Russian Jews
Between the Reds and the Whites,
1917–1920
JEWISH CULTURE AND CONTEXTS

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Russian Jews
Between the Reds and the Whites,
1917–1920

Oleg Budnitskii
Translated by Timothy J. Portice

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PHILADELPHIA
In memory of my father, Vitaly Danilovich Budnitskii
(1930–1990)
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## Abbreviations

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<thead>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Columbia University</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheka</td>
<td>Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comintern</td>
<td>Communist International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>delo, a file within a fond (archival term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKOPO</td>
<td>Jewish Committee for Assistance to War Victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDRP</td>
<td>Jewish Social Democratic Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evkom</td>
<td>Jewish Commissariat of the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evvoensek</td>
<td>Jewish Section of the Department of International Propaganda of the Political Administration of the People’s War Commissariat of the Ukrainian SSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>fond, document collection (archival term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARF</td>
<td>State Archive of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARO</td>
<td>State Archive of the Rostov oblast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorkom</td>
<td>City Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubkom</td>
<td>Gubernia Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIA</td>
<td>Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l.</td>
<td>page (archival term)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Leeds Russian Archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narkom</td>
<td>People’s Comissar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OESRP</td>
<td>United Jewish Socialist Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGPU</td>
<td>State Political Directorate, successor to the Cheka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>op.</td>
<td>inventory (archival term)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polrevkom</td>
<td>Polish Revolutionary Committee</td>
</tr>
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<td>Revkom</td>
<td>Revolutionary Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGASPI</td>
<td>Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RKP</td>
<td>Russian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERP</td>
<td>Jewish Socialist Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovdep</td>
<td>Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovnarkom</td>
<td>Soviet of People’s Commissars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsevaad</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Jewish Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VChK</td>
<td>All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voenrevkom</td>
<td>Military Revolutionary Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTsIK</td>
<td>All-Russian Central Executive Committee</td>
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<td>YIVO</td>
<td>YIVO Institute for Jewish Research</td>
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Introduction

From 1918 to 1920, Russian Jewry\(^1\) suffered persecution and devastation on a scale that had not been seen since the Khmelnitskii Uprising in the seventeenth century. Of all the tragedies in the annals of Jewish History, only the Holocaust would surpass this period in savagery and wanton murder. To this day, experts still differ as to the total number of Jews who perished in the pogroms, the bloodiest of which took place in Ukraine in 1919 and 1920. Literature on the subject places the total number of victims anywhere in the range of 50,000 to 200,000 killed or mortally wounded.\(^2\) Not included in this number are countless other victims who were robbed, raped, or permanently disfigured.

Perhaps due to the shadow of the Holocaust, the causes, conditions, and consequences of these events have yet to be sufficiently studied. At the same time, a number of scholars have attempted to draw comparisons between the Holocaust and the pogroms that had occurred some twenty years earlier. Avraam Greenbaum, for example, claimed that “in some ways—especially since killings were sometimes carried out as a kind of “national duty” without the usual robbery—they bear comparison with the Holocaust some twenty years later.”\(^3\) David Roskies deemed the mass murder of Jews during the Civil War to be “the Holocaust of Ukrainian Jewry.”\(^4\) Richard Pipes, writing much in the same vein, claimed that “in every respect except for the absence of central organization to direct the slaughter, the pogroms of 1919 were a prelude to and a rehearsal for the Holocaust. The spontaneous lootings and killings left a legacy that two decades later was to lead to the systematic mass murder of Jews at the hands of the Nazis: the deadly identification of Communism with Jewry . . . in view of the role this accusation had in paving the way for the mass destruction of European Jewry, the question of Jewish involvement in Bolshevism is of more than academic interest.”\(^5\)

Though these contributions are valuable, the pogroms of 1918–20 and the role of the “Jewish question” in the larger context of the Civil War have
hardly been examined in the detail they deserve. Still, the goal of the present study is not limited to investigating the tragic events of the pogroms themselves in isolation. Though any study of the period would be remiss to ignore these events, the suffering of the Russian Jewish population was but a part of the larger tragedy of the Russian Revolution and the ensuing Civil War.6

In this tragedy, Jews played the role of both victim and executioner. Like many of the peoples of the former Russian Empire, the Jewish population found itself fragmented into a number of different groups and organizations during this “new time of troubles.” These groups, each having its own worldview and set of priorities, often came into conflict with one another. In the given historical context, it is impossible to talk about the Jews “in general.” Instead, this study will focus on those groups and individuals who were important participants in the political and social development of Russia as a whole, as well as those who participated in the numerous Jewish nationalist movements.

This does not mean that I will be focusing exclusively on prominent politicians and social activists. Jewish privates who served in the Volunteer Army during its Ice March to Kuban, Jewish members of the Red Army, Jewish tailors and accountants who would go on to become Chekists, the “bourgeois” Jews who were persecuted by those very same Chekists, and the large number of Jews who were not involved in any sort of political activity would all come to play vital parts in the historical events of 1918–20, and their stories deserve to be told as well.

Of less concern for my investigation are the “internationalists” who rejected their Jewish heritage, and the Zionists who tried to distance themselves from the political events inside Russia. They will not, however, be completely ignored. Trotsky (who once claimed that the Jews interested him as much as the Bulgarians) will make an appearance, as will a number of Zionists who were unable to stay completely “above the fray” due to varying circumstances (including, on occasion, the Cheka). It is worth bearing in mind throughout that for the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population, the central goal during the Civil War was survival and escape from the violence that was taking place all around them. In this they differed little from the non-Jewish population, who faced similar challenges. It should be noted, however, that surmounting such challenges was particularly difficult for those of Jewish heritage.

I would like to emphasize that this study is concerned not only with Jewish history. It is rather about the history of the Civil War in Russia. At the
same time, writing a full history of the Jewish experience of the Russian Civil War, or examining all aspects of the “Jewish question” during the Russian Civil War, would be an impossible task. I will focus instead on two main themes: Jewish participation in the struggle between the Reds and the Whites, and the role of the “Jewish question” in the internal politics of these central participants of the Civil War.

In order to better understand the events at hand, I will provide a brief summary of the history of the Jews in Russia during the imperial period, paying particular attention to those aspects that would prove to be influential in the years to come. Furthermore, the events of World War I were to play a greater role in the following years for Russia’s Jews than for any other nationality in the former Russian Empire. With this in mind, I will occasionally include details from 1914–17 and earlier historical periods in order to provide a clearer historical context for the events at hand.

Among the numerous topics to be addressed are Jewish participation in the White movement, and the attitude of the Reds and Whites towards Jews in both their internal and external politics; the attempt by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox church to prevent the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine; the pogroms of the Civil War period; the role of Jews in the establishment of the Soviet state; and the role played by Jewish socialist parties in Red Army recruitment, including attempts to create Jewish organizations within the Red Army.

Nearly all of the Jewish political parties, socialists included, severely disapproved of the Bolshevik coup. The Jewish population at large likewise found little good in the Bolsheviks’ program of liquidating private property and religious institutions, and the Red Army was hardly without sin when it came to pogroms against Jews. These stances were to change radically over the course of the Civil War. In this study, I will attempt to show how such a marked change was made possible.

A significant part of the current monograph is dedicated to problems that have thus far remained nearly untouched, such as Jewish participation in the White movement and the Whites’ attitudes towards the “Jewish question.” The very posing of such issues might at first seem surprising, given that the White movement is most often associated with pogroms and antisemitism. An equally persistent stereotype is the notion that Lenin and his associates were generally supportive of the Jewish population. The reality of the situation is much more complicated. The anti-Bolshevik movement in the south of Russia, as I shall attempt to show, received material and financial support
from a number of individuals of Jewish descent, and the Volunteer Army’s political program, at least at the beginning, was decidedly liberal.

As a rule, the White leadership refrained from making antisemitic statements. In fact, on several occasions they would declare their disapproval of antisemitic pogroms. The ideology of the movement was considerably influenced by the Constitutional Democratic Party (the Kadets), which had continually agitated for Jewish equality. Kadets were among the most important members of Denikin’s inner circle, and two Kadets (first N. E. Paramonov and, later, K. N. Sokolov) were put in charge of Denikin’s propaganda efforts. Thus it would seem that the Jewish population would have less to fear from Denikin’s Volunteer Army than from any other anti-Bolshevik force. On a few occasions, Denikin’s forces were even greeted as liberators in Jewish areas they had captured from Bolshevik forces or from Petliura’s army. Tragically, the very same Jews who were the first to welcome the Whites often became the first victims of the ensuing pogroms.

Such bitter contradictions abound in the events of the period. Why, for example, did some politically active Jews support and participate in the White movement at the beginning of the Civil War? Moreover, why did some Jews continue to support the movement even after the Volunteer Army began to carry out pogroms? How did the Whites, who had begun the conflict with liberal political slogans, turn into a band of pogromists? What role was played by the liberal members of the Russian intelligentsia (the Kadets in particular), who had always stood for Jewish equality, but who in supporting the White movement tacitly approved of antisemitism? And finally, was there any real choice between the Reds and the Whites for Russia’s Jews? Or to put the same question in a slightly different fashion, what was the “correct” course of action for Jews to take in a country that had been torn asunder by internal contradictions, a place where Jews were an undesired and unwanted minority?

In order to find answers to these questions we must refrain from looking at Jews as victims only; Jews were active participants in the political processes taking places on both sides of the front. It is also necessary to examine how the leadership on both sides related to the “Jewish question” within the context of the Revolution and the Civil War. Finally, the relationship between Jews and the leadership of the Whites must be examined, starting at the very origins of the anti-Bolshevik movement.

Only recently has the possibility of gaining an adequate understanding of the Civil War, particularly in regard to events that concerned the Jewish
population, become truly feasible. This is largely due to two reasons. First of all, researchers now have access to sources and archival materials that were unavailable during the Soviet period. Secondly, it is only now that we are able to reevaluate these events within the larger context of the historical legacy of the twentieth century.
The Jews “arrived” in Russia without having to leave the comfort of their homes. As a result of the three Partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795), the Russian Empire suddenly acquired the largest Jewish population of any country in the world. In the year 1800, 22.8 percent of the world’s Jewish population resided within Russian territory, a number that was to increase throughout the nineteenth century (46.9 percent in 1834, 50.0 percent in 1850, 53.4 percent in 1880) before decreasing in the beginning of the twentieth century (39.0 percent in 1914). The number of Jews in the Russian Empire also continued to grow in absolute numbers. In 1772, Russia’s annexation of the Belarusian territories raised the total of Russian Jews by some 60,000, with the Second and Third Partitions further increasing the number by 500,000, and an additional 300,000 coming under Russian sovereignty after the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw. Other figures put the post-partition Jewish population of the Russian Empire at 800,000.

However, the main cause of the increasing number of Jews within the Russian Empire was population growth. Two consequences of strict adherence to the religious norms of Judaism, which had a profound influence on Jewish family life and standards of hygiene, were high birth rates and low mortality rates. Thus, despite the massive emigration that occurred from 1881 to 1914, in 1914 nearly 5.25 million Jews were living in Russia. However, the Jewish population as a percentage of the total population of the Russian Empire, which had grown from 1.5 percent in 1800 to 4.8 percent in 1880, began to steadily decrease, reaching 3.1 percent in 1914. It is worth noting that these figures are approximate; other sources provide different numbers. Concrete data is only available from 1897 onwards, after the first Russian census was carried out. According to this data, 5,189,400 Jews lived in the Russian Empire.
in 1897, which was approximately 4 percent of Russia’s population and 49 percent of the Jewish population of the world.3

At least at first, the Russian authorities’ relationship towards the Jews was remarkable for its relative tolerance; in 1772 the first official address to the newly-acquired territories stated that those living there, Jews included, were to have the same rights as Russian subjects. It could even be said that most of the Jews in question barely noticed their shifting from one state to another. However, new laws regarding Russia’s newest territories were to bring both benefits and problems for their Jewish populations. As a result of Catherine II’s reforms in the organizational structure of the Empire in 1778, Jews were included in the “trade and industrial” class. In accordance with Catherine’s decree of January 7, 1780, Jews were allowed to register in the merchant class, and were allowed to participate in municipal organizations (such as the ratusha and magistrata) as equals with their Christian compatriots. At the same time, Jews who were not registered as merchants were included among the petty bourgeois (meshchanine), and forced to pay a higher head tax (podushnaia podat’).

From 1785 onwards, the Charter to the Cities (Gramota na prava i vygody gorodam Rossiiskoi Imperii) allowed Jews to register in any of the six categories of urban inhabitants that were allowed to participate in the city Duma: “Whereas people of the Jewish faith, having already entered the Empire as equals according to the edicts of Her Majesty, are in every case to observe the law, established by Her Majesty, that all are to use these rights and privileges according to their call and station, without regard to either faith or nationality.”

Nevertheless, Jews were not always able to take advantage of the rights they were afforded, and they nearly always faced opposition from the local Christian population in general, and from the Polish gentry in particular. Jews were often prevented from participating in elections, and the imperial authorities proved unable to achieve full compliance with the laws they passed down, despite numerous demands that these laws be observed.

The ability to move freely from place to place was one of the most sought-after privileges for citizens of the Russian Empire. For Russia’s Jewish population, this right was also one of the first to be restricted. In this case, the imposition of restrictions resulted from commercial competition between Jewish and Russian merchants in the late eighteenth century. In 1782, the Senate decided to allow merchants living in the newly acquired territories to move from city to city for business purposes. This was no small boon, as they had
earlier forbidden merchants from leaving the towns in which they were registered. Apparently, the author of the law had intended to include only the Belarusian territories in the law, but this was not explicitly stated in the text. Taking advantage of this “loophole,” Jewish merchants began to start businesses within Russia itself, with some registering among the merchant guilds of Moscow and Smolensk. Unused to serious competition, Muscovite merchants were convinced that the Jewish merchants’ bargaining skills could only be achieved through dishonest and fraudulent means. The Christian merchants submitted a complaint to A. A. Prozorovskii, then Governor General of Moscow, claiming that the only possible way for the Jewish merchants to set their prices so low was through the use of contraband, and that the Jews had settled in Moscow illegally.

Prozorovskii forced the Jewish merchants to leave Moscow, leading them to submit a complaint to the authorities in St. Petersburg. “Her Majesty’s Council” rejected their petition, forbidding them to register as merchants except in the Mogilev and Polotsk gubernias (Belarus), the Ekaterinoslav region (namingnichesto) and the Tauride oblast, which had recently been carved out of territories acquired from the Ottoman Empire. The Council’s decision in the matter was approved by Catherine II on December 23, 1791. For all intents and purposes, this decision laid the groundwork for what was eventually to become the Pale of Settlement.

The new territories acquired after the Second and Third Partitions increased the number of areas where Jews were allowed to live. At the same time, the new laws concerning these territories forbid Jews from settling beyond them (i.e., within Russia itself). According to the ukaz of June 13, 1794, Jews were allowed to live in the following territories: the Minsk, Iziaslav (later Volynia), Bratslav (later Podolia), Polotsk, Mogilev, Kiev, Chernigov, and Novgorod-Seversk gubernias, as well as Ekaterinoslav and the Tauride oblasts. In 1795, two newly formed gubernias (Vilna and Grodno) were added. The Pale of Settlement would wax and wane in size over the course of the following century. By the turn of the twentieth century, it would include fifteen gubernias: Bessarabia, Vilna, Vitebsk, Volynia, Grodno, Ekaterinoslav, Kovno, Minsk, Mogilev, Podolia, Poltava, Tauride, Kherson, Chernigov, and Kiev (excluding Kiev proper).

While Western European Jews quickly gained political rights and freedoms from the period of the French Revolution onwards, their Russian counterparts remained “distinct from the native population by their religion and
their own social institutions, and fulfilled a specific economic role that was separate from the one played by the dominant corporations and trade guilds for nearly a hundred years after their “arrival.” Properly speaking, one can only truly conceive of a specifically “Russian” Jewry from the 1870s onwards. Before this point, most of the Empire’s Jews were more “Polish” than “Russian.”

During their time as subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Jews were the bearers of capitalist values. In fact, it was precisely for economic development that they had been “summoned” by the Polish monarchy centuries earlier. Jews occupied positions in management and administration, often completely taking over these tasks from the local gentry. They leased land, estates, and shops, and held monopolies on goods such as salt or spirits. They were also active in other economic spheres, having a large presence in credit markets and trade. Jewish craftsmen had a near monopoly in sectors such as tailoring and shoemaking; some Jews earned their livelihood through agriculture.

In the 1760s, Catherine II attempted to attract Jewish settlers to Novorossiia in order to occupy empty lands, and to increase the paltry numbers of the “Third Estate” in the territories. As potential competitors, it is hardly surprising that the Jews were to come into conflict with their Christian neighbors. However, it should be noted that by the time of the Partitions Jewish economic influence had already significantly diminished from its peak in the Middle Ages. This was especially true in the financial sphere, where they had been unable to compete with monasteries and wealthy landowners. Yet despite this, the Jews’ reputation for being “exploitative” persisted among the general population, particularly among the peasantry.

This stereotype was given further currency by the senator and poet Gavriil Derzhavin, who in 1799 responded to a petition submitted by the Jews of Shklov, who claimed persecution at the hands of one of Catherine II’s former favorites, S. G. Zorich. The following year, Derzhavin went to Belarus in order to investigate the reasons for a famine, and was shocked by the things he saw. The title of his travel notes speaks for itself: “The Opinion of Senator Derzhavin Regarding the Abominable Lack of Bread Due to the Coercive Designs of the Avaricious Jews, and on Their Reorganization and Other Matters.”

The “need” to protect local populations from Jewish “exploitation” became one of the cornerstones of Russian policy towards its new subjects. It quickly became the justification for expelling Jewish populations from certain towns, forbidding freedom of movement, and limiting the number of
professions Jews could enter. Government policy also focused on combating Jewish “fanaticism,” on the one hand, and possible “rehabilitation” on the other. Many considered the “exploitative nature” of the Jews to be a consequence of this “fanaticism,” which largely consisted of the idea that the Jews believed themselves to be a chosen people, and thus despised their non-Jewish neighbors. Equally important was the fear that Jews were not loyal to the local authorities, and that for the Jewish population the religious demands of Judaism were more important than adherence to governmental laws. The “liberal” and “conservative” approaches to the “Jewish question” differed mainly in the fact that liberals preferred to give Jews rights to help speed the assimilation process, while conservatives insisted on Jewish “reform” before any rights were to be granted.

In general, the Russian authorities strove for the full integration of Jews into Russian society. Various individual authorities differed only in the methods they tried to adopt. More liberal initiatives, such as allowing “useful” Jews to live beyond the Pale, and expanding Jewish access to educational institutions (even to the point of providing subsidies) alternated with more conservative ones, such as forced deportations from certain towns, or prohibitions on traditional clothing. Such contradictory tendencies would occasionally appear together in a single law. The struggle against Jewish “fanaticism” reached its peak during the reign of Nicholas I, who in 1827 subjected the Jewish population of the Empire to military conscription (the armed forces were often used as a vehicle to convert subjects to Orthodoxy), and in 1844 established government institutes for Jews whose faculty and administration were completely composed of Christians. Throughout the nineteenth century, numerous commissions and committees dedicated to the “Jewish question” attempted to advance governmental policy. The initiatives undertaken ranged from the reasonable to the absurd. In the end, the state’s attempts to assimilate its Jewish population proved unsuccessful. This fact can be seen in the exceptionally low number of Jews who decided to convert to Christianity, despite the many benefits such a decision offered. Throughout the entire nineteenth century, only 84,500 Jews (or 0.7 percent of the Jewish population) decided to convert to the Christian faith. In this respect at least, the “material” proved too resistant to be shaped to the government’s designs.

This program of assimilation differed from the Jewish experience under Polish rule. Many Jews had decided to go to Poland not only because of the many economic rights offered by the Polish monarchy, but also because of additional guarantees that allowed them to follow their own way of life. Under
the Poles, Jewish cultural and legal institutions were openly tolerated and had official recognition, although the degree of such tolerance varied, and anti-semitism due to religious reasons or economic competition did occur on a regular basis. At the same time, Jews did not integrate themselves into the native populace. They lived in their own neighborhoods, spoke their own language, and wore “traditional” clothing (which was considered to be purely Jewish but had, in fact, been adopted in Poland around the sixteenth century). Men wore beards and side-locks, while women shaved their heads and wore wigs. It would be naïve to think that this “segregation,” if you will, was resulted solely from the attitude of Christians towards their Jewish neighbors, and that Jews were suffering for the lack of day-to-day interaction with their Christian countrymen outside of their business dealings. As Jacob Katz has shown, the ghetto walls were built from both sides. Jews were able to get along without closely interacting with the surrounding local population, and Jewish dietary laws and other restrictions made simple things such as going to visit one’s neighbors problematic. Besides, for most of those living in the shtetl the ongoing debates between the hasidim and mitnagdim were often more engaging and pertinent to their lives than the events taking place in the local Christian community.

The Jewish Enlightenment movement (Haskalah) was not widespread in Russia. Its adherents, the maskilim, were few in number and were forced to rely on official support in their reform efforts. The situation of Russian Jews, whose cultural and social status was often higher than their neighbors, was markedly different from the situation in Germany, where Haskalah had originated. At the turn of the nineteenth century, several maskilim who had been educated in Germany or had traveled extensively abroad propagated the idea of expanding secular education within the Jewish population. In 1800, Dr. I. Frank gave Derzhavin an essay in German entitled “Is it Possible for a Jew to Become a Good and Decent Citizen?” which called for the establishment of secular schools with instruction in German and Hebrew. The Russian maskilim Perets, Notkin, and Nevakhovich also strove to overcome the gulf separating the Jewish and Russian communities. In 1803 Nevakhovich was to publish the first work of Russian-Jewish literature, entitled “Lament of the Daughter of Judah” (Vopl’ dshcheri iudeiskoi).

The patriarch of the Russian Haskalah was I. B. Levinzon, whose book Mission in Israel (Missia v Israile, 1828) proposed a program of education reform, including the teaching of European languages and secular subjects to Jews. Levinzon also called for Russian to replace Yiddish as the language of
everyday communication. Unlike their European counterparts, Russian maskilim did not call for religious reforms to Judaism, nor were they extreme assimilationists. Their works, for the most part, were published in Yiddish. The only place in the Russian Empire where the maskilim experienced any real success in their efforts was Odessa; by the end of the 1820s, they were a major force within the community there. However Odessa, with its multicultural population, economic and cultural possibilities and rather large Jewish population, was an exception to the rule.

Jewish entrepreneurship experienced rapid growth throughout the nineteenth century. The first Russian industrialists and bankers were often either Jews or Old Believers. This fact speaks less to the inherent business acumen or capitalist mentality of either religious minority than to the reality of their persecution. Having been forced to flee persecution on a number of occasions, both groups were capable of quickly switching their professions and could adapt their knowledge and abilities to new economic climates, a skill set that was hard to come by in a country that was still very much in a feudal state. Jews were often able to build their capital through loans, alcohol sales, and trade. These moneylenders, store owners, and businessmen would eventually become titans of industry as bankers, sugar barons, and “kings of the railroads.” Of course, this kind of success happened only to a few. The vast majority of these small-business owners remained impoverished.

By the beginning of the 1830s, Jews owned 149 of the 528 factories in the eight gubernias of the northwestern and southwestern territories of the Empire. At around the same time, Jews controlled 30 percent of the textile industry of Ukraine. As time progressed, several entrepreneurial groups, such as the Brodskiis, Zaitsevs, Galperins, and Balakhovskiis, were to try their hand at the rapidly expanding sugar industry. By relying on technological innovations, the Jewish collectives were quickly able to take over and expand into new markets. A case in point: Israil Brodskii, the patriarch of the “sugar kings” of Odessa, was able to increase his production of lump sugar from 1500 poods in 1856 to 40,000 poods in 1861, an increase of 2700 percent. By 1872, nearly a quarter of the sugar trade was controlled by Jewish companies, with the vast majority concentrated in the Ukraine. The capital for these undertakings, as was often the case for the Russian Jews, was provided by selling liquor licenses. Jewish businessmen were also successful in the flour trade, leatherworking, brewing, tobacco sales, and a number of other spheres of business.

I. S. Aksakov’s claim that nearly all overland trade in the nineteenth century passed through the hands of the Austrian and Russian Jewry was not
far from the truth. By the mid-nineteenth century Jews constituted an overwhelming majority in the Merchant Guilds in nearly all of the gubernias of the Pale of Settlement. These included: Bessarabia (55.6 percent), Chernigov (81 percent), Courland (70 percent), Ekaterinoslav (24 percent, and 37 percent of the First Guild), Grodno (96 percent), Kiev (86 percent), Kovno (75 percent), Minsk (87 percent), Mogilev (76 percent), Podolia (96 percent), Poltava (55 percent), Vilna (51 percent, and 73 percent of the First Guild), Vitebsk (38 percent, 91 percent of the First Guild), and Volynia (96 percent). In the Minsk, Podolia, and Chernigov gubernias the First Merchant Guild was 100 percent Jewish, while in Vitebsk, Volynia, and Grodno the number was higher than 90 percent.29

Jews also had a large presence in the bread and timber trades. In the opinion of one scholar,30 they “led Russia into the international market.” They were responsible for 60 percent of Odessa’s bread exports in 1878, and according to the 1897 Census, for every 1,000 tradesmen in the Northwestern Territories, 886 were Jews. This number rose to 930 out of every 1,000 in the case of grain traders.

Along with Poles, Jews were to dominate the western borders of Russia in the explosion of industrial activity that occurred in the years following the Great Reforms of the 1860s. Alexander II’s reforms gave Russian Jews the chance to break free from the Pale of Settlement, and thus belatedly laid the foundation for the “Russification” of Russia’s Jews. This time around, assimilation was more voluntary than coercive. In 1856, the Emperor ordered that the possibility of greater assimilation be examined, insofar as the “moral attributes of the Jews would make such a thing possible.” In this instance, the “liberal” tendency in official policy proved dominant, with the granting of civil rights preceding “reformation.” Of course, a relatively minor proposal such as allowing members of the Jewish First Guild to leave the Pale (a decision that probably affected only a hundred or so families) proved to be a laborious task for Tsarist bureaucrats, who took three years to decide to grant “Merchants of the First Guild, their families, stewards, and a limited number of servants” freedom of movement.31

A number of additional laws enacted over the following twenty years increased freedom of movement throughout the Empire. On November 27, 1861, Jews with a master’s degree and higher were allowed to leave the Pale of Settlement. From 1865 to 1867 the law was extended to include Jewish doctors with no formal higher education. In 1872, it was further expanded to graduates of the Petersburg Technical Institute, and by 1879 all those with higher
education were allowed to live beyond the Pale, including those who worked in medicine. On June 28, 1865, craftsmen were afforded the same right; and on June 25, 1867, soldiers who had fought during Nicholas’s reign were given the same privilege. Jews were likewise granted the right to enter the civil service, and to participate in local governmental organizations and the new courts.

These reforms quickly led to the establishment of a number of Jewish communities outside of the Pale. The capital, St. Petersburg, attracted a large number of energetic and successful Jewish industrialists, as did a number of other large cities. Hundreds, and then thousands, of Jewish youths flocked to local *gimnaziya*, universities, and institutes. This increased access to education gave numerous Russians the opportunity to succeed in careers that would have previously been closed for them; for Russian Jews there was the added incentive of overcoming the restrictions that they were subject to. A degree also gave them the chance to avoid military service, or at the very least to shorten and lighten their service.

During this same period, Jews began to play a significant role in the financial sphere and in railroad construction. The first Jewish bank outside of the Pale of Settlement, I. E. Gintsburg, was founded in Petersburg in 1859. Previously, Jewish financial institutions had been limited to Warsaw, Odessa, and Berdichev, the last of which had more than eight Jewish-run banks in 1849. Among the most prominent Jewish businessmen of this time were the Poliaakov brothers (finance and railroads), I. Bilokh, the oil magnates Dembo and Kagan, and bankers such as E. Ashkenazi, I. Vavelberg, A. Varshavskii, A. Zak, the Efroiss family, and others.

Odessa served as the cultural capital for Russia’s Jews in the 1860s and early 1870s. The first Jewish periodicals, such as the Hebrew-language weeklies *Kha-melits* (*Advocate*) and *Khashakhar* (*Dawn*), the Yiddish *Kol-mevasser* (*Voice of the Herald*) (1862–71, edited by A. Tsederbaum), and the Russian-language *Rassvet* (*Dawn*), *Sion* (1861–62) and *Den’* (*The Day*, 1869–71), were all published there. However, Petersburg would soon replace Odessa as Russia’s “Jewish capital.” From 1860 to 1910, twenty-one of the thirty-nine Russian-language Jewish journals and newspapers were published in Petersburg, compared to only seven in Odessa and three in Vilna. Among these were the weekly *Rassvet* (*Dawn*, 1879–83) and the monthly *Voskhod* (*Sunrise*). As early as the 1850s, Petersburg was also to serve as the center of Jewish politics, where the *shtadlanut*, the representatives to the government, were located. Among the most prominent of these were members of the Gintsburg family,
who had been given the title of baron by the Duke Gessen-Darshtadtskii. The founder of this dynasty was Evzel Gintsburg, and his son Goratsii followed in his footsteps.\textsuperscript{37}

The Russian government was determined to expand the number of Russian Jews studying in secular schools and universities. In 1863, the government set aside 24,000 rubles in subsidies for Jewish students, which were funded by taxes levied on Jews. The educational reforms of 1864 allowed children of “all social status and faiths” to pursue education, which greatly increased the number of Jews enrolled. In 1865, the number of Jews enrolled in gimnaziums was 990 (3.3 percent of all students), by 1870 the number was 2045 (5.6 percent), and in 1880 the number reached 7004 (12 percent). In certain areas, such as Odessa and Vilna educational districts, the proportion was naturally much higher. The number of Jews enrolled in universities was 129 (3.2 percent) in 1865, while in 1881 it had grown to 783 (8.8 percent). The rapid growth in numbers led the government to discontinue the stipend program in 1875.\textsuperscript{38}

Although the Russian government was concerned with economic growth, it also sought to limit the role of foreigners and non-Russians in the domestic economy. The reforms of the 1860s, though they gave all subjects of the Empire the right to pursue education, simultaneously forbid Jewish merchants from registering in guilds outside of the Pale of Settlement.\textsuperscript{39}

This dual approach to policy can be observed in the laws passed regarding the formation of corporations. A series of laws passed in the 1870s and 1880s had the professed goal of “limiting the ownership of land in certain locations and in certain spheres of industry from invasive elements.” Among the “invasive elements” were foreign subjects, Poles, and Jews. In the 1860s, both Poles and Jews were forbidden from owning land in certain areas, such as the Vilna and Kiev gubernias. In 1872, in order to ensure compliance with these same laws, sugar producers were forbidden from owning more than 200 desiatins of land in the southwest territories.\textsuperscript{40} If a corporation had already succeeded in acquiring additional land, then the stock would have to be held in the individual’s own name, and stockholders could not be from amongst the “undesirable elements.” May 22, 1880 saw the passage of a law that forbade Jews from obtaining land in the Don Cossack Oblast (Voiiska Donskogo Oblast), which was intended to ensure that Jews would not occupy the territory that had been transferred from the Pale of Settlement to the jurisdiction of the Don Cossacks. On May 3, 1882, Jews were forbidden from acquiring or managing properties outside of urban areas. By all appearances,
many tried to circumvent the prohibition, which eventually led to Government officials demanding in May of 1892 that corporations owning land in rural areas within the Pale of Settlement refrain from allowing Jews to control or manage such properties. And these were hardly the only discriminatory laws.\footnote{41}

Jews also played an important role in the economic and social life of Kiev, and formed a significant portion of the Kiev stock market committee by the end of the nineteenth century. On the initiative of the sugar magnate Lazar Brodskii and his brother Lev, a group of university professors, engineers, and industrialists met with the goal of establishing a polytechnical institute in Kiev. At the time, the quickly developing industrial sphere was facing a dearth of technical specialists. The campaign resulted in the founding of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute in honor of Alexander II, with half of the funds coming from government sources, while the other half was collected by Brodskii and the Ukrainian sugar magnate N. A. Tereshchenko.\footnote{42}

Even in Moscow, the citadel of the Old Believer merchants who were often hostile to “foreign” competition, there were 129 Jewish merchants registered in the First Guild out of 740 members (of which 436 were Russian, 92 of foreign citizenship, and 87 belonged to other ethnic groups). The number of Jewish merchants in Moscow would continue to grow, although many registered as merchants only in order to escape the Pale of Settlement and to gain access to other privileges. By 1911, there were 159 Jewish merchants registered in Moscow’s First Guild, of which approximately 35 had registered “for the title.”\footnote{43}

In the late 1870s and early 1880s, the government seemed determined to continue its mission of “emancipating” the Jewish population. The Minister of Internal Affairs, L. S. Makov, sent a circular to all Governors General on April 3, 1880, stating that Jews who had illegally settled in areas closed to them were not to be forcibly removed. In what was a common pattern for the period, another, secret circular was sent three days later regarding the investigation of P. A. Cherevin, who was charged with the task of examining the activities of the mythological “cosmopolitan Jewish kahal.” The circular stated, “the head of the Third Bureau of his Imperial Majesty informed us that according to information received, nearly all of the Jewish capitalists have joined this organization, which pursues goals that are quite harmful to the Christian population, that they contribute large and small sums to the kahal’s organization, and that they even show material support to revolutionary parties.”\footnote{44} The circular had little weight or authority behind it, though it
is of some historical interest. Its author was a member of the inner circle of the future Alexander III, and it is thus indicative of the mentality of a certain part of the upper echelons of the Russian bureaucracy.

The year 1881 marked a watershed in the history of the Russian Jewry. After the assassination of Alexander II in March of 1881, pogroms began in the south and southwestern regions of the Empire and continued with occasional interruptions until 1884. Pogroms against the Jews had occurred earlier in Russia’s history, but they had often resulted from economic competition between the Jews and Greeks in Odessa, and had been limited to that area. The government took a series of measures aimed at stopping the pogroms, but eventually laid responsibility at the feet of the Russian Jews themselves, claiming the riots to be a result of the “abnormal relations between the native populace and the Jewish population of certain gubernias” (i.e., as a result of the Jews’ “exploitation” of the native populace). The Conservative and Slavophile press (as well as certain official publications) either welcomed or sought to justify the pogroms. Populist revolutionaries even attempted to use the pogroms as a means to instigate a revolt.

On May 3, 1882, the Russian government enacted the “Temporary Laws Regarding Jews,” which introduced a number of restrictions, as well as measures aimed at preventing further pogroms. For all intents and purposes, the Jewish population were accused of provoking the pogroms through their “exploitation” of the Christian population. At the same time, it should be noted that the government actually did want the pogroms to come to an end, fearing that the pogroms would not be limited to the Jewish population. According to the new measures, Jews were forbidden to live outside of urban areas, and prohibited from owning or leasing land. It should also be noted that these restrictions were largely not enforced in the first half of the 1880s, mainly due to opposition from the Ministry of Finance.

In 1887, the Ministry of Education, with I. D. Delianov at its head, introduced quotas on the number of Jews allowed to enroll at educational institutes (10 percent within the Pale, 5 percent outside of the Pale, and 3 percent in the capitals). Enforcement of these quotas was mostly left to the discretion of the administration of the institution in question. In addition, soon after Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich was appointed to the post of Governor General of Moscow in the beginning of 1891, laws were enacted demanding the forced deportation of Jewish craftsmen and veterans from the time of Nicholas’s reign from Moscow and the surrounding areas. In the years 1891–92 nearly 20,000 Jews were forced to leave.
Jews responded to this crisis by leaving Russia. For the next thirty years, large numbers of Jews emigrated; between 1881 and 1914, \( 1.98 \) million Jews left the Empire, with \( 1.5 \) million heading for the United States. A small number emigrated to Palestine; other destinations included Argentina, Europe, and South Africa. The government was in favor of emigration, which it viewed as a way to solve the “Jewish question.” The Minister of Internal Affairs, N. P. Ignatiev, declared in January of 1882 that “the western border of Russia was open for the Jews [to leave].” K. P. Pobedonostsev foresaw the following resolution to the “Jewish question”: “One third of them will die out, another third will emigrate, and the remainder shall dissolve into the surrounding population.” Jews who left Russia were forbidden from ever returning.

Nathans has recently called attention to the use of the term *crisis* in historical studies of Eastern European Jewry. “If such a large number of historical events are interpreted as ‘crises’, then the term begins to acquire static properties which then lose their multi-faceted relationship to other dimensions of historical experience.” Theoretically, such a formulation is certainly correct, but it is equally correct, in my opinion, that from 1881 onwards the Russian Jewish population had truly reached a stage of crisis. Ten years after the pogroms of the 1880s, Jews were deported from Moscow, and the Kishinev pogrom would take place soon after, in 1903. These events affected the entire Jewish population of the Russian Empire, first and foremost psychologically. The ensuing revolution of 1905, and the European crisis from 1914 to 1921, would lead to a fundamental shift in the fate of Jews living within the Russian Empire.

One objective indicator of the severity of the conditions for Russian Jews was emigration. In 1904, 77,500 Jews emigrated to the United States, 30,000 more than in the previous year. This increase would continue (in 1905, 92,400 would emigrate; in 1906, 125,200; in 1907, 114,900), decreasing only after 1907. During the period 1903–7, 482,000 Jews would emigrate to the United States at an average of 96,400 per year, the highest number for any period to that point in the history of the Jews in Russia. Immigration to the United States would spike again in 1914 (102,600) with many leaving to avoid military service or to escape the growing threat of military conflict.

The pogroms led to a renewed interest in emigration to Palestine. One such response to the pogroms was the formation of Hovevei Zion, which was led by Leon Pinsker. A doctor from Odessa and a social activist, Pinsker published a German-language pamphlet entitled “Auto-emancipation,” which
examined the living conditions of Jews in the diaspora. He reached the conclusion that assimilation, which he had previously supported, was impossible, and that the only possible solution for the Jewish people was the acquisition of their own territory. In 1882, a group of youths in Kharkov created the organization Bilu, which was dedicated to resettling Jews in the Promised Land. The first group of Bilu members reached Palestine in 1882. A second group, which attempted to secure rights for Jews from the Ottoman government, arrived in Palestine in 1884. Difficult physical labor and conflicts with their Jewish supervisors led several members to return to Russia, and the movement gradually petered out. At an 1884 meeting of Hovevei Zion groups in Katowice, Pinsker called for the Jews to return to Palestine and to focus on farming and agriculture, anticipating the kibbutz movement. In 1890, the Society for the Assistance of Jewish Farmers and Craftsmen in Palestine and Syria was founded.

The first Zionist Congress took place in Basel in 1897. One third (66 of 197) of the delegates came from Russia. There were 373 Zionist organizations in Russia in 1897; by 1903–4 the number had risen to 1572. Russian Jews actively participated in the Zionist movement, whose leaders included: Ia. Bernshtein-Kogan, M. Usyshkin, V. Temkin, M. Mandelshtam, L. Motskin, I. Chlenov, H. Syrkin, B. Borokhov, V. Zhabotinskii, and others. The scale of participation on the part of Russian Jews is evident in the fact that when the Jewish Colonial Bank was established in accordance with the Second Zionist Congress in London, with 200,000 shares priced at one pound sterling (ten gold rubles) a share, 75 percent of the shares were bought by Russian Zionists. In 1897 the Odessa Zionist organization alone had 7,500 members. Russian authorities tolerated the activity of Zionist organizations at first, as they served the interests of the State. However, as it became clear that relocation to Palestine would not happen any time soon, Zionists began to agitate for the improvement of living conditions for Jews in the here and now. Five Zionists were elected to the first State Duma. At a conference of Russian Zionists in Helsingfors in November 1906, I. Grinberg, acknowledging the crisis in the Zionist movement, expressed his reluctance to fight for Jewish rights within Russia. But, at Zhabotinskii’s instigation, a platform was passed that called for democratic reforms within the country, including the guarantee of civil liberties and status as a recognized minority, as well as the right for Jews to observe the Sabbath and use their native languages. This transformation of the Zionist movement into a liberal-democratic political party soon led the Senate to repeal their legal status. As a result of government
persecution and the general decrease in democratic activity following 1907, by 1915 there were only 18,000 active Zionists in Russia.\textsuperscript{37}

According to the 1897 Census, there were 5,215,805 Jews living in Russia. Of these, 1,965,852 (38.65 percent) were involved in trade, while 1,793,937 (35.43 percent) were in industry. Next in number were the 334,827 in the service industries (6.61 percent), 278,095 individuals who did not declare a profession (5.49 percent), and 264,683 in the civil service or “free” professions (5.22 percent), followed by 201,027 in transportation (3.98 percent) and 179,400 in agriculture (3.55 percent).

By comparison, 76.5 percent of Russians were in agriculture, as were 62.9 percent of all Poles. In industry the numbers were 10 percent and 14.1 percent, respectively; 2.2 percent of Russians, 1.7 percent of all Poles, and 75 percent of the Armenian population were involved in trade professions; and 1.7 percent of Russians and 2.5 percent of Poles were in the civil service or “free professions.”\textsuperscript{58}

On the whole, Jews tended to live in urban areas. They composed a majority of the urban population in eight gubernias (Minsk, Grodno, Mogilev, Vitebsk, and Volynia, as well as three from the former Polish territories). In six additional gubernias, Jews were the largest ethnic group among city-dwellers. In the Kherson gubernia, Jews composed 28.4 percent of the urban population, and 25.9 percent of the urban population of Ekaterinoslav. By 1910, nine cities (Warsaw, Odessa, Lodz, Vilna, Ekaterinoslav, Kishinev, Berdichev, Bialystok, and Kiev) had a Jewish population over 50,000. The largest Jewish population was in Warsaw (310,000), followed by Odessa (172,608), while the smallest of these populations, in Kiev, numbered 51,000. Together, these cities contained nearly a million Jews, or one-fifth of the entire Jewish population of the Empire. Fifteen other cities had populations between 25,000 and 50,000, for a total of 500,000.\textsuperscript{59} From 1897 to 1910 the Jewish urban population grew by nearly a million people (38.5 percent), totaling 3,545,418 by 1910. In 1910 there were 229 towns and cities with a Jewish population above 10,000. Within the Pale of Settlement, the number of Jewish communities with a population greater than 5,000 people grew from 130 in 1897 to 180 in 1910 (communities with more than 10,000 people grew from 43 to 76).\textsuperscript{60}

The number of Jewish “settlements” beyond the Pale was insignificant in comparison with the number of Jews living within it. However, the rate of growth of these populations was higher than in the Pale; Jews were more concentrated in the larger cities, and material and educational conditions were better, a result of the government’s program of “voluntary integration.” In 1897, 43,000 Jews lived in cities whose populations were greater than 100,000
(Petrograd, Moscow, Nizhni Novgorod, Tula, Samara, Kursk, Tblisi, Taganrog). By 1910 these populations had doubled to approximately 75,000–80,000 individuals. These, in the words of Ia. Leshchinskii, were the main points of concentration of “the Jewish bourgeoisie and professional intelligentsia.”

There were a significant number of Jewish craftsmen in these cities who enjoyed a higher standard of living than their counterparts in the Pale. There were Jews living outside of these cities as well; Jews comprised 7.2 percent of the population of Rostov-on-Don in 1914 (about 16,000 individuals).

Life within the Pale was more traditional than outside of it, though the rapid modernization of cities within the Pale left little chance of preserving traditional ways of life, irrespective of religious beliefs. As Leshchinskii described the situation, “The Jewish communities of Odessa and Ekaterinoslav consisted of large numbers of Jews who had broken with the traditional patriarchal Jewish way of life, and quickly adopted both the good and bad aspects of urban civilization. Among them one can see marked contrasts, with fully assimilated Jewish bourgeois living side-by-side with the impoverished Jewish proletariat.”

The Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century resulted in the financial ruin of many Jewish craftsmen, leading many of them to emigrate abroad. The “proletarianization” of the Jewish populace had reached a grand scale by the outbreak of World War I. According to Leshchinskii, 600,000 Jews (30 percent of the working population) had become part of the proletariat by the beginning of the war. Half of these were workers and apprentices in workshops, while 75,000 worked in factories, mostly concentrated in the Polish territories, in cities such as Warsaw, Bialystok and Lodz. An additional 110,000 Jews were employed as porters, longshoremen, and in similar professions.

By the end of the nineteenth century, 39.7 percent of those engaged in commerce in Russia were Jewish (72.8 percent in the Pale of Settlement). They owned mostly small-scale enterprises, and the profits of the Jewish “merchant class” were often barely enough to make ends meet. Löwe claims that Jews suffered as a result of industrialization, perhaps more than any other ethnic group in Russia, as they were deprived of those advantages they had earlier enjoyed. In his view, the stereotype of the Jews as the “spearhead” of capitalism (as Russian conservatives often viewed them) was more an ideological construct than a reflection of reality.

Both industrialization and rapid population growth hit Jewish craftsmen (remeslenniki) and traders hard. In the Kursk and Yaroslav gubernias
(where Jews were forbidden to live) there was less than one craftsman per 1,000 inhabitants, whereas there were 2.6 for every 1,000 in the Kiev gubernia. Of these the majority were Jews. At the turn of the century, a craftsman’s income was often less than half that of a peasant (150–300 rubles, as opposed to 400–500 rubles respectively). Many would not survive market conditions and became unemployed, and turned to haunting market squares in the hope of finding work. In some communities, unemployment went as high as 40 percent. In 1898, nearly 20 percent of Jews within the Pale received charitable assistance for Passover. In 1900, nearly two-thirds of Jewish funerals in Odessa were paid for by the community. According to some sources, at the turn of the century 30–35 percent of the Jewish population was unable to make ends meet without relying on assistance from charitable institutions.

By 1914 nearly half of Russia’s 5.6 million Jews belonged to the lower middle class, while another quarter could be considered members of the proletariat, a fact that casts doubt on the conservatives’ claim that Jews served as the “spearhead of capitalism.” At the same time, such a claim did contain a kernel of truth. Of course, it was not the unemployed Jews of the shtetl that conservatives had in mind, but rather other Jews—the successful financiers, wholesale traders, and industrialists. The liberal economist M. V. Bernatskii, who was later to become the Finance Minister of the Provisional Government (and later served in the same capacity for Denikin and Vrangel), would concur with the conservative opinion, though he viewed the situation as a positive one. Taking into account that Jews composed more than a third of the “merchant class,” he wrote, “If we can put aside the ideals of subsistence production and see the successes of our country’s development in trade, we are forced to admit that Jews have played an enormous role in the Russian economy. Enormous, as they are the ones who are making such trade possible.” Bernatskii was also of the opinion that if there were no Jews in Russia, it would be necessary to invite them in, to stimulate trade and industry.

Unfortunately, Bernatskii was in the minority, and the restrictions placed on Jews, motivated by fears of “Jewish domination,” slowed economic development. These fears were completely irrational. Productive citizens (or “subjects”) serve as the foundation of civil order; the fruits of their collective labors decrease poverty; so by extension, the authorities’ ire at their presence should logically also decrease. Yet the authorities, or at least most of them, preferred to have Jews leave the country if they refused to “perish or assimilate,” instead of allowing them to work for the “economic prosperity of Russia,” to use Witte’s formulation. Even as the Ministry of Finance attempted to prove that
“our industry is as yet unable to get by without foreign and Jewish capital,” the Ministry of War, the Ministry of the Interior, and several others, up to and including Nicholas II, were not inclined to repeal the numerous restrictions placed on Jews.69

The Russian government closely followed popular opinion, and derived much of its support from the more conservative portions of society. Those in charge of policy concerning the Jews in Imperial Russia increasingly came from the conservative camp. While liberals considered Jewish “emancipation” to be a component of their main goal of liberating Russian society from backwards absolutism, “patriotic guardians” of various types believed that Jewish activities, be they intellectual or economic in nature, were leading to the impoverishment of the nation and to a perilous break with the spiritual values of the Russian Orthodox state.

The slogan, “The Jew [zhid] is coming!” which appeared on the pages of the newspaper New Times (Novoe Vremia) in 1880,70 could be found, in one form or another, in nearly every conservative or reactionary publication. Thirty years after this phrase graced New Times’s pages, an even worse variant would appear: the “Jewish Invasion.”71 Antisemitism in Russia contained its own peculiar combination of a hatred for Judaism, which was deeply entrenched in Orthodox culture,72 along with the anti-capitalist reaction to modernization, whose main perpetrators, it was claimed, were Jews. Parts of Russia’s intelligentsia were likewise heavily influenced by European antisemitism, particularly of the German variety.73

Turgenev’s Huntsman’s Sketches encapsulate the relationship of “the people” to the Jews, which is based on fundamental religious differences. The protagonist, the landowner Chertokhanov, hears the rumblings and shrieks of a crowd as he is passing through a local village. Someone is being beaten. He asks a local woman about what is taking place:

“The Lord knows, battiushka,” answered the old woman . . . “you can hear that our lads are beating a Yid [zhid].”

“A Yid? What Yid?”

“The Lord knows, battiushka. A Yid appeared among us; and where he’s come from—who knows?”

“So, you see, they’re beating him, sir.”

“Why beating him? What for?”

“I don’t know, battiushka. No doubt, he deserves it. And, indeed, why not beat him? After all, battiushka, he crucified Christ!”74
This story, entitled “The End of Chertopkhanov,” was published in 1872. Thirty years afterward, the economist and journalist M. I. Tugan-Baranovskii was serving his exile in the Poltava gubernia. He discovered that Ukrainian peasants and the local Jews would get along well and would cooperate to their mutual benefit. “Yet despite all this,” he wrote, “the Jew can never be completely sure that this Russian neighbor, whom he lives next to in peace and harmony year in and year out, won’t someday attack him, steal his property, commit foul acts against him, or even possibly kill him . . . He might be an ‘OK Jew’ but . . . from the point of view of the Russian peasant he will always be an outsider and moreover a proponent of a repulsive faith. ‘Did the Jews not crucify our Lord?’ This universal source of antisemitism, consecrated by the passage of centuries, particularly in Russia, cannot help influencing social opinion.”

Tugan-Baranovskii also argued that the basis of Russian antisemitism was not to be found only in the archaic worldview of the peasants, but also in the upper and middle classes and parts of the intelligentsia. He believed that antisemitism was a result of increased nationalism and economic competition; in his opinion, those unable to compete economically with the Jews would often become nationalists and antisemites.

The integration of the Jewish population under the conditions of a growing nationalism (or nationalisms, as the Jews were caught between growing Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish nationalism) only served to strengthen antisemitic tendencies. The Jews were accused of facilitating the development of industry at the expense of agriculture. Witte’s introduction of the gold standard was also blamed on the Jews, as many knew it would lessen the value of agricultural goods. Such a situation, in the opinion of many journalists, would benefit only a small number of bankers and Jews who did not concern themselves with production through labor. New Times attributed the rise of the Bund, the beginnings of the Zionist movement, and increased Jewish interest in Marxism to the notion that the Jews were planning on carving out their own state from Russia. If an earlier revolutionary slogan had been “all lands to the peasants!” then in the current climate Jews were accused of transforming peasants into proletarians, thus freeing up the land for its new owners.

Russian business owners and journalists, particularly in Moscow, were the most fervent in attacking their foreign and non-Christian competitors. For example, the newspaper Russian Review (Russkoe Obozrenie), founded in 1890 by the merchant D. I. Morozov and edited by Prince D. N. Tseretelv, frequently targeted Jews, Poles, and Germans. The paper claimed, among other
things, that Jews considered themselves to be “above the law.” Some of the articles bear an eerie resemblance to the denunciations of later eras.\textsuperscript{77}

Attempts to push Jews out of one or another sphere of social activity could not always be explained by the purely “materialist” concept of competition. The nationalist credo that the Russian land was tied to its people also served as a common theme for radical right-wing journalists, as well as certain government administrators. In 1909 N. P. Muratov, the governor of Tambov, removed S. M. Starikov from his position as head of the local music academy, basing his decision on the belief that “the state of music in Tambov has suffered in the hands of the Jews,” as well as on the more abstract idea that a city “which is truly the center of a Russian gubernia is well deserving of a ‘Russian’ music academy.”\textsuperscript{78}

At the turn of the century, a small but significant portion of the Russian intelligentsia fell under the influence of European racial theory. The famous conservative journalist M. O. Menshikov popularized the racial theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, as well as racist German theoreticians.\textsuperscript{79} Chamberlain’s \textit{The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century}, one of the ideological bases for Nazism, was published in Russia by A. S. Suvorin in five separate editions between 1906 and 1910 under the title \textit{The Jews: Their Origins and the Reasons for Their Influence in Europe (Evrei, ikh proiskhozhdenie i prichiny ikh vliianiia v Evrope)}. The neo-Slavophile S. F. Sharapov criticized “liberal dogma” for its belief that the Jews were as white as the Germans, the English, or the Slavs. In his opinion, the “Jewish question” was not a legal one, but rather a question of race. Right-wing organizations began to renew their demands that even christened Jews should be forbidden from occupying government posts. In 1912, students entering the Military Medical Academy were forced to provide proof that there were no Jews in their family in the past three generations, and those who had Jewish fathers or grandfathers were forbidden from joining the Cadet Corps. These were hardly the only cases of discrimination based on ethnicity, as opposed to religion.\textsuperscript{80}

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Overall, the Jewish population of the Russian Empire was more law-abiding than the population at large. In 1907, 1,441,433 people were convicted of crimes. Of these, 41,677 (2.89 percent) were Jews. There were 93,6 convicted criminals per 100,000 subjects, whereas the number for Jews was 74.3 per 100,000. The
percentage of Jews convicted of political offenses was higher (10.6 percent, or 477 men and 69 women, for a total of 546). This was less than the number of Jews convicted of theft (716, 680 men and 36 women) although as a percentage of the entire population the number convicted was well within the average (4.02 percent). However, Jews were the most likely to be convicted for infractions against the Trade and Credit Code (27.12 percent), although in absolute numbers this only amounted to 32 individuals (24 men and 8 women).81

This is not to say that the Jewish population did not contain its share of criminals, including thieves and murderers (56 men and one woman, or 1.11 percent of all those convicted), and even horse thieves (30 individuals, or 1.45 percent of Russia’s total). From 1903 to 1913, the percentage of Jews convicted of crimes hovered between 3.4 and 3.9 percent, less than the rate of Russians, Poles, Latvians, and Lithuanians. In 1913, the national average was 104 convicted criminals for every 100,000 individuals, whereas the corresponding number for Jews was 97 per 100,000. However, statistics are a relative science, and the relatively high rates of conviction speak more to the effectiveness of judicial and police structures in European Russia as opposed to, say, the Central Asian territories, where conviction rates were much lower (55 per 100,000).82

Dry statistics often contradict widespread stereotypes and myths, one of which is the belief that Odessa was the “criminal capital” of the Russian Empire. In 1913, there were 224 convicts for every 100,000 inhabitants in Odessa, compared with 353 in Baku, 384 in Kazan, and 400 in Nizhnii Novgorod. Before 1917 there were no large-scale criminal organizations in Odessa. The infamous bandit Mishka Iaponchik spent most of the decade preceding the Revolution in prison for his participation in anarchist “expropriations.”83 Even the most famous examples of Odessian banditry were more myth than fact: the prototype for Isaac Babel’s Benia Krik (from his collection of short stories, entitled Odessa Tales) had far less in common with his literary counterpart than military commander S. K. Timoshenko had with his (Savitskii in Babel’s Red Cavalry).

The gulf between the “spearhead” portion of Russian Jewry, who were becoming more and more integrated into Russian society, and their less fortunate fellow Jews was steadily increasing. Soon enough they would literally be speaking different languages. In 1897, 96.9 percent (5,054,300) of all Jews claimed Yiddish as their native language,84 followed by the Russian language (1.28 percent, 67,063), Polish (0.90 percent, 47,060), and German (0.44 percent, 22,782). Less than half (45 percent) of all adult men and only 25 percent of adult women were literate in Russian.85 Though the rate of Russian literacy
among the Jews was lower than that of the German minority living in Russia, it was higher than that of the Russian population. In addition, a majority of Jews living in the Pale of Settlement were conversant in either Ukrainian or Belorussian.86

In St. Petersburg the process of assimilation occurred rapidly. In 1855 there were less than 500 Jews in the capital; by 1910 the number was 35,000. In 1869, Yiddish was the native tongue of 97 percent of St. Petersburg’s Jews, but the number who spoke Russian as their native language was to grow quickly (to 28 percent in 1890, 36 percent in 1900, 42 percent in 1910). Over the same period, the percentage of native Yiddish speakers decreased to approximately 54 percent of the Jewish population.87 The children of the Jewish elite attended Russian schools and universities and began to identify more closely with Russian culture. This did not always entail a break with Jewry. Aleksei Goldeneveizer (son of the lawyer A. S. Goldeneveizer) studied in the First gymnasium of Kiev alongside the future theologian V. N. Ilin and Sergei Trubetskoï (son of the philosopher and journalist), as well as Petlura’s future Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Ia. Shulgin.88 A lawyer like his father, Goldeneveizer took an active role in Jewish politics, and understood the language of the Jewish “street” (though he himself admitted that he didn’t know Yiddish very well).89

In the twenty years between the 1897 census and the 1917 revolution, the cultural dynamics of Russian life were to have a profound effect on Jewish assimilation. Indirect proof of this can be found in the 1926 Soviet census, in which 70.4 percent of Jews considered Yiddish to be their native language, although only 42.5 percent of literate Jews in the Ukraine and 56.4 percent of those in Belarus were literate in Yiddish. Russian had now become the literary language for more than half of the Jewish population. As one might imagine, these changes were even more evident outside of the Pale of Settlement. It is highly unlikely that this shift took place in the ten years preceding the Soviet census.90

Jews played a significant role in Russian literature and literary criticism at the turn of the century, as they did in journalism and publishing.91 They also had a large presence in the legal profession. By 1888, Jews comprised 21 percent of St. Petersburg lawyers, as well as 39 percent of apprentice lawyers.92 Among the “stars” of the legal profession were A. Ia. Passover, G. B. Sliozberg, M. M. Vinaver, O. O. Gruenberg (all in Petersburg), as well as A. S. Goldeneveizer (Kiev) and others.93 However, towards the end of the 1880s the government began to restrict the access of Jews to the legal profession at
the behest of their Christian colleagues. In 1889, the Emperor approved a proposal by then Minister of Justice N. A. Manaseina that allowed Jews to pass the bar only upon explicit approval of the Ministry of Justice, following a recommendation by a committee of other lawyers. On a practical level, this meant that Jews could become full lawyers only in exceptional circumstances. Thus, Vinaver and Gruzenberg, who were well-known in legal circles, were forced to serve as solicitors for 15 and 16 years, respectively. In 1915, quotas were imposed (15 percent in the Warsaw, Vilna, and Odessa okrugs, 10 percent for Petersburg and Kiev and surrounding territories, and 5 percent for all other legal districts).

* * *

Emigration, secular education, and the “proletarianization” of a significant portion of Russia’s Jews all served to weaken the system of traditional Jewish values that had previously gone unchallenged. As a result, Jews were increasingly drawn toward politics. This was particularly true of the younger generation. In 1897, the United Jewish Workers’ Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia (or Bund) was founded at an illegal congress in Vilna. It was both the first social democratic political party in Russia and also the largest Jewish political party. Three Bund members would go on to be founding members of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1898. The Bund opposed Zionism, and although it espoused a class-based ideology, it also agitated for Jewish cultural autonomy, an issue that was to lead to its split with the Social Democrats in 1903, though they reunited in 1906.

The year 1899 saw the formation of several Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion) groups, which attempted to combine socialism with Zionism; followed in 1903 by the founding of Tseirei Zion (Youth of Zion), which pursued a non-Marxist socialist agenda. In January of 1905, a group of Poalei Zionists who were committed to the creation of a Jewish state (in Palestine or elsewhere) founded the Zionist Socialist Workers’ Party, with N. Syrkin at its head. Their more “classical” Zionist counterparts formed the Social Democratic Party Poalei Zion (headed by B. Borokhov) in February of 1906. April of the same year witnessed the founding of the Socialist Jewish Workers Party, headed by Kh. O. Zhitlovskii, which opposed “territorialism” and Zionism. In 1906, the Jewish People’s Party (Folkspartei) united the followers of historian and thinker S. M. Dubnov, who believed that Jews were “one people united in spirit” who must agitate for “wide cultural and communal autonomy.”
Dubnov believed that Zionism was an opiate for the spiritually feeble and was opposed to emigration to Palestine. Finally, that same year also saw the founding of the Jewish People’s Group, with Vinaver at its head. Its membership included most of the Jewish “Kadets.” The members of this group also held anti-Zionist beliefs.26

A number of Jews were also among the leadership of the Russian revolutionary parties, including the Social Democrats (Iu. O. Martov-Tsederbaum, P. B. Aksel’rod, and others), the Social Revolutionaries (G. A. Gershuni, the Gots brothers, and others). Russian anarchism first appeared within the Pale of Settlement (it was centered in Bialystok, Ekaterinoslav, and Odessa) and Jews often constituted a majority in anarchist groups.27 The radicalization of Jewish politics was accompanied by the continued integration of the Jewish population into Russian society.28 Over the previous half-century, a small but growing segment of Russian Jewry had come to consider themselves “Russian keepers of the Torah.” This relatively small, yet influential, group was more educated and prosperous than the general Jewish population, and was deeply involved in the economy and politics of the Empire. For members of this group, Russian culture was as important as Jewish culture; if the Russian language was not their native tongue (though it often was), they at least used it for professional communication. A number of them played significant roles in the development of Russian culture as well. Not all of the members of this group should be considered assimilationists; adopting Russian culture no longer necessarily entailed disowning one’s Jewish heritage or a refusing to participate in issues affecting the Jewish community. Business owners, lawyers, doctors, writers, scientists, and publishers, they believed that liberalization and reforms would allow Jews to live in Russia as well as they did in Western Europe, and they actively collaborated with Russians to that end. They were often just as fervently patriotic as their Russian counterparts.

Government policy toward the Jews at the turn of the twentieth century continued to demonstrate the same lack of consistency as in earlier periods. On the one hand, decisions undertaken by the Senate and favorable rulings by the Ministry of the Interior resulted in a number of restrictions from the “Temporary Laws” being eased or removed during the period 1897–1907. Surprisingly, these rulings had little to do with political orientation, and Prime Ministers of varying political beliefs (Sviatopolk-Mirskii, Stolypin, Plehve) all softened the authorities’ stance towards Jews. Among the restrictions that were lifted were the laws forbidding Jews to live outside of cities and the prohibitions on distilling alcohol.29
However, some restrictions remained, such as those limiting access to education, as well as the laws aimed at keeping Jews out of certain professions. In 1894, seven years after the law imposing quotas on Jews in educational institutions was enacted, Jews still comprised 13.3 percent of all university students (1853 total), while by 1902 the number had dropped to 1250 (7 percent of all students). As a result, many Jewish students went abroad. In 1902 and 1903, between 1,895 and 2,405 Russian Jewish students studied abroad in European institutions (nearly twice the number enrolled in Russia). During the revolutionary years of 1905–1907, the number of Jewish students enrolled in Russia increased to 4,266 (12 percent). Restrictive measures were reinstated soon after, and in 1913 there were 2505 enrolled Jewish students (7.3 percent). In 1915 the government passed an initiative granting educational privileges to those who had served in the war (as well as their children) regardless of faith or ethnic status. This increased the percentage of Jewish students to nearly 8 percent (approximately 2000) of all students enrolled in state universities and institutes in 1916. During the war it was impossible for Jews to study abroad, and studying in private institutes of higher education became the only available option. As the number of Jewish students in private institutions increased, the government considered instituting quotas for Jewish students at private institutions as well. Officials were split into two more or less even camps, and the Emperor eventually decided the matter, siding with those in favor of quotas on May 21, 1916. Given the extreme measures taken in government education policy towards the Jews from the mid-1880s to 1914 one cannot help agreeing with Nathans’ claim that these events were a kind of “silent pogrom.”

In 1886, 9,255 Jewish students were enrolled in gimnaziums. In 1911, the number had increased to 17,538, but the percentage had fallen, from 10.2 percent to 9.1 percent of all students enrolled. The number of university students during the same period increased from 1,856 to 3,602, but in terms of percentage there was a decrease from 14.5 percent to 9.4 percent. Taking into account overall population growth, and the increase in education and numbers of spots for students in universities, it becomes clear that thousands of young people whose parents were unable to pay for their education were prevented from realizing their educational goals. This situation increased the numbers of the “thinking proletariat” that was to produce future revolutionaries.

The beginning of the twentieth century greeted Russian Jews with another wave of pogroms, which were even more bloody than those of years past. Unchecked antisemitic propaganda found fertile ground among a
population whose culture already contained numerous antisemitic aspects. The result was the Kishinev pogrom, which took place during Easter in 1903. The cold-blooded murder of nearly 50 Jews in peacetime shocked both Russian society and the international community at large.¹⁰⁵ This new wave of pogroms was to continue through the years of the 1905 revolution.

Even under the “constitutional monarchy” Jews did not receive full civil rights. According to Russian law, Shmariagu Levin, a Jewish Duma Deputy, did not have the right to live in Petersburg. Attempts to address the issue of Jewish rights met with little success. The persistence of the Pale of Settlement and the numerous restrictions on Jews in this newly “free” country seemed barbaric to Western countries, whose own citizens were not immune from persecution while in Russia. In 1911, the United States government withdrew from its trade agreement with Russia, due to the fact that its citizens of Jewish heritage were subjected to the same restrictions as local Jews.¹⁰⁶

In 1913, an event occurred that seemed to come straight out of the annals of medieval history. Menahem Mendel Beilis, a resident of Kiev, was indicted for the murder of a 13-year-old Ukrainian Christian boy. A number of antisemitic organizations and far-right Duma deputies called for his conviction based on a blood libel accusation that Beilis had engaged in ritual murder, though there was no evidence to support the ludicrous claim. Though he was eventually acquitted, the very possibility of such a show trial speaks volumes as to how the Jewish populace was treated in the last years of the Russian Empire.¹⁰⁷

Despite the numerous restrictions in place, the number of Jews in the Russian elite continued to grow. German, Jewish, and Polish subjects comprised 20 percent, 11 percent, and 11 percent (respectively) of all founders of corporations from 1896 to 1900.¹⁰⁸ The Imperial government, for whom nationalism was a matter of policy, introduced measures aimed at limiting the presence of “foreign” actors in the domestic economy. In 1911, Stolypin instructed the Ministry of Industry to push Jews out of the bread trade. From 1913 to 1914, laws were enacted that prohibited Jews from controlling real estate or serving as directors of corporations.¹⁰⁹ In 1914, the Ministry was shocked to discover that in the Northwestern Territory, only 8 percent of those employed in banks and corporations were Russian, compared to 35 percent Jews, 26 percent Germans, and 19 percent Poles. The Ministry insisted on the imposition of quotas based on ethnicity in order to redress the situation, both in the Northwestern Territories and in the rest of the Empire.¹¹⁰ Despite these measures,
Jews would continue to comprise approximately 20 percent of the “business elite” in Russia.\textsuperscript{111}

As we can see, during these three decades government policy towards the Jews was more concerned with the placing of restrictions than with any kind of “emancipation,” even though the government considered the latter its official policy and would occasionally take steps in that direction. According to Klier, Jews were persecuted because of their connection to the “Polish question.” His claim rests on the notion that the government considered Jews to be in league with the Poles due to their close economic ties, and, as the latter presented a threat to the Empire as a whole, both groups were subjected to discrimination. The result was that Russia’s Jews, who could have become “obedient” subjects much like the Jews of Austria-Hungary of Germany, were instead pushed towards the opposition, eventually joining liberal or revolutionary movements in accordance with their social position or temperament.\textsuperscript{112}

Even if the government initially associated the Jews and the Poles, the situation had changed drastically by the outbreak of the First World War. Soon after the beginning of the war, Nicholas’s manifesto to the Poles promised the creation of a Polish state, whereas Jews were automatically considered to be potential traitors.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, only two countries (Russia and Romania) had placed legal restrictions upon their Jewish citizens. Of course, Russia had no monopoly on antisemitism, which had been growing in other countries such as France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the first pogrom of the twentieth century was to occur in Russia. The Kishinev tragedy, which took place during a time of peace under the delinquent watch of a negligent government, exposed Russia’s treatment of its Jews to the world, as did the show trial of Mendel Beilis. While the latter was not the only antisemitic show trial of the era to gain notoriety, it is worth remembering that the Alfred Dreyfus case involved an accusation of espionage, not ritual murder. And although Dreyfus was convicted, he was eventually pardoned. Beilis, however, was exonerated by the jury on the basis that he had not killed the boy in question. This did not mean that the Russian population at large did not believe the accusations against the Jews.

One can only guess as to what course the Jews of the Russian Empire would have taken had the Russian Empire continued its existence. Given the rate of emigration, it is quite possible that the Jews would have largely abandoned the country. On the other hand, it is also possible that “voluntary integration” would have eventually succeeded, and the Russian Jews could have
come to resemble their French and German counterparts as “Russian keepers of the Torah.” Yet such thoughts are outside of the realm of history, existing only in the kingdom of hypothetical speculation.

The World War—which at the time nobody thought to call “the first”—did take place. It is highly unlikely that in the patriotic furor of August 1914 (or, in the Russian context, July, according to the Gregorian calendar still used at the time) anybody could have considered the possibility that the three-hundred-year history of the Romanov Empire was drawing to a close, that it had only three years to live. And it seemed just as impossible that the man in charge of negotiating the peace, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Republic (called “the people’s commissar” according to the French tradition), would turn out to be a certain Lev Trotsky, a former exile and a Jew.
Soon after the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881, the famous Russian historian and conservative journalist Dmitrii Ilovaiskii wrote in Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti (The St. Petersburg News): “Now that the body of the martyred Tsar has been given to the earth, we, the Russians, must first and foremost fulfill our holy duty to seek out the very sources of that dark force that has taken him from Russia.” Ilovaiskii expressed the conviction that Russian “nihilists and socialists” were merely “a crude, often unconscious weapon,” that they had been led to commit the crime not so much by the “enemies of proprietorship and civil order” as by the “internal and external enemies of the Russian State, and of Russian Nationalism.”

According to Ilovaiskii, Great Russians (Velikorossy), comprising a kind of “Panurgic herd” in this “underground gang,” were the only ethnic group that did not have nationalistic motives. “The Karakozovs, Solovievs, and Ryssakovs are precisely those crude unintelligent weapons that were caught up in a web of social propaganda. They themselves did not know for what goals or deeds they were serving as weapons.” Among the internal enemies of Russia, Ilovaiskii listed the Poles first. “The second element,” wrote the author of scores of enduring editions of school textbooks, “is clearly visible and even patently obvious, namely, Jewish revolutionaries. They have come forth as quite possibly the most active element in the recent actions, murders, attacks, and university disturbances.”

If Ilovaiskii, who was one of the first to succinctly formulate the “foreign” (inorodcheskii) character of the Russian revolution, gave Jews “only” second place among the threats to Russia, this would indicate that the Jews were not yet playing a leading role in the liberation movement. At the very
least, Jews did not yet personify the central, active force of the Russian revolution in Russian public opinion, even in its “blackest” variants.²

Two decades later, this situation had changed markedly. In 1903, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sergei Iulevich Witte, remarked to Theodor Herzl that Jews comprised nearly half of the membership of revolutionary parties, even though they were only six million people in a nation of a 136 million.³ If Witte exaggerated, he did so only slightly.

From 1901 to 1903, Jews composed 29.1 percent (2269 individuals) of those arrested for political crimes. From March 1903 to November 1904 more than half of those investigated for political activity were Jews (53 percent). This fact can most easily be explained as a reaction to the Kishinev and Homel pogroms. In 1905, Jews made up 34 percent of all political prisoners; of those exiled to Siberia, 37 percent were Jews.⁴ During the calmer period from 1892 to 1902, Jews comprised 23.4 percent of the Social Democrats under investigation, fewer than the number of Russians (69.1 percent, 3490 individuals), but slightly more than the number of Poles (16.9 percent). The number of Jews who were Social Democrats exceeded the number of Russians (according to police data) in both the southwestern (49.4 percent to 41.8 percent) and southern territories (51.3 percent to 44.2 percent). They also comprised the lion’s share of those under investigation in Odessa (75.1 percent Jews versus 18.7 percent Russians). In Petersburg and Moscow the situation was reversed—10.2 percent Jews and 82.8 percent Russians in the northern capital; 4.6 percent Jews and 90.1 percent Russians in Moscow.⁵ Without a doubt, the Bund, the largest revolutionary party in Russia, contained the largest numbers of Jews involved in criminal political activity. In the summer of 1904, the Bund could claim 23,000 members; in 1905–7, 34,000; and in 1908–10, when the revolutionary movement quickly began to decline, about 2,000 members. For comparison’s sake, in the beginning of 1905, the entire Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (RSDRP) consisted of approximately 8,400 members.⁶ There was also significant Jewish representation in the Russian revolutionary parties and organizations. During the time of the 1905 revolution, approximately 15 percent of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (PSR) was Jewish, and there were a number of “maximalist and anarchist terrorist groups that were almost entirely Jewish.”⁷ Among the SR-Maximalists, 19 percent were Jewish, while 76 percent were either Russian or Ukrainian.⁸ At the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party in London in 1907, nearly a third of the delegates were Jewish.⁹
At the same time, however, it must be noted that regardless of the extent of Jewish participation in Russian or Jewish revolutionary parties, Jewish revolutionaries comprised a minute portion of the general Russian population, as well as an extremely small percentage of Russian Jewry. In the perception of the typical Russian resident—from the lumpenproletariat to the intelligentsia—the role of Jews in revolutionary activity was greater than it actually was. A typical example can be found in a joke from the satirical liberal journal Vampir from the 1905–7 revolutionary period. Though of limited wit, it is nevertheless telling. It reads, “Warsaw. Eleven anarchists were shot in the fortress prison. Of these, 15 were Jews.”

The urban masses responded to the freedom given to them by the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 with pogroms. The leading participants were those very workers whom the revolutionaries (including those of Jewish origin) had wasted so much strength and energy indoctrinating. Incidentally, it should be noted that previous strikes and demonstrations, in particular those associated with May 1, which often occurs around the time of Passover and Easter, had regularly threatened to grow into pogroms. Revolutionaries spent significant effort attempting to prevent or at least localize any ethnic or religious conflicts, such as those that occurred in the Donbass region, an industrial center located at the bend of the Dniepr River. Jews comprised 20 to 35 percent of the urban population of these kinds of rapidly developing regions.

Despite their “love for the people” (narodoliubie), the Social Democrats in industrial centers such as Rostov-on-Don were well aware of the antisemitic tendencies of a significant portion of the working class. A leaflet entitled “To the Dockworkers” is a case in point. On one side, the leaflet called for the masses to take part in the May 1 demonstrations, while on the other side it instructed them not to beat Jews.

