);
- Regulatory quality (WB).

**Conditions for development:**
- Health expenditures (percentage of GDP);
- Research and development expenditures (percentage of GDP);
- Domestic credit to private sector (percentage of GDP).
These are not ideal indicators, perhaps. However, our choice is motivated by their accessibility and conceptual coherence of the suggested model.

The five basic functions of a modern state are treated as five dimensions of stateness, each described by a different group of relevant indicators. Measuring such a five-dimensional concept requires a vector index of stateness in lieu of a unique scalar. The vector consists of five components, each measuring a particular aspect or dimension of the concept we are studying. Each component of the vector is produced by principal component analysis and is the first principal component extracted from the corresponding set of indicators (see Appendix 3). The timespan of the analysis covers the 1990s and 2000s, using the decade as a unit of time because expert judgments have been coded only for decades. If annual data for some attributes were available, then their values were averaged over the decade. Naturally, we extracted principal components from a joint set of variables measured for both decades, thus making the resulting indices comparable over time.

In order to include stateness in further analysis and explore its relationship to trajectories of regime transformation, we propose a typology of stateness based on vector indices. We use cluster analysis to classify countries according to five sub-indices of stateness. We employ the same approach used to identify regime change trajectories.

**Identifying Factors of Regime Change Trajectories**

Having constructed the PCADI and the typology of stateness, we use regression and comparative analysis to reveal factors affecting regime change. As regression analysis of observational cross-sectional data makes causal inference spurious, we combine it with time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) and multilevel models.

Finally, because gaps arise in our dataset, we cannot include all the 29 post-communist countries in the regression analysis, although we do address their development with qualitative methods. The majority of regression results correspond to 23 countries, excluding Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mongolia, and Turkmenistan.

**Results of Testing Hypothesis 1**

**Cross-sectional Analysis**

PCADI was used as a dependent variable in cross-sectional regression models with several structural variables (infant mortality rate, life expectancy, GDP per capita, growth in GDP per capita, Gini Index) on the right-hand side. As cross-sectional regression analysis is especially prone to problems with endogeneity, we lagged right-hand-side variables to mitigate endogeneity. The dependent variable represents PCADI in 2008, while predictors are averaged over 1989–1993.

Because of the small-N sample, we do not rely on asymptotic distributions of t-statistics and use a bootstrap with 10,000 replications to calculate standard errors. The results for 23 countries are given in Table 1.2 (see Appendix 1) where Models 1 through 5 are bivariate and Model 6 is a multiple regression. The coefficient for growth in GDP per capita is positive, but not statistically significant. Thus, economic growth at the beginning of the transformation period is not a good predictor of regime outcomes in the 23 post-communist countries we consider in the regression analysis. This may indicate that the social support of democratic reforms was due to many characteristics of social development.
reflecting the well-being of citizens (for instance, the Gini Index). Sure enough, GDP per capita dynamics are not the most straightforward indicator of this. Though the coefficient is not statistically significant, its sign deserves a few words of discussion. The positive sign suggests that a better recovery from economic crises is associated with more successful democratization.

Coefficients for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality and the Gini Index are statistically significant with signs consistent with the initial expectations. Put differently, positive coefficients for logged GDP per capita and life expectancy corroborate the idea that highly developed nations have a higher propensity for ensuring democratic consolidation. A similar interpretation is given to the negative coefficient for infant mortality; inasmuch as more developed countries have lower infant mortality rates due to a better fulfilment of key social functions.

One might also hypothesize that the sign of the coefficient for the Gini Index may be not robust for changes in model specification because of the complex relationship between inequality, as measured by the Gini Index, and democracy. More inequality may mean both poverty amidst the broad social strata and a differentiated social structure with considerable differences in income. Though the first situation hampers democratic consolidation, the second one should encourage it. Our further research supports this claim.

Our main focus here is on $R^2$ statistics, which suggest that the infant mortality rate at the start of democratization is the best variable for explaining cross-nation differences in the regime change outcomes of the 23 post-communist countries. A bit less informative in this sense is the logarithm of GDP per capita. These structural characteristics statistically explain 56 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively, of cross-nation variation in the level of democracy in 2008.

We abandon the bivariate regression setting in Model 6, which contains all explanatory variables from Models 1 through 5. This model accounts for 62 per cent of the variation in PCADI in 2008. Naturally, all coefficients are statistically insignificant because of the multicollinearity reinforced by a small sample size. Especially collinear are logged GDP per capita and infant mortality rate, with a product–moment correlation coefficient of $-0.81$.