All these exhortations would come to naught in October of 1905. For Russian Jews, the first fruits of the “freedom” won in the 1905 revolution were more pogroms. Particularly severe and bloody pogroms were carried out in Odessa, Rostov-on-Don, and Ekaterinoslav. In Odessa, according to police statistics, about 400 Jews were killed, and nearly 300 were seriously wounded. In addition 1632 Jewish homes, apartments, and places of business were destroyed.

The Rostov-on-Don pogrom, in many ways comparable to the one that occurred in Odessa, was one of the more bloody that took place during the first Russian revolution. Approximately 150 people were killed. On October 18, 1905, a confrontation took place between radicals carrying red flags with
the slogans “We won!” (Nasha vziala!) and “Zion,” and participants in a “patriotic demonstration.” In the course of the conflict several people were killed. Among those murdered by the “patriots” was one Klara Reizman, who had been carrying a red banner. The “patriots” killed her by shoving the wooden pole of the banner down her throat. A pogrom ensued over the next three days. Local Jewish and worker militias opposed the pogromists. Thanks to the “neutrality” and sometimes outright support of the pogromists by the local Cossacks and police, the conflict turned out to be one-sided, although data from official sources indicate that the pogromists also suffered significant casualties.

The biographies of Samuel Gurvich and Solomon Reizman, who played a significant role in the revolutionary events in Rostov-on-Don, were fairly typical. Gurvich was the son of Meir Gurvich, a well-known optometrist in Rostov and an active participant in Jewish circles. Samuel Gurvich started out as a Zionist, but quickly switched over to the Social Democrats. He was one of the organizers of a student group with members throughout southern Russia, and was a member of the RSDRP committee for the Don region. During the time of the famous Rostov walkout of 1902, he was one of the speakers at the massive meeting that took place outside the city, although the police agents failed to recognize him at the time. After the schism in the RSDRP in 1903, Gurvich sided with the Mensheviks. He went abroad and received further political indoctrination, and was imprisoned upon his return to Rostov in 1905. Released in accordance with the Imperial Manifesto of October 17, Gurvich, who commanded a great deal of authority in revolutionary circles, was chosen as chairman of the Rostov-on-Don Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. Though he himself was an opponent of armed rebellion, an uprising nonetheless broke out in December of 1905. After the insurrection Gurvich was forced to flee, and he reappeared in Rostov only in 1917, having served several years in prison.

One of the leaders of the uprising was Gurvich’s comrade in the southern Russian group, Solomon Reizman. Reizman had fled Rostov-on-Don in 1903 due to pressure from the police. In Petersburg he took part in the organization of the Soviet of Workers Deputies. He returned to Rostov after the October 17 Manifesto for personal reasons: his brother had died, and his sister had been murdered by the Black Hundreds. On November 28 he reported for work at a railroad workshop, and the next day he was elected a delegate of the railroad bureau. He became the chairman that very same evening. This twenty-year-old plumber was now in charge of running the Vladikavkaz
railroad. It was here that the strike started, eventually growing into an armed rebellion. After the rebellion was put down, Reizman was arrested and handed over to be tried on charges of seizing the Rostov-on-Don station of the Vladikavkaz railroad. He was the central figure in the trial, which the government attempted to give a decidedly antisemitic character. Poalei Zion drew a lot of attention to the proceedings, even though its Rostov-on-Don organization had not played an active part in the rebellion. As a minor, Reizman received a fairly light sentence—64 months in prison. However, he did not have to serve them out; several months after the trial he died in prison.\footnote{17}

Of the 657 pogroms in Russia during the period from October 1905 to January 1906, 41 took place in the Ekaterinoslav gubernia. These pogroms killed 285 people, and the 13.2 million rubles of damage exceeded that in any other region. The three-day pogrom that took place October 21–23 claimed 95 lives, while 245 were severely wounded. The perpetrators raped young girls and pregnant women. They also destroyed 311 businesses and 40 apartment buildings, razing several of them to the ground. In Luzovka, 10 Jews were killed and 28 were wounded, 84 stores and shops were destroyed, along with over 100 apartments. Overall damages amounted to nearly a million rubles. Several miners who worked in the outskirts, when they heard that a pogrom was taking place, asked the conductor of the local train to head towards the city. Along the way, they forced him to sound the whistle, in order to gather more people interested in participating in the pogrom. The miners were joined by factory workers and other members of the working class. It is readily apparent that workers in industrial regions constituted the majority of the pogromists.\footnote{18}

This was not the case everywhere. In Debaltsevo, Lugansk, and Shcherbinovka, miners and workers thwarted attempted pogroms. In Kamenskoe and Ekaterinoslav, groups of workers fought against the miners, peasants, and soldiers who had attacked the local Jewish population. In Krivoi Rog, Annovka, and other towns and cities in the Donbass region, soldiers opened fire on pogromists, wounding several and killing 19 people.\footnote{19}

The pogromists “rationale” for carrying out pogroms most often involved accusations that Jews defamed the Tsar, the Orthodox faith, and the Russian people. Occasionally added were claims that Jews organized strikes, which deprived workers of their wages. During the attacks of October 1905, Jews were not the only victims; students, members of the intelligentsia, and “people in glasses” were all in danger. In Transcaucasia, Armenians were targeted alongside the Jews.
Several scholars maintain that the workers’ participation in the pogroms cannot be explained exclusively by conservative beliefs, antisemitic prejudices, or the simple desire to pillage and plunder. Many workers had become disillusioned with the general strike, which, instead of improving their standing, had benefited only the organizers and agitators (of whom many were Jewish). While the workers felt deceived, at the same time they were now aware of their political power. That is why their rage was directed at students, the intelligentsia, and the Jewish population. Be that as it may, it is not necessary to directly connect the pogroms with any kind of disillusionment regarding the general strike. For our purposes, it is sufficient to point out the obvious connection between periods of revolutionary violence and upheaval and the marked increase in the scope of pogrom activity.

For several years, the Russian liberal intelligentsia had been consoling itself with the notion that the pogroms had been organized by the government. As contemporary historians have shown, the sins of the government have been greatly exaggerated. Government officials did not occupy themselves with the organization of pogroms. Putting aside for a moment questions of morality, it would have been irrational for the government to try to increase disorder in a country that was already in the throes of revolution. Moreover, this would hardly have been logistically feasible; the Emperor’s decision to sign the October Manifesto was sudden, leaving no time for government officials to organize pogroms (even if they had so desired). Antisemitic laws, however, were a completely separate issue. Government policy did contribute to an environment that allowed the pogrom activity to occur on a massive scale. Such policies included accusing Jews of creating their own misfortune, tolerating an increase in far-right organizations (and, on occasion, providing financial support for such groups), refusing to undertake any serious measures to disavow antisemitic propaganda, rejecting compensation for pogrom victims, and failing to prosecute to the full extent of the law those who participated in pogroms, as well as those who had allowed them to take place. Local authorities often failed to enact measures that would have prevented pogroms. Whether this was due to panic, incompetence, unreliable police and military forces, or any of a number of other reasons can only be discerned on a case-by-case basis.

The year 1905 served as clear example of how freedom could turn against itself in a country that lacked democratic traditions and a sufficiently strong intelligentsia. The events of the 1905 revolution were to strike terror in the heart of Mikhail Gershenzon, one of the founders of the journal Signposts.
“Being who we are, it is not only impossible to talk of any ‘merging with the masses.’ Rather, we should fear them more than any possible punishment that could be carried out by the authorities. We should instead praise and be thankful for the government, as it is only their bayonets and prisons that stand between us and the fury of the people.”

Gershenzon warned against the illusion of the intelligentsia’s “love for the masses” and these warnings were particularly relevant for its Jewish contingent. Antisemitism, which up until now had been considered prevalent only among the masses and the far right, was to become more and more widespread among the Russian intelligentsia.

An incident involving Aaron Shteinberg, a well-known Jewish philosopher and social activist, serves as a case in point. Shteinberg was shocked and dismayed by a number of articles in the newspaper Zemshchina written by the Russian philosopher Vasilii Rozanov in 1913 during the Beilis trial. In them, Rozanov allowed for the possibility that a “ritual murder” had taken place. Shteinberg went to Rozanov seeking an explanation. He was received warmly, and was given a rather eye-opening explanation and justification:

“You see,” Rozanov said, ‘Whenever my daughters come home from school and talk about a new friend of theirs with great excitement and amazement, I already know ahead of time that it’s some Rachel, Rebecca, or Sara. But if I were to ask them about their new acquaintances Vera or Nadezhda, they’d always say, ‘She’s such a bore, she’s not very pretty, her eyes are always glazed over, there’s no spirit to her! We Russians just simply cannot look at you with that fire with which you’re looking at me right now! You will seize power, of course. But one has to stand up for Russia!”

This speech deeply disappointed Shteinberg, who, by all accounts, had been prepared for a philosophical debate. As it turned out, it had nothing to do with any “ritual”; it had to do with politics. In a later article, Rozanov would “openly admit that he had been in favor of Beilis’s conviction on political grounds in order to prevent Jewish dominance, the so-called Jewish “yoke.” Russia had escaped the Tartar-Mongol yoke, and now the Jewish version was to replace it. In order to prevent this, one had to fight against the Jews.”

Antisemitic attitudes were common among other members of the intellectual elite of Russia as well. Aleksandr Blok told Shteinberg of his dislike of Jews, which had started during the Beilis trial when, among other things, people who had earlier hidden their Jewish heritage began to demand his signature on letters of protest. The context of the conversation, which took
place in 1919 while both Shteinberg and Blok were sharing a cell as guests of
the Cheka, precludes any possibility of insincerity on the latter’s part. It was
at this point that Shteinberg formulated an idea that he would later relate to
Andrei Bely. According to Shteinberg, Blok’s dislike of the Jews was, unbe-
knownst to Blok himself, the “other side of the coin” of Russian patriotism.
Shteinberg noted that a number his close associates in the Russian cultural
elite, including Andrei Bely, Ivanov-Razumnik, Petrov-Vodkin, Karsavin,
and others, shared this quality.25

The liberal principles of the Kadets likewise became subject to erosion.
P. B. Struve spoke of “asemitism” and a “national face” (natsional’noe litso)
that the Russian intelligentsia should take vis-à-vis the Jewish community,
although he did make a clear distinction between this democratic and consti-
tutional “attitude” and “bigoted antisemitism.”26 On March 17, 1910, Ariadna
Tyrkova wrote in her diary, “Conversations about nationalism are everywhere.
They seem to be more and more prevalent among the radicals. I was at Gre-
deskul’s on January 6th. We were arguing about the press. Gredeskul was
there, as were Ervin Grimm and D. D. Protopopov . . . everyone was saying
that we shouldn’t tolerate the fact that we have no newspapers besides the
‘Jewish’ Rech’ [Free Speech]. Only Rodichev and David Grimm disagreed, the
latter stating that nationalism was an anti-cultural phenomenon.”27

However, antisemitism was not inherent to a majority of Russia’s politi-
cized elite. Quite the opposite was true. For the majority of liberals opposi-
tion to discrimination against the Jews was compulsory, and antisemitic
statements were considered unacceptable. The first point of the platform of
the Constitutional Democratic Party, which was to be the most influential
and long-lived Russian liberal party, states, “All Russian citizens, without re-
gard to sex, creed, or nationality, are equal before the law. Any social dis-
crimination or restrictions regarding the personal and property rights of Poles,
Jews, and all other ethnic groups without exception must be repealed.”28 The
Beilis trial, which had become a litmus test for true democracy and tolerance,
demonstrated the best aspects of the Russian intelligentsia. Though hardly a
semitophile,29 Vasili Maklakov, whose speech at the trial was a deciding fac-
tor in the accused’s acquittal, quite correctly termed the trial a “salutary warn-
ing.”30 Rozanov was excluded from the Religious Philosophy Society for his
antisemitism.

The problem lay elsewhere. In the period between revolutions there was
an indisputable growth in antisemitism among groups that had not previ-
ously been known to exhibit it. This necessarily pushed Jews to the Left, as
even among the Kadets, the “standard-bearers” of Russian liberalism, a “Janus-faced policy” towards the “Jewish question” became evident.

Before examining the role of the Jews in the fateful year of 1917, it must be determined whether the Jewish members of the Russian liberation movement can be considered as acting in concert with Jewish interests, or whether they should even be considered Jews at all. After all, a number of them had rejected their Jewish faith and heritage. The marked internationalism of many revolutionary groups, especially the Bolsheviks, gave their antagonists within the Jewish community convenient grounds on which to “excommunicate” them from Russian Jewry.

At a meeting on June 8, 1917, S. M. Dubnov said, “And from among our community there have appeared a good number of demagogues who have fallen in league with the heroes of the street and the prophets of the insurgency. They appear under Russian pseudonyms, ashamed of their Jewish heritage (Trotsky, Zinoviev, etc.), but it is their Russian pseudonyms that we will take to be their ‘Jewish’ names, [so] they have no place among our people . . .”

One could just as easily say that revolutionaries of Russian extraction should be excluded from their people based on the fact that they did not observe the tenets of Orthodoxy. However, another interpretation is possible here. Perhaps the active participation of some Jews in the revolutionary movement was not, in fact, due to any break with Jewish identity, as so many internationalist revolutionaries claimed, but was rather because of their Jewish heritage. To accept this idea, one does not necessarily have to share the mystical musings of Berdiaev, who claimed that there was much in common between Jewish messianism and its Marxist variant. There are other, more objective historical and economic grounds for making such a claim.

Obvious socioeconomic and political factors were to result in a majority of Jews being pushed towards the opposite camp. It is clear that the Jewish community as a whole refused to endorse the revolutionary program of the revolutionaries of Jewish heritage, be they Bolsheviks, SRs, or from other political parties. Nor could any Jewish socialist party be taken as being representative of all of Russian Jewry. At the same time, for many the solution to the “Jewish question” appeared to be entwined with the success of the Russian revolution. It was precisely the legacy of antisemitic prejudice and discrimination in Russia that inclined, and sometimes even directly led, the children of many well-off Jewish families to join the ranks of the revolutionaries. A significant portion of the revolutionary leadership came from well-established
Jewish families. Iulii Martov, Sergei Ezhov, Vladimir Levitskii, and Lidia Dan, all grandchildren of the publisher Aleksandr Tsederbaum, were to become prominent Social Democrats. Mikhail and Abram Gots, the grandsons of the Moscow tea magnate Volf Vysotskii, and Il’ia Fondaminskii were among the leaders of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs). Osip Minor, son of the head rabbi of Moscow, was first a member of the People’s Will, then an SR, and finally, in 1917, the chairman of the Moscow City Duma. Among the Bolsheviks one could find the son of well-to-do farmers (Trotsky, whose true surname was Bronshtein), dairy farmers (Zinoviev [Radomysliskii]), as well as the son of an engineer (Lev Kamenev [Rosenfeld]), and a doctor (Grigori Sokolnikov [Brilliant]). All of the above-mentioned individuals had the opportunity to pursue just about any career path they desired, yet they all chose instead the path of the revolutionary.

Jews were the most urbanized and literate people of the Russian Empire (along with Germans), yet they were restricted in where they were allowed to live, their choice of profession, and their access to education as a result of their religious affiliation. It is hardly surprising that such circumstances would give rise to individuals who would eagerly devote their lives to the overthrow of the existing power structure. Boys from a traditional Jewish upbringing would study in Russian gymnasiums, then go on to study in a Russian or foreign university, and would absorb revolutionary ideology more quickly than others, being able to sympathize with such ideas not only on an intellectual level, but on an emotional one as well. Real-life experience was an important contributor in this transformation of Jewish youth into Russian revolutionaries.

Some of them would explain their dedication to the revolution as a result of “Jewish problems.” Aleksandr Brailovskii once gave a speech at a political demonstration in Rostov on March 2, 1903, that eventually resulted in a conflict with the police and the murder of a police officer (the fatal blow was delivered by Isaak Khaevskii). When asked at the ensuing trial as to why he, the son of a well-off merchant from Rostov, had joined the revolutionaries, Brailovskii responded, “I am a Jew. As such, I have experienced oppression and deprivation of freedom for all of my life. When I wanted to enter the university, I wasn’t accepted because I was a Jew, and I was thrown overboard. I could not but welcome the roar of the demonstrators. That is why I joined them.”

Others would categorically deny any connection between their Jewishness and their revolutionary fervor. “This national moment, so vital to the life
of Russia,” Trotsky once wrote, “played nearly no role at all in my personal life. From a very early age, nationalist fixations bewildered me on a rational level. This would occasionally grow into moral discomfort or even outright disgust. A Marxist education deepened these feelings, and transformed them into an active internationalism.”

Many Jewish revolutionaries either consciously or (as was more often the case) unconsciously identified with the interests of the Russian peasants or workers, about whom they knew next to nothing. In this, they were hardly different from their Russian counterparts.

Fyodor Stepun, a commissar for the Provisional Government in 1917, who had made a trip to Vilna in 1907, made some very apt observations regarding the state of Russian Jewry before the revolution. The “piercing pity” that Stepun felt for the Jewish population and deep shame in light of Tsarist policy, would have been completely at home among the radical “comrades” of Heidelberg University:

my second conviction is this: that in participating in peasants’ and workers’ issues Jews were simply fighting for their own equal rights, which, of course, they had a right to do. As a result of their political ideology, they didn’t see themselves as being different from the Russian people.

At the time, I knew and understood very little about workers’ and peasants’ issues. But I always believe what my eyes tell me. And I couldn’t help thinking that there was little common sense in an argument I saw between the grandson of a Vilna rabbi and the son of a Kovno banker, neither of whom had ever seen Russian land or a Russian muzhik. They were arguing heatedly with each other over the best ways for the Ryazan, Siberian, and Poltava peasantry to manage their land, pausing every minute or so to cite the works of Karl Marx.

Although Stepun’s description may seem somewhat exaggerated, he manages to grasp the essence of the matter at hand. However, where Stepun saw “little common sense,” Maksim Vinaver, one of Russia’s leading Jewish liberals, saw quite the opposite. In an article dedicated to the memory of Shloime Rapoport (S. A. An-sky), a revolutionary and collector of Russian and Jewish folklore, Vinaver writes:
So many Jewish youths who had just managed to tear themselves away from the Bible and the Talmud agreed to fight to death for a peasant people who, it would seem, were completely foreign to them, knowing only that they were laboring and suffering. They believed in these people only because they were prepared by a belief in truth, goodness, and the eventual triumph of justice. Their acquaintance with the biblical prophets and testaments of Jewish culture prepared them for this. The seeds sown by those Russian pilgrims who had struggled for truth and justice fell on fertile ground, and over the decades an unbreakable chain pulled the Jewish youth towards the ranks of those parties that were attempting to achieve the common good, in accordance with the belief in an immanent, inherently mystical aspiration on the part of all (whether of all mankind or of one nation). When the pogroms broke out, some cast stones at such dreamers, claiming that they had gone to guard the “vineyards of outsiders.” A barbarous accusation. To struggle for truth means to attempt to fulfill the commandments of the Jewish prophets, which means to work for one’s own vineyards, not those of others. And in this aspect there is no difference between one’s own vineyard and someone else’s.37

One final example is doubly valuable for the fact that it was written by someone outside of revolutionary circles, as well as the fact that it was published in the end of the 1930s in emigration, long after sympathy towards the revolutionaries had fallen out of fashion. Oskar Gruzenberg, the well-known lawyer, wrote that he felt his Jewish heritage particularly acutely one night in 1886, during a police raid in Kiev. As he was a student at the university, the police did not harass him, whereas his mother, who had come to visit from the Pale of Settlement and had been guilty of some minor infraction, was forced to spend the rest of the night on the spittle-ridden floor of the police station in the company of drunks and prostitutes. He only managed to get her out by calling in some major favors. A still furious Gruzenberg wrote the following, nearly fifty years after the event in question: “To forget how they humiliated my elderly mother, who had never done anything wrong to anybody in her whole entire life, would mean to forget the fact that life is only worth living when one is not a slave. What happened that night? What was decided? In short, I now saw every person who was fighting against autocratic
tyranny and cruelty as an ally, as a brother whom I was obligated to assist in times of need.”\textsuperscript{58} Such an understanding of obligation and responsibility was undoubtedly the attitude of a large number of Jews, including members of the “establishment.”

Vladimir Zhabotinskii, a pronounced opponent of the Jews’ participation in the Russian Revolution, nonetheless maintained that “the Jewish blood spilled on the barricades was the result of the will of the Jewish people themselves.” In response to criticism of that assertion, he stated that

all of these fashionable shrieks and cries claim that Jews do not have a national politics, only a class-based one. Jews have no class-based politics, but have had, and currently have (although only in the earliest stages), the politics of a national coalition, and those who have pursued such a politics without even suspecting it are all the more ignorant. They did this in their own fashion, with excesses and extremes, but in essence they were only expressing various aspects of the unified will of the Jewish people. If there were many revolutionaries among them, then this means no more than such was the atmosphere of the nation. Jewish barricades were raised in accordance with the will of the Jewish people. I believe this to be true, and since I do, I bow down and welcome the people’s revolution.

Of course, having (rather facetiously) bowed down before the “will of the people,” Zhabotinskii then posed the following question, “But has the Revolution improved the lot of the people?” The doubts of the brilliant Russian poet and ideologue of the Jewish national movement led him to answer in the negative:

The will of the people does not always lead to the good of the people, as they are not always capable of objectively measuring the chances of success and failure. It is particularly easy to go astray when success is dependent on a belief in a powerful ally, in the belief that he will understand, stay true, that he’ll help. But the fact of the matter is that none of us know this ally very well, and God only knows how he’ll thank us for our efforts.\textsuperscript{39}

R. A. Abramovich, a Bundist, was slightly more pragmatic. At a meeting at the Moscow State Conference in August of 1917, he declared: “[O]nly the
full and complete victory of the revolution, only the full and decisive democratization of life in this country is capable of ending the oppression of Jewish people and guaranteeing autonomy for them. . . . this is why the Jewish workers—not only as members of the family of the international proletariat, not only as citizens of a free Russia, but as Jews—are deeply invested in the furthering of the revolution in Russia.”

Discrimination and oppression provided a natural environment that would inevitably lead to an increase in the number of revolutionaries from among the Jewish population. By October of 1906, the more rational government administrators understood this. The experience of the 1905 Revolution, among other things, led Stolypin to come up with a series of proposals to repeal restrictions on Jews in the Russian Empire.

Stolypin explained to the Tsar that the “Jewish question” was now being raised as “Jews have a legal basis to demand full equality in accordance with the civil liberties granted by the Manifesto of October 17.” Moreover, Stolypin sought to “placate the non-revolutionary elements of the Jewish population in order to rid our government of a situation that has served as a source of countless opportunities for abuse.” However, Stolypin’s initiatives ran up against the inexplicable mystical inclinations of the Emperor, who returned the set of proposals on December 10, 1906 without approving them. “Long before I received these proposals,” Nikolai II would go later to write, “I thought about them day and night. And despite the most convincing arguments in favor of approving the matter, an inner voice continues to repeat to me ever more insistently that I should not take this decision upon myself.”

A large portion of the Russian population was convinced that if another revolution were to occur, then Jews would be active participants. The far right claimed that Jews served as the “backbone” of the revolutionary movement, and that without their support no revolution would be possible. It comes as somewhat of a surprise, then, that Jews who had participated so actively in struggles against the autocracy, or who were at least extremely sympathetic to such actions, were such minor participants in its downfall. This “strange” fact is of course rather easy to explain. The revolution in Russia was predominantly Russian, and could not be the sole result of a well organized minority. It was instead the result of the decay of the state on the one hand, and the coincidence of a number of disparate factors on the other. In any case, its goal was not a solution to the “Jewish question.” The February Revolution of 1917 demonstrated this. There was no talk of any kind of Jewish conspiracy; the only conspiracy to be found was in the actions of the
generals who refused to support the Russian Tsar, their commander-in-chief.

Although Jews would go on to play a more significant role in the Russian revolution, they never played a decisive one. Many Russian nationalist writers were fully aware of this. Ten years after the revolution, Lev Karsavin would write, “It’s time to get rid of this stupid fairy tale . . . that Jews thought up and carried out the Russian revolution. One would have to be extremely uneducated and ignorant of history, as well as having a hatred of the Russian people, to believe that the Jews were capable of destroying the Russian state. This is a philosophy of history worthy of Ataman Krasnov, and apparently borrowed from Dumas-père, who likewise blamed Count Caliostro for the French revolution!”

“After all, didn’t our revolution start with the most typical of Russian rebellions, ‘unthinking and ruthless’ at first, but bearing deep inside it some kind of moral depth, some kind of idiosyncratic truth?” asked Nikolai Ustrialov, in an article tellingly entitled “Patriotica.” “No, neither we [the intelligentsia] nor the people can deny responsibility for the current crisis, whether with regard to its better or its darker aspects. This crisis is ours, it is genuinely Russian, it is from our psychology, from our past . . . And even if one day it is mathematically proven—whereas in the current situation it is yet not mathematically proven [The article was published in 1921]—that 90 percent of Russian revolutionaries were foreigners or that they were mostly Jews, that would take nothing away from the purely Russian character of the movement. Even if ‘foreign hands’ have joined in, the movement’s soul, its ‘interior,’ is Russian for better or worse, is of the Russian intelligentsia, and is refracted through the psyche of its people.”

Nikolai Ustrialov, speaking of the ideological roots of the Russian revolution, blamed everything from the broken spirit of Slavophilia, to Chaadaev’s pessimism, Hertzen’s revolutionary romanticism, and the atmosphere captured in Dostoevsky’s characters such as Petrusha Verkhovenskii and Alyosha Karamazov. “Or perhaps they [Verkhovenskii and Karamazov] aren’t Russian?” he would note acidly, “And what of the Marxism of the 1890s, headed by people like Bulgakov, Berdiaev, and Struve, who we now consider to be the bearers of the true Russian Idea? It is not foreign [inorodtsy, non-Russian] revolutionaries who are now leading the Russian revolution, but the Russian revolution that is leading foreign revolutionaries to come to know the ‘Russian spirit’ in its current condition.”
Let us return to March 1917. Before the return of exiles and emigrants from abroad, there were relatively few Jews in the Executive Committee (Ispolkom) of the Petrograd Soviet. In fact, there was only one, Yuri Steklov. The lack of Jewish members pleased Semyon Dubnov. On March 17, he wrote in his diary, “The Jews are not at the forefront of this revolution . . . a tactical move, and a lesson learned from 1905.”

On March 11, 1917, Vinaver called upon Russia’s Jews to be patient, brave, and measured, not to “stick out in high or visible positions,” and to serve the motherland and the revolution without calling attention to themselves. Nirenberg, a Bund member, was of the opposite opinion: “Let Jews become senators, officers, and so on. If we do not take these rights now, they won’t be given to us tomorrow.” Vinaver’s humility did not last long. As if following the recommendation of his opponent on the left, Vinaver accepted the post of Senator, along with O. Gruzenberg, former Duma deputy I. Gurevich, and Odessa attorney G. F. Blumenfeld.

On the evening of March 22, 1917, Dubnov wrote, “A remarkable day. Today the Provisional Government published its decision to remove all restrictions on nationalities and religion. In other words, it published its decision to emancipate the Jews of Russia. After forty years fighting and suffering, my life’s dream has come true. I still cannot actually comprehend all the greatness of the moment. Later, when the fearful satellites of this new sun on the historical horizon disappear, and the German Hannibal at the gate with the ghosts of counterrevolution and anarchy melt away, we will be able to feel the light and warmth of a new world.”

Dubnov’s misgivings would soon turn out to be justified. In another entry, he writes, “I just came back home. Early today I saw people on the street running with their pound or so of ‘daily bread.’ I couldn’t help but think that we are standing on the edge of a precipice. The majesty of the revolution and the absolute impotence in the face of famine, every political freedom but an utter lack of bread. How will these contrasts influence the dark masses?”

The absence of Jews from the predominantly Russian revolutionary political elite did not last long. As mentioned earlier, the lack of Jews in revolutionary leadership was largely due to the physical absence of the large number of leaders who had been exiled or voluntarily emigrated. As Jewish revolutionaries made their way back to the capitals, their numbers would increase rapidly.

On October 16, 1917, in the newspaper Obschee Delo (Common Cause), V. Burtsev published a list of 159 emigrants who had returned to Russia in the
infamous “sealed wagons” via Germany. The list was given to him by the Special Commissar of the Provisional Government, S. G. Svatikov. There were no fewer than 99 Jews on the list. In the group of 29 people who accompanied Lenin to Petrograd, 17 were Jews. The number of Jews who returned to Russia by less exotic means was also significant.

However, the vast majority of Russian Jews were not affiliated with Lenin and his followers. The February Revolution, and the repeal of restrictions enacted by the Provisional Government, were met with elation and enthusiasm among Russia’s Jews. “The rebirth of Jewish cultural and political life,” aptly notes Gitelman, “created an institutional barrier against the penetration of Bolshevik ideas and organizations.”

Jewish communities were reestablished, and busied themselves not only with religious tasks, but with cultural and educational ones as well. Jewish schools, charities, newspapers, musical societies, and reading circles began to thrive. At the same time, this blossoming of Jewish culture took place against the background of ever-deepening economic problems, including the bankruptcy of most small businesses and high unemployment (particularly among young people), problems that were caused by, or at the very least exacerbated by, the hardships of life in wartime.

The “political geography” of Russia’s Jews in 1917 looked something like the following. The most popular parties by far were Zionist in orientation, with a total membership of approximately 300,000 in 1200 local party organizations by October of 1917. They were also victorious in nearly all of the elections that would take place in 1917–18. In a certain sense, the quickly growing number of Zionist adherents paralleled a nearly equal increase in the number of SRs. If Russian peasants voted for the SRs in order to gain ownership of their land, then Jews did so in order to realize their dream of going to the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael), the land of their fathers.

The spring and summer of 1917 saw the formation of religious parties that often acted as a united front, demanding in their platforms that Saturday be a non-working day and funding for community institutions; and also an eight hour workday, the right for workers to strike, freedom of religion, rights to religious education, and land reform according to the SR platform. One such party appeared in the summer of 1917 after the merger of a number of Moscow and Petrograd groups under the name Ahdut (Unity). The same moniker was adopted somewhat later by Jewish religious groups in Ukraine. Such groups considered themselves to be representative of the religious
majority of Russian Jewry, “the true people, silent and scattered” in the words of one of the founders of the party Netsakh Israel.51

Among the socialist parties, the largest, most influential and most involved in Russian politics was the Bund, which had 33,700 members in December of 1917. The Bund’s politics fell largely along Menshevik lines. In terms of Jewish policy, the Bund opposed the “romanticized utopia” of the Zionists and the “clerical aiders and abettors” of the bourgeoisie, and declared the language of the Jewish working masses to be Yiddish rather than Hebrew.

In 1917, the Bund took a fiercely anti-Bolshevik stance. Soon after the February Revolution, the Bund newsletter Arbeiter Shtime declared Leninism to be a disease that was weakening the revolution.52 They would later depict Lenin as an anarcho-syndicalist, mocking his slogan for the immediate realization of the socialist revolution.53

In May of 1917, the Jewish Socialist Workers’ Party (SERP) and the Zionist-Socialists (Zionist-Socialist Workers’ Party) combined, creating the United Jewish Socialist Workers’ Party (OESP), or, in Yiddish, Fareynikte. The party had a significant influence in Ukraine. They were close to the SRs, whom they later joined in a bloc during the parliamentary elections. SERP’s founder, Kh. O. Zhitlovskii, had been one of the founders of the Social Revolutionaries, as well as the ideological protégé of its leader, V. M. Chernov. The new party collaborated with the Mensheviks in the organized labor movement.

Poalei Zion, with its idiosyncratic ideology a hybrid of Marxism and Zionism, was more proletarian in character. Though the party had only 2,500 members on the eve of the February Revolution, by the summer of 1917 its membership had grown to between 12,000 and 16,000. Politically, they were close to the Menshevik-Internationalists. Some members of the party sympathized with the Bolsheviks, but the Zionist roots of their platform presented an insurmountable obstacle to a full merger. As in the Bund, there was no unanimity with regard to policy concerning the war. In the Ukraine they supported the Central Rada.

Dubnov’s Folkspartei, which was comprised mostly of Jewish intellectuals, was a “party for those who don’t belong to any party,” as a contemporary once wittily remarked.54

The final major participants, though they did not enjoy widespread support among the Jewish working masses, were the “Jewish Kadets.” They advocated full civil rights for all Jews, as well as the maintenance of religious and educational rights, including the use of Yiddish and Hebrew as languages for
instruction, and the preservation of the religious character of most Jewish schools. This Jewish People’s Group did not, however, agitate for autonomy from the Russian Empire. The group’s influence was most easily defined in terms of the personalities of their leaders, such as Vinaver, Slozberg, and Gruzenberg (in as much as the latter was any kind of party politician).

In both Russia and Ukraine, the Jewish population was fragmented. A local Jewish Congress which took place in Kiev May 9–11, 1917, quickly degenerated, in the words of one participant, “into an occasion of constant contention and strife among the Russian Jews.” The breakers of the peace turned out to be members of the Bund, who were clearly in the minority. On the second day of the conference, a rabbi from Berdichev asked all present to stand in honor of the Torah. The Bund members refused. The scandal shocked the writer S. A. An-sky, who claimed that the Torah “is not only a religious symbol, but also a symbol of Jewish culture, which has persisted for centuries.” It was in honor of this culture that everyone had been asked to stand. The incident ended there, though the Bund members nonetheless left the conference on the final day, with its leader, M. G. Rafes, calling the remaining attendees the “black and blue Jewish bloc.”

Disputes between members of differing political tendencies would continue until the last days of the Provisional Government. Several days before the Bolshevik coup, M. L. Goldshtein (representing the Jewish People’s Group) gave a series of reservedly patriotic speeches in the Council of the Russian Republic, which were met with withering criticism from N. Baru (Poalei Zion) and G. M. Erlikh (Bund). One author’s account of this soon-to-be-defunct organ of power sadly noted that, “only the Jews found it necessary to use the Council of the Republic for the settling of scores between each other.”

Thus it is impossible to speak of any kind of united Jewish politics. The politicized sections of Jewish society were torn by the same contradictions present in Russian society. Any hope of creating a kind of all-Jewish party that would put forth a united political program proved to be illusory. The political differences, and corresponding social and culture differences, proved to be too great.

Elections in Jewish communities, including those for delegates to the All-Russian Jewish Congress and the Russian Constituent Assembly showed the following preferences. On the local level, ten gubernia elections in Ukraine had the following breakdown: Zionists (36 percent), the Bund (14.4 percent), Ahdut (10 percent), the United Jewish Socialist Workers’ Party (OESRP, 8.2 percent), Poalei Zion (6.3 percent), the Folkspartei (3 percent), the Jewish
People’s Group (1 percent) with all other local organizations comprising the remaining 20 percent. In the elections to the Jewish Congress, the results demonstrated even greater support for the Zionists, who won 60 percent of the positions, whereas socialist parties won 25 percent, with religious parties winning 12 percent.\(^{58}\) In Petrograd and the surrounding areas in January of 1918, only one-third of eligible voters participated. The Zionists’ successes were impressive, with eight races won, while the Bund, the Jewish People’s Group, Orthodox parties, and the Folkspartei won one race each.\(^{59}\)

Elections to the Constituent Assembly were even more indicative. The Jewish National Bloc, which included Zionist and religious parties, received 417,215 votes out of the 498,198 total cast for Jewish parties. The other parties did not fare as well (the Bund received 31,123 and Poalei Zion 20,538, with 29,332 votes going to other socialist parties). In Minsk, the National Bloc received 65,046 votes, whereas other parties managed only 11,064; in Kiev the results were 24,790 for the National Bloc versus 12,471 for the Bund and Menshevik coalition.\(^{60}\) From the National Bloc list the following members were elected to the Constituent Assembly: The Zionists Iu. Brutskus, A. M. Goldstein, the Moscow rabbi Ia. I. Maze, V. I. Temkin, D. M. Kogan-Berntshtein, N. S. Syrkin, and O. O. Gruzenberg, who at the time was close with Zionist circles. D. V. Lvovich was elected from the party list of the SRs and OESRP, along with the Bundist G. I. Lure, who was chosen from the party list of the Bund and the RSDRP (SDs). A number of Jews were also elected to the Assembly from other parties (for the most part the socialist parties). The Secretary of the Constituent Assembly for the one day of its existence was the Socialist Revolutionary M. V. Vishniak.\(^{61}\)

The overwhelming majority of Jewish voters voted for Jewish parties. Determining the number of Jews who voted for Russian political parties, and which parties they voted for, is a difficult task. How many Jews followed the plea of Vinaver, who asked them to vote for the People’s Freedom Party (Kadets), “Not one Jewish vote should be thrown away in this struggle for culture and order against anarchy and backwardness”? How many instead voted for the Bolsheviks, who promised a quick end to the war, but who Vinaver and his allies had identified as forces of this same anarchy? Unfortunately, we may never know the answer.\(^{62}\)

The overwhelming successes of the Zionists in numerous elections facilitated the publication on November 2, 1917, of a declaration by the British foreign minister, A. G. Balfour. Written in the form of a letter addressed to Lord L. Rothschild, the Balfour Declaration stated the intention of the British
government to assist in the creation of a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. The declaration was met with great optimism on the part of Russian Zionists. It seemed as if the centuries-old dream of the Jewish people was finally closer to becoming a reality. It is somewhat strange that in the future the Zionist parties in Russia were to play much less of a role in the lives of the Jews than the socialist ones. Gitelman attributes this change to the departure (both voluntary and forced) of many Zionists as a result of Soviet persecution. This is quite true, but it is only part of the picture. Voting for the Zionists in 1917 was the same as voting for a dream. It would have been impossible for even 10 percent, let alone 100 percent, of the Jewish population to move to Palestine. People were forced by circumstances to live in the “here and now,” already under the conditions of early Sovietization, threatened by the violence that was to accompany the civil war. The Jewish socialist parties were more capable of addressing the threats of physical annihilation presented by the current day. The “Zionist project,” on the other hand, seemed unrealistic.

Most Russians were unaware of the internal conflicts in the Jewish community. Leaders of the Jewish political parties or movements were well-known mostly among members of their own community. Those Jewish politicians who found success on the national stage beyond the Jewish political parties tended to identify according to class lines or social group. They often either completely ignored “Jewish” issues, or treated them as being of secondary importance (with some rare exceptions). Among the deputies of the Constituent Assembly, the number of Jews elected on the Soviet of Peasant Deputies list outnumbered those of all Jewish national organizations combined by a factor of four to one. In the Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasant Deputies, 20 percent of the members elected at the First All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of Peasant Deputies were Jewish.

By our admittedly rough estimate, the Soviet elite at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 could be said to comprise a little over 3,000 individuals. This number includes members of the Constituent Assembly, members of the Provisional Central Election Committee, members of the Democratic Congress, members of the Council of the Russian Republic, and the Central Committees of the main Russian political parties. The period in question runs from the February Revolution until the establishment of one-party dictatorship in Soviet Russia in July of 1918. Of these 3,000 or so, nearly 300 were Jews of all political stripes and colors, from the anarchists and Bolsheviks on the left to right-wing Kadets.
The central committees of nearly all of the significant political parties of Russia had members of Jewish origin, and in the Bolshevik and Social Revolutionary parties the leadership was anywhere from a quarter to a third Jewish. At the Sixth Congress of the RSDRP, there were six Jews among the twenty-one members of the Central Committee (Zinoviev, Trotsky, L. B. Kamenev, Ia. M. Sverdlov, G. Ia. Sokolnikov, and M. S. Uritsky). A. A. Ioffe was one of eight candidates for the Central Committee. The Central Committee of the Menshevik coalition was nearly 50 percent Jewish. Three of the sixty-seven members of the Kadet Central Committee elected at the Eighth Congress were Jewish, including Vinaver, who was elected second from the list, after party leader V. I. Vernadskii. Nearly one-fifth of the membership of the first five Provisional Central Election Committees was Jewish.

While Jewish revolutionaries did a lot of work behind the scenes, they were eager to take the stage as well, and there were a large number of Jews among the orators in various political arenas. In this respect, they refused to follow the model of behavior espoused by Vinaver and Dubnov, and made their presence felt. This fact was noticed by those who tended to see only Jews among the revolutionary parties, as well as those who were slightly more objective.

For the memoirists of 1917 among the most striking orators were Steklov (Nakhamkes), the Menshevik Fedor Dan, and the Bundist Meir Liber. Fedor Stepun would write, “In those days [the first weeks after February] the imposing, deafening figure of the bearded Steklov would appear on stage more often than any other. He was a zealous Anarcho-Marxist.” Liber and Dan appeared so often before the Petrograd Soviet that the verb “to Liberdanize” soon appeared in public discourse.

In Odessa, the most prominent speakers and social critics of the time included the Bolsheviks Aleksandr Khmelnitskii (the future People’s Commissar for Justice in Ukraine in 1919), Ian Gamarnik, Sergei Ingulov (Reizer), Leonid Isaakovich Ruzer, and the SRs Rikhter and S. S. Zak (along with the “iconic” SR N. N. Kuliabko-Koretskii). Khaim Ryt served as the leader of Odessa’s anarchists from 1917 to 1918.66

A similar picture could be found in Kiev, Minsk, Vitebsk, and any other city with a significant Jewish population, as well as in a few locales outside of the confines of the Pale of Settlement. In Rostov-on-Don the Social Democrats S. M. Gurvich, and A. S. Lokerman, as well as the SRs Shraiber, Freid, Berdichevskii and others, were elected to the city Duma and the Soviet of
Workers’ Deputies. At some points debate in both of these organizations would go on nearly exclusively between Jews.

The local summer elections of 1917 provided some intriguing results. Within the territory of the Pale, they demonstrated who controlled the sympathies of the local population. Yet even in territories outside of the Pale, Jews would become members of the government, by election through party lists. This would seem to indicate that Jewish heritage was not a “deal-breaker” for the local Christian population, at least at this particular moment in history.

Seven Bund members joined the socialist coalition in the Kiev Duma, which also included the SRs and Social Democrats. Three deputies were elected on the united ticket of the OESRP and Poalei Zion. The Jewish Democratic Bloc, which included Zionists, members of Agudat Yisrael, and the unaffiliated Soviet of United Jewish Organizations, received five seats total.

In Minsk twenty-eight representatives of Jewish parties were elected to the city Duma, which amounted to more than 25 percent of the total number of voting deputies. Sixteen of these came from the Jewish National Bloc composed of non-socialist parties, whereas the Bund managed only ten seats as part of the Social Democratic Bloc, and Poalei Zion and Zionist Socialists won one seat each.

In Vitebsk, the Bund came out ahead, winning eleven seats as part of a coalition with the SRs and Mensheviks, while Zionist and Orthodox parties won nine seats, with one seat being held by the Folkspartei.

The dominance of the Bund in heavily Jewish territories can be explained by the fact that they gained votes by forming coalitions, allowing them to get extra support from non-Jews. This option wasn’t a possibility for the Zionist or Orthodox parties, or for those Jewish Socialist Parties that decided to enter the elections on their own.67

In several cities, Jews were to assume leadership roles in local government structures and legislatures. A. Vainshtein (Rakhmiel) was elected chairman of the city Duma in Minsk, and the Menshevik Ilia Polonskii was elected to lead Ekaterinoslav, while his fellow party member A. M. Ginzburg (Naumov) became the second-in-command in Kiev. Bund member D. Chertkov was elected chairman of the Duma in Saratov.58 Later on, the Bolsheviks would be blamed for placing the two capitals in the hands of Jews (Zinoviev in Petrograd and Kamenev in Moscow). However, Jews were already leading the city governments as early as June 1917, with SR G. I. Shreider being democratically elected to govern Petrograd,69 while his fellow party member O. S. Minor was elected chairman of the Moscow city Duma.
The Jewish population of Rostov served as a microcosm for the Jewish political experience in the year 1917. Like many other Jewish communities, Rostov Jews were split into a multitude of political parties and organizations. Zionists, Poalei Zion, SERP, the Bund, and a number of Jewish organizations sympathetic to the Kadets united to form the “United Committee of Jewish Social Organizations” (OKO). But the most politically active members of the Jewish community were to be found in the Russian political parties, ranging from the Kadets to the Bolsheviks.

The city Duma elections neatly illustrated the political sympathies of Rostov’s Jews and their role in the political life of the city. Elections were conducted according to party lists. Mikhail Rabinovich was elected on the Zionist ticket, while the Bund and the SERP joined a coalition with the SRs, Mensheviks, and the Armenian party Dashnaktsutiun. The local representatives of Poalei Zion endorsed the socialist bloc, even as Poalei Zion accused the Bund and SERP of preventing them from joining. Explaining their stance towards the activities of the OKO, Poalei Zion passed a resolution stating that “the OKO does not represent the interests of the Jewish population of Rostov.”

A most interesting discussion was to take place at a meeting of the Kadet party, which also included prominent members of the Jewish community such as Abram Chernikov, Lev Volkenshtein, and Abram Gorodisskii. Chernikov claimed that it was a mistake not to form a coalition with local Jewish parties, which were entering the elections separately.

The local Kadet leader V. F. Zeeler replied that “the Party of People’s Freedom did not consider it necessary to isolate the ‘Jewish question’ and talk of forming a coalition. The Party believes that it has always marched in solidarity with the Jews, feels their pain and suffering, and will continue to march on with them.”

Volkenshtein claimed that he didn’t understand, “Who are these Jews and what are these Jewish organizations that Chernikov is talking about? Such horrible things! Are we not full-fledged citizens? What use do we have for such distinctions? Is it not true that there are 400,000 Jewish soldiers fighting alongside their Russian comrades? What difference does it make if there are only Christians in our party list, we would vote for them any way, as we believe this party has always been with us and for us. Leibs and Ivans are now equal. Tell all of our fellow Jews that the membership of the Party of People’s Freedom has always defended us and has given us freedom and equality. We believe in them, and will continue to support them.”
Gorodisskii disagreed with Volkenshtein, and expressed surprise at the fact that the Jewish population was not supporting the Kadets, or the Jewish Kadet members. He reminded those gathered, “As long as nationalities exist, questions of nationality will also exist. But a split would be a grave error, harming both the parties and the nationalities in question.”

As a result, an overwhelming majority of Kadets voted in favor of ordering the central committee to form a coalition with the OKO. In turn the OKO called upon its fellow Jewish citizens to vote for the Kadet ticket, which “includes our members of the OKO, who have taken upon themselves the responsibility of achieving the national and cultural interests of Jews as well as the beginnings of cultural autonomy.”

Jews were widely represented in the party lists leading up to the elections. They comprised nearly one-third of the socialist bloc, 10 percent of the Bolshevik party list, 25 percent of the Kadet party list, and nearly half of the list of the People’s Socialist Party of Labor.

The socialists claimed a decided victory in the elections, winning eighty seats, as compared to sixteen for the Kadets and thirteen for all other parties. Nearly 33 percent of all voters were of Jewish heritage. The city administration was to include Vulf Pleskov, a member of the Don committee of the RSDRP in the early 1900s, along with Aleksandr Lokerman, one of the most popular politicians in Rostov, who was elected secretary. Lokerman was the head of the Don RSDRP from 1902 to 1903, and the main organizer of the 1902 strikes and 1903 demonstrations. One of the “founding fathers” of the RSDRP, he was a delegate to the Second Congress, and sided with the Mensheviks. He was a brilliant publicist and orator, a well-known party member on the national level and a leading figure in the organized labor movement. Arrested several times in the past, he reappeared in Rostov in 1917 and was immediately elected to the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.

After those first few euphoric weeks that followed the February Revolution, it soon became clear that freedom was only freedom and nothing more; that for victory in war one must fight, and that to build civil society one must work. In other words, things were not going to simply take care of themselves. As a result, those seized by revolutionary fervor began to search for the cause of their worsening material conditions. A new search for enemies was underway. For some it was the Kadets, for others the Bolsheviks, for still others the bourgeoisie. But for an even greater number, these enemies were to be the Jews. The open and active work of politicians of Jewish heritage, no mat-
ter what their position or ideological orientation might be, now seemed to confirm the writings of antisemitic thinkers and journalists.

The growth in antisemitic sentiment that began in the summer of 1917 was universally noted by contemporaries of every political conviction and creed.

It should be noted that the disappearance of parties to the “right” of the Kadets from the Russian political scene after the February Revolution did not mean the disappearance of those newspapers that liked to publish articles written in the spirit of the Black Hundreds. Likewise it did not entail the disappearance of the admittedly significant readership of said publications. One such publication, A. A. Suvorin’s Malen’kaia Gazeta (Little Newspaper), claimed that it was “for Jewish equality, but against Jewish dominance,” to quote the title of one of its articles. Denying any charges of antisemitism, it implored: “good Jews, good Russian citizens, cast out your reckless, evil tribesmen yourselves, for they will bring great harm to your people in Russia.” The newspaper published articles that would make claims along the lines of “the second army is under the command of the ‘Bolshevik’, Rabinovich.” Authors of such articles would call attention to the ethnic heritage of their political opponents, playing on the nationalistic sympathies of their readers. According to contemporaries, Little Newspaper would “sell out in minutes,” was “vulgar and illiterate, but contained true life, and its readers were addicted to it.” Its popularity can be measured by the increase in its print runs, from 20,000–60,000 copies in 1916 up to 109,000 copies in June of 1917.74

In the beginning of June, 1917, Jewish Week already noted with some concern that “among the masses Leninism is beginning to be associated with the idea of a specifically Jewish kind of agitation, and though this demagogic tendency is refuted every day, it still calls forth more and more hatred. In this fertile soil. . . . will a wave of antisemitic pogroms grow.” The paper associated this rise with the yellow press, publications such as Vechernee Vremia (Evening Times) and Little Newspaper, which were dedicated to trash the “Bolshevik Jews, who appear in public using Russian last names.” Little Newspaper in particular, “the mouthpiece of that journalistic villain, Aleksei Suvorin” would “day in and day out” prominently display a list of all Jewish Bolsheviks, both their real names and their pseudonyms.75 Jewish Week’s contention that taking on a Russian last name in a country where Russian is the dominant language is completely natural—and that such complaints could
just as easily apply to the Russian “Ulianov”—would probably have done little to convince the readers of these tabloids. The success of Little Newspaper was due in no small part to the fact that it had its finger on the pulse of a certain segment of Russian society, who considered their misfortunes to be the result of the sudden arrival of “foreigners” in positions of power.

By June, Jewish circles in Petrograd were extremely concerned as to what form the “Christian masses’ response to Jewish ‘activity’” would take. Alarmed by the lack of tact displayed by Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, the author of the “Notes” section of Jewish Week feared that should a time of troubles ensue, the Jews would be blamed for “the anarchy brought into Russian life as a result of Marxism and maximalism.”

On June 8 a meeting took place in the hall of the Petrograd stock exchange. The topic of conversation was the response of Jewish society to the current political climate. Vinaver, Sliozberg, and Dubnov all spoke, with the latter “disowning” the “Bolshevik demagogues” from the Jewish community.

At approximately the same time Gorky remarked in an article from the cycle Untimely Thoughts (Nesvoevremennyye Mysli) that “antisemitism is still alive, and is slowly and carefully rearing its wretched head once more, hissing, slandering, splattering with the poisonous spittle of hatred”:

How did this happen? It turns out there were two Jews among the more anarchic Bolsheviks. Or maybe the number was even as high as three. Some even count as many as seven and are firmly convinced that these seven Samsons will reduce the 170-million-strong Russian temple to rubble.

It would be funny and stupid, if it weren’t so despicable . . .

There are . . . thousands of proofs demonstrating that the equation Jew = Bolshevik is a stupid one, the result of the zoolo-gical tendencies of agitated Russian citizens.

I, of course, will not take the trouble to provide these proofs—honorable people have no need of them, while those lacking honor would find them unconvincing.

Idiocy is a disease that cannot be cured by means of sugges-tion. To the person suffering from this incurable condition it crystal clear: since there are seven and a half Jews among the Bolsheviks, the Jews are to blame for everything . . .

And after all of this, the honest and sane Russian man will once more begin to feel alarmed, and will experience a tormenting
shame for his Rus’, and for the Russian blockhead who in times of trouble immediately looks for an enemy from without, instead of in the depths of his own stupidity.78

Stupidity, however, is an international phenomenon. After all, the belief on the part of many Jewish activists that a mere change in the external power structure of the country would solve the “Jewish question” could also be attributed to stupidity or naïveté. The Russian Revolution gave the Jews the March 22 declaration of equal rights, passed by the Provisional Government. However, it would also later give them an explosion of pogrom activity and an indescribable amount of suffering. As is often the case with such tragedies, all this would happen to a group of people who were, to a large extent, apolitical in nature.

After the events of July 1917 (the “dress rehearsal” for the Bolshevik coup), Stepun recalled how “janitors, shop-owners, cabbies, and barbers, all of the unwashed masses of the Petrograd petit bourgeoisie were dying for the opportunity to attack ‘comrades, Jews, and traitors’.”79

The renowned literary historian Boris Eichenbaum recorded a conversation he overheard in a bookshop on August 23, where an elderly sailor said “The revolution is insane, it was carried out by a minority, there aren’t any Russians in the Soviet of Workers Deputies, they are all traitors that should be hanged.” The owner of the book shop agreed with him, saying, “The Jews did everything.”80

Dubnov writes the following on September 20: “the shops are filled with the most scandalous conversations about how the Yids are evil, how they made themselves rich during the war at the expense of the people’s misfortune, how Jews have seized power in the city Dumas and government institutions.”81

It is somewhat curious that some far-right journalists, as well as a good portion of the military rank-and-file that the Bolsheviks were dependent on, would all agree that the Bolshevik struggle was a fight against the Jews. One possible explanation is that a number of the Bolsheviks’ opponents in the Soviets and other organizations in Petrograd were Jews such as Iu. O. Martov, G. I. Shreider, and A. R. Gots (who would later head the anti-Bolshevik Committee for Saving the Motherland and the Revolution). Another possible explanation was the pronounced tendency of the political “base” to associate any hostile force with Jewishness.

At the same time, the rank-and-file would quickly forget the nationality of those speakers whose slogans were supportive of their own goals. Thus a
battalion stationed in Mogilev were willing to “benevolently forgive” a female Bolshevik agitator who called for a quick end to the war, but nearly beat to death S. Ia. Lur’e, who, as a representative of the Soviet, claimed that any peace, even a separate one, could only be achieved through a long period of negotiations. The Ukrainian peasantry could also engage in such “internationalism” if it served their interests. Thus in Odessa, the Social Revolutionary S. S. Zak was wildly popular following the February Revolution and was considered an expert on the “agrarian question.” In fact, he became so popular, that it was said that peasants would come to the city and ask, “Where’s the Yid who’s giving out land?”

“How fast are these changes in the psychological state of the masses!” wrote V. I. Vernadskii, a member of the Kadet Central Committee as well as Deputy Minister of Education for the Provisional Government. “Jews now command the military. Who could have dreamed of that even twelve or eighteen months ago?” A week earlier, he had written that some of the socialist Deputy Ministers reported, “among the crowds of Smolny monastery the word zhid is heard at every step.”

The Cossacks, who had come to the defense of the Winter Palace, at first claimed that Lenin and “his whole gang were a bunch of Yids.” However, realizing the weak position of the defenders of the Provisional Government, they soon changed their minds and departed. As it turned out, according to a certain Cossack Cadet Officer (Podkhorunzhii), the Provisional Government was only supported by “women and Yids” and “half the government are Yids too.” “But the Russian people stayed with Lenin” said the same officer, explaining his betrayal.

Kerensky’s decline in popularity led to a rumor that he was actually Jewish. Upon leaving the Winter Palace on the eve of the Bolshevik coup, he happened to catch a glimpse of the following piece of graffiti: “Down with the Jew Kerensky, long live Trotsky!”

Contemporaries often remarked upon the “Jewishness” of this or that political actor during the Revolutionary period. This was especially true when the person in question belonged to the opposing camp. The Kadet V. D. Nabokov, a member of the All-Russian Commission for the Elections to the Constituent Assembly, was arrested towards the end of November 1917 for refusing to recognize the authority of the Soviet of People’s Commissars. Sentenced to five days in Smolny, Nabokov was apparently indifferent to the Jewish heritage of his colleagues L. M. Branson, M. V. Vishniak, and V. M. Gessen, the last of whom had come to Smolny voluntarily in support of his
fellow Kadets. However, Nabokov could not help but note the “repulsive, shabbily dressed figure” of M. S. Uritsky, who had “brazen, Jewish facial features.” Uritsky was the commissar of Tavricheskii Palace; Nabokov would have to deal with him later after his release from prison.  

The only newspaper of a more “traditional” antisemitic orientation that continued to publish after the February Revolution was Groza (Thunderstorm). After the Bolshevik coup, it claimed, “The Bolsheviks have seized power. The Jew Kerensky, lackey to the British and the world’s bankers, having brazenly assumed the title of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and having appointed himself Prime Minister of the Orthodox Russian Tsardom, will be swept out of the Winter Palace, where he had desecrated the remains of the Peace-Maker Alexander III with his presence. On October 25, the Bolsheviks united all the regiments who refused to submit to a government composed of Jew bankers, treasonous generals, traitorous land-owners, and thieving merchants.”

A week later, Groza evaluated the Bolsheviks’ actions in much the same terms. “A remarkable order has been established by the Bolsheviks over the past eight days. There have been no robberies, nor any instances of violence!” “The Bolsheviks have an enemy in the Jewish [zhidovski] kahals, the traitors from among the land-owners, generals, merchants, and government workers. . . . In Petrograd the Jewish Rescue Committee under the leadership of the Yid Gots transmitted a secret order from Kerensky on October 28 to Yids in military academies to resist turning in their arms, promising to return to the capital the next day. The Latvians and Armenians listened to the Jews, but many Russians refused.”

The newspaper was closed by the Bolsheviks following the publication of this edition, their support for the new regime notwithstanding. The Bolsheviks were hardly in need of such “defenders.”

Ilia Ehrenburg wrote M. A. Voloshin from Moscow in November of 1917, soon after the Bolsheviks seized power:

The worst began after their triumph. It is strangely desolate. Moscow has been tortured, crippled, and left empty. The Bolsheviks are on a rampage. I find myself thinking more and more about going abroad; as soon as the opportunity appears, I will leave. I am doing this to save Russia for myself, to leave open the possibility of someday living here. These hideous abominations are truly “cray-fish caviar.” I would really like to work, but this is impossible
here. Yesterday I was standing in line, waiting to vote for the
Constituent Assembly. People were saying, “Whoever’s against the
Yids, vote for number 5! (meaning the Bolsheviks),” “whoever’s for
world-wide revolution, vote for number 5!” The patriarch rode by,
sprinkling holy water; everyone removed their hats. A group of
soldiers passing by started to belt out the *Internationale* in his
direction. Where am I? Or is this truly hell?\(^93\)

S. Ia. Lur’e was shocked by the combination of Bolshevik propaganda and
antisemitism prevalent in the campaign period leading up to the elections for
the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd. In the Okhta area of the city where he
lived, Bolshevik agitators assured voters that Kerensky was, in fact, a Jew.\(^94\)

In a diary entry dated November 16, 1917, the publicist D. V. Filosofov
recorded a story recounted to him by I. I. Manukhin, who had been serving
as a doctor in the Peter and Paul Fortress, where the ministers of the Provi-
sional Government were imprisoned:

Today in the fortress there was a curious incident. A group of Red
Guards came to the Commandant’s office quarters. One of them
was drinking water, having grown tired of talking. He had been at
Andreev’s coffee house, “beating up Yids.”

—Are you a Bolshevik?
—Yes!
—Then why are you beating up Yids?
—I don’t know, they told us to go to the coffee house, there
were Yids there. What do I have to do with it? I don’t
know. . . . etc.\(^95\)

Similar incidents could be found outside of the capitals. As the masses
that the Bolsheviks depended on grew more radicalized, their antisemitic
tendencies were noticed by the Jewish bourgeoisie as well as by socialist politi-
cians of Jewish heritage, especially as they repeatedly spoke out against the
Bolsheviks.

The first “shot” was fired in a meeting of the Rostov-on-Don Soviet on
October 14, 1917, which was dedicated to preparations for the All-Russian
Congress of Soviets. First Lokerman, and then Shraiber attempted to con-
vince those gathered that the Congress would lead to the end of democracy,
and criticized the tactics of the Bolsheviks. They were interrupted by whistles and cries of “Down with the Jewish [zhidovskikh] deputies! Get the Yid off the stage!” At the next meeting of the Soviet, where it was clear that a majority had sided with the Bolsheviks, Gdalii Freid, “taking note of the Bolshevik majority of the Soviet, expressed the desire that the comrade Bolsheviks would take measures to prevent the shouting of pogromistic sentiments such as were heard at the last meeting.”

The “comrade Bolsheviks” promised to do so. But how could the Bolshevik leadership possibly control the dark masses on which they were so dependent?

All of the Jewish parties and groups took a negative view of the Bolshevik coup. The Zionist newspaper Togblat (Daily Newspaper) made a careful distinction between the two revolutions of 1917. “In March the revolution was of the people, in the fullest sense of the word. Now it presents itself as a conspiracy among the soldiers.” The Bund newspaper Arbeiter Shtime (Worker’s Voice) called the Bolshevik coup “insanity.”

An emergency session of the Central Committee of the Bund took place in Minsk after the Bolshevik coup. Attendees included A. I. Vainshtein, A. Litvak, Ester (M. Ia. Frumkina), M. G. Rafes, and A. I. Chemerinskii. A resolution was passed placing “full political responsibility” on the Bolsheviks for the “insurrection and civil war that was begun by them against the will of the majority of the revolutionary democratic parties during the two weeks before elections to the Constituent Assembly, where the problem of reorganizing the structures of power could have been achieved through peaceful means in concert with all of the revolutionary democratic forces.” The resolution claimed that the Bolsheviks had isolated themselves from the rest of “revolutionary democracy” and were forced to act “in means that would suppress democratic freedoms and condone unchecked terror, which is always a characteristic of government by a minority. The Bolshevik terror, which based itself on the military dictatorship of the armed forces, presents a great danger to the revolution and opens the path for the establishment of a military dictatorship of the counterrevolution.”

One of the Bund’s proclamations during the election period called upon the citizens of the Vitebsk and Mogilev gubernias not to vote for the Bolsheviks, “who were responsible for the civil war, who had led the revolution to the precipice by their insurrection, and who made use of oppression, persecution, and violence.” Their publications called upon people to engage in
sabotage against Bolshevik power. At the same time R. Abramovich warned against armed resistance to Bolshevism, as this could push the masses, who were capable only of seeing in black and white, into the arms of the Bolsheviks. G. Erlikh foresaw that enthusiasm for Bolshevism would also come to the “Jewish street,” but also that such interest would be short-lived, as Jewish workers could not support a party that lived “next door” to the Black Hundreds.

The leading articles of *Jewish Week* for the middle of November 1917 carried typical titles: “In the Chaos of Destruction” and “Waiting for Catastrophe.” The author of the latter wrote, “Russian Jewry, unlike the Ukrainians, Cossacks, or people of the Caucuses, cannot fence themselves off territorially from brazen experimenters. Their political and economic interests are too entwined with the native Russian population; we are compelled to undertake the most active and energetic part in saving Russia from the Bolshevik attack.”

Russian citizens of Jewish heritage undertook armed struggle against the “Bolshevik attack” from the very beginning of the Revolution and the Civil War. Stereotypes in the social consciousness and historical literature somehow “automatically” place Jews in the Bolshevik camp. In reality, however, Jews fought on both sides of the barricade, at least at first.

“For the past several days the Jewish community in Petrograd has been mourning its numerous victims in the same way as if a pogrom had been taking place” noted the article “Funerals of the Jewish Cadets,” published in *Vecherniaia pochta* (*The Evening Post*) on November 6, 1917. “More than 50 victims were buried in the Jewish section of Preobrazhensky cemetery. Among those were 35 cadets who died during the siege of the Vladimir Academy and telephone station.” Before joining the academy, most of these victims were students enrolled in the Psychoneurological Institute. Jewish cadets also took part in the defense of the Winter Palace.

The number of Jewish officers in the army should not come as a surprise. After Jews received full civil rights, many Jewish youths, who had early viewed military service somewhat indifferently, enthusiastically joined the ranks of the Russian army and joined in her defense. The relatively high levels of education among the Jewish population led to many being accepted to officers’ school. They rushed to defend the democratic government, which they quite rightly considered to be their own.

Another Petrograd newspaper, *Volia Naroda* (*Will of the People*), published a brief article on November 5, 1917 entitled “In the Peter and Paul Fortress,” which listed a number of officers who had ended up in the prison.
It included the names of thirty-five officers, including names such as Lifshits, Mirochnik, Berman, Levin, Soloveichik, and others. There were a total of twelve Jewish names. 107

Nevertheless Jewish circles attempted to deny the Jewish heritage of many of the Bolshevik leaders. On November 26, 1917, a Zionist meeting took place in Petrograd. It had been called to celebrate the long-awaited liberation of Jerusalem by British forces; though those gathered had no way of knowing this, troops under the command of General Allenby were to enter Jerusalem on that very day. At the meeting, M. S. Shvartzman, a doctor, remarked, “We do not want Russian Jewry as a whole to be held responsible for the actions of these repulsive butchers, these renegades of Jewry. Rather, we would hope that they themselves will be held responsible for their actions before our entire people.”

The author of the short article “On the Threshold of the Promised Land,” published in Vechernii Chas (Evening Hour) on November 27, 1917, which quoted Shvartzman’s words, commented, “The speaker chose not to name names. But the perceptive audience knew who he was talking about, the Nakhamkises, Bronshteins, and others.” 108

Yet it was to prove difficult to disassociate the Bolshevik leadership from the rest of Russia’s Jewry. Unlike the Jewish officers who perished in relative anonymity, the names of Trotsky, Zinoviev and others were on everyone’s lips.

On January 7, 1918, the chronicler of Russian Jewry Semen Dubnov, wrote, “They won’t forget about the participation of Jewish revolutionaries during the Bolshevik Terror. Lenin’s comrades, the Trotskys, Zinovievs, Uritskys, etc., will end up screening him from criticism. Even now I can already hear how people quietly call Smolny “Yid Central” [tsentrozhid] under their breath. Soon they’ll start saying it out loud, and judeophobia will take deep root in all sectors of Russian society. They won’t forgive us. The earth is fertile for antisemitism.” 109

Dubnov was wrong on the last count. The stage had been set for antisemitism at a much earlier date.

On May 10, upon hearing of the pogrom being carried out by Red Army units in Novgorod-Severskii, he wrote, “We are perishing because of the Bolsheviks, and will die at their hands.” 110

On July 7, 1918, “For 35 years I cursed Tsarist despotism, now I curse its reverse side, the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’” 111

And so we have come full circle.
Discrimination against the Jews in Tsarist Russia inexorably pushed a certain portion of the Jewish populace into the ranks of the revolutionaries. In addition to bringing long-awaited civil rights, the revolution was inevitably to bring countless tragedies and misfortunes to Russian Jewry. It was a set of problems with no “correct” solution. Attempts to find such a solution were paid for by the blood of tens of thousands of victims.
Soon after the Bolshevik coup, a writer for the “Kader” publication *Jewish Week* reported his observations on the civil servant strike then taking place. In particular, he was interested in those who were going to the Labor Ministry in search of jobs replacing the striking workers. The list of those interested numbered more than 300 individuals.

“I had a distinctly negative impression of those gathered,” wrote M. Levin in an article titled “A Sad Event” (*Grustnoe iavlenie*), “they were most striking in their lack of intelligence and composure. There were some refugees from the Baltics, soldiers, young women who had never worked anywhere, etc. One could immediately tell that these individuals who wanted to be ‘mobilized into the service’ were completely incapable of replacing the real workers. The entire ‘mobilization’ turned out to be a farce.”

Levin was struck by the number of Jews among the would-be strike-breakers. In talking with some of them, he discovered that “they are not Bolsheviks, and in general are not interested in politics. They are simply looking for something to do and are ready to take advantage of the opportunity.” The author was dismayed that “all of these young people felt no shame whatsoever. One young Jewess even boasted to her friend that the commissar had requested that she show up the very next day, as she was able to copy documents quickly.”

A writer from the Zionist publication *Rassvet (Dawn)* was likewise ironic:

I have no statistics at hand, but a good half of my acquaintances at least have entered the civil service; our children’s teacher (a Jew) has gone to work at the Department of War. I ran into the “unter-shames” [a synagogue assistant] from our congregation. He was...
walking around with a rifle on his shoulder, carrying on like he was some kind of militia member. A local reporter has become the commissioner of snow removal, a salesman from the local kosher shop is on some committee or other that’s working on the constitution, my tenant, a first rate psycho, is working in provisions (though I have no idea what it is he is supposed to be providing), and my secretary is running some kind of fortress or prison.

The writer I. F. Nazhivin recalled a visit he paid to V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, who at that time was in charge of the Sovnarkom. He had hoped to receive permission to go abroad. The meeting took place after the Soviet government had already been relocated to Moscow:

I arrived at the Kremlin at the indicated time. I went to the offices of the Sovnarkom, which at the time was located in the court building. All over the place there were Latvians, Jews, Jews, and more Jews. I have never been an antisemite, but the sheer number of them made it impossible to ignore. And they were all still wet behind the ears.

In this case it is easy to compare Nazhivin’s impressions with the actual list of those people who were working at the Council at this time. Nearly 30 people were employed there, including the second secretary Ia. Sh. Arganov (the future Chekist), Ia. I. Liberman and L. I. Morgenshtern, assistants to the secretary, expeditor B. Ia. Belenkaia, registrar M. R. Grosman and typist S. M. Livshits. In other words, nearly one-fifth of the employees there were Jews. This rate was the same for the other offices of the Sovnarkom as well; of the 105 individuals given permission to eat in the Sovnarkom canteen, about 20 were Jews. This was more than enough to make their presence “impossible to ignore.” V. G. Korolenko, who had lived in Poltava and considered himself a semitophile, experienced similar feelings: “There are a lot of Jewish boys in the Red Army, which is a bit irritating, especially as many of those in charge are Jews.”

Of course, for many the problem was not (only) in the number of Jews. It bears repeating that only a few months earlier, Jews had been forbidden from occupying high posts in the state apparatus. They were not even allowed to do technical work. Such a sudden change could not pass unnoticed. Jews had begun to play a role in society that they had never played before.
“To the local mentality this was one of the most surprising phenomena. Something had become real that earlier on had seemed possible only in fantasy. Large numbers of the Jewish semi-educated class were attracted en masse to the organizational and distribution departments of the government,” recalled Ia. A. Bromberg, a cadet from the Konstantin military academy in Kiev who had fought against the Bolsheviks in Kiev in November 1917. He was shocked to see “a Jewish soldier among the Sanhedrin of commissars” who subjected him to a “tortuous and meaningless interrogation”: “The timid and peaceful Jew, who in earlier times would have gladly dived into the nearest available hole upon encountering any outsider . . . disturbing nothing, lest he himself be harmed, [now] turned out to be a part of, and even in charge of, the most notorious bands of thugs.”

A. A. Borman, son of the famous Kadet A. V. Tyrkova-Williams, joined the Soviet civil service in early spring of 1918 as part of an undercover mission on behalf of the Volunteer Army. According to his memoirs, the Metropol Hotel, which was inhabited mostly by important Soviet officials, was filled with people, “who were attached to the present government only as a result of their material well-being.” “Bureaucrats, merchants, Jews from the Pale,” that was how the “secret agent inside the Kremlin” described the roster of the Sovnarkom.

The Metropol, where most of the Soviet elite lived, had been renamed the Second House of Soviets. The other famous Moscow hotel (The National) was renamed the First House of Soviets. On June 2, 1918, 148 government officials or party activists (not including family members) resided in the former “National.” About 30 of these were Jews. Not all of them were Bolshevik Party members; part of the building belonged to the Left SRs. These latter included Party leader B. D. Kamkov (Katz), Chekist G. D. Zaks, Central Committee members Ia. M. Fishman, L. M. Braginskii, V. M. Levin and others could be counted among the denizens of the First House of the Soviets. After the Left SRs revolt on July 6, many inhabitants of the First House went on to meet a variety of fates. Kamkov, after numerous arrests and periods in exile, was eventually shot in 1938. Zaks joined the Bolsheviks and, like many of his comrades, was executed in 1937. Levin managed to emigrate to the United States. But for the time being at least, they and the other Left SRs, including Maria Spiridonova and V. A. Aleksandrovich (then Dzerzhinsky’s deputy), were neighbors and allies of their future persecutors and executioners, the Chekists I. K. Ksenofontov and Ia. Kh. Peters.
According to Borman, most of the Soviet civil servants had little love for the Bolsheviks at first. However, “having settled in to their new jobs they quickly changed and began to fear new changes more than anything else . . . Officers of the General Staff raced each other in their desire for additional perks. Old, decent workers in the Justice Ministry convinced themselves that they had to serve the new authorities faithfully. The rationalizations were the most primitive: better to let what is remain, otherwise it will cease to be. The effectiveness of ration cards was not limited to the workers.”

At a later date, the satirical poet Leri (V. V. Klopotovskii) wrote the following work regarding the adaptive abilities of a certain segment of the Russian intelligentsia:

When the evil Central Executive Committee, without any right,
Began its march against the people,
And forced them to clean ditches,
As if they had sinister intentions,
Blessed was he who did not waste the day,
And going to the Communist Commissars,
Did not hide his social skills,
And immediately joined the service,
He who having found the norm,
Managed to understand the historical moment,
And placed one foot, so to say,
On the Soviet platform,
He who managed to take on a loyal face,
Even if he was not of the Bolshevik race.

But it was not rations alone that led people to decide to serve the Soviet state. Under the Bolsheviks, a hitherto unknown democratization of power was taking place. It was democratic in the literal sense of the word. The *demos* occupied positions of power that previously would have been unthinkable, due to class, religious, or educational restrictions. “I have seen so many people, particularly among the Jews, who in old times were virgins when it came to power, so many people who were in love with the task before them,” wrote Viktor Shklovsky in Finland in 1922.

Lenin claimed that the Jews who joined the Soviet civil service “eliminated the widespread sabotage that we had encountered immediately after the October Revolution and which had been extremely dangerous for us.”
discussion of Gorky’s pamphlet “About Jews” (“O evreiakh”) gave Lenin the opportunity to further elucidate the role that Jews and other ethnic minorities had played in the revolution. In particular, Lenin touched upon the importance of the evacuation of the factories and the Jewish population from the Baltics to Central Russia. While the “Latvians induced steadiness and order” into the ranks of the Russian working class, a “significant number of Jews from the middle intelligentsia” “sabotaged the sabotage” of the civil servants and greatly assisted the revolution in a difficult moment. He emphasized that the Bolsheviks were able to “seize and significantly alter the state apparatus due to this reserve of sober, literate and more or less capable group of new officials.” Lenin wholeheartedly agreed with Dimanshtein’s contention that Jewish “elements” played a large role in the revolution, though he thought it unwise to “single out this moment in the press for numerous reasons.”