It is theoretically meaningful to discover the share of PCADI variance that may be explained by all these structural factors when redundant information is excluded. To understand this, we orthogonalized the space of right-hand-side variables through principal components, and regressed PCADI from 2008 on them. Standard errors, again, were computed with the bootstrap. Table 1.3 (see Appendix 1) summarizes these results.

We see from Model 8 that the first two principal components, which account for about 83 per cent of total variance, have statistically significant coefficients, although the second principal component’s significance is not robust (compare Models 7 and 8, where differences in standard errors lead to different conclusions about statistical significance when $\alpha = 0.05$). Because a substantive interpretation of coefficients from a regression on principal components is problematic, we focus on the $R^2$ statistic, which is equal to 0.57. Hence, the structural factors we include in the regression allow us to account for no more than 57 per cent of the cross-national variation in PCADI after redundant information has been removed.

Now, is it indispensable that the remaining variation in PCADI is caused by procedural factors? A stochastic approach to the empirical data suggests that the attribute we analyse has an inherent randomness reflecting its dynamic nature. Thus, we need procedural variables to be included in the model explicitly.
Table 1.4 reports these results. Model 9 includes only two procedural variables, one representing state capture and the other being a dummy variable for a country’s foreign policy orientation. This dummy variable takes on a value of ‘1’ if a country has a pro-Russian orientation, and ‘0’ in other cases. This model reveals that coefficients for both procedural variables are negative. Hence, countries with higher levels of state capture are on average less democratic in 2008. As for countries that were building allied foreign relations with Russia during the period of 1989 to 1993, these are on average 4.58 points less democratic than the rest. Taking into account the range of PCADI (from ‘0’ to ‘10’), we claim this effect to be significant both statistically and substantively. Additionally, this model is especially insightful because it accounts for 86 per cent of the dependent variable’s variance, while containing only one continuous variable and one dummy variable on the right-hand side. This model with two procedural explanatory variables explains more variance than Model 6 with five structural explanatory variables. This finding emphasizes the role of procedural factors in explaining the results of regime transformations.

However, Models 10 through 12 show that the statistical significance for the state capture coefficient is quite unstable. Nevertheless, the sign remains the same. We argue that the changes in statistical significance are due to the variable’s collinearity with logged GDP per capita (R = −0.6953) and infant mortality (R = −0.6367).

Our analysis indicates the effectiveness of combining structural and procedural variables when explaining the results of regime transformation in post-communist countries. This is especially explicit in Model 11, which combines both types of variables and accounts for 93 per cent of the cross-national variance in PCADI.

**TSCS Data: Fixed Effects Models**

Although the regression models described above reveal a rather congruent picture of statistically and substantively significant factors for regime transformation, all of them are potentially subject to such flaws as unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of explanatory variables. The use of lagged right-hand-side variables, averaged over the period from 1989 to 1993, cannot level these out completely.

We employ fixed-effects models to mitigate these problems. The model contains a separate constant for each country and allows for a correlation between country constant and error term – a kind of endogeneity. This is a nice property of the model, as this correlation is rather plausible. We also admit that the effect of different explanatory variables is heterogeneous for distinct subsamples of countries. To account for this, we use dummy variables for pertinent regression slopes.

The findings are presented in Table 1.5 (see Appendix 1). Models 13 through 15 are estimated with OLS applied after the so called ‘within transformation’. The only difference in these models concerns the set of explanatory variables analysed. More specifically, Model 14 adds GDP growth rate to Model 13. The logic behind this model augmentation is that GDP growth rate reflects the effectiveness of the state in coping with economic turbulence. Model 15 includes the logarithm of GDP per capita as well. This variable is correlated with life expectancy (R = 0.7214), but its substantive meaning is different.

Model 16 is a fixed-effects model with panel-corrected standard errors, as is conventional after the publication of Beck and Katz’s (1995) seminal paper. Estimation assumes first-order serial correlation, which is common for all countries.
All these fixed-effects models are highly consistent in their findings. Positive coefficients for life expectancy suggest that the conditions of living, which reflect a wide range of social and economic characteristics of states, have an impact on progress in democratic consolidation. Countries with higher life expectancy on average are more democratic.