Of course, in order to aid the revolution in the central provinces, the Jews had to get there first. This move was carried out by the military authorities during World War I. The number of refugees and displaced persons, according to various sources, ranged from 500,000 to a million. Massive deportations and the impossibility of resettling the displaced within the Pale forced the government to temporarily lift the restrictions on Jewish residency outside of the Pale in August of 1915.

There were 211,691 Jewish refugees and evacuees in Russia, according to EKOPO (The Jewish Committee for Assistance to War Victims) and the Tatianin Committee, the organizations set up to provide them with assistance. Of course, the true number is probably somewhat larger, as it is highly unlikely that all refugees were accounted for by charitable organizations.

The refugees arrived from a number of regions (Northwestern—136,431; Poland—26,223; the Baltics—22,242; Southwestern—11,426; no data—12,691). The gubernias with the highest numbers of refugees were the following: Kovno (69,313), Grodno (30,356), Vilna (30,149), and Courland (16,782).

By the second half of 1916, the “old” districts of the Pale had lost 116,698 (55 percent) of their Jewish population, while the “new” districts had lost 94,993 (45 percent). The refugees resettled in the following locales: areas near the front, 66,008 (31 percent); southern gubernias, 65,108 (31 percent); central gubernias, 33,458 (16 percent); Volga region, 34,015 (16 percent); other gubernias, 13,103 (6 percent). In sum, Jewish refugees resettled in 349 different locations.
throughout Russia. Around 95 percent of Jewish refugees who left the Pale of Settlement resettled in cities. Only fragmentary information regarding specific cities is available. According to a census of Jewish refugees carried out in March 1917, 4,307 Jews resettled in Voronezh. By the end of 1916, 500 Jews had fled to the Belgorod uyezd in the Kursk gubernia. The Jewish population of Rostov-on-Don increased by 2,000 individuals from 1914 to 1918, largely due to Jewish refugees.

Charitable organizations registered 140,988 men and 14,579 women, from a variety of professional backgrounds. Craftsmen and those working in industry comprised 51.8 percent of all refugees, those in trade 36.7 percent. Smaller groups included the “free” professions (7 percent) and those employed in private service (1.6 percent) and agriculture (1 percent).

The government contributed nearly 17 million rubles in aid to Jewish refugees. More than 10 million rubles in additional aid came from abroad, including 7.25 million rubles sent from the United States, with the rest coming from Great Britain, South Africa, France, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, and Scotland. Contributions came from both Jewish and Christian charities. The Jewish Central Committee for Victims of the War collected 3,769,799.88 rubles, of which 2,020,584.44 were donated by Petrograd Jews. Aid from July 1, 1914 until July 1, 1917 totaled 31,119,917.44 rubles. Though a significant sum to be sure, it was hardly enough to compensate for all the loss and hardship experienced by the refugees during their exodus.

Jewish refugees received the least assistance from their Russian compatriots and non-Jewish organizations within Russia. Their total donations amounted to less than a third of the sum given by the Scottish Christian Fund, which totaled 291,892 rubles. The main donors on the Russian side were N. A. Shakhov and a certain Tishchenko (10,000 each) and the editorial offices of Russkie Vedomosti (15,000).

Upon their arrival, the Jewish refugees were hardly given a warm welcome. The first 600 refugees to Vladimir were personally met at the railway station by the governor, who informed them that only 60 of them were allowed to stay, while the rest had to travel farther north. The governor of Tambov interfered in the distribution of governmental aid to the refugees, claiming they were receiving more than adequate support from their coreligionists in Petrograd. Several local authorities also made it perfectly clear that the newcomers should not show their faces on the street. Of course, such prejudices were not limited to Russians. An English nurse by the name Violetta Thurstan managed to outdo her Russian coworkers during her time
Bolsheviks

in the Polish territories. She believed that Jewish refugees suffered less than other nationalities as they were, according to their nature and instincts, a nomadic people with no roots. Thus, she reasoned, it was easier for Jews to settle into new surroundings and adapt to new work. Moreover, they were assisted by their fellow Jews. Thurstan was convinced that many Jews were sympathetic to the Germans, and that any impoverished Jew could making up for his losses by selling information to the enemy.²⁵

By December 1917, there were approximately 2,481,666 Jews in German occupied territories. The Polish territories under Russian control contained 1,675,666 Jews (14 percent of the total population of Poland), while the Vilna gubernia (excluding two uezds), and the Grodno, Kovno, and Courland gubernias held 808,000, or 15 percent of the total population. In the former Pale gubernias there were approximately 3,305,000 Jews (10 percent of the population), and there were 532,000 Jews (0.5 percent) living outside the Pale, for a total of 3,837,000 people. In addition, 78,832 Jews (0.6 percent) lived in the Caucasus, 38,730 (0.6 percent) were in Siberia, and 17,532 (0.2 percent) were in Central Asia.²⁶

For our purposes, however, the Jewish population of Moscow and Petrograd is of much greater importance. According to a law enacted on August 19, 1915 entitled “On permitting Jewish refugees to inhabit urban centers outside of the Pale of their settlement” (O razreshenii evreiam-bezhentsam zhitel’stva v gorodskikh poseleniakh vne cherty obshchei ikh osedlosti) Jewish refugees were forbidden from resettling in the capitals, rural areas, and Cossack territories. Nonetheless, the Jewish population in Moscow and Petrograd grew. A census counted 101,000 refugees in Petrograd and its suburbs on February 26, 1916. Of these 4.4 percent were Jews. It is highly likely that there were also a good number of Jews among the 20 percent of those surveyed who refused to list their ethnicity and religious beliefs.²⁷

A year later the ensuing revolution completely removed all restrictions on Jewish mobility throughout Russia. By 1917, Petrograd had a population of 2.5 million people, including 50,000 Jews (by comparison there were 34,095 Jews in Petrograd in 1910, a little less than 2 percent of the city’s population). By June 1918, Petrograd’s population decreased to 1,469,000, and by August of 1920 it had shrunk even further, to 722,000. The Jewish population, however, decreased at a much slower rate. According to demographics, there were nearly 30,000 Jews in Petrograd in 1920.²⁸ Of course, by this time the composition of the Jewish population had greatly changed. Many members of the former elite had gone abroad or fled to the south. These included

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M. M. Vinaver, O. O. Gruzenberg, G. B. Slizyber, and the Gintsburg family.

The revolution sped the process of assimilation for Russia’s Jewish population. Before the revolution the number of mixed marriages had been fairly insignificant, but by 1920 34 percent of all Jewish marriages involved a non-Jewish partner.29

By the summer of 1917, nearly 57,000 Jews above the age of 15 resided in Moscow, according to one survey. The commission in charge of the survey put the population of those younger at 15–20 percent of the population, for a total of 65,000–69,000 Jews. Of these, recent arrivals accounted for no less than 60 percent.30

Thousands of Jews were forced to leave their homes at a moment’s notice from territories near the German front. Gorky painted a picture in his typically emotional style: “They expelled them, 15–20 thousand at a time. The entire Jewish population of the city! In 24 hours! Sick children were transported in wagons like frozen livestock, like little pigs. Thousands of people marched along the virgin snow, pregnant women gave birth alongside the road, people fell ill, and the elderly perished.”31 In their new homes Jews were forbidden from buying land. Meanwhile the Ministry of Internal Affairs was coming out against the Jews’ returning to their former homes after these areas were liberated from the enemy. Their justification for this policy was the notion that Jews were unsuited for agricultural work, as well as the belief that the army had to be protected from potential spies.32 The imperial authorities created Lenin’s “reserve” with their own hands. In addition to the large number of civilian refugees, it should also be kept in mind that there were a good number of Jewish soldiers as well. While it is probably impossible to arrive at a precise number of these Jewish soldiers who ended up far away from their birthplaces, the total probably numbered in the thousands.

* * *

The steady stream of Jews entering the service of the Soviet state is hardly surprising. Unlike the vast majority of the population, Jews could not escape to the countryside to wait out the tumultuous times. During the period of War Communism the population of Petrograd was reduced by three-quarters, whereas the Jewish population only decreased by a little more than two-thirds (and some sources claim it only decreased by half). Civil service presented itself as perhaps the only means by which they could survive in an
era characterized by the liquidation of private property. This was even more true for refugees, who had been subsisting on charitable donations. The revolution resulted in thousands of “vacancies,” and the very real chance to make a career by means of this sudden opportunity was tempting to many. Jews were particularly well situated to succeed in the new order due to their high rates of literacy and education. In addition, few Jews had deep ties to the previous regime. In the vast majority of cases, it is difficult to say whether the new workers entered the service because of their political convictions, or whether their political convictions were an extension of their new careers. Noting that the people “dispossessed” as a result of the revolution were disproportionately Jewish, the Menshevik St. Ivanovich (S. O. Portugeis) wrote:

The plagues being visited upon the Jews (not as “Jews” of course, but as “bourgeois”) were mostly carried out with the assistance of Jewish agents from among the communists and renegade Jews from other parties. These “bourgeois” were persecuted by the same Jewish children who had grown up on the very same street, and who were now seduced by bolshevism . . . This terror and persecutor was no “dover-aher” but our “very own Yankel,” the son of Rabbi Moishe from Kasrilovka, a completely harmless young man who had last year failed his pharmacology exam, but had managed to pass his politgramota exam.33

Of course, the number of Bolsheviks of Jewish extraction was not limited to failed apothecaries. From 1918 to 1920, three Jews served as People’s Commissars (Trotsky, I. E. Gukovskii, who headed Finance from April to August 1918, and M. G. Bronskii, who was the head of Trade and Industry from March to November of 1918) in the Soviet Government (Sovnarkom, The Soviet of People’s Commissars). During the same period, there were 15 Russian People’ Commissars, in addition to a Pole, a Georgian, and a Latvian, for a total of 21 people (not including left SRs). From April to May of 1918, Jews comprised approximately 20 percent of all collegiums of People’s Commissariats (Narkomats) members (24 of 114). Here too the majority were Russians (76 of 114).34

Jews were also prevalent in those spheres that they had dominated under the old regime. All of the workers in the Department of Legal Publications at the Sovnarkom were Jews—S. M. Flaksman, M. A. Ziskin, A. F. Roizman, and R. B. Refes.35 There were also a large number of Jewish workers in the
However, only an insignificant number of these were members of the Bolshevik Party. Among the professional lawyers who entered the Soviet civil service was Aleksandr Grigorievich Goikhbarg (1883–1962), who, according to V. A. Maklakov, “had never been a communist, but had always been a perfect scoundrel, and a corrupt one at that.” From 1904 to 1917 Goikhbarg had been a Menshevik, but after the February revolution he became a lecturer at Petrograd University, taught at the Bestuzhev courses, and collaborated on the liberal journal *Law Pravo* (*Law*). In 1917, he had also served as one of the editors for the Menshevik publication *Novaia zhizn’* (*New Life*). He launched a brilliant career in the Soviet period. In 1918, he became a member of the Collegium of the Narkomat of Legal Affairs, as head of the bureau for law codification. In 1919 he was forced to work in Siberia, where he joined the Russian Communist Party (RKP (b)). In May of 1920 in Omsk, he served as a prosecutor in the first Soviet show trial following the defeat of the Kolchak Government. Trial records (particularly those regarding Goikhbarg’s performance at the meetings of the Siberian Bolshevik Central Committee, where it was agreed on beforehand who would face the death penalty) do little to change the picture of Goikhbarg as a “perfect scoundrel.” His zeal and “professionalism” were duly rewarded; from 1921 to 1923 Goikhbarg served as the chairman of the “small” Sovnar-kom, and it was under his leadership that the civil code of the RSDSR was prepared.

Of course, not all of those working for Soviet justice were scoundrels and careerists. Among the many true adherents to the revolution was Aleksandr Isaakovich Khmelnitskii (1889–1919). In 1918, he served as the general counsel for the Narkom of Legal Affairs. A lawyer’s son and native of Odessa, Khmelnitskii finished school at the top of his class and graduated from the Novorossiisk University law faculty with highest honors. Gifted with a remarkable memory, he served as a consultant for the Conference of Justices of Peace and the Society for the Defense of Women before the February Revolution. He joined the Bolsheviks in 1917, and became the leader of the party organization in Odessa, distinguishing himself as a fiery orator. By 1919, he had become the People’s Commissar for the Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of Ukraine, a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party, and the deputy of the head of the Political Directorate of Internal Military Security of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). At the age of 30, Khmelnitskii died of typhus. One can only guess how such a brilliant career might have continued.
The Print Bureau of the Sovnarkom was headed by the Bolshevik Tovii Lazarevich Akselrod (1888–1938). There were several Jews among his staff (many of whom had no party affiliation) who worked as copy editors, typists, couriers, and so on. The “Sovietization” of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had earlier been closed to Jews, was a task given to Ivan Abramovich Zalkind (1885–1928), a representative of Trotsky. Zalkind, a member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDRP) from the age of 18, had repeatedly been threatened with arrest and exile before the Revolution, and emigrated to France in 1908, where he completed a doctoral program in biology at the Sorbonne. Like Akselrod, he returned to Russia after the February Revolution, and participated in the October coup in Petrograd. Despite the resistance of many of the former workers of the ministry, Zalkind was able to transform it by relying on the relatively few supporters of the regime within the ministry itself, and by introducing new revolutionary workers into the mix. In December of 1917 he became head of the Western Countries bureau, and soon after, in January of 1918, was appointed Ambassador to Switzerland.

Jews likewise played a vital role in the Soviet and Party apparatuses in Petrograd. In September of 1918 they composed 9 percent of all Party operatives, and nearly 54 percent of those among senior officials. According to M. Beizer, the total percentage of Jews in the Bolshevik City Committee (Gorkom) and Gubernia Committee (Gubkom) in 1918 was 45 percent, though by 1921 it was only 22 percent. The Zionist A. Idelson, in attempting to explain the growing numbers of Jews in the corridors of Bolshevik power, claimed that in the educated portion of the masses the majority were Jews. Perhaps he was right. As the lower classes grew in power and influence, so too did the role of Jews in Soviet and Party structures. Five out of the eleven people in the Petrograd Gorkom in 1918 were of Jewish origin, and three of the five members of the Presidium of the Petrograd Council of Trade Unions (Petrosovprof) in 1919 were Jews. This, of course, was the Party elite, with the “proconsul” of Petrograd, Zinoviev, at its head.

The situation was different at the lower levels of the Party machine. According to V. L. Burtsev, in 1919 the Bolshevik Party in was 2.6 percent Jewish, as opposed to 1.8 percent of the general population. By comparison, the Bolshevik Party in Petrograd was 74.2 percent Russian (Russians made up 92.6 percent of the general population), 10.6 percent Latvian (0.7 percent), 6.3 percent Polish (4.2). From these numbers it is readily apparent that the Jewish rank and file did not immediately flock to the Bolshevik Party.
Of the 23,600 members of the Bolshevik Party in January of 1917, nearly 1000 were Jews (4.3 percent). Towards the beginning of 1921 (after the major military conflicts of the Civil War), the number had grown to 17,400, although this was still only 2.5 percent of the party as a whole. The Bolshevik Party, which saw a rapid increase in membership in 1917 from 40,000 members in April to 200,000 by August (before decreasing to 115,000 in 1918) saw a proportionally smaller increase in the number of Jewish members. In 1922, according to a variety of sources, anywhere from 1175 to 2182 Jews joined the Party in 1917. Keeping in mind the fact that Jews in general tended to be more politically active than other ethnic groups, it would seem that on the whole they preferred to join other political organizations.

A brief list of the number of Jews who joined the Communist Party by year, according to Party documents: Before 1917, 964 members, 1917 (2,182), 1918 (2,712), 1919 (5,673), 1920 (5,804), 1921 (1,966). The Party census included 91 percent of all Party members, with the exception of Party organizations in Yakutia and the Far East, where there were very few Jews to begin with. It is clear that in 1920 there were more Jews than the Party records account for, and it is possible that some were expelled from the Party during purges that took place before the census. The reality of conditions during the Civil War period might also explain the difference in numbers. However, the discrepancy does not seem overly significant. By the beginning of 1922 there were 19,562 Jews in the RKP (b), while the Party census listed 19,564 (5.2 percent of the Party as a whole). It is clear that the “stagnation” in the growth of Jewish members of the Party was due to purges going on within the Party. In 1920 there were 2,728,300 Jews in Russia, comprising 2.11 percent of the population of the country. In terms of absolute numbers, Jews occupied third place in Party membership, after Russians (270,409 or 71.90 percent) and Ukrainians (22,078 or 5.80 percent).

Bolshevism was hardly widespread among the Jewish working class, to say nothing of its lack of popularity among the petty bourgeoisie. In 1917, the membership of Bund was more than ten times the number of Jewish Bolsheviks. In general, the Jewish socialist parties condemned the October coup.

After seizing power, the Bolsheviks were faced with two main tasks in regards to the “Jewish question.” The first was to assert control over the “Jewish street.” The second was to suppress the antisemitic and pogromistic tendencies among the soldiers, sailors, and workers whom the Soviets relied upon for support.
The Bolsheviks paid fairly little attention to the “Jewish proletariat” before the coup, due at least in part to the lack of Yiddish speakers in the ranks of the party. In January of 1918, the Jewish Commissariat (Evkom) was created within the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkomnats) with S. M. Dimanshtein at its head. In July of 1918, the first Jewish section (Evsektsiiia) of the RKP (b) was formed in Orel, and 12 other cities with significant Jewish populations soon followed suit. October 1918 marked the first nationwide Evsektsiiia conference. Participants included Bolsheviks and non-Bolsheviks alike, with many of the latter being teachers or various cultural figures. At the conference, the Jewish communists elected the same Dimanshtein as head of the Central Bureau of the organization. The Evkom and the Evsektsiiia were run by practically the same people, and were often referred to in tandem. Eventually, the Evkom was absorbed by the Evsektsiiia.

The brightest faces of the new organization were Semen (Shimon) Markovich Dimanshtein (1886–1937), and Samuil Khaimovich Agurskii (1884–1947). Dimanshtein studied at a Lubavich yeshiva and at the age of 18 had received the title of rabbi, although he soon chose another path in life. He joined the party in 1904, participated in the 1905 revolution, and was sentenced in Riga in 1909 to four years of hard labor, which he served in the Saratov prison. He was then exiled to Siberia, which he fled in 1913 for Paris. Having returned to Russia after the February revolution, he worked in military organizations and edited the newspaper Okopnaia Pravda (Enshackled Truth). After the October revolution he briefly served as a member of the collegium at the People’s Commissariat of Labor, and then was ordered to serve on the “Jewish front.” Agurskii had finished a heder, started to work at the age of 12, and joined the Bund at the age of 18 in 1902. In 1905, he left for the United States, where he worked as a tailor and wrote journalism for local Yiddish-language socialist publications. In 1917 he returned to Russia and became a Bolshevik.

The largest task facing the Evkom and Evsektsiiia was the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat over the “Jewish street.” To achieve this, they needed to liquidate Jewish social organizations, Zionist organizations, and finally any Jewish socialist political parties. Jewish communism, having the full might of the Soviet State by its side, was ultimately successful in reaching its goal.50

It was also necessary to spread Bolshevik propaganda among the Jewish working class. Given the lack of Yiddish specialists at hand, this proved
difficult at first. Of the three editors of the Party’s Yiddish-language newspaper *Die Varkheit* (Truth), two of them did not know Yiddish.  

The Evkom was not shy about its goals. On May 18, 1918 at the second conference of the Union of Jewish soldiers, the chairman of the Evkom suddenly stood to make a speech. In no uncertain terms he expressed his dissatisfaction that when debate turned towards interaction between numerous social organizations, the Evkom was largely ignored. 

The chairman announced that Soviet power was striving for a “complete destruction of Jewish organizations, as well as all other nationalist organizations. The State itself will recreate the institutions that will know how best to help the working class. The Commissariat itself will provide assistance to Jewish soldiers and prisoners of war, as they [the Commissariat] are the true representatives of the working class.”  

A. A. Vilenkin, a member of the Party of People’s Socialists, was elected as chairman of the presidium. (Some months later, he was shot by the Bolsheviks for belonging to Savinkov’s “Union for the defense of the Motherland and Freedom.”) Among other topics, the conference raised the issue of self-defense in the face of increasing pogroms. One presenter (Brams) noted that the state was always against Jewish self-defense, whether it was during the reign of Nicholas II, or under the “ultra-socialist state of the workers and peasants.”  

The Zionist newspaper *Khronika evreiskoi zhizni* (Chronicle of Jewish Life), which had replaced Dawn when the latter was closed by the Bolsheviks, remarked with due irony in 1918 that “the Jewish Commissariat maintains its prestige and is acting in accordance with the maxim coined by Sholem Aleichem: ‘You can beat my Jews, and I’ll beat yours.’” The Zionists were unable to maintain such a carefree attitude to the situation for long. 

At the peak of the Civil War, the Evsektisiias took to attacking Jewish community organizations. The dismantling of Jewish organizations and the suppression of their activity were completely in keeping with the Lenin’s pre-revolutionary views. “Jewish national culture,” wrote Lenin in 1913, “is a slogan of rabbis and the bourgeoisie, the slogan of our enemies.”  

The decree concerning the liquidation of autonomous Jewish cultural organizations was prepared by Agurskii, and approved by Stalin (then serving as Commissar of Nationalities) on April 11, 1919:

The Central Commissariat on the Jewish National Affairs, having investigated the activities of the Central Bureau of Jewish Communities, has concluded:
1. That the Jewish Communities and their Central Bureau surround themselves with those who are clearly enemies of the interests of the Jewish working class, and of the October Revolution.

2. That said Communities and Bureau are engaged in harmful political activity, directed at obscuring the class consciousness of the Jewish working masses.

3. That the Communities, having taken upon themselves various governmental functions such as cultural, educational, and social services, are giving the Jewish working youth a distorted education of an antiproletarian nature. Thus the Central Commissariat of Jewish Affairs decrees that the Central Bureau of Jewish Communities, and all Jewish Communities with their corresponding departments located on the territory of the RSFSR be closed forever.

All monies and inventories shall be handed over to the local Jewish Commissariats.

The given directive takes effect from the moment of its publication in any of the official organs of the Soviet government.56

S. M. Dubnov, having read the “idiotic” decree that was to close Tsevaad (the Central Bureau of Jewish Communities) and autonomous Jewish communities, remarked in his diary, “These interlopers have decided to repeal an autonomous nationality that has existed for 25 centuries. Pitiful pygmies.”57 The “interlopers,” however, were insistent and consistent in achieving their goal.

Copies of the directive were sent out with an accompanying letter by Dimanshtein, which stated:

In keeping with the 2nd All-Russian Conference of the Jewish Sections of the RKP [Russian Communist Party] we have enclosed a directive concerning the liquidation of Jewish cultural organizations. The Moscow and Central Vaad of Jewish communities have already been liquidated, and we are now moving on with the liquidation of other bourgeois organizations: Zionist organizations such as Tarbut, Hehalutz and others.
In accordance with the directive, we suggest you begin the liquidation process in your own city, county, or region. In order to best carry out this task throughout all of Russia, the liquidation must be carried out immediately and without reservation.\(^{58}\)

In his commentary to the directive, Dimanshtein wrote that if Jewish communities had earlier been beholden to the Jewish bourgeoisie, then after the revolution they “demonstrated bourgeois tendencies with the minor addition of the Jewish socialist parties.” Power was lodged firmly in the hands of “the Zionist bourgeoisie.” They “feel the support of the imperialist Allied powers, and consider themselves victors, and the soon-to-be masters of Palestine, and already say so openly.” From the words and tone of Dimanshtein’s writing, it was not hard to guess who the next victims of the Evsektsiias and Evkom were to be.

“We are convinced,” wrote Dimanshtein,

that the Golden Calf of the Entente powers will be unable to defeat the idea of Soviet power, that, to the contrary, our Moses (Lenin) will turn the calf to ashes (perhaps by simple requisition). Then Turkey will be liberated from the “mandate” of England and the Jewish occupation.

The Jewish worker in has achieved consciousness and recognizes himself and his class enemies, even if they are in Jewish garb. He struggles against them, and casts them out. With the closing of these communities we have lessened the sphere of influence of the bourgeoisie, and we can now reclaim the remainder of the masses who had stumbled after them.

With the closing of these organizations we grow closer and closer to the triumph of communism.\(^ {59}\)

In the summer of 1919, the leadership of the Zionist Organization in Russia attempted to ascertain their legal status in the eyes of the Soviet government. At this time, Dimanshtein informed the Presidium of the Cheka that “according to the directive of the most recent conference of the Jewish Communist Sections and Commissariats, which was later confirmed by the Central Committee of the RKP (b), bourgeois Zionist organizations are to be liquidated.” The Bolshevik leadership was faced with a problem: on the one hand, the Zionist movement was recognized throughout the world; on
the other, Zionist ideology was incompatible with the ideals of Communism. They found a solution worthy of Solomon: Zionists could be attacked “without any declaration of war,” through secret arrests and administrative pressures. On June 27, 1919 in the Secret Section of the Cheka a “Jewish panel” was formed. On July 21 the Central Executive Committee officially approved the following directive:

In as much as the Zionist party has not been declared counterrevolutionary and for as long as the educational and cultural activity of Zionist organizations does not contradict the decisions of Soviet power, the presidium of the VtsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] orders all Soviet institutions to not interfere in the aforementioned activities described above.

The directive was signed by A. S. Enukidze, Secretary of the VtsIK.60

Less than a week after the VtsIK directive, the Central Bureau of the Evsektsiia sent out a secret memo composed on June 29, 1919 and signed by Dimanshtein and secretary of the Central Bureau Anshtein, which requested information on Zionist organizations and evidence of their counterrevolutionary activities:

In order to carry out the liquidation of Zionist organizations with all of its adherent institutions, we are in need of the immediate procurement of specific, well-vetted materials, transcripts, booklets, posters, etc., which characterize the counterrevolutionary activities of Zionist organizations in the provinces, such as:

Praising the Entente powers or calls for their victory
Speeches against the Soviet State
Accusations of antisemitism directed towards the Soviet State
Malicious criticism
Ways in which Zionist organizations associate with similar organizations abroad and in the countries of the Entente.
Financial records, sources of income, expenditures [of Zionist organizations], and how active, [and] influential [they are], and the degree of [their] opposition to the task at hand.

We request that you immediately, without losing a single day, start sending said materials, or portions thereof.61
Soon the Cheka entered the fray. On September 1, 1919, Chekists searched the grounds of the Central Committee of the Zionist Organization in Petrograd as well as the editorial offices of The Chronicle of Jewish Life. Several members were arrested, including Iu. Brutskus, Sh. Gepshtein, A. Zeideman, A. Rappoport, R. Rubinshtein, and N. Shakhnovich. Their treasury was also seized. A number of the arrests took place in Moscow. The newspaper was closed, those arrested were held from anywhere from several days to six weeks, and the Central Committee’s offices were sealed for five months. Curiously enough, one of those arrested, Gepshtein, was accused of sending secret information to London from the basement of his own home.  

In Odessa, the Zionist leaders V. I. Temkin, S. S. Pen, Ia. Ia. Vasserman, Kh. Sh. Rosental and Sh. P. Galperin were arrested on suspicion of fraternizing with the Volunteer Army and the Entente. The Zionists M. D. Elik, E. A. Bogorov, and M. L. Manoszon were shot by the Cheka.  

Dimanshtein provided ideological support for these repressions, claiming that the Zionists were “closely connected to the Entente” and were guilty of counterrevolutionary activities. “The pogroms do not bother them at all,” wrote Dimanshtein. “For them they are just another means by which they can try to force the Jews to strive for their ‘own state’ . . . the documents we have discovered during these searches and arrests confirm this.” This was a concerted disinformation campaign, which included reports that V. E. Zhabotinskii had been proclaimed Governor General of Palestine, and was playing the role of “Muraviev in Poland and Lithuania.” Subsequently Dimanshtein would attempt to portray Zionists as being in league with the White movement. One example: his publication of an accusatory invective on the trial of a certain Turkeltraub, publisher of Dawn in Kharkov, which was then under Denikin’s control, under the heading, “White Zionists in the Seat of the Accused.”  

A new blow was struck against the Zionists in the spring of 1920. On April 20, a conference of Zionists gathered at the Polytechnical Museum in Moscow, the first conference since the congress of 1917. On April 23, seventy-five delegates and guests were arrested (two, the elderly rabbi Ia. Muze and the ailing E. Cherikover, were immediately released). At the Lubyanka, Iu. Brutskus made reference to the VTSIK directive that cleared the Zionist Party of counterrevolutionary status. At this point one of the Chekists replied that the organization had not received permission to hold a conference. Brutskus took the opportunity to remind them that according to Soviet law, legal organizations did not need to request permission in order to hold gath-
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erings. The answer he received: “You know the law, but you don’t know how things are done in the Cheka. Sit down and get to know them.” The Zionist was sent to the Butyrka prison. The Chekists, for their part, strengthened the accusations against the Zionists by claiming that they had seized explosives from the accused. Later Izvestia would go on to publish a refutation of that claim, which had undoubtedly been sanctioned from above.65

On June 29, 1920, six of the Zionist leaders (Iu. D. Brutskus, G. I. Gitelson, A. I. Idelson, R. B. Rubinshteyn, E. M. Steimatsky, and N. A. Shakhnovich) were sentenced to five years in prison, while one (E. M. Barbel) was sentenced to six months of forced labor without imprisonment. They were all immediately amnestied. The rest had been freed earlier. Despite the fairly lenient sentencing, it was now clear that the Soviet state was holding its course in its attempt to liquidate the Zionist movement, though it was doing so with a minimum of noise. The head of the Secret Section of the Cheka, M. I. Latsis, made the following point in arguing the need to combat Zionism:

If Zionism, which is seizing nearly all of the Jewish intelligentsia, were to fulfill its goals, we would lose a great number of very skilled people who are very much needed for our own administration and organization.66

The Central Committee of the RKP (b) allowed Zionists to be targeted in the press. M. Rafes, a former Bund member, was particularly active in this enterprise. After the pogrom carried out by Arabs against the Jews in Jerusalem on April 4, 1920, and the Entente’s declaration on April 24 that Palestine was to fall under British control, Rafes published a major article entitled “The Palestinian Pogrom and the Palestinian Idea” (“Palestinskii pogrom and palestinskaia ideia”) in Zhizn’ natsional’nostei (The Life of Nationalities). The article was later published as a separate pamphlet. The British Mandate had included the conditions for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine:

Instead of liberating the Jewish people, as the English imperialists and Zionists would claim, we get instead the blatant enslavement of Arab peasants under the yoke of Anglo-Jewish capital, along with the enslavement of the small number of Jewish workers and farmers. Instead of a land ‘flowing with the milk and honey’ of national freedom and ideology, we get a simple three-day Jewish pogrom!
What could be more deeply morally bankrupt? Zionism is still destined to serve its shameful role as the lackey of English imperialism... [The] complete rejection of Zionism—that is the ultimate demand of life, now being announced to all left-Socialist Jewish groups, one that will be repeated by the Third Communist International.  

The second congress of the Comintern, which took place in July and August of 1920, called “the Zionists’ Enterprise in Palestine”, “a shining example of the deception of the working masses of an oppressed people that was carried out by the forces of imperialism, in conjunction with the Entente powers, and their bourgeoisie.”  

By the end of 1920, the Zionist movement had been forced to move underground, thanks to the efforts of the Evsektsiia and the Cheka. In the years that followed, nearly all of the Zionist leaders were compelled to leave the country.  

At the suggestion of Jewish Communists, the People’s Commissariat for Enlightenment included an addendum to the directive entitled “On the schools of national minorities.” Added on June 26, 1919, it said, “The Jewish working masses living in the territory of Soviet Russia are to consider their native language Yiddish and not Hebrew.” The directive was signed by M. N. Pokrovskii, who was also the head of the Soviet school of historical science. It was likewise signed by the head of the Department for the Enlightenment of National Minorities, P. M. Makintsian.  

As part of the struggle against Zionism, the All-Ukrainian Committee for Assistance to Pogrom Victims was shut down. The committee had been formed during the period of the Directorate, when pogroms were at their peak. First headed by the well-known lawyer M. N. Kreinin, it would later be run by M. L. Goldstein, also a lawyer. The chairman of the legal commission of the committee was one of the few Jewish lawyers to have served the state under the imperial regime, Ia. L. Teitel. The “pogrom committee” was transformed into a commission under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Social Services, which strictly enforced the rule that the funds collected by the Committee would go towards restoring labor infrastructure, but that they should in no way fall into the hands of “exploiters.” It could be claimed that this stolen money was redistributed according to clear class principles.  

The Bund, the largest Jewish socialist party, did not approve of the Bolshevik coup, as was mentioned in the previous chapter. M. Liber, the leader...
of the right wing of the party, and his supporters were in favor of military action against the Bolsheviks.

When Bolshevik forces seized Kiev in February of 1918, the Ukrainian Bundists condemned their actions, and their leader M. G. Rafes even wrote that “the Bolsheviks, with their ‘socialist’ artillery have done Shulgin’s work for him. They have managed to destroy everything the revolution had achieved in building up Ukraine.” The Kiev Bundists voted against recognizing Bolshevik power in Ukraine, to the count of 762 against, 11 in favor, and 7 abstentions. Responding to M. A. Muraviev’s claim that the Red Army “had brought in the ideals of socialism on the points of their bayonets,” Rafes composed a pointedly anti-Bolshevik article entitled, “Bayonocracy.”

According to one of his political opponents, Rafes, the Chairman of the Central Provisional Committee of the Bund in Ukraine, was the brightest star of all the politicians in Kiev at the time: “He was a compelling orator, in both Russian and Yiddish. A talented polemicist, and a dangerous critic. And, what is most important, he had limitless reserves of energy and true strength.” Despite the numerous incidents that Rafes was involved in from 1918 to 1920, he always managed to record what had happened and almost immediately publish it. On November 14, 1918 he was arrested by the Ukrainian authorities in Kiev while attending a meeting with other political and social activists. A total of twenty-eight people were arrested, among them SRs, SDs, Bundists and others. They were held in the Lukianov prison.

“The reader should note,” Rafes wrote, “that among those arrested on November 14 there was nary a communist or Bolshevik to be found. The inhabitants of cell 1, corridor 6, had been fighting against the Bolsheviks for a year. Even the left-wing Bundists had no Bolshevik sympathies whatsoever. In Kiev, in Ekaterinoslav, in the city Dumas and in the Central Rada, Bundists always took the initiative in the fight with Bolshevism.”

The accuracy of these words can be measured against those of his political opponent, who recalled that the “best moments” in Rafes’ political activity occurred “towards the time of the Bolsheviks arrival in February of 1918.” “During this time, he courageously fought against Bolshevism, and attempted to expose it.”

After the dissolution of the Constitutive Assembly and the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest, the Bund decided to fight against the Bolshevik coup, but by May of 1918 the party was already dominated by those who wished to
“fight against Bolshevism in the soviets and through the soviets.” The Bolshevists did not give them a chance, excluding them from the soviets, along with right SRs and the Mensheviks, in June of 1918, and forbidding party activities of any kind.

At this point, it would have been difficult to divine that within the span of a few months, Bundists and Bolsheviks would be fighting under the same banner.

The Jewish social democratic party Poalei Zion in Russia attempted to fulfill the function of a “constructive opposition” to the Bolsheviks. In the middle of 1918, they decided to join in the work of the Evkom in order to “fight against its goals, which are directed against the interests of the working masses and autonomous Jewish institutions.” Such relative loyalty did not prevent them from being excluded from the soviets in June of 1918, although they were allowed to carry on with their political activities within Soviet Russia. However, Poalei Zion had very few representatives in the Russian soviets. In Ukraine, representatives of Poalei Zion were part of the Central Rada, and later on were included in the Directorate. In 1917–18 a split in the party could be discerned between the left (headed by G. S. Fridliand) and right (headed by S. I. Goldelman) wings.

Until the end of 1918 the problem of the Bolsheviks’ relationships with the Bund, Poalei Zion, and Fareynikte (the United Jewish Socialist Workers Party) was not of pressing importance, as the base of the Jewish socialist parties was located in the territory of the former Pale of Settlement in the occupied lands of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltics. The situation changed drastically, however, when the Civil War broke out in the Southern and Northwestern regions of the country.
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Chernigov gubernia. The “reasons” used to justify the pogroms were strikingly reminiscent of those used during Tsarist times. Jews were accused of welcoming the Germans, of shooting Red Army soldiers in the back, and of being counterrevolutionaries. Fifteen Jews were killed in the city of Mglina during a punitive expedition in response to the murder of a local politician (Shimanovskii), while several more were beaten or wounded. The Red Army also destroyed a large number of Jewish apartments. The next day, the Red Army demanded compensation for the murder, and surrounded the homes of the wealthy (without regard for religion or national origin). At one such house several people had gathered, and the “internationalists” commanded, “The Russian can leave, but the Yids have to stay.” The Red Army soldiers killed seven Jews, including a two-year old girl and a deaf-mute woman. When Zorin, one of the local Red Army commanders, heard that they were killing Jews, he immediately shot two of the perpetrators on the spot. He was then forced to flee for his life from his own subordinates. Of course, the Jews had nothing to do with the murder of the politician in question, which was the supposed reason for the expedition in the first place.

On April 6, 1918 in Novgorod-Severskii, a 600-man detachment of Red Army soldiers killed at least 57 Jews (later accounts, which included those killed on the road and in villages surrounding the city, place the total at 88, with an additional 11 seriously injured). Entire families were destroyed. The writer and Zionist activist A. Ia. Slutskii was killed along with his wife. Among the other victims were “an unknown elderly Jew of 65 years” and “an unknown impoverished Jew who had been a member of the synagogue for 70 years.” About 20 Jews were murdered in Seredina-Buda, with additional victims in the surrounding villages.

The bloodiest slaughter took place in the town of Glukhov, were more than 100 Jews were exterminated. The newspaper Dawn published excerpts from a letter written by one of the local inhabitants who was fleeing “the horrors of Glukhov.” Dated April 23, 1918, it told how the author and his family, having hidden from the Reds in the town of Altukhov, moved constantly from house to house, and eventually took refuge in the forest. The decision was made to leave the children with one of their servants. Soon after, probably frightened by the appearance of the authorities, the servant ran after her masters, imploring them to take the children, as she was afraid that “someone would betray her and say she was hiding Jewish children, and that they...
would then kill the children, her and her family.” In this case everything turned out for the better and they were not discovered, although the Red Army had succeeded in putting the fear of God into the local Jewish populace.

There were other, less bloody examples of the “special” relationship Red Army forces had with Jews. In March of 1918 in Ekaterinoslav, for example, a group of “anarchist-maximalists” in conjunction with Red Army forces attacked a Jewish self-defense militia and disarmed them. They then opened fire on the militia, killing one of the militiamen. As this was going on, the attackers cried, “Yids [zhidy] are counterrevolutionaries and Whites.”

In September of 1918, the well-known historian S. P. Melgunov, who was arrested in the first days of the Red Terror after the attempt on Lenin’s life, was in a cell of the Butyrka prison with twenty-four Red Army soldiers, who had been incarcerated for the past three months without charge. When Melgunov was interrogated by Dzerzhinsky himself, he used the opportunity to remind the head of the Cheka about the imprisoned soldiers, who apparently had been forgotten about. Dzerzhinsky responded that “it will be good for them to sit in jail for awhile,” as they had tried to organize a pogrom in Vladimir. Melgunov thought that Dzerzhinsky was making up the charge on the spot, as it was highly unlikely that he had personally would know much about the situation. However, it is quite possible that Dzerzhinsky did in fact know what he was talking about. In any case, it is indicative that, invented or not, the first thing that came into Dzerzhinsky’s mind at the time was the word pogrom.

The history of the Bolsheviks’ initial entry into Rostov-on-Don has been well documented. Soviet forces reached the city three and a half months after the coup in Petrograd. During this time the Jewish population of the city—even supporters of revolution from the Bund and the Mensheviks—had formed an extremely negative attitude towards the Soviet state. Reality was to prove worse than their most pessimistic expectations. For two and a half months terror reigned throughout the city. All the inhabitants, including the “clean” ones, were affected, but the Jews were again singled out for special treatment.

Of course, there were no direct orders that encouraged the persecution of Jews. The President of the Don Republic, F. G. Podtelkov, was once asked during a public event: “What are we to do about the Jews?” He answered in a
language that was easily understood by the audience at hand, “Under Soviet rule, we are ordered to accept even Yids [zhidy] as people.”

The graphic events of the Bolshevik regime in Rostov have been preserved by contemporaries. The liberal Kadet journalist P. T. Gertsov-Vinogradskii, who wrote for the popular newspaper Priazovskii krai (Azov Region), recalls how the Bolsheviks searched the building he was living in at the time:

Some comrades with machine guns show up, and the first question they ask the doorman is:

Got any Yids here?

Do you hear this, you Socialist Gods of Olympus!

They robbed our house during the very first sweep and, becoming enamored of their theft, forgot to separate the Greeks from the Jews. Of course, robbery is robbery. However, I have nothing against the principle of equality among nations when it comes to robbery. If you’re going to rob someone, then go ahead and rob everyone!

No matter how hard I try, I just can’t get the “socialist” expression “got any Yids?” out of my non-socialist brain.

The SD A. S. Lokerman, a delegate to the Second Congress of the RSDRP, was shaken by all he had seen during the seventy-four-day period of Bolshevik rule, and quickly published a book about what he had experienced. He describes the death of the Zionist M. Shapiro, who worked as a cashier at a hospital called “Hope” (Nadezhda). In response to the rant of a Red Army soldier who was shouting, “We’re gonna kill all the bourgeois and the Yids!” Shapiro said that only hooligans spoke in such a matter. Shapiro was then detained while they “established his identity.” Within an hour his corpse turned up at the hospital.

Lokerman wrote that of all the naïve, theoretical, and unfeasible pretensions of the Bolshevik project there remained only a kind of facade, “behind which convicted felons, Black Hundreds, sadists, [and others] would commit heinous and hideous acts. As a true movement of the people, Bolshevism took in all sorts of scum from all levels of society. These elements gradually came to determine the tone and character of the entire Bolshevik movement. . . . our ‘sailor comrades’ have recently begun to turn on their ‘leadership’ because of the latter’s education, bourgeois heritage, or, in some instances, indulgent attitude towards Jews.”
Prince G. N. Trubetskoi, a former envoy to Serbia, describes a typical episode in his memoirs. Soon after the retreat of the Volunteer Army from Rostov in February of 1918, Trubetskoi set off for Moscow, accompanied by his son, P. B. Struve and the philosopher N. S. Arseniev. They were traveling through the back country to get to the railroad when they found themselves in front of a Red “revolutionary committee” in a remote village. The travelers, who had managed to obtain false travel documents, were subjected to a search and interrogation:

They treated Arseniev rather strangely. For some reason they took him for a Yid. We repeatedly told them that he was from an Orthodox family, and that two of his uncles were priests. Our driver vouched for him, telling how Arseniev had been recounting Saints’ lives for the duration of our journey. “They can do that,” noted the chairman of the committee. He was the cruelest of all of our interrogators. They wouldn’t relent in their calling Arseniev a Yid . . . these were truly the unwashed masses in revolt.93

Antisemitic tendencies could often be found among the operatives of the Cheka. G. Ia. Aronson, a Menshevik, described his time in the Butyrka prison after the Bolsheviks had begun to turn on their former SD allies:

The VChK created a joint commission with the MChK [the Moscow Cheka] for the purposes of our interrogation. It was headed by Samsonov, a Chekist, a worker, and (I think) a former anarchist. The interrogations themselves were revolting. They grilled us on our family backgrounds, whether we came from the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, made some jokes at the expense of the bourgeoisie. Then, out of nowhere, a whiff of antisemitism. Samsonov asked one of the workers, a member of the Central Committee, the following question:

How’d you end up in this company of lawyers, doctors, and Jews?94

It was even more common to hear antisemitic remarks from the other side, by the way. A typical middle-class homeowner once told Aronson,
I know you are the ones behind the revolution. Under the Tsars he kept foreigners like you busy. Didn’t give Jews the right to live wherever they wanted. The Finns and Poles always wanted to secede from Russia. The Caucasians were always stirring things up. I know that Tsereteli and Liber set up the Revolution. But for us, Russians, peasants, workers, merchants, let me tell you, the revolution has been nothing but complete and total destruction. You just took advantage of our weak character and laxness. We ourselves are to blame: after all, why in the world did we blindly follow a bunch of Jews and Georgians?

Another interesting event occurred during the investigation into the murder of the Head of the Petrograd Cheka, M. S. Uritsky. The Chekists in charge of the case, Otto and Riks, originally believed that the murder had been planned by Zionists and Bundists, who detested Uritsky for his “internationalism.” The pair arrested a large group of Jews. However, both overly-zealous investigators were relieved of duty for their antisemitic actions, and those arrested were set free. Otto would return to work for the Cheka in 1919.

It should be noted, however, that these antisemitic tendencies, and even the pogroms themselves, occurred at the beginning of the Red Army’s existence. As I. M. Cherikover put it, “The Red Army had not yet been reigned in and subjected to discipline. At this time there was no systematic, concerted struggle against the widespread antisemitic sentiment among the rank and file. That was to come later.”

The Bolshevik leadership could not help noticing the dangers posed by antisemitism, and introduced a number of measures aimed at repressing it. In addition to theoretical formulations, based on the ideal of the “international proletariat,” the Bolsheviks were acutely aware that antisemitism could prove to be a useful weapon in the hands of their enemies.

From the very first days of the Soviet state, antisemitic propaganda—to say nothing of violent acts committed against Jews—was equated with counterrevolutionary activity. According to the “resolution on the fight against counterrevolutionary activity,” approved by the Second All-Russian Congress (October 26–27, 1917), local soviets were ordered to “immediately undertake the most serious measures aimed at preventing counterrevolutionary and “antisemitic” speeches, and to prevent any pogroms.”
On April 27, 1918 the Moscow Oblast Sovnarkom, in accordance with the resolution, resolved to “recognize the absolute necessity of doing educational work among Red Army members, with the goal of raising the level of their cultural enlightenment and consciousness,” as well as “diligently” recruiting “members of political parties that support the Soviet platform to serve in the ranks of the Red Army.” The Moscow Oblast Sovnarkom, then, viewed a lack of education as the most significant factor behind the pogroms. Among other things, the Sovnarkom required “the local Jewish commissariat and the editorial offices of Izvestia to immediately set about creating pamphlets concerning the Jewish question, and to publish a series of articles on the topic in Izvestia itself.” The Information Department of the local military commissariat was ordered to “pay serious attention to the development of antisemitic agitation and to keep records of troops to be relied upon in the event of a pogrom.”

However, these measures did not diminish the amount of antisemitic activity. On July 27, 1918 the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR adopted a directive entitled, “On eliminating the antisemitic movement at its root.” It stated that “counterrevolutionaries have renewed their persecution of the Jews, taking advantage of the hunger and fatigue of the masses, in addition to the underdeveloped nature of much of the masses, and the remnants of enmity towards the Jews with which the masses were inoculated during the Tsarist regime” [italics mine]. It was explained to the workers that “The Jewish bourgeois is our enemy not because he is Jewish, but because he is bourgeois. The Jewish worker is our brother.”

The Sovnarkom declared that “the antisemitic movement threatens the revolutionary efforts of the peasants and workers” and called for “the working people of Socialist Russia to fight this evil by any means necessary,” as well as ordering all deputies “to take decisive measures to destroy the antisemitic movement at its roots.” According to Dimanshtein, the main author, the text of the declaration was edited by Lenin. It was Lenin who introduced the phrase “at its root.” Leaders of pogroms were to be branded as outlaws.

Iu. Larin, who was later asked why Lenin considered the struggle against antisemitism to be important for “our revolution” gave a fairly crafty reply, “It doesn’t just have to do with protecting Jewish workers from injustice, it has to do with protecting the entire revolution from the bourgeoisie” [italics Larin’s]. The cleverness in the response had to do with the fact that by the summer of 1918, the Red Army posed at least as great a threat to the Jews as it did to the Bolsheviks’ enemies.
A pamphlet published by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies in 1918 was addressed to “our own,” that is, to workers and soldiers. This is clear from the very first paragraphs:

One famous Russian writer refused to sign a document protesting the persecution of the Jews. He found the very possibility of being in league with the persecutors humiliating.

We, the party of the proletariat, must find it equally humiliating and shameful that we are forced to combat pogromistic tendencies within the working class. We write on our banners, “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” while we simultaneously collaborate with our class enemies against our Jewish comrades, which greatly harms our goals. The barbarian actions of the German invaders did not make us ignore the cries for revolution from our German comrades. Why then does the ridiculous phrase “Jewish dominance” hypnotize us, robbing us of clarity of thought and freedom of action?”

The pamphlet told readers that Jews, in general, were like any other people. “Like everyone else, Jewish society can be separated into different classes. They are no different from the other peoples they live with. Socialism at its root does not allow for any unique national qualities . . . all nations, Jews included, can be divided into mutually antagonistic classes.” Keeping in mind that many of his readers were at least somewhat familiar with the Bible, the author continued, “Like all peoples, Jews have their own saints and criminals, geniuses and idiots, heroes and cowards. The Jews gave us both Christ and Judas, the first Christian martyrs, and probably were among the executioners of those same martyrs. They gave us Marx, Lassalle, and other famous revolutionaries, but they were also present in governments that were hostile to the revolution.”

One part of the pamphlet was clearly addressed to soldiers in the army, many of whom had been involved in deporting the Jewish population during the First World War:

Among Jewish soldiers there probably were many cowards and traitors. But why did the Tsarist regime conceal the names of Jewish soldiers who had distinguished themselves during the war? The list of Jews who were awarded the Order of St. George was cut
from the book right as it was going to press, never to be published. The Tsarist regime manipulated social opinion. But as for those of us who have opened our eyes to the bright future of socialism, can we not throw off these leprous rags of the Tsarist times? You, comrades from the front, can bear witness to the truth of what has been said. Cleansed by revolutionary consciousness, we can now reflect upon what we were party to earlier.”

Apparently the author (like a large majority of the Russian intelligentsia) was convinced that the “pogroms never appeared spontaneously, they had always been organized by the government, and were now being organized by the remnants of pro-Tsarist groups.” However, at the time the greatest enemies of the Bolsheviks were the “complicit” Mensheviks and SRs. It would have been difficult to accuse them of organizing the pogroms, and the anonymous author even goes so far as to say that the Mensheviks and right SRs were “principled opponents of pogroms. There are many Jews among them, and of course, Jews do not organize pogroms against themselves. But they have allowed groups and classes to gain power who live to persecute Jews, having built their own success on the misfortune of Jews” [italics in original]. Comparing the cruelty and senselessness of pogroms to natural disasters, the author makes the point that at least “the latter cannot be attributed to any kind of ill will.” He concludes: “[P]ogroms are organized by the villains of society, by its thieves and traitors who are now trying to rock the foundations of Soviet authority. Only enemies of the people are capable of organizing pogroms.”

This topic remained pertinent more than a year later; the same pamphlet was republished in 1919 with no new additions. Peter Kenez, relying on the 1919 edition (he probably did not suspect the existence of an earlier version of the same text), claims that Soviet propaganda, which had attributed all kinds of crimes (real and invented) to the Volunteer Army, did not single them out in regards to the pogroms. He argues that from the Soviet point of view, this was not the best way to attract the peasantry to the Soviet cause. In general, the observation is apt. But in this case, the example chosen is less than convincing. The Volunteer Army was not mentioned at all in the pamphlet because it did not present a real threat to Soviet power at that time, whose main enemies were the “compromisers,” the Mensheviks and SRs. At this point the Volunteer Army had yet to sully itself with pogroms; their “accomplishments” in this field were yet to come. But most importantly, the pamphlet
itself was addressed to “our own,” to the workers and soldiers among whom antisemitic tendencies were widespread. Those in charge of Soviet ideology were well aware of this state of affairs, and party and state organizations in Moscow, Petrograd, Kiev, Kharkov, Kursk, and Odessa published large numbers of pamphlets directed against antisemitism and pogroms. Their style and argumentation have a lot of common with the text examined above.109

In their continued attacks against pogroms and antisemitic agitation, the Bolsheviks continued to identify monarchism and the international bourgeoisie as the main culprits. In a speech from March 1919 released on gramophone records, entitled “On the pogromistic attacks on the Jews,” Lenin claimed that antisemitic hostility was being employed by capitalists and landowners, and that “the power and forces of capital are reliant on discord among the workers.” He declared, “Shame on that cursed tsarism, which tortures and persecutes the Jews,” and claimed that those who “sow hostility against the Jews sows hatred towards other nations.”110 In June of 1919, the Soviet government set aside funds to aid pogrom victims.111 Of course, it is worth mentioning that the Ukrainian Directorate did the same, even though they went on to murder the greatest number of Jews during the Civil War.112

Given the scale of the destruction, Soviet propaganda took a somewhat reserved approach to the question of the pogroms. Still, I do not believe that it is entirely deserving of R. Pipes criticism, namely that “Lenin no more condemned the Ukrainian pogroms than Denikin,” and that “the Soviet press ignored the subject.”113

In reality the Soviet press was hardly silent. They did not suppress information about the pogroms and tried to explain the events on a “theoretical,” if primitive, level. In May and June of 1919, Pravda published two articles by Il. Vardin (Mgeladze) that examined the pogroms. There are few concrete facts and names, but there is extensive discussion of monarchists, priests, and world capitalism. The first article, entitled “Against the Jews—for the Tsar,” discussed the “flashes of pogroms” in Ukraine and the Western Territories alongside the increase in antisemitic agitation in Soviet Russia:

Both there and here the fight against the Jews is inextricably connected with the fight against the power of the Soviets, against the party of the communists. “Beat the Yids [zhidy], save Russia! Down with the communists and commissars!” This shout can be heard anywhere the dark forces of the priests, landowners, kulaks, and store owners can be found.
The landowner, kulak, priest, and bourgeois, that is, all segments of the population who are leaving the historical stage permanently thanks to the efforts of the revolutionary masses, are uniting under the banner of “Jewish destruction” [zhidoedstva]. Massive pogroms in Petliura’s Ukraine, in “democratic” Poland and Galicia all indicate that even the representatives of “national” capital are ready to drink the wine of antisemitism.

We must show the masses what is hiding beneath the slogan “beat the Yids!” We must explain to all the workers that the “Yid” [zhid] was the bone that the Tsar and the gentry tried to throw down the throats of the workers and peasants.

Increasing agitation against the Jews is, in essence, agitation for monarchism, the priests, and the serf owners. We need to wage the same struggle against antisemitism as the revolution currently wages against monarchism.114

Here Vardin largely repeats the major points from Lenin’s speech. However, at this juncture pogroms were not being carried out by monarchists. Vardin was forced to admit as much in his next article on the topic a month later. “The latest wave of pogroms against the Jews has shown that these pogroms are not solely the accomplishments of tsarism, of the aristocratic reaction, of the medieval political regime. Even contemporary ‘democracy’ while marching under the sign of ‘equality, fraternity, and freedom,’ has come to swallow Jewish blood ‘in secret.’”115

Vardin paid particular attention to those places (Galicia, Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine) where pogroms were being carried out by Petliura, Grigoriev, and other “democrats.” He declared that the main supporters of pogromistic “democracy” were “the middle element,” the intelligentsia, bureaucrats, kulaks, and other members of the middle class. “In the face of ‘the Jew’ and ‘the communist,’ the ‘democratic’ bourgeoisie finds someone who is guilty of all evils. In stupid, impotent fury he throws himself at the ‘Yid’ and destroys him. This stupid, dirty animal believes he will feel sated once he has systematically devoured the Jew . . .”

The role of international capital, of course, was not ignored: “the imperialists will be most pleased if the idiots gnaw at the Jewish bone and leave them in peace.” Vardin claimed that even Jewish capitalists were amenable to the massacre of the Jewish nation in the interest of “class solidarity,” pointing out that most of the victims came from the poor. He declared the protests of
the Jewish bourgeoisie in Poland and Lithuania against the pogroms to be hypocritical: “The Jewish bourgeois must know that the Polish lackeys of world capital would not dare to organize pogroms against the will of Clemenceau and Lloyd George. The Versailles oligarchy is completely responsible for pogromistic ‘democracy.’” Although Vardin’s accusations in the direction of world capital amount to little more than a stylistic cliché, it is more difficult to take issue with his conclusion: “The salvation of the laboring Jewish masses [lies] not in Paris, but in Moscow.”

The Soviet press continued to pay significant attention to the “Jewish question” at later points as well, informing readers of White atrocities and of the anti-Soviet position of the Jewish bourgeoisie, who it claimed were willing to turn a blind eye to the murders of their fellow Jews. In an article published in Izvestia entitled “General Denikin and two Kharkov Jews,” the Kharkov Jewish bourgeoisie came under attack:

No less than the Russians did they dream in the silent night of the destruction of nightmarish Bolshevism, of the strong and benevolent rule (only without pogroms) of Astrov and Vinaver, of law and order for the preservation of their factories, mines, and shops, and they were overjoyed when there was not a single pogrom after their [the Whites] entry into Kharkov. The four thousand Jewish corpses in Ekaterinoslav, and the murdered Jews of Lozovaia were far away and didn’t worry them much, especially as the delegation to Mai-Maevskii assured them that measures would be taken to investigate . . . 116

According to Izvestia, the Jewish bourgeoisie had formed a “Jewish Committee for Assisting the Volunteer Army,” in which a certain L. E. Berg and M. A. Eizler played a leading role in calling on “Russian citizens of the Jewish faith” to enlist in the Volunteer Army.117 Izvestia also faithfully reported on the atrocities committed by troops under the leadership of K. K. Mamontov, who had led a daring raid into the rear lines of the Red Army. The reports placed particular emphasis on the specifically antisemitic nature of their attacks.118 In an article written shortly after the Whites’ capture of Kiev, it was claimed that “Denikin’s forces [by shooting members of the Cheka] initiated a popular revolt that soon took on the familiar form of a Jewish pogrom.”119

The Life of Nationalities, a newspaper of the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, also published information on the pogroms. On one occasion,
it published a detailed report on the pogroms that took place in Ukraine from January to August 1, 1919, which had been prepared by the Committee for the Assistance of Pogrom Victims of the Russian Society for the Red Cross in Ukraine. According to the Committee, 26,000 people were killed and nearly three times that many were wounded during the period in question. This put the total number of those killed or wounded in during the first seven months of 1919 at approximately 100,000 individuals.\textsuperscript{120}

*The Life of Nationalities* also reported on the rise of antisemitism in Europe, particularly in Poland,\textsuperscript{121} Romania, Hungary, and Germany, all the while emphasizing that antisemitism was also “one of the best means to combat the workers’ movement”: “under this cover they can give the masses any poisonous pills they like, and [the masses] will swallow them whole, paying no attention to the poison.”\textsuperscript{122}

From these examples it is clear that the Soviet press was hardly silent on the matter of pogroms. Nor did it ignore the growth of antisemitism in Russia (and in Europe as well). Trotsky himself was to grace the pages of *Izvestia* and address the issue. The article stemmed from the recent discovery of a report composed by the former Red Army brigade commander Kotomin, who had gone over to the Whites. The report was intended for Kolchak’s army, but Soviet military authorities on the Eastern Front had recently managed to obtain a copy, and through a bizarre twist of fate it had found its way to Trotsky’s desk. Trotsky entitled one section of his analysis of Kotomin’s report “antisemitism.”

In a curious fashion, Trotsky explained the purely rational reasons for the visible role of Jews in the revolutionary movement, while spending even more time trying to refute Kotomin’s claim that Jews were “particularly talented.” He also attacked the Jewish communists of the “most recent mobilization,” claiming their dedication to communism was motivated by national, rather than class, concerns.

Trotsky denied Kotomin’s claim that Jewish commissars comprised such a “large percentage,” though he did admit that it was a “fairly significant number.” However, Trotsky particularly took issue with another of Kotomin’s claims, which was “similar to those of many other antisemites, that the reason for the significant number of Jewish commissars can be seen in the special talents and capabilities of the Jews”:

In reality, such an evaluation is completely uncalled for. The fact is, Jews are mostly an urban population, and within the urban population they comprise a very large element. The Tsarist regime, which
created the most trying conditions of existence for the Jews, not only pushed the Jewish workers in the direction of the Russian workers, but also pushed the bourgeois elements of the intelligentsia towards the path of revolution. Among the many Jewish communists of the latest mobilization, there are many for whom communism did not spring from class concerns, but rather national ones. Of course, these are not the best communists, and the organization of Soviet power does not rely upon them, but on the Petersburg and Moscow proletarians who were tempered in the old underground.

Antisemitism is not only hatred towards Jewry, but also cowardice before Jewry. Cowardice has large eyes, and sees qualities in the enemy with that are in no way inherent to him. The social and legal conditions of Jewish life are sufficient to explain the role of the Jews in the revolutionary movement. However, it has not been proven, and cannot be proven, that Jews are more gifted than Russians or Ukrainians.123

Gorky was to express a different opinion of Jewish capabilities. On one occasion, Dimanshtein came to Lenin with Gorky’s pamphlet “On the Jews,” which was published in a huge print run by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Dimanshtein wanted Lenin to delay the distribution of the pamphlet, as “Gorky was singing an unbelievable hymn to the Jewish people, praising them without exception, which gave the impression that the revolution was dependent on the Jews, the middle-class elements in particular.” Lenin went only so far as to say that “the pamphlet was not very well designed, for in a peasant country one must occasionally deal with shameful prejudices such as antisemitism.” Nonetheless, Lenin considered the pamphlet to be useful, and did not think that confiscating it would be worthwhile.124

Strangely, other than the single phrase, “In the struggle for Russia’s freedom the Jewish intelligentsia has spilled just as much of its own blood as the Russian intelligentsia has,” there is not a word about the role of Jews in the revolution in Gorky’s pamphlet. Moreover, there is no mention of the revolution “depending on the Jews.”125 In his usual manner Gorky scolded the Russian people for their laziness and jealousy, and for their inclination to blame someone else (“wife, neighbor, weather, God, anyone but themselves”) for all of their misfortunes. These allegedly inherent qualities of the Russian people were juxtaposed to Jewish perseverance in the struggle for life, their
“wise love” towards children and labor, and their belief that the law will be triumphant. Gorky’s arguments in defense of the Jews were quite distant from the clichés of Bolshevik Marxism. They were, however, probably more readily understood by his audience: “It was the Jews who out of our dirty earth managed to raise a glorious flower, Christ, son of a Jewish carpenter, to whom you, the enemies of the Jews, allegedly bow down. Christ’s apostles, Jewish fishermen, were likewise such magnificent flowers of spirit, and they confirmed that the Christian religion on earth was the religion of the international brotherhood of the people, a religion in whose soil the ideas of socialism and the international took root.”

Dimanshtein’s disapproval of Gorky’s pamphlet probably had more to do with Gorky secretly protecting Zionists and attempting to denounce their persecutors (i.e. Jewish communists), as M. Agurskii and M. Shklovskaia have argued. As Gorky once wrote: “Like you, the Jews have factions that are hostile to one another: the Jewish Zionists want to resettle in Palestine, where they have founded a government; while others are against this and attack the Zionists, closing their schools and synagogues, and outlawing the teaching of the Jewish language to their children. Jews are just as much a fragmented people as we Russians are.” There are, of course, several errors in Gorky’s claims. The Jewish state in Palestine was yet to be founded, and there weren’t any “Zionist” synagogues; at the time Zionism was still mostly a secular movement. Still, it is clear where Gorky’s sympathies lay.

* * *

The Bolshevik leadership was well aware of the antisemitic attitudes that were widespread throughout the population at large, workers and peasants included. The military censors in charge of opening and checking mail would often run across statements to the effect that no one wanted to go to war, and that “it isn’t worth fighting for the Soviet and the Jews” (Volkhov, Orel gubernia June 3, 1919). Another correspondent complained about the effectiveness of some of the Jewish Communists in Tver. At an event billed as a “Congress of Soviets,” the brilliant Moscow orator Sosnovskii had managed to push through a resolution declaring that war must be waged until the Bolsheviks were victorious (this was no small feat, given the antiwar sentiment in most regions). After the resolution, however, “the Yids started up again, and everyone hung their heads in disappointment” (Tver, June 26, 1919). A Red Army
soldier from the Kaluga gubernia complained that all of the deserters had gone home, and that they were angry at him for “serving Jewish power and selling his own skin” (June 25, 1919). Yet another letter from Nizhnedneprovsk claimed that “the workers are saying that they don’t want to protect this Jewish [zhidovskoe] government anymore” (June 1, 1919). A Red Army soldier wrote home, “I curse this government, and wish that it would collapse, the sooner the better. Then I wouldn’t have to serve those Yids, I could serve my own God. Down with the lot of them.”

An inhabitant of Kiev reported that much of the population did not support the Soviet government, and quite reasonably pointed out that “the large number of Jews [among the Bolsheviks] provides an excellent argument against Soviet authority” (June 12, 1919). The Bolsheviks themselves were well aware of this problem. In May of 1919, a communist named Federchuk wrote to G. I. Petrovskii with the following request: “send respectable, balanced people who are able to gain the trust of the masses to do the agitation work. Then the peasants won’t be able to latch on to Grigoriev’s slogan: ‘Instead of land, they gave you the Cheka, and instead of freedom, they gave you commissars from among those who crucified Christ.’” It was not clear where such “respectable” people were to come from, especially as it was imperative that they be completely loyal to Soviet power. With Jews, one could be sure of at least one thing: they had no other choice but to side with the Soviets.

It should be noted that the “large number of Jews” was only one of many reasons people disliked the Soviet authorities. Ignorant of the fact that their mail was being read carefully by military censors, many people wrote quite openly on a number of other objections they had. Some of these were much more important than the ethnic make-up of the Party: corruption, persecution of the church, and a collapse in general morality were all important, not to mention the forced requisitions and mobilizations which often pitted brother against brother. Some accused the Jews of avoiding military service (“The Yid needs to fight, but he’s not around. Ten of the Yids from the Tailors’ Union have left, while all our Russians fight. We should beat them all, down to the very last Yid. Those speculators don’t have anything to fear, while we’re afraid of everything” [Livna, Orel gubernia, June 30, 1919]). But people were even more disturbed by communists who did not join the army: “The communists are all deserters. When they were allowed to rob the peasants they were all communists, but when they get to the front, they all run away” (Smolensk, undated); “Some of the comrades had come into the Party...
as wolves in sheep’s clothing, but as soon as they heard the communists were being mobilized they made like bees and flew from the hive” (Oboian’, Kursk gubernia, July 25, 1919), etc.

This is not to say that such sentiments were unique to those living under the Reds. The civilian population in White territories was just as likely to take issue with their living conditions, if not more so. They faced the same forced requisitions and confiscations, the same atrocities carried out on prisoners and the families of Red Army soldiers, the same public executions and punishments and so on. Often the disillusionment there was even more bitter, as many had expected the Whites to restore law and order (“Never would I have imagined that Denikin’s army would engage in robbery. It wasn’t just the soldiers, but the officers too. If I had known how the White victors would behave themselves, I would have hidden the linens and the clothes. Now there’s nothing left” [Orel, November 17, 1919]). Rather than citing the numerous descriptions of robberies and violence that took place under the Whites, I will limit myself to an excerpt from a letter that best demonstrates why the majority of the population supported the Reds in the end: “You had everything under the Whites, but you were always under the whip [pod nagaiko]. Let the White Army be damned. We’ve managed to wait for our comrades, and now at least we live in freedom” (Vereshchagino, Viatka gubernia, August 8, 1919).

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A number of Jews served in the terror organization known as the Cheka and it is widely accepted that Jews comprised a disproportionate number of its operatives. Leonard Schapiro wrote, for example, that “anyone who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the Cheka stood a very good chance of finding himself confronted with and possibly shot by a Jewish investigator.” Zvi Gitelman has also claimed that serving in the Cheka was particularly popular with the Jewish population. He argues that the authorities found the Jews to be extremely reliable, as they had no connection to the old regime and were fervent enemies of the Whites. Moreover, Gitelman notes that some Jews joined the Cheka out of a desire to avenge crimes committed against the Jews by anti-Soviet forces, and by personal quests for power.

Both historians and memoirists, however, have largely relied on opinions, and not on material facts. At the given moment, the only article to have examined the precise number of Jews working for the Cheka and the OGPU (the State Political Directorate) according to the rosters of the Bolshe-
vik Central Committee is L. Krichevskii’s “Jews in the Administration of the Cheka-GPU in the 1920s.” For this study, we are only concerned with the numbers for the Civil War period. According to the September 1918 count of those employed at Soviet institutions in Moscow, there were 781 workers in the central administration. As of September 25, 1918 there were 278 Latvians, 49 Poles, and 29 Jews. In other words, Jews composed 3.7 percent of those employed. Among the senior officials of the Cheka there were 119 Latvians, 19 Poles, and 19 Jews (8.6 percent). Of the 70 commissars of the Cheka, 38 were Latvian, 22 Russian, 7 Poles, and 3 Jews (4.3 percent). There were 8 Jews (19.1 percent) among the 42 interrogators and deputy interrogators, whereas 14 were Latvian, 13 were Russian, and 7 were Jews. Notably, in the Section for Combating Counterrevolution, which was the most significant section of the Cheka, the six Jews constituted 50 percent of the interrogators.

In June–July of 1920, there were 1,805 individuals working in 32 gubernias for the “secret sections” of the Cheka. Of these, 1,357 were Russian (75.2 percent), 137 were Latvian (7.6 percent), 102 were Jewish (5.6 percent), and 34 were Polish (1.9 percent), with other nationalities represented in significantly smaller numbers. By the end of the Civil War (i.e., late 1920), there were more than 50,000 people working for the Cheka at the gubernia level. Of these 77.3 percent were Russian, 9.1 percent were Jewish, 3.5 percent were Latvian, 3.1 percent were Ukrainian, 1.7 percent were Polish, 0.6 percent were German, and 0.5 percent were Belorussian. Thus the total number of Jews working for the Cheka was approximately 4,500 individuals.

Naturally, this percentage would prove to be much higher in the territories of the former Pale. Before his execution, P. M. Molozhavskii wrote the following note to his wife and daughter: “I write this note in the hopes that it will reach you, and that you will be able to recover my body. They didn’t bother to interrogate witnesses. They are killing everyone, without care for justification or guilt. All of them are Jews.” A Chekist who was taken prisoner by the Whites admitted that Jews comprised 75 percent of the Kiev Cheka. V. I. Vernadskii recorded the following story of Senator V. P. Nosovich, who had been captured by the Kharkov Cheka only to miraculously escape: “He [Nosovich] said he saw people going to their deaths, and heard shots. They walked past on the way to their execution, naked except for their shirts, while Red Army soldiers (not Jews) followed them from behind.” Apparently the “not Jews” marked this instance as exceptional.

The Kiev Cheka was particularly ruthless in carrying out the Red Terror. It was assisted by the All-Ukrainian Cheka (Vucheka), which had moved to
Kiev after the surrender of Kharkov. The summer of 1919 would prove to be a true nightmare for the inhabitants of Kiev. The protocols of the Kiev Cheka from May until August 1919 contained lists of sentences carried out, sometimes at a rate of more than fifty a day. At the time, the Kiev Cheka was led by Degtiarenko, with Shub and Ivanov serving as secretaries. The following members had the right to propose executions: Grinshtein, Savchuk, Shvartsman, Ugarov, Latsis, Iakovlev, Shishkov, Apeter, Vitlitskii. Members Zakolupin, Rubinshtein, Livshits, David, and Baitskii served as advisors. By no means did the Kiev Cheka limit itself to slaughtering people for political beliefs or social status. Nor did it spare people due to their ethnic heritage. Among the fifty-nine cases reviewed by the Kiev Cheka on August 5, 1919 (Degtiarenko presiding with Shub as secretary, members present were Grinshtein, Savchuk, Shvartsman and Ugarov) there were instances of charges against Jews. The Cheka was just as merciless towards them as it was towards the Orthodox. Moisei and Aron Meerovich Soiferman, Isaak Iosifovich Linetskii, and Shaia and Mikhail Avrumovich Bukh, were all sentenced to death for selling counterfeit Kerenskii currency, while Aba Afroim Feldman and Meilakh Iakovlev Vainer were found guilty of banditry. Pison Isaakovich Koltun was sentenced to imprisonment in a second-degree camp. Of course, given the swift carriage of justice, it was impossible to ascertain which of the condemned were actually guilty of the charges brought against them.

From 1917 to 1920 the membership of the upper echelons of the Cheka varied. In its first year (the Cheka was founded on December 7 (20), 1917), the Cheka appointed by the Sovnarkom included F. E. Dzerzhinsky (chair), G. K. Ordzhonikidze, Ia. Kh. Peters, I. K. Ksenofontov, D. G. Evseev, K. A. Peterson, V. K. Averin, N. A. Zhidelev, V. A. Trifonov, and V. N. Vasilevskii. By the very next day, only Dzerzhinsky, Peters, Ksenofontov and Evseev remained. They were joined by V. V. Fomin, S. E. Shchukin, N. I. Ilin, and S. Chernov. By January 8, 1918, the collegium included Dzerzhinsky, Peters, Ksenofontov, Fomin, Shchukin, and V. P. Menzhinskii. They were joined by the leftist SRs V. A. Aleksandrovich (deputy chair, though he was later replaced by G. D. Zaks, who had by then joined the Bolsheviks), V. D. Volkov, M. F. Emelianov, and P. F. Sidorov. After the elimination of the leftist SRs and their removal from positions of power, the membership roll included Peters (who ran the Cheka for a period until the investigation of the leftist SRs was completed), Dzerzhinsky, Peters, Fomin, I. N. Polukarov, V. V. Kamenshchikov, Ksenofontov, M. I. Latsis, A. Puzyrev, I. Iu. Pulianovskii, V. P. Ianushevskii, and Varvara Iakovleva, the sole woman to serve in the Collegium.
of the Cheka during the Civil War period. They were later joined by N. A. Skrypnik and M. S. Kedrov. In March 1919, a new collegium was announced, which included Dzerzhinsky, Peters, Ksenofontov, Fomin, Latsis, Kedrov, Avanesov, S. G. Uralov, A. V. Eiduk, F. D. Medved, N. A. Zhukov, G. S. Moroz, K. M. Valobuev, and I. D. Chugurin. By 1920 the collegium consisted of Dzerzhinsky, Ksenofontov, Latsis, N. I. Zimin, V. S. Kornev, Menzhinskii, Kedrov, Avanesov, S. A. Messing, Peters, Medved, V. N. Mantsev, and G. G. Yagoda. Thus, from 1918 to 1920, four Jews served in the highest governing body of the Cheka: Zaks, Messing, Moroz (who first headed the Instructional Section, and later headed the Investigation Section), and Yagoda, who would lead the Cheka from 1920 onwards.