We also find a complex link between democracy and the Gini Index. Model 5, with cross-section data, had a negative coefficient for the Gini Index, while in Models 13 through 17 it is positive, suggesting that countries with higher inequality are, ceteris paribus, more democratic. But the interaction term for the Gini Index and the dummy variable for state capture in the 1990s (one if state capture measure is equal to either three or four out of four possible values) has a negative coefficient. Such an approach allows us to get a deeper understanding of the mechanism that links democracy and inequality. We reveal the deleterious effect of inequality in cases where it is due to a deep gap between the poverty of large segments of the population and the wealth of the political and/or business elite. This situation characterizes ‘captured’ states. The opposite is also true: In ‘not captured’ states, income inequality is to a large degree due to a complex social structure and, consequently, is related to better requisites of democracy. The results of regression analysis corroborate such a differentiated view of the effect of inequality. Thus, the Gini Index is positively related to democracy in ‘not captured’ states, but the relation disappears, all else being equal, when looking at ‘captured’ states.

**Multilevel Modelling**

We verify the FE model’s findings with multilevel regression models. They are based on estimating the vector of regime transformation for each state. It is a linear OLS approximation of the regime transformation trajectory and conveys information about its general direction and speed. As different vectors are different lines, corresponding constant terms and slopes vary. High positive slopes indicate a fast consolidation of democracy, whereas a small positive or negative slope suggests no clear transformation vector, and a big negative slope reflects consolidation of autocracy. The constant term is less informative, being equal to the starting value of PCADI predicted by the model. We seek to find variables that explain the differences in slopes and constants across countries.

Though the multilevel approach resembles FE models, it is different both theoretically and technically. Particularly, it helps to model dynamics explicitly as a change in time.

Table 1.6 displays results for multilevel regressions. Models 17 and 18 are reported as baselines because they provide the basis for assessing increases in explained variance when additional right-hand-side variables are included. We concentrate on Model 20, because it is the fullest one and gives parameter estimates that are robust to changes in specification.

Firstly, the coefficient of the variable for time is positive and indicates that the majority of post-communist states were moving towards a consolidated democracy. But this trajectory does not concern those countries whose foreign policies were oriented towards Russia. Vectors of regime transformation for these countries have slopes of $-0.08$ ($0.13$ less $0.21$). Hence, post-communist countries form statistically discernible groups characterized by different types of transformation direction.

Secondly, Model 20 vindicates the differentiated effect of inequality. While the coefficient for the Gini Index is positive, its interaction with state capture in the 1990s is negative. Both coefficients are statistically significant.
Then, logged GDP per capita is positively related to the dynamics of regime transformation. Finally, the dummy variable for presidential systems with an opposition that did not attain power at the beginning of the transformation is also both negative and statistically significant at $\alpha = 0.1$. Thus, such countries are less democratic on average. The latter finding is of considerable theoretical importance, as it points to the fact that the institutional design chosen by post-communist countries under study had influence on the trajectory of regime transformation. Presidential systems which are much more institutionally unbalanced than mixed or parliamentary ones create in cases of opposition failures adverse institutional environment for the development and consolidation of democracy. This statistical result is corroborated by our further qualitative analysis.

In sum, empirical analysis consistently suggests that structural factors have less explanatory power than procedural ones when modelling differences in the trajectories and results of post-communist transformation.

Clusters of Post-communist Transformations

Cluster analysis allows us to allocate different types of regime transformation trajectories in post-communist countries into six distinct groups (see Appendix 2), which we interpret as follows:

1. **Towards democratic consolidation** (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Estonia).
2. **On the road to democracy** (Albania, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine).
3. **Breakthrough to democracy** (Serbia and Croatia).
4. **Problematic trajectories** (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia).
5. **On the road to autocracy** (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan).
6. **Consolidated autocracies** (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

The first cluster consists of post-communist countries that have, compared with the other clusters, achieved significant, although somewhat varying, results in the consolidation of democratic regimes. With the exception of Mongolia, which is largely a specific ‘anomaly’, most of these countries had favourable structural preconditions for democracy. However, their steady upward regime transformation trajectories to a large extent resulted from strategic decisions in favour of democracy taken by key political actors. Pro-Western politicians steered their countries out of a communist past while returning them to where they had once belonged – the European family of civilized and democratic nations (Mongolia is an exception, once again). ‘Back to Europe’ became a strong normative attitude among the elites and the public as well as a foreign policy orientation.