Jews also served in key positions in the administrations of the Central, Moscow, and Petrograd Chekas. Until his assassination on August 30, 1918, M.S. Uritsky served as the chair of the Petrograd Cheka. Yagoda served as Dzerzhinsky’s second deputy (after Menzhinskii), and V. L. Gerson served as Dzerzhinsky’s secretary. M. M. Lutskii served as Dzerzhinsky’s Special Plenipotentiary (osoboupolnomochennyj). Of the five-person collegium of the Moscow Cheka formed under the chairmanship of Dzerzhinsky in December 1918, two were Jews: B. A. Breslav, the de facto chair up until April 1919, and Ia. M. Iurovskii, who had carried out the execution of the Royal family.

From the data above, it is clear that the number of Jews in the Cheka did not exceed the proportion of Jews involved in the Party, Soviet, or military and governmental organizations. Thus it hardly seems worthwhile to look for any particular motives that attracted Jews to the Cheka. On the whole, such reasons would differ little from the more general tendency of the Jewish population to support the Soviet regime. Much like their non-Jewish comrades, there were probably some Jewish Chekists who were fanatics, those who measured their zeal in accordance with the Terror of the French Revolution. Others worked for the Cheka for the material gains such employment conferred. Still others simply enjoyed playing with other peoples’ lives. There were undoubtedly sadistic executioners among them as well, who either came to the Cheka as such, or managed to acquire such qualities while acquainting themselves with their new profession.

Latsis was put in charge of the Ukrainian Cheka in 1919. Lenin was quick to instruct him that “[t]he Cheka have brought a cloud of evil to Ukraine, as they have been formed too hastily, and have admitted a large number of hangers-on.” Lenin demanded that the Chekas be reformed, and that these “hangers-on” be expelled. Latsis responded that he had started
to purge the Chekas “from my very first day of work on April 10 . . . Our misfortune lies in the fact that we have nothing to work with. In Ukraine we collected the very same workers that we had dismissed in Moscow as being incompetent or unreliable.” Moreover, Latsis claimed, the percentage of communists in the Cheka was three times greater than in other Soviet organizations.\footnote{110}

Latsis attempted to prevent excesses by liquidating the *uezd*-level Chekas and forbidding “petty speculation,” i.e., he forbade the Chekists from engaging in activities that could lead to abuse or corruption. It is indicative that from the very beginning Chekists in the Ukraine were forbidden from “seizing anything during an arrest, except for pertinent evidence.”\footnote{111} Apparently, there were problems in assuring that Chekists kept their “hands clean,” as Dzerzhinsky once said. This was hardly limited to Ukraine. Komarov, a representative from the Kostroma *gubernia* at a Congress of local Cheka cells, had the following to say about the relationship between the troops and the local Cheka organization: “If a member of the [Cheka] walks by and you don’t bow to him, he’ll glare at you for three weeks. At the drop of a hat they turn into officials from the time of Nicholas. And what talk can there be of forming a cell when they’re drunk every day? . . . Requisitioned goods are never sent off, they’re just used for the benefit of the collegium’s own wealth.”\footnote{112}

At the same time, the Cheka could not let good things go to waste. In August of 1919 the Presidium of the Cheka ordered that A. Ia. Belenkii be put in charge of collecting the personal effects of those executed by the Cheka, so that they could later be redistributed by the Presidium.\footnote{113} The head of Lenin’s personal security detail and a member of the Party since 1902, Belenkii was a particularly trusted figure.\footnote{114}

Working for the Cheka did have decided material benefits. In February of 1918, a Chekist’s salary was 400 rubles a month, more than twice that of an unmarried Red Army soldier (150), and 1.5 times the salary of a married one (250). The salary of a collegium member (500 rubles) was equal to that of a People’s Commissar (*narkom*). Collegium members also received food rations and free uniforms. Last but not least, they could always receive “bonuses” in the form of possessions taken from those who had been executed.\footnote{115} The Cheka were not alone in their use of confiscated goods. On occasion the VTsIK would request that its workers be given a list of “necessary fabrics and materials for clothes, linen, shoes, and other goods available at your canteen.” After the formation of the Commission for the Preparation of Gifts to be Sent to the Front (*Komissiia po podgotovke otpravki podarkov na front*), the
Presidium of the VTsIK requested that the Cheka transfer “valuable items that you have that may be used as presents or awards (watches, cigarette cases, etc.) and place them at the disposal of the aforementioned Commission.”

V. D. Bonch-Burevich, then in charge of the Sovnarkom and a participant in the formation of the Bolshevik secret police, compared Dzerzhinsky to Antoine Quentin Fouquier de Tinville, the public prosecutor of the Revolutionary Tribunal from the French Revolution. N. Bukharin, who in 1919 represented the Central Committee of the Party at the Collegium of the Cheka, justified the Bolshevik terror several years later by quoting Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, claiming, “One needs to rule by iron, if it is impossible to rule by law.” M. I. Latsis gave the following blueprint for interrogating the accused: “[D]o not look for clues as to whether or not they rose up against the soviet in arms or in words. Your first duty is ask what class the accused belongs to, their social background, their education, and their profession. All of these questions will decide the fate of the accused.” In this sense, Latsis was simply paraphrasing Robespierre’s statements from the National Convention concerning the introduction of the Law of 22 Prairial, which opened the Reign of Terror: “The only delay in punishing the enemies of the fatherland should be until such time as they are found out: it is not so much a question of punishing as of destroying them.” It is worth remembering that according to the Law of 22 Prairial, all legal guarantees (the right to question, the right to defense, and to hear the testimony of witnesses) were suspended. Instead the inner convictions of the judge and jury were deemed sufficient to decide whether one was innocent or should be put to death. Revolutionary tribunals worked alongside committees that made do without juries. In this the Bolsheviks took much from their French predecessors. After all, was the “judicial troika” of December 1918, which included Dzerzhinsky, Latsis, Kadrov, and Ksenofontov, anything more than a direct “borrowing” from the French Terror? Perhaps it was the following excerpt from Saint-Just’s speech at the Convention on October 10, 1793 that led the Cheka to name their journal Red Sword: “You must punish nor merely traitors but the indifferent as well; you must punish whoever is passive in the Republic . . . between the people and its enemies there can be nothing in common but the sword.”

It is possible that such majestic phrases were intended to raise the stature of the Chekists in their own eyes. Even among their comrades within the Party, their investigations and punitive actions were less than popular (to say nothing of the terror they enforced on the rest of the population). It was only later that the image of the “valiant Chekist” was to take hold, thanks to the
efforts of some (far from untalented) journalists, writers, and directors. For the moment they were (to use M. I. Latsis’ formulation) the “thugs” of the revolution. The Cheka constantly experienced a dearth of workers, one that was all the more pressing as they were unable to rely on the pool of civil servants who had served before the Revolution.\footnote{166}

At this stage the Cheka was hardly an elite intellectual segment of the Bolshevik apparatus, and its workers left much to be desired in the education department. Only 0.8 percent of those working for the Cheka in 1920 had completed a degree, 1.1 percent had at least spent some time in a post-secondary institution. 13.7 percent of workers had completed high school, while 12.5 percent had completed only some high school.\footnote{167} By 1921, the percentage of those with higher education had risen to 1.03 percent (513 individuals), while the overwhelming majority (57.3 percent) had not gone beyond primary school.\footnote{168} Of course, at this point the Cheka was not engaged in sophisticated special operations; their main function was to instill terror. Loyalty to the Bolshevik Party was more important than any education.

A distinct picture of the Jewish Chekists can be found in the biographical directory of the elite of the NKVD from 1934 to 1941. Of the Jews serving in the upper echelons of the NKVD in the 1930s, three-quarters (seventy-eight individuals) had begun their careers from 1918 to 1921. Nearly all of them (sixty-nine) came from former Pale territories, while the lion’s share (sixty-six) came from a rather suspect class background, with most coming from the families of petty merchants or craftsmen. All but four of them were less than 30 years of age when they joined the Cheka. Thirty-five individuals were between 15 and 20, twenty-four between 21 and 25, and fourteen between 26 and 30. Half of them (thirty-seven) came to the Cheka from the Red Army, where nearly all of them started in the ranks. Fourteen of them had even managed to serve in the Tsarist Army. Six of these future leaders of the NKVD had either never gone to school or are missing educational information, nineteen had a primary education or had studied in school for a year or two, fourteen had an incomplete secondary education, twenty-six had a secondary education, eleven had an incomplete higher education, while two had completed teachers’ exams. Four individuals had joined the Party before the revolution, while most of the rest had joined during the Civil War. Some had been members of other political parties, including some Jewish parties (four from Poalei Zion, and one Bundist).\footnote{169}

The monograph *ChK-GPU-NKVD in Ukraine: People, Facts, Documents*, which examines the activities of Soviet security forces in Ukraine, includes
some information about Jewish Chekists. Besides the individuals discussed, it lists thirty-five additional agents who began their careers in the period 1918–21. Although some data is missing, the general picture is nonetheless intriguing. Of these thirty-five individuals, nine joined the Cheka between the ages of 15 and 20, ten between 21 and 25, and seven between 26 and 30. Fifteen of them came to the Cheka from the Red Army, where they had nearly all served in the ranks. Three had no formal education, eleven had failed to complete primary school, with an additional eleven completing a primary education, two had an incomplete secondary education, and six had completed secondary school. Twenty-six came from former Pale territories, while two were born beyond the Pale. Only three came from workers’ families, while two were of the intelligentsia. The rest came from the craftsmen, servants, or small business owners (there is only information for twenty-eight people). Twenty-one entered the Bolshevik Party from 1917 to 1921, while two were members before the revolution. Among those who joined after the revolution, one was a former SR, one an anarchist, and one was a member of Poalei Zion.

Let us look at some of the survey data regarding those Jews who joined the Cheka during the Civil War, and went on to make a career for themselves in the organization. Among those of the “older generation” were Lev Belskii (Abram Levin), Iakov Genkin, and Samuil Gilman. Belskii was the son of a worker who was employed at a shipping office. He had successfully passed correspondence exams that qualified him as a private tutor and a pharmacist’s apprentice. He worked as a pharmacist, joined the army in 1911, and went to the front in July 1914. He was a member of the Bund from 1905 to 1907, and joined the Bolsheviks in July 1917. In April 1918, at the age of 29, he was appointed the chair of the Simbirsk gubernia Cheka, and he continued to ascend the ranks of the organization. Genkin was the son of a teacher at a Jewish school who likewise had passed his tutor’s exam. Before the revolution he worked as a mechanic and tinsmith. He completed four years at the local city school, and served in the army from 1911 to 1920. In March 1919, he joined the Bolshevik party. In 1921, at the age of 31, he was promoted from the ranks to the position of Cheka inspector of his division.

Most of those working for the Cheka were much younger, 20 years of age on average. The youngest was Mark Rogol, who had been born in Odessa to the family of a glass-blower. From the age of 13 he worked as an unskilled laborer at a tobacco factory, he joined the Bolsheviks by 15 (at the age of 17 he was expelled for drunkenness, but was later readmitted), and became an agitator for the Odessa Gubkom. Within a month (March 1920) he had joined...
the local Cheka, and by July was the deputy of the head of the Kremenchug Cheka. By September 1920 he was the head of Information and Intelligence for the Politburo of the Cheka of the Aleksandria uezd.

Mikhail Andreev (Sheinkman) was the son of a porter, had received a primary education, and joined the Bolsheviks in 1919. He became the deputy of the Mozyr uezd Cheka in July 1920, at the age of only 17. By December 1920 he was an investigator for the Belorussian Cheka. Isai Babich, the son of a cobbler who had completed two years at a religious school, joined the Bolsheviks in 1920 and became the assistant to the Special Plenipotentiary of the Nikolaev Cheka the same year, at the age of 18. He had transferred to the Cheka from his position as a typesetter for the political division of the Navy on the Southwest front. Abram Sapir (b. 1900) was the son of a train dispatcher and had never gone to school. His qualifications consisted of having worked at a train station as an unskilled laborer. He joined the Cheka in March 1919 as an investigator specializing in transportation matters in the Baranovichi Cheka. He joined the Bolsheviks in August 1919, and from March 1920 worked as the secretary of the Cheka section overseeing shipping in Odessa.

Mikhail Volkov (Vainer), the son of a tailor of unknown education, had worked as a clerk for a mine shopkeeper when he was a boy. He joined the Red Army in October 1917, and joined the Bolsheviks in January 1918. He began working for the Cheka in May 1918 at the age of 18. He worked as an instructor in the Operations Section of the Kursk Cheka until June 1919, and then served in a number of Cheka organizations in the Red Army, heading the Cheka of the Thirty-second Rifle Division from 1919 to 1920, and the Eighteenth Cavalry Division in 1920.

Iakov Veinshtok, the son of a petty merchant, had finished four years at a local school (during the party purges of 1921, he was expelled for being part of the intelligentsia—apparently four years of schooling was too much for the party). Before joining the Bolsheviks in July 1919, he worked as a clerk in a trade office. He joined the Red Army in December 1919, and by the following May had joined the Cheka, serving in a number of leadership positions in a variety of military units. By September 1920 he was head of the Cheka organization attached to the Forty-first Rifle Division.

Some of the Jewish Chekists were more educated. Semen Gendin, the son of a doctor, apparently had managed to complete his courses at a gimnazium. He joined the Red Army in 1918 at the age of 16, and by 1921 was working as an investigator for the Moscow Cheka. Mark Gai (Shtokliand), the son of a hatter, finished the Kiev Art Academy and two years at the Law
Faculty of Kiev University. He joined the ranks of the Red Army in October 1918, and engaged in political and managerial work with the military. He joined the Bolsheviks in March 1919, and the Cheka by May 1920. At just under 22 years of age, he was serving as the head of the Cheka Political Section attached to the Fifty-ninth Division.

The infamous brothers Berman were born to the proprietor of a brick factory in the Transbaikal oblast. Fortunately for them, their father’s factory had failed early on, thus giving them a less suspicious social background. The elder, Mattvei, completed trade school, joined the army as a common soldier, graduated from the military academy in Irkutsk, and was promoted to the rank of praporshchik (ensign). In August of 1920 he became the chair of the Cheka in the Glazov uyezd. Throughout the Civil War he served in a number of positions in the Ekaterinburg, Omsk, Tomsk, Verkhneudinsk, Eniseisk, and Semipalatinsk Chekas. The peak of his career saw him overseeing a gulag and the construction of the Moscow Canal, which was built mostly with prison labor. He eventually became the deputy to the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, and served briefly as the People’s Commissar of Communication before his arrest and execution in 1939.

Mattvei’s younger brother, Boris, completed four years of schooling, and worked in a shop as a boy. He served in the Red Guard, and was able to hide from the Whites thanks to a false passport. He was later mobilized by White forces and worked as a security guard for the Chinese Eastern Railway. He joined the Irkutsk Cheka in February 1921, still under the age of 20. Later, Boris would serve as the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs for the Belarus SSR. He was shot two weeks before his older brother.

Semen Mirkin’s story is perhaps the most bizarre of all. The son of a cobbler, he completed two years at a Jewish school before going to work as a tailor’s apprentice (and later as a tailor) in numerous villages in the Pale of Settlement. In June 1915 he was in Orel, probably as a refugee. Despite being only 16 years old, he somehow ended up in the army (either freely or by conscription). On leaving the army in March 1918, he returned to his tailoring pursuits, but by July of the same year he once again found himself in the army. He continued his profession for the Red Army Cavalry School in Orel, and then as a tailor for the Ninth Infantry Division. By November 1919 he had joined the Bolsheviks, and he studied at a Party school in Rostov from April to December 1920. By January 1921, he was weaving a different kind of web as a military investigator for the Revolutionary Tribunal attached to the Thirty-first Division. He joined the Cheka in June of 1921, and was put in
charge of combating banditry in the Twenty-second Infantry Division. This graduate of a heder and a Bolshevik school eventually became the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Northern Ossetian ASSR. In 1939 the former tailor was arrested, and he was executed in January of 1940.

It is not too difficult to imagine the kind of “investigations” carried out by these former tailors and typesetters, most of whom had only finished the fourth grade. Praskovia Semenovna Ivanovskaia (the daughter-in-law of V. G. Korolenko and an old revolutionary) once rebuked a young female Cheka investigator, a seamstress by the name of “Comrade Rosa,” for terrorizing her charges by threatening to shoot them. Rosa replied to the charge “with heartfelt simplicity”: “But what am I to do if they don’t confess?”172 In Kharkov, a former hairdresser by the name of Miroshnichenko and the 18-year-old Iesel Mankin constantly threatened their victims with death. On one occasion, Mankin leveled a Browning at the accused and said, “Your life depends on the correct answer.”173 In all likelihood, there were much worse instances of abuse as well.

In the 1920s the number of Jews serving in the OGPU (the predecessor of the NKVD) increased. They also continued to serve in the upper levels of the OGPU in approximately the same proportion as they had during the Civil War. This increase was due at least in part to the large number of Jews who moved to major cities. Among the Jewish population it was easier to find workers with an education, knowledge of foreign languages and other skills in demand. The number of Jews in the OGPU-NKVD continued to grow in the first half of the 1930s as well, reaching a peak of 39 percent (forty-three individuals) in the upper levels of the NKVD in 1936. By 1941 only ten remained (5.5 percent).174 The repressions of the second half of the 1930s drastically changed the ethnic makeup of the organization. By 1940 Russian comprised 84 percent of the central NKVD organization, followed by Ukrainians (6 percent) and Jews (5 percent, 189 individuals). By the end of the 1940s Jews were largely gone from the organization.175

* * *

Soviet authorities did not discriminate against Jews on the basis of their ethnic heritage. When “excesses” did occur, they ran counter to the party line. However, ethnic heritage was not the only means of discrimination. Sometimes local authorities or requisition units would treat the entire local Jewish population as bourgeois, speculators, smugglers, or counterrevolutionaries.
In the spring of 1919, in the Klimovichi uezd in the Mogilev gubernia, a Soviet canteen was distributing apples in honor of the upcoming holidays. The man in charge of the distribution announced that all Russians should get in line, while “the Jews aren’t to get any. They’re all speculators.” The Jewish population of Kivichi, a village in the Chernigov uezd were ordered by requisition troops to pay a tax of 500,000 rubles, while the peasant population of the entire volost’ was ordered to pay only 90,000. In Roslavl (Smolensk gubernia) an emergency tax of 800,000 rubles was placed on a Christian population of 45,000. The local Jewish population (of 2,000 people!) was to pay 3.2 million.\textsuperscript{176}

A Red Army soldier working for the ChON\textsuperscript{177} wrote home in June of 1919 that he was currently stationed in the village of Krasnopole, where he and his comrades had “driven out the deserters and conscripts” and had searched the homes of the local Jews, where they found “lots of goods, salt, bread, footwear, and a lot of silk.” Although the soldier in question had a monthly salary of 350 rubles, there is little doubt that his job had its perks: “there are a lot of speculators; you can take 1000 rubles worth of goods off of a single one depending on what they’re carrying, sometimes more if you’re lucky, and then you can sell [the goods] or exchange [them] in the village for bread and lard” (Orsha, Gomel gubernia, June 28, 1919).\textsuperscript{178} Such looting was done almost in an official manner. On one occasion the writer Korolenko was on his way to the Poltava Cheka, in all likelihood to get someone out of trouble. On the road there he ran into an elderly Jew, who had just been released after his arrest. Shaking Korolenko’s hand, he introduced himself: “I’m Goikhman, a bourgeois.” Korolenko remarked, “This Soviet power is seeking contributions from the bourgeoisie. He paid, and so they let him go.”\textsuperscript{179}

The fundraising efforts of the Cheka were to have a deleterious effect even on those who might have supported the Bolsheviks. A well-off elderly Jewish man from Kiev, who had been arrested several times and had “ransomed” himself just as many, admitted to an acquaintance that he had earlier sympathized with the socialists, and had hoped that they would do away with injustice. Now, quotas and the Pale of Settlement seemed to him “a fantastic dream”: “Back then they only robbed you once every five or six years, and only demanded blood sacrifices once every several decades. But at least the world was open, and you could leave this inhospitable homeland. Now they rob you constantly and spit all over you. This is the long-awaited socialism, an era of boorishness and criminal behavior, when the most barbaric instincts are given free rein!”\textsuperscript{180}
Of course these “additional expenditures” on the part of merchants in the form of bribes and lost goods were passed on to the consumer, which only served to further incense the local population at what they believed to be “speculation.” Not surprisingly, Jews were often the target of such animosity.

The concept of “class warfare” was more than a metaphor during the Civil War. In the fall of 1918, a Sirotin school representative was wounded while trying to solicit contributions from local merchants with the goal of creating a Jewish school with Yiddish instruction. The Secretary of the kombed (Committee of Poor Peasants) was killed trying to collect a tax from the very same merchants. In response, the local Cheka arrested twelve people, six of whom were executed.181

In Lepel, those merchants whose fortunes had been ruined by War Communism soon turned to smuggling. When they were caught, sentences were handed down that would have been unthinkable under the Tsarist regime. Five people were executed, while the rest were sent to labor camps.182 Other victims of the Bolsheviks included the Jewish merchant Okunev (from Sevastopol) and his son.183

Jews had a significantly smaller chance of being taken hostage by the Bolsheviks during the war. As Cheka order No. 208 (December 17, 1919, signed by both Dzerzhinsky and Latsis) explains, a hostage is defined as “a captive who comes from the society or organization that is fighting against us. Moreover such an individual has value for the enemy . . . The enemy won’t put out anything for a country teacher, a miller, a forester, or a shopkeeper, let alone a Jew.” Hostages were to be high officials, wealthy landowners, factory owners, talented professionals, scientists, relatives of the anti-Bolshevik leadership, etc.184

One can only imagine what they meant by “talented professionals.” Apparently one of them turned out to be Ilia Ehrenburg, who, in order to escape capture, was forced to flee from Moscow to Ukraine in September 1918.185 Of course, if there were no “valuable” members of society at hand, Jewish shopkeepers often proved a viable substitute, and were shot “in accordance with the Red Terror” with equal success.186 Those who had served as officers during the Provisional Government, and those who were members of political parties that had fallen out of favor, were also common targets.187 The assassination of the last Chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, M. S. Uritsky, was largely motivated by the fact that Uritsky had ordered the death of V. Pereltsveig (a former cadet) along with twenty other hostages. L. I. Kannegiser, Uritsky’s future assassin, had begged Uritsky to let his innocent friend go free, to no avail.188
On May 12, 1919, fifty members of the bourgeoisie were arrested in Kiev. All of them “happened to be” Jews. A young university student described one of the arrests in her diary. Cheka agents stormed into her home with an arrest warrant for her uncle, who was away at the time. When the agents telephoned headquarters for further instructions, it was decided that any brother would do, and they took away the girl’s father. Having gathered the requisite number of captives, all of them homeowners and merchants, all Jewish, they took them to the Cheka (at this point it was already the middle of the day). On this occasion, at least, the prisoners got lucky, the authorities were unable to come up with a reason to shoot all of them, and the majority of the prisoners were released within five days.

A number of well-off Jews from Poltava were less fortunate. Having been sent to the rear lines for forced labor, thirty-five of them ended up in the hospital with such severe injuries that even a member of the Bolshevik command ordered the following resolution to be included in his review of the matter: “Death to those miscreants who have disgraced Bolshevik power with their brutality.” Such forays into “self-criticism” were few and far between.

Literally hours before Kiev was captured by Denikin’s forces, a Jew by the name of Gorenstein was executed by the Cheka. His crime: looking younger than the age listed in his passport, which the authorities took to be fake. When friends and acquaintances protested his arrest, and it turned out that he was who he said he was, the Cheka high command turned their attention to another matter: who was trying to protect the wealthy owner of a sugar factory. The protests quickly ceased. As Gorenstein was not among those listed as being shot, his family had hopes that he was still alive. They soon discovered that he had been executed without orders. A member of the Cheka was later seen walking out of Sadovaia 5, the building where the executions took place, carrying Gorenstein’s patent leather boots, which were perhaps the only reason why Gorenstein was murdered.

In the city of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, a massacre was carried out by Red partisans under the command of Ia. Triapitsin, who had captured the city from Japanese Siberian Intervention forces in February 1920. According to the partisans, the remaining Japanese troops attacked on March 12. The partisans soon gained the upper hand and routed the Japanese garrison, killing the remaining soldiers. A day of mourning was declared in Japan. By April the Japanese had begun the occupation of the northern half of Sakhalin Island, and by May, 5,000 Japanese soldiers were sent to the city.
that their position was untenable, Triapitsin (then twenty-three years old) and his chief of staff Nina Lebedeva (twenty-one years old) decided to raze the city and evacuate the populace. “Counterrevolutionary elements” were to be eliminated. The first to be slaughtered were the Japanese inhabitants of Nikolaevsk.¹⁹²

The rest of the inhabitants sentenced to death were split into five categories. Jews and their families fell into the first category. V. V. Romanova believes that the Jews killed were victims of a “class crusade,” as many of them were major figures in the fish and gold industries. The second category was composed of the wives and children of officers and soldiers. In the third week of May a ten-day massacre began that was to claim the lives of 2,500 people. It is unknown how many of them were Jews. Documents from Triapitsin’s trial demonstrate that “members of the Jewish community were taken into the middle of the Amur by boat and were drowned, adults and children.”¹⁹³ Numerous such testimonies can be found in A. Gutman’s investigation of the events from 1924. He writes, “The author attracts the reader’s attention to the Jews who were killed in particular. They fully refute the widespread myth that the bloodthirsty Soviet regime has shown mercy to the Jews and is protecting them from pogroms.”¹⁹⁴

The events at Nikolaevsk drew the attention of the international community. In order to put the matter to rest, Triapitsin and his collaborators were put on trial for “failure to obey the orders of the government and for anarchist activity.” On July 9 1920 Triapitsin and Lebedeva were sentenced to death, along with five other individuals. They were executed the very same day.¹⁹⁵

On some occasions, Jews were executed in order to prove that all were equal in Soviet society. After the Bolsheviks recaptured Kiev in January of 1920, ten people were executed for “speculating in currency.” Their names were printed on giant posters up and down the main street of Kiev. Nine of those executed were Jews, and passers-by on the street could be heard saying, “well, they’ve finally got around to getting their own . . .”¹⁹⁶ In Kherson in the summer of the same year, the Bolsheviks posted lists of those executed, at the rate of fifteen a day. The last five names on the list each day were Jewish, to assist in the “struggle against anti-Semitism.”¹⁹⁷

Under the rules of War Communism, even the most common economic activities were outlawed. Those who dared to disobey the regulations ran an extremely high risk of falling into the hands of the Cheka. A miller, G. Ia.
Aronov, was executed for attempting to sell flour according to its market value (as opposed to the price set by the authorities), even though everybody was well aware of the fact that the set prices were impossible, and would have led to the end of flour production. S. M. Mirkin was also executed for “actively participating in speculation” with Aronov, by buying flour from him and attempting to sell it in his shop. This was no isolated incident. During the Soviet-Polish War, the Red Army similarly murdered “several rich Jews” in Grodno.

Those Jews who planned on leaving the Soviet state were in for a bitter surprise. After the end of armed conflict in early 1921, tens of thousands of Jews who had been ravaged by pogroms, requisitions, poverty, and unemployment attempted to cross the border. At the time, pogroms were still being carried out by a number of armed groups. For the Soviet government, however, attempts to emigrate were viewed as crimes. The head of the Cheka organization serving the northern border of the Kiev military district issued the following warning: “I will confiscate all property, and will shoot those who attempt to do cross the border regardless of the reason for leaving the country or transporting goods across the border. All those who know of such attempts and fail to inform the Extraordinary Section will be considered to be in collaboration with the traitors, and will be imprisoned in labor camps, and have their property confiscated.”

The city of Proskurov had been the site of some of the worst pogrom activity of the Civil War. There an order was issued claiming that Jews were attempting to cross the border en masse and were taking with them government property. Any individual who noticed “a Jew heading for the border” was required to “detain him and hand him over to the authorities.” Jews who attempted to cross the border faced several months in prison and the confiscation of their belongings. Some of those who attempted to emigrate were accused of espionage and executed.

It is true that in April 1921 the Politburo of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party passed a decision to allow nearly unlimited Jewish emigration. Ironically, one of the most fervent opponents of the decision was the Evsektsiia. From their point of view, allowing Jews to go abroad would lead to “massive Jewish emigration, at a time when non-Jews were forbidden from emigrating.” Moreover, they felt that the arrival of masses of refugees, most of whom had experienced the pogroms, would give “Zionists and other bourgeois organizations . . . material for filthy lies for the slanderous radio broadcasts
of America, England, etc." As a result, a series of measures aimed at limiting emigration were worked out. Soon emigration became completely impossible.

Unlike in Tsarist times, the western border of Soviet Russia would now be closed to Jews, and would remain so for the next fifty years.
The White movement drew most of its support from the ranks of the military. Thus, the treatment of Jews in the Russian Army paid a particularly significant role in the formation of the Whites’ response to the “Jewish question.” In a relatively recent study, I. Petrovskii-Shtern claims that “The Russian Army has had a reputation for being one of the most, if not the most, anti-Semitic institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia.” However, he also advises caution, noting, “This commonly accepted opinion, accepted at face value by Russian and Jewish historians, demands serious reevaluation.” In my opinion, the data from Petrovskii-Shtern’s own study, as well as from other sources, is decidedly at odds with his somewhat “revisionist” conclusion.

Jews faced a large number of restrictions when it came to military service. As a rule, Jews were forbidden from serving as officers in the armed services. Starting from the time of D. A. Miliutin’s 1874 military reforms up until 1917, only nine Jews were commissioned as officers. Eight of these were the scions of influential Jewish banking families. From the very beginning it was clear to everyone involved that none of them would actually serve in the army. The only Jewish officer to come from more humble beginnings was Herzl Yankl Tsam, a former cantonist, who in 1876 was allowed to take the first-level officer’s exam. Already past 30 at the time of his commission, Tsam ascended through the ranks remarkably slowly despite his excellent record of service. Tsam was promoted to Captain only upon his retirement some 20 years later. Of these nine Jewish officers the last to be commissioned was Avraam-Alfred Gintsburg, the fifth son of the Baron G. O. Gintsburg. In 1886, Alexander III had allowed Gintsburg to be promoted to the rank of
Cornet, a decision that later served as a reason for the Tsar to forbid similar promotions.  

In the army, Jews were constantly viewed with suspicion. Among the many accusations leveled against them, the most typical were a lack of patriotism, preferential treatment of their coreligionists, and negligence in their military duties. Jewish doctors were also blamed for the poor conditions of medical treatment in the Western military districts. As a result, an open letter written by Minister of War P. S. Vannovskii on April 10, 1882, entitled, “On the Introduction and Enactment of Measures Restricting the Influx of Individuals of the Mosaic Law in the Military Medical Service” (O prividenii v ispolnenie mer po ogranicheniiu naplyva lits Moiseeva zakona v voennomeditsinskuiu sluzhbu), placed a new series of restrictions on Jews. In addition, the Ministry took the step of transferring Jewish doctors to the Turkestan and Eastern Siberian military districts. These restrictions also affected Jewish paramedics (fel’dshery—doctor’s assistants) and pharmacists’ apprentices. Jews and Catholics (i.e., Poles) were not allowed to be scribes, telegraph operators, draftsmen, foremen, train conductors, engineers, millers, gunsmiths, or members of the Engineering Corps. They were also not allowed to work at depots or to practice medicine in the western military districts. They were not even allowed to serve as soldiers in fortress garrisons. From all of the above, it is hardly difficult to draw the conclusion that Jews were considered to be potential swindlers, saboteurs, and traitors. How else can one explain the restrictions placed on their access to material goods, military technology, and classified documents? The restrictions introduced by Vannovskii were not always strictly observed. Indeed, in some cases they were outright ignored, given the fact that the peasants who made up the majority of the Russian Army were often incapable of serving in positions that required a high degree of literacy or special training. In such cases, the army was forced to resort to employing Jews, Poles, and other foreigners.

By some measures, Jews were actually more likely to serve in the Army than other ethnic minorities in Russia. In a 1904 memorandum addressed to S. U. Witte, P. P. Mendeleev writes:

Even the 1874 statute concerning military service, which proposed no restrictions on Jews, has been hampered by the directives preventing Jews from serving in certain posts and forbidding them from achieving the rank of officer, etc. Jewish parents are forced to pay a fine of 300 rubles if their son should fail to report for military
service. Thanks to emigration, poor record keeping, and other factors, such situations occur quite often, and such fines represent a heavy burden for the poor and impoverished. All of this takes place even though the ranks are sufficiently replenished, and in fact the percentage of Jews who actually serve (more than 5 percent) is greater than the rate of overall participation across the Empire (4 percent).⁴

Here Mendeleev is citing figures from Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik (a government newsletter), according to which the total number of Russian subjects entering military service in 1892 was 260,307, of which 15,438 (or 6.29 percent) were Jews. In 1893, the numbers were 15,366 Jews (5.84 percent) of the 257,224 total; in 1894, 14,171 (5.25 percent) of 268,351; in 1895, 14,188 (5.2 percent) of 272,992. According to the census of 1897, the total Jewish population of Russia was 5,189,000, or 4.73 percent of the entire population of the Russian Empire.⁵ According to the same census, Jews comprised 11 percent of all conscripts from the Pale of Settlement territories.

During the period 1890–1902 this percentage would fluctuate between 12.9 and 15 percent. This number decreased in the period 1904–9 (from 9 percent to 10.4 percent).⁶ The decrease in numbers happens to coincide with a period of intensified emigration, which reached its peak during the period 1903–7, when nearly half a million Jews left the country.

Nearly 90 percent of Jewish soldiers in the Petersburg, Kiev, Vilna, and Warsaw military districts served as combat troops. The lion’s share of these served in the infantry (76.3 percent) with smaller numbers in the artillery (6.3 percent), cavalry (4 percent), and engineering corps (1.2 percent). Non-combat troops accounted for 5 percent of all Jewish soldiers in Kiev in 1908, 2.5 percent in Warsaw, and 2.4 percent in Vilna. Despite emigration (and their completely understandable reluctance to serve in the armed forces, where they were treated as pariahs), Jews nonetheless comprised a larger portion of conscripts (as expressed in terms of the eligible male population) than any other ethnic group in Russia.⁷ Thus, the widespread rumors of rampant Jewish desertion and of their serving only non-combat roles cannot be confirmed statistically. However, sometimes impressions and stereotypes tend to be given more credence than actual facts.

Jews were always suspected of being disloyal; in fact, the officer corps was instructed to expect this. One such example can be found in a secret circular distributed among the troops from 1905 to 1907, with the approval of
Minister of War A. F. Rediger, “The Jewish population has been involved in disturbances including the spreading of propaganda, perhaps funded by foreign sources, that raises in them unrealizable hopes. The displeasure of these vile meddlers often expresses itself in insubordination and resistance to the police and local administrations as representatives of the authorities and guardians of civil order. The lower ranks must be constantly reminded that the distribution of such proclamations is being carried out by saboteurs, who are without honor or conscience. These failures and vagabonds do not care for that which is dear and true to the Russian who deeply loves his Sovereign and his Motherland.”

The answers to a survey entitled “Of the Martial and Moral Qualities Among Members of the Jewish Faith in the Lower Ranks” (which was distributed to the generals of the Imperial Army in 1912) provide an interesting case study of the attitudes of the Russian military command toward Jews. All fifty senior military officers agreed that an excess of Jews in the military was harmful. Thirty-four of these expressed a desire to completely forbid Jews from joining, with twenty-eight allowing for no exceptions, and only six allowing for some flexibility. Only sixteen recognized the necessity to reconcile themselves to the presence of Jews in the army in one form or another. There were also several proposals aimed at minimizing the “danger” posed by Jews by removing them from combat duty (statistically this would have been impossible; there were more Jews in the army than there were non-combat positions). Ia. G. Zhilinskii summarized the opinions of those surveyed in a memorandum addressed to the War Minister V. A. Sukhomlinov on January 11, 1913: “1. A majority of 56 percent of the combat generals were for the complete expulsion of Jews from the army. 2. A minority of 32 percent were of the opinion that Jews should remain in the army. 3. 12 percent were inclined to pursue a solution to the problem of Jews in the army within the greater context of the solution to the Jewish question in the Empire.”

Sukhomlinov proposed the following resolution: “The desired solution to the problem is the complete and total removal of Jews from the army.” This viewpoint was shared by Nicholas II. It should be noted that the signature of a certain General A. S. Lukomskii accompanied Zhilinskii’s on the memo. At the time Lukomskii was in charge of mobilization for the army, and he would later become chairman of the Special Council of the Russian Armed Forces in the South of Russia under the leadership of General Denikin. General M. V. Alekseev (who was later to form the Volunteer Army) was
also among those surveyed. His response to the survey indicated a temporary willingness to tolerate Jewish soldiers in the ranks of the army.\(^{11}\)

The period 1907–1914 was “significant for the rapid increase in xenophobia in Russian society as a whole and in the armed forces in particular.”\(^{12}\) In the words of Petrovskii-Shtern, the military regulations adopted right before the outbreak of World War I were “perceived by some leftist Duma deputies as being antisemitic.” Nonetheless, he goes on to argue, when viewed “within the context of the opinions of the upper ranks of the military, it should be viewed somewhat differently . . . The regulations of 1912 strengthened all of the anti-Jewish restrictions regarding military service that had been introduced in a number of circulars written from the early 1880s to the late 1900s.”\(^{13}\) The military regulations were not only “perceived” as being antisemitic by contemporaries; they in fact were antisemitic in nature.

The anti-Jewish convictions typical for a Christian society, as well as influence from certain sectors of the press, were hardly the only sources of antisemitism among the officers; “Science” played an important role as well. Among the required subjects taught in military academies and colleges were military geography and military statistics. As Peter Holquist notes, the authors of the widely used textbooks in these subjects paid particular attention to the composition and “quality” of the population, splitting it into reliable and unreliable “elements.” For military statistics, the ideal population was a monoethnic one that spoke only one common language. Thus the heart and center of the Empire was considered to be healthy and reliable, while the populations of the border regions were undesirable and unreliable. According to military statistics, qualities such as loyalty and patriotism were inherent to Russians, whereas Jews were characterized as being unpatriotic, avaricious, and self-centered; Poles and Muslims were considered to be completely foreign and unreliable. In these aspects, Russian military statistics were following the tendencies of the most recent racial theories; the author of the textbook, V. R. Kannenberg, often cited Ernest Renan as proof of the Jewish tendency towards separatism. At the turn of the century, and particularly after the 1905 revolution, ethnic identity became an increasingly important category for determining the “quality” and “reliability” of local populations.\(^{14}\)

Holquist writes:

Military statistics undoubtedly incorporated existing anti-Polish, anti-Muslim, and anti-Jewish prejudices. But they then recast these
existing prejudices in a new register. Deportation measures toward Jewish subjects during the First World War were not simply the enactment of old-style anti-Judaism. Instead, they reflected the shift from traditional religious stereotypes—anti-Judaism—into a new form of civic anti-Semitism, one not derived primarily from religion and not focusing exclusively on Jews. The Council of Ministers and the General Staff repeatedly disagreed throughout 1915 over the Jewish deportations. The dispute arose precisely out of a clash between the old-style anti-Judaism of traditional bureaucrats, seeking to keep Jews isolated in the Pale of Settlement, and the new-style anti-Semitism of “progressive” military men, identifying whole segments of the population as politically and militarily unreliable. It was this anti-Semitism, and not the supposedly congenital Russian peasant anti-Judaism (as manifested, say, in pogroms), that framed the violence against Jews in the succeeding revolutionary convulsions.¹⁵

In reality the situation was slightly more complicated. Tsarist ministers went against the Stavka’s recommendations, though they did so not out of any religious convictions, but because of more pragmatic concerns. Deportation was an inexpensive option, in the literal sense of the word. After all, it was easier to deport people than to resettle them, and such tasks would be the responsibility of the civil authorities. Moreover, violence against Jews gave Russia a bad reputation on the international stage, making countries such as the United States more reluctant to extend lines of credit. It is hardly a coincidence that the Finance and Foreign Ministries were among those who came out against the inane proposals of the military.¹⁶ Although the anti-Semitism prevalent among the officers was not exclusively the result of educational indoctrination, Holquist’s apt observations do draw an accurate picture of the practices of the military during the First World War and ensuing Civil War.

Jews were in no rush to join the military, and many used every means at their disposal to avoid military service. Avoiding military service or the conscription of one’s children served as one of the main motivations for emigration.

According to the assurances of General A. I. Denikin, one of the most progressive Russian military commanders, there were no ethnic tensions in the army barracks:
The nationality question did not exist in camp. If soldiers of non-Russian descent experienced difficulties in service, it was mainly due to their ignorance of the Russian language. Actually Latvians, Tatars, Georgians, and Jews who did not speak Russian were a terrible burden to the commander of the company and the company itself, and these circumstances created animosity toward them. The majority of such soldiers were Jews. In my regiment and in others with which I was acquainted, complete tolerance was practiced toward Jewish soldiers; but it is impossible to deny that in some units there was a tendency toward oppression of Jews. This by no means resulted from the military system, but was brought into the barracks from the outside, from the national way of life. The majority of Jews were townspeople, living in poverty for the most part; therefore, they sent sickly recruits, boys who were less well-developed physically than the peasant youth. This immediately placed them in a rather inferior position in the barracks. The inadequate education they received in the heder and their frequent ignorance of the Russian language complicated their situation still further. All of this, on the one hand, made it extremely difficult to train these boys to military order, and on the other, significantly increased their burden in the service. I must add that some common traits of the Jewish character, such as hysteria and love of speculation, also played a significant role.

Judging from the facts at hand, the reality of the situation was much worse than Denikin’s portrayal of it. Some Jewish conscripts went so far as to inflict serious injury on themselves, just to avoid going to the army. This behavior can hardly be explained away by the “inadequate education” among the Jewish masses. According to Denikin, there existed a number of underground “doctors” willing to cut off toes, rupture eardrums, yank out teeth, or even dislocate hip bones, all in order to help individuals avoid military service.

This was not an exaggeration on Denikin’s part. There also exists testimony on the Jewish side that recounts the activities of this “institution” in detail. One example is the story of Leiba Abramovich Iagudin (1874–1964), who in the late 1890s was living in Velikie Luki, in the Pskov gubernia. In 1895, Leiba turned 21, meaning he had reached the age of military conscription. As the Tsarist authorities were often distrustful of documents stating...
the age of Jews, he was called to the local conscription office. There doctors were able to “determine lagudin’s age by looking at him, and concluded that he had been born in 1874, before the first of October.”

Several months before the muster lagudin decided to destroy his body in the hopes that the medical commission would not consider him fit for military service. To do this in his hometown of Velikie Luki would be dangerous, as there was the possibility that others might inform on him. Instead, Leiba went to Pskov, where he found a certain “specialist.” According to his memoirs, “they gathered several of us young men in a tiny room. For several months, without leaving the room, we would constantly smoke, drink strong coffee, not sleep, and waste numerous days and nights playing cards. We sat on chairs that were missing one leg. As soon as you began to nod off, you’d crash to the floor and immediately wake up. I eventually arrived at the commission completely atrophied; my heartbeat was irregular, my lungs wheezed, I was barely alive. So they classified me as unfit for service.”

Those Jews who did serve in the Russian army often sought ways to escape. Such was the case with David Shkolnik, a native of Melitopol who was called to military service in 1911. In a letter intended for a friend or relative in the United States that was intercepted by the military censors, Shkolnik wrote that he was patiently bearing the burdens of military service, and might have been willing to bear them to the end, but that recent events (the threat of war with Austria-Hungary) had forced him to “seriously consider cutting ties with our ‘Stepmotherland.’ . . . I had braced my heart to bear the most difficult of services, military service, for my unfortunate homeland. But to offer up my own life and the well-being of my family as a sacrifice seems illogical at best. To spill blood so that one’s people, their lives, and every moment of existence could be poisoned . . . for this I have neither the strength nor the desire.” Cutting ties with the “Stepmotherland” was not an easy act for the author; instead it was a choice forced upon him by the “hell of physical and moral suff ering” of war. “To abandon everything that has entered one’s flesh and blood over the centuries and generations forever is an easy thing to say. But I’m sure that for most immigrants this wound never heals.”

Given that this letter was intercepted by the military censors, it is highly unlikely that the author was able to realize his intentions.

A significant part of Russia’s Jewish population did not wait for the beginning of the war, but emigrated earlier. The year 1914 saw a marked increase in the number of Jewish immigrants to the United States from Russia, amounting to about 102,600 people. If it had still been possible to cross
the Atlantic after August of that year, the number would probably have been higher.

Little had changed in the twenty years since Leiba Iagudin had endured self-mutilation in Pskov in order to avoid military service. In 1916, Ia. A. Bromberg of Odessa claimed he was the only one among his fellow Jews who was not afraid of any kind of military service, and who avoided the two most common escapes from military duty: enrolling in the medical faculty and engaging in voluntary disfigurement.24

It is difficult to assemble an accurate picture of the martial capabilities of the Jewish members of the Russian armed forces during the First World War. In general, one is forced to rely on the decidedly subjective opinions of either military commanders or the Jewish soldiers themselves. The long list of medals and honors awarded to Jewish soldiers that can be found in the Jewish press does just as little to clarify this question as the accusations of cowardice and desertion that were leveled against Jewish soldiers.

Denikin wrote that “Jewish soldiers, conscientious and sharp-witted, created a normal situation for themselves in peacetime. And in war, all distinctions tend to become obliterated, with only individual valor and quick-wittedness receiving distinction.”25 A more balanced evaluation of the situation, however, can be found in the memoirs of A. A. Brusilov. Brusilov thought his evaluation of Jewish soldiers was “completely unbiased,” seeing as he “had no prejudices towards this group of people, positive or negative,” and that he “studied all aspects of them as soldiers” during the war. He writes, “Without a doubt, a large number of Jews were adequate soldiers, though many were poor soldiers as well. Some were all too willing to be taken prisoner, and, according to the testimony of Russian soldiers who had escaped, some of them felt more comfortable there. But there were other instances, though few in number, in which Jews demonstrated the lofty qualities of valor and love of the motherland.”

In support of his views, Brusilov cites two examples. In one case, there was a Jewish reconnaissance scout, well-known for his bravery and intelligence, who was considered by his peers to be the best in the division. He was in combat from the beginning of the war, was wounded on three occasions, and was awarded the Medal of St. George four times and the Cross of St. George three times. He was slated to receive the First Degree Cross of St. George when a problem arose: Jews were forbidden to receive the promotion (to the rank of podpraporshchik, equal to first seargent) associated with this honor. The corps commander brought the problem to Brusilov’s attention.
The latter took responsibility for the matter himself, embraced and kissed the reconnaissance scout in front of the troops, “and, even though it was illegal, promoted him to the rank of podpraporshchik and presented him with the First Degree Cross of St. George.”

The individual in question was probably Meer Zaivelovich Bondar, the recipient of all four orders of the Cross of St. George, whose martial exploits were reported in Jewish Week in January of 1917.

The other case involved a Russian Orthodox praporshchik (ensign) who had distinguished himself in battle and had received several honors and awards. He was to be presented with the Order of St. Vladimir (fourth degree). “A thorough review of his documents revealed that he was a baptized Jew. According to the law, he did not have the right to join the school of praporshchiki, and moreover could not be made an officer.” According to the law and the opinion of the corps commander, the individual in question should have been punished, rather than promoted. But Brusilov “was in complete disagreement with such a point of view” and allowed the presentation to take place, adding that, in the event that the matter should come to light, he was willing to take all responsibility on himself.

Brusilov would quite reasonably conclude, “From these two examples it is clear that Jews had very little reason to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland that was only a ‘stepmother’ to them. I could hardly complain about the fact that the majority of them among our ranks were poor warriors. I’ve always thought that a martial spirit demanded strict justice, but here they were forced into the role of pariahs. It would be interesting to know how Jews perform in the German or better yet the Austria-Hungarian armies, where they are accorded full civil rights.” It’s telling that both General Brusilov and the potential deserter David Shkolnik coincide in their description of Russia as a “stepmother” for Jews. The appellation is as obvious as it is apt.

Many Jews agreed with Brusilov’s view. R. M. Khin-Goldovskaia, a Russian writer and converted Catholic, wrote in her diary, “Jews who have managed to escape Germany are only given a week’s time to live outside of the Pale of Settlement. Go die for Holy Russia, for the Tsar our Father, for the glory of the Slavic idea, this is your responsibility; while the ghetto, the numerus clausus and quotas, the random fate of children and youths standing before the closed doors of schools, this is your right. I’m neither a semitophile nor a semitophobe, and I know that now is not the time to ‘discuss’ these things or anything else for that matter, but I can’t stop thinking about it.”
Several days later, in an entry full of disappointment on hearing that the authorities would not soften restrictions on Jews despite the war, she writes, “Tomorrow is the lottery at Moscow University for those Jews who are starved for education. There are 800 among the ‘starving’ while there are only 80 spots available. Since I’m not Misha [her son from her first marriage, M. S. Feldshein], and don’t consider Russia to be ‘sacred,’ all these indecencies, which society barely protests against at all, have had a decidedly chilling effect on my nationalism.”

The swell of rising patriotism that seized the Russian educated classes soon after the outbreak of the war soon found adherents among the Russian Jews as well. The Duma Deputy N. M. Fridman made the following statement on behalf of the Jewish population on July 26, 1914: “We the Jews live under exceptionally arduous and trying legal conditions. Nonetheless, we have always considered ourselves to be Russian citizens and have always been faithful sons of the Fatherland . . . No force is capable of turning the Jews of Russia from their homeland, Russia, the land with to which they have been bound for centuries. In defending their homeland many Jews are not only acting in accordance with their conscience, but also in accordance with a deep sense of devotion.”

Many hoped that a country that was allied with the democratic countries against German imperialism would soon remove restrictions on its minorities. However, this illusion quickly dissipated. The historian Ia. S. Lur’e wrote the following ironic hymn to Nicholas II on the occasion of the Russian army’s entry into Galicia:

O courageous knight, you have broken,
The chains of slavery in the Carpathians,
As a just leader in impoverished huts
You cut down and suff ocated Jews.
You shall take away Palestine
From the overreaching sultan.
And in the valley of the River Jordan,
Introduce the Pale and Jewish quota.

A more prosaic example of this disenchantment can be found in a letter addressed to an eighteen-year-old student at the Tashkent Trade Academy, which was intercepted by the Turkestan security forces and sent to the Police
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Ministry in Petrograd. The addressee had been planning on getting baptized in order to join a military academy. The letter, dated November 24, 1915, was written by the student’s sister, then serving as a doctor or nurse in Moscow. On learning of her brother’s intentions, she wrote:

As an adult, you have to make a full accounting of your decision. As your sister, I would ask you the following questions: 1. Whom are you going to defend? 2. Whose Fatherland are you going to defend? 3. What will this Fatherland give you, a Jew, and what has it ever given you? . . . when I was working in the infirmary, many times I would hear soldiers shouting behind my back that ‘all the Jews’ throats should be cut, they should all be killed!’ . . . They were afraid of me, though they always treated me well, as I only treated them well, but they’d still say such things behind my back. Later on in Moscow you could hear people saying “We need to beat up all of the Jews.” Jewish soldiers, with tears in their eyes, would tell me how terribly they were treated by the other soldiers and the officers. And what did they do with all the Jews living near the front? They exiled all of them like criminals. Who are you fighting for? Where’s your self-respect? Where’s Isaac’s, who has already decided to take up the cross? If you have brains in your head you’ll think about this and understand that fighting for those who would spit in your face is the same as spitting in your own face . . . Russia is their own country, they use it for whatever they want. Nobody will ever say to them that they should all have their throats cut. But that’s what everyone is saying to us Jews now. After the war we’re expecting pogroms in and outside of Moscow. Think about what you’re doing, Abrania. I am ashamed to even call you a Jew. You’re a person who has no self-respect, just as a beaten dog has no self-respect. You can beat and strike a dog, but it keeps on crawling back for more . . . If they had forced you to join, then I would understand that you had to obey, but you shouldn’t go looking for trouble yourself.33

The massive deportations of Jews, which reached a peak in 1915, had a visible effect on the attitudes of Jewish soldiers. A local chronicler in the Ukrainian village of Sirotin noted that “from 1915 onwards, desertion was almost universal among Jews and non-Jews. Many went underground. Rare was the
house in Sirotin that did not contain at least two or three people who had ‘buried themselves alive.’” Several of them remained in hiding until the February Revolution.34

Nevertheless, disdain for military service (however justified) was not universal among Russia’s Jews; many heroically went to the front to defend their homeland. The short-lived journal Evrei i Rossiia (Jews and Russia), which published four issues from May 12 to August 16 in 1915, published a special edition entitled “Jews: Heroes of the War” containing information about Jewish soldiers who were awarded medals and orders for bravery, as well as those who were wounded on the field of battle. The illustrated biweekly Evrei na voine (Jews at War, Moscow, 1915), dedicated to bearing witness to Jewish bravery and loyalty, published accounts of Jewish military exploits, along with photographs of those who had distinguished themselves in combat. It also publicized the exploits of Jewish soldiers in the Allied armies, where Jews were allowed to hold more prominent positions than they were in Russia. The cover of one issue featured a photo of fifteen-year-old volunteer David Shapiro from Poltava, an enlisted soldier who was later awarded the Cross of St. George for distinction in battle.35 Aleksandr Mazur, a gimnazium student who had volunteered for military service, met his end in Insterburg in Eastern Prussia.36 In Riga, eleven-year-old Vulf Iankelson had asked to enlist in the armed forces.37

Photographs of Jewish soldiers of the “Patriotic War” could even be found on postcards. Those featured included Aizik Gutman, who was wounded while escaping captivity, the aviator E. B. Margulis, who was twice awarded the Cross of St. George, and the doctor A. S. Glikman,38 who perished in the Caucuses. Another series of postcards, entitled “Russians on Jews,” included the photographs and comments of numerous Russian cultural and political figures addressing Jewish participation in the war. Pavel Dologrukov, a Kadet party member, was quoted as saying: “The time has come to ask the ‘Jewish question.’ Hundreds of thousands of Jews are spilling their blood for Russia’s victory . . .” Entrepreneur and philanthropist N. A. Shakhov was also featured: “The Jews are fighting alongside Russians and dying in blood-stained battlefields. One hopes that better days are coming for our Jewish ‘step-brothers’ as well.”39

Jewish Week, the “Jewish Kadet” newspaper, published similar stories on a regular basis. The first issue of 1917 included the photographs of three Jewish soldiers who had served in one artillery battery. All were recipients of the Cross of St. George, with one, Zakharii I. Shor, being awarded the fourth,
third, and second degrees of the Cross of St. George. The paper also noted that Shor had three brothers who were also serving in the army. The other two soldiers pictured, F. Kozorez and E. Kaufman, were awarded the Cross of St. George, (fourth and third degree) and the Medal of St. George (second, third, and fourth Degree).

Readers could also learn about Private Eliasha Vulfovich Shatse, who was awarded the Cross of St. George (fourth degree) for “repeated reconnaissance undertaken in hostile territory.” The same award was given to infantryman Gersh Shulimov Troler. Private Viktor Abramovich Berger, a university graduate, was awarded a Cross of St. George for valor in a bayonet battle with an Austrian patrol. David Kopelevich received not only the fourth and third degrees of the Cross of St. George but also the fourth, third, and second degrees of the Medal of St. George. Moisei Tsikovich Tsuzimir received the Medal of St. George (fourth and third degrees) for helping evacuate wounded soldiers from the field of battle under enemy fire.

In comparison to these true feats of military valor, Avraam-Alfred Gintsburg’s promotion from the rank of Cornet to the rank of Poruchik (equivalent to a lieutenant) seems paltry in comparison:

Baron A. Gintsburg, the fifth son of Baron Goratio Gintsburg, 51 years of age. Served in the Volyn dragoon detachment. After two years of service, he passed the academy exam in 1884 [in actuality, it was 1886], having been given special permission. He was one of the last Jews deemed worthy of the rank of cornet. Baron A. Gintsburg often took part in horse races, and often placed in them. The war found A. Gintsburg in Paris. He returned to Russia on the last ship allowed through Constantinople, and joined the militia. He participated in the siege of the Peremyshl fortress.

Publications like *Jewish Week* continued to publish such exploits, although it was clear that such stories would not possibly change the antisemitic attitudes prevalent both in the army and in society. The writer N. A. Teffe described the way “patriotic” parts of society viewed Jewish members of the military in a satirical short story entitled “Two Natures.” When the story opens, a female patron discovers the disturbing fact that a wounded Jew has been admitted to her hospital. This bad news is tempered somewhat by the fact that a recent recipient of the Cross of St. George First Degree is also being treated at the hospital. The military hero is given a separate ward and a
special bed, and made ready to be presented to important visitors. But (to the protagonist's horror) the Jew and the recipient of the Cross of St. George turn out to be one and the same. Distraught, she even interrogates the doctor to find out whether the former object of her admiration has been faking his injuries. Much to her chagrin, his wounds are all too real; the soldier has had his foot amputated.44

In February of 1915, the Petrograd Press Committee forbid publication of the last names of Jewish soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battle. This was all done for “the public good”; as one censor (General M. A. Abadash) claimed, the leftist press was spending too much time on the feats of Jewish soldiers, “ignoring the heroes with Russian last names.” Jewish names were to be replaced instead by initials. Thus in all of the Petrograd newspapers (including Jewish ones) columns of initials appeared alongside Russian and other non-semitic last names. Some of the more egregious injustices resulting from this censorship included an incident where the press was forbidden to mention a Jewish soldier who had taken over command of his platoon upon the commanding officer’s death, and a prohibition on publishing the photographs of three Jews who had been awarded the Cross of St. George, one of whom had lost both his arms in battle. This exceptionally petty “editorial” decision likewise resulted in heavy censorship of a story relating the return of thirteen-year-old Itsik Kaufman from the front. Kaufman had somehow managed to join the army and had been severely wounded in battle. The story was allowed to be published only when all “Jewish” references were removed (including the name of the young protagonist). In May of 1915, the military censors in the Kiev military district simply made their work easier by outlawing the sale of War and Jews and Jews at War.45

Of course the issue at hand was that stories of Jewish war heroes cast doubt on the wide-spread stories of Jewish “betrayal.” Such actions were not unique to Russia. Despite the fact that 12,000 German Jews died at the front, their Christian compatriots still accused them of avoiding military duty. Walter Ratenau, one of the best-known Jews in Germany (and later the Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic), wrote in August of 1916 that “As the number of Jews who die in this war increases, so too will the lengths to which their opponents go to prove that they’ve been hiding in the rear, waiting out the war. Hatred for them will double and triple.”46 Ratenau himself was to become a victim of this hatred, eventually shot by a German nationalist.

The extreme right press, not to mention the openly antisemitic publications, facilitated the breakout of antisemitic sentiment in society and in the
army. A passage from the popular newspaper, *New Times*: “When the victorious Russian Army returns, she shall say with a loud voice that in the theatre of war, the Jews were our enemies.” The newspaper *Russkoe Znamia (Russian Banner)* claimed that “treason is in the Jews’ blood,” even including those who had volunteered. The same newspaper informed its readers that in the army field hospitals Jewish doctors would inject soldiers with syphilis and would mutilate their patients in various ways. The newspaper *Groza (Thunderstorm)* proposed driving the Jews into cities that were to be given over to the Germans, and then revoking their Russian citizenship.

The military censors would occasionally forbid outright antisemitic publications, but the vast majority passed review. On the one hand, the censors were instructed to forbid publications from “including articles that had the tendentious character of attacking Jews, non-Russian citizens, or even the citizenry of Russia’s military allies”; on the other, a directive adopted by the Petrograd military censors on November 25, 1914 “did not allow indiscriminate attacks on non-Russian citizens, but allowed for the presentation of discrete facts.” This directive opened the door for interpreting all published attacks against Jews as “presentations of discrete facts.”

Nearly half a million Jews were mobilized during the First World War, or 10 percent of the Empire’s Jewish population. As of March 20, 1915 there were 180,000 Jewish soldiers stationed at the southwestern front. The high command required officers to follow the behavior of their Jewish subordinates closely; Jews were suspected of being disloyal until proven otherwise. Even during wartime a number of generals sought to eliminate Jews from the ranks of the army, or at the very least to have their numbers decreased among the combat troops. Some, without any orders from high command, refused to accept Jewish replacement troops, or had them transferred away from the front lines. General M. V. Alekseev required that all Jews, including doctors, be removed from local institutions participating in the war effort.

* * *

In the February 26, 1917 edition of *Jewish Week*, one of the writers, perhaps led by the demonstrations of Jewish loyalty at the front mentioned earlier, posed the following rhetorical question: “Will there, or won’t there be ‘relief’ for the Jews?” The author, like everyone else in Russia, did not have the slightest suspicion that the very next day events would transpire that would
lead to the collapse of a 300-year-old dynasty and a fundamental change in the lives of Jews and non-Jews alike.

Less than a month after the abdication of the Tsar, the Provisional Government published a decree repealing all restrictions on Jewish citizens. Coincidentally, after the collapse of the autocracy Jewish Week stopped publishing photographs of decorated Jewish veterans. It would seem that the editors had decided that there was no longer anything to prove. The period immediately following the February Revolution saw a marked increase in Jewish patriotism. V. B. Shklovsky’s Sentimental Journey mentions the case of a foreign-based Jewish artist who returned to Russia to serve as a common soldier. Shklovsky himself, who had earlier served in an armored division without any hope of being promoted to an officer, personally led a shock troop battalion in an attack near the village of Lodziany, was wounded in the stomach and later awarded the Cross of St. George (fourth degree). In a moment of historical irony, the SR Shklovsky was given the award by General L. G. Kornilov. Even in the small village of Sirotin, “Jewish desertion noticeably decreased” during the first days of the Provisional Government.

Among the restrictions that were lifted was the prohibition against Jews joining the officer corps; by May of 1917, 2,600 Jews were enrolled in military academies and institutes. The first Jewish citizen to achieve the rank of naval officer was midshipman Fedor Itsikson. By the summer of 1917, 131 Jewish students from the Kiev Military Academy had been accepted into the officer corps. In Odessa, 160 Jews were admitted to the ranks of the junkers. August marked the first graduating class of Jewish officers from the Petrograd military district, including nearly 200 graduates from the Third Petergoff Officers’ School. On October 1, several hundred Jews were accepted into the officer corps from the Aleksandrov and Alekseev military academies. A significant number of these were either students of technical institutes or had already earned a degree in the technical sciences. They were mostly assigned to the engineering corps.

One of the first Jewish officers was Grigorii Fridman, son of the director of the Moscow branch of the Azov-Don Bank. He had earlier studied at the Rostov gymnasium, and in 1913 left for Bonn, Germany, where he was enrolled in the Philosophy Faculty for two semesters. He returned to Russia before the beginning of the war, and enrolled at the Commercial Institute in Moscow, where he continued to study philosophy under I. A. Ilin, A. A. Manuilov, and S. A. Kotliarevskii. Under the influence of the February revolution, Fridman
enrolled in the Aleksandrov Military Academy in April of 1917. By August, he had already graduated. At a meeting with an acquaintance in Moscow during the fall of 1917, he remarked, “Right now everyone is denigrating the nationalities and forgetting Russia. I’d like the Jews who had been forgotten by Russia to be an exception to this.”

Drunken with the spirit of freedom and full of revolutionary idealism, Mikhail and Piotr Gorodissky, sons of the chairman of the Rostov Jewish community, left for the front in March of 1917. Mikhail, who had been excused from military service as a student of Moscow University, joined the shock troops. His younger brother was in the sixth grade in the Rostov gymnasium, and ran away to the Caucasian front. “Dear mama,” he wrote, “We Jews have finally become citizens. How could you possibly want me to betray the Republic by coming back and taking my exams?”

Soon after the revolution, Jewish Week proclaimed, “today’s army is not an army in the typical sense. It is an army of the people, in the full sense of the word. The vast majority of those who had grown used to the implicit slave-like obedience of compulsory conscription were defeated on the front; the core of the army is now composed of peasants and workers who have not yet fallen victim to the slave psychology of the regular army. Even more important is the fact that the officer corps, which in peace time was a closed caste, today comprises a large number of intelligent, educated young people, who have brought to the army a spirit of conscientiousness and a love of freedom . . . The new Russia (and we along with her) is experiencing the dawn of a new, auspicious era where happiness and freedom are being reborn.”

However, this patriotic fervor would soon be tempered. The “people’s” army was still the bearer of those same prejudices that characterized the masses at large and the military in general. The news that a large number of Jews had been accepted into the officer corps led a council of soldier’s and officer’s delegates in one regiment to adopt a resolution expressing their reluctance to “have Jews as officers in light of their incompetence . . . [and] relying on the rule that no officer can be accepted to the regiment without the agreement of all officers, compelled them to warn the new Jewish officers that such promotions would not be accepted by the regiment in question.”

In another regiment, seventy-four Jewish soldiers were arrested on suspicion of sympathizing with two deserters. One of the recent Jewish graduates from the Aleksandrov Academy, as a result of discrimination against him on the part of his Orthodox comrades and in light of his belief that “Jewish officers will not be able to overcome the antisemitism ingrained in the sol-
liers”, wrote to Kerensky requesting to be sent to the front as a common soldier. S. Pozner, citing antisemitism in the divisions quartered in Odessa and Pskov, and noting the generally negative attitude in army circles towards Jews, claimed, “As it was, so it remains—antisemitism in the army.”

At the same time, a surprising number of Jews held positions of power in soldiers’ committees. The soldiers tended to send representatives who “weren’t compromised and were capable of speaking out and taking action. Nearly any literate person who was not an officer would find himself going from committee to committee, eventually finding himself in a committee on the front . . . This resulted in a large number of Jews in the soldiers’ committees, as the only members of the intelligentsia who were serving among the rank and file at the time of the revolution were Jews.”

Following the huge number of casualties suffered by the army, most literate people were promoted to the officer corps. “Seeing a literate person not in an officer’s uniform was a rarity. If he could write, then that was a real find. Sometimes a huge train of troops would arrive, and there wasn’t a single literate person among them, so no one was capable of reading the list of names. The Jews were an exception to this. They were never promoted . . . This is why the vast majority of literate and educated soldiers turned out to be Jews. They were elected to the committees. You ended up with the following result: Soldiers’ committees would be nearly 40 percent Jewish, with Jews occupying important positions of responsibility, while the Army as a whole would still be saturated with a mind-numbing antisemitism, and continue to organize pogroms.”

The officers and generals of this “mind numbingly antisemitic” army turned out to be the only force capable of resisting the Bolshevik coup.

* * *

The Don region served as the center for the organization of anti-Bolshevik forces. It was to this area that M. V. Alekseev, the most authoritative Russian commander, fled after the Bolshevik coup. He was later joined by L. G. Kornilov, A. I. Denikin, and others who had been freed from prison. Their choice of the Don region was hardly coincidental. They believed that under the protection of the Don Cossacks (whom many erroneously considered to be pro-government) they could create a military force that would be capable of taking on the “German agents” (which many sincerely believed the Bolsheviks to be, at least at the outbreak of the war). The fact that A. M. Kaledin,
a military general and someone who could not be suspected of separatist sympathies, had been elected Ataman there afforded added assurance.

The organization of the Volunteer Army took place in Novocherkassk, the Don Cossack capital, and Rostov-on-Don, a city with a rather large and influential Jewish population. Rostov had long replaced the Cossack capital in terms of importance. As the military doctor L. S. Fridland once wrote:

Since time immemorial, Novocherkassk had looked upon its reckless neighbor with envy. Rostov had become boisterous and tumultuous ... leaving the feeble, decrepit capital of the Don region only the soporific aromas of its former fame and the privilege of serving as the residence of the acting Ataman. The entire North Caucasus, and the Kuban and Stavropol regions, felt drawn to Rostov. The Don steppes fed and watered this American seed in Russian territory. Novocherkassk slept an unwakeable sleep, wrapping itself in its history as in a blanket, only occasionally turning an Ataman’s eye towards life, and unhappily grumbling at the rumbling predator snarling at its back.68

The case of the Jewish community in Rostov is unique, but at the same time its story shares many characteristics with the fate of the rest of Russian Jewry on the eve of the Civil War. Until 1888, Rostov was considered part of the Pale of Settlement. According to the law of May 22, 1880, which aimed to “protect and develop the economic activity of the Cossacks”, Jews were forbidden from living within the territory of the Don Cossack Oblast (Oblast’ Voiska Donskogo, OVD), and were likewise forbidden from owning or renting property. Exceptions were made only for Jewish medical doctors, individuals who possessed a graduate degree, government officials, and finally, any landowners who were in possession of their land according to contracts enacted before May 22, 1888.

After the inclusion of Rostov into the OVD, the Jews who had come to Rostov before May 19, 1887 were given the right to remain in the city. However, they were put on special police lists (as were the Jews of Taganrog and Azov) and forbidden, along with their children, from owning any property in Azov and Taganrog until 1910. At the time of the 1897 Census, there were 11,838 Jews in Rostov, or nearly 10 percent of the population. By the outbreak of World War I the number had increased to nearly 16,000, or 7.2 percent of the city’s population in 1914,69 making Jews the second largest religious group
in the city. In 1918, the Jewish community in Rostov was flooded with refugees from Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland, increasing Rostov’s Jewish population to 18,000, while the city as a whole grew to nearly 200,000. By 1920 the number of Jews living in Rostov had reached 22,777, placing it almost on par with the total Jewish population of Petrograd (25,433 at the time).

The Jews played a significant role on Rostov’s social and economic life. They played a major role in banking, industry, and trade, and nearly one-third of the houses of Rostov’s main street (Bolshaia Sadovaia) were owned by Jewish families. Eighty percent of the doctors were Jewish, and there were numerous members of the community involved in journalism and the arts.

At the time of the Bolshevik coup, there were ten functioning synagogues and houses of prayer in Rostov and nearby Nakhichevan. There were old and new Jewish cemeteries, a Jewish hospital that had been founded thanks to Jewish donations, and two private Jewish schools. Near the main synagogue there was a Talmud Torah school, a school for women, and a Jewish library, and there was a nearby bookstore run by V. N. Dubnov, brother of the famous historian. The charitable organization Gmilas Khesed was active in both synagogues of the city.

After their first-hand experience in dealing with the Bolsheviks at the beginning of 1918, it is hardly surprising that a significant portion of Rostov Jewry believed that their only chance for survival lay with a strict government that could preserve law and order, even if this meant supporting the Cossacks and the Whites. At the time, this seemed like a fairly reasonable choice; nowhere in the declarations of the White leadership was there any mention of repealing the laws enacted by the Provisional Government, including the one that had granted Jews full civil rights.

Among the more anti-Bolshevik Jewish leaders was the businessman and political activist Abram Samuilovich (Avrum Shmul-Usherovich) Alperin, who had claimed during the Constituent Assembly elections that it was “better to save Russia with the Cossacks than to destroy her with the Bolsheviks.” Alperin, a legal consultant for many of Rostov’s banks and stockholders, made use of his influence in affluent Jewish circles. He was the founder of the Rostov Merchant Bank, managed a tobacco factory owned by Asmolov and Kushnarev, and also headed the organizations Mylovar and Salomas. Completely capable of reconciling his entrepreneurial activity with his belief in reorganizing society according to socialist principles, he was a leader of the People’s Socialist Labor Party of the Don region. Alperin threw his support behind Kaledin, believing a strong authority to be better than anarchy. He
collected donations from the Rostov bourgeoisie and from the workers of his own factory, and on December 13, 1917 presented Kaledin with 800,000 rubles to help form Cossack partisan units. Alperin even participated personally in military actions and was at one time in charge of propaganda under General E. F. Semiletov, whose troops included a large number of Jewish volunteers. This service, of course, did not later save Alperin from being attacked by the Black Hundreds when he “dared” to establish two endowed scholarships at Don University, in honor of the Cossack generals V. I. Sidorin and E. F. Semiletov. Alperin also became the vice-chairman of the Don Society for Cossack Assistance, which opened up two field hospitals and organized several ambulance units.

In the middle of December 1917, the Volunteer Army was at a critical juncture; the army’s coffers were nearly completely empty. M. V. Alekseev informed the Don-based entrepreneur N. E. Paramonov, whose palace served as the headquarters for the army, that if he did not receive some form of financial support by four o’clock in the afternoon, he would be forced to dissolve the army. A number of Rostov businessman donated funds to the anti-Bolshevik cause. Ten minutes before the deadline Paramonov delivered 500,000 rubles to Alekseev. Of this amount 200,000 rubles was donated by Boris Abramovich Gordon, an engineer by education, who also worked as the managing director of a major tobacco company, Laferm, and as director of Kolobov and Bobrov. A member of the Petrograd Export-Import Joint Stock Company, Gordon would later go on to provide material support for the Volunteer Army, sending “hundreds of cases of tobacco and cigarettes” for their use. Reports that “the first funds received by the Volunteer Army were received from the Jewish bourgeoisie of Rostov” were well-known.

Other Jewish communities continued to donate funds to the anti-Bolshevik military organizations over the next few years. In May of 1919, Jewish organizations in Ufa and Tomsk each donated 100,000 rubles to the Kolchak Army. The latter sent an additional 50,000 to the Tomsk Department in charge of military education, and sent an additional 25,000 rubles to the army in July of 1919. All told, Tomsk Jewry spent several million rubles in support of the White forces. Fund-raising for the Whites also took place in the cities of Omsk and Ekaterinburg. To be fair, it is difficult to say whether this was a result of enthusiasm for the White cause, or simply payments aimed at guaranteeing their own safety.

In hindsight, this Jewish support for the White cause might seem somewhat bizarre. However, at the time it made complete sense. If one takes into
account the official and unofficial political announcements of the time, as well as the numerous politicians (such as P. N. Miliukov) who came to the Don region to support the White cause, Jewish supporters of the Whites were acting in accordance with their own interests. It is worth remembering that it was a Kadet government (the first Provisional Government was overwhelmingly Kadet) that passed the long-awaited law establishing equal rights for Jewish citizens.

The political program of General Kornilov was fully in keeping with the spirit of the February Revolution. Liberal and democratic in nature, it stated that its most immediate goals included not only the “destruction of Bolshevnik autocracy” but also the strengthening of the “meaningful gains of the revolution.” The following seven points were among the fourteen enumerated in the document:

1. To restore the rights of citizens: All citizens of the Russian State are equal before the law, regardless of sex or nationality, the extermination of class privileges, maintaining the sovereignty of individuals and their homes, freedom of movement, place of habitation, etc. 2. To fully restore freedom of speech and of the press. 3. To restore freedom of industry and trade, and repeal the nationalization of privately held ventures. 4. To restore the right to private property . . . 8. To recall the Constituent Assembly cancelled by the Bolsheviks. Elections to the Constituent Assembly must be free, without any coercion of the people’s will at any place in the country. Those elected are to be considered immune [from prosecution] and sacrosanct . . . 11. The church will be granted full autonomy in all religious matters. Government oversight over matters pertaining to religion will come to an end. Freedom of religion shall be fully restored. . . . 14. General Kornilov will recognize certain nationalities who fall under Russia’s authority, and will give them the right to broad local autonomy, under the condition of maintaining the unity of state . . .

I have highlighted those points that are most pertinent for the investigation at hand. It is easy to see why the majority of the Jewish population of the former Russian Empire might sign on to such a program. It represented a return to the gains made during the February revolution, and a realization of its slogans under the auspices of a stronger authority. Though the sincerity of
Kornilov’s political program should be viewed with due suspicion, archival sources lend credence to the view that it was born of the best of intentions. One of the extant copies of the platform with Kornilov’s signature can be found among the papers of P. N. Miliukov, which are kept in the Bakhmeteff Archive at Columbia University. This copy was sent by Kornilov to Alekseev, and was accompanied by a letter dated February 2, 1918 that stated, “This program has not yet been made public, nor do I think it ready to be announced, until it will be, in my opinion, desirable or necessary.” Thus, Kornilov (or his advisers) thought it was too soon to promulgate the liberal-democratic program, perhaps fearing the disapproval of conservative officers. In any case, Kornilov’s program was motivated by factors beyond mere political calculation.

Of course, Kornilov’s political program was well-known, despite all pretenses of secrecy. Alekseev, who once had been forced to arrest Kornilov after his unsuccessful coup, and who greatly disliked Kornilov and his political ambitions, gave the following response to Kornilov’s letter: “When Kornilov ‘once more enters the political arena’ openly, instead of secretly, those surrounding him should not raise unnecessary objections to the work at hand. On the one hand, this program ‘is not to be made public,’ on the other it has already been well-publicized by word of mouth . . . this political program is Kornilov’s own personal matter.”

Anton Denikin is of particular interest in understanding White policy toward the Jewish population. Denikin was the head of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia during the period of their greatest successes as well as their greatest failures and humiliations, including numerous pogroms, widespread robbery, and rampant corruption. One of the most prominent figures of the anti-Bolshevik movement, he was remarkable not only in terms of his military and political conquests, but in his more intellectual achievements as well. A talented publicist, Denikin was widely published in the military press before the revolution. His monumental, five-volume work, *The Russian Turmoil* (*Ocherki russkoi smuty*), remains the pinnacle of White memoirs for its wide grasp of events, deep analysis, and impeccable style.

Though the aforementioned work does touch upon the “Jewish question,” Denikin’s unfinished *Path of a Russian Officer* (*Put’ russkogo ofitsera*) provides more valuable insight into Denikin’s personal relationship towards the Jews. Denikin began this work in January of 1944 in Nazi-occupied France and continued to work on it after his arrival in the United States. Denikin’s experiences with Jewish culture were significantly different from those of other White commanders. The son of a former serf who joined the
White Movement

military and eventually retired with the rank of major and a Polish woman from a family of impoverished landowners (so impoverished that until meeting her husband she supported herself and her elderly father with her sewing), Denikin was raised in the Vistula region (Privislinskii krai), and was exposed to Jewish people and culture from an early age. It is somewhat curious that the future leader of “United, indivisible Russia” spoke to his father in Russian, and to his mother in Polish. In regards to religion, Denikin became Orthodox not only as a matter of law, but at the urging of his soul as well: “I became a devout churchman. I served at the altar with great enthusiasm, rang the bell, sang in the choir, and later on became a lay reader.”

The young Denikin went through “all stages” of religious doubt, but one night while in the seventh grade he came “to the final and irrevocable decision”: “‘Man, a three-dimensional being, is unable to understand the higher laws of existence and creation. I reject the animal-like psychology of the Old Testament but I completely accept Christianity and Orthodoxy.’ It was as if a mountain had fallen from my shoulders! By this belief I have lived. And in this belief I will end my years.”

Denikin studied in the Włosławek realschule from 1882 until 1889:

Besides the Poles and Russians there were Jews in every class, although never more than two or three. Almost half the population of the town was Jewish and they held all the trade in their hands. Many of them were competitive persons but only a few sent their children to high school. The rest confined themselves to heders, a special Hebrew, outmoded, Talmudic, medieval sort of school, which was permitted by the authorities but not given educational recognition. In our realschule the “Jewish question” simply did not exist. Jews were not regarded as a separate class. Among the pupils they were judged according to their individual morals and true comradely natures.

Having graduated from the Kiev military academy in 1892, Denikin was assigned to the Second Artillery Brigade, located in the city of Bela in the Siedlce gubernia. Approximately 5,000 of the 8,000 inhabitants of the town were Jewish, while the rest were mostly Poles and Russians associated with the military. The social lives of the military brigade and that of the town were closely intertwined. What else could be expected in this god-forsaken backwater? Denikin provided an “ethnographic” description of the town:
The Jews held all of the town’s commerce in their hands. They were suppliers, contractors, and petty commissioners. Without such agents one could not get along. They facilitated the housekeeping chores of life for us. They supplied everything, anything from anywhere. Through them one could acquire furniture, dress oneself on long-term credit, or borrow money on a promissory note to defray deficiencies in the officer’s budget. And that budget was modest. For instance I received an allowance of fifty-one rubles a month.

Near us the life of small-town Jewry went on, outwardly open in nature but entirely closed to foreigners. They had their exclusive interrelations, their taxes as scrupulously gathered as those of the government’s state treasury, their private notarial functions, their law and their courts, their ecclesiastical hierarchy, and their system of religious and economic boycott.

According to Denikin’s memoirs, the local doctor was the lone representative of the intelligentsia in town, while the rest continued to follow the “old ways and customs”:

The men wore long gabardines and the women misshapen wigs; the children shunned state primary schools and went to their own medieval heder, schools permitted by the authorities but not given any educational recognition. The rare Jewish youth who completed secondary school did not settle in the town but went out in search of broader horizons . . . [T]he Jews of Bela were linked to the rest of the populace by hundreds of economic threads but in all other respects the Russians lived entirely isolated from them.

Of course, occasional conflicts would arise. Denikin recounts one episode of a romantic nature, where a young colonel fell in love with a beautiful and impoverished Jewish girl, moved her into his home, and gave her a home-based education. Their relationship remained private, and they didn’t appear in public together, so neither the army command nor the local Jewish community interfered. But as soon as rumors were heard that the young woman was going to convert to Lutheranism (in order to legalize their relationship) “the peaceful Jews of Bela became unusually agitated.” According to Denikin, the local Jews threatened to kill the young woman and once even broke
into the colonel’s quarters in his absence in search of her. On another occasion they surrounded him on the outskirts of town and attacked him. The incident nearly led the officer to resign his commission. Fortunately, the story came to a happy end; the colonel was transferred to a different post, and managed to get married in the meantime.88

In general, Denikin did not seem to have any personal prejudices toward Jewish people, and his conceptions of patriotism and nationalism would often coincide with his espousal of liberal values. Denikin’s beliefs and convictions were formed during his years at the Academy of the General Staff and remained more or less constant up until the revolution of 1917. The future leader of the White movement would later write, “I espoused Russian liberalism in its ideological essence without any sort of party dogmatism. In broad generalization this attachment led me to three theses: (1) constitutional monarchy; (2) radical reform; and (3) a peaceful path to the restoration of the country.”89

Denikin’s relationship towards Jewish members of the armed forces is of particular interest for this study. In his memoirs Denikin claimed that “throughout the Russian army nationalistic divisions among officers and among soldiers were completely erased and did not at all affect the amiable course of regimental life . . . In 1908 when the press accused the army of increasing the number of ‘foreign races’ in the command, the semiofficial organ of the War Ministry, Russkii invalid, carried this rebuff: ‘Russians are not those who bear Russian surnames but those who love Russia and consider it their Fatherland.’ ”90

However, this equality did not extend to people of the Jewish faith, for whom joining the officer corps was impossible. Denikin claimed to have personally known seven students at the Academy who had been born into the Jewish faith and had converted to Christianity before entering the army. Of these, six reached the rank of general before the outbreak of the First World War. (In his memoirs, Denikin chose not to give the surnames of these generals who had left the religion of their elders for the prospects of a military career.)91 Despite these limited “success stories,” the “national boundaries” of the Civil War period proved more difficult to overcome. As Denikin noted in his Outlines of the Russian Turmoil, a number of Jewish officers joined the Volunteer Army, and several of them undertook the Ice March in 1918, which earned them a great deal of respect among the troops. However, subsequent mobilizations included officers who refused to accept Jews into their companies; in some cases Jewish officers were relieved of posts they had already
been previously assigned to. Denikin himself requested that General Mai-Maevskii take measures to prevent this clear breach of military discipline. Unfortunately, these measures proved impotent in light of the officers’ passive resistance. Denikin found himself forced to order the Jewish officers to remain in the reserves.\footnote{\textsuperscript{92}}

Denikin did not undertake similar measures with the Jewish soldiers among the rank-and-file, believing that this would amount to legal discrimination. According to Denikin’s own testimony, Jewish soldiers were often discriminated against; other soldiers at times refused to share quarters with them, or refused to eat from the same communal pot. At first, the army command was compelled to isolate the Jewish soldiers into their own regiments. Mass desertions and a weakening in the requirements of the draft helped “regulate” the situation somewhat. Despite these conditions, Denikin still claimed that once Jewish soldiers were “scattered” among various units, discrimination was not a problem.\footnote{\textsuperscript{93}}

There are few accounts of the Jewish soldiers who fought for the White movement. On the one hand, they were few in number; on the other, few would want to advertise the fact, especially after the pogroms carried out by the Volunteer Army. Nor were members of the White Army inclined to talk much about their Jewish comrades. General Denikin, in recalling a number of Jewish officers who had participated in the Ice March, neglects to mention their names or any details about any of them. However, Jewish soldiers who fought in Cossack partisan formations were discussed in the Rostov press at the time. These included S. A. Rozenbaum, who perished during the Ice March and was a supporter of Kornilov, as well as the student V. Shirman (killed in battle), and the four brothers Gershanovich, who all served in the partisan outfit led by Captain V. M. Chernetsov,\footnote{\textsuperscript{94}} which was later depicted in Sholokhov’s novel \textit{Quiet Flows the Don}.\footnote{\textsuperscript{95}}

Reports of some Jewish participants in the Ice March are mentioned in an article dedicated to the “Jewish members of Kornilov’s forces.” It was composed by a certain D. Denisov (probably a pseudonym), who was personally acquainted with the heroes of his story. One of the soldiers mentioned in the article was Grigorii Fridman, who was mentioned earlier in this chapter. Fridman left for the Don region in November of 1917, where he joined the ranks of the First Division under Kornilov. In the battle near Matveev Kurgan in January of 1918, his platoon was ordered to provide cover for an attack by holding off an advancing battalion of sailors. In the course of the battle he lost his life. His only epitaph would be the words of the author of the article,
which stated, “In the distant Don steppe there lies the undiscovered body of a young philosopher. Without hesitation or regret he left his family and the comforts of home, traded in his Plato for a rifle, and went to die for his stepmotherland.”

Mikhail and Pyotr Gorodisskii also gave their lives for the White cause. Both had been wounded during the First World War. The elder was politically inclined towards the SRs, while the younger supported the Kadets. In November of 1917, Mikhail, “with his St. George on his vest,” participated in battles against the Bolsheviks in Moscow, where he was wounded and captured. On November 7, he was able to escape Butyrka prison and reach the Don, where he found his brother. They both participated in the Ice March as members of the “students battalion” under the command of General A. A. Borovskii. For two months both brothers fought in numerous battles, and both were nominated for the Order of St. George. While it is unknown if Mikhail ever received the honor, we do know that Pyotr never had the chance; he was fatally wounded in a battle near the Cossack village [stanitsa] of Korenovskaia and died soon thereafter.

Despite the dismissal of Jews from the army that took place several months later, Mikhail remained with the army for two years. In February of 1920, after the second retreat of the Whites from Rostov, his squadron was captured by Budenny’s cavalry. According to Denisov, most of the other officers were taken prisoner. Mikhail, however, was killed for having belonged to the regiment formed in Kornilov’s honor.

“I know three of them, . . .” Denisov concludes, “but there were many more. Unknown, disliked by their own, cut down by the enemy, forgotten by everyone, thrown from one shore of the sea, and not accepted on the other . . .”

V. A. Amfiteatrov-Kadashev’s work includes other accounts of Jews who served the White cause, including a certain Poruchik Brodiskii, who served in Denikin’s propaganda department. Despite being a commissioned officer, he felt that he “had only earned his epaulets once he had endured the Ice March.” Jewish supporters of Kornilov could be found among the ranks of the Volunteer Army at later dates as well. Ilia Ehrenburg happened to meet one of them under fairly dramatic circumstances. In the middle of December 1919, Ehrenburg was attempting to reach Feodosia by sea, leaving from Rostov and traveling through Kerch. During the part of the journey from Kerch to Feodosia an officer dragged him up onto the ice-encrusted deck, intending to throw him overboard. “My companion [Ia. I. Sommer] ran to the mess hall. There was a Jewish Kornilov officer there. He came out with a revolver in his
hands. He saved my life.” Ehrenburg would include this episode in his remarkable memoir, People, Years, Life. It is rather unsurprising that in the Soviet edition Ehrenburg’s savior loses all traces of ethnicity, becoming instead an officer “who loved Blok’s poetry.”

The story of Lev Semenovich Fridland (1888–1960) is also worth telling. Mobilized as part of the Don armies in 1918, Fridland, a medical student from Kiev, was drafted by the army in 1915 and sent to the Caucasian front in 1916. After the end of the military action he found himself in Rostov, were he was soon drafted once again, this time by the White Cossacks. Judging from his memoirs, Fridland had no political sympathies to speak of. He was sent to the military hospital in Nizhne-Chirskaya, located on the Upper Don. He remained there after the White retreat by permission of general I. A. Poliakov and the local Ataman, Generalov, who thought it best for him to treat the many wounded left behind who could not be evacuated. Under the Reds, Fridland remained head of the same military hospital, where he saved the lives of numerous wounded officers. When the Whites retook the area, he was nearly killed by Cossacks for being Jewish. Despite the intercession of his colleagues, Fridland was arrested on orders of General K. K. Mamontov, the commanding officer of the troops who had retaken the town.

On August 1, 1919, Fridland was court-martialed and sentenced to death. His sentence was reduced to four years hard labor, thanks to a petition to the court by a number of Cossack officers whom Fridland had hidden from the Reds. The petition read, “At a time when no one was willing to lift a finger to help us, when were thrown to the winds of fate, this Jewish doctor, risking his own life, shielded us from the merciless violence of the Bolsheviks.” According to Fridland, the reevaluation of the sentence was greatly facilitated by the presence of a member of the Extraordinary Commission for the Investigation of Bolshevik Atrocities. The doctor was sent to the Novocherkassk prison, where he was eventually freed by the Red Army.

Fridland’s memoirs were first published during the Soviet period, when there was absolutely no reason for him to publicize his role in the White movement. Thus it seems reasonable to trust the authenticity of the episodes described. Ensuing editions of Fridland’s memoirs eliminated all of the “seditious” episodes, including all mentions of his Jewish heritage.

I. B. Schechtman has written about how the Volunteer Army found support in “well-known Jewish circles” during June and July of 1918. But as the army continued to grow in numbers, antisemitism began to grow more and
more prevalent. Even at this early stage, the army refused to accept Jews as officers, doctors, or even as rank and file members.\textsuperscript{104}

Jews were also turned away from the quasi-legal Volunteer troops that were forming in Ukraine at the time. (Advisors to P. P. Skoropadskii largely turned a blind eye to such paramilitary groups, which were being gathered under the command of General L. N. Kirpichev in Ukraine.) A Jewish youth who had not been allowed to join complained to the editorial office of the newspaper \textit{Golos Kieva (Voice of Kiev)}, which was run by the “liberal-monarchist” E. A. Efimovskii. Despite the censorship in place, Efimovskii still made the decision to run an article on the event, which had disturbed him deeply. As a result the paper was closed, and the editors were forced to go to Odessa.\textsuperscript{105}

This was not a simple occurrence of anti-Jewish discrimination. Rather, the newspaper had made the fatal mistake of merely pointing out the fact that such groups were being formed right under the noses of the Germans (the leadership of the Volunteer Army did not recognize the Brest treaty, and had planned on renewing the war with Germany). In any case, revolution began in Germany a month later, and Skoropadskii’s regime soon crumbled.

In the beginning of September 1918, A. S. Alperin came to Ekaterinodar to bring to General Alekseev’s attention “the fact that Jews were being forbidden from joining the army and other manifestations of antisemitism in the Volunteer Army.” In a meeting on September 8, 1918, Alekseev responded to Alperin’s charges, saying that “the entire high command” was firmly committed to “the equal rights of all citizens, and against antisemitism.” “For as long as I stand at the head of the Volunteer Army, there will be no antisemitism,” said Alekseev. But Schechtman claims that “after this there came a qualifying condition that for all intents and purposes nullified this programmatic declaration: ‘But, of course, history carries its own weight, and the prejudices that have been built over the years cannot be overcome immediately.’”\textsuperscript{106}

Alas, the former Tsarist general had a clearer picture of the situation and public opinion than did Schechtman, writing fifteen years later. For the most part, high-ranking officers did not encourage antisemitic sentiment, nor did they advocate antisemitic activity, regardless of their own personal relationship with Jews. Vinaver, who was with Denikin in Ekaterinodar during November 1918, received a telegram from Crimea concerning the danger of possible pogroms in Volunteer territory and the panic that had broken out among the Jewish population. Vinaver decided to approach General A. M. Dragomirov and showed him the telegram. At the meeting, they discussed
the idea of publishing a statement that would clearly define the policies of the Volunteer Army towards the local population. As Vinaver would later recall, it was Dragomirov himself who had wanted to include a statement that would unambiguously prohibit violent acts against minorities. The text was sent by telegram to the Crimean troops, in the name of the central command of the Volunteer Army and Vinaver himself, who was a member of the Crimean government. The third subsection of the November 7, 1918 declaration states, “The Volunteer Army condemns any attempts to pit one nationality or class against one another.”

However, according to the testimony of D. S. Pasmanik, A. V. Korvin-Krukovskii (who was then in command of the Volunteer forces in Crimea) considered that any government that “a Karaite and a Jew were a part of was automatically illegitimate. And any socialist, no matter how patriotic in orientation, is automatically considered to be in league with the Bolsheviks.” Thus, the Volunteer Army was unable to ally itself with the Crimean government. Of course, the ethnic make-up of the Crimean government was of secondary importance to the Volunteer Army. The military often disagreed with the civilian government on how best to govern Crimea, on the best ways to combat Bolshevism, and on other matters. The situation was not helped by the ever-changing politics of the Allies (who had landed troops on the peninsula), the conflicts between them and the Volunteer Army, and (perhaps most importantly) the attitudes of the local inhabitants, which ranged from cautious to outright hostile. Given all of this, it comes as no surprise that the numerous attempts to create an “oasis,” or at the very least a zone of “normalcy,” in Crimea all proved to be futile.

In light of later events, it is hard to imagine that when Vinaver went to Kiev in 1918 to oppose the foolhardy “German sympathies” of Kadet leader P. N. Miliukov, his first visit would be to V. V. Shulgin. This was the first time the two had talked, except for a brief meeting in April of 1917 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the first State Duma, which Vinaver had celebrated with a series of books and articles. After all, what could the liberal leader of Russian Jewry have to talk about with Shulgin, a monarchist and fervent anti-Semite?

Despite their widely differing political positions, Vinaver (for the moment at least) found Shulgin to be a sympathetic figure. “At this time I found myself drawn more closely to him than to anyone else,” Vinaver wrote, “and our two-hour conversation left me feeling satisfied. I found him to be a person of firm character and great spiritual tact. If he hadn’t stood so far from
the mainstream of Russian culture, if he hadn’t had to lose so much old baggage in order to catch up with the times, I think he could have been one of the leading figures of a movement aimed at the rebirth of Russia.” (This note was written by Vinaver upon his return to Crimea on July 14, 1918.)

In October of 1919, Shulgin, as one of the ideologues of the White movement, would publish the infamous antisemitic pamphlet “Torture by fear.”

* * *

The anti-Bolshevik stance of a significant portion of Rostov Jewry did not result in a decrease in antisemitism among the Cossacks and the White Army. Nor did it succeed in getting Jews the right to participate in local government. Under the Provisional Government, there were several Jews elected to the City Duma (mostly members of liberal and socialist parties, with the exception of one Zionist). While Rostov was under Soviet control, two Bund members and one Poalei Zion member were given places in the interim soviet, and several Menshevik and SR representatives were of Jewish heritage. Under the Don government headed by Ataman P. N. Krasnov, however, Jewish participation in government was out of the question.

In his memoirs, Krasnov dramatically recounts a conversation he had with A. M. Gorodysskii, a leading figure of the Rostov Jewish community:

In late January [of 1919], a representative from the Jewish community appeared before the Ataman, the lawyer Gorodysskii, who requested permission to ask straight, open questions without standing on ceremony.

“Ask away. And I will give you in return an equally straight and honest answer, for I have no secrets.” replied the Ataman.

“There are rumors, dark rumors, that there will be pogroms in Rostov and Ekaterinodar,” said Gorodysskii.

“These rumors are the work of my enemies,” replied the Ataman, “and they are completely groundless. You know that I will not allow violence from any quarter. In Rostov I have a competent police force, and a sufficient and fully reliable garrison . . .”

“I’m very thankful for your reassuring words,” Gorodysskii replied, “I had no doubt that you would answer me so. Now,
tell me, can the Rostov Jews count on being admitted to the Krug, if not now, then in the future, at least in the form of a delegation, and having the possibility of defending their rights there?”

“As long as I am Ataman,” the Ataman responded, “No one, save the Don Cossacks, will be allowed to decide the fate of the Don.”

Gorodysskii bowed and departed.\footnote{111}

Krasnov followed this description with a claim that the rumors of pogroms had been spread with the financial support of Rostov Jewry in order to discredit him.

At the same time, the laws of the Provisional Government were maintained by the Whites, at least when it came to social and religious institutions. The closer one was to the “White capital,” Rostov, the more this was true. Never before—or after—did the Jewish population of Rostov have such open opportunities to create their own cultural and social organizations that would serve their own national, cultural, and religious interests, as they did under the Don government and the Volunteers.

The Rostov archives contain documents describing the founding of various Jewish professional, cultural, and religious organizations. The professional organizations often included educational dimensions as well. Thus, the charter of the Tinsmith’s Union of Rostov and Nakhichevan called for the creation of tinsmithing classes and apprentice workshops, as well as the publication of manuals, the creation of a club and a library, and numerous cultural events.\footnote{112}

Abram Manasevich Gordon, a prominent member of the First Merchant Guild in Rostov, along with local Zionist leader M. L. Rabinovich, A. S. Alperin, I. G. Shereshevskii, and others, collectively founded the Jewish Cultural and Educational Society, whose goal was “the development of Jews in general as well as the development of Jewish youth, focusing in particular on instilling a love for their native culture and history in all of its forms; developing and introducing proper ideas for the education of the younger generations in the spirit of national self-consciousness, in conjunction with the mental, moral, and physical development of the Jewish population; providing material support for students in need, as well as anyone else involved in Jewish education; and publishing newspapers, journals, brochures, and books that are in keeping with the goals of the Society.”\footnote{113}
Naturally, such a broad program could not be realized under the conditions of the Civil War. Nevertheless some of these things were accomplished. I. G. Shereshevskii, for example, opened a Jewish *gimnazium*, the first organization of its kind.

In the beginning of 1919, six months after the establishment of the Jewish Cultural and Educational Society, a group of people (including Isaak Vulfovich Shtulbaum, the pharmacist Srul-Abram Kopelevich Kainarskii, Ester-Beila Evseeva Pershman, and others) founded the Jewish Cultural League, whose stated goal was “the development and promotion of secular culture among the Jewish population of Rostov, of all types of art including literature, the visual arts, music, theater etc, and supporting the construction of a new, democratic Jewish school and other educational institutions. Moreover, the Rostov Cultural League proposes the establishment of a Yiddish cultural foundation dedicated to the memory of the Jewish writers Mendele, Perets, and Sholem Aleichem.”

In the fall of 1918, a group of students from the Don and Warsaw universities (Simkha Noukhumovich Eeges, Itskhok Leizerovich Aviosor, Gertz Shaevich Roset, Debora Gershevna Lur’e, and others) founded “a cultural-educational society of Jewish Zionists studying in institutes of higher education, called ‘Gekhover.’ ” The society’s stated goal was, “the promotion of knowledge concerning Jewish history among Jewish students, including the promotion of Jewish literature, and culture in all of its manifestations, as well as the history of Palestine past and present, in particular the colonization of Palestine.” The students proposed organizing lectures, readings, libraries, museums, exhibitions, schools, evening courses, and so on, “to collect and popularize . . . information concerning Jewish history . . . to discuss questions related to Jewish history, Jewish literature, and Palestine; and to establish commissions and panels for the study of these questions.” Their activities were to take place throughout the Don region. Membership in the society was open to Jewish Zionists enrolled in institutes of higher education, i.e., “individuals who admit the necessity of creating a Jewish national political entity in Palestine.”

Other organizations founded in Rostov included the Union of Jewish Refugees of the city of Rostov and Nakhichevan and the Society for Assisting Jewish victims of the Civil War (December 12, 1919). The only Jewish organization that was not granted a charter under the Whites was a “society of non-party affiliated Jews for the strengthening of religious morals in Judaism” called Agudat Isroel (Union of Israel). Their request for a charter was
signed by Rabbi Iossel-Gilf Sroev Berman, Aron Mifsheveich Stukater, Gershon-Nison Gdalevich Kaganov, Iakov Shmerkov Lemko, and others. The society aimed to “preserve and strengthen religious and national values of Judaism and its centuries-old traditions, develop the religious and moral foundations and religious and national values of Judaism in all of its forms among the local Jewish population . . . [I]n order to achieve the declared goals . . . the society will organize kindergartens for children, elementary schools, secondary schools, evening schools for adults, and discussion groups addressing topics of a religious and moral nature, and lectures.”

The request was denied, with the following justification: “taking into account that the membership of the society, as it is presented in the proposed charter, could include minors and even children, whose participation in the society is unacceptable on the basis of their restricted legal status, as well as the fact that the restricted status of members of said category from participating in the governing of the society is not accounted for, this charter is ineligible for registration.”

It is impossible to know for sure whether the motivating factor behind the dismissal of the charter was truly a strict interpretation of the letter of the law, or whether the powers that be did not approve of the “strengthening” of Judaism in the region under their jurisdiction. The latter is probably more likely, seeing as the petitioners did not resubmit another charter, although it would have been a simple matter to include the necessary provisions to prevent minors from serving in leadership positions. Moreover, the tone of the refusal was strikingly arbitrary and artificial.

Still, this was the only occasion on which a Jewish organization was denied registration. In all other cases local authorities adhered to the demands of the regulations on the “Status of Societies and Unions” passed by the Provisional Government on March 20, 1917. As a result, the Jewish population of Rostov had the legal right to create their own social institutions, which (as we can see) they took full advantage of.

Jewish social institutions in Siberia likewise faced few obstacles. On February 24, 1919, the regional court in Irkutsk registered the charter of the Russian Zionist Organization, founded by the engineer Moisei Abramovich Novomeiskii, Aleksandr Manuilovich Evzerov (a graduate of the law faculty), and Zinovii Isaakovich Shkudin. The charter claimed that inasmuch as communication with the Central Committee of the Russian Zionist Organization was impossible, a new five-person temporary bureau would be established in Siberia, which would be accorded all the rights of the Central Committee. The charter went on to state that the Zionist Organization of Russia func-
tioned as a part of the International Zionist Organization and supported its platform, which had been approved by the Basel Congress in 1897. Later the Jewish athletic organization Makkabi was formed, as well as a number of cooperatives and other social organizations.

In January of 1919, the Congress of Jewish Societies of Siberia and the Urals took place. In December of 1918 Jewish party lists were entered in the city Duma elections in several cities in Siberia and the Far East. In Vladivostok, two seats with voting rights were filled from the Zionist and non-affiliated Jewish party list, while one more seat was awarded to the Jewish community.

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The general policy among the commanders of the White movement (at least from 1919 onward) was to prevent Jews from joining the military. This posed a relatively large problem when White forces managed to occupy Kharkov, where half of the officers recruited were Jewish. The detachment began to participate in military actions, but the Jewish soldiers were soon relieved of duty and sent to headquarters to await “further orders.” Once they were reassigned, they were not admitted to their new posts and were relieved of duty.

A “Jewish Volunteer” described the situation in Kharkov. After Denikin’s forces had managed to occupy the city, a number of Jews, including officers, students, and cadets from the artillery academy who had been unable to finish their courses due to the Bolshevik coup answered the call to arms. The volunteers were assigned to an armored train. Six of the Jewish volunteers were registered there. However, at the last moment they were refused and sent back to the muster point. Attempts by two other individuals to join a different artillery unit were met with the same response. The battery commander explained the situation: “You see, gentlemen, the commanding officer of the cavalry artillery has asked me not to send him soldiers whose last names end in ‘man’ and ‘son’.” The surname of one of the volunteers was Volfson, while the other’s was Gandelman.

The officer corps of the Armavir Garrison expressed extreme displeasure of the assignment of twenty-six Jewish officers (or “Kerensky graduates” as a secret communiqué of the Osvag put it).

In Ekaterinoslav, Jewish officers were not admitted to the White army; instead, their epaulets were ripped from their shoulders. After Odessa fell under the control of the Armed Forces of South Russia, the First Marching Company was formed, which included eighty Jewish officers and petty officers,
of whom thirty were volunteers. On September 7, 1919 they set out for the front. Upon their arrival, the Jewish officers were first reassigned away from the front lines, and then simply relieved of duty. Other Jewish members of the squadron were reduced to the ranks.\footnote{126}

Iurii Gruzenberg, the son of O. O. Gruzenberg, a midshipman during the war and a naval pilot, attempted to join the armed forces in Sevastopol. Despite the repeated admonitions of his father (who had fallen victim to antisemitic prejudices on more than one occasion), as well as his own personal experiences, the young idealist still maintained, “I gave a solemn oath to serve Russia, therefore I must honor my promise.” After his son was refused, Gruzenberg senior used his connections to personally petition A. D. Bubnov, the commander of the Black Sea fleet, but received the following response through an adjutant, “Jews have no place in the navy, nor will they ever, as long as I am in command.” The irrepressible patriot would not give up, and tried to join the air force, but his only reward for his efforts was a dismissal from service on September 21, 1919.\footnote{127}

In Crimea Jewish junior officers were not allowed among the rank and file, and those who were already serving were reassigned to supply duties. When D. S. Pasmanik (a well-known social figure and ardent supporter of the Volunteer Army) lodged a protest, he received the explanation that the reassignments had not been ordered by command. Instead, they were instigated by the officer corps. “This one fact,” Pasmanik would later write, “did more damage to the image of the Volunteer Army among the Jewish population than all of the Bolsheviks’ propaganda.” Pasmanik was also disturbed by the repeated rumors that the Bolshevik forces contained units “completely composed of Jews.” Though Pasmanik lent little credence to these rumors, he was relieved when Jewish former soldiers came to him “with a request to obtain permission to form a Jewish detachment, composed of those who for some reason or other were not admitted to the Volunteer Army. This Jewish squadron would be responsible for internal law enforcement and policing, and would confront any sudden outbreaks of Bolshevik agitation. It was clear that by this we had in mind possible pogroms.” However, this request was also denied. A similarly groundless refusal was given to a group of German colonists who wanted to form their own detachment to fight the Bolsheviks.\footnote{128} It was clear that the Whites had no use for “foreign” soldiers.

Already in emigration, after the White pogroms had taken place, Pasmanik would later rhetorically ask himself, “Could I have just stepped aside after this? I certainly could have if the same situation existed among the
Bolsheviks as well, if all of the Jewish population had unanimously decided to stay neutral in the Civil War. But this just wasn’t the case; they had Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev in charge of everything. That’s why I couldn’t just sit with my hands in my lap.”

And so, Pasmanik accepted the “rules of the game” as dictated by the Judeophobes, and admitted to the existence of a collective responsibility of the Jewish people as a whole, as well as a kind of “collective will” (“If the entire Jewish population had decided . . .”). Pasmanik even turned to open antisemites in his search for understanding, as if allowing for the possibility of some kind of dialogue: “But if the Russian antisemites could only understand how difficult it is for us Jews to manifest this desire to sacrifice ourselves, only then to be rejected by the Volunteer Army.” The antisemites, or at least one of them, truly did appreciate Pasmanik’s efforts. Here is how Pasmanik himself described an episode that would later seriously harm his reputation: “One beautiful day someone in a Red Cross uniform stopped by the editorial offices. In front of everyone present he embraced me and gave me a kiss in greeting. I didn’t recognize him at first. “Whom do I have the pleasure of speaking to,” I began. “It’s me! Purishkevich!” [a noted anti-Semite] he exclaimed, shaking my hand. “Do you happen to know that I’m a Jew?” I asked. “Who cares if you’re a Jew? You’re the Jew that I admire and respect!” he blurted out. And then he began to explain to me in great detail his particular kind of antisemitism.”

Purishkevich’s “respect” for Pasmanik only brought the latter a great deal of unpleasantness; the left-wing press had a field day with the story the next day.

Perhaps the most indicative historical document recounting the misfortunes of a Jewish officer is to be found in a report, dated September 24, 1919, written by one Abram Khaim-Ruvinovich Shafi r, and addressed to Denikin. Shafi r had served as a soldier, petty officer, and commissioned officer from July 22, 1914 until January 11, 1918. On July 1, 1917 he was assigned to a military academy for petty officers. “As a junker, I participated in the suppression of the Bolshevik uprising in Vinnitsa in 1917 where my fellow junkers Mordkin and Antonov were killed.” On December 7, 1917 he and others stationed on the southwestern front were transferred by General D. G. Shcherbachev to the Sixteenth Reserve Infantry Unit, where as a result of the Ukrainian takeover on January 11, 1918 he was sent to the military command in Kishinev as a native of Bessarabia.”

Upon discovering that Kishinev was in the hands of Romanians, Shafi r set out for Odessa. He did not answer the call to arms given by the Bolshevik commander M. A. Muraviev. According to Sharif, what followed was this:
On November 6, 1918 (new style), while living in Bakhmut, I was accepted to officer’s instruction corps of the Forty-sixth Bakhmut Regiment. On December 25, 1918 after the capture of Bakhmut by the Volunteer Army I was transferred to the Second Rifle Regiment named after General Drozdovskii, where I and four other Jews were relieved of duty on January 6, 1919, as being excluded from conscription . . . Having submitted a report on January 7, in which I indicated that patriotism is not measured by one’s dedication to this or that ethnic group or religion, and considering myself obligated, along with my non-Jewish comrades, to work for the restoration of a United Great Russia, mother of all peoples who inhabit her land, I was relieved of duty. On March 22 of the same year I was in Odessa, where I had been sent for medical treatment until April 6 due to a wound I had received. Not wanting to remain in a place ruled by anarchy and tyranny, I disregarded my wounds and on March 23 joined the Forty-second Yakutsk Regiment and left with the regiment for Tulcha, then held by French forces for the Romanians.

I enclose a notarized copy of a short memorandum describing my service in the Volunteer Army, and in keeping with order number 1870 given on August 16 regarding the promotion of all praporshchiki to the rank of second lieutenant, which is applicable to me, having been relieved on August 22, I hereby request promotion with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia, as at the current moment I am unassigned to any detachment. Having no clothes other than my uniform, I would also request confirmation that I, having been relieved of duty from winter until May 1, 1920, retain the right to wear the uniform of an officer of the rifle regiment under the command of General Drozdovskii. My military record, as well as the testimonies of officers and soldiers, may serve as evidence of my service to Russia, which I considered to be my homeland despite the suffering and oppression during the Tsarist regime, and the pogroms that were occasionally carried out against us (in the interest of higher political goals).

Having served in the army for three and a half years, and in the Volunteer Army for eight months, until August 22, 1919, when I was dismissed for no other reason than being a Jew, I now
understand that Russia is just a stepmother for Jews, and that I, having been thrown overboard, can only hope to reach the shore of a new place where character will be judged according to virtue instead of ethnic identity. I therefore request documentation attesting to the fact that the Volunteer Army will not prevent me from going abroad, and that I served in the Volunteer Army from December 25, 1918 onwards as an enemy of Bolshevism. Upon supplying such a document to the English Mission in Constantinople, I will be able to receive permission to go to Palestine, where I hope to put my spiritual and physical gifts to good use.”

The documentation mentioned above was attached to the report and signed by the commanding officer of Shafir’s regiment, who confirmed all that Shafir had said.

The attached documents said, among other things, that Shafir had been:

- Wounded near Kurdiumovskaya and evacuated on February 9, 1919.
- Transferred from the Yakutsk regiment back to the Drozdivskii regiment as a common soldier of the Ninth Company on May 8, 1919.
- Wounded and remained in battle near Kirpichnaia on May 12.
- Wounded near Lopasnaia and evacuated on May 18.
- Sent to Kharkov by a medical commission for medical treatment from July 2 to August 2, 1919.
- Relieved of duty as a Jewish officer on August 22, 1919 by the Kharkov military command.

Unfortunately, the written record ends here. One can only hope that Shafir was able to reach Palestine in the end.

Analogous conditions existed in the eastern territories controlled by the Kolchak government. Jews were forbidden from enrolling in military schools, could not serve in positions of responsibility, and were prohibited from serving as secretaries or translators, and Jewish members in the ranks were often persecuted.

Despite the policies forbidding Jews from joining the armed forces, some still managed to serve. Such cases were exceptions, rather than the norm, and for those willing to risk serving, the real danger came not from the enemy, but from their comrades-in-arms. Kiev student David Goldin, who had
voluntarily joined the Volunteer Army in the beginning of July in 1919, was nearly hanged by a group of Cossacks. Fortunately, a group of artillery soldiers intervened and stopped the impending murder. When he joined the ranks, Goldin was forced to listen to his commanding colonel wax poetic about the participation of the “Jewish youth” in revolutionary activities, which served as justification for the Russian officer corps’ being “less than accepting” of Jewish soldiers. Yet Goldin would not change his mind, and joined his squadron. According to his commanding officer, Goldin “did not distinguish himself in any way, good or bad. He was simply a competent, disciplined soldier.”

It’s hard to discern what might have motivated Goldin. According to his biographer, he wanted to demonstrate to his commander that not all Jews were on the side of the Bolsheviks (of course, the accuracy of a conversation reconstructed nearly forty years after the fact can be debated). Goldin served in Denikin’s army until December of 1919; when he went to visit his father, who was terminally ill. He ended up in Bolshevik-occupied territory. There’s no record of him after this point.

Another interesting episode from the annals of Jewish volunteers in the White Army was recorded in the memoirs of an artillery soldier who served in Drozdovskii regiment. Numerous young soldiers joined the army during the short period when the Whites occupied Bakhmut in the early winter of 1919. Among the former gimnazium students was a young man by the name of Verlinskii, who was of Jewish heritage. He was assigned to the Second Officers’ Rifle Regiment.

The Army wasn’t exactly overflowing with Jewish volunteers, so when a Jewish volunteer did appear, he was met with a certain amount of caution. In battle Verlinskii acquitted himself extremely well, and was later awarded a Cross of St. George (fourth degree). His success on the battlefield facilitated his acceptance by the other volunteers and soldiers. Verlinskii was reticent, brave, enlisted in the Army voluntarily, and was an honorable soldier. He was one of ours, a Drozdovskii soldier. That was the general opinion of him. Even when people would bring up Trotsky, the Red commander, and make fun of his family heritage, as soldiers were inclined to do, they grew silent if Verlinskii was present, as they didn’t want to offend or upset their fellow soldier and comrade.
In 1920, during the “Crimean period” of the White movement, Verlinskii was transferred to a machine gun group attached to the Seventh Howitzer Brigade, where he served as a spotter for a heavy machine gun cart. In a pitched battle with Red cadets near the town of Mikhailovka, Verlinskii’s position came under assault by infantry. Verlinskii was “killed on the spot after taking a bullet to the mouth, with his hands still grasped around the controls of the already silent machine gun.” His comrades searched for a Jewish cemetery, but finding none, they “buried him in a local village cemetery, and placed his army cap on top of his grave.”\textsuperscript{138} His captain, Nikolai Rebikov, left the following laconic description in his journal, “Junior machine gunner and volunteer Verlinskii. A \textit{gimnazium} student from Bakhmut. Killed near Mikhailovka on October 9, 1920.”\textsuperscript{139} The above examples were exceptions to the general attitude towards Jewish volunteers. After the outbreak of pogroms carried out by Denikin’s troops, the number of Jewish volunteers fell to single digits.

Representatives from the Jewish community met twice with General Denikin; once in Taganrog in the beginning of August 1919, and once in Odessa in October. Both times they requested that Jewish officers be allowed to rejoin the army. At the first meeting, Denikin “described previous incidents related to this question and the dire consequences for those officers should they be forced to serve in such regiments.” One of the members of the delegation replied, “So what? Let them undergo such moral tortures, death included! We’re willing to go that far; we’re willing to sacrifice our own children!” Denikin refused to accept such an offer, due to very pragmatic considerations. Lynchings would be followed by punishments to those involved, which would only lead to a “new wave of hatred.”\textsuperscript{140}

At a meeting in Rostov on October 20, 1919, the Russian ambassador in Paris, V. A. Maklakov, defended Denikin’s position to those present, including A. L. Chernikov, G. Ia. Bruk, and F. E. Lander. “When Denikin accepts officers into the army, he takes on the responsibility of providing them with an environment they can serve in. If even one of these Jewish officers were to be killed, Denikin would be forced to punish and execute the perpetrators. And this would greatly complicate things in the army.”\textsuperscript{141} Upon returning to Paris in early December, 1919, Maklakov would go on to write a letter addressed to the Finance Minister of Denikin’s government, claiming that the exclusion of Jews from the army was proof of the government’s capitulation to antisemitism. He recommend following in the footsteps of “the pogromist
Petliura” and the Poles, who “despite all of their Judeophobia” still allowed Jews to occupy positions of responsibility. Then, if the press brought up any pogroms, they would be able to respond, “As you can see, we aren’t antisemites; antisemitism is only a phenomenon of the base passions of the scum of society . . . we [the Whites] don’t have that excuse at hand.”

Even after the Kiev pogroms, some Jews still supported the Volunteer movement. A twenty-person organization under the name of the Jewish Committee for the Rebirth of Russia, published a declaration calling on the Jewish population to support the Volunteer Army. At the same time, A. A. Goldenveizer was quite correct in stating that by this time “a vast gulf now separated the Jewish population and the army. Having lived through the pogroms, the Jews had no choice but to use all means at their disposal to leave for those places where they wouldn’t be threatened again. The Jewish merchant, unsure of his own safety and that of his family, could not leave his home to pick up his wares. This destroyed his livelihood. The Jewish officer could not go on loving the army that he had been cast out from.”

Despite the decidedly antisemitic atmosphere prevalent among Denikin’s troops, some Jews still attempted to collaborate with the Whites. Prince Pavel Dolgorukov recalled how a “former rabbi, Shneerzon,” once traveled with him from Rostov to the recently occupied Kharkov. Dologrukov had met him earlier in Riazan and had come to appreciate his organizational capabilities in “acquiring provisions.” “Together we organized a huge meeting with local representatives of the local communes, railroads, banks, corporations, merchants and so on, to figure out ways to supply the army. The ensuing evacuation of Kharkov prevented us from realizing our goals, but Shneerzon later made a proposal to the person in charge of provisions, S. N. Maslov. The project concerned provisioning both the troops and the civilian population, but it was rejected by Denikin, who said “absolutely no Shneerzon!”

These words of Denikin, who was himself perhaps the most pro-Jewish of all of the white military command, serve as a fitting epitaph for Jewish “collaboration” with the Whites. The White movement, which had been founded with financial contributions from anti-Bolshevik segments of Jewish society, now cast the Jewish population aside as something foreign and alien to them. It is doubtful that the story could have ended any other way. Differences in culture and religion proved too great to overcome, despite the two groups’ common political views and beliefs.

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Crimea was to serve as the setting for the last act in the White drama. It is worth remembering, however, that the area in question was fairly large (in total, the Crimean territory was only 13 percent smaller than the entire country of Belgium). According to a publication of the local Statistics Bureau headed by M. E. Benenson, Crimea had 808,903 inhabitants, of which 68,159 (8.4 percent) were Jewish. The Jewish community was the third most populous in the area, smaller than the Orthodox Russians and Ukrainians (399,785) and the Tartars (216,968, or 26.8 percent), but larger than the German minority (41,374, or 5.1 percent).\footnote{137-48292_ch01_1P.indd 167}

P. N. Vrangel attempted to learn from Denikin’s mistakes; he was completely cognizant of the deleterious effects of antisemitism on the army, and clamped down on antisemitic tendencies. This was much easier to accomplish in the limited territory of the Crimean peninsula. “White Crimea” could not exist without external aid, and such assistance was dependent on projecting a positive image for the sake of public opinion in the West. It was also necessary to positively influence those who had the ear of Western governments. These included émigré Kadets who had already established themselves in London and Paris, and who were traditionally considered to be the standard-bearers of liberal democratic values in Russia. It was evident that the West would evaluate the democratic nature of Vrangel’s regime in part by looking at how the government treated its Jewish population. P. B. Struve, placed in charge of foreign affairs by Vrangel, proclaimed that the government would pursue, “a leftist politics through conservative means.”

Vrangel reorganized Denikin’s troops into the Russian Army. While doing so, he did not hesitate to publicly punish, demote, or court-martial senior officers. Numerous independent-minded generals were court-martialed and sentenced to hard labor (though this was often later commuted to exile). Vrangel exerted firm control over his troops, who both loved and feared him. Whatever his own personal opinion towards Jews (and judging from his personal and political correspondence, his views were no different from those of a typical army officer), the political decision to forbid pogroms and antisemitic propaganda was ruthlessly carried out and enforced.

On July 5, 1920, the newspaper \textit{Velikaia Rossiia} (\textit{Great Russia}) published an interview with Vrangel in which he discussed the foundations of his political worldview. In this interview, Vrangel touched upon the “Jewish question”, among other things. Vrangel claimed that “anti-Jewish attitudes among the masses are spreading due to the infected abscess of Bolshevism. The people do not understand who should be held responsible. They see Jewish commissars...
and communists and don’t stop to realize that this is a fragment of Jewish society that has broken away from the community, and that it is distinct from those Jews who have no communist convictions and who have rejected Soviet power.”

Vrangel rejected the theory of collective responsibility on principle, citing the erroneous nature of equating Jewishness with communism. He announced that he considered any pogromistic activity to be “disastrous for the state,” and would fight against such things using all of the means at his disposal. His reasons for doing so were practical: “Pogroms weaken the army. Troops who participate in them are derelict in their duties. One morning they attack Jews, and by evening they’ll be attacking the civilian populace.”

In contrast to his predecessor, Vrangel did not merely claim that he was preventing pogroms; he actually prevented them as well. And he would occasionally employ harsh measures in doing so.

According to Iu. I. Gessen (a Jewish businessman who had come to Crimea to participate in an economic congress in September 1920), the Jewish community was satisfied with Vrangel: “Vrangel keeps close watch over pogromists, and ordered the hanging of a former Bolshevik captain along with six of his accomplices for carrying out pogroms in the villages near Kakhovka.” Gessen also claimed that in enforcing these policies, Vrangel was losing his standing among the antisemitic segments of the officer corps.

The last claim is highly unlikely; the vast majority of officers had already experienced the panicked retreat and catastrophe at Novorossiisk. Vrangel, who had managed to reform the army, was an object of admiration for many. Nonetheless, the rumors mentioned by Gessen are telling. It would be hard to imagine similar things being said about Denikin.

When Simferopol was threatened by possible pogroms, as a result of antisemitic agitation carried out by certain religious figures (such as V. I. Vostokov), Prince V. A. Obolenskii immediately left for Sevastopol, where he and P. B. Struve met with Vrangel. Vrangel promised to take action, and he did. Vrangel issued an order forbidding “any kind of public demonstrations, sermons, speeches, lectures, and disputes that would engender political or ethnic discord.” The order went on to state, “The Russian army is in the midst of liberating its native soil under the severe conditions of war. It has a right to demand the unanimous support of all of those for whom it provides a peaceful existence. [emphasis in original]. I charge all garrison commanders, commandants, and civil authorities with enforcing the execution of this command. I will banish those who fail to obey as being unworthy of office, rank, and title.”
Not stopping there, Vrangel summoned Vostokov and reprimanded him, or as he would later describe it in his memoirs, “explained the perilous nature of his actions.” This “explanation” proved to be effective, as Vostokov ceased his sermons.\footnote{137}

V. A. Maklakov, the ambassador to Paris, was to play an influential role in Vrangel’s approach to the “Jewish question.” Maklakov visited Crimea in September 1920 and was quite impressed by Vrangel’s temperament, pragmatism, and decisiveness. In a series of letters to Vrangel’s Prime Minister, A.V. Krivoshein, Maklakov often discussed matters pertaining to the “Jewish question.” Recalling a conversation he had with “one of the most honorable and prominent representatives of the Jewish community,” who “viewed the ‘Jewish question’ through the eyes of a Russian and a civil servant” the ambassador recommended heeding the opinion of his anonymous interlocutor. “Living abroad, we understand extremely well how any manifestation of antisemitism could be portentous for Vrangel. This is particularly true now, as America is currently having presidential elections, and Jewish support for Vrangel could have positive political consequences.”\footnote{138} This conversation led to a clearly articulated policy regarding the Jewish population. Even if Vrangel himself was “above any suspicion,” the presence of Tsarist-era officials such as Krivoshein, G. V. Glinka, E. K. Klimovich, and others led some in Western circles to doubt the democratic nature of his government, as well as its tolerance of ethnic minorities. This was to prove true both in the émigré community, and also in the governments and presses of the western democracies. Vrangel’s government differed from Denikin’s (which had included a number of Kadets) as well as from the short-lived Government of South Russia, which had even included the socialist N. V. Chaikovskii among its members. The Jewish community wanted to be assured that, “this government is not only unsympathetic toward pogroms, but will actually prevent them and be willing to undertake all necessary measures to do so.”\footnote{139}

Maklakov advised Krivoshein to reenact Statute 269 of the former penal code, which established punishments for civil disorders among factory workers and peasants. There was a section of the statute that provided for prosecution of civil disorders motivated by religious hatred; it had earlier been applied to cases of anti-Jewish pogroms:

If this statute has been repealed, it would be useful and not at all provocative if it were restored in its general form. If it has not, it would be worth reminding people of its existence. It would not
single out Jews, and would not be specifically directed at anti-Jewish pogroms, but against pogroms in general, though it would be clear that such pogroms would fall under its jurisdiction. In addition, it would likewise be useful to have some decrees that regulate or strengthen the punishments or administrative actions that can be taken against newspapers, etc. This would demonstrate the unacceptability of instigating civil disorder, including instigation founded on a religious basis . . . To put it clearly, the idea is to approach pogroms from the perspective of their danger to civil order and their unacceptability, with all of the consequences thus entailed. Right now [enforcement] is so slack, I think many would consider this to be a major improvement.”

In another letter, Maklakov recounted a conversation he had had with the former Tsarist Prime Minister A. F. Trepov, now a leader in conservative circles in the Russian émigré community. According, to Maklakov, Trepov “claimed to be an enemy of antisemitism in the most categorical terms.” Although Trepov was skeptical of coming to an agreement with the Russian Jews, he had much higher hopes for “prominent Jews in the West,” who “from a distance look at things much more calmly and judiciously”:

If we can come to an agreement with these Jews from abroad and convince them that Vrangel will in no way allow pogroms or incite antisemitism, then they will come to realize the necessity of Jewish capital in the future rebuilding of Russia; they will understand that they have something at stake in putting Russia back on its feet. If such an agreement could be reached (or not even an agreement, but rather a conversation which wouldn’t be publicized), and they believed in it, then all of Jewry, i.e., all of the capital, would be on our side.

Krivoshein heeded the ambassador’s advice. In a secret telegram dated October 30, 1920 (ten days before the end of the Crimean regime), Krivoshein told Maklakov that his advice was fully compatible with Vrangel’s political program. He likewise assured him that no steps in the “reactionary” direction were being planned. Krivoshein suggested that Maklakov make use of the current proposal to have Avgust Kaminka, then head of the Azov-Don Bank, become the new Finance Minister of Vrangel’s government as evidence
of their democratic credentials. Though motivated by practical concerns, such an appointment would also demonstrate the lack of antisemitic sentiment in the government. However, Kaminka eventually declined the position, as did P. L. Bark, a former Finance Minister under the Tsars. The reason for their refusal was obvious. Everyone, regardless of political orientation or religious belief, was hesitant to climb aboard a sinking ship.

According to some sources, D. S. Pasmanik was offered the opportunity to head Vrangel’s Press Department. Pasmanik had continued to serve the White cause faithfully, and was at the time working as Burtsev’s deputy at the newspaper *Obshchee Delo (Common Cause)*, which served as Vrangel’s main media outlet in Paris. However, Pasmanik was disturbed by the “reactionary measures” he had heard were being introduced by Vrangel, as well as various manifestations of antisemitism in Crimea. Burtsev relayed a letter from Pasmanik letter addressing his concerns to Vrangel. Vrangel responded to Pasmanik’s letter the day he received it, October 18 (31), 1920.

I am deeply thankful for all that you do for Russia. Don’t believe the rumors. Here is an excerpt from my most recent directive, which was published yesterday: I have announced my plans and will not relent in seeing them realized. [They are] the welfare and freedom of the people, the introduction of the revitalizing foundation of civil order into Russian life, which is foreign to ethnic and class enmity, the unification of those forces of Russia that have escaped destruction, and the continuation of the military and ideological struggle until such time as the Russian people can themselves express their will regarding the future of Russia. To fulfill these tasks I require people who are strong in spirit, who are familiar with civil life and who are capable of building it. I am indifferent to the party and political affiliation of such people, as long as they are dedicated to the Motherland and can operate effectively in these new circumstances.155

However, it was too little, too late. Pasmanik received Vrangel’s reply on November 13, 1920. By this time the Crimean regime had ceased to exist.

The Crimean experiment was an attempt to create a normal standard of life and introduce reforms for the good of the majority of the population. As far as the “Jewish question” is concerned, it also demonstrated that if the authorities had sincerely wanted to put an end to pogroms and the agitation
that led to them, then it was entirely within their power to do so. As Krivo-
shein astutely noted after the end of Vrangel’s regime, “There wasn’t even a
hint of pogroms, not when our army captured cities, nor when we retreated
from them. There was vocal antisemitism, but it was more intellectual in na-
ture, and it did not influence daily life or the rule of law. Even the Bolsheviks
had pogroms, but things in Crimea were completely peaceful.”

Admittedly, it is another question entirely whether Vrangel would have
been able to maintain martial discipline and order had he succeeded in at-
tracting more members to his army, and had more territories had fallen under
his control. It is quite possible that he would have had the same experience as
Denikin, where initial successes turned out to be harbingers of future ruin.
Though we can only speculate about such scenarios, one thing remains cer-
tain: Vrangel never attempted to exploit antisemitism for his own benefit,
and he strove to deter all those who attempted to do so.
In the summer of 1921, a minor scandal broke out in the Russian émigré community in Paris. The prominent SR activist A. A. Argunov refused to join a book preservation society that had recently been organized by the historian S. G. Svatikov. The main reason for Argunov’s refusal was Svatikov’s former activity in the Osvag (an acronym for the osvedomitel’no-agitatsionnoe otdelenie, the White propaganda department). In a letter to Svatikov dated July 4, 1921, Argunov writes, “You knew where you were going when you decided to work for the Osvag. It is hardly a coincidence you are trying to distance yourself from responsibility for that time in the past. These days no one, not even most simple participant in the Volunteer movement, is capable of hearing about that ‘propaganda’ without hatred. Even Burtsev, the faithful lackey of the Osvag abroad, now repents for his actions. As for those of us who were not participants, but merely witnesses to and victims of this ‘propaganda,’ we wait for the day when a full history of all of the Osvag’s actions—its literature, its posters with red yids [zhid] sitting on the Kremlin, its pictures of the Last Judgment, and many other abominations—will be written down in detail.”

Such a detailed history has yet to be written, although several studies have touched upon the issue. In this chapter, I will examine but one aspect of this problem, namely, the antisemitic dimensions of White ideology and propaganda, both in the White organizations themselves, and in the press in the territories under their control.

In the early days of the movement, neither the official ideology of the Whites nor its accompanying slogans were antisemitic. During this period,
the Whites received substantial financial support from Jewish business owners. However, it is difficult to disagree with the opinion of Peter Kenez, who claimed that antisemitism became a kind of “surrogate” for White ideology. The leaders and ideologues of the Whites proved incapable of coming up with convincing and effective slogans on their own. This was probably due in no small part to their lack of concrete goals. “Let’s get rid of the Bolsheviks, then form a Constituent or National Assembly, which will then decide which path Russia should take” was hardly a statement that would inspire the masses.3

The Whites instead found that antisemitic slogans were much more effective in mobilizing the semi-literate and illiterate masses. They also provided a convenient explanation of events for the more educated officers and intelligentsia. It is also worth bearing in mind that antisemitism had already taken root during World War I. Moreover, the army in general and the Cossacks in particular already had participated in deportations of the Jewish population, who were constantly suspected of providing aid to the enemy.4

The events of 1917 seemed to confirm the fears of those who foresaw the Jews seizing power in Russia. One of the most typical forms of antisemitic propaganda at the time was to distribute lists of names of Bolshevik or revolutionary leaders of Jewish heritage. Occasionally non-Jewish names would be added in order to demonstrate how other leaders (including everyone from Kerensky to Antonov-Ovseenko) were in league with the Jews.

The Osvag was the main propaganda organ of the Whites in the South (though its official name changed over time, the acronym stuck). The Osvag was formed on September 10 (23 new style), 1918. On September 28 (October 11), it was placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Special Council. By December it had received a new name (osvedomitel’noe biuro) and was a division within the Special Council itself. It was headed by S. S. Chakhotin, a physiologist who had been educated at Heidelberg University and who was well known in political and journalism circles.5

The Propaganda Section (otdel propagandy), which continued the work of the Osvag, was opened on January 16 (29), 1919. It was headed by N. E. Paramonov, a Kadet and well-known businessman and publisher from Rostov. Paramonov, in the words of a contemporary, had “an American mentality.” He attempted to enlist workers of all political views (including moderate socialists) in his propaganda efforts, claiming that only a united front would succeed in defeating the Bolsheviks. His “ecumenical” outlook (and the efforts of his enemies in Ekaterinodar) led to his resignation a mere month and a half after he assumed the position.6 He was replaced on March 8 (21) by K.
N. Sokolov, a member of the Kadet Central Committee. On December 22, 1919 (January 4, 1920) Sokolov delegated his leadership position to his deputy, Colonel B. A. Engelgardt. In March of 1920, Vrangel ordered the remnants of the Osvag to be shut down.⁷

Rostov-on-Don served as the political capital of the White movement during the Civil War. It contained many of the White ministries and organizations, including the Osvag. A large number of newspapers of varying political orientations were published in the city, and a significant portion of the political and cultural elite had sought refuge there, both for political reasons, and to escape the rampant starvation and cold climate in other parts of the country. As the satirical poet Filipp Penkov once wrote:

With your submissively exposed neck,
With a face grayer than the Finnish cliffs,
Ill-fated Russian refugee,
Where haven't you been?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

and so you've moved to the Don
under the shade of the blessed peaks.
Crazed, for three weeks you drank
three quarts of milk a day,
and ate amazing, rich bread,
as white as a summer cloud at noon.⁸

Along the same lines, Viktor Sevskii wrote, “Someday, tourists will come to see Rostov, the city where all of Russia once lived.”⁹ In his memoirs, L. S. Fridland was of the same opinion: “The city is as rich as 140 thousand Rothschilds. Rich, majestic, and bubbling with all the joys and temptations of life. And the sins as well. It is a mini-capital, teeming with people. All of the financial world of Moscow and Petrograd are here, the Riabushinskis, the Morozovs, and the Eliseevs have all settled down here . . . Rostov has never been so blindingly beautiful. It has reached its zenith of fame and speculation . . .”¹⁰

In a satirical poem entitled “Onegin of our Days,” the poet Leri (V. V. Klopotovskii) gave his own description of these tumultuous days in Rostov:

. . . Rostov was in a frenzy . . . Having turned up there,
he did not waste his days in vain,
and adopted along with bustling society
the Petersburg style . . .
His provincial head became dizzy
in its new role,
as all Petersburg and Moscow
appeared on Bolshaia Sadovaia.
Oh those days of a created legend!
The counterintelligence and Osvag,
and the “church bells,” and the flag
of United Russia indivisible,
Ministers, women . . . Such
were the days of Denikin’s Rostov.12

The Osvag was located on Bolshaia Sadovaia, the main thoroughfare of Rostov, occupying four floors of an enormous hotel.13 In the summer of 1919, the Osvag had 255 employees in its central offices, although this was only the tip of the iceberg.14 In total, the Osvag employed anywhere from 8,500 to 10,000 individuals. It was split into a number of sections focusing on a variety of media (information, propaganda, literature, theater, cinema) and employed a large number of talented artists and writers, including E. N. Chirikov, I. D. Surguchev, S. A. Sokolov-Krechetov, I. Ia. Bilbin, E. E. Lansere, and others. It published a number of newspapers, journals, and brochures, and it organized lectures, theater productions, and other cultural activities. Though not the only such organization in Rostov, the Osvag (in terms of brute numbers) always played the leading role. Although many scholars (and some of the leaders of the White movement itself) attest to the ineffective nature of White propaganda, this is not entirely true.15 Lazarskii, among others, has convincingly shown that the White propagandists were able to achieve their goals, even if it required distorting the facts and engaging in demagoguery.16 For the Whites (and for the Reds as well) the ends justified the means.17

Contemporary accounts of the Osvag’s relationship to the “Jewish question” are often strikingly contradictory in nature. Some witnesses claim that it engaged in antisemitism, and was dominated by Black Hundreds. Others, surprisingly, claim that the entire organization was run by Jews, who had gone to work there in order to avoid military service. In his memoirs of 1921, Sokolov wrote about the “asemitism” of the Osvag, claiming that there was an “unwritten rule” restricting the employment of Jews and socialists. “A
formal ban on hiring Jews did not exist,” he wrote, “but with a few exceptions, which you could count on one hand, there were no Jews working for us. This was simply because the nearly universal antisemitic attitudes of the masses, especially in the military, made the very idea of a Jewish propagandist ‘impossible.’” This fact was a source of concern for Sokolov, who faced a dearth of talented “[people] who know the racial and party affiliations of those members of the intelligentsia capable of writing, speaking, and carrying out propaganda, and who also know what this means in practice.”

According to some sources, Sokolov himself was active in preventing Jews and socialists from working for the Osvag. An employee of the Osvag who had begun his tenure under Paramonov reported that Sokolov “rabidly attacked him [Paramonov], and accused him of accommodating Socialists (including Svatikov”), of filling the ministry with Jews, of leftist, and so on.” Sokolov would later go on to bemoan the fact that “Jew hunts” were “the favorite pastime of official spies and volunteer informants” among those working at the Osvag; it is worth bearing in mind that he himself was not above playing such games when it suited his goals.

The activities and composition of the Propaganda Section drew the concerned attention of the influential Colonel V. M. Pronin. Pronin was a close colleague of Kornilov and had been imprisoned in Bykhov along with Denikin. He fled prison for the Don region and participated in the Ice March. On June 25, 1919, Pronin wrote the following in a letter to his immediate superior, General V. E. Viazmitinov: “In its current state, the Propaganda Section is not an institution that creates and propagates enlightened ideas and slogans that the Volunteer Army can place upon its banners while engaged in a titanic struggle with Bolshevism, which is led by the Jews. It is rather an institution that is destroying the work of our army and undermining the authority of its commanding officers.” As proof, Pronin cited the “feeling of indignation and resentment” that would seize the officers and the civilian population “when they know and see who works in the Section.” He drew attention to the fact that among the workers of the Osvag there were individuals “who have participated in the destruction of Russia, individuals with suspicious pasts . . . the pure and sacred banner of the Volunteer Army is being touched by unworthy hands . . . the Propaganda Section should be under the direct control of those without party affiliation and members of the military, those who are building and rebuilding Russia with their blood and bones, not those who have stained themselves by violating and dismembering her.” Pronin concluded, “The sword that is destroying Bolshevism, and the leadership
of the task of reviving the people and restoring its soul, must remain in the reliable hands of the military.” Pronin’s letter eventually made it to Denikin, who then ordered “an audit to be carried out by reliable and informed people.”

The requisite information was forwarded to the Justice Department of the Special Council. V. N. Chelishchev did not consider the presence of nineteen Jews among the personnel of the Propaganda Section to be worthy of an entire review. All that was required was to give the corresponding order “regarding the change in the policy of hiring for mid-level positions” to the Section Head and his assistants. They could then decide who was to be trusted or fired, and forward the necessary information to the Department.

Despite this, a small number of Jews continued to work in the Propaganda Section. On August 1, 1919, this situation resulted in a formal denunciation by Colonel Ia. M. Lisovoi. Lisovoi had earlier worked as the head of the Military Political Section, one of the predecessors of the Osvag, under the command of General Alekseev. He claimed that Jews and “individuals sympathetic to Bolshevism and foreigners” were infiltrating the propaganda efforts. According to Lisovoi, by February and March of 1919 “Jewish dominance” in the Section had reached a troubling degree. This was due to the protection of Svatikov, who at that time was Deputy Head of the Section and who allegedly had “several connections with Jewish circles.” In Lisovoi’s opinion, the situation was so dangerous that the most “correct” (i.e., trustworthy) Jews, including the attorney Gorodisskii and his son, had voluntarily left the section in order to avoid further complications. Russian military cadets had also informed Lisovoi that there were Jews among the faculty, and that they were “afraid of working with them.” Lisovoi had had such concerns earlier, and had previously contacted Paramonov, who allegedly replied, “the time will come when we will be rid [of them].” After Paramonov’s departure, the “Jewish inundation was gradually stopped,” although Lisovoi was still concerned that “in the past weeks, Jews have been trying to infiltrate various parts of the Propaganda Section, the theater department in particular.” Lisovoi was only able to uncover two Jews (Shatskii and Piletskii) working in the Propaganda Section itself. The first (according to his Osvag colleague Georgievskii) supported a platform that completely went against the ideals of the Volunteer Army, and allegedly made no secret of it.

Jews were being fired from the Osvag even before the review that resulted from Pronin’s letter. These included the composer of the Volunteer Army hymn, M. I. Iakobson. A “free artist,” Iakobson had worked as a free-
lancer for the musical section of the theater department. Knowing that a Jewish last name might prove to be an obstacle to Iakobson's being hired, the Deputy Head of the Propaganda Section E. D. Grimm emphasized in a letter to Denikin that Iakobson was the son of a Titular Councilor and a member of the Russian Orthodox faith. However, even the “proper” religion did not save Iakobson; Denikin “expressed the desire that he [Iakobson] not remain in the Propaganda Section.” 27 Iakobson was not the only victim, however. A. N. Eremeeva has written that the actor V. A. Bliumental-Tamarin, “one of the active propagators of the ideas of the Volunteer Army through theater” was likewise dismissed because of his Jewish background. 28 Earlier, when the Whites captured Kharkov in the summer of 1919, Bliumental had ridden through the streets on a white circus horse, carrying a tricolor flag affixed to a pike, with a church chalice tied to his saddle, asking the civilian population to make donations for presents for the liberators. 29 The son of a famous actor and actress (his mother, Maria, became one of the first People’s Artists of the USSR), Bliumental-Tamarin had only the most tangential relationship to the tribe of Moses. After the end of the Civil War, he was forgiven his past “sins,” thanks to the intercession of Lunacharsky. However, Bliumental’s anti-Soviet activity was not yet over. Finding himself in occupied territory outside of Moscow in 1941, he decided to work for the Nazis, telling antisemitic jokes and performing parodies of Stalin on the radio. According to unconfirmed reports, he was eventually killed by partisans.

In any case, despite the fact that a small number of Jews were employed at the Osvag, they were hardly in control of the organization. Moreover, it should be noted that the “purge” of the Osvag was carried out according to ethnic identity, rather than on the basis of religious faith.

Nationalism was undoubtedly the central point of the Whites’ ideological program. The re-creation of a united, indivisible Russia remained the rallying cry of its leaders, and all forms of separatism were to be destroyed. 30 The Bolsheviks were depicted by the Osvag as German agents even after the conclusion of the First World War. This was not always the result of conscious fabrication on the part of Osvag propagandists. Some sincerely believed this to be the case, including such high-ranking officials as V. A. Maklakov, who (in November 1920!) believed that instructions from “German officers and generals” were one of the main reasons for Wrangel’s defeat. 31

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks actively attempted to enlist foreign prisoners of war into the ranks of the Red Army. In the fall of 1918, nearly 50,000 soldiers (5–7 percent of the total army) were foreign citizens. The number of
total foreign subjects who fought for the Red Army over the course of the entire Civil War ranges from 250,000 to 300,000. After the former prisoners left the army for their various home countries, the number of foreigners in the army decreased (to 0.5 percent–1 percent by the fall of 1920).

The Whites likewise relied on foreign troops. By early 1919 Kolchak’s army included a Romanian unit composed of soldiers from Transylvania and Bukovina, by June an additional 10,000 Serbs and Croatians could be counted among his forces, and by August a Polish division had been formed, composed of 10,519 soldiers and 771 officers. Of course, this does not include the more independent-minded Czech Legion, which also fought against the Bolsheviks in the East.

Many of the participants in the White movement considered Bolshevism to be primarily a non-Russian phenomenon, and called attention to the large number of non-Russians (inorodtsy) associated with the movement, Jews in particular. Similarly, White propaganda often emphasized the anti-Christian character of the revolution. Ideas of this sort can be found in a brochure that was distributed among the White troops, entitled “To our deceived brothers in the Red trenches” (“obmanutym brat’iam v krasnye okopy”). It was written by S. A. Sokolov-Krechetov, a Symbolist poet and publisher, who had earlier served as a volunteer in World War I and had been wounded and captured. Upon his return, he decided to join the “ideological front” in the war with the Bolsheviks.

A brief example of his work:

We have truly scared Lenin’s gang.
For them the Russian spirit is worse than any plague.
They know that the gallows await them for their accursed deed,
the cat knows whose food it has eaten!
The Bolshevik bosses are all flustered,
those godless commissars
who have grown accustomed to taking from the people their last ruble.
They cried out “Save the Soviet Republic!”
And so they try to save their thieving machinations;
and have announced a universal mobilization:
“If you won’t come willingly, we’ll take you by force,
by the whip if that works, by bayonet if necessary.
March on, you unwashed peasant host,
go die for Leiba Trotsky,
for the Red banner!
Forward, comrades! We’re right behind you.”
Wonderful comrades, it must be said.
They drink and rob, while you are to die,
Hey brother peasants, use your brains,
**Who** is leading you, and **who** controls you?
**Who** has convinced you to lie down and die?
And **where** have your new Tsars come from? \(^{35}\)

Later on in the same brochure, the author claimed that Bolsheviks had been sent to Russia by Germany, and hinted at the “foreign nature” of the movement, mentioning its Chinese and Latvian supporters in particular. “Leiba” Trotsky also featured prominently in the work, though Lenin was much more often the main target. Sokolov-Krechetov often tried to play upon the religious sympathies of Red Army soldiers:

> You can judge who they are by the way
> They persecute the Christian faith.
> The faith in which our grandfathers were born.
> The faith by which the Saints were saved;
> That faith under whose defense and protection
> We Russians have been sheltered since time memorial.
> The forsaken thought it wasn’t enough
> Having taken our freedom they aim to take our God.
> But wait!
> Hands off!
> We have seen a lot from you,
> But the Baptized nation
> Will not tolerate
> This latest insult.
> Dreadful times are upon us!
> Half of Russia has already cast off the burden
> Of the Bolshevik herd, which oppressed the working people.
> Half of Russia has risen up! \(^{36}\)

The portrayal of “foreign elements” as the root of all evil was not limited to artistic propaganda; it found its place in more official documents as well. In November 1919, the Don Ataman General A. P. Bogaevskii issued an order, chastising those self-serving soldiers in his ranks who hid their new dress kits
at home and had appeared at formation in rags: “It is time to understand,” he wrote, “that it is not the Don Government that is at war with the Sovdep Tsar Leiba Bronshtein, but all of the Cossacks and the entire peasantry of the Don region . . . It is time to understand that Leiba Bronshtein’s victory would mean the end of Cossacks, the end of the peasant, the end of the worker, the end of those who earn goodness through their sweat and tears. Everything will go to the insatiable stomachs of the Chinese, Latvians, Jews, and Communists.”

A popular Volunteer song likewise portrays foreigners as the origin of all of Holy Russia’s woes:

Rus has been invaded
by alien forces
honor has been disgraced
the temple defiled.
We bravely go into battle
for Holy Rus
and, as one, spill
young blood.37

A variant of the last two lines of the song were slightly less sublime:

And we’ll kill all the Yids
No matter what.38

The Red Army also sang a version of the song which included these lines:

We bravely go to battle,
for the power of the Soviets . . .