As a rule, a typical transformation in these instances was initiated amid growing public discontent with the old regime, which itself began to neglect its social and economic obligations. This discontent was accompanied either by a split in the ruling communist party and an emergence of a reformist wing that was at least temporarily capable of controlling changes or by the resurgence of an opposition that could not be ignored by hardliners, who were themselves rapidly losing popular support. The political programs of opposition groups frequently combined democratic elements with nationalist ones. The transitions to democracy in countries of this cluster were undertaken via round tables or ‘velvet revolutions’. Transformation processes were accompanied by virtually no violence both before
and after the collapse or controlled dismantlement of the old regimes and opposition’s advent to power. A partial exception to this scheme is represented by Romania. Institutional design patterns in this cluster were determined by the formation of strong parliaments, as well as by the emergence of oppositions that derived their legitimacy from a pre-communist past. It is worth mentioning that, with some exceptions, such as Mongolia, one of the sources of this new legitimacy was an experience with statehood prior to communism. State-building in most of these countries (i.e., the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones – Fukuyama, 2004b, p. 17) occurred in accordance with priorities of the modern social state.

The second cluster consists of post-communist countries with transformation trajectories that are more irregular or ‘bumpy’ compared to the first cluster. These countries ventured into transformations under dissimilar structural conditions and experienced different political crises of a varying scope and intensity, including those resulting from both political and non-political (ethnic, regional, etc) cleavages. There were as well attempts to use the state: for private and/or corporatist purposes. The more serious problems these countries faced dealt with the rise of nationalist oppositions, ethnic and other conflicts, and even territorial losses.

This cluster provides strong evidences that democratic institution-building is often inconsistent and followed by delays and setbacks when there is either a significant presence of deep cleavages that have the potential to result in large scale conflicts or a simultaneous need to carry out various reforms. However, under these unfavourable conditions, not a single political actor can expect to dominate for a substantial period of time, even if he or she can enjoy the situational advantage of readjusting the ‘rules of the game’ for his or her own benefit. Paradoxically, this gives the countries of the second cluster a chance to pursue democratic-focused trajectories, however imperfect they may be. It should be noted that one of the sources and manifestations of defects with this trajectory comes from conflicts over the choice of institutional design, including that of a presidential option.

The third cluster consists of Serbia and Croatia. The post-communist transformations in these countries suffered from the disastrous effects of widespread violence during civil wars and of involvement in conflicts with neighbouring countries during Yugoslavia’s lingering and painful disintegration. These countries fell prey to the rise of nationalism, which led to nearly a decade of large-scale violence. Institutions of the state have been to a large extent ‘captured’ by autocratic leaders and their clans. However, those new political leaders that came to power under direct pressure from the West and that were not related to the previous regimes of, say, Milosevic and Tudjman, managed to bring these two former Yugoslav republics out of international isolation and carry out comprehensive reforms that allowed for the rapid implementation of a democratic project. The selection of a parliamentary design facilitated this further.

The fourth cluster offers examples of transformations starting under the considerably different structural conditions of Russia, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. However, the hybrid presidential regimes established in these countries resulted from the constant inability or unwillingness on the part of key political actors to seek compromises in order to avoid conflicts. Instead, they easily yielded to the temptation of using different degrees of violence to resolve conflicts with numerous political opponents. After having ascended to power, the once-promising democrats frequently demonstrated a reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of the opposition and to allow for fair political competition. Moreover, all these countries opted for strong presidential systems. This unsurprisingly led to an extremely
high price of losing power – intertwined with huge stakes of property – to political rivals who had long lists of grievances caused by former democrats who turned into ‘strong men’. None of the countries leaned toward a ‘European project’. The fact that these countries are stuck in transition and bump repeatedly into the same unsolved problems can be explained by the specific actions of key politicians, rather than by simply having the wrong initial structural conditions. Institutional reform remains an important prerequisite for economic growth and development in such countries (see Guriev & Zhuravskaya, 2010).

The fifth cluster is made of countries with substantially different starting conditions, including quite favourable ones, such as in Belarus and Kazakhstan. By contrast, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan were departing from communism under conditions of large-scale conflicts, such as the civil war in Tajikistan. Moreover, oppositions in these countries were weak or largely undemocratic, such as the national democratic opposition in Tajikistan, which made an alliance with Islamists. Whatever the differences might have been, the countries in this cluster showed that the autocrats coming to power did not stop short of using all means possible in order to guarantee self-preservation in politics. The countries of this cluster opted for strong presidentialism and in most of the cases pursued the ‘state capture’ track of various sorts. Despite some elements of diplomatic manoeuvring, these countries did not exhibit ‘pro-European’ foreign policy orientations.