The theme of persecution of the Orthodox church was central to the Whites’ propaganda efforts. Posters depicting Soviet-occupied Moscow and Petrograd often replaced the crosses adorning churches with hammers, sickles, and red flags. The White propagandists even went so far as to recruit to blind and the lame in their efforts. As B. A. Engelgardt recounts in his memoirs, there was a blind singer in Rostov at the time who enjoyed a good deal of popularity. He would often sing a song he had written himself, recounting the story of how a Jewish Commissar had ordered the desecration of a
church. The singer claimed that he himself had participated in this violent act while with the Red Army, and that as a result God had blinded him.\textsuperscript{40}

As A. N. Eremeeva has noted, “The Bolsheviks often were given the role of Judas, of the Antichrist who was trying to lead the Russian people down the road of perdition.” This was true of Jews as well. One Osobag poster depicts Jesus bearing the Cross, while a sailor and a prostitute force him onwards. The image of Trotsky can be seen behind Jesus’ persecutors. The drawing was accompanied by the following lines:

\begin{quote}
Reaching over across piles of corpses and spilt blood, 
kissing his pale lips, 
once more the grandson of Judas 
sends Christ to be crucified on Golgotha.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

Calls to defend the Orthodox faith were often mixed with decidedly un-Christian calls to attack Jews. In July of 1919, the White infantry sang the following song in Kharkov:

\begin{quote}
We shall drink for the Holy Cross, 
and for the Liturgy. 
And for the slogan: “Beat the Yids 
and save Russia!”\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

While serving at a White military hospital, the doctor L. S. Fridland was stunned to discover the prevalence of antisemitic propaganda in the White press, which was full of accounts of Jewish commissars shooting priests, and, in his opinion, open calls to engage in pogroms. Fridland was so shaken that he immediately wrote three letters to Rostov (the recipients were V. F. Zeeler, a leading social figure, Rabbi Goldenberg, and the publisher of Priazovskii krai) reporting on the presence of antisemitic agitation.\textsuperscript{43}

V. A. Miakotin mentions an anonymously published leaflet that told the following story. Some “Red Orthodox” come across a “Red Jew” praying in a train and ask him why the churches are being closed while the synagogues are not being touched. He explains that the revolution is being carried out by the Jews and that the Russians are nothing more than tools in their hands. In response the “Christian” soldiers take the Jewish soldier, beat him severely, and throw him from the train. The story concludes, “Kill the Yid Commissars and the Judaizing scum and come over to the side of your true friends—Denikin’s
troops, the Volunteers, and the Cossacks! Cross yourselves, Russian Orthodox people, and hurry to save Russia and yourselves!”

Trotsky was enemy number one for Osvag propaganda (followed by Lenin), and his image was to be found on a number of Osvag posters, which were often directed at the illiterate or the barely literate. One of these (entitled “Peace and Freedom in the Sovdep”) depicts a monstrous Trotsky straddling the Kremlin walls. The crosses on the Kremlin cathedrals have been replaced by flags, and a group of Chinese Red Army soldiers are engaged in executions beneath his feet. Another poster (“Sacrifice to the International”—“V zhertvu internatsionalu”) clearly echoes the blood libel myth. Trotsky is depicted killing a girl wearing traditional Russian dress at the foot of a monument to Karl Marx. Other members of the Bolshevik movement look on, as does Kerensky, who for some strange reason is included in the picture. The girl symbolizes Russia. Occasionally, Trotsky was caricatured as a devil.

According to A. M. Drozdov, the Osvag headquarters in Rostov had the following picture in one of its windows: “Here Trotsky is shown not as a person and not even as a Jew, but as a Yid, a hook-nosed zhid, with blood-stained lips like a graveyard vampire. The punishing bayonet of a Volunteer soldier is shown piercing him, a bit early, don’t you think?”

Numerous chastushki (satirical, popular short poems) were also written about Trotsky:

Trotsky, you can’t fight!
It’s not coming to anything.
You won’t trick us again,
We’ve learned better.

He was also depicted as a monarch. As one poet put it, “Bronshtein, having seized power and the crown, has crawled onto the royal throne.” It is hardly a coincidence that A. T. Averchenko’s dystopia “Excerpt from a future novel” (Otryvok budushchego romana) depicted Trotsky’s son ruling over the Soviets in 1950. Though Lenin was also often portrayed as the founder of some new dynasty, A. N. Ereemeeva points out that Lenin was often depicted more sympathetically than Trotsky. Lenin’s name “was mostly associated with utopian projects and empty promises; Trotsky fulfilled the role of the cruel torturer. ‘Bloody Trotsky and the deceiver Lenin are cutting her [Russia’s] heart in pieces.’” This juxtaposition can be seen in the verses of S. Ia. Marshak, who...
in 1918 was the head editor of the Ekaterinodar-based newspaper *Utro Iuga* (*Morning of the South*):

> Lenin acts according to ideas,
> He's a fanatic, a maniac,
> But there's just no justifying
> Trotsky-Bronshtein.

On both the Red and White sides of the conflict there was a deep hatred of those who profited by exploiting the misfortunes of others due to the war. Of course, it should be noted that the general lack of goods and rampant inflation prevalent at the time could make even the most sincere and honest business transaction seem like speculation. M. A. Voloshin wrote the following on the topic, in a poem entitled “Spekuliant”:

> To be under all regimes invincible,
> with a hand in everything, eating everything, omnipresent,
> to be capable of juggling both one’s conscience and chintz, and matches, and the Motherland, and soap . . .

S. Ia. Marshak had an even deeper understanding of “deficit economics” and the futility of using force against speculators. In a short satirical poem, he wrote:

> I came to my wife
> in order to cheer her up.
> I tell her: “From now on
> we’ll hang the speculators.
> Soon everything will be normal,
> we’ll buy a ham at the market
> some foreign wool
> and some leather boots.
> We’ll live together again
> without care, like we used to!”
> That night I went to sleep
> happy in my hopes like a child . . .
> At the first rays of the sun
the servant girl went to the bazaar and returned all in tears, frightened to death. She says: There are posts set up and between them on ropes, as if they’re church bells, are hanging all the sellers from the bazaar . . . The very same day I decided to take my boots to the cobbler, knowing that they couldn’t be saved without repair. I think to myself and wonder, How much will that godless barbarian take? I take a look and right by the gates I see the cobbler hanging from a post. Next to him is the butcher, the jeweler, tailor, and baker, the coffin-maker and the wood-seller, the hairdresser and the apothecary . . . I stopped by the café “Bristol” where they used to sell oil and salt by the wagon, along with coal, quinine, and cotton-wool. But it was quiet there now, the merchants were silent. From boredom the waitresses were catching flies by the window . . . And my wife sits and waits, wondering how soon we’ll buy foreign wool and leather boots . . .

As the Jews traditionally engaged in commercial activity, it was inevitable that they would become the focus of other people’s hatred of speculators. Moreover, the Jews had been accused of hoarding goods, using counterfeit coins, and creating artificial deficits since the period of World War I. The play of impersonal market forces demanded a human face.
Jews were not the only ones engaged in commerce, of course. In A. Rennikov’s satirical story “Tovarischchestvo Donmykriuver” the three protagonists were named Sobakin, Rabinovich, and Ter-Petrosian. Unfortunately, very few would-be writers professed such “objectivity.” A case in point is V. Meingard’s caricature of a “speculator.” The original version was published in the summer of 1917, and showed an individual refusing to purchase a bond offered by the Provisional Government, as his hands were otherwise occupied (by a sack full of money). A second version of the same drawing can be found on the first page of the satirical journal Faraon, published by the Osvag in December of 1919. The second version contained a few changes—and not just changes from summer to winter clothing. In this version, the speculator is refusing to donate to the army, and has been given clearly Semitic features.

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion also grew in popularity. Originally published in St. Petersburg in 1903 (and republished in 1905), the text existed in several variants, although the “canonical” version was to become that of S. A. Nilus, as published in the book The Great within the Small or the Antichrist, an Imminent Political Possibility. Though the Protocols did not enjoy widespread popularity at first (even early on it was recognized as a hoax), the events of 1917 led to a renewed interest in conspiracy theories, and many now accepted the events depicted as fact (as Hannah Arendt has noted, for the historian the fact that people believe in a hoax is more important than whether the hoax itself is real). As V. L. Burtsev explains, “The cult of antisemitism was in search of a new book, a new Koran. The Protocols of Zion came to its aid.”

According to Burtsev, the Protocols were republished in Moscow in 1918 and taken to the South of Russia by “Muscovite anti-Semites,” including the attorney A. N. Varlamov (he also erroneously names the archpriest I. I. Vostorgov). In Taganrog, the writer I. A. Rodionov and several others participated in a reading of the Moscow edition of the Protocols. Though the publishers of the Moscow edition received no support from White military command, this did not stop the work from becoming widespread and popular among the people. Subsequent editions included one published in Novocherkassk in 1918 (by Rodionov and the attorney Izmailov), with several additional versions appearing in Siberia and the Far East. The Novocherkassk edition claims that the Protocols serve as the key to understanding the revolution.

The poisonous ideas of this work were to find fertile ground in the Don region. At the peak of fighting between the Red Army and the Cossacks of
the Upper Don region in the spring of 1919, a pamphlet appeared entitled “Accursed Fools, Slaves, and Stooges of the Yids” (Duraki prokliatye, raby i prikhvostni zhidov), addressed to the members of the Red Army. The author, who identified himself only as a Cossack, explained how in 1897 a secret meeting of Zionist elders of the thirty-third degree had gathered in Basel under the leadership of Herzl. There they came up with a plan to take over the world, and it was allegedly this plan that was now coming to fruition in Russia. The author accused the Jewish conspiracy of being behind any number of Russia’s woes, including a fake vaccine against the Spanish flu. There is little doubt as to the literary ancestor of the pamphlet.61

Fridland’s memoirs provide an excellent example of how seriously this work of “historical fiction” was taken. He recalls a conversation he had with the White General K. K. Mamontov, who inquired about the goals of the Basel meeting. When Fridland replied that he had no idea what Mamontov was talking about, he received the following response: “Come on, don’t pretend. All Jews know about this. And every Jew is a Zionist. The entire revolution and the Bolsheviks are the result of these congresses. Jewish bankers want to destroy Christ and spread their beliefs all over the world. So they’ve begun with Russia, with Orthodoxy. Plain and simple.” When Fridland proffered the idea that these claims were fiction and that the general had been led astray, Mamontov retorted, “What deception can there be when the newspapers write in great detail of the programs and meetings of the All-World Jewish league, who sent Trotsky and Nakhamkes to Russia. You can’t cover up the Basel meetings. Jews are all cut from the same cloth. You are no doubt aware of Nilov’s [sic!] book?”62 Though memoirs are susceptible to lapses in memory and a certain artistic stylization, Fridland’s account of the conversation captures the essence of the issue at hand, and there is little doubt that Mamontov’s “Nilov” was in actuality none other than the publisher of the most popular edition of the Protocols.

In 1919 a book was published in Khabarovsk under the title Documental Data Proving the Origin of Bolshevism and What Bolshevism Is Actually Trying to Achieve (Dokumental’nye dannye, dokazyvaiushche proiskhozhdenie bol’shevizma i k chemu stremit’sia bol’shevizm v deistvitel’nosti). As one might expect, the document is nothing more than another edition of the Protocols, based on the Nilus edition. The author (who identifies himself only by the initials “M. P.”) claims that the only way to understand Bolshevism is to understand the political program of the “Zionist Masons,” as “so-called Bolshevism is but a small piece of their intended plan . . . [Bolshevism] is one of the
means and one of the stages of the Jewish triumph over the goyim, as they disdainfully call the world’s non-Jewish population."

The author bases his assertion on the fact that after the Protocols were published, the Bolsheviks “followed them to the letter.” Somewhat curiously, the author does make a distinction between these “Zionist Masons” and Jews in general. “It is not necessary to fight against the Jewish people; like any other nation, they have nothing to do with it. The struggle, a most energetic struggle, must be carried out against the Jewish Zionist Organization, and the means of the struggle must, of course, include force, but even more importantly it must include strong, honest, state organizations for all peoples (Russians in particular). These organizations must not allow party-based conflicts, and must not rely on the ephemeral, unnatural concepts of absolute freedom and equality. They are only words thrown into the world that serve as bones of contention, and which have led, as we know by experience, to the complete destruction of the Russian State.”

It is painfully apparent that the author had no understanding whatsoever of the actual goals of the Zionist organizations. It is just as obvious that he was ignorant of the fact that most of the Jewish revolutionaries he listed were, in fact, fervent opponents of the Zionist program (including Minor, Dan, Gots, Liber, Abramovich, and others). The fact that he attributes the slogans of the French Revolution to the Zionist movement only serves to further strengthen the absurdity of his claims. Such errors, however egregious, are of secondary importance. What is important, however, is that such views were widespread. Kolchak himself may very well have been reading this very same edition in October of 1919 on his way to Tobolsk. According to G. K. Gins, the Admiral “couldn’t put it down. He brought it up in general conversation several times, and his head was filled with anti-Masonic thoughts. He was constantly seeing Masons among those who surrounded him, in the Directorate, and among the workers of foreign missions.”

Similar to the Protocols was the “Report of Comrade Rapoport to the Members of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party Poalei Zion” (Doklad tovarya Rapoporta chlenam Evreiskoi sotsial-demokraticeskoi partii Poalei Tsion), which can be found in abridged form in a secret Osvag Political Report (No. 188) dated July 13, 1919. In it, a certain “Comrade Rapoport” reprimands his fellow party members for not being brave enough “to break with the old socialist superstitions and humanistic prejudices.” He goes on to claim that the central task of the party is “to bring together Ukraine with the Crimea, Southern and Western Belorussia, Bessarabia, and the Western Don
Basin as organic parts of Ukraine, bringing them into the orbit of our economic activities in order to impoverish the local population with the goal of creating a sufficient number of cadres for the battle for our ideals.”

“Rapoport” goes on to describe how the party could take over heavy industry and trade, and form syndicates that would control small businesses, transport, and other spheres. This would all take place under the cover of slogans aimed at winning over the Christian population (throughout the document “Rapoport” always defines groups according to their religious affiliation). The takeover of the sugar industry is described in particular detail: “The proletarian window-dressing that we’ve thrown over these cooperatives aimed at the Christians has succeeded in masking our goal: to secure a comparatively inexpensive and high-quality product for the Jewish consumer, and [text breaks off] a significant profit from this product.”

Responding to a certain “Comrade Strusberg,” “Rapoport” continues, “Taking care of the moral principles and national solidarity of the Christians is not our concern. It was precisely Christian greed and treachery that made the nationalization of the factories easier for us…” He then goes on to recount an incident where some sausages made from the corpses of dead horses had resulted in several cases of glanders. Despite the outbreak of illness, “Rapoport” was glad that the sale “brought a profit to our younger brothers”: “Given the reduction in the quantity of the product on the market, one could not have hoped for a better result.”

“Rapoport” described Ukraine as “the third Sinai,” as “here we keenly feel our economic omnipotence with every fiber of our collective national soul” (the second Sinai was revolutionary France). Even if the secret plans of the Jewish parties become well-known, he continues, there is no cause for worry: “Given the multitude of political parties and the shortsightedness of the Ukrainian masses, they will be unable to oppose us with any energy or strength. If necessary, we have the Russian intelligentsia at our disposal, and can use them against the Ukrainians… [The intelligentsia’s] hatred of everything Ukrainian makes them ready to serve us not out of fear, but out of conviction, if only to harm the Ukrainians… at the moment, given the completely fragmented nature of the active segments of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, as well as the avarice, egoism, and dearth of principle in the Russian intelligentsia, we have absolutely nothing to fear.” Rapoport concludes by claiming that the Jewish parties (Poalei Zion, Bund, and the Zionists) have managed to unite the Jewish masses, who will in turn “lead millions of sheep after them.”
The inspiration for “Rapoport’s” report would seem to come from Alphonse de Toussenel’s 1844 work *Les juifs rois de l’époque histoire de la féodalité financière*. A follower of Charles Fourier, Toussenel was one of the first writers to develop the idea of a Jewish conspiracy against the Christian states. “Rapoport” himself refers to the work, claiming that “Galician Jesuits” had passed it on to Petliura, who “now is aware of our secrets.”

Denikin’s response to the document is somewhat curious. Although he knew the report to be false, he nonetheless wrote that “the large-scale and well-though-out plan for ‘the economic superiority of the Jews’ in Ukraine was masterfully described in realistic detail.” Citing a message from A. M. Dragomirov (who was in the fall of 1919 in charge of the Kiev oblast), he noted that “three-quarters” of the sugar industry was under Jewish control. This claim notwithstanding, “this ‘report’ was buried in the secret archives and was never brought to light.”

The fact that “Rapoport’s report” remained an internal document of the Osvag indicates a degree of common sense in the upper echelons of the White movement. On the one hand, the Osvag deemed it necessary to include such a hoax in its political report. On the other, they nonetheless realized its fictitious nature and did not make use of it for propaganda. A thorough examination of the secret political reports of the Osvag (from agent reports and summaries from newspapers, including the Soviet press) shows that the “Jewish question” had a significantly smaller presence in the material presented to High Command than one might expect.

For the most part, the Osvag reports would include any mentions of antisemitism in speeches or in the Soviet press, as well as any discussions of the “Jewish question.” In the May 17, 1919 report, an individual who had recently returned from Petrograd reported that “hostility against the Jews is reaching a tense level, and waves of pro-pogrom sentiment are rolling from place to place.” The report composed by the Don Bureau for May 18–25, 1919 included information from Soviet territory that Lenin was now allegedly talking with a strong Jewish accent, and that a rumor was being circulated that “this is not the Lenin of 1905, but a ‘Yid-double’ [zhid-dvoinik].”

A report from July 11, 1919 entitled “Report of information about the crimes and misdeeds of the Bolsheviks” recounted an event that allegedly took place in Crimea at the Taganash train station. A group of Red Army soldiers heard shrieks and cries coming from a reserve cargo car while their train was stopped at the station. They opened the car doors and discovered a haggard, blood-covered peasant who had had his ears cut off. According to
the story, the peasant had called the station commander a Jew and was tortured as a result. Furthermore, he was told that he would live only until the soldiers arrived. The report concludes, “The Red Army soldiers, who in recent times have turned against the Jews, were infuriated by the commander’s actions and killed him and his three Jewish assistants.” The report, perhaps unsurprisingly, neglects to mention the source of the story.

One of the Osvag’s press reviews analyzed the position of the Kadet publication *Svobodnaia Rech’* (*Free Speech*) towards the “Jewish question” in light of the recent publication of General Knox’s report on the role of Jews in the murder of the royal family. The newspaper reported, “The fact that Jews played a large role in the Russian disaster is so striking that it would be foolhardy to ignore it.” However, the writers of *Free Speech* believed that it was of the greatest importance that such facts, no matter how accurate they might be, not be used to spread antisemitism and pogromistic activity.

The review continued, “This newspaper considers its task to be the fight against antisemitism, which it finds to be detrimental for the ‘goal of the Russian state’ which it serves. Thus the newspaper considers it within its rights to say that this ‘crooked perspective on the issue’ must be corrected in the interests of the entire Jewish people. The newspaper calls for the ‘restoration of equality in evaluations.’ If, according to the newspaper, the ‘mere fact of Jewish persecution serves as a motive to raise noisy indignation,’ if calls for pogroms are repugnant, then the fact that estates are being destroyed, officers are being slaughtered, and members of the bourgeoisie are being hunted down, all with the approval of revolutionary leaders, is no less horrible. ‘As [the revolutionary leaders] include Jews, it is natural that hostility towards the Jews is growing in the social consciousness.’”

These and other reports reflected attitudes that were widespread among the lower classes on both sides of the front even though some reports (such as the “waves of pro-pogrom” sentiment) had no bearing on reality. At the same time, they also demonstrate the rightward intellectual drift of some segments of the liberal intelligentsia, who were prepared to make concessions to such attitudes and hold all Jews responsible for the Jewish Bolsheviks and the blood and suffering of the Russian revolution. For the White leadership, documents like the ones examined here not only demonstrated the most effective forms of anti-Bolshevik propaganda; they also served as an important source of information on the attitudes of the army and the civilian population.

The Osvag was hardly the only propaganda agency employed by the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. Nor was it the worst. Amfiteatrov-
Kadashev noted in his diary that “at the time there was not a single person in Rostov who would have been opposed to organizing their own Osvag and their own counter-intelligence.” One such “mini-Osvag” was an organization led by Colonel Rezanov. B. A. Engelgardt (the effective head of the Osvag in Sokolov’s absence) once saw a propaganda play put on by Rezanov’s organization. Among other things, the play depicted the flogging and hanging of Bolsheviks in life-like detail. Engelgardt attempted to have the play banned: “The audience leaves the theater in such a state that all it would take is for someone to yell ‘beat the Yids!’ and there wouldn’t be anything left of Bols-haia Sadovaia.”

Rezanov also published counterfeit Bolshevik newspapers that employed the new orthography and mimicked the tone of Bolshevik publications. These fake Pravdas were created with the intent of increasing hatred towards the Bolsheviks. Naturally, they also contained articles on the role of Jews in the revolution. One such article (penned by “M. Kogan”) took issue with the “rumor” that Jews were not participating in the revolution: “Though it is true that Jews are not participating in the direct defense of the revolution—you will not find them in the ranks—the Russian worker and peasant must not forget that the entire sacred mission of the revolution is led by Jews, that they occupy the highest positions of responsibility, and that they are leading the world towards revolution.” Many found such articles convincing; the famous Don writer F. D. Kriukov even wrote a response to Kogan’s article in the newspaper Donskie vedomosti (Don News).

F. S. Panchenko’s Biulleten’, published from 1918 to 1919, was among the more odious “independent” antisemitic publications. The twenty-second issue contained the statement “without asking the Russian people, the Yid [zhid] has pissed on his statue of liberty . . . [for this] we will have our revenge on you and have a bloody feast [trizna, a feast for the dead—Trans.].” A similar publication was V. M. Purishkevich’s Blagovest’ (Good News). An editorial in the first issue claimed that the goal of Bolshevism was “the defilement of the Christian peoples of the world in the interests of Judaism.” Purishkevich called for the Volunteer Army to enter “an open war against Jewry.” Denikin himself declared the newspaper V Moskvu! (To Moscow!) to be a pogromist publication. The subtitle of the newspaper read, “Take the whip, and drive the Jew to Palestine.” According to the writer A. M. Drozdov, the newspaper enjoyed “a truly enormous and terrifying popularity.”

Evgenii Venskii, a well-known satirist and former contributor to Satirikon and Novyi Satirikon, was particularly enthusiastic about Rodionov’s
antisemitic newspaper *Chasovoi (The Sentry)*, which was based in Novocherkassk. According to Amfiteatrov-Kadashev, *The Sentry* was so antisemitic that its employees would have welcomed contributions from Tomás de Torquemada, Nebuchadnezzar II, and Emperor Titus. Calling it a “real newspaper,” Venskii announced he was willing to contribute to it without pay, and that he had “already written two poems against the Yids.” Fearing retribution for his work, Venskii signed his work with a pseudonym, “Inna Chebotareva.” This caution proved to be well founded. Venskii would later go on to collaborate with Valentin Kataev, F. F. Ekkert, and K. D. Grekov in composing the first Soviet political operetta (*politoperetta*), entitled *Atlantida*. Ironically, the piece was a biting satire of the White emigration.\(^{83}\)

B. A. Suvorin’s newspaper *Vechernee vremia (Evening Times)* and the journal *Narodnaia mysль (The People’s Thoughts)* both contained a great deal of antisemitic propaganda.\(^{84}\) In the latter publication, the author “Malita Skuratov”\(^{85}\) explains the reasons for his misfortunes in simple terms: “The foreign commissars now hold all the power over the Russian people. They’re in the Sovnarkom, the Sovdeps, the Cheka. And they’ve started to destroy and pillage the Russian people. They were all shouting about the bourgeoisie and the capitalists. In reality, they didn’t do anything to the bourgeoisie or the capitalists; instead they started to mercilessly eliminate the priests, officers, and anyone else who was capable of standing up for the Russian people and the Russian land.” The author then offers the following “coping mechanism” for dealing with such sorrow: cast out the foreign commissars, “take [them] and crush [them] like the vile bedbugs they are.”\(^{86}\) Of course, for most of the readership the commissars were out of reach; the “foreigners,” however, were close at hand.

The White military command occasionally tried to prevent the press from fanning the flames of antisemitism. Lieutenant General P. G. Semenov, then Governor-General of Rostov, closed *Evening Times* for “printing articles that persecuted nationalities.”\(^{87}\) He also exiled Purishkevich after one of his inflammatory speeches of a similar character. On November 4, 1919, Beliaev, then the acting governor, “permanently” closed *To Moscow!* The reason for the closure was the fear of a pogrom, “which was already brewing in the marketplaces and other crowded points in Rostov.”\(^{88}\) Three days after this Beliaev was relieved of duty due to “some misunderstandings.” Though it might have been nothing more than a coincidence, Beliaev’s removal was met with enthusiasm on the pages of *Good News*.

Certain portions of the White leadership not only held antisemitic views themselves, they also (either openly or secretly) supported antisemitic organi-
zations. In his memoirs, Denikin recalls his surprise at discovering that one of the secret sections of the Central Propaganda Department kept in close contact with and heavily subsidized the Union of Russian National Communities, a “right-wing organization that was hostile to the policies of the leadership.” He goes on to claim that it was this organization that financed the publication of *To Moscow!* in September of 1919.89

In November of 1918, the students of the Don University went on strike, protesting the fact that the military had opened fire on a student demonstration in Kiev. The leader of the strike, Rebekka Albam, was arrested. Colonel K. M. Grekov, who was then the governor of Rostov, was a rather picturesque figure; at one point he had given a speech directed at Rostov’s criminal elements that included the phrase, “Thieves, swindlers, con-men, and whores! Come to the meeting and repent! Or it’ll be all the worse for you!” In response to the events at the university, Grekov issued the following command in the form of an open letter to Albam. In the letter, he expressed his bewilderment at the idea that the Rostov authorities somehow were responsible for the events in Kiev: “After all, we didn’t kill anybody here in Rostov, and if you want to protest every single murder, don’t forget to take a trip down to New Zealand. Someone was killed there too . . . in the Free Don we have our own freedom, our own Ataman and Krug, and we don’t want any other kind of freedom!”

Even the fervently anti-Bolshevik Amfiatrotov-Kadashev was uneasy with the Governor’s buffoonery, especially as Grekov declared that Albam should be tried in a military court, and would likely be sentenced to be shot or hanged as “a prominent Bolshevik.”

The military court was surprisingly lenient to Albam, sentencing her to exile in Soviet-controlled territory; however, a harsher “informal” sentence was soon imposed. The Cossack convoy escorting Albam murdered her in cold blood, allegedly for crying, “Long live Soviet power!” Amfiatrotov-Kadashev notes in his diary that even if she had said nothing, “the Cossacks would have killed her anyway.”90 The blood of this naïve young woman was on the hands of Grekov, who had knowingly inflamed the passions of the Cossacks under his command by drawing attention to her ethnic heritage. The murderous intent of the equation “Jew = Bolshevik” had once more been realized.

* * *

Denikin’s propaganda made active use of “visual propaganda.” One such example recalled by Ehrenburg was an Osvag poster entitled “On to Moscow!”
(Vpered, na Moskvu!) which depicted the horse of St. George trampling a large-nosed Jew.\(^91\) The Kolchak government made similar use of the visual arts, although antisemitism was less widespread in the East. This can be explained by the fact that the “Jewish question” was less pertinent in Siberia, as well as by the personal views of those in charge of Kolchak’s propaganda machine. N. V. Ustrialov, a famous publicist who worked for the Russian Press Bureau (“the Siberian Osvag,” as he put it) could only recall two instances of “deplorable antisemitic attacks” in the Bureau’s publications.

The first occurred in the beginning of summer 1919, when the propaganda section released a poster depicting Lenin and Trotsky with crowns on their heads. “The poster was not bad in and of itself, but the artist had replaced the Soviet five-pointed star with the six-pointed Star of David, which obviously gave the entire work a tinge of vulgarity. Rabbis in some of the towns quite reasonably protested the poster, as did the democrats. It caused us a fair amount of hassle.” Ustrialov categorically insisted that the management of the bureau was not in any way involved in the creation of the poster, and that the Bureau had reprimanded those responsible. He also claimed that the head of the Bureau, A. K. Klafton,\(^92\) had simply overlooked the shape of the star. Moreover, Ustrialov claimed that Klafton “didn’t even know what the Jewish symbol was.”\(^93\)

The second instance occurred in December 1919, toward the end of the Kolchak movement. Ustrialov, while leafing through the Bureau newspaper Our Newspaper (Our Newspaper), discovered an antisemitic drawing. He summoned Nemilovskii, then editor of the newspaper, and “sharply pointed out to him the unacceptable nature of such drawings.” Nemilovskii took umbrage at Ustrialov’s attempt to curtail “his rights as an editor” and threatened to resign. In the end, Ustrialov resigned himself to allowing the issue to be published, even though it “tore at his conscience.” He rationalized his decision by claiming that it would have been difficult to stop the release of the issue at such a late stage. In later years he would come to regret his decision.

Although Ustrialov did not deny that these antisemitic attacks in the White press were not isolated instances, and though he admitted that “there exists common antisemitism at the front,” he nevertheless claimed that those in power “fought against this evil and were not guilty of it.”\(^94\)

Indeed, if one examines the claims of the chairman of the Kolchak government and its de facto minister of foreign affairs (P. V. Vologodskii and I. I. Sukin), they clearly demonstrate the intention to fight against antisemitism, and to prevent attacks against Jews.\(^95\) However, taking into account
that the government exerted little to no control over the military (and had little effective control of its own territory), such well-intentioned declarations amounted to little more than words in the wind. Even the Supreme Commander himself was not always able to control his stubborn subordinates. Insubordination was to prove to be the scourge of the White movement in the East.

Whether or not the intentions of the White leadership were sincere is another question. On June 29, 1919, F. Rosenblatt (a representative of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee) was given an audience with Kolchak. Rosenblatt informed the Supreme Commander that he was shocked by the extraordinary amount of antisemitic propaganda he had seen in official publications, bulletins, and posters since his arrival in Vladivostok in March. Kolchak assured Rosenblatt that antisemitism was alien to Siberia, that it had been imported from elsewhere as the result of the refugees (Jews and non-Jews), and that it was largely the result of the evils of the Civil War. He further claimed that he would not allow violence against Jews and that the instances of antisemitism Rosenblatt had witnessed were isolated and would be prevented in the future, etc.

In his conversation with Rosenblatt, Kolchak claimed that Jews on the whole “were more bourgeois and conservative” than the Russian population as a whole, and that Jews would have to answer for the actions of Trotsky, Sverdlov, and Ioffe just as Russians bore responsibility for those of Lenin, Krylenko, and Lunacharsky. In his opinion, Jewish safety could only be guaranteed by putting an end to chaos and installing strong leadership “which would not allow one part of the population to rise up against another.” The transcript of Kolchak and Rosenblatt’s conversation was published in newspapers in Siberia and America, though it was censored both by the Kolchak government and by American diplomats, who had judged Kolchak to be an acceptable leader, capable of bringing Russia out of anarchy. Apparently, they did not want to ruin his reputation in the eyes of the American public. In general Rosenblatt was impressed with Kolchak, and did not object to the censorship of the transcript.

One of the more poignant moments of the conversation that did not make the press account occurred when Rosenblatt and Kolchak were discussing the issue of antisemitic leaflets. Kolchak pointed out that a lot of those mentioned by Rosenblatt were intended for the Red Army, and not for his own troops. “Does this mean that you want the Red Army to engage in pogroms?” asked Rosenblatt. Kolchak did not like the question, and claimed
that this was precisely why he had forbidden such propaganda. In reality, however, he had done nothing of the sort, as Rosenblatt correctly noted later in his report to the Joint Committee upon his return to America. In fact, the day before his meeting with Kolchak, the army bulletin had printed a notice to the effect that Kolchak’s telephone operators were unable to gain information about the Red Army’s plans because all of the Red Army commanders spoke to each other in Yiddish.

When Rosenblatt drew Kolchak’s attention to this fact he replied, “You wouldn’t want me to suppress information, would you?” Rosenblatt correctly pointed out that this was more of an insinuation than it was information: “This would mean that the Red Army is in the hands of the Jews, and that the Jews are responsible for the Civil War.” In response, Kolchak announced that he was well aware of the number of Jews in the Red Army and that they could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Nonetheless, he did not disavow the inflammatory message. Two days after the interview yet another antisemitic pamphlet was released by M. K. Diterikhs, who had just been put in command of the Siberian Army.

While the leadership announced various measures against antisemitism, publications such as Russkii Voin (Russian Warrior), Sibirskiaia Rech’ (Siberian Speech), Russian Army (Russian Army), Strelok (Rifleman) and Vpered (Onward) continued to publish antisemitic texts. One such example was the brochure “A Rabbi’s Speech to the Jewish Nation” (Rech’ ravvina k evreiskomu narodu), which was freely distributed throughout the territory of the Kolchak government. Yet another reiteration of the Protocols of Zion, it purported to explain the means by which Jews had taken control over the world, and foretold the imminent destruction of Christianity.

Clearly on some occasions such initiatives came “from below.” A case in point is a leaflet from February 10, 1919 addressed to “our brothers in the Red Army,” signed by “Siberian riflemen.” The text draws the attention of Red Army soldiers to the fact that “those in charge, sitting behind your backs, are all Yids who hate everything Russian, who always try to squeeze the last drop of blood out of the Russian peasant and worker.” The soldiers were reminded that “when one of the Russian scoundrels (there’s a black sheep in every family) would start to oppress peasants or workers, you would call them a ‘blood-sucking Yid.’ Now real blood-sucking Yids are commanding you, telling you to kill your own brothers.” There are no Jews at the front, but it is easy to find them in the rear, “behind your backs.” The Bolsheviks (and here the authors had a point) were seizing bread, livestock, horses, money, “and all other valuable
possessions.” Finally the leaflet warned that when the Bolsheviks were eventually defeated, their leaders “having seized all the Russian gold and valuables” would run away, “and you will remain beside a broken trough, there will be nothing to plant in the villages, and you’ll have no way to feed your families.” The leaflet called on members of the Red Army to “take up your arms and point them not at your Siberian brothers, but at those who have destroyed your home villages, at all of those Yid commissars and the Russian villains that aid them . . . down with the Yid commissars and their Bolshevik friends. Long live all that is Russian.”

There are numerous examples of similar publications, which were so common that one of Kolchak’s officers once remarked to an American that no one in Kolchak’s territory was capable of writing a pamphlet without attacking the Jews. The newsletter of Kolchak’s Western Army noted in an analysis of propaganda efforts that most posters and proclamations being issued contained “a specific orientation that is reminiscent of those parts of the press that come out under the slogan ‘beat the Yids.’” Claiming that, “the soldiers and peasants are forced to contend with complicated issues of the current moment,” the author argues that government propaganda efforts limited to denigrating the Bolsheviks and Jews were not effective. The greatest problem facing the White Movement was not only the difficulties facing the soldiers and peasants, but those facing the White leadership itself, who proved equally incapable of solving the issues of the day. As a result, they clearly lost the propaganda war.

* * *

Leaders of Jewish communities and parts of the liberal democratic intelligentsia attempted to fight back against antisemitic propaganda in the press. Unlike the Bolsheviks (who had largely eliminated independent publications by the middle of 1918), the Whites tolerated the existence of “alternative” publications both on the right and the left, although such publications were occasionally subject to persecution from the authorities. In general, government and military control over the press was less severe under the Whites than it was under the Soviets.

Priazovskii krai, the most respectable newspaper of the Don region, rose to the defense of the Jewish minority on several occasions. Primarily liberal democratic in orientation, the newspaper was once accused of being “a publication that mostly serves the interests of foreign segments of the population.”
In August 1918 Priazovskii krai published an article by the Rostov Rabbi Z. Goldenberg entitled “The ‘Jewish Question’ on the Don.” In it, Goldenberg writes, “With inexpressible sadness, we are once more forced to drag out the ‘Jewish question’ from the dusty archives.” In order to avoid destruction at the hands of chaos, he declared, it is imperative that all citizens of the Don work together in concert, something that is only possible when “the equality of all [citizens] is recognized.” The rabbi claimed that politicians who made use of the “old conclusion of Judeophobes” and played on the “base instincts of the masses” were shortsighted and dishonest.

“Everyone knows that Jews have given the most money for the maintenance of the Volunteer Army and Cossack units. Dozens of Jews have been slaughtered by the Bolsheviks because of this. It is likewise hardly a secret that the [local] Jewish population has sent several of its members to the Volunteers, while not one of them has gone on to become a prominent Bolshevik. Only the baptized Jew Dunaevskii and a certain Ravikovich (from Gomel) can be seen among the members of the Revolutionary Committee. But we do not see . . . one single Jew in the Soviet of the Don Republic.”

Goldenberg’s attempts to defend his local brethren (“it wasn’t the local population, but Jews from elsewhere”) were fairly naïve. It is highly unlikely that Goldenberg himself was ignorant of the fact that those very same “shortsighted” politicians cared nothing for the actual opinions of the Jewish population in the Don region, or anywhere else. They were in need of an enemy, one that was familiar and easily identified by the masses. For that purpose, it was difficult to find a better candidate than “the Jew.”

Another technique that Goldenberg employed in his article was the notion that just as there were bad Russians (i.e., Bolsheviks), so too there were bad Jews: “Finally, [as] Jews are equal to the rest of the population and have the same rights, let them also have the right to have their own scoundrels and scum.” In conclusion, Goldenberg appealed to the Don army, imploring them to ignore “the black knights” and “not to bring dead ideas and oppressions back from the grave.” Instead he called on them to take “the only path of law and justice . . . total equality for all without exception, for our strength and salvation lies in our unity.”

Equally naïve and conciliatory was the response of the Jewish theologian Z. Sh. Gelfat to an antisemitic article in Suvorin’s Evening Times. Gelfat wrote that he understood the “biting pain and burning shame that eats away at the heart of any son of the Homeland upon seeing his Fatherland defiled.” Thus he would not condemn the author of the article “Christ’s Resurrection”
(who had chosen to conceal his identity behind a pseudonym) for excessive indignation that had led him to focus exclusively on the “tribe of Rozenfeld-Bronshtein, while leaving in the shadows such famous names as Muralov, Dybenko, Krylenko, Lunacharsky, and Lenin at their head.” Gelfat also took issue with the notion that all the Soviet commissars were Jews, “in contradistinction to those commissars who have been captured, where one sees only Russian names.”

He refused to see how “an intelligent person could see the salvation of Russia in the destruction of an additional hundred Jewish shops, or the murder of another thousand Jews . . . This would hardly enter into the plans of builders of a civil society.” Put perhaps the main target of Gelfat’s attack was the tendency of the article “to conflate the role of the Bolsheviks with religion.” “I never saw the Russian clergy take part in the destruction of synagogues in Bialystok, Kishinev and other cities in Russia . . . nor can we consider Trotsky and those like him, who allow pogroms in Kiev and other cities, to have anything in common with the teachings of Judaism.”

“Not only do we refuse to defend them, but we will be the last to be saddened when they are hanged. Moreover, even if some kind of extenuating circumstance is found in the criminal code that might soften their sentence, I can say that our religious courts would hold them completely accountable. If we have not yet pronounced them to be anathema, it is only because we do not want to put ourselves in an absurd position, as we know full well what a hollow ring the concerns of Judaism and the Jewish religion have for them . . . I hope that these longings for Christ will turn to peace, and that the most difficult social problems would be solved of their own accord on the basis of mutual love.”

Priazovskii krai welcomed those social and political forces that were for Jewish equal rights, and thus often provided a forum for those cultural activists who supported the Zionist movement.

The journalists of Priazovskii krai and the weekly Donskaia volna (Don Wave) were opposed to equating Jews with the Bolsheviks, and instead emphasized the role of individual Jews in the struggle against Bolshevism. This can be seen in the following excerpt from an article on Iu. M. Steklov-Nakhamkes: “Speaking of Nakhamkes, people often bring up his Jewish heritage. Though he is a Jew, Nakhamkes completely lacks typical Jewish characteristics. He’s a typical Lebiadkin [a character from Dostoevsky’s Demons], a retired captain who gives ridiculous, impudent speeches, one day brazenly daring to visit Ms. Stavrogin, the next falling at the feet of his
keeper Stavrogin and his agent Verkhovenskii, as he is afraid, deathly afraid of losing his allowance.”

After Fanni Kaplan’s assassination attempt on Lenin, a journalist using the pseudonym K. Treplev (a character from Chekhov’s *Seagull*) wrote the following in *Priazovskii krai*: “That which the multitudes of Russia, who have peacefully taken up the yoke of Bolshevik power, were evidently incapable of doing, has been done by a woman, a Jew, Rosa [sic] Kaplan . . . Bow your heads, Russian citizens, before the grave of the woman who fearlessly gave her life for your happiness.”

In examining White propaganda efforts, what wasn’t used was often just as important as what was. A common theme in White propaganda was exacting revenge on the Bolshevik executioners. The assassination attempt on Lenin and the successful assassination of Uritsky would seem to be ideal subjects for the White propaganda machine. Yet they were almost completely ignored. This was not because the Whites were against individual acts of terror; rather it was due the fact that both L. I. Kannegiser and Fanni Kaplan were Jews, and thus served as poor examples of heroic self-sacrifice for the Don Cossacks or the “Siberian riflemen” mentioned earlier.

Don Aminado (A. P. Shpolianskii) gave the following version of events several years later in emigration: “They’ll hang Dora [sic] Kaplan and forget about her, not only in the Kremlin and in the Lubyanka, but also in the ‘Astorias’ and ‘Majestiques’ abroad. It has nothing to do with the deed; it has to do with the sound. Charlotte Corday, now that’s musical. Dora Kaplan sounds impoverished and prosaic. The witnesses of history are spoiled. The elite demand shining lights and noise. They’d sooner spit on a sacrifice, a feat, a heavy Colt in a skinny hand.”

Kaplan’s first name was Fanni, and not Dora. She was not hanged, but rather shot in a corner of the Kremlin. Afterwards, the commandant of the Kremlin (P. D. Malkov) burned her body in an iron drum with the help of the poet Demian Bednii. But that’s not the point. Don Aminado got the most important part correct. “Fanni Kaplan” just didn’t sound right, and the counterrevolutionaries of Russia were never able to find their own Charlotte Corday.

In an article entitled “Who Is to Blame?” the Don University professor I. Malinovskii categorically refuted those who tried to place responsibility for Russia’s demise on the Jews: “From these accusations it is but one step to their logical conclusion, which took the form of the Bialystok, Kishinev, Odessa, and Kiev pogroms, which have covered the Russian name in shame.”
In another article, entitled “Our Social Duty,” Malinovskii examined the causes for the pogroms of the turn of the century in Russia, claiming that they resulted from a combination of the base instincts of the “dregs of society,” a particular political strategy on the part of the authorities, and silence from the Orthodox Church. Placing a large portion of the blame on the government, Malinovskii wrote that a certain amount of reaction would be inevitable in fighting the revolution, but that there also existed a limit beyond which the destructive aims of the revolution would only be furthered:

“That limit which must not be crossed has been shown by the march of history. Our history has clearly and distinctly shown those bases that must form the foundation of our new political and social order. These would include freedom and civil equality, equality of all Russian citizens without regard for social status, nationality, or religion. The duty of those responsible for social life is to understand this simple truth and to make it a reality.”

Reality, however, seemed to have other plans. A year after Malinovskii’s article, Russian citizens of “Jewish nationality” wouldn’t have time to think about equality. They were too busy fighting for their survival. In the first installment of “Letters from Poltava,” published in the Ekaterinodar newspaper (Utro Iuga (Morning of the South), V. G. Korolenko wrote that by the second day of Denikin’s occupation of the city, “there were pogroms and lootings everywhere.” “‘They’re not only robbing Jews . . . and they’re not killing anyone.’ [T]his may be true, but it is a pitiful justification . . . Alas, this new page in local history begins with sorrow, sullied by the first days of a regime that many had expected to usher in an era of law and permanent rights.”

In these days the journalist A. Rostovtsev would repeat Malinovskii’s arguments on the pages of Priazovskii krai. If the situation had changed over the past year, it had only done so for the worse. “From several places there comes news of the return of our old favorite techniques . . . a delegation from the Jewish community informed the Commander-in-Chief of them . . . the forces of the reaction have arrived to replace dying ‘communism.’ They wish to make use of the opportunity created by the Bolsheviks to turn back the wheel of history. In order to do so, they need to line up in rows all of those who have fought against Bolshevism and for the liberation of the Homeland. They need to discredit the entire liberation movement, and convince the
masses that the liberation movement of 1917 [of the February revolution] was the result of the actions of a few individual nationalities living in Russia.”

In addition to Priazovskii krai and the short-lived Rostov-based Parus (Sail), the Ekaterinodar newspaper Morning of the South also came out against antisemitic propaganda. This publication existed from November 23, 1918 until March 4, 1920 and was the continuation of the newspaper Rodnaia zemlia (Native Soil), which had been shut down by the authorities. Like its predecessor, it was of a moderate socialist outlook, and to a certain degree expressed the views of the Union for the Rebirth of Russia, whose leadership belonged to the People’s Socialist Party. V. A. Miakotin, A. V. Peshekhonov, and A. A. Iablonovskii all contributed to the paper, but its real star was the feuilletonist S. Ia. Marshak, who went by the pseudonym “Doctor Friken.”

Commenting on the rise of antisemitic propaganda in the Kuban region, the journalist Chernyshev wrote, “antisemitic propaganda is the best way to aid the Bolshevists in their agitation efforts, as they will not hesitate to ascribe antisemitic beliefs to the real anti-Bolshevik forces as a whole . . . it is a complete disservice to the goal of actively combating Bolshevism.”

Morning of the South also engaged in polemics with the official White press, such as Velikaia Rossiia (Great Russia). When an article by N. N. Lvov appeared in the latter publication which claimed that “nowhere has a revolution had a more anti-national character than ours,” and that this was due to the “Jewish influences on the development of the Russian revolution” and that “it is impossible to deny that the Bolshevik revolution is being led by Jews,” Morning of the South responded with two articles. In one of them, N. Iakovlev (undoubtedly a pseudonym) took an ironic approach to Lvov’s article, which, he claimed, blamed everything on the “international Jew”: “Even the Paris Peace Conference fulfills the will of the taciturn American Colonel House, servant of the American Jew. Behind House there stands the American banker Shiff, who is clearly in contact with Trotsky-Bronstein. This is the troika that rules the world.”

The newspaper responded to a lecture given by the antisemite E. Nozhin (which claimed that all evil stemmed from the Masons and, of course, the Jews) with both a serious article and a satirical poem by Dr. Friken entitled “Scientific Discovery” (“Uchenoe otkrytie”):

The honorable Nozhin has told us, recently in his lecture, that the one who betrayed and destroyed the country
was the Jew, the malicious Jew.
The entire world is in Jewish control . . .
Who can avoid their influence?
Whenever there are problems or disturbances
Cherchez le zhid, cherchez le zhid!

The good doctor went on to poke fun at the idea of Jews adopting pseudonyms, claiming that Grishka Otrepev (False Dmitry) and Emelka Pugachev’s real names were “Gershka” and “Haim” and that Boris Savnikov was actually “Baruch Ropshin” from Latvia.” He went on to claim that Nozhin himself was a “Jew in disguise”:

Hiding behind a name
that ends in “ov” or “ski” or “in”
Brazenly laughing at us
is a citizen of Jerusalem . . .

Doctor Friken did not neglect to address another central topic of antisemitic (and philosemitic) propaganda: the percentage of Jews among the Bolsheviks:

And so we began to discuss
how many Solomons and Erems
are in the Sovnarkom.
An official in a uniform
said that the sons of Israel
must comprise the old quota of 3 percent
in the Sovnarkom.

Though it is possible the articles of Russian liberals and democrats had some effect on the attitudes of the educated classes, they most likely failed to reach the masses and influence their opinions. The masses, as an anonymous journalist pointed out when writing on the convocation of the Orthodox Church in Stavropol, were: “enslaved by petty human passions, enslaved by earthly desires; the great commandments of love—the basis of our faith—were forgotten; and on the ground of this lost faith, on this ground of darkness and cruelty, the Russian Orthodox Christian revealed his bestial visage to the world.”

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A number of Jewish authors could be found in the more liberal-democratic publications that were located in White territory. S. Ia. Marshak, who in Soviet times would be best known for his poems for children, published a number of anti-Bolshevik satires and epigrams in the Kuban press. One such poem, entitled “Two Commissars,” depicted the new rulers, the “seminarian Erema” and the “visiting student Solomon”:

They both ruled harshly,  
and did not shy away from cruel measures. 
Both the one and the other  
carried a revolver in their pocket.\textsuperscript{129}

Marshak penned a similarly satirical poem, entitled “Debates on Petrograd,” at a time when there was still a real possibility that Yudenich would capture the capital:

At the Commissars’ meetings,  
fiery Trotsky raised the alarm,  
calling all the\textit{communares}  
to Petrograd’s defense.  

However, the commissars’ fervent response was cooled by the “old ecclesiast” Lenin, who claimed that defending the city would be a “waste of energy”:

Petrograd, empty and impoverished,  
having forgotten its former joy,  
is now turning into a graveyard  
the cradle of our glory.  

The Petrograd Sovdep  
sends me reports every day,  
and requests tenderly and angrily:  
“Bread is needed. We need bread!”  

Let Yudenich and his Finnish bandits  
take the dead city.  
(true, it’s a pity to lose the Khesinskoi Palace  
It was my first refuge!)
Let Piter be taken by sea
by foreigners. I am ready
to give it up without an argument . . .
There’ll be fewer extra mouths!

I’ll be rid of the burden,
of the worries and costs . . .
Let the Brits and the French
feed Red Petrograd!\(^{130}\)

L. G. Munshtein (who used the pseudonym Lolo) composed biting portrayals of Soviet writers and artists of the period. In one poem, he says, “Whenever I’m sad about Chekhov, I remember *The Seagull* (*Chaika*); whenever I bemoan Gorky, I remember the Cheka.” Another poem contains the following scene:

—Are you going to sing in the three-colored dress [In Russian, the word also means “tricolor” —Trans.]
It looks so nice!
— I used to like that color combination . . .
— But what about the bright red one you wore when you sang at the Commandant’s birthday, when you were at the height of your talents?
— I don’t find it beautiful anymore!
It drives me to tears! It makes me sick!
— So what did you do with it? Soak it in kerosene and burn it up?
— No, I hid it away (I mothballed it).\(^{131}\)

For anti-Bolshevik Jewish inhabitants of the Russian Vendée such as Ilia Ehrenburg, life under White rule posed a number of problems and paradoxes. This can most clearly be seen in Ehrenburg’s journalism of the period. During the fall and winter of 1919, Ehrenburg was widely published in Kiev and Rostov. In the article, “In Defense of an Idea,” written in September of 1919, Ehrenburg wrote, “One has to fight the Chinese and the Chekists with bayonets, and one has to fight famine with bread, but against a banner one must also raise a banner, and one must fight an idea with an idea. They say ‘the international,’ we respond ‘Russia’ . . . we don’t know what Russia has to give Europe, but at night her torch will suddenly burst into flame . . .”
This born-again Slavophile proposed that Russia offer peace and harmony in opposition to the Bolsheviks' slogan of civil war, and that the Bolsheviks' adherence to “arithmetic justice” be replaced by a thirst for truth and love. A few weeks after Ehrenburg composed this article, the Kiev pogrom took place.

After the pogrom, V. V. Shulgin wrote the infamous article “Torture by Fear,” a kind of manifesto for the ideology of antisemitism. Speaking in the name of the Russian population, the author poses the following question, “Have the Jews learned anything over these past nights?” From Shulgin's point of view, two paths were open to the Jews. The first was to admit their guilt in the destruction of the state (“which they had not created”) and repent. The second path was “to deny [everything] and accuse everyone except for themselves.” He concludes, “Their fate will depend on what path they choose. Has not the ‘torture by fear’ shown them the proper path?” The rather simple truth that the defenseless Jews being slaughtered in Kiev were on about as good terms with the “Jewish” Trotsky as Shulgin was with the Russian Lenin was of secondary importance to the author.

Ehrenburg wrote a response to Shulgin entitled “What the Zhid Thinks”:

During these nights I, a hunted “Yid,” underwent all that V. Shulgin spoke about. But this torment “by fear” was broader and more terrifying than he thinks. It was fear not only for those who were being attacked, but for the attackers as well. Not only for a part, for the Jews, but for the whole, for Russia . . . V. Shulgin asks, ‘have the Jews learned anything over these past nights?’ Yes, I have learned to love Russia even more tormentingly, and even more strongly.
What a difficult and beautiful science it is.

The pogromists were perhaps the least in need of the tears of an unwanted sympathizer; in Jewish circles Ehrenburg’s acceptance and justification of the scourge was met with indignation. S. Margolin, writing one day after the appearance of Ehrenburg’s article, claimed that “during the days of the pogrom Ehrenburg forgot everything in the world except his love of Russia, at whatever cost, even though this is from the psychology of a slave, and is definitely not from the psyche of a son of a great people and a proud country.”

Ehrenburg would publish several other anti-Bolshevik articles in the newspapers *Kievskaia zhizn’* (Kiev Life) and the Rostov-based *Donskaia rech’* (Don Speech). At the end of December he made his way to Crimea and was
based in Koktebel at the residence of M. A. Voloshin. This period saw Ehrenburg begin to reevaluate his attitude toward the Civil War. According to Ia. I. Sommer, the “deciding factor” in his change of heart was the testimony of S. Ia. Efron, the husband of the poet Marina Tsvetaeva and a member of the Volunteer Army, who had been in Koktebel in February or March of 1920. Even if this is the case, the seeds of change were present much earlier. The Kiev pogrom, Ehrenburg’s train trip from Kiev to Rostov during which he was constantly threatened with being thrown from the train (as did happen with his traveling companion, the artist I. M. Rabinovich), and the attempt by a drunken officer to forcibly “baptize” Ehrenburg by throwing him overboard from the ferry he was taking from Kerch to Feodosia in December of 1919 are but a few of the events that made the writer reconsider his previous views. Unlike most of Crimea’s temporary inhabitants, Ehrenburg met the end of 1920 in Moscow, instead of Constantinople. The Whites were skilled at losing even their most ardent supporters.

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The beginning of the Vrangel regime signaled a change in the structure of the White propaganda machine. Vrangel shut down the remaining operations of the Osvag, which (regardless of what it thought of itself) had a poor reputation and was commonly seen as having spread antisemitism. Information gathering and propaganda duties were transferred to the Press Department of the Civil Administration. Not once did Vrangel resort to antisemitism as an ideological weapon. Nonetheless, the remnants of antisemitic propaganda would still occasionally break through, even in official publications. An official leaflet from June of 1920, for example, makes the claim that “everybody knows that in the Sovdep power is held by Yid brains, Latvian bayonets, and Russian fools.” According to Prince V. A. Obolenskii, the agitators employed by the government were conservative at best, and reactionary at worst: “The demagoguery of the agitators naturally followed the path of least resistance, and made use of the antisemitism growing in the army and in large portions of the population.” Even by Vrangel’s own admission, “the defunct ‘Osvag’ continued to make its presence felt.”

The choice of G. V. Nemirovich-Danchenko to head the Press department was particularly unfortunate. Not only did he turn a blind eye to antisemitic publications in right-wing journals, he published in them himself. In Vrangel’s own opinion, the June 29 issue of Russkaia pravda (Russian Truth)
contained two pro-pogrom articles. His attention was drawn to the articles by the American and French representatives in Crimea, who stated that they would be extremely poorly received in their respective countries. Vrangel reprimanded the Censorship department, fired the censor who had approved the publications, and quickly shut the newspaper down.\footnote{143}

Vrangel’s order concerning the matter was openly published and widely distributed. It stated: “I have repeatedly indicated that in this terrible hour the salvation of the Motherland lies in the unity of all Russian citizens. Any kind of national, class, or party hatred that precludes the possibility of productive work is unacceptable. At this time the incitement of one portion of the population against another still has not come to an end, and in certain instances the workers in Government institutions have not undertaken the measures necessary to eliminate this evil at its root.”\footnote{144}

Nemirovich-Danchenko’s response to the situation was predictable. Although he admitted to the “antisemitic direction” of the articles, he did not see in them any threat to civil order. He also claimed that “a number of members of the General Staff praised [the editor of Russkaia pravda] . . . as an impassioned warrior for the Russian cause and a highly talented publicist.”\footnote{145}

It is true that Nemirovich-Danchenko was hardly the only antisemite in Vrangel’s government. V. L. Burtsev recalled how in 1919 the general V. F. Subbotin (then commandant of Sevastopol) had given him a copy of the Protocols of Zion and advised him to use it for propaganda purposes in the newspaper Obschee Delo (Common Cause). Subbotin remained with the army under Vrangel as well, and was one of those in charge of reinforcing Perekop. Not long before the disaster at Perekop, Vrangel himself had mentioned to Burtsev that there were numerous antisemites in the army.\footnote{146}

The most right-wing publication to be found in the Crimea was Tsarkolokol (The Tsar Bell), that “eternal companion” of the White movement, to borrow N. N. Alekseev’s phrase. The paper was published by N. P. Izmailov, who anticipated Maiakovskii in claiming, “The work of the printing press must be equal to that of the machine gun.” This was perhaps the only publication in Crimea that was opposed to the Vrangel government. Izamilov himself was usually the sole author to be found on its pages. The first “guest writer” to appear in the paper was Nemirovich-Danchenko, the head of the Propaganda department (writing under a pseudonym, of course). There is no doubt that he shared Ismailov’s antisemitic viewpoints. When he later composed his memoirs, he found it necessary to include excerpts from a 1920 letter sent from Constantinople to Sevastopol, which “shed light on the source of
the influences that were fatal to the Russian army.” This source turned out to be the High Kahal, whose representative Aaron Simanovich had unleashed Rasputin on Russia. Both Kerensky and Trotsky had allegedly already “bowed down in veneration” before Simanovich in 1917, and he was now surrounded by corrupt Russian officers and had even made inroads into Vrangel’s government. “The Kahal has gold and an innumerable amount of lira, and thus they have servants of every color and stripe: Greek, English, French, American, Bolshevik, and SR agents, and democratic organizations who are willing to do anything for money.”

Upon discovering that he had been publishing antisemitic rhetoric and using confidential government information in his articles under a number of pseudonyms, Vrangel relieved Nemirovich-Danchenko of command. His replacement was to be G. V. Vernadskii, a historian and professor at Tauride University who was the son of the Kadet CC member V. I. Vernadskii.

The central source of inflammatory antisemitic propaganda in the Crimea was the Russian Orthodox Church (or, more precisely, a number of its clergy). Of these, the most infamous was Vladimir Ignatevich Vostokov, who had gained renown for his speeches against Rasputin. As a result of these speeches, the church leadership had effectively exiled him, to keep him as far away from the capitals as possible. Previously an avowed liberal, Vostokov once performed a prayer service in honor of the February Revolution in a red robe. However, ensuing events had turned him into a virulent antisemite and monarchist. The murder of his twenty-one-year-old daughter Nina by Bolshevik forces in September of 1918 (for “connections” with the Whites) undoubtedly played a major role in this about-face. Vostokov was convinced that his daughter had been killed for her religious beliefs.

The memoirs of Father Georgii Shavelskii (Archpriest of the Volunteer armed forces) include an account of Vostokov’s participation in the Church Council that took place in May 1919 in Stavropol: “The priest Vostokov made a lot of noise at the Council, and began to accuse the Council, the clergy, and even the Patriarch himself of inaction and lukewarm conviction. He insisted that the Church openly and unyieldingly take action against ‘the Jews and Masons’ under the slogan: ‘for the faith and the Tsar.’” When Vostokov’s ideas received little support, he turned to directly addressing the laity, inflaming their emotions. Vostokov’s performance at one meeting “was met with a harsh rebuke from Prince E. N. Trubetskoii, Archbishop Dmitrii and Bishop Mikhail, who called him a slanderer, a rebel, and a misanthrope.”
Vostokov now appeared in Crimea and began to preach in Simferopol. “Every Sunday,” writes Prince Obolenskii, “he would give fiery speeches from the cathedral pulpit calling for a battle against the Jews who had enslaved the Russian people through the Bolsheviks. His speeches were powerful and well-delivered and they made an enormous impression. The people would flock to the cathedral, not for prayer, but only to listen to the misanthropic speeches of the priest. By the third Sunday the crowd was already overflowing the cathedral. Vostokov came out onto the church portico and spoke from on high to the crowd, in which one could already hear the hysterical shrieking of women and terrifying cries of ‘beat the Yids.’”

The journalist G. N. Rakovskii also wrote about the particular role played by the antisemitic clergy in the Crimea. He claims that beginning in the fall of 1920 the clergy had begun to carry out a “particularly Monarchist campaign,” and had started to hold “days of repentance” which included a three-day fast. The masses were electrified by “the pogromistic sermons and speeches of Beniamin, S. Bulgakov, Malakhov, members of various ‘national societies’ and so on.” Vostokov was the most extreme of all, calling for the “crushing of Jewish skulls.”

V. A. Maklakov, then Ambassador to France, was shocked by the degree of antisemitism in the intelligentsia and clergy during his visit to Crimea in September 1920. He was particularly shocked at the behavior of Sergei Bulgakov, a former Marxist and Kadet, and a well-known philosopher and economist who had earlier been a writer for the journal Signposts (Vekhi). Bulgakov had joined the priesthood in 1918, and had come to Crimea in 1919, where he found a position as a professor of political economy and theology at Tauride University.

Vrangel, who felt that it was impossible to attack the clergy publicly for their antisemitism, asked Maklakov to talk to Bulgakov, as they had both attended Moscow University before they had both joined the Kadets. Earlier, Kadet members had jokingly called both Maklakov and Bulgakov “Black Hundreds,” as they occupied the extreme right wing of the Kadet party. Vrangel hoped that Maklakov would be able to influence the clergy through the “more cultured bishops,” and prevent their flock from engaging in pogroms.

Maklakov relayed his conversation with Bulgakov to the Ambassador to the United States (Bakhmetev) in a letter written soon after his return to Paris:

As far as antisemitism is concerned, I can say that I have seen the most dangerous form of it: the suspicion, or perhaps the conviction,
that the entire world is controlled by a single Jewish syndicate in America that has purposefully unleashed Bolshevism on Russia. I can tell you that Bulgakov does not yet believe this personally, but he has serious misgivings. It is true that he questioned me pointedly in great detail as to any information I had at my disposal that could refute such an understanding. He interrogated me about my connections to Masonry, what I had heard and seen, the raison d’etre of Masonry and so on. In brief, I can say that for Bulgakov, if not now then in the future—and for many of the less educated bishops at the present moment—the overwhelming role played by Jews among the Bolshevik leadership is no coincidence and is not to be explained through historical reasons, but is simply a manifestation of their [the Jews’] purported desire to control the world. Bulgakov is a fervent opponent of pogroms, and for his part admits that Vostokov’s sermons, while not pogromistic, (this he refuses to admit) may call forth unchristian and very dangerous feelings in the masses. He’s cultured enough to admit this, but on the other hand he may provide support for what I believe is a much more dangerous tendency, for the government to be completely at ease with protecting itself from Jewry in self-defense. I would not be surprised if Bulgakov approved of, if not the Pale of Settlement, then at least a prohibition on [Jews] entering the civil service and other restrictions on Jewish rights. So now you can see what tendencies have reappeared among representatives of the intelligentsia; Bulgakov is, after all, a member of the intelligentsia. Vrangel and Krivoshein are keenly aware of this danger. If from abroad it seems to us that this could easily be put to an end, simply by exerting pressure on the clergy, then we only need to spend time in Crimea and see the kind of social atmosphere there to understand that simple caution in this matter might result in giving the clergy too much free reign.

I met with Bulgakov on friendly terms and left him on friendly terms, having talked for an entire day and night. We reached some common ground, but nevertheless such an abyss appeared between us on the most basic points of departure that no real agreement seemed possible.¹⁵⁶

Despite Maklakov’s claim that Bulgakov was a “fervent opponent of pogroms,” news appeared in the émigré press in late October detailing
Bulgakov’s pogromistic sermons, and even claiming that copies of them were being pasted around the city as proclamations. The famous publicist Boris Mirskii (Mirkin-Getsevich) wrote in the *Jewish Tribune*: “According to newspaper accounts S. Bulgakov, while living in Crimea, is taking an active part in antisemitic and outright pogromistic agitation. A philosopher and a priest, a scientist and a monk, he is using his scholarly authority and monk’s cap to reinforce the black deeds of the officials of the Osvag, overly zealous police officers, and the unenlightened, enraged, innocent masses of the square . . . A writer, thoughtful and intelligent, a philosopher turned antisemite . . . there is no way to ignore this . . . Bulgakov is a significant figure in the Russian cultural context, and his sudden antisemitism should be singled out from the similar phenomena often labeled ‘social antisemitism’ in the South of Russia. Bulgakov’s is a special case; his current antisemitism—savage, ugly, constituting, according to the newspapers, almost a church sanction on Jewish annihilation—is likewise a special event . . . ‘At the Feast of the Gods’ is followed by calling for pogroms on the streets and walls of Sevastopol.”

In the very same newspaper, A. V. Kartashev attempted to defend Bulgakov in particular and the Orthodox Church in general: “Unfortunately, the professor and priest S. N. Bulgakov has been hastily added to the list of those preaching for pogroms. Is it possible that a disciple and inheritor of the word and deed of Vladimir Soloviev could become an author of pogromistic proclamations? I don’t doubt for a moment that this is nothing more than the typical illiteracy of those who trade in information that is essentially incomprehensible to them. Bulgakov has become a monarchist. This does not entail anything strange for a Solovievian theocrat. The vulgar connection between monarchism and antisemitism is in any case inconceivable in relation to the noble and lofty accomplishments of Russian culture that are embodied in the personality of S. N. Bulgakov.”

Kartashev admitted that belief in the monarchy may lead “to a certain kind of antisemitism.” “But it would only be of the highest ideological kind, in the form of religious antagonism or a cultural struggle of ideas, and not in the vulgar, dirty and idiotic form of pogromistic agitation . . . They have turned S. N. Bulgakov into a caricature of a stupid pogromist, pasting all sorts of shameful nonsense on the fences of Sevastopol. This kind of unenlightened, unreflective mixture of monarchist ideology with the pogromistic mindset does not facilitate the objective explication of the truth or help to dampen political and ethnic passions . . . The church has always been a cultural
factor in forming national types and state structures . . . the Russian church has never been antisemitic.”

A detailed investigation of the policy of the Russian Orthodox Church would take us beyond the scope of the given study. Still it is worth pointing out that its clergy occupied a variety of different political positions during the Civil War. In the case of Crimea, the civil authorities were forced to dampen the martial furor of the clergy on several occasions. Krivoshein once complained to Maklakov about the difficulties of fighting the sermons of the clergy. Krivoshein also told the ambassador of the “predetermined appointment” of Kartashev, possibly as head of Church relations.

Today, no copies exist of Bulgakov’s “proclamations,” so it is impossible to ascertain whether or not they could be characterized as instigating pogromistic sentiments. Still, it can hardly be doubted that some kind of “seductive” texts written by Bulgakov were being distributed at the time. Evidence for this point comes not only from “Jewish” and Soviet sources, but from the Whites themselves. After returning to Paris, Maklakov told a colleague (N. V. Chaikovskii) that Vrangel had asked Bulgakov to assist in preventing the distribution of a leaflet, addressed from the priesthood to the people, that might provoke pogroms. As soon as Maklakov raised the topic with Bulgakov, the latter said, “I wrote it myself.”

Vrangel’s government proved to be the only one capable of actively preventing antisemitic propaganda. The Crimean catastrophe precluded the possibility of fully evaluating Vrangel’s policy as well as his other attempts to carry out a “leftist politics in rightist hands.” By the middle of November 1920, both the right and the left found themselves in Constantinople, where a different series of problems faced them.
Chapter 6

In the Shadow of the Holocaust: The Pogroms of 1918–1920

The pogroms that occurred during the Civil War were unprecedented in terms of their cruelty and scale. At various times, historians have proposed various rational explanations for their occurrence. The most commonly cited motivations include: revenge for Jewish participation in the Bolshevik movement and the destruction of Russia, economic factors (which had become all the more keenly felt during the collapse of everyday life), and even the simple base desire to loot and plunder, which many pogromists undoubtedly had. Other more concrete justifications have included the Jewish votes in the Rada that opposed Ukrainian independence, gunshots allegedly fired at retreating soldiers from Jewish homes, and others.

In my opinion, these explanations are merely attempts to rationalize the irrational. The syllogism, “Trotzky commands the Red Army, therefore we should cut off the hands of the local cobbler, rape his wife, and crush the skull of his child” is clearly flawed. If the Jewish socialist parties voted “incorrectly,” then why should the blame fall on those Jews who voted for religious political parties, and who were themselves far from being politically active? If Jews wanted to fight the Bolsheviks alongside the Whites, then why were they not allowed to serve in the military? After all, they were behaving in a “politically correct” fashion. Moreover, portraying the pogroms as “punishment” for supporting the Bolsheviks does little to explain the pogroms that were carried out by the Red Army, which would take place at the slightest slackening of military discipline.

From 1918 to 1920 more than 1,500 pogroms took place in over 1,300 cities, villages, and towns in Ukraine alone. According to various sources,
anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000 Jews were killed outright or mortally wounded. Another 200,000 were seriously injured. Thousands of women were raped. At least 50,000 women were widowed, and nearly 300,000 children became orphans. The precise number of victims will probably never be firmly established, despite the fact that information on the pogroms was being collected in a more or less systematic fashion as early as May 1919. Jews were killed on the streets, and in the fields. Entire families perished, leaving no one to tell their tale. Of course, the Jews were not completely wiped out by the devastation of the Civil War, but we must be cautious in relying on survivors’ tales when considering this phenomenon. As Jan Gross noted, writing about the butchering of the Jewish residents of Edvabne by their Polish neighbors in 1941:

All that we know about the Holocaust . . . is all skewed evidence biased in one direction: these are all stories with a happy ending. They have all been produced by a few who were lucky to survive . . . and that is why we must take literally all fragments of information at our disposal, fully aware that what actually happened to the Jewish community during the Holocaust can only be more tragic than the existing representation of events based on surviving evidence.

Despite the large number of contemporary accounts by both Jews and non-Jews alike (and an equally large number of works dedicated to the study of the pogroms of the Civil War period) a definitive history of the pogroms has yet to be written.

According to N. Gergel’s “conservative” estimates, during the period beginning in December of 1918 and ending in December of 1919, the Directorate and its allies were responsible for the largest number of pogroms (439, or nearly 40 percent). They were followed by unaffiliated groups (307, or 25 percent), the Whites (213, 17 percent), Reds (106, 9 percent), Grigoriev’s troops (52, 4 percent), unknown groups (33, 3 percent), and Polish troops (32, 3 percent). During this time, the Directorate and its allies killed 16,706 Jews (54 percent), the Whites 5,235 (16.9 percent), unaffiliated groups 4,615 (14.9 percent), Grigoriev’s troops 3,471 (11.2 percent), the Reds 725 (2.3 percent), Polish forces 134 (0.4 percent), and unknown groups 36 (0.1 percent).

Some pogroms were bloodier than others. On February 15, 1919 in the town of Proskurov, forces under the command of Ataman Ivan Semesenko...
slaughtered 1,650 Jews in little over four hours, purportedly as punishment for an unsuccessful Bolshevik coup. Groups under the command of other Atamans (Struk, Zelenyi, Tiutiunnik, Kozyr-Zirka, Sokolovskii, etc.) also engaged in pogroms. The forces of the rebel Red commander N. A. Grigoriev (a former Tsarist officer) killed anywhere from 1,300 to 3,000 Jews from May 15 to 20, 1919 in the city of Elisavetgrad. From September 23 to 26, 1919, 1,300–1,500 Jews from the Jewish population of nearly 10,000 in the town of Fastov were murdered by a brigade of Terek Cossacks under the command of Colonel V. F. Belogortsev.\(^5\)

Occasionally, the perpetrators would limit themselves to pillaging and looting, and would kill “only” a few dozen Jews. At other times, pogroms were carried out with a savagery that was exceptional, even for the Civil War period. Ukrainian “rebels” would bury Jews alive, “boil them alive in a large cauldron on the town square,” drown them, beating any who tried to swim to safety with rifles, would “tie groups of them to the rails and let the train run over them,” and so on.\(^6\)

Ukrainian forces were not the only ones engaged in such savagery. Polish legionnaires in the village of Dolginovo in the Vilna gubernia did not limit themselves to robbing Jews and beating them with whips. If they found a particular Jew that they didn’t like, they would break his arms and legs, blind him, or cut off his ears and nose. They would then retire for lunch, before coming back to shoot the victim later. The Whites competed with the legionnaires with their own particular brands of torture. When the militia chief of Velizh was discovered to be not only a communist, but a Jew as well, he had his two gold teeth ripped out, was tortured with hot pokers underneath his toenails, had chunks of flesh carved from his body, and was finally burned alive.\(^7\)

This is but one episode. At the hands of the “Volunteers,” “grey-bearded ‘communists’ who had taken refuge in a synagogue behind the Torah” were killed, as were infants (along with their mothers and grandmothers). Jews were occasionally simply shot, but were more often hanged, trampled by horses, dismembered, or buried alive. They would often be tortured before they were killed. Thousands of women were raped, from young girls to elderly women. The rape was often carried out by groups of soldiers, who would occasionally force the victim’s husband or children to watch.\(^8\)

Workers at the Eastern European Jewish Archive have managed to determine the names of nearly 16,000 of the victims, and in almost 10,000 cases their ages have been confirmed as well. Twenty-five percent of the victims
were women. Eleven percent of the victims were under the age of 17. If we can fix the number of those killed or mortally wounded at 50,000 (the minimal number, according to historical and demographic data), and assume a proportionate number of victims across age groups, then 63 percent of the victims were between the ages of 17 and 50. Two hundred infants less than one year old were killed during the pogroms, more than a thousand children between the ages of 1 and 7, and nearly 4,000 children between the ages of 8 and 16. Nearly 13,000 of the victims were over the age of 50. Again, these are according to the most conservative estimates. If newly proposed figures turn out to be accurate, these numbers could be multiplied by a factor of three.9

Later, we will discuss the books that were based on the materials collected by the Kiev Jewish intelligentsia in this undertaking. In the meantime, it was worth remembering that an “exhaustive and definitive” “encyclopedia of the pogroms,” such as was called for by I. B. Schechtman,10 has yet to be written.11 Studies of the tragedy of Russian Jewry from 1918 to 1920 experienced a decline after the Second World War, when the horror of the Holocaust eclipsed interest in previous events.

Of all those who engaged in pogromistic activity during the period, the White forces must be given their due. I. M. Cherikover was not far from the truth when he claimed, “in terms of the total number of pogroms carried out in Ukraine during the period, the Whites were responsible for only one-fifth . . . but this is the total number of pogroms from 1918 to 1921, and the Volunteer Army was only active in pogroms for a period of several months. In this period, the Volunteer Army broke all records. Their pogroms were more intensive than those of the others, the number of victims was higher, and the violence was more widespread.”12

I will now attempt to examine the reasons, consequences, and particularities of the pogroms carried out by the Volunteer Army, in order to place them within the larger context of anti-Jewish violence from 1918 to 1920. In doing so, I will be relying on existing studies on the subject, as well as archival materials.

The majority of the studies dedicated to pogroms of the period first appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. They often presented themselves as historical collections, rather than academic studies.13 The very first studies of this kind attempted both to describe the historical context and also to offer adequate explanations for the events that had transpired. One of the first “chronicles” of this type was written by N. I. Shtif in March of 1920 (it was published in Berlin two years later). The author, a member of the editorial board in charge
of collecting materials related to the pogroms in Ukraine, cited as his central task the “demonstration of the intrinsic, organic connection between the pogroms and the military and the socio-political program of the Volunteer Army.” According to Shtif, the White political program “included all the signs of a restoration, of returning Russia back to its pre-Revolutionary state,” which was clearly demonstrated by “the relationship of the Volunteers towards the three fundamental questions of Russian society: the agrarian question, the labor question, and the question of national minorities. Returning land to the land-owning class, suppressing the labor movement, and an utter contempt for the needs of ‘foreigners’ [инородцы], these were the three foundations of this program. Jewish disenfranchisement and slavery were inalienable and organic aspects of this program.” “Pogroms,” Shtif concludes, “were a reaction to Jewish equality, which had been achieved during the repugnant revolution. These reactions, carried out by those in favor of a restoration, were the first step towards a re-enslavement of the Jewish people.”

S. M. Dubnov called the Ukrainian pogroms the “third gaidamachina.” Since the middle of the seventeenth century, Dubnov wrote, the Ukrainian people “would, in times of political upheaval, fulfill their ‘mission’ of exterminating the Jewish people with an even greater zeal than their predecessors had during the times of the Crusades.” In speaking of the “pogromist mission” of the Ukrainian people, Dubnov was sure to make clear that he was not talking about “the ‘nation’ as a whole, but rather only a portion of them, as there are large masses of people of a certain level of spiritual development, who have nothing in common with those parts of society who have raised themselves beyond this level of culture.”

It is hard not to notice that the pogroms of the Volunteer Army cannot be accommodated in Dubnov’s explanation. The great Jewish historian recognized this, and attempted to undo the contradiction in a footnote: “‘Denikinshchina,’ or the pogroms of the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army, were the most savage of the pogroms of the period. They form an exception to our general thesis, inasmuch as the perpetrators came from several ethnicities throughout all of Russia, from former Tsarist officers to Caucasian foreigners [инородцы]. But it is worth keeping in mind the following facts: 1. The theater of war was the territory of Ukraine. 2. The instigators of the massacres of Jews were mostly Cossacks, who have always served as the forerunners of гайдамакs since the seventeenth century. 3. As was the case in the past, the Cossack-led military attacks were followed by “civilian” peasant attacks, including looting cities and taking stolen goods to the countryside, etc.”
S. I. Gusev-Orenburgskii was also to focus on the predominantly “Ukrainian” characteristics of the pogroms in his *Crimson Book*, which contained materials collected by the Committee for the Assistance of Pogrom Victims under the auspices of the Russian Red Cross in Kiev. Gusev-Orenburgskii does mention “Volunteer activities,” but emphasizes that “the history of Ukraine is a chronicle of pogroms . . . for the fifth time, before our very eyes, a bloody Ukrainian campaign is undertaken . . . a sea of blood, which has surpassed all of the horrors of times past.”

In the opinion of I. M. Cherikover, the “virulent antisemitic ideology and pogromistic activities of the Volunteer Army” could only be understood after having explained the “nature of the Volunteer White movement.” Concurring with Shtif, he writes that “the Volunteer movement was essentially a movement for restoration and for a complete and total return to the old ways.” Its participants were seized by “a wild hatred not only for October, but for February as well, not just the Bolsheviks, but the Revolution in general.” In other words, the White Army was against the very same revolution that had made Jews full-fledged citizens.

I. B. Schechtman, however, departed from Dubnov’s view. He believed that the antisemitism prevalent in the Volunteer Army “found no nourishment in the specific conditions of the Ukraine, but was already fully formed before their arrival there.” This contention seems more likely. The aforementioned opinions of various historians of the 1920s seem to attribute to the Ukrainian soil an almost mystical ability to provoke pogroms. Such was also the opinion of S. A. Pavliuchenkov, who claimed that as long as Denikin’s forces were within the Don, Kuban, and Crimean territories (or even in Kharkov), everything was more or less calm for the local Jewish populations. “But as soon as the White Army entered central Ukraine and came upon the prepared ground, they immediately joined in the pogroms with enthusiasm.”

O. Figes is inclined to give the Ukrainian soil similar special qualities.

In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that crossing a few hundred kilometers of soil could transform a well-disciplined military force into a band of murderers and pogromists. At the very least, there are certain psychological and ideological prerequisites. It should also be noted that Jews were slaughtered with equal enthusiasm by the Whites in Russian territories. White forces captured Balashov on two separate occasions, and carried out pogroms both times shortly after their arrival. According to local witnesses, at least thirty-five people were killed, and a number of people were arrested, including women and children.
Under the command of General K. K. Mamontov, the White Cavalry would go on raids behind enemy lines that included the killing of Jews, who were singled out as targets. In Kozlov, Mamontov’s troops destroyed all of the Jewish homes over the course of four days. Jews were cut down and shot on the streets and in their homes. The pogrom was accompanied by looting carried out by the local civilian population. When Red forces entered the city on August 30, 1919, they saw “a dead city: the main street, like the others, was completely empty; besides the mutilated corpses of murdered Jews and workers, and the corpses of horses, there was no one and nothing on the streets.”

The pogrom victims were buried in Elets from September 7 to 10. In total, 53 men and women were laid to rest. Among the victims were girls between the ages of 17 and 19, who had first been raped before being executed. There were also little boys, aged 4–6. “Corpses were everywhere: in the forest, in the ravine, in the river, and even in the wells.” Some victims had been mutilated to the point where they could no longer be identified. One victim, the cobbler Shnekher, protested when soldiers came to take away his goods. As a result, he and two of his Jewish colleagues were taken away. Their bodies were found later in the countryside. Nearly 200 people of various ethnicities disappeared without a trace. The dark-haired and bearded writer M. M. Prishvin, who lived in Elets at the time, was originally taken for a Jew by the marauding soldiers, yet he somehow miraculously managed to avoid death. Losing his coat, which the soldiers grabbed as he tried to make his escape, seemed to be worth the sacrifice.

P. Kenez has come to the conclusion that “anti-Semitism was neither a peripheral nor an accidental aspect of White ideology; it was a focal point of their worldview.” In his opinion, “the Russian officer corps had long been anti-Semitic in Imperial Russia.” But this “normal” antisemitism “was mild when compared to the murderous obsession that they developed in the course of the Civil War. Seeing Jews in important positions in the Soviet regime no doubt contributed to their hatred, but this cannot be the full explanation, for obviously most of the Soviet leaders and most of the workers of the Cheka were as Russian as themselves.”

Elsewhere Kenez compares the White officer corps to the Nazis, positing that their antisemitism had reached a “pathological degree” during the Civil War:

This new and passionate anti-Semitism was born out of a need to explain, not so much to others, as to themselves, why the revolu-
tion had occurred. In the view of the reactionary officers it was the alien Jews who were primarily responsible. They were the microbes that destroyed the body politic of old Russia. As the officers became even more frustrated with the confusing world around them, their anti-Semitism became increasingly pathological. They murdered more and more Jews and it was necessary to justify themselves by thinking up sinister Jewish conspiracies. Perhaps paradoxically, participation in pogroms increased anti-Semitism. . . . It alone enabled them to make sense of a world that to them seemed senseless. In this respect, at least, the White officers were precursors of the Nazis.  

In opposition to Kenez, Pipes considers it absurd “to depict the White movement as proto-Nazi,” with antisemitism the “focal point of [its] worldview.” In Pipes’s opinion, this “focal point” was nationalism, not antisemitism. He agrees that “the White officer corps, not to speak of the Cossacks, was increasingly contaminated” with antisemitism as the Civil War unfolded. “Even so,” he writes, “it would be a mistake to draw any direct link between this emotional virulence and the anti-Jewish excesses during the Civil War.” Pipes notes that “the pogroms were inspired far less by religious and national passions than by ordinary greed: the worst atrocities on the White side were committed by the Terek Cossacks, who had never known Jews and regarded them merely as objects of extortion.”

According to Pipes, “once pogroms and razgromy (destruction of property) became the order of the day, it was inevitable that Jews would become the primary victims: they were seen as aliens, they were defenseless and were believed rich.” O. Figes, the author of another general study on the Russian Civil War, finds himself in accord with Pipes view on the issue. Though he gives White propaganda its due credit, Figes clearly echoes Pipes, claiming that the pogroms were mostly initiated by Cossacks and their commanders, and that the pogromists were mostly motivated by the desire to rob, rape, and kill Jews, who were perceived as alien, rich, and weak.

According to Pipes, this “eruption of virulent anti-Semitism” in response to the 1917 revolution can be explained by the coincidence of several factors: First, there was the de facto end of the Pale of Settlement during World War I, and the appearance of a significant number of Jews in government institutions. These combined to form the impression among the populace that “whereas everybody else had lost from the Revolution, the Jews, and they
alone, had benefited from it.”

This conclusion was furthered by three additional phenomena: the active role of Jews in the Cheka, the murder of the royal family (which Jews were quickly accused of perpetrating), and the need to find a new scapegoat after the departure of the German forces (early on, many believed the sole power propping up the Bolshevik regime was the Germans).

It is difficult to imagine that a “hostile relationship” towards Jews that allegedly only appeared in the winter of 1918–19 had managed, within the span of six short months, to explode into a series of pogroms so savage that they elude rational explanation. Nor does it seem necessary to consider the Southern Army separately from other parts of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. In doing so, Pipes is relying on the argument of Denikin himself, who was engaged in a polemic with Shif, and claimed that the Volunteer Army should not be equated with the “armed forces of the South, whose members included Cossacks and mountain people [i.e., Caucasians].”

Though valuable, the preceding studies by historians and critics contain some historical inaccuracies. For example, the Whites were not in favor of a “restoration”; their leadership was keenly aware of the impossibility of undoing the February revolution. Moreover, such conservative or even monarchist political views did not necessarily require participation in pogroms against Jews. Petliura’s forces were republicans and socialists, yet they killed Jews with just as much enthusiasm as the Whites did. The reasons behind the pogroms of 1918–20 (especially those carried out by Volunteer forces) can only be understood when these events are placed in their proper historical context.

Schechtman once made the claim that “the pogroms carried out by the Volunteer Army were purely military in character. They were carried out exclusively by the regular troops of the Volunteer Army.” The same could also be said for the pogroms carried out by the Directorate, the Red Army, or Grigoriev’s forces. In fact, the very word “pogrom” does not seem to be entirely applicable to the anti-Jewish violence that occurred during the Civil War period. Pogroms, as they are often defined, are more akin to a spontaneous phenomenon, a sudden surge of violence against Jews, carried out by civilian groups. Military forces, as a rule, would arrive on the scene to suppress pogroms. During the Civil War, the civilian population (the peasantry in particular) would join in looting that had already been started by the military. The perpetrators were often regulars, or members of quasi-regular formations within well-disciplined military organizations. A significant portion of them had served in the army before; many had taken part in World
War I. In the case of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, the vast majority of the officer corps came from the Imperial armed forces and had served in the First World War, as had a large portion of the rank and file.

I believe that the reasons behind the pogroms of 1919–20 are to be found not only in the events of the revolutions and Civil War. They are instead a culmination of anti-Jewish violence that had begun in 1914. Acts of violence against Jews had begun in the very first days of World War I. Moreover, they began before they were officially sanctioned by the authorities. The mobilization period, which saw large numbers of troops gathered together at major railway hubs, was accompanied by attacks on the local Jewish population. Such attacks were to continue later as well, during the militia mobilization announced in August 1915. Among the less violent actions brought to the attention of the governor of Kherson were the beating of several Jews by recruits; an attack on a Jew by the name of Varshavskii, who received two knife wounds; and the smashing of windows in a number of Jewish houses. In comparison to what was going on at the front lines, these amounted to little more than petty vandalism.

The commanders of the Imperial Army viewed the entire Jewish population with suspicion. For them Jews were a priori disloyal and inclined towards treason and espionage for the other side. The fear of espionage eventually took on an almost pathological character. Jews were accused of “consorting with the enemy through the use of underground telephones, and aeroplanes and supplying them with gold and food supplies.” According to one version, Jews tied the gold to goose feathers, and then sent the birds to the enemy. According to another, dead geese were filled with gold and then sent to Germany. In the Volynia gubernia a priest preached that the Jews were spies, and that a telephone had been found in the stomach of a cow that was capable of getting in contact with the enemy. Authorities soon received reports that Jews had been sending messages to Germany “in the eggs of chickens of a valuable breed,” as well as the report of a plan on the part of Vilna Jewry, who, “in their basements and in the slums,” were creating molds for artillery shells for the enemy forces.

These fantastic tales were circulated throughout the Russian Army. The Jews had allegedly attempted to give the Germans a million rubles in gold by smuggling it in a coffin; a Jewish miller was in contact with the Austrian army through a telephone in his basement. Other Jews had preferred to cut Russian telephone lines and reconnect them to the Austrians, while still others allegedly used fires and other signals to convey information to the enemy,
indicating the troop positions of the Russian army. Jews were also accused of planning to start a rebellion in Kronstadt, and purportedly tried to pass information to the Germans in Danzig by throwing a message in a bottle into the sea, and so on. A lack of small coins, especially at the front lines, led to rumors that the “Jews were hoarding silver for the Germans.” In Petrograd, the synagogue was raided, as was the home of its leader, I. A. Varshavskii, by “spy-hunters” seeking an “apparatus for corresponding with the enemy by means of a wireless telegraph.”

The soldier Maksim Chepurnoi wrote to his parents in a letter dated August 9, 1914: “The Austrian forces have made an underground telephone, and our damn Jews keep on telling them everything, how our forces are doing, where they are, and where they’re going, and [the Jews] were telling them everything until we caught them and shot them and now we’re robbing all the Jews and beating them and we should because they just want to trick us all.”

“Spymania” was widespread on the other side of the front as well. In August 1914 there were rumors in the German civilian population that there were automobiles traveling throughout the countryside laden with gold for spies and saboteurs. Conscientious patriots in several regions detained a number of cars and on one occasion even killed several government officials riding in them. The head of Austrian intelligence was forced to personally investigate reports claiming that the enemy was being informed of troop positions through signals emanating from the fire tower in Peremyshl. Two firemen were arrested under suspicion of espionage, and the counterintelligence officer in charge of the investigation was nearly killed himself, having been taken for a spy by the locals. The rumors were completely unfounded.

Similar rumors included accusations that Russian agents were using burning houses, church bells, windmills, and other unlikely means of communication. The head of German military intelligence concluded that such rumors “are no more than fairy tales, as is the general opinion that such methods might be employed in the theater of military activity.”

The Austrian and German authorities undertook decisive measures aimed at stopping such ridiculous rumors, as they could lead to destabilization both on the front lines and in the rear. As N. V. Grekov, the author of the most recent study of Russian counterintelligence in the early twentieth century, writes, “as opposed to the Western governments, which attempted to restrain the sudden appearance of ‘spymania,’ the Russian army saw in it an unexpected ally in the struggle against internal and external threats to the
security of the Empire. From the outset of the war, “spymania” was propagated both in the highest circles of the Russian military command, and also among the population. Its influence was quickly felt in the political and economical development of the country.”

This “spymania” which had become prevalent in both military and civil society, had a decidedly ethnic character, which resulted in an entire people being placed under suspicion. The baseless accusations of espionage against Jews could be attributed simply to the ignorance of civilians and soldiers, who had mostly been recruited from among the peasantry. But the authorities were not much better. In the summer of 1915, the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a circular to all governors proclaiming that “according to unconfirmed reports, the Germans, with the goal of undermining the peasant population of Russia” intended to produce a number of machines capable of burning down grain at its root. They were to be assisted in this undertaking by Russian subjects of German extraction, who had been “convinced to participate in this matter as a result of Jewish bribes.” The same information was reported by the Finance Ministry, which forwarded it to those in charge of requisitions.

A similar false rumor that was widespread traced its origins to Kuzhi, near Shavlë (Shauliai). A report of treason was printed on May 5, 1915 in the bulletin of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, only to be reprinted in the official newspaper Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik (Government Herald), before finally being published in nearly all of the Russian newspapers, which were in turn often displayed in public spaces alongside other reports on the war. The events, as per orders, were to be related to every rank and file soldier in the army. This is what “happened”: On the night of April 27, German forces ambushed an infantry regiment that was quartered in Kuzhi. According to the rumor, the German soldiers had allegedly been hidden in the basements of local Jewish homes. Moreover, after a signal shot was fired, Jews had set the entire village on fire.

An investigation carried out by State Duma members A. F. Kerensky and N. M. Fridman later showed that at the time of the attack there were no Jews in Kuzhi whatsoever. They had all left after an artillery bombardment and the ensuing fire. Kuzhi was predominantly Lithuanian; of forty homes, only three belonged to Jews. In the entire town there were only five small cellars, two of which were only three meters deep and two meters wide. It is clear that the entire story had been invented by the officers, who had “slept through” an enemy attack, despite the locals’ warnings that the enemy was nearby. Nevertheless, the authorities refused to print a retraction.
The political persecution of the Jews was only partially due to the anti-semitism of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and his head of staff general N. N. Ianushkevich. Such policies were in fact taught as part of military theory. Officers in military academies and schools were instructed as to the positive and negative segments of the civilian population. This theory only served to confirm prejudices that were prevalent among most Orthodox Russians from childhood. The Jews had denied Christ, they exploited others, they neither planted nor harvested but rather had managed to squeeze a profit “out of thin air,” they were rebellious, and they were undermining the power of the Tsar and the foundations of Russian life. They were the embodiment of all that was alien and hostile. This was particularly apparent in the Pale of Settlement, where most of the mobilized troops had never been before. Jews spoke a different language, dressed in their own way, their customs were bizarre and worthy of suspicion. As such, they were very suitable scapegoats for military failures and material discomforts. They were also completely defenseless. The military command would attribute a defeat to Jewish “treason” and sanction violent action against the Jewish population. Each discrete occurrence would demonstrate how far such violent reprisals were allowed to go.

There was one additional factor that called forth distrust towards Jews in Russia. Soon after the beginning of the war, the German Jewish activist Max Bodenheimer founded “the German Committee for the Liberation of Russian Jews (Deutsches Komitee zur Befreiung der russischen Juden).” The committee was headed by several prominent members of German Jewry. They saw the war against autocratic Russia as a means for liberating Russian Jews from Tsarist despotism. Bodenheimer believed that German imperial interests coincided with the interests of Eastern European Jews, and that the latter could serve as guides for German policies in the East. In August of 1914, the unified Austro-Hungarian German command made a direct address to the “Polish” Jews who were currently Russian subjects, announcing that their armies had come to liberate them from Russian slavery.

German newspapers published articles expressing the hope that the “liberators” would be able to collaborate with the Jewish population. Such statements, along with the proclamations of the German and Austro-Hungarian commanders, only served to justify the argument prevalent among the Russian military command that repressive measures must be taken against the Jews. Of course, they did not bother to wait and see if the expectations of their enemies were ever fulfilled.
Among the preventative measures introduced by the Russian command were massive deportations of Jewish populations away from the front. Nearly 250,000 people were deported, with an additional 350,000 fleeing the arrival of the German forces. Jews were not the only ones deported; Germans, Roma, Hungarians, and Turks were also forcibly removed. The deportations were often violent. Any Jews suspected of sympathizing with the enemy were sent to a military tribunal, whose decisions were evident before any kind of trial began. However, such cases rarely made it to court. As one of the military judges said to Prince Pavel Dolgorukov, “[I] never had to sign a single death sentence [in matters concerning “Jewish espionage”], as each commander simply hangs anyone who seems like a spy without trial.” According to German data, in the first weeks of the war more than one hundred Jews were executed on charges of espionage. It is more than likely that the actual number was in fact much higher. According to the testimony of a Red Cross worker, dozens of Jews were hanged in Ivangorod alone. Of course, the very same worker goes on to write in his diary, “apparently espionage continues to flourish among them.”

On the front the life of a Jew was cheap, if it had any value at all. The British Military Attaché to the Russian Army, General Alfred Knox, once awoke after spending a night in a Polish village to discover the corpse of a Jew hanging from a tree opposite the house he had slept in. The man had been hanged for “espionage.” The perpetrators did not bother to waste any time in seeing if the charges were actually true. On another occasion one of the Russian generals informed Knox that he had been forced to hang three Jews for attacking a Cossack. The British general coldly noted that after this the “Jews became much more polite.”

What was the basis for these accusations of espionage and treason? Was there anything to them besides naked prejudice? Mass deportations of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children may be absurd, but is it possible that these absurd and harmful policies nonetheless had some real justification, however minor or insignificant? There certainly were enemy agents among the Jewish population, especially in the border regions. It is also true that a significant portion of the Jewish population had very little patriotic feeling for their uncaring “Motherland.” But there is an enormous gap between a lack of patriotism and actively serving the enemy. How many individuals were willing to cross it? Seeing as how most of those suspected of espionage were punished without any legal proceedings, we will probably never know. Moreover, the military tribunals often deprived the accused of
counsel, and the accused themselves rarely understood Russian, or the events unfolding before them. When Jews who were accused of espionage were given legal counsel, the charges were always dismissed due to lack of compelling evidence.\textsuperscript{59}

On one of the rare occasions when a charge of espionage was tried in court, O. O. Gruzenberg objected to the accusation and successfully managed to gain another hearing of the case. As a result a certain Gershanovich from Mariampol in the Suwalki gubernia, who had been sentenced to six years hard labor for aiding and abetting the enemy while the city was under German occupation, was acquitted of all charges. Instead, an imam by the name of Bairashevskii was convicted of slander.\textsuperscript{60}

As of January 1, 1914, there were 1,379 individuals suspected of espionage by Russian counterintelligence. From 1911 to 1913, about 220 of these 1,379 (nearly one-sixth) were arrested. Such a low arrest rate must be accounted for by the particular methods used by investigators; for example, if a Jewish merchant was suspected of espionage, then all of his companions and business partners made the list as well. Those suspected often included individuals who had been abroad (or who had relatives abroad, particularly in enemy countries). From 1911 to 1914, thirty-three individuals were tried for espionage. Of these, thirty-one were convicted, while two were exonerated.

There were Jews among those accused of espionage. In 1912, six Jews (five Russian, one German) were arrested in the Vilna okrug (district) on suspicion of espionage. In accordance with the practice of the time, the German subject was amnestied. Two of the Russians, Zakarii Kaufman and Ivan Greblov (the secretary for the Twenty-eighth Artillery) were sentenced to eight years hard labor. Girsh Sagalovich, who had attempted to go abroad in order to sell secret documents concerning mobilization, was sentenced to six years. In the same okrug, Abel Braunstein (five years hard labor) and Movsha Smilg (three years) were convicted of assisting German intelligence and exiled to Siberia, as was Shlema Freiburg from Vilna (four years).\textsuperscript{61}

Let us now turn to the testimonies of the opposing side, the memoirs of M. Ronge and V. Nikolai, who were the respective heads of Austrian and German military intelligence. Ronge had once expressed the hope of making use of “the mood among the Jewish population that had resulted from the pogroms.” According to his account, he received a proposal from the Jewish religious community in Budapest offering their services and contacts with rabbis in Russian Poland. A similar proposal came from another, unnamed, Jewish organization. However, after the end of the war Ronge would claim
that “these demonstrations of good will resulted in insignificant results provided by these organizations.”

Nikolai, the head of German military intelligence, was slightly more optimistic. He wrote that “it should not be difficult to find numerous elements in the acquired Russian border territories who are prepared to carry out covert assignments and who are willing to serve as intermediaries with those who occupy high governmental and military posts.” However, “a Jew as a spy in Russia was often unacquainted with military affairs, and was unable to work independently. As an intermediary, he was often deprived of his wages by the very same Russian he had approached in order to betray.” As a rule, Jewish money-lenders, in collaboration with German agents, would attempt to recruit unintelligent army officers or officials who were deep in debt. However, Nikolai claimed, the potential marks would then usually refuse to repay their debts, threatening to turn in the provocateur to the police.

These stories recounted by Nikolai seem highly unlikely. The Jewish recruiters had to be completely aware of the danger they faced in recruiting Russian officers. Not only would they be unable to recoup their debts, but they would lose their freedom as well. Moreover, money lending and espionage are rather different spheres of activity. It is much more likely that the Jewish agents were playing their employers for fools, receiving an additional salary in exchange for stories of their crafty debtors. After the beginning of the war, those who worked for Germany were mostly Poles, people from the Baltic nations, and Jews. They were guided purely by financial considerations. As Nikolai recalled, “Russian Jews, even during wartime, viewed espionage first and foremost as a trade. They did not actively take part on either side. Despite the fact that they fared better in terms of rights and religious freedoms under the Germans, their sympathies were more likely to incline towards the Russians.”

The results of such activity, irrespective of religious affiliation, were insignificant. “None of the Russian army’s formations were communicated through spies in time.” For German intelligence the most reliable information came from radio operatives, as Russian cyphers were simple and rarely changed. Another valuable source was the documents left behind by Russian authorities and seized by German forces as they advanced. The head of Austrian intelligence concurred: “The most unsurpassingly valuable source of information turned out to be the Russian radio service . . . Russians treated their equipment with such utter disregard that it seemed that none of them had ever thought it would be possible to use the very same receivers they had
in order to catch the necessary frequency.” According to Ronge, the next most valuable source of information were interrogations of captured soldiers.66

It is somewhat difficult to imagine that the heads of Austrian and German intelligence would waste so many resources on recruiting agents who proved to be highly ineffective. It is also worth remembering one more important fact: at the beginning of the war, tens of thousands of Jews were serving in the Russian army (at least 400,000 Jews were called up during the course of the war). It is doubtful that the Jewish population was overly inclined to assist an enemy whose goal was the destruction of their friends and relatives serving in the opposing army. Thus, one is forced to conclude that the reports of Jewish espionage and treason were grossly exaggerated, and that for the sins of dozens, or at most a couple hundred individuals, hundreds of thousands of Jews were punished.

When viewed against the enormous number of people forcefully deported, the number of those suspected of espionage was incomparably small. One is forced to agree with Grekov’s concluding remarks in his monograph on the history of espionage and counterintelligence in early twentieth-century Russia: “Today we can claim with certainty that the scale of German and Austrian espionage in Russian territories during the First World War was greatly exaggerated.”67

In addition to deportations, in order to “neutralize” the Jewish population, the military engaged in the more “rational” practice of hostage taking. It was one matter to deport Jews, but it was quite another to resettle them, as the “receiving” gubernias were less than eager for their arrival. Thus the authorities decided to use a less wasteful method for combating “treason.” On May 24, 1915, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich “recognized the necessity of taking a number of rabbis and rich Jews captive as a warning for their criminal outbursts, as well as threatening their property with seizure. Should there be the slightest attempt on the part of Jews to undertake actions that would do harm to our army, they were warned that the most repressive measures would be taken.”68

The taking of hostages was first practiced by the Germans in Belgium and France. In the literature on the subject it has been claimed that only Russia decided to take captives from their own subjects whose coreligionists were simultaneously being drafted into the army. This is not entirely true. Austria-Hungary employed a similar approach when it annexed Bosnia and Montenegro (de facto 1878, de jure 1908). In Montenegro, in accordance with Austrian orders, “small military formations” were subject to being fired upon.
should they attempt to move from village to village. To add credence to the threat, the village of Orakhovats was razed and the hostages were shot. After the Russian occupation of Galicia, there was decidedly pro-Russian sentiment among the local populace. “We were confronted with a hostility the likes of which the most pessimistic of us never even dreamed,” wrote Ronge. The Austrians resorted to taking hostages, mostly village elders and Orthodox priests. The fate of the latter was particularly tragic. Before 1916, 128 priests were shot, 125 were imprisoned, and 25 were threatened with legal action. An additional 71 priests left with the Russian forces. In total these numbers amounted to one-seventh of the entire priesthood in the Lvov, Peremyshl (Przemyśl) and Stanislav okrugs.69

Nonetheless, the Russian repression of the Jewish population was unprecedented in scale. “The Imperial government and Judeophobic society continued to engage in a war of annihilation even while Jewish blood was being spilled on the front lines.” The claim is only somewhat exaggerated; this “war” never reached the point of total annihilation. Nonetheless there is a good amount of truth in the claims of the authors of the “black book” of Russian Jewry.70

Wounded Jewish soldiers were not exempt from deportation. Private D. E. Kortsov, who had been undergoing medical treatment for his injuries, was deported from Kiev in 1915. Decorated veterans fared no better; the disabled I. B. Lindin, a cavalier of the Cross of St. George, was also deported in the same year.71 In June of 1915, S. M. Dubnov wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council, which never reached its addressee: “Recently, the Minister of Internal Affairs [N. A. Maklakov] allowed wounded Jewish soldiers recuperating in Petrograd to remain in the capital for only two months, in order to ‘become familiar with the use of their artificial limbs.’ After this, these incapacitated invalids are to be expelled from the capitals of the country in whose defense they had lost their own arms and legs.”72

Deportations were often accompanied by violence, looting, and pogroms. The looting often took place under the guise of “requisitions” and was for all intents and purposes sanctioned from above. As the headquarters of the Fourth Army of the Southwestern Front explained in reply to a request for “protocols in carrying out requisitions in the theater of military action and in threatened regions”: “Take everything from the Yids.”73

The chronicle of the devastation of Jewish settlements in Belorussia and Lithuania during the summer and fall of 1915 differs little from the history of the pogroms during the Civil War period. Cossacks and Dragoons took the
most active part in the looting and pillaging. In the Kovno gubernia, fifteen population centers were attacked in June of 1915. In the shtetl of Volniki, a fourteen-year-old girl by the name of Alta Shmidt was raped, while outside of the town of Onikshtry a Jewish miller was murdered along with his son for refusing to give up his wife and daughter.\textsuperscript{74}

From August to September of 1915, nineteen population centers were attacked in the Vilna gubernia. The attacks in Smorgon were particularly vicious. Several people were killed, and Cossacks raped women inside the synagogue. The violence came to end after a confrontation with Jewish soldiers. During the deportation, Leiba Sobol told a Cossack officer that he would not leave behind his elderly father, who had fallen ill. The officer shot the old man on the spot, and told Sobol that he was now free to leave. Cossacks razed several houses in Smorgon and elsewhere. Some Jews were burned alive.\textsuperscript{75}

The pogroms stretched across the Minsk, Volynia, and Grodno gubernias. Local peasants joined in the looting, just as they would in 1919 during the pogroms in Ukraine. Once again, Cossack troops took a leading role. Rape was widespread, and murders were not uncommon. In Lemeshevichy (in the Pinsk uezd) three twelve-year-olds and one eleven-year-old girl were raped, in Lebedev (in the Vilna gubernia) the rape victims were mostly elderly women, including those over the age of seventy. In the village Bereznovka (Borisov uezd) ten Cossacks raped a seventy-two-year-old woman. According to intelligence data from the police department, by the fall of 1915 in nearly the entire western area of the Borisov uezd and the Minsk gubernia, the Jewish population was vulnerable to looting and pillaging. Again, it was mostly Cossacks (and occasionally Uhlans) carrying out most of the violence. They were often encouraged and joined by the local peasant population.

Soldiers would often request “tribute” and demand tobacco and cigarettes. The general in charge of the Cossack forces that had occupied the village of Dokshitsy once summoned the local rabbi and threatened to hang him if the local shops remained closed. When they were opened, local peasants joined the soldiers in throwing all of the goods into the street. A Cossack soldier once demanded tobacco from a flour merchant by the name of Beines Shapiro. When Shapiro explained that he did not deal in tobacco, the Cossack placed a noose around his neck and dragged him off to be hanged. Along the way, he demanded fifty rubles. Such was the price of a life. When Shapiro explained that he only had ten rubles, the Cossack demanded a hundred cigarettes to make up the difference. As Shapiro went around town attempting to procure the cigarettes, the Cossack followed him, beating him
with his saber to make him hurry up. On occasion, Cossacks quartered in Jewish homes would fuel the fire with furniture, even when there was plenty of firewood to be found.\\footnote{26}

In the town of Grodno, during the battle with German forces, most of the civilian population took shelter in cellars. The Cossacks went throughout the town, poking pikes into the cellars to look for people hidden within. Bronislava Brzhenkovskaia was wounded by one of the Cossack pikes. She was dragged out of the cellar and taken before an officer. The Cossacks claimed, “Jews are hiding in cellars and shooting at the troops.” The officer ordered that she be taken away and that all Jews hiding in basements should be killed, which was done in short order. The wounded woman was taken to Lida. When it became apparent that she was actually a Pole, she was freed.\\footnote{27}

Military publications such as Razvedchik (The Scout), Nash Vestnik (Our Herald), and Izvestia legitimized the violence perpetrated against the Jews, and were full of antisemitic statements, which had been passed by the military censors. One such story, “Malen’kii Fel’eton” (published in The Army Herald, Armeiskii Vestnik) told how a Cossack beheaded a “small nimble shopkeeper” with his saber. Meanwhile, The Scout published a piece announcing that in the now-liberated Galicia, “Russian law” had been established, meaning that any violence against Jews would be met with little opposition from commanding officers.\\footnote{28}

These anti-Jewish measures were the result of a shared common policy and were not merely the manifestations of antipathy toward Jews on the part of military command, as they have often been presented. However, the roles of certain individual military commanders should not be ignored. Some of these were quite successful in their war against the Jews, indeed, far more successful than they were at defeating an armed opponent. Among those included would be the general N. N. Iaushkevich and others such as N. V. Ruzskii, N. I. Ivanov, and M. D. Bonch-Bruevich. In 1917, Bonch-Bruevich served under General Ruzskii and was chairman of the Commission on Workers’ Issues on the Northern Front. Literally on the eve of the February revolution, he made a proposal that would expel all Jewish doctors not only from the front lines but from the home front as well. It is unclear as to why the commission was occupying itself with Jewish doctors (apparently it was the result of “enthusiasm” on the part of the chairman).\\footnote{29} Due to the revolution the measures were not passed, and Bonch-Bruevich went on to become one of the “founders” of the Red Army, and successfully continued his military career under the command of Trotsky and E. M. Sklianskii.
The violent actions committed against the Jews in Galicia were even more vicious than the repressions suffered by Russian Jewry. After the Russian invasion in August of 1914, pogroms of various degrees of severity took place in Brody, Radzivillov, Lvov, Sokal, and other cities and villages. The main instigators, once again, were the Cossacks. As a rule, the violence would only come to an end after a “normal” occupational government was established.80

Descriptions of the Russian army’s actions during the Brusilov Offensive differ little from the pogroms that were to occur in Ukraine in 1919. In Buchach, a Jewish soldier witnessed a ten-year-old boy who was lying near his mother. Both of his hands had been broken. His mother’s legs had been cut off, her head smashed, and she had been raped before she died. In addition to this, he saw numerous women who had been beaten to death and men who had had their eyes cut out or who had been strangled or burned alive.

The entire Jewish population fled the town of Monastyrzhisk upon the second arrival of the Russian army, with the exception of three mentally ill individuals and one person who was paralyzed. The latter, a man 60 years of age, owned several plots of land. When Cossack forces first entered the city, they announced: “You Yid, under the Austrians you were allowed to own land. Under the Russians, you’ll have to till the earth with your own teeth.” They then whipped the old man, forcing him to get down on all fours and dig at the ground with his nose. The next day, the paralytic broke his own nose.

Violent acts were accompanied by sacrilege. Torah scrolls from twenty-three synagogues in the city of Buchach were pillaged. The Jewish soldier Abba Lev managed to collect nearly four poods of desecrated Torah scrolls from fifteen cities in Galicia and Bukovyna that had been attacked by Russian forces. In Monastyrzhisk one synagogue was used as a military hospital. The Jewish cemetery was also destroyed; graves were dug up, and their marble tombstones shattered.81

Violence toward the Jewish population was, for all intents and purposes, ordered from above, and antisemitic propaganda clearly indicated who the enemy was. Soon, antisemitism became a common practice in the armed forces. This “model” of the military pogroms of the Civil War period was in place long before the events that were to transpire in Ukraine.

Official propaganda and widespread anti-Jewish sentiment fed off one another. The civilian population often blamed the Jews for the scarcities that occurred as a result of the war. A. L. Yudenich, the head of the Volynia Gen-
darmes, reported to the police department on May 8, 1915 that the population of the city of Zhitomir “was markedly hostile to Jews,” who had allegedly “artificially inflated the prices of necessities.” There were some who believed that they had to “deal with” the Jews, and these “conversations were heavily influenced by the most recent official proclamations regarding Jewish espionage and treasonous activity. They were strengthened by the latest sensationalist rumors, apparently spread by the very same Jews, that our troops had been losing, and that they lacked guns and ammunition.” These rumors could spill over into “open pogroms against Jews and mass rioting.”

This report speaks to the effectiveness of official propaganda. The “most recent official proclamations” cited by Yudenich were undoubtedly the latest reports from Kuzhi. Similar reports came from Kherson. In May of 1915 the governor of Kherson had likewise informed the Department about an increase in anti-Jewish sentiment in connection with the scarcity of goods, which was attributed to Jewish speculators and “Jewish espionage, such as the events that had taken place in the Shavley area.” The police chief in Volynia attributed the rumors regarding military defeats and the lack of arms and munitions to the Jewish population. Unfortunately, these were hardly rumors. It was precisely at this time that a powerful German and Austrian combined offensive began, which eventually resulted in a large number of Russian casualties, forcing the army to retreat from Galicia. The Russian forces lost nearly 500,000 soldiers to capture alone. As far as the lack of military supplies was concerned, everyone knew about it; it was one of the best-known open secrets of the war.

These reports forced the police department into action. On May 21, 1915 the department published a circular aimed at preventing pogroms:

Among certain segments of the Empire’s population extreme hostility towards Jews has been building. This is largely the result of their attempts to take advantage of the problems in the current market, where they are attempting to artificially inflate prices of the basic necessities required for life.

As a result of this, as well as the latest official accounts confirming Jewish espionage in the current war, restless segments of the population have been openly conducting a propaganda campaign aimed at encouraging the masses to partake in open general pogroms against the Jews.
One of the most scandalous antisemitic documents of this period was the handiwork of K. D. Kafafov, a high-ranking official in the police department. On January 9, 1916, he sent a circular to all local governors, commanders, and chiefs of police. I will quote only the most important part of the message:

According to information received by the Police department, Jews, through numerous underground organizations, are currently carrying out revolutionary propaganda with the goal of increasing discontent throughout Russia. In addition to their criminal agitation among the troops and in major industrial centers of the Empire, including fomenting labor strikes, they have adopted two more methods: the artificial inflation of the prices of necessities and the withholding of small denominations of money from circulation.

Knowing that neither military setbacks nor revolutionary agitation will have any lasting effect on the masses, the revolutionaries, the Jews that inspire them, and their secret German supporters now intend to incite discontent and protests against the war through the methods of famine and hyper-inflation. These malicious merchants are hoarding goods and slowing deliveries and the off-loading of goods at railroad stations as much as they possibly can.

Thanks to the lack of small coins in circulation, the Jews are attempting to instill a distrust of Russian currency among the general population in order to devalue it. They thus force depositors to remove their saving from state institutions and banks while hiding metal coins, the only money that has any intrinsic value. Following the release of equivalent [paper] banknotes, the Jews have actively participated in the spreading of the rumor among the populace that the Russian government has gone bankrupt, as it doesn’t even have enough metal for coins.\textsuperscript{85}

As a more recent study has shown, the initiators of this circular were two generals, M. V. Alekseev and V. I. Trotsky, who had sent a memorandum to the author on November 26, 1915. Kafafov himself seemed somewhat opposed to its being sent out, but he was forced to comply by his superior, the deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (S. P. Beletskii).\textsuperscript{86} The document serves to demonstrate the thought processes and mentality prevalent among certain
segments of the Russian military and bureaucratic machine. First and foremost they incorporated a belief in a conspiracy, a kind of evil presence that was secretly determining the course of historical events.

Several years later, F. I. Rodichev would write, “We turned out to be quite mistaken in regards to the intellectual maturity of Russia. There were those who were correct in their evaluation of the Russian peasantry, who maintained a medieval mentality, which held that cholera could be transmitted through binoculars, that Germans were coming by plane to Tambov to steal their grain. However, we were all wrong when it came to the upper echelons of society . . . This anti-Jewish environment, so similar to the one where people believe in a conspiracy by the Masons, they believe in sorcerers, the end of the world, a devil with horns or without them . . . The anti-Semitism of the upper echelons of this society has much in common with the antisemitism of the masses: the darkness of ignorance, the power of vile passions and animal instincts, and the complete incapacity for rational analysis.”

The obvious absurdity of the Kafafov circular was even apparent to V. I. Purishkevich, who on February 12, 1916 exclaimed in the Duma: “I hate the Jews, and my views on the Jewish question have not changed, but it does not follow that at the current moment I can point my finger at the Yid and say that he embodies all that is evil.” This “betrayal” on the part of Purishkevich disturbed a number of his fellow antisemites. The clerk Malinin from Vilna wrote, “Why would you, while removing the German yoke from us, want to sell us into slavery to those spying, treasonous, treacherous Yids? It is shameful, and we, the entire Russian people, announce that we will ‘overthrow the government, and do everything possible to expel the Yids from Russian soil.’ The Army is still strong and is completely aware that all Yids are traitors, while the people are also ready for anything.”

A congress of monarchist organizations in Nizhny Novgorod that took place from November 26–29, 1915 adopted a series of resolutions of a similar nature. The honorary chairman of the congress was A. I. Dubrovin, the leader of the organization Union of the Russian People. The chairman was K. N. Paskhalov, a well-known activist on the right. The attendees at the congress, however, were predominantly “people of meager means.” These “idea workers for monarchist ways,” according to the congress organizers’ report, paid for their own travel expenses.

The economics committee of the congress, which was chaired by the priest P. I. Lastochkin, passed a resolution entitled “The struggle against scarcity.”
The resolution praised the fight against “Jewish aggression” and proposed “taking all trade out of Jewish hands by declaring them to be foreign subjects.” The resolution also proposed a series of “anti-market” measures, such as the introduction of a state monopoly on basic necessities (kerosene, tea, sugar, tobacco, and alcohol), concentrating the bread market in the hands of the government, restricting the role of banks in wholesale trade, and forbidding or restricting foreign and non-Russian activity in the Russian economy.

Trade, one of the basic spheres of Jewish economic activity, was becoming more and more dangerous due to inflation and the lack of goods. Impersonal market forces had to be explained in human terms. Thus the belief that Jews were purposefully hoarding goods began to take root in the social consciousness. On May 7, 1916, a pogrom broke out in Krasnoiarsk due to “a lack of basic necessities.” The homes and stores that were destroyed were predominantly Jewish.

* * *

After the February Revolution, conditions became even worse. On June 24, 1917 a group of Jewish tradesmen was attacked in Kiev while unloading their wares. Several of them were severely beaten, as were a number of Jewish members of the local militia who had attempted to stop the beatings. On June 28 a similar crowd attacked Jewish shops at the market in the city of Aleksandrovsk in the Ekaterinoslav gubernia. A local Cossack regiment was called in to suppress the disturbance. There was a rumor in the city of Elizavetgrad that “Jews were hiding all of their goods in the cemetery. The masses believed the absurd rumor and went to search the cemetery, digging up several dozen graves.”

Nearly every issue of Jewish Week from the summer of 1917 onwards included accounts of “pogromistic activities.” These occurrences were most often linked with reports of scarcity of basic necessities and other vital goods. In August rumors began to be spread that Jews were taking goods out of their market stalls and burying them, and an outbreak of attacks ensued. In most cases, the Jews in question were simply returning the goods to storage. In Chernigov, such rumors led to an attack on Jewish homes by a mob a thousand strong in search of the hidden goods. In the area of Solianka in Moscow on August 20, there was a rumor that people were hiding additional bread. A bakery was destroyed, and a number of Jews who happened to be nearby were beaten including two commissars, Reizen and Kovarskii. On August 22 on
the corner of Vitebsk street in Petrograd, a “riot occurred when a crowd attacked a group of merchants whom they suspected of hoarding goods.”

On September 12 Jewish Week ran two articles, “The Danger of Pogroms and Methods of Self-defense” and “An Ominous Premonition.” The euphoria of the previous March had long since dissipated. The authors attempted to establish who was behind the organization of the pogroms, and assumed that they were tied to the former regime. They called for unity within the Jewish population, while simultaneously advising that everyone should try not to “stand out.” For the bakers and shoe-sellers who were often the first targets of attacks, such advice was of little use.

The situation was much worse than it appeared to the journalists writing in the capitals. Antisemitism seemed to be growing of its own accord. Petrograd politicians and journalists sought the “ringleaders” of the pogroms, while the population was in search of “internal enemies,” Jews first and foremost. The population at large was convinced that “outsiders” had to be responsible for their widespread misfortune. In Russia in 1917, these “outsiders” were also held responsible for artificially inflated prices, the general dearth of goods, and everything else, up to and including the coup d’état that had taken place in the capitals.

The writer I. F. Nazhivin provides an interesting account of Russian antisemitism from this period. The year 1917 found him in the village of Bulanovo (about five hours outside of Moscow and fifteen versts from Vladimir). Despite widespread indicators of civilization (a telephone, growing literacy among the younger generations), Nazhivin was constantly in awe of the backwardness of the local muzhiks. “In some places, there were outbreaks of antisemitism the likes of which had never been seen in our area, as only a small number of us had ever seen a live Jew.”

In the fall of 1917, pogroms would continue, reaching a massive scale. On September 12 and 13 in Tambov, riots broke out in which first Jewish (and later Russian) stalls and shops were destroyed. Of course, the fact that this turned out to be a “general” pogrom was of little solace to those Jewish merchants who were the first to be targeted. As the lead article in Jewish Week claimed, “in all honesty, it is hard to tell these days who is an extreme democrat, and who is simply a convinced pogromist.” When the Tambov Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies was informed of the pogrom, someone proposed enacting measures to end it. “Why stop them? Let’s go help them out!” several voices responded. Despite the fact that this information was published in several newspapers, a retraction was not forthcoming.
The participants in the Tambov pogrom were put on trial. Of the fifty-eight accused, forty-three were soldiers. This should hardly come as a surprise; garrisoned soldiers were among the most active participants in the pogroms of 1917. There were more “general” pogroms than “Jewish” ones. However, no matter where such riots were to occur, if there was a Jewish population in the vicinity, its members would nearly always come under attack.

In the pages of Jewish Week, such occurrences no longer fell under the rubric of “pogromistic” or “antisemitic” agitation. Instead, they were simply labeled “pogroms.” Nearly every account of a pogrom mentioned participation by members of the armed forces. The participation of the “revolutionary” army was hardly newsworthy. It was still completely possible for soldiers to murder a couple of Jews without any fear of reprisal if the latter were suspected of being in league with the enemy. During the panicked Russian retreat from Tarnopol in July 1917, pogroms were carried out in Chernovtsy, Stanislawov, Tarnopol, and elsewhere. “The completely disordered soldiers shamefully shrink before the German advances, ‘valiantly’ raping, looting, and slaughtering peaceful civilians (the horrors of the pogroms in Kalush and Halych far exceeded those of Kishinev),” wrote one commentator, by no means a semitophile himself.

The troops stationed at the Caucasian front in Persia also engaged in pogroms. These were not carried out against Jews in particular (as they were few in number). Rather they bore a more “international” character, and often targeted marketplaces. Such pogroms took place in Ushkue, Urmia, Solozhbulake, Sherif-khane, Dilmane, Khoe. During the pogrom in Urmia, one of the members of the army committee apparently cried out to the soldiers, “Comrades, what are you doing? Is this really the best way to fight capitalism? Capitalism can only be attacked in an organized fashion!” The main victims of these pogroms were Kurds. As requisition squads were pillaging the local Kurdish population, one group found themselves surrounded. The squadron commander’s head was chopped off and given to the children to play with. In reprisal several Kurdish villages were razed. According to witnesses, local women covered their faces, chests, and legs from the knees to their waists in feces in order to avoid being raped. The soldiers wiped them clean and raped them anyway.

In late September–October of 1917, pogroms became commonplace. Newspapers reported pogroms in Bendery and Tiraspol that were carried out by soldiers, and pogromistic activity in Kharkov. In Ostrog in the Volynia
Pogroms of 1918–1920

At the end of September 1917, a group of twenty soldiers in Kharkov went to a Jewish cemetery and desecrated a newly-dug grave, claiming that goods had been hidden in graves over the past several days. On October 2, a group of soldiers, shouting “The Jews are hoarding shoes!” attacked a Jewish funeral procession. The soldiers forced them to open the coffin and “present” the deceased.

In Roslavl in the Smolensk gubernia a pogrom broke out in the usual fashion. A crowd gathered, demanding rubber overshoes (galoshy). Having discovered a box of shoes, the crowd took to beating and robbing the local Jews. At least two people were killed and up to twenty were wounded. The pogrom was led by soldiers from the two reserve regiments stationed at Roslavl.

In the middle of September, a similarly tragic episode took place at the Vladimir market in Kiev. A Jewish woman by the name of Epelbaum was giving out flour according to ration cards. The Jewish women present were forced out of the line; the crowd had decided that Epelbaum was giving Jewish women flour without having to wait in line. Several women stormed the stall. A rumor soon started that Epelbaum had attacked one of the women with a weight and killed her. A mob soon formed, including local soldiers (who were selling watermelons they had earlier stolen) and temporarily demobilized soldier who were in town seeking medical treatment. Together they attacked Epelbaum and beat her half to death. Her relatives and a number of Jewish members from a local militia squad comprised of saddle-makers came to her assistance. But as she was being taken away by ambulance, the mob dragged her away and finished her off.

A similar event transpired in Vitebsk on April 29, 1918, even after the establishment of the Soviet state. Fortunately, this time there were no victims. On this occasion, the local commissaries refused to distribute flour during Christian holidays. The local Christian population held the Jews responsible for this, as they were the ones who were allegedly “saving all the flour themselves for Passover.”

In a lead article in Jewish Week entitled “Don’t Panic!” the author describes the situation facing Russian Jewry: “Once more the Damoclean sword of the pogrom movement hangs over the heads of Russian Jewry. This movement is of such a scale that it may make all the preceding pogroms look like...
child’s play.” According to the author, the pogrom movement that had seized
the country in the fall of 1917 was not specifically aimed against Jews. “It is
undoubtedly the result of the complete collapse of the social and political life
of the country, and has been further sharpened by the crisis in necessities.
Thus, the center of this issue is to be found in the fight for the recovery of the
central political mechanisms of the country.” The claim is more or less ac-
curate, although it hardly made things more bearable for those Jews who
were far removed from politics, yet nevertheless found themselves to be the
first victims of the economic and political “disease.”

This issue of the newspaper came out three days before the Bolshevik
coup, though the pogroms failed to cease upon their assumption of power. In
Kors (Krolevets uезд) a pogrom took place November 11–13. The most active
participants were soldiers from the local garrison. In total, the bandits pil-
laged twenty-six Jewish shops. Order was eventually restored by troops sent
by the revolutionary military committee located in Konotop. In Rybnitsa
(Podolia губерния), a number of Jewish shops and homes were destroyed, and
people were killed and wounded. A wave of pogroms targeting Jews and
landowners broke out in the Mogilev губерния. Groups of soldiers returning
from the front attacked and looted shtetls and country estates. Everything
(including undergarments) was either carried off or destroyed on the spot.

From September to December 1917 nearly sixty population centers wit-
nessed some form of pogrom activity. In April of 1918, Iu. D. Brutskus, one
of the leading Zionists of the time wrote: “The bloodless Russian revolution
gave birth to bloody chaos, freedom gave way to tyranny, equality—to the
rule of ‘declassed’ [deklassirovannyе] elements, and brotherhood turned out
to be a word that had long lost its meaning. A vicious and bloodthirsty war of
all pitted against all has begun. And in this war, as in all catastrophes and
revolutions, the weakest suffer the most, and of all the nations, the most de-
fenseless is the Jewish nation . . . In this golus [diaspora], in places where the
Jews are too many in number not to be noticed but too few in number to
defend themselves, civil disturbances are most often accompanied by po-
groms. The motivations are varied, and the types of pogroms are dependent
on the psychology of the people involved, but the fundamental reason re-
 mains the same: the weakness and defenselessness of the Jewish people.”

Brutskus was disturbed by those “politickers” who had “crawled to the
Jews in 1905,” and who were much like the Russian revolutionaries of 1882 in
their attempts to “take advantage of these unfortunate events for political
ends”: “The Bolsheviks have already come out and made their accusations
against the bourgeoisie, the counterrevolutionaries, and the priesthood, whom they accuse of being behind the pogroms, while on the other side we hear the philippics of the other political parties, placing all of the blame on the Bolsheviks and their demoralizing and anarchistic tactics.”

Brushtskus apparently foresaw the resolution that was to be adopted at the Kadet conference in November of 1919.

* * *

The image of Jews as spies and traitors was deeply ingrained in the social consciousness, particularly among members of the military. Depending on the context, Jews could be painted as Bolsheviks just as easily as they could counterrevolutionaries. With their fevered and primitive worldviews, the Reds, Whites, and Petliurists would all at various points imagine themselves to have been “shot in the back” by the Jewish people.

At certain points this metaphor would be “realized” in real life. Such a “shot in the back” (allegedly carried out by a Jewish woman) was the justification for the pogroms that took place in Galicia. In Brody, a young woman (the daughter of a hotel owner) allegedly fired into a group of Cossacks. She was killed, along with four other Jews, and part of the city was razed to the ground. Only later on did it become clear that no one had fired at the Cossacks (whereas earlier this had been treated as an indisputable fact). The Jewish quarter of Lvov was ransacked and eighteen Jews were killed in reprisal for “a shot being fired by a Jewish woman from a window.” Similar “gunshots” served as a starting signal in nearly ten other pogroms. I. P. Demidov, a Duma member and head of a medical brigade active near the front, once remarked to A. S. An-sky that in just about every city “a gunshot fired by a young Jewish woman” would coincidentally happen to come from the building where the best store in town happened to be located.

“Jewish gunshots” would continue to be heard by various armed forces during the Civil War period. Red Army soldiers, in a disorderly retreat from a German offensive during the spring of 1918, carried out a series of pogroms in the northern uezds of the Chernigov gubernia, claiming that “the Jews were shooting at the Red Army,” that “they’re all counterrevolutionaries” and were welcoming the advancing German forces. A certain Fomin, the head instructor of the Military Commissariat in Kursk at the time, claimed that Jewish militia forces were firing upon retreating Red Army soldiers. The Evkom (Jewish Commissariat) sent its own representative to investigate the
accusations. As it turned out, there were no Jewish militias in the city whatsoever.123

On April 9, 1919 Polish legionnaires in the city of Pinsk (population 24,000, of which 20,000 were Jews) arrested the attendees at a Zionist meeting who had gathered to discuss how best to distribute some humanitarian aid sent to them from the United States. Nearly all of those present (thirty-seven individuals, though other accounts put the number at thirty-five) were taken out to the market square and executed by machine gun. According to the original version propagated by the Polish telegraph service, “several shots were fired at the occupying ublans from the windows of Jewish homes as night fell, already after the city had been occupied.” The meeting was allegedly a Bolshevik recruitment center, and the Polish troops had discovered “large caches of weapons.” A representative of an American Jewish organization happened to be in town at the time. Thanks to him, the incident was widely publicized in the international press.124

During the Petliurist pogroms at the beginning of 1919, I. F. Nazhivin was traveling from Kazatin to Odessa by train. On the train he noticed that “among the sullen, frozen passengers there was a brazen call for more and more pogroms. Soldiers formed the majority of the proselytizers. They attempted to convince others that the Jews had formed their own special regiments, that they were fighting for the pany [Poles], that they were firing from their windows at the people who had taken up arms, etc.” Nazhivin doubted the accusations, as “Jewish regiments and so on seemed rather unbelievable . . .” The soldier began to shout, “Not only have they formed their own regiments, not only have they opened fire on us, but they even poured boiling water on the people from their windows. They stand for the old regime.” The majority of the passengers supported the soldier.125

After the Bolshevik capture of Kiev, the Petliurist Fourth Artillery was passing through Kazatin, which was close to where Nazhivin lived at the time. Even at this point, the Petliurists were sure they would be able to handle the Bolsheviks, if they could only manage to “cut down those damn Yids!” “What do you mean cut down the Yids?” Nazhivin asked, surprised, “I thought you were Republicans, that you stood for liberty, equality, and brotherhood?!” “As it turned out, there was a special exception for Yids when it came to liberty, equality, and brotherhood because they were forming their own regiments in order to support the old regime, because they poured boiling water on the soldiers, etc.”126
One would think that the Whites, who were more civilized than the Ukrainian peasants that constituted the bulk of the Petliuirists, would have been better. However, during the Battle of Kiev in the spring of 1919 White forces began to spread rumors that Jews had been throwing boiling water and sulfuric acid at “our sisters of mercy.” An officer with “a university insignia on his chest” proclaimed, “The Jews are attacking our soldiers, throwing boiling water and burning tar [sic] at our nurses, and assisting the Bolsheviks.”

After the Whites reoccupied Kiev, the newspaper Vechernie Ogni (Evening Lights) published a list of Jewish homes and apartments from which retreating White Army members had been shot at and attacked with boiling water and sulfuric acid. The editors assured its readership that the list had been verified by the local police and that it “corresponded to military reports.” A special commission was established to investigate all of the addresses listed. The newspaper’s claims were rejected. The sheer absurdity of the accusations was readily apparent to any sober thinking person. After all, these events took place in the twentieth century, not the Middle Ages. The very notion that Jews would shoot at troops from their own windows is ridiculous. Nonetheless, this utter nonsense was passed by the military censors. Among other things, it was established that the puffs of smoke coming from the windows of Jewish homes in Kiev were caused by ricochets. In other words, the accusers had gotten everything right except for the direction of the shots fired. Similar stories from other towns and cities could be explained in a similar fashion.

Discussing the myth of “shots in the back,” Denikin once remarked that “in addition to real occurrences, false accusations were also common in order to justify illegal violence. On occasion such shots turned out to be of ‘Christian’ heritage, or were completely fabricated. Mutual hatred clouded people’s minds, and every hostile act from the Jews seemed objectively plausible, and all accusations, both true and false, were accepted by the masses and their unwavering beliefs.”

V. M. Fisher, a translator of Byron and the author of numerous textbooks on Russian literature, witnessed a typical episode in the city of Dashev in the Lipovets uyezd. In October or November of 1919 a number of Cossacks came to the village. Though they did not rob or pillage at first, the situation soon changed, especially after a Cossack squadron was ambushed. Naturally, they blamed the ambush on the local Jews. One of the Cossacks told Fisher, “We weren’t going to touch anyone. We went outside walked for about ten
versus or so, when we were ambushed by a gang. They couldn’t have been sent by anybody but the Yids. That’s what we decided. So we say, ‘Just you wait, you devils! We’ll take care of you real quick!’ We got rid of them, and came right back here.”

There was no logic whatsoever to any of this. The “insurgents” constantly terrorized the local Jewish population and constantly resorted to extortion, taking thousands of rubles. In one instance, they demanded a hundred pairs of shoes. On occasion these would-be fighters for a free Ukraine would take hostages. The commander of one of the squadrons explained, “Our unit is employing pedagogical methods. We are trying to teach the Jews to stay out of politics. We want to kill their desire for power in Ukraine, where it should rest only in the hands of the Ukrainian people. So we give them a little bloodless lesson.” This “lesson” consisted of whipping the hostages. Other rebel units would later “make their presence felt with additional pillaging and occasional murders and rapes.”

The Cossacks had their own “logic.” By blaming the local Jews for “selling them out” to the enemy, they were not simply looking for reasons to engage in banditry. They actually believed their own claims. The mere presence of Jews among the local population was a sufficient explanation for what had transpired. The ensuing attacks were hardly the worst that were to occur in this town. A Jewish midwife by the name of Khalaldovskaia also lived in the town of Dashev. “Her husband had gone to Siberia with the intention of bringing the rest of the family at a later date. But she and her young son had gotten stranded in Dashev. A dentist by the name of Moroz was sharing their apartment with them. One day a group of Cossacks showed up at their apartment, spent the entire evening there, and started to make advances on her. She refused. At the time Moroz was there with another guest. The Cossacks killed them all. The son managed to escape to safety. The next morning, their bloody corpses were discovered, still seated around the table . . .”

When it came to Jews, soldiers often took the worst possible explanation of event as the only possible explanation. When some Petliurists came across a Jewish tailor with two daughters (aged 11 and 14), and happened to noticed that the older child was holding a pair of scissors, they accused the girl of having sabotaged the telegraph lines. As punishment, they cut out their eyes and tongues, and then killed them. Some White officers killed a Jewish student and his wife for “espionage.” Their “proof” was the presence of a notebook filled with addresses. The student had been employed by one of the Kiev newspapers, and he had fled the city after it had been seized by the
Bolsheviks. As he and his wife were rushing towards “liberated” Kiev, they met their end at the hands of the Volunteer Army . . .

Isaak Babel’s literary alter-ego Liutov, the war correspondent from the series of short stories Red Cavalry, describes how some Red Army members slaughtered an elderly Jewish man: “Right outside my windows they were getting ready to shoot an old grey-bearded Jew for espionage. The old man was shrieking and trying to get away. Kudria from the machine gun detachment put his head under his arm. The Jews fell silent and spread his legs. Kudria pulled out his dagger with his right hand and carefully slit the old man’s throat without dirtying himself. Then he knocked on one of the closed windows. ‘If anyone wants to come and get him, let them. That’s allowed.’”

Some time back Turgenev wrote a short story about a Jewish spy from the time of the Napoleonic wars. The story’s protagonist finds himself unable to watch an execution and runs from the place where the “Yid Girshel” was being hanged. The memory was to remain with him his entire life. Seventy-five years separate Babel’s story from Turgenev’s. Babel’s Liutov doesn’t close his eyes, nor does he run away. By this time, human life had lost much of its value, and literary technique had become more concise. Babel needed only a paragraph to describe his execution.

Engaging in commerce during the height of the Civil War was a fatal occupation for the Jewish population. Reds, Whites, and Greens alike all held a passionate dislike for merchants and those who would engage in speculation. The Reds as a matter of principle tried to outlaw profit and attempted to put an end to commercial interests.

Upon returning from a trip to Ukraine, N. Materanskii, the head of the Moscow Soviet’s Provisions Department, noted that one of the reasons for antisemitic sentiment was the Jews’ role “as speculators in the markets of the most vital necessities”: “In Ukraine, the Jews mostly worked in commerce, and now nearly the entire remaining private commercial structure is in their hands.” According to Materanskii, Jews played “a dominant role in storing, purchasing, and the delivery of provisions, in price-gouging, and in the problem of provisions in general.” This is why they were subject to “all the hatred for the crisis.” Moreover, the population at large believed that the Jews currently in positions of power were protecting those who engaged in speculation.

In a letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, G. Klunnyi (a former member of the Ukrainian Left SR Party) likewise held that the main reason for antisemitism in his village was the Jews’ traditional choice of occupation, commerce. “Most of the villagers knew a Jewish
businessman who had used any means possible to exploit others, particularly when it came to the selling of bread. Whereas the peasant fed the Jews with the food he made, the Jew did nothing for him. The Jewish craftsman served the bourgeoisie (the Poles, _panstwo_) and the petit-bourgeois (hatters, shoemakers, etc.). But the village had never seen Jewish proletarians. Since peasants do not consider trading to be labor, they do not take any Jews to be workers. This is why the peasants have such a hatred for the “Yid commissars.” This is also why the phrase, “the Jews used to exploit us, now they want to sit on our necks” is so popular in Ukraine. A nation that stands apart from the cultural life of the masses, that stands apart from the principle of labor, becomes an object of hostility for those masses, who associate it with the oppressing class.”

It is easy to see how the views of this recently converted communist coincide with the archaic worldview of the peasantry. During War Communism, trade, which was almost always considered to be “speculation,” was equated with criminal activity.

The claim that the Jews were responsible for the dearth of provisions was widespread. “Bread used to cost us 5 rubles, and now it costs 15 rubles, and it’s all because of the Yids, who have taken over all of the institutions,” wrote one inhabitant of the town of Rovny in the Volynia gubernia. However, there were also those who were more perceptive in their readings of the “political economy” of 1919. “Right now there is a struggle going on between Soviet power and the local rebels. The Jews are the main victims of the conflict, as they’re blamed for the increase in prices,” wrote a local inhabitant of Zhitomir (Volynia gubernia) in a letter dated July 29, 1919.

In reality, such “speculation” in the vast majority of cases was no different from the situations already familiar to us from the tales from Dashev. The aforementioned Fisher once wanted to buy a box of matches. The Bolsheviks had outlawed trade at the time, and such an undertaking was no easy task. Usually one would get a light by going up to someone smoking a pipe, and lighting a small piece of coal, which one could later use to light a home oven:

I run into a Jewish boy. “You don’t know anyone selling matches, do you?” The insidious, traitorous question makes the boy take flight. How could he just come right out and say it? You can’t expose your fellow brother to disaster like that. Trade is a forbidden activity. I see someone else and ask the same question. He looks around and silently goes into hiding. The third person I meet apparently has
heard of me. He cautiously points out the secret house where the matches are.

I go up to the house, but it’s closed; there’s a lock hanging on the door. I get ready to leave, but then I happen to catch a pair of searching eyes staring at me from behind the curtain at one of the windows. The window opens, and a Jew leans out and asks what I want. When I tell him, he climbs out the window with a key in his hand, unlocks the door and leads me inside. There we make our forbidden trade. I give him a kerenka [money issued by the Provisional Government] for a box of matches that has been dug up from God knows where. He then leads me out, locks the door, climbs back in the window, and goes back behind the curtain. The house takes on its previous uninhabited appearance. It’s better this way. It’s unlikely that someone would take the trouble of breaking the lock. Another passerby, upon noticing the lock, shakes his head and keeps on going.131

The psychology of a significant part of the White officer corps was defined as a “chip off the Bolshevik block” (skolok s bolshevizma), according to V. A. Maklakov. During the Vrangel regime in Crimea, officers were often inclined to adopt Bolshevik methods for their own use: “If the Army doesn’t have enough clothes or shoes, ‘requisition’ them from the stores and the bourgeoisie.” Officers would send search parties to “search shop stalls for goods, and if they found anything, even if it was only a couple dozen pairs of undergarments, they would treat it as if thousands and thousands of goods were being stored. Then the usual indignation, ‘Here we are freezing, while you’re hoarding goods. They’ll have to be confiscated. End of story.’” This kind of simplistic and aggressive mentality was prevalent among the officers of Denikin’s day as well, who favored the slogan: “Beat the socialists, beat the speculators, beat the Jews.”142

The Jews, who comprised nearly three-quarters of the traders in the former Pale of Settlement, were as vulnerable to being attacked for their economic activities as they were for their religious beliefs. Widespread robbery and the impossibility of delivering goods (as we will see in the accounts of Jews being attacked on trains) led to an easily predictable result. “All the shops are closed and it is impossible to get anything,” as Shulgin remarked in mid-December, 1919. Shulgin rebuked the White Army for its relaxed attitude towards robbery, explaining, “The way we deal with the merchants is
disgusting. We do nothing but accuse them of speculation and curse them to the four corners of the world, but when you get right down to it, we wouldn’t be able to live if it weren’t for them. We don’t know how to get these goods from the peasants. We don’t know how because commerce is an art, and like all arts you can’t understand it right away . . . The Bolsheviks, with their decrees and measures, are exterminating these people as members of the ‘bourgeoisie,’ while we do the same thing by accusing them of ‘speculation’ and robbing them. It all leads to the same result: famine.”

The numerous military organizations active during the Civil War all engaged in “requisitioning supplies.” For a significant portion of the White armed forces, pillaging became a major motivation for participating in military engagements. This activity started to take place long before Denikin’s troops reached Ukraine. The officers were clearly dissatisfied with their pay, and Denikin, as several contemporaries unanimously agree, openly tolerated the “legal right” of his soldiers to take money from the corpses of dead Bolsheviks. One of the White generals once attempted to make a case for the sheer impossibility of replacing Provisional Government currency. “I entreat you, if we do this we’ll destroy all of the spirit for attack, which rests on those who live with the hope of taking kerenkys from a dead body.” In a “normal” war, soldiers are shot for such behavior. But in this case, it was almost openly encouraged. The Whites often did not limit themselves to “requisitioning” provisions from the civilian population. They would also steal clothes, jewelry, and money as well. Here we are talking about the Christian civilian population, of course. Soldiers were always able to take whatever they wanted from the local Jews.

D. S. Pasmanik was bewildered by the “Bolshevik” psychology of the Cossacks undergoing medical treatment at a military hospital that had been opened by the Crimean government. He could not imagine how such soldiers, who had such a clear hatred for their officers, could be relied upon in battle against the Bolsheviks. When he voiced his reservations to an officer he knew, his acquaintance responded, “At the front, that Cossack will fight bravely . . . in the hope of pillaging something.”

According to Prince E. N. Trubetskoi, Denikin once remarked that although army discipline was not as high as it used to be, his troops “were still disciplined: they don’t refuse to die.” A White officer explained to the Prince that, “he means they aren’t disciplined, because they engage in looting, but they fight extremely well.” Trubetskoi reflected, “One had to understand the contrasts that coexist in the human soul. They aren’t only sacrificing their
lives, they also ardently and unselfishly love Russia, but, at the same time, they give free reign to their appetites. Their inspired nature carries the secret of their triumph over the Bolshevik army, where only fear and selfish appetites exist, without any love, and without the most important thing, without any soul. And in thinking of the Volunteer Army, one can’t help recalling the saying: your many sins are forgiven, for you have loved much. Which is better? Those who don’t engage in robbery, those cold, callous people who condemn the Volunteer Army without raising a finger in Russia’s defense, or those who carry out superhuman feats for her and who are willing to die for her, those who, in their sublime, shining ascent, may experience moments of temptation? According to man, these may be judged separately. But God’s justice will always prefer those who run hot to those who are lukewarm.¹⁴⁶

As it would turn out, God was of a different opinion.

D. S. Pasmanik, another apologist for the White movement, had a different impression from Trubetskoi’s regarding the Reds and the Whites. “Enthusiasm is completely lacking in our camp, while the Bolsheviks have it in enormous quantity.”¹⁴⁷

Late September 1919 saw the peak of pogroms carried out by the Volunteer forces in Ukraine. A second wave swept the area upon Denikin’s retreat under Bolshevik pressure, during the winter of 1919–20. A. A. Goldenveizer, who had been living hand-to-mouth in Kiev, arrived at the following “immutable law of society”: “During the transfer of power in a civil war, both sides are equally hostile and dangerous towards the civilian population. The future regime manifests this in their hatred towards the side under whose rule they still find themselves. The former regime, having lost all hope of maintaining their power, likewise loses all interest in the civilian population’s safety, sustenance, or political sympathies. Retreating troops often wrecked more havoc than the conquerors that arrived to replace them.”¹⁴⁸

When the Whites seized a town or city in the Ukraine, a pogrom nearly always ensued. V. G. Korolenko, drawing on his experience in Poltava, noted that when Bolsheviks entered a city, the atmosphere was more or less peaceful. It was only afterwards, “when the Cheka began to operate, that their authority was viewed with indignation and loathing.” Denikin’s forces, however, “Entered with a pogrom and constantly carried themselves in such a way that no one had any warm feelings for them. One had the impression that the Volunteer forces were broken not only physically, but morally as well.”¹⁴⁹

The pogrom in Poltava lasted three days. The Cossacks apparently considered a three day orgy of looting and pillaging to be their right. Officers
would occasionally attempt to disperse the looters, beating them in the face with the butts of their pistols, but for the most part they turned a blind eye. The pogromists had their own peculiar kind of ethics. A group of Cossacks were staying in the building of a certain Maks Berkovich. The Cossacks had already had their fill of looting, and were more or less on good terms with the owners of the apartment above Berkovich’s. This did not stop another group of Cossacks from robbing Berkovich. When the latter went to his “own” Cossacks, and told them what happened, the Cossacks were indignant: “If you’re a Cossack, stop by tomorrow and take whatever you need. Now climb back out the window . . . swindler!” The Poltava pogrom was nearly bloodless, claiming only two victims: a Jewish school teacher by the name of Iampolskii, whose body was left in the street, and a man by the name of Levin, whose only sin was to have the same last name as a Chekist.¹⁵⁰

* * *

The Volunteer Army captured Kiev on two separate occasions. The first took place in the end of August, with few if any excesses on the part of the soldiers. Nonetheless, according to the memoirs of a Jewish woman who had gone to greet the White forces with flowers, a hatred of Jews “united everyone, and what a hatred it was: ‘Yid, zhidovka [Jewish woman], komissar, komissarha [female commissar].’ “ “Beat, cut, and rob.” Only one topic was on everyone’s lips, “the Yid.” Everyone associated the Jews with the Bolsheviks and demanded vengeance. Entire throngs of Kiev’s citizens would march down Sadovaia Street towards the former headquarters of the Cheka, beating Jews and “Chekists” along the way. Of course, the real Chekists were nowhere to be found, having long since left the city. Still, accusations of collaboration with the dreaded Cheka served as a means for evening personal scores, or were simply a means for expressing fury and despair toward a suitable target. And the most “suitable targets,” of course, were to be found among the Jewish population.¹⁵¹

In several towns, these “Red Chekists” were “discovered and captured” at the same time as a group of officers was being buried with full military honors for having valiantly fallen in battle alongside their regiment, which, according to Shulgin, was entirely “comprised of Jews.”¹⁵²

The events of these days were captured in the diary of sixteen-year-old Nelli Ptashkina, who came from an affluent assimilated Jewish family that in earlier times might have converted to Christianity. Originally from Moscow,
the family had fled the city for Kiev, where they had relatives who by all indications were also well-off. During the Bolshevik occupation, Nelli’s father was occasionally hunted by the Bolsheviks. Though he apparently was not suspected of any political crimes, Nelli’s father would have been targeted as a member of the ruling class (either as a businessman or civil servant). Nelli’s diary, full of girlish musings on love, discussions of literature, and so on, rarely makes any mention of her Jewish heritage. The topic comes up suddenly, in connection with the long-awaited liberation of Kiev by the Volunteer Army: “August 22, 1919 [old style] . . . Our joyous mood is slowly turning into one of heavy foreboding. The air is buzzing with curses aimed at the Jews, ‘Yids, Yids, Yids!’ can be heard at every turn. It’s horrible! You want to join the crowd, but it’s impossible. All this while your heart takes joy at the sight of the Russian flag, and you consider the ‘liberators’ to be your own family. At the same time, my heart aches from this feeling of forced detachment.”

The feelings prevalent among the population of Kiev were in accord with those serving in the Volunteer Army. Nelli’s family once invited two Volunteer soldiers to their home for dinner (the soldiers had been guarding the courtyard in the rain). Though at first impressed by their guests’ martial spirit, the hosts grew quite disturbed when one of them casually remarked, “It’d be great to go to Podol right now and get some Yids to kill. The weather’s perfect for it.”