The sixth cluster consists of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These countries demonstrate how easily Soviet era authoritarianism can be replaced with a post-Soviet authoritarianism that is based on neo-patrimonial practices. This replacement was caused by both an absence of mass demand for change and the metamorphosis of first secretaries of local communist parties into presidents for life with virtually no opposition from either the nomenklatura or the streets. Surprisingly, the case of Tajikistan has set a different pattern. This is probably more evidence in favour of the argument of political strategies and tactics over that of initial structural conditions. It should be noted that hopes for the trouble-free rule of autocrats in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan clash with the growing Islamist challenge, which is still kept under control by means of security. However, the more it is suppressed now, the greater challenge it will pose in the future. Both countries may be regarded as accurate warnings against strong presidentialism gravitating towards neo-patrimonial varieties of sultanism, harshly suppressing the opposition and ‘capturing the state’.

This brief interpretation of six clusters cannot put an end to the debate over the primacy of structural and procedural (actor-oriented) factors in post-communist transformations. Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can be made.

First, the composition of clusters can be attributed to specific ‘proportions’ of certain structural and procedural factors. Each cluster has its own specific set of factors and patterns of interactions leading to an observable result.

Second, it can be argued based on the analysis of ‘anomalies’ that there are no automatic effects of favourable or unfavourable structural factors outside the context of actions undertaken by political actors. To put it differently, due to certain political strategies, democracy can take root in spite of poverty, cleavages, etc. However, the opposite situation is also possible.

Third, the following procedural, policy-related factors leading to democratic outcomes can be identified on the basis of qualitative comparative analysis of the abovementioned cases: (a) existence of pressure on the ‘old regime’ (more specifically, pressure ‘from below’, for example, in the form of mass demonstrations; it is preferable that this pressure
holds out after the collapse of the ‘old regime’ in order to discipline reformers); (b) actions of the ‘old regime’ (no non-reflexive attempts to save the situation at all costs; instead, willingness to negotiate and to allow round tables with those who challenges their authority); (c) the origin of reformers and how they came to power (distribution of power resources at the initial stage of transformation; a split in the ruling party and the emergence of reformers from the ranks of the ruling party who are ready to carry on a dialogue with those who challenge the ‘old regime’; the rate at which the opposition with no relation to the ‘old regime’ comes to power and, in general, rotation of politicians in the executive and legislative branches); (d) the specifics of the opposition (organized with an integral political program) and its program (the key factor here is the dominance of democratic principles over nationalist or religious objectives, otherwise a democratic project is doomed); (e) institutional design (a definite choice of parliamentary arrangements and strong consecutive limits of presidential power is conducive to the consolidation of democracy); (f) the presence of an external reference point taking a democratic shape and various forms of assistance form democratic states.

**Results of Testing Hypothesis 2**

Empirically observed differences in the capability of post-communist countries to provide external security, domestic order, legitimacy, administrative capacity, and conditions for development allows us to group them into three types of stateness, which, for lack of more precise terminology, are, for the time being, referred to as (a) full, (b) thin, and (c) average.

The full (or plump) type of stateness is characteristic of those post-communist countries that, in the course of transformation processes, succeeded both in meeting obligations ascribed to a modern social state and in expanding the volume of these obligations. These achievements have been partially due to favourable socio-economic conditions but above all have resulted from the policy choices made by key political actors. The idea of ‘fullness’ of stateness has nothing to do with ‘state power’, ‘international influence’, and so forth. Instead, it is understood as the ability of a state to execute its functions towards both an individual citizen and society in general.

The group of post-communist countries aspiring to ‘full stateness’ consists of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, etc. These countries aim towards (a) ensuring international security with the help of international institutions (with NATO, above all); (b) ensuring internal order, understood in terms of Rechtsstaat in the absence of grave threats; (c) maintaining necessary social conditions for the legitimacy of the state and political regime; (d) ensuring the quality of institutions and administration; and (e) creating a complex environment for the development of human capital, innovations, and entrepreneurship. Yet, there is some dissimilarity in this group. We can see a stable subgroup of countries with relatively flat dynamics of stateness, consisting of Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Poland. This contrasts with a subgroup of countries with an intense expansion of stateness in different directions over the past two decades, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. Croatia is aiming to join this subgroup. Indeed, Croatia is an example of a dramatic breakthrough to a high degree of stateness taking place almost simultaneously with a breakthrough to democracy.
It is necessary to reiterate that the countries aspiring to ‘full stateness’, as we conceptualize it, are moving in a democratic direction. However, there is an anomaly within this group that has to do with an absence of favourable structural conditions represented by Moldova. This country has a very weak and one-sided (thin) stateness, but has, nevertheless, demonstrated a potential for democratic development.

The second type of stateness stands in contrast to the first one. We call it thin. This type of stateness is characteristic of post-communist countries that initially had relatively limited socio-economic and other resources for develop and maintain all the necessary functions of modern stateness. However, the decisive factor here has had to do with political decisions and actions, rather than initial conditions. Some of the countries in this group managed to ensure internal order by employing all possible means, including force and violence. The peculiar condition of stateness for others in this group has resulted from the involvement of external actors. Internal evolution can also be seen as a factor of thin stateness here. These countries have different types and levels of legitimacy and capacity to provide conditions for the complex development of human capital, innovations, and entrepreneurship. In most cases we see unbalanced expansion and, figuratively speaking, fluctuating stateness, especially when unfavourable conditions of territorial disputes, poor quality of institutions, and limited resources for development are involved. This is typical of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, for example.

The third type of stateness – average – is characteristic of Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Mongolia. These are very different countries facing various internal and external challenges and following dissimilar transformation trajectories. The elites in these countries choose utterly different political strategies (a comparison of Belarus and Mongolia is particularly eye-opening, to say the least). Yet they are all brought together into one group by having an ‘average’ level of stateness, understood as the extent and specifics of performing basic functions required from a modern social state.

The analytical tools we use allow us to distinguish between five types of stateness dynamics (see Appendix 4):

1. Uniform expansion of plump stateness (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland).
2. Explosive expansion of average stateness (Croatia).
3. Sharp reduction of average stateness (Kyrgyzstan).
4. Minimal dynamics of average stateness (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russia, and Ukraine).
5. Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of thin stateness (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova).

A uniform expansion of full stateness is typical of successful countries that departed from communism in a relatively smooth way and have been able to build socially oriented states to ensure that their citizens are enjoying external security, internal order, legitimate government, government’s efficient administrative capacity, and a potential for further development.

An explosive expansion of average stateness is distinctive of Croatia. This country provides an example of dramatic expansion of stateness in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, due to a combination of internal change and external pressure.4
A sharp reduction of average stateness is distinctive of Kyrgyzstan. This is the only country studied in which internal conflicts lead to the overall reduction of stateness’ scope, accompanied by a general weakening of all state functions.

A minimal dynamics of average stateness is characteristic of countries with substantially different initial structural conditions, political strategies employed by key political actors, and outcomes of development in the past two decades. However, in terms of performing basic governmental functions, their dynamics of stateness demonstrate similarities.

An extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of thin stateness is typical of countries with substantial differences compared to those of the previous type. However, they all share the same levels of thin stateness and patterns of uneven expansion due primarily to a reactionary approach to various crises and threats.

Turning back to one of our research questions and to a corresponding hypothesis on the relationship between the types and dynamics of stateness and trajectories of regime transformation, we believe that the essential elements of this relationship are obvious and significant, although we are not yet able to give them a detailed theoretical justification at this stage of research.

First, as shown by our empirical analysis, democracy corresponds to full stateness and has little in common with the categories of ‘strength’, ‘power’, and ‘influence’. A high degree of external sovereignty is desirable, but, strictly speaking, not necessary for democracy. Trajectories of democratization, as a rule, correspond to the expansion of stateness. Yet several anomalies exist here, including Mongolia and, above all, Moldova. These countries were indicated as anomalies when we analysed factors of regime change.

Second, it is evident that, in general, a thin type of stateness is not typical of a democracy or a democratic trajectory of regime change, with Moldova serving as an exception. One of the explanations here is that it is easier for autocrats to rule under conditions of socio-economic deficits and poor institutional quality (see Gandhi, 2008; Charron & Lapuente, 2010; Frantz & Ezrow, 2011). An alternative explanation suggests that autocrats are different and that they rule under varying structural and political conditions, meaning that they do not choose the same policies, even under similar conditions. Countries with a thin type of stateness demonstrate uneven (one-sided) dynamics, primarily in the areas of external security and domestic order.

Finally, not only the ‘anomalies’ discussed above, but our other cases as well, may call for caution dealing with the notorious problem of ‘sequencing’: at least in the post-communist world stateness in terms of fulfilling basic social functions may be strengthened along with the development of democratic institutions and procedures.

Conclusions and Desiderata

The qualitative and quantitative analysis undertaken in this paper supports both of our hypotheses. Peculiarities of the trajectories of post-communist transformations, aggregated into six distinct clusters and analysed above, support the argument that structural factors, be they favourable or unfavourable for democracy, do not predetermine the processes and outcomes of transitions, which in fact depend on the strategic and tactical choices of leading political actors. Structural conditions, however, as our first cluster demonstrates, become indispensable on the path leading towards democratic consolidation.

The analysis carried out in this paper also corroborates our proposition about the relationship existing between transformation trajectories and the types and dynamics of
stanness of post-communist. Plump – in the sense of the volume of the social functions performed by a modern state – and more-or-less evenly expanding stateness corresponds to transformation trajectories leading towards democratization, while thin stateness with a one-sided dynamic, if one exists at all, is typical for transformations leading in non-democratic directions. Democracies do seek to better provide basic social functions for citizens and society, while non-democracies have different priorities.

In our further research we are planning to verify our findings using a larger sample of countries, including not only the classics of the third wave of democratization and the post-communist examples of the fourth wave, but also the Arabic countries of the fifth wave as well. Analysis of such a large-N sample may help us to check our preliminary conclusions and provide new ones.

**Acknowledgements**

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**Notes**

1 With maybe some disagreements regarding sequencing: Should state-building and effective institutions come first, followed by democratization, or should both tracks occur simultaneously, thereby supporting each other?

2 We are fully aware of the problematic nature arising from the concept of ‘post-communist countries’, which embraces those states that have undergone profound transformations over the past two and a half decades and have developed extremely different characteristics. At the moment they demonstrate more differences than similarities. However, we are interested in understanding why and how they have developed these different features after their exit from communism more than two decades ago.

3 Montenegro was excluded from the dataset due to an absence of relevant data for most of the analysed period.

4 We believe that this group should also include Serbia, but this country was left out of the analysis due to statistical limitations.

5 Mongolia still remains an exception in this cluster.

**References**


**Appendix 1. Tables with regression analysis results**

**Table 1.1** Product–moment correlation (R) and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ) between PCADI and other democracy measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy measures</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>0.9705</td>
<td>0.9688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastil’s index</td>
<td>0.9705</td>
<td>0.9785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDS</td>
<td>0.9448</td>
<td>0.9430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economist index</td>
<td>0.9640</td>
<td>0.9467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Number of observations in parentheses.*
### Table 1.2 OLS regressions with structural factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita logged</td>
<td>2.80**</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth rate</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>0.85**</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.39**</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-14.03**</td>
<td>7.91**</td>
<td>-52.23**</td>
<td>9.99**</td>
<td>17.77**</td>
<td>12.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.48)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(14.23)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(2.33)</td>
<td>(27.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01. Bootstrapped (10,000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is PCADI ranging from 0 through 10. Explanatory variables are averaged over 1989–1993.

### Table 1.3 OLS regressions on principal components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st principal component</td>
<td>1.30** (0.33)</td>
<td>1.30** (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd principal component</td>
<td>-0.88 (0.50)</td>
<td>-0.88* (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd principal component</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th principal component</td>
<td>-0.73 (1.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th principal component</td>
<td>-1.44 (1.34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.94** (0.55)</td>
<td>6.94** (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01. Bootstrapped (10,000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is PCADI ranging from 0 through 10. Explanatory variables are principal components extracted from GDP per capita logged, GDP per capita growth rate, life expectancy, infant mortality and Gini Index averaged over 1989–1993.

### Table 1.4 OLS regressions on structural and procedural factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>(12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orientation on Russia</td>
<td>-4.58*** (1.18)</td>
<td>-3.57** (1.33)</td>
<td>-4.46*** (1.03)</td>
<td>-4.59*** (1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State capture in 1990s</td>
<td>-1.06*** (0.24)</td>
<td>-0.72** (0.24)</td>
<td>-0.42 (0.25)</td>
<td>-1.03*** (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita logged</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.31** (0.48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.01 (0.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>10.91*** (0.42)</td>
<td>11.12*** (0.40)</td>
<td>0.55 (4.11)</td>
<td>11.20*** (2.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.86</td>
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</table>

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01. Bootstrapped (10,000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is PCADI ranging from 0 through 10. Infant mortality, GDP per capita logged and Gini Index are averaged over 1989–1993. Orientation on Russia is an expert evaluation and concerns 1989–1993. State capture in 1990s is expert evaluation as well and concerns 1990–1999.
### Table 1.5 Fixed effects models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>(13)</th>
<th>(14)</th>
<th>(15)</th>
<th>(16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>0.34* (0.13)</td>
<td>0.32* (0.15)</td>
<td>0.36* (0.17)</td>
<td>0.26** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index</td>
<td>0.36** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.34** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.34** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.33** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index* * State capture in 1990s</td>
<td>-0.25** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.24** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.26** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.26** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth rate</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita logged</td>
<td>-0.37 (0.64)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2_{within} )</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2_{between} )</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p < .05, **p < .01. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Dependent variable is PCADI ranging from 0 through 10.

### Table 1.6 Multilevel regression models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>(17)</th>
<th>(18)</th>
<th>(19)</th>
<th>(20)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years since 1989</td>
<td>0.13** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.15** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.13** (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth rate</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01* (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index</td>
<td>0.17** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.19** (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation on Russia</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacillations in foreign policy orientation</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Years since 1989) *</td>
<td>-0.22** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.21* (0.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(orientation on Russia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Years since 1989) *</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vacillations in foreign policy orientation)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism with no opposition in power</td>
<td>-1.92</td>
<td>-1.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Years since 1989) *</td>
<td>-0.12** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.11** (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index* * State capture in 1990s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita logged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.20** (0.54)</td>
<td>5.01** (0.42)</td>
<td>2.29** (0.85)</td>
<td>-2.74 (2.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (const)</td>
<td>6.604** (1.987)</td>
<td>3.755** (1.189)</td>
<td>4.066** (1.326)</td>
<td>3.762** (1.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (time)</td>
<td>0.024** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.023** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.023** (0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cov (time, const)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.223* (0.068)</td>
<td>-0.229* (0.087)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (resid)</td>
<td>2.675** (0.181)</td>
<td>1.280** (0.089)</td>
<td>0.816** (0.063)</td>
<td>0.816** (0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p < .05, **p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Appendix 2. Clusters of regime transformation trajectories in post-communist countries

**Figure 2.1** Regime-transformation trajectories of cluster 1 (‘Towards democratic consolidation’)

**Figure 2.2** Regime transformation trajectories of cluster 2 (‘On the road to democracy’)

**Figure 2.3** Regime transformation trajectories of cluster 3 (‘Breakthrough to democracy’)

Figure 2.4 Regime transformation trajectories of cluster 4 (‘Problematic trajectories’)

Figure 2.5 Regime transformation trajectories of cluster 5 (‘On the road to democracy’)

Figure 2.6 Regime transformation trajectories of cluster 5 (‘Consolidated autocracies’)

### Appendix 3.

**Table 3.1** Descriptive statistics for vector index of stateness and its indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators:</th>
<th>External security</th>
<th>Domestic order</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Administrative capacity</th>
<th>Conditions for development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggression on the territory of the country</td>
<td>– 0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial claims</td>
<td>– 0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border disputes</td>
<td>– 0.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist threats</td>
<td>– 0.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>– 0.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigovernment paramilitary groups</td>
<td>– 0.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances of citizens</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrajudicial killings</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in founding constitutional rules</td>
<td></td>
<td>– 0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public consensus on founding constitutional rules</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political prisoners</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of state capture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– 0.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness (WB)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption (WB)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory quality (WB)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditures (% of GDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and development expenditures (% of GDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model fit:**

| % of variance explained | 70.02% | 76.80% | 62.51% | 89.34% | 68.25% |

*Note:* Factor loadings are correlation coefficients between sub-index and correspondent indicators.
Appendix 4. Selected radar-charts of stateness dynamics in post-communist countries

(1) Uniform expansion of ‘plump’ stateness

![Uniform expansion of ‘plump’ stateness (Slovak Republic)](image1)

**Figure 4.1.1** Uniform expansion of ‘plump’ stateness (Slovak Republic)

![Uniform expansion of ‘plump’ stateness (Slovenia)](image2)

**Figure 4.1.2** Uniform expansion of ‘plump’ stateness (Slovenia)
Figure 4.1.3 Uniform expansion of ‘plump’ stateness (Poland)

Figure 4.1.4 Uniform expansion of ‘plump’ stateness (Hungary)
(2) Explosive expansion of ‘average’ stateness

![Figure 4.2.1 Explosive expansion of ‘average’ stateness (Croatia)](image)

(3) Sharp reduction of ‘average’ stateness

![Figure 4.3.1 Sharp reduction of ‘average’ stateness (Kyrgyz Republic)](image)
(4) **Minimal dynamics of ‘average’ stateness**

**Figure 4.4.1** Minimal dynamics of ‘average’ stateness (Russia)

**Figure 4.4.2** Minimal dynamics of ‘average’ stateness (Belarus)
Figure 4.4.3 Minimal dynamics of ‘average’ stateness (Kazakhstan)

Figure 4.4.4 Minimal dynamics of ‘average’ stateness (Mongolia)
(5) Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of ‘thin’ stateness

Figure 4.5.1 Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of ‘thin’ stateness (Azerbaijan)

Figure 4.5.2 Extremely uneven (one-sided) expansion of ‘thin’ stateness (Georgia)