The “quiet pogrom” that took place in Kiev from October 17 to 20, 1919 clearly demonstrates the degree of degradation in the Volunteer Army. The pogrom took place after the city had been lost to the Bolsheviks, only to be retaken several days later. There are significantly more eyewitness accounts of the Kiev pogrom than there were of others, as there were a number of writers in the city who managed to record the events that transpired. These writers had various political allegiances, from the antisemitic Vasilii Shulgin to Ilia Ehrenburg, who was at the time a supporter of the White movement. Their accounts of the “quiet pogrom” have much in common.

Witnesses noted the “business-like” nature of the pogrom. There was no “spontaneous” upheaval, no widespread destruction. Feathers from torn mattresses did not fill the streets, the sound of broken glass did not ring out at night. The perpetrators knew exactly what they wanted. Groups of armed people entered apartments, often leaving a lookout outside of the building. One of the soldiers present would accuse the Jews inside of Bolshevism, of deserting the Volunteer Army, and of shooting at Volunteer forces from their
windows. As compensation, the robbers demanded jewelry and money, threatening to ransack the home and shoot the owners if valuables were discovered. If the proffered sum satisfied these scourges of Bolshevism, they would take their leave. Otherwise, they would line the inhabitants of the home up against a wall, as if to execute them. They would then place the barrel of a gun against a child’s head or use other means of torture to get what they wanted.

In the suburbs outright looting took place, and the local populace often joined in completely emptying Jewish homes of everything that was inside. Executions would occur in secluded places and were often unrelated to the looting; in most cases unfortunate passers-by were the victims. In some instances people were able to pay off their would-be executioners and thereby save their lives.\(^{156}\)

“A medieval dread is settling upon the night streets of Kiev,” wrote Shulgin in the newspaper *Kievlianin*, “This deathly silence and desolation is occasionally interrupted by blood-curdling screams. The screams come from the ‘Yids.’ They scream from fear. Somewhere, a group of ‘people bearing bayonets’ appears on a dark corner, and those gigantic five- and six-story buildings begin to scream from top to bottom. Entire streets, seized by deathly horror, scream with inhuman voices, fearing for their lives. It is painful to hear these voices of the post-revolutionary night. Of course, this fear may be exaggerated and, in our opinion, it takes on absurd and degrading forms. But it is still a genuine terror, a real ‘torture by fear,’ that the entire Jewish population has been subjected to.”\(^{157}\)

These fears were not overly exaggerated. Nearly 300 Jews were murdered during this “quiet” pogrom.\(^{158}\) Ehrenburg wrote many years later, “What can I say about the Kiev pogrom? You can’t shock anyone these days. Women, children, and elderly people were screaming in their darkened homes throughout the night. It seemed as if the houses and streets, the entire city itself, was wailing.”

Elsewhere, Ehrenburg described a scene that could serve as an artistic summation of the events of the Kiev pogrom: “An old man was lying in the courtyard, looking up at the empty autumn sky with his empty eyes. Maybe this was Tevye the milkman or his in-law, guarding the doomed Egupets?\(^{159}\) There was a puddle nearby, not of milk, but of blood. The wind nervously pulled at the old man’s beard.”\(^{160}\)

The tragic mixed with farcical. Ehrenburg’s father-in-law, the doctor M. I. Kozintsev, once had a “young man in an officer’s uniform” break into his apartment. The officer shouted, “You crucified Christ and sold out Russia! . . .”
Then, seeing a cigarette case lying on the table he asked, “in a calm and business-like way, ‘is that made of silver?’”

“In times past, when pogroms were used in the struggle against Jewish exploitation,” Goldenveizer remarked with irony, “the victims were most often the impoverished who lived in the city outskirts. Now, when the pogroms are used as revenge against the Bolsheviks, the victims are nearly all from among the wealthy . . .”

Looking back at the events of 1919, Ehrenburg, writing after the Holocaust, noted that in 1919, “the executioners had still not thought to use gas chambers. The savagery was “hand-made”: cut out a five-pointed star on a forehead, rape a little girl, throw an infant out a window.” This “hand-made” savagery on the part of the Whites can only be considered within the context of the Nazi “death factories.” Richard Pipes is correct in comparing a pogrom carried out by a group of Terek Cossacks under the command of Colonel Belogortsev with the Nazi Aktion: the only things lacking were the mobile gas chambers. The Cossacks demanded money, and if there was none to be had, they slipped a noose around the neck of the master of the house and dragged him from room to room until he lost consciousness. The victim was then awakened through the use of rifle-butts and cold water. The procedure was then repeated. Any family members who attempted to intervene were beaten, sometimes to death. The hacked corpses were then given to dogs and swine. Several homeowners were commanded to light their own homes on fire, and were then forced into the flames at the point of a bayonet. In Fastov, approximately 200 houses and shops were razed. Nearly 100 people were burned alive.

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Jews were literally hunted along the railroads. It is unlikely that the number of those who were slaughtered, let alone the number robbed, will ever be known with any accuracy. In the beginning of 1919, the peak of the Petliurist pogroms, sixteen Jews were slaughtered by rebellious soldiers in a train headed to Odessa from Uman. Nazhivin, who witnessed the event, was amazed by the unconcerned attitude of the murderers: “they just walked up and cut them down like you would a calf, and then used the dead body to knock out a window” and throw it off the train.

A courier for V. V. Shulgin’s Azbuka (an intelligence operation) arrived at White headquarters from Kiev on May 19, 1919. On the way to his destination,
his train had been stopped by a group of “rebels.” “The first question was whether I was Orthodox or a Jew, then they checked for a cross around my neck. When they checked my documents, they paid particular attention to the stamp; if it had been Soviet they would have shot me (commissars, delegates, and so on) or at the very least given me a beating.” According to his testimony, the train had been held up at the Znamenka station by troops loyal to Grigoriev. “Nearly 200 Jewish or Jewish-looking passengers were shot on the spot.”167

This information could very well serve as a real-life companion to Babel’s short story “The Road” (Doroga). In this story, the protagonist recounts a train ride on which “dozing next to me was a schoolmaster, Jeguda Veinberg, and his wife. The schoolmaster had married some days prior, and was taking his wife to Petersburg. They had been whispering about new methods of teaching for the entire trip, and then they fell asleep, their hands intertwined.” One of the “rebels” who stopped the train “looked at their permit signed by Lunacharsky, took a Mauser with a narrow dirty muzzle out from under his coat, and shot the teacher in the face . . . The train was stopped in the steppe. Snow banks glistened with polar brilliance. Jews were being thrown onto the tracks from the cars. Shots rang out unevenly, like screams.”168 By comparison, the Drozdovskii soldiers “merely” threw Jews off of trains. Their method of checking for “pure blood” was the word “corn” (kukuruza). Some Jews had trouble rolling their ‘r’s in Russian.169

Ehrenburg left Kiev in 1919, eventually reaching Koktebel by way of Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Mariupol, Kerch, and Feodosia. The entire trip took nearly a month. “Officers and Cossacks would constantly storm the trains when we were at a station, shouting, ‘All Yids, communists, and commissars, get out! ’ ” The chances of finding communists or commissars in White territory were highly improbable. But there were a good number of “Yids” at hand. “We crawled into the dark corners of caves, lay down in the cargo holds. People would go insane with cabin fever and begin to go mad and die. We would lie among them, covered in lice. Over and over again the same monotonous shout could be heard, ‘Who here is a Jew?’ Lice and blood, blood and lice . . .”170

Pogroms and lynchings managed to obscure another “condition” of Jewish life under the Whites: constant humiliation. After Kharkov’s capture by the Whites, “there weren’t any pogroms as such, no, they didn’t do anything to the Jewish merchants that served them and sold them inexpensive goods, but if a Jewish or Jewish-looking member of the intelligentsia acted with too
much confidence, or if a restaurant owner or merchant refused to give way in a deal, they were beaten.”

D. Glikman managed to make the trip to Kharkov, the temporary location of White headquarters, in July of 1919. The city was safer than the railroads: “In every wagon there are endless conversations about the Bolsheviks and the Jews. In quite a touching display of solidarity, a bag man, a country teacher, a tradesman, a student, a lady with flowing locks of hair, a clerk, and an unwashed peasant woman all agreed as to the essence of the problem. It constantly rings in your ears, ‘Yids . . . Yids . . . Yids . . .’”

While riding from Kharkov to Rostov in August of 1919, Vernadskii wrote: “‘Yid [zhid]’ is a word that is completely accepted in the society I am now headed to. They are willing to recognize the fact that you can’t restrict Jews’ rights by law, although they desire and talk about such restrictions on a practical level, society won’t accept them [the Jews]. It’s clear that this is the precise attitude present in America regarding the civil rights of blacks.” If anything, Russian Jews in 1919 would have been envious of African Americans.

In an entry dated October 14, 1919, Nelli Ptashkina recorded her thoughts on her trip from Kiev to Kharkov. She and her family were traveling in the unpleasant company of a group of young officers:

Three of us were sitting on the bench. Then he [one of the officers] brazenly asked us to give him a seat. When my mother protested, he shouted ‘Russian people don’t behave like that!’ No one present objected to his words. I turned to the window and started to cry. It was so shameful and bitter . . . and for what?

You do nothing but love and wish the best for your homeland, which up until that point I had considered to be Russia, and hear how you’re slandered by that filthy word, ‘Yid.’ Impotent spite and burning hatred fill your soul. Now I’d just prefer to leave.

During those terrifying days during the Pogrom in Kiev I felt a common brotherhood, a common unity with those impoverished, revolting Jews that I had earlier despised. Now, they didn’t disgust me, even at that time. And why? What is all of this for?”

* * *

The pogroms carried out by the Whites shocked contemporaries more than those that had been committed by the Petliurists, although the latter claimed...
more lives and went on for a longer period of time. To understand why this was the case, it is worth examining (ironically enough) an article written by I. M. Bikerman, yet another Jewish apologist for the Whites, who denied the specifically antisemitic character of the pogroms during the Civil War period:

Were there pogroms directed against the Jews in the South of Russia? If the annihilation of human beings and human kindness, if murder, pillaging, rape, and other kinds of human destruction constitute pogroms, then there is no number that could express the magnitude of Jewish pogroms during this Time of Troubles, for these years saw the constant spilling of Jewish blood, and hundreds of thousands of Jewish families were completely and utterly destroyed. But in a more general sense all of Russia was the victim of a pogrom, even half of Europe. The words “Jewish pogrom” have long since taken on a kind of technical meaning that does not refer to the killing of people and the destruction of personal property in general, but rather to such destruction within the context of peacetime, during times of order and universal—with the exception of those threatened—safety.

It is only in this sense that one can explain the worldwide outcry after the Kishinev pogrom. It didn’t only have to do with the deaths of 53 individuals, but also with the betrayal on the part of the government, which had refused to defend the lives and property of its own citizens, and instead allowed others among its citizenry to “openly and collectively break all criminal laws and destroy the bases of human community.” It was this betrayal of the principles of governance that was “the most incomparably disturbing aspect of this Jewish pogrom.”

In the case of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, such concerns had no place. The Whites were attempting to (or at least claimed to be attempting to) restore law and order. Among their leadership there were well-known figures who were associated with times past when it was forbidden to murder and steal. It is hardly a coincidence that in many towns the local Jewish population greeted the Whites hospitably, as liberators. Nor was it a rarity when the members of that very same delegation sent to meet the “liberators” became the first victims of White aggression.
The difference between White proclamations and reality is striking. Apologists for the Volunteer forces constantly draw attention to the orders (which are hardly large in number) given by commanders of varying ranks with the goal of preventing violence against Jews. The archive of the Russian Embassy in Paris contains copies of several directives that threaten pogromists and insist on the defense of the Jewish population. It would seem that they were written, at least partially, for the sake of appearances.

On July 31, 1919 V. Z. Mai-Maevskii, the commander of the Volunteer Army, issued the following order from Kharkov:

The Volunteer Army, engaged in a difficult struggle for the restoration of our Great Motherland and for the reestablishment of law and order within her borders, must first and foremost introduce order, calm, and the rule of law in the territories already liberated from the Bolsheviks.

Under the mighty protection of the Army, the inviolability and peaceful existence of all citizens, regardless of station, nationality, or religious beliefs, must be ensured. There is no place for even isolated instances of oppression of any class of the population, or of any nationality, such as the Jews.

All members of the army must at all places and at all times obey the principle of respect for the law.

Commanders of all ranks are to follow this order and strictly adhere to its fulfillment and enaction, and bring those guilty of disobedience legally liable.176

Two months later the Russian News Agency distributed an excerpt from an interview with the very same Mai-Maevskii under the heading “Mai-Maevskii on the Jewish Pogroms,” which first and foremost demonstrated that the order mentioned above had had little effect. The general said, “Central Command has always undertaken all possible measures to prevent pogroms. Those who follow the military field courts know that those found guilty of violence are punished in the severest manner.”177 It is obvious that the promise to avoid even isolated incidents of violence was not kept. Those who knew the actual state of affairs were keenly aware that when the general spoke of inevitable punishment for those who engaged in acts of violence against the civilian population, he was passing off fantasy as reality.
If one compares the orders issued by White command in Kiev over a three-week interval, one quickly comes to three conclusions: 1. The generals knew what words to use. 2. The generals themselves were probably against such acts of antisemitic violence, if only because of the negative effects on martial discipline. 3. Their words had no effect whatsoever.

General N. E. Bredov, the head of the Kiev garrison, issued an order on August 22, 1919 that stated:

Information has reached me that individual acts of violence have been carried out against the peaceful Jewish population of the city of Kiev.

After the taking of Kiev, some Ukrainian units killed several members of Jewish self-defense units, which had been organized for the security of the city with the full knowledge and assistance of the city administration. Among the populace there is pogromistic propaganda. I would like to draw to everyone’s attention the following: I will not refrain from employing the most severe methods of punishment against those who engaged in their own independent reprisals in their own independent courts. Such pogromistic agitation hinders the command of the Volunteer Army from establishing civil order within the city, and undermines the authority of the Volunteer Army, which considers that its duty is to act within the strict boundaries of civil law without resorting to employing the assistance of self-appointed keepers of the common good.

The Command of the Volunteer Army will ruthlessly punish the Bolsheviks (communists) and will use its authority to guarantee the safety of the civilian population regardless of nationality. It will cut off at the root, by means of the most severe measures at its disposal, all attempts to establish mob law, independent reprisals, and pogromistic agitation.¹⁷⁸

The very same Bredov, upon visiting Fastov after the pogrom, remarked that he had not found anything terrible to have taken place.¹⁷⁹

The next order, issued by Pavlovskii, the Governor General of Kiev, on September 14, demonstrates how little effect Bredov’s threats had on the “bravery” of the troops:
Certain units are allowing themselves to carry out acts of violence against the Jewish population. Taking advantage of the Jewish holidays, they have driven them from their synagogues and houses of worship, as has happened in the Lukianov area.

It is shameful that such courageous defenders of the Motherland, who acquit themselves with immeasurable heroism on the front lines, should forget their honor and transform themselves from protectors into oppressors.

Disrespect for religious beliefs is a serious offense, and I will hold such offenders responsible for their actions, as I will with all those engaged in violence, who shall likewise be punished to the fullest extent of the law.¹⁸⁰

Denikin was well aware of his troops’ actions (though not necessarily in all of their horrifying, bloody details). While in Odessa, he sent a telegram to the commander in charge of the Kiev oblast “to be enacted immediately”: “I have been made aware of acts of violence that have been carried out against Jews by members of the army. I demand that the most decisive measures be undertaken in putting an end to this phenomenon, and that those found guilty be punished severely.”¹⁸¹ The order had little or no effect.

S. A. Poklevskii-Kozell, the Russian ambassador to Romania, put in a request to headquarters asking that members of the Committee for the Assistance of Pogrom Victims be allowed to travel to Ukraine to render assistance to the victims of pogroms, and to study the conditions they lived in. A. A. Neratov, the de facto head of Denikin’s foreign policy, telegraphed the following response at Denikin’s request:

[Denikin] fully sympathizes with the Kishinev committee’s desire to render assistance to Jews who have suffered from the pogroms, against which we are undertaking all available measures, including bringing those responsible to justice. However, the anti-Jewish mood in the populace has increased to such an extent following the Bolshevik incursion into the South of Russia that such a trip of delegates to such locales could result in dangerous unrest and even threaten their own personal safety. Under such conditions, it is preferable that such aid and goods be sent through the local authorities. There are no obstacles to the evacuation of victims and
their families, of which the commanders of the respective oblasts have been informed.\textsuperscript{182}

An analysis of the reports from the intelligence, political, and information networks that reached the main headquarters of the Whites will serve to clearly illustrate the sources of Denikin’s information regarding the attitude towards Jews held by the civilian population and the army as well as the degree to which antisemitism had penetrated both the masses in general, and Denikin’s informants in particular.

On May 24, 1919 the head of intelligence in the Don oblast sent a message to Denikin claiming that the popularity of Grigoriev, a former Red commander who had rebelled against the Bolsheviks, had been facilitated by “a slogan introduced by him: ‘Beat the commissars, beat the Yids.’ In addition to a hatred of the commissars there reigns among the people a frightful hatred for the Jews. It is no coincidence that one of the commissars in Chernigov, commenting on Grigoriev’s popularity, claimed that ‘the people are ready to follow anyone who shouts “beat the Yids.”’”

According to the informant, this attitude had been taken into account by the Bolsheviks, who had begun to remove Jewish commissars from Ukraine. Simultaneously, “Bolshevik-commissar-agitators,” fearing the growing popularity of the Volunteer Army, had let loose a rumor that “the Volunteers stand up for the Jews, that they were receiving funds from Jewish bankers, and that when they arrived in Ukraine they would give all the rights to the Jewish capitalists.”\textsuperscript{183}

The above-cited fragments have been marked in pencil. Though it would be difficult to confirm that this was done by Denikin himself, the markings were either made by him or by one of the other members of the White High Command. The next passage is also marked:

At one point the Bolsheviks considered prayer meetings in churches to be unlawful gatherings and closed the churches. But the population eventually won for itself the right to pray and now church services go on unhindered. The religious movement increases with each passing day, and the churches are full of the faithful to an extent that would have been unheard of in the past. The tortured people are searching for consolation in religion and an escape from the horrors of real life. The commissars are trying to combat this religious tendency among the people. Jewish commissars are
particularly active in this fight, sparing no means at their disposal. There exists an enormous amount of anti-Jewish sentiment. They are protected by the Soviet authorities, under the mighty patronage of Trotsky himself. Trotsky is now the head of the Sovdep, and Lenin has faded into the background.\textsuperscript{184}

On June 11, 1919 a certain Karl Germanovich Lerkhe, the representative of the Volunteer Army in Tulcha, wrote a report on the conditions in Odessa and the surrounding areas: “Full of virulent antisemitism, particularly after the latest series of blasphemous acts and disrespect expressed towards the priesthood, the Russian peasantry has undertaken a universal slaughter of the Jewish population, both in their own villages and in neighboring towns and cities.” Lerkhe named the towns of Belaia Tserkov, Fastov, Kiev, and others. According to his own words, regiments under the command of Ataman Zelenyi were slaughtering Jews, and the local peasants were joining them.\textsuperscript{185}

An agent of the intelligence organization Azbuka, writing under the pseudonym of “Chinizelli,” authored a report dated July 9, 1919, that recounted his visit to ataman Zelenyi’s headquarters. The agent also wrote of the stories he had heard while traveling from Odessa to Kiev: “There is an extremely hostile attitude towards the Jews, who are seen as having trampled on the religious sentiments of the people.”\textsuperscript{186}

A report of the Odessa branch of Azbuka from August 11, 1919 describes a meeting that had taken place on June 23 at the local circus, under the title “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Communist Party.” “Seventy-five percent of those in attendance were Jews. The fashionable blouses of Jewish women and greasy student caps over Jewish locks predominated.”\textsuperscript{187} One can only guess why fashionable blouses would in any way be indicative of the ethnicity of the women wearing them.

Denikin himself would later claim that the report “gave the facts, and, probably, some fabrications, a well-intended exposition, if somewhat tendentious, but one that was also gloomy and repetitive.” No matter what the general claimed to feel about the information he received, he did not doubt that the Jews were hostile toward the White forces. “To what extent this attitude was created \textit{a priori}, and to what extent it was a \textit{consequence} [emphasis Denikin’s] of those acts of violence carried out against the Jews by the troops, is a difficult problem to solve,” he noted.\textsuperscript{188} Indeed, this was the central problem for the Whites in regards to the “Jewish question.” There were some Jews
who were amiably predisposed to the White movement, but the acts of violence carried out by the Volunteers left them with little choice.

One of the most intriguing documents from the archives of Denikin’s headquarters was a secret addendum to Political Communiqué No. 242, dated December 2, 1919. Signed by Colonel V. M. Bek, head of the Information Section of the Propaganda Department of the Special Council, the document contains a special section dedicated to “the pogrom question.” Surprisingly, the topic was not the pogroms carried out by the atamans or the Petliurists, but rather the pogroms carried out by Volunteer forces themselves. On one page of the typed memo one can discern, in concentrated form, all of the traditional elements of all the contemporaneous and ensuing apologist perspectives regarding the Volunteer Army: the attempt to place responsibility for the pogroms on others (up to and including the victims themselves), assurances that the authorities have undertaken decisive measures, which allegedly have resulted in the suppression of the “wave of pogroms,” and so on. “In discussing the essential facts of the pogrom, it should be noted that the bringing to light of the regrettable fact of the pogrom is not always carried out in an objective manner, neither in the resolutions passed by [certain] organizations and groups, nor in the press.” Though the author of the addendum did not dismiss the facts themselves, he interpreted them in a way that differed greatly from the organizations and groups that remain anonymous. “As far as the numerous reports and accounts received by the Department indicate, there were two main causes of the pogrom. The first rests in the attitudes of the peasant masses. These people, rightly or wrongly, consider the Jews to be people who either are, or could become [italics mine] ardent Soviet workers, and believe that the basis of the Communist ideology lies in Judaism as such. From here there follows an implacable, organic hatred, which found its expression in the broad wave of pogroms that flooded Ukraine from the beginning of the current year, against which both the Soviets and Petliura found themselves powerless. They say that when Ataman Zele- nyi occupied rural towns, he gathered all of the Jews in the town square and shot them by the hundreds with machine guns. The village women, who looked on as row after row of defenseless people were felled by machine gun fire, crossed themselves and said, ‘Glory be to God’” [the italicized portion was marked in pencil].

The other cause, according to the report, was the attitude of the troops, who feared that the civilian authorities away from the front lines would not undertake “the necessary measures to eliminate internal Bolshevism”. “Thus the urge to immediately, losing a single minute, dispose of Bolshevism and its
adherents.” Moreover, there was a desire for vengeance, as many among the civilian population and the army “had family members who had been killed by the Bolsheviks.” “For the time being self-control and strict discipline restrain the troops from excesses, but when the spark of even an isolated shot in the back comes between the anvil of the people’s hatred and the hammer of the military impulses of the soldiers—an explosion is inevitable” [passage in italics marked in pencil].

The already accepted equivalence of Jewry with Bolshevism is striking here, as is the claim that the troops were slaughtering Jews in an attempt to eliminate “internal Bolshevism.” Professor N. N. Alekseev, a participant in the White movement, provided what I believe to be an extremely accurate description of the psychology of many of his comrades-in-arms: “We were fighting the Bolsheviks ‘to the death,’—and such conditions gave our movement a kind of implacable tactical radicalism. We believed that not only the Bolsheviks themselves, but everything they touched, should be wiped from the face of the earth . . . We believed that everything associated with Bolshevism needed to be purified by fire and sword.” Some of the members of the White movement were waging a similar “fight to the death” not only with the Bolsheviks, but with the Jews as well.

In describing the “shot in the back” as the spark necessary to set off a pogrom, the author of the addendum added: “With regard to the largest pogrom, the one that took place in Fastov, there is no precise information that such a spark was present.” In trying to remove at least some of the responsibility for the pogrom from the “Volunteers,” Bek rejected the claims published in the newspaper Kievskoe Ekho that the local peasants had attempted to protect their Jewish neighbors, but that the pogromists (i.e., the soldiers) had confronted them and threatened them with “the same savage reprisals: and the murders, torture, and violence continued with an ever-increasing ferocity.” “According to the Department’s information, which has been confirmed by eye-witnesses, the local peasant population took the leading role in the pogrom. Hundreds of carts were summoned from neighboring villages to take away the stolen property. The series of events leading to the pogrom was initiated by the local peasantry alone, it was only later that they were joined by the troops.”

The points of the report that more or less hold the victims themselves responsible for the pogrom are also indicative: “It should likewise be noted that the rumors being spread by Kiev Jewry and the pro-Jewish press regarding the pogroms only serve to embitter the masses to an extreme degree, and hinder the administration’s efforts to secure order.”
Denikin was to use a similar argument at a later date. While explaining the pogroms as a manifestation of bestial instincts called to the surface by the war and revolution, by universal chaos, and by the loss of moral standards and the cheapening of human life, he nonetheless pointed to causes of a different order “which the Jewish press ignores or denies.” These included “the fact that there is an overwhelming presence of the Jewish element in all the major Soviet institutions.”\textsuperscript{194} The general never asked himself whether the murder of people who had nothing to do with the Soviets—to say nothing of the slaughter of innocent children—fulfilled his own “moral criteria.”

When representatives from the Jewish communities of Rostov, Ekaterinoslav, Taganrog, and Kharkov visited Denikin on July 26 (August 8) 1919, he admitted that there were a significant number of people who were “openly hostile,” and he believed that a declaration of the equal rights for the Jewish population, or one forbidding “excesses,” would be “inconvenient” for him.\textsuperscript{195}

An even more influential personage was likewise unsuccessful in his attempts to convince Denikin to take action to prevent future pogroms. Winston Churchill, who was then serving as the British Secretary of State for War, telegraphed the following message to Denikin on September 18, 1919: “It is vital that General Denikin not only do everything in his power to prevent a massacre of the Jews in the liberated districts but also to issue a proclamation against anti-Semitism.”\textsuperscript{196}

In the beginning of October, 1919, another Jewish delegation sought an audience with Denikin. Members included I. S. Mogilever, Z. I. Temkin, and L. V. Raukhverger. Once more, they asked the general to put an end to the pogroms. Denikin announced that “the government was doing everything in its power to prevent pogroms. The strictest orders possible have been issued. Meanwhile, you must make your youth understand that. . . . their attitudes must change. Then, in collaboration with each other, we will be able to put an end to this spontaneous movement.”\textsuperscript{197} Denikin’s words differed little from a similar argument that had earlier been laid out by the Ukrainian leader V. Vinnichenko. When a similar delegation had visited Vinnichenko in January 1919 after a number of Jewish train passengers had been attacked in Bakhmach and Konotop, Vinnichenko “promised to undertake the possible measures, and then made a few comments to the effect that the Jews were supporting to the Bolsheviks, even going so far as to say, ‘Don’t try to turn the army against me.’”\textsuperscript{198

During the Civil War, nobody wanted to go against the army. In an article entitled “The Jews, the Bolsheviks, and the Pogroms,” in October of
1920, B. V. Savinkov wrote, “No one should be killed on the grounds that Bronshtein is in the Kremlin. Punish the guilty Jews, but leave the Jewish people alone. Those who don’t understand this truth will not be capable of saving Russia. The might and majesty of the State rests on its [sense of] justice and rule of law. The law must be the same for everyone.”²⁹⁹ Of course, Savinkov could write about the equality of the law just as much as he could rely on the support of the soldiers of the pogromist S. N. Bulak-Balakhovich. . . .²⁰⁰

V. A. Maklakov was of the opinion that while Denikin was hardly a semitophile, he understood the importance of stopping pogroms. In a meeting of the Jewish Political Collegium in Rostov on October 20, 1919 attended by A. L. Chernikov, G. Ia. Bruk, and F. E. Lander, Maklakov claimed that Denikin “is a very honorable person and not a pogromist” that “he doesn’t want pogroms and is prepared to attempt to stop them, and that as a member of the government he clearly understands that Russia will not by restored by means of pogroms.” Maklakov also made reference to the lack of power and full authority in Denikin’s government itself. Speaking of the necessity of punishing the guilty soldiers, Maklakov demonstrated that he shared Denikin’s concerns, namely that “putting officers on trial could result in unrest in the officer corps, which could lead to negative results.”²⁰¹

It was only on January 23, 1920, after the Whites had suffered a series of defeats, that Denikin issued an order demanding an immediate end to acts of violence against the Jews. The order was written in Denikin’s own, expressively idiosyncratic style, and demonstrated the general’s serious intentions:

Let no charge of usurping the people’s rights be leveled against the warriors fighting for the liberation. If the commanders do not immediately direct their attention to eradicating this [violence against the Jews], the new offensive with be useless and will come to nothing. I demand that severe measures, up to and including capital punishment, be employed against those engaging in robbery and violence, as well as against all those who condone such actions, no matter how high they are in rank or position. Remember, one can not undertake the holy mission of liberating Russia, our long-suffering motherland, with befouled hands.²⁰²

But it was too late. A new offensive was out of the question. Utter panic quickly ensued. The commanding officers, with few exceptions, lost whatever control they had over their troops, and the Denikin period of the White
movement came to an end with the catastrophe in Novorossiisk in March of 1920 and Denikin’s subsequent resignation.

Later, in emigration, Denikin was capable of objectively evaluating the moral level of the troops that had been under his command. Lamenting the lack of supplies, he admitted that the possibility of material gain had served as one of the most important motivating factors for segments of the White forces, particularly, he noted, in the case of the Cossacks and fighters from the Caucuses:

Beyond the line that marks the endpoint of “military spoils” and “requisitions” there opens up the gloomy abyss of moral collapse: violence and robbery.

These blazed throughout the Northern Caucuses, throughout the entire South, across the entire theatre of the Civil War. Carried out by the Reds, Whites, and Greens, [such acts] filled the people’s cup of suffering with new tears and blood, confusing in their minds all of the ‘colors’ of the military and political spectrum, and often erased whatever features differentiated a savior from an enemy.

Much has been written, and still more shall be written, of that ulcer that ate away at the armies on all sides on all fronts. Truth and lies.

And the justifications that claim that with the Reds, things were incomparably worse, are pitiful. After all we, the Whites, were the ones who were specifically struggling against violence and its perpetrators! . . . That many serious excesses were the inevitable reaction to having one’s country and family humiliated, to seeing the soul of the people rent asunder, seeing that people’s property was destroyed, that the blood of kin and friends [had been spilled], this is not surprising. Yes, vengeance is a terrible feeling, amoral, but comprehensible, at the very least. But there was also greed. And greed is naught but an abomination. Let truth cover our putrid wounds, while giving our conscience no rest, that it might awaken in us a deeper repentance and [lead us] to a fuller and more sincere rebirth.203

* * *

I find it difficult to agree E. Mawdsley’s claim that “the pogroms had no effect on the outcome of the Civil War, although they perhaps turned some public opinion in the West against the White cause.”204 In addition to the
loss of moral (and material) support from the West, the pogroms contributed
to the disintegration of the army, and transformed battle-ready and discipline
units into bands of robbers and murderers. The best example is the case of a raid carried out by the White Cavalry under the command of K. K. Mamontov in the fall of 1919. Instead of pursuing a more auspicious route to
the west, in the direction of Kursk-Orel-Tula-Moscow, Mamontov, slowed
down by carts piled high with stolen goods, occupied Voronezh. After Ma-
montov’s forces left the city in the fall of 1919, Mamontov sent a number of
the Cossacks under his command on leave. By December 2, 1919, the recent
hero was relieved of command by Vrangel for “criminal negligence.” As we
saw earlier, many of Mamontov’s troops slaughtered any Jews they came
across, with a zeal that easily matched that of their comrades in Ukraine.
Judging by the amount of stolen goods they managed to acquire, they had
probably robbed nearly everyone they encountered.

General A. M. Dragomirov, the head of the Kiev oblast, who was criti-
cized (according to Shulgin) both for allowing pogroms and for not allowing
attacks on Jews, remarked (according to Shulgin) in October of 1918 that sometimes he
felt that half of the army should be shot to save the remaining half. On De-
cember 31, 1919, while sharing a drink with the same Shulgin in Odessa, he
said his opinion had not changed. He simply did not know how to go about
determining who was guilty, and said that the perpetrators would simply
cover each others’ backs: “I gave the strictest orders . . . but nothing helps . . .
because they cover for each other . . . maybe I should open some kind of spe-
cial court? I’ve already tried that, and it didn’t work . . .”

Commanding officers did not always turn a blind eye to the actions of
the pogromists. On a few occasions, the perpetrators were properly punished.
In a handful of cases, the punishments went to extremes. In Kiev on October
8, a military field court passed a series of sentences against a number of sol-
diers for stealing 40,000 rubles worth of goods and “beating the Jew Kapler.”
Staff captains Auster and Levitskii, along with the praporshchik Bogalev, were
given indefinite prison sentences, while the praporshchik Galchevskii and “the
civilian Terchinskii” were executed by firing squad.

Dragomirov reported to Denikin the events that had taken place in Kiev.
“A number of gangs started going into the Jewish quarters and demanding
money. Some of the scoundrels were caught at the scene of the crime, and
were acquitted by the military court . . . I summoned the court and gave them
a tongue-lashing the likes of which they had never heard before . . . the court
then started handing out death sentences, all of which were carried out . . .”
These cases were hardly typical. Most occasions were more similar to another series of events recounted by Dragomirov, when he once ordered the execution of seven soldiers guilty of the murder of three Jews. The execution was to take place in Slobodka, a suburb of Kiev, in the middle of the night. Originally, the judge had sentenced the murderers to hard labor, but the general increased the severity of the sentence. This caused such uproar in Russian circles that dozens of people came to intercede on behalf of the convicted, including the local metropolitan, Antonii. More importantly, rumors started to fly that if the sentence were to be carried out, “not a stone would be left upright in Slobodka.” Dragomirov decided to reexamine the case, using the excuse that there was new testimony to be considered, even though he himself did not believe it had any bearing on the case.

He later wrote Denikin, “without a doubt, the execution of those seven soldiers would have resulted in revenge being taken either in Slobodka, or in some other place. This is the main difficulty of this battle. It is impossible to employ capital punishment in such matters, and nobody fears hard labor; everyone is sure there is an amnesty on the way from Moscow.”

The murder of Jews ceased to be considered a crime. For many members of the White movement it was either a matter of a simple reflex, or an inseparable element of the struggle against Bolshevism. Shulgin demonstrates this point clearly in the following anecdote:

In one town an eighteen-year-old boy with a rifle in his hands is running through some ruined streets (ruined by whom? Us? The Bolsheviks? The Petliurovtsy? Bandits? God only knows).

What are you doing over there?
Looking for a Yid, sir.
What Yid?
He was just here a second ago, I saw him.
So he was here... what did he do?
He didn’t do anything... he’s a Yid!

I take a look at him, his young face flushed from cocaine, and see all the vices known to man...

What’s your unit?
He answers...
March!
He’s gone.
Looking for a Yid with a rifle in your hand in full daylight.
“What did he do? Nothing . . . he’s a Yid.”

* * *

One of the major differences between the pogroms of the Civil War era and those that preceded it (1881–84 and 1905–6) was the colossal increase in the number of victims. In comparing dozens or a few thousand killed with tens of thousands, we are talking of a degree of violence of a completely different order. If in the former instances one could possibly make a case for civil disturbances that happened to claim a few victims, then in the latter we can only speak of purposeful extermination. While it is true that not every pogrom was accompanied by the wholesale slaughter of Jews irrespective of age or sex, this was the first time pogroms of this type had taken place in modern Russia history or in the history of Europe in the twentieth century. H. Abramson emphasizes that the revolutionary period was characterized by a sustained absence of central authority, and such a power vacuum led to widespread anarchy and violence. Though this is true, I have attempted to illustrate another trait of the Civil War period, namely that for the first time ever antisemitic acts of violence were being carried out by the authorities, or, to be more precise, by those actors who had staked a claim to eventually become the ruling power of the country. They may not have organized the pogroms, but they declined to adopt sufficiently decisive measures to prevent them. Instead, they yielded to the prejudices prevalent among their troops and implicitly sanctioned their actions. At first the pogroms were carried out by military forces that were more (the Whites) or less (the Directorate) organized and disciplined. Taken together, the soldiers of the White movement and of the Directorate account for more than 50 percent of those killed. As it turned out, well-organized troops were “better equipped” to engage in indiscriminate bloodshed.

When the White forces were involved, the pogroms were often the most bloody. It is possible to fight off or hide from a group of vagabonds, but it is nearly impossible to do so against an army. I believe that P. Kenez is absolutely correct in considering the slaughter of Jews in the Ukraine in 1919 to have a particularly “modern” character. It could easily serve as the starting point for the “tradition” of the twentieth century. The massive carnage was prepared by ideology; an aggressive nationalism, whose most striking aspect
was antisemitism, became a surrogate for the ideology of the White movement.\textsuperscript{212}

V. P. Buldakov is correct in contending that “the most horrifying aspect of the White Terror, and of all the reciprocal violence committed during the Civil War period, was the Jewish pogroms.” One cannot help agreeing with another of his claims, namely that even if one-tenth of the information we have concerning the pogroms carried out by the Whites in Ukraine in 1919 is true, then the Whites “had no chance of ever achieving victory in the fight for the Russian state.”\textsuperscript{213}

In pre-revolutionary Russia, antisemitic violence always came “from below” (with the exception of the deportations at the outbreak of World War I). In such cases, the police and military may have played a passive role (and even sympathized with the pogromists), but they almost never participated in the pogroms themselves. Their role was to maintain order.\textsuperscript{214} In 1919, one could not rely on the authorities. Or to be more precise, one was forced to rely only on one authority. Soviet authority.

It is difficult to agree with Richard Pipes, who, repeating the ideas of I. M. Bikerman, writes that from a broader historical perspective the pogroms against the Jews “were part and parcel of the pogroms perpetrated at the time throughout Russia.”\textsuperscript{215} Actually, a “broader historical perspective” shows something quite different. During the Civil War, Jews were killed precisely because they were Jewish, regardless of their age, sex, or political convictions. This is why, in my opinion, one must consider the pogroms of the Russian Civil War as precedents for the Holocaust.
The Russian Civil War proved to be a severe test for the theoretical and moral convictions of Russian liberals. For the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets), the only organized political force that continued to profess liberal values after the events of 1917, the “Jewish question” was particularly trying.

Often criticized from parties to the right of them for being too “Jewish,” the Kadets were in favor of equal rights for Jews. M. M. Vinaver, one of their leaders, was also the head of a number of Jewish organizations, and a significant portion of their activities (publishing in particular) were financed by Jewish business leaders.

However, Russian liberals were hardly unanimous in their approaches to “the Jewish question.” In the period between the 1905 revolution and World War I, there was an upsurge of antisemitic sentiment. P. B. Struve, commenting on the “Chirikov affair,” noted how Germans would easily assimilate into Russian culture without leaving a trace, whereas Jews, who played the most prominent role in Russian culture when compared to other “foreigners,” would nonetheless “remain Jews.” Struve called upon the Russian intelligentsia to show their “national face” (natsional’noe litso), and not to be hesitant in demonstrating their “spiritual” preferences in regards to the “Jewish question.” Struve emphasized that these “spiritual” preferences were separate from “political” ones, as he believed that a just government must be impartial when it came to policy. 

P. N. Miliukov took issue with Struve’s opinion, claiming that “this type of political apathy in the intelligentsia of will lead directly to an inclination toward aesthetic nationalism, which in turn will quickly give rise to a genuine,
tribal, chauvinism.”⁴ V. E. Zhabotinskii discussed the appearance of what he termed “asemitism” among the Russian intelligentsia. According to him this was seen in a “disinterested desire to be free of the unwanted element in one’s own social circles.” He considered “asemitism” to be a precursor of antisemitism.⁵ Miliukov, a rationalist and skeptic, compared the disagreement to an argument over “where the witches were coming from, Russian Novgorod, or Jewish Kiev.” He ironically remarked that if one did not believe in witches, it was rather difficult to take sides in the argument.⁶ Unfortunately, ensuing events were to demonstrate that there was a sizable portion of the Kadet party that was not opposed to such witch-hunts.

The traditional “semitophilia” prevalent among the liberals was tested during the years of World War I. Although a significant number of the more prominent Kadets were willing to openly defend those being persecuted, such a stance was far from universal. When the famous writers Leonid Andreev and Fyodor Sologub composed the “Appeal to Russian Society” (Vozzvanie k russkomu obschestvu), which called for an end to Jewish persecution and the granting of full civil rights to Jews as “one of the conditions for the building of the state,” at least four Kadets (F. F. Kokoshkin, V. A. Maklakov, A. A. Manuilov, M. V. Chelnokov) refused to sign for a variety of reasons.⁷ When the “Jewish question” was debated among the Kadets, they generally refused to acknowledge that antisemitism and the tradition of violent acts against the Jewish population were deeply ingrained in the masses. Instead, they would most often place the blame on the government, or, if the opportunity presented itself, on German intelligence. At a party conference in June of 1915,⁸ Vinaver gave a speech in which he addressed the sources of the “indiscriminate accusations of Jewish espionage.” Citing the observations of a Russian writer who had claimed that most of the denunciations against Jews came from “the same region where Colonel Miasoedov operated,” Vinaver seemed to imply that persecution of Jews had a mistaken, though rational, basis.

A resolution proposed by the Central Committee exonerated the masses, saying: “Our goal is to prove to the masses that certain people want to deceive and manipulate them, by awakening evil desires within them.”⁹ E. G. Sholp, a delegate from Kiev, warned that “the Russian liberation movement is now threatened by a force it has never faced before: up until now the masses had never been predisposed to Judeophobia.” The source of this antisemitic sentiment, the five-million-member Russian Army, led Sholp to worry that “there will be no village safe from infection.” V. P. Osninskii, a
delegate from Moscow, repeated the old line that “Judeophobia was being sown by the authorities both consciously and unconsciously,” though he still held out hope that “not every soldier will spread antisemitism upon returning to his village. [We] can hope for a brighter future after the end of the war.”

M. M. Ichas of Kiev was of a different opinion: “All you hear in the train cars are antisemitic conversations, whether among women, officers, or others.” Ichas had once heard two officers having a conversation in which “one of them openly stated his support for solving the Jewish question according to the ‘Turkish method.’”

V. A. Maklakov, the attorney who served as Beilis’s counsel during the show trial, took a more pragmatic approach. Though he agreed that antisemitism “was supported by the orders of the authorities,” he fairly transparently hinted at the idea that the authorities were responding to pressure “from below.” He called for the delegates to imagine “the position of those very same authorities when faced with the fact that those [soldiers] who are going to their deaths, those who are to be killed, believe in Jewish espionage and betrayal. In such a case, the authorities are forced to resort to such measures.”

Maklakov was firmly against any sort of “conspiracy theories.” “The resolution states that the defenders of the old ways have invented ‘spymania’ as if fulfilling a plan that had been invented by obscurantists.” Having been to the front himself, Maklakov testified that antisemitism in the Army was extremely widespread. “There they say that if it isn’t true that all Jews are spies, then at least all spies are Jews, and that they can’t help being our enemies.” Maklakov’s fairly logical arguments that “the Austrian Jews have a civic duty to support their own army,” and that in the current conditions he “wouldn’t have the strength” to accuse Jews of lacking patriotism, were interrupted by cries of protest.

A majority of Kadets would continue to believe that the main source of antisemitism could be found in official policy. At the Sixth Party Congress (February 18–21, 1916), V. P. Obninskii said, “Despite the urgency of the moment and the work at hand, the government continues to ready pogroms against the Jews in keeping with its usual goal: to make up for its losses by attacking the Jews.” Obninskii did not support his claim with any kind of serious material evidence.

Although the February Revolution brought a democratic power to Russia under the rule of the Kadets, democracy was no guarantee of Jewish safety. At the Ninth Party Congress in July of 1917, O. K. Nechaeva said, “In the past several days, an irremovable, shameful stain has appeared on the conscience
of our unfortunate motherland, which is already suffering enough from shame and terror. I speak of the pogroms that accompanied the retreat of the Russian Army. One cannot read of the events that have transpired in Tarnopol and Kalush without feeling shaken, without a feeling of burning shame. This returns us to the worst times of the autocratic order, and brings to mind events that had seemed relegated to the distant past, namely, the pogroms in Kishinev and Bialystok.”

Nechaeva warned that pro-pogrom sentiment existed in Petrograd as well. Following the traditional liberal line, she sought to find scapegoats in positions of power. Since the Tsarist government no longer existed, a more suitable target had to be found: “Literature of a pogromistic character was discovered alongside photographs of a ritualized murder in Bolshevik headquarters. The German agents will stop at nothing in their desire to see our capital awash in blood and to disgrace our revolution.” In her speech, Nechaeva was simply repeating a number of rumors that had become prevalent in Petrograd at the time.

Of course, Bolsheviks and German agents had nothing to do with it. The insurrection was taking place according to the logic of all insurrections, and was accompanied by violence, robbery, and pogroms. This was the opinion of Rodichev, who dedicated his speech at the final Kadet Party Congress in October of 1917 to “the wave of pogroms, which has spread so wide as to cover the entire Russian land”: “One hears reports of violence against Jews, peasants, and others from all directions, in cities and in villages. Soldiers’ rebellions and all kinds of violence and pillaging have become a fact of life for all of Russia, staining the Russian name, threatening to turn it into a word of abuse.”

Rodichev demanded that the government undertake measures to combat this phenomenon, never suspecting that the government in question had but ten days to live. After the Bolshevik coup, the Kadets gave their full support to the White movement. The anti-Bolshevik National Center, created in the spring of 1918, was for all intents and purposes a Kadet organization. This fact was alluded to by P. I. Novgorodtsev, who was at the time a member of the Kadet Central Committee, “This is not the time to split into political parties,” he said at a meeting of the Central Committee in Ekaterinodar in May of 1919, “It is the time for the Constitutional Democrats to act not as a party, but as a unifying center. Thus the pull towards the National Center. There is no Kadetism or Democratism. Instead, there is the national task of unification. . . . the question is one of nation and state, not of political party.”
In the words of Central Committee member K. N. Sokolov, “Historically, the National Center had been founded by a coalition of the Kadets and those to the right of them,” although, “under the leadership of Denikin, the dominant influence came from the ‘leftist-Kadets.’” Sokolov quite correctly wrote that the National Center “was never ‘of the masses,’ it always maintained the status of an intellectual organization, which cooperated with the government in raising questions of policy, preparing legal material, and nominating personnel for positions.”

The Chairman of the Central Committee, Pavel D. Dolgorukov, as well as committee members P. I. Novgorodtsev, S. V. Panina, S. S. Salazkin, P. P. Gronskii, N. K. Volkov, and A. V. Tyrkova-Williams all gave active support to Denikin. N. I. Astrov, K. N. Sokolov, V. A. Stepanov, M. M. Fedorov, all members of the Kadet Central Committee, also served as part of the Special Council under Denikin. Sokolov was placed in charge of Denikin’s propaganda department in the beginning of 1919. Kadets did not form a majority of the membership of the Special Council; however, strength in numbers was not always correlated with influence. The conference was firmly under Denikin’s control, and the White general was to have the last say in everything. N. I. Astrov remarked at a meeting of the Kadets Central Committee that, “We may be in the minority in the Special Council, but Denikin is with us.”

The protocols of the Kadet Central Committee from the Civil War period have not been preserved in their entirety, and the notes that remain are not always very clear or coherent. Nonetheless, they give the impression that a shift occurred in the mentality of a significant portion of the liberal Russian intelligentsia in regards to the “Jewish question.” When a certain V. G. Geller was refused a position at the propaganda department because of being Jewish, this shift became all the more apparent. M. L. Mandelshtam, a Central Committee member and the lone Jew of its “southern” branch, asked the Committee whether Sokolov himself had made the decision not to hire Geller. Discussion on the question was tabled, apparently due to the absence of Sokolov.

The notes from the meeting of May 19, 1919 (which took place a week after Mandelshtam’s comments) include a special section entitled “The Jewish question.” Mandelshtam once more brought the question to the fore, this time examining the issue on a more abstract level. “I love Russia more than Jewry,” he began. “[F]or me the Jewish question is a question for the state. It must be addressed. It is also a question for the party. Though there are Trotsky’s and Vilenkins, the Jewish bourgeoisie, which is predominantly...
Zionist, is suffering. I understand it when Russians don’t like Jews; I myself have an involuntary dislike of Latvians. But we must fight against this. There are fewer socialists among the Jews then there are among the Russians.”

Mandelshtam once more brought up the issue of Geller, who hadn’t been hired because of a standing order not to accept Jews in that department. Mandelshtam again inquired, “Is this Sokolov’s view?” He then illustrated the position being taken by the Propaganda Department in regards to the “Jewish question.” He claimed that the department had been systematically spreading “all kinds of nonsense” about Jews, adding the word “Jew” at every possible opportunity. Mandelshtam suspected that most of this was the doing of a certain Egorov, who had earlier worked for the reactionary newspaper New Times. He concluded by asking, “Is it right for the head of the Propaganda Department to be a member of the Central Committee if that department does not accept Jews, and carries out antisemitic propaganda?”

Once more, discussion of the question was put off until such time as Sokolov might be present. However, Sokolov never made an appearance.

The “Jewish question” was raised again during the next Central Committee meeting. Though it is unclear whether he was discussing the Geller matter or a more general declaration in regards to the Jewish question, Pavel Dolgorukov said, “It is not worthwhile making a protest on behalf of the party. That announcement must come from the National Center. There will be pogroms; we must take action to stop them.” Dolgorukov neglected to mention any concrete forms such actions would take.

Novgorodtsev, who at the time was one of the most right-wing Kadet members, had the following to say on the matter: “We cannot support antisemitism, but the question is a difficult one. The Jews are active and talented in facing Slavic inaction. Their roles as commissars; they didn’t use enough tact; the connection with Masonry (the five-pointed star) the banner of the Antichrist. You have to understand the psychology of a priest. The sincere and influential Vostokov is against the Jews. His mentality has completely changed. America’s pro-Bolshevik tendencies can be attributed to Jewish influence. All of this has led to the appearance of antisemitism in intellectual, Kadet circles. We are forced to survive Bolshevism on the right, and it will be difficult for the Kadets when everything progressive is persecuted. The main weapon of every partisan leader is antisemitism. A resolution is insufficient; we must go deeper than that.”

As can be seen from Novgorodtsev’s speech, a belief in these “mystical” powers of Jewry had become widespread not only among the “unenlightened
masses,” but in highly educated circles as well. A month earlier, V. I. Vernadskii, a prominent Kadet and distinguished scientist, summed up the feelings he and a colleague (Agatangel Krymskii) had for the revolution that was taking place in Hungary: “We both look at the Hungarian Soviet Republic as a testament to the forces of Jewry.”

Jewish revolutionaries (including Bela Kun and others) played an active role in the events taking place in Hungary.

Prince G. N. Trubetskoi, a Kadet and member of the Special Council, headed the Department of Religious Affairs under Denikin. When Denikin expressed his displeasure regarding the passivity of French troops in Odessa during the spring of 1919, Trubetskoi offered the following explanation: “in Odessa, as in Paris, one can feel the persistent workings of the Jews and Masons, all of whom aim to prevent the intervention of our allies and their assisting us in the creation of a unified, strong Russia.” “That which had at first seemed to be pure invention, or the fantasy of the Black Hundreds, who attributed all of our troubles to the ‘Jewish masons,’ has recently seemed to have some real basis behind it,” wrote Trubetskoi in June of 1919. “The entire history of our revolution and of Bolshevism was sufficient for such an explanation. But having some understanding of the influence of the Masons in the French army, I considered it my duty to inform Denikin as to these facts.”

Trubetskoi was particularly suspicious of the head of French forces, Freidenberg, who he mistakenly thought was a Jew, and found Freidenberg’s activities to be in keeping with the goals of Masonry.

Denikin, who had been exposed to the real life of Russia’s Jewish population from childhood, did not seem to share in Trubetskoi’s delusions. Though he was not as “educated” as some Russian intellectuals, Denikin’s views proved to be the epitome of common sense when compared to the thoughts and actions of those surrounding him.

E. N. Trubetskoi, the brother of G. N. Trubetskoi, had been one of the founders of the Kadet Party before joining the more moderate Party for Peaceful Renewal (Partia mirnogo obnovleniia). In the summer of 1919, he wrote, “[I] have never been a Judeophobe, and do not sympathize with the current attempts to depict the Jews as the main or sole perpetrators of Russia’s destruction.” However, for Trubetskoi the role of “Jewish Masons” in the “fate and actions” of Bolshevism was an accepted fact. He associated this “phenomenon” with the First Beast of the Christian Apocalypse. Trubetskoi dissented from those on the right who sought to equate “the kingdom of the Antichrist with Jewish Masonry.” He found this idea to be merely an illusion: “Jewish Masons are nothing more than a partial manifestation of the
kingdom of the Beast; those who beat and rob Jews serve this kingdom to an equal degree.”

Let us return to the meeting of the Kadet Central Committee. Apparently Novgorodtsev’s antisemitic speech drew a protest from Mandelshtam. However, the precise nature of the protest is not recorded in the protocol. In any case, Novgorodtsev is on record as denying that he had become more antisemitic as a result of keeping company with those on the right. “I would ask that you not accuse me of antisemitism. We have to deal with it together.” He agreed that Sokolov should respond to Mandelshtam’s concerns. In turn, Mandelshtam expressed regret for his words towards Novgorodtsev, and announced his readiness to take back his words. Sokolov, as was to be expected, was once more absent.

Mandelshtam came forth with a concrete proposal: “Recognize the role of the Jews in the Revolution. The terror of collective responsibility felt by the Jews. You cannot hold an entire people responsible for the actions of a few. There’s nothing to be done with that. We are not speaking of defending the Jews, but merely saying that they should not be attacked.” Mandelshtam’s words are fairly disorganized; apparently the record was trying to capture what must have been an impassioned, if disjointed, speech. In an attempt to preserve “objectivity” Mandelshtam talked of Ukrainian Jewry as being at fault for something, though he never clarified what it was they were at fault for. He also said that antisemitism was strongest among those on the right, and that in blaming the Jews for everything, such people were “seeking the path of least resistance.” He once more pointed out that the Propaganda Department “was creating a pogromistic mentality, which the head of the department, a Central Committee member, must combat. At the very least, he is condoning this agitation.”

Astrov put an end to the debate. He believed that “the answer was clear.” The problem wasn’t with Sokolov in particular. Rather it had to do with the “general attitude.” “There was probably a general order regarding Geller. Perhaps he [Sokolov] will say that we need to provide an outlet for give antisemitic tendencies. We, as Kadets, need to examine this closely and attempt to understand this phenomenon and take action against it. The question needs to be posed from a broad point of view. The matter must be tabled,” he concluded.

In the end, little action was undertaken. The Central Committee asked Dolgorukov to talk with Sokolov about the matter and decided that the issue would be “fully debated at the next meeting.”
Two weeks later, Dolgorukov replied that he had talked to Sokolov and had relayed the accusations of antisemitism in the Propaganda Department. Sokolov replied that he was familiar “with attempts to move in this direction” and that he was trying to resist them. As far as the situation with Geller was concerned, Sokolov claimed that the order to not accept Jews had come from above. Sokolov assured the Committee that the antisemitic brochures had been published before he assumed his position. The Central Committee decided to enter Sokolov’s testimony into the notes of the meeting. The promised “full debate” of the Jewish question apparently did not take place.33

Later in life, Sokolov clearly felt uneasy about his position as head of the Propaganda Department, and attempted to underline the fact that he had but a tangential relationship to the department’s output. In his memoirs, he claimed that he had served as the head of the department from March 6 to December 20, 1919, while simultaneously serving as head of the Justice Department. He drew attention to the fact that he was abroad from the beginning of June until the end of August, and that as a result of “circumstances,” he effectively “took leave from the Propaganda Department, only resuming my duties on November 6, one and a half months before my resignation.”34

* * *

In commenting on the revolution of 1905, P. B. Struve claimed that the participants were free from any “moral reservations” that might hinder the realization of their respective programs. It would seem that the group of Russian liberals who aligned themselves with Denikin’s forces held a similar amoral position. Denikin’s troops carried out more than 200 pogroms in Ukraine, brutally slaughtering thousands of innocents who were in no way tied to politics. The Kadets effectively turned a blind eye to these events. The Kadet leadership, which had a particularly close relationship with Denikin, issued no protests concerning the carnage. It can be said with absolute certainty that the Kadets knew what was taking place. But aside from a simple summary of the facts in private correspondence there is little or no mention of the events. In September of 1919, A. V. Tyrkova-Williams wrote a letter from Rostov-on-Don to V. L. Burtsev (who was in Paris at the time). In it she writes, “It is really bad for the Jews right now, they are all being attacked. The Ukrainians do it the most. Makhnovists and other criminals and the like. The Reds occasionally do the same. There are the fewest pogroms in Volunteer territory, but they are taking place here as well.”35 Ironically, Tyrkova’s
letter happened to be written during the period when the White pogroms were about to reach their peak.

The Kadet position on White policy towards the Jewish population was not limited to an appalling lack of action in combating the widespread anti-Semitic propaganda. They even went so far as to openly fraternize with those who blamed the entire Jewish people for the events of the Revolution. Intellectual circles that earlier had been adamant in their belief in Jewish civil rights (if not outright “semitophilic”) now recognized antisemitism as a valid worldview.

On October 9, 1919, an article appeared in the Kadet newspaper *Svobodnaiia Rech’* (*Free Speech*) that was to serve as the apogee of the intellectual antisemitism of the period. Written by I. F. Nazhivin and entitled “To the Jewish Intelligentsia” (*K veireiskoi intelligentsii*), it was a rejection of intellectual cosmopolitanism. The author decided to take up the cause of the basest kind of nationalism. Though Nazhivin openly admitted that his adherence to nationalism was irrational, he nonetheless declared his support for repealing the Russian citizenship of the Jewish population. This was nothing less than a call for the mass deportation of a people who had spent nearly 150 years within Russia’s borders. Until such a “solution” was possible, Nazhivin contented himself with merely calling for restrictions on the rights of Jews: “We used to proclaim that the Russian people were very tolerant, and that all of the pogroms that had broken out in Russia were caused by government agents. Yet now that we have fully realized our freedom we must admit that we were mistaken. Since that time the old government has ceased to exist, and the hatred of the Jews has flared up with particular fury, and the pogroms have reached an incredible scale.”

Beginning with the idea that this outbreak of hatred was inherent not only in the unenlightened masses, Nazhivin came to the conclusion that the roots of anti-Jewish sentiment could be traced to “something racial, dark, and so deeply ingrained that it will evade any kind of scientific investigation.”

For Nazhivin, a former Tolstoyan, the reasons for the increase in antipathy towards the Jews were obvious, and were in no way limited to the “unbridled speculation that the Jews engage in alongside traitorous blackguard Russians.” Chief among these reasons was the active involvement in revolutionary activities of the Jewish intelligentsia, as opposed to the Jewish masses. He continued, “Revolutionary fervor has now begun to pass, and the Russian people have awoken to a new sense of nationalism. They can feel Russia, and understand that they are part of her. This newly awakened Russian citizen
can see that he is surrounded by the Jewish names of the advance guard of the already retreating Pugachevian hordes.” Nazhivin was more than ready to admit that the Russians themselves were in part responsible for the “death of the Motherland,” and lauded the actions of Jews such as Kannegiser (who assassinated Uritsky) and Kaplan (who attempted to assassinate Lenin). However, he felt that it was important to take into account the psychology of the uneducated masses, who “didn’t care for such things and continue to engage in wanton destruction.” He called upon the Jews to fall silent, to go into hiding, and to sacrifice their people and themselves for the good of Russia. In short, he asked the Jews to leave Russia alone.

The fact that Nazhivin had been married to a converted Jew appeared to be of little consequence to the writer: “One has to keep in mind that life is first and foremost irrational. You cannot draw any rational conclusions from it. The outbreak of nationalist sentiment is a spontaneous force. A former internationalist myself, I now say that this spontaneous force is a sacred one that must be respected. ‘Russia for the Russian, first and foremost’—this is the slogan that will soon unite millions.”

Calling for a more “humane” solution to the “Jewish question” than the pogromistic program, Nazhivin wanted all Jews to be stripped of their citizenship. This would both prohibit them from assuming any positions of power within the Russian state, and stop them from “interfering with Russian life.”

The fact that such an antisemitic manifesto could be published in a Kadet newspaper is stunning. In earlier times it would have been unthinkable for the Kadet organizations to condone such thoughts. The next day, October 11, a response to Nazhivin’s impassioned essay was published. Despite a weak attempt to dispute some of Nazhivin’s claims, the article nonetheless found itself in agreement with his major points.

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During the Civil War a number of White Kadets abandoned their liberal and democratic principles. This was particularly evident in the Party Conference of November 3–6, 1919, which took place in Kharkov. Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams was particularly candid in her evaluation of the situation: “The Army must be placed before the democratic platform. A ruling class must be formed, not a dictatorship of the majority. We must create an aristocratic spirit. The dominance of Western democracies is a ruse that suits the politicians of those countries. We have to be able to look the savage beast, the
masses, in the eye.” Faith in democracy had come to an end. Commenting on a resolution proposed by Petr Ryss (which neglected to include the phrase “national dictatorship”), Tyrkova-Williams continued, “[such ideas] are a return to that same old love that deceived us, and that we used to deceive others.” In the Kadet mentality of this period, there was no longer any place for “love of the masses.” Tyrkova-Williams herself summed up the sentiment at the Kadet conference best when she said, “Calm requires machine guns.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Tyrkova-Williams’s words bear an uncanny resemblance to a remark once made by V. V. Shulgin “Machine guns. That’s what is needed.” The only difference was that Shulgin made his remark during the first days of the February Revolution, while Tyrkova-Williams’s came two and a half years later. By that time, there was little or no difference in the “practical” policies of rightist Kadets and those who were openly reactionary.

In debating the “Jewish question” during the conference in Kharkov, the Kadets held the Bolsheviks responsible for the pogroms then taking place. Although the Bolsheviks were hardly innocent of such atrocities, their actions were hardly comparable in scale and number to the pogroms carried out by White forces and various Ukrainian organizations. In contrast to the White leadership, the Bolshevik authorities severely punished pogromists and suppressed antisemitic sentiment. Antisemitism was in no way a part of Bolshevik ideology and was never used for propaganda purposes. However, there were several occasions when Bolshevik forces were infected with the very same kind of antisemitism that was so prevalent among the Whites.

The resolution adopted at the Kadet conference (most likely composed by Dolgorukov) is a testament to dialectical obfuscation: “The Conference finds that one of the most fundamental reasons for the prevalence of base instincts among the masses is the corrupt atmosphere created by Bolshevism, which has engaged in wanton violence and the annihilation of its enemies as a matter of principle. This corruption of spirit has served as fertile ground for repulsive acts of violence, which when taken in their totality represent a true pogrom against all of Russia. A bloody whirlwind is now coursing throughout the country, overwhelming the Russian citizenry and claiming thousands of victims from all segments of the population, including the clergy, the officer corps, intelligentsia, peasants, and the workers. This moral savagery born of Bolshevism has also called forth widespread pogroms against the Jews.”

The resolution makes no mention of who stood to benefit from these pogroms, nor does it propose doing anything to stop these “anonymous” pogromists. Moreover, the resolution seems to place most of the responsi-
bility on the Jews themselves. It clearly alludes to the principle of collective responsibility, as if confirming the idea, proclaimed in any number of antisemitic brochures and pamphlets, that there was a kind of central authority among Russian Jewry: “Responsible groups of Jews in positions of authority must declare war on those elements of the Jewish population that are actively participating in the Bolshevik movement and carrying out criminal and vile acts . . . Russian Jewry must come to the realization that their safety is completely dependent on the unconditional recognition and support of the national dictatorship and the Volunteer Army, which is reestablishing Russian statehood. Only the firm rule of law, which the national authorities are trying to bring about, will provide reliable safety for all citizens irrespective of differences in nationality and religious belief.”

There is no indication as to why the path leading to “the firm rule of law” must necessarily include pogroms. One cannot help but agree with the opinion of William Rosenberg and Natalia Dumova, who have both described the Kadet resolution as a justification of antisemitism, which indirectly held Jews responsible for the pogroms against them. It is no coincidence that the antisemitic ideologue Shulgin welcomed the Kadet resolution. This resolution on the “Jewish question” led to a number of disputes, both at the Party conference and in the days following.

The discussions that took place at the conference are particularly interesting. P. Ia. Ryss was the first to bring up the “Jewish question.” Citing Nazhivin’s article and its weak rebuttal in Free Speech, he claimed that the party “had lost its ideological unity.” “This is a change in the party platform. For the very first time from among the ranks of the People’s Freedom Party there appears a slogan that calls for attacking an individual people as such. The old ruling principles of the party have disappeared.” A. V. Makletsov, a Kadet from Kharkov, supported Ryss, and claimed that Nazhivin’s article represented a break with the party’s ideology. Makletsov added that “the Jewish population is disintegrating, and that governmental authorities should be compelled to assist them.” L. E. Cholganskii of Kiev drew attention to the decrease in support for the Volunteer Army among the citizens of Kiev. Among other reasons, he singled out the participation of White forces in pogroms that had taken place in Kiev as well as the pro-pogrom Kievlianin run by Shulgin.

These objections notwithstanding, the dominant tone of the discussion was of a rather different character. The editor of Free Speech, B. E. Maliutin, denied the accusations of betraying the Party platform, insisting that “just as
in the past, we stand for equal rights.” “Now, after the revolution, the Jewish question has once again been posed, though it has now been posed differently,” he continued, claiming that new solutions to the question had to be found.

Whereas Maliutin was more reserved about this change in ideals, Kadet members V. I. Snegirev and N. A. Koiander were much more frank. Snegirev believed that “Our greatest misfortune is that we have never been nationalist. Our Party has been a national one [rossiiskaia], but never a Russian one [russkaia]. There must be unanimity in nationality, the Orthodox faith, and the State.” He disapproved of Ryss’s resolution, and claimed that “if we are to draw attention to the Russian pogroms against the Jews, then we also need to mention the Jewish pogroms carried out against the Russians.” As proof of the existence of the latter type of pogroms, Snegirev related the story of “a certain officer . . . whose family had been killed by a Jewish family.”

Koiander claimed that “there is no need to single out the issue of pogroms, though if it must be posed, it should include an address directed at the Jewish people.” “Outcasts of the Jewish people are at the head of the Revolution, and revolutionary internationalism has trampled all things Russian. The pogroms aren’t directed at the perpetrators, but one shouldn’t simply protest the pogroms and leave it at that. Agitation is at the foundation of the Jewish question. In Odessa, they are already accusing the Volunteer Army, General Denikin, and the Special Council of having sold out to the Jews. If you pass a resolution on the pogroms, it will be read as being for the Jews. The Volunteer Army marches with love for Russia, and with hatred for the Jews. If you tear out the hatred of the Jews, you risk tearing out the love of Russia as well.”

L. A. Velikhov, a Central Committee member, also supported Free Speech, noting that “we needed to find a means to fight this harmless cultural battle, and the newspaper found one without going against the Party.” For this member of the Kadet leadership at least, there was no question regarding the necessity of attacking the Jews; the only concern was what form the attack was to take. At the same time, he disagreed with the rightward shift of the party, which in his opinion was still against pogroms and for Jewish rights. “But,” he warned, “the Jewish nation cannot be absolved [otkrestit’sia] of Jewish participation in the Bolshevik attack against Russia. The Bolsheviks’ main ideologue is a Jew, while their chief officer is a Latvian. The Jews must disassociate themselves from Jewish Bolsheviks. In demanding the condemnation of pogroms, they must likewise condemn their fellow tribes-
men, who have destroyed Russia. This is where the Russians disagree with the Jews.”

Velikhov was apparently ignorant of the blatant contradiction contained in his own words. One can’t be for equal rights one minute, and then demand that certain nationalities perform “acts of penance” the next.

During the second day of the conference (November 4, 1919) several party members spoke out against the antisemitic statements that had dominated the preceding day. Tyrkova-Williams announced that “we need to hold ourselves responsible for the sins of the Volunteer Army and struggle against them.” Objecting to Koiander’s earlier speech, she listed a number of plausible reasons for antisemitic sentiment, before concluding with the traditional liberal position: that hatred of the Jews stemmed from “blindness” and “ignorance.” “But it is incorrect to think that hatred for the Jews is somehow intertwined with love for Russia,” she concluded.

Frenkel, a Jew himself, felt it necessary to remind Koiander that “Jews made an announcement in the Duma rejecting the Bolsheviks” and that “within the context of governance, pogroms were harmful.” He stressed that “there is no ‘inherent’ hatred for Jews in the Russian soldier, nor in the Russian people.”

Koiander attempted to explain and soften his shocking claims from the previous day, saying that “no one is blaming anyone for anything” and that he “did not mean to offend anyone.” Concerning his equivalence of hatred for Jews with patriotism, he explained, “In order for the army to succeed, we must punish the Jews who are in league with the Bolsheviks.” “On October 25, 1917, I felt like I was a Russian citizen for the first time. On November 1 I started to work with the Volunteer Army. Just as A. V. Tyrkova said, we must hold ourselves responsible for the sins of the Volunteer Army. This army is my icon, my life, my love.”

However, by this time Koiander’s “icon” had already been stained and blackened. The debate led some Kadets to question whether they had any place left in the party. On the second day of discussion, Ryss spoke out, “Listening to Koiander’s words on love and hate could not help filling me with a sense of shame in regards to the Volunteer Army. As far as my own attitudes as a Jew are concerned, then I must say that I consider myself to be a Russian citizen. I could care less if someone doesn’t like me, but I do need to know whether it is possible for us to coexist. You ask us to denounce Jewish Bolsheviks. We have done so several times and are willing to do so again. Yet you have also said that children are not responsible for the sins of their fathers. I
will not speak on the Jewish question. I do not want to stand accused of something, as I feel no guilt. Debate among yourselves and come to a decision.”

During his presentation, Ryss read a few notes he had received that he claimed would shock those gathered. Among those read out loud were the following: “Is it true that 20,000 Jews left Kiev with the Bolsheviks?” “Is it true that Jews were opening fire from their windows?” These questions, so similar to the ideas espoused in the antisemitic Kievlianin, were nonetheless composed by members of the Kadet party. Even Snegirev’s formula of “Nationality, Orthodoxy, and the State” was nothing more than a reiteration of Uvarov’s trinity of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” from the reign of Nicholas I. Given the prevailing attitudes of those in attendance, it should come as no surprise that the resolutions adopted by this gathering were to represent an essential departure from Kadet ideals.

At a meeting of the Kadet Central Committee in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, 1919, Dolgorukov remarked that “in passing the resolution on the ‘Jewish question,’ it was proposed to limit ourselves to a condemnation of the pogroms.” But this proposal was rejected and the original resolution passed, with 14 in favor and 8 against. Although Dolgorukov claimed “[t]he prominent local Jew Orshanskii did not object to the resolution,” he did not mention the positions of the other Jewish party members in regard to the decision.

The members of the Central Committee differed in their evaluation of the resolution on the “Jewish question.” Stepanov thought that “a resolution was very much needed.” Iurenev indicated that “the resolution concerning the Jewish question corresponded to the discussions of the Central Committee.” Sokolov considered the resolution to be “successful”; Dolgorukov defended the resolution as well. Tyrkova-Williams regretted that “not all of the aspects of the Jewish question” were addressed, due to “technical reasons.” Only Astrov disagreed with the “conclusion of the resolution on the Jewish question.” After this exchange of opinions, the Central Committee decided to approve the resolutions adopted by the Kharkov conference.

However, not all of the membership of the Central Committee approved of the decision. P. P. Gronskii was not present at the Kharkov conference. In an interview with the newspaper Jewish Tribune, he noted that only twenty-eight delegates had been present in Kharkov, of whom only five were members of the Central Committee. “The resolution regarding the Jewish question was adopted by an extremely narrow majority. Personally, I am not sympathetic to it, and its passage was met with protests by several members of the party. As a result, the resolution was declared to be unrepresentative.”
sentative of the opinion of the party as a whole at a joint session of the South-
eastern Committee and the Central Committee of the party, which took
place in Rostov during the second half of December, 1919. In any case, I am
quite sure that the Constitutional Democratic Party does not think that the
entire Jewish people is responsible for the actions of a few individual Jewish
Bolsheviks.”

This corrosion of pro-Jewish sentiment was mostly limited to the Kadets
who were most closely associated with the White movement. V. A. Mak-
lakov, the Russian ambassador to Paris, witnessed this first hand during his
visit to the Don region during the fall of 1919. In a conversation with repre-
sentatives from the Jewish Political College in Rostov (A. L. Chernikov,
G. Ia. Bruk, and F. E. Lander), which took place on October 20, he explains
the situation: “Those liberal circles that I knew previously to have a positive
opinion of Jews are now oriented differently. True, this is a temporary phe-
nomenon and it will soon pass, but until it does ...”

As for the Kadets who remained abroad during this period (such as P. N.
Miliukov, F. I. Rodichev, I. I. Petrunkevich, and V. D. Nabokov), they were
categorically opposed to the principle of “collective responsibility” in relation-
ship to Russian Jewry. They condemned the pogroms as well as antisemitic
propaganda. Petrunkevich, a member of the old guard of the party, severely
criticized Nazhivin’s article that called for stripping Russia’s Jews of their
citizenship. In an essay in The Jewish Tribune, Petrunkevich writes, “We
can and must be mindful of the press, including publications like Free
Speech, that sow hatred among the Russian people in the guise of indignant
patriotism, which in turn incites the people to violence and civil strife.”

This is not to say that the Kadets stationed abroad were willing to admit
to the role of the Volunteer Army in the carrying out of pogroms. They at-
ttempted to convince others (and themselves) that the pogroms were perpe-
trated by “certain segments” of Denikin’s army, that “the pogroms went
against the leadership,” and that “Denikin was fighting against them with all
of his strength.” Rodichev insisted on painting fantasy as reality, claiming
that “we know that pogromists are actively being repressed.” Nabokov was
of the same deluded opinion: “Supporters of the slogan ‘beat the Jews’ can
only be found in the most unenlightened dregs of society, where the Makh-
novists, Grigorievists, and so on make their home...” The delusional
thinking of the “Parisian Kadets” was not due solely to a lack of knowledge.
Losing faith in Denikin’s forces would mean losing any hope of liberating
Russia from Bolshevism. “Besides Denikin’s army, we see no other organized
physical force capable of defending the law,” Rodichev wrote, not knowing that Denikin’s defeat had already been guaranteed.63

Because of their hopes for White military success, the Kadets abroad often considered the pogroms not as purposeful actions of the Volunteer Army, but rather as a “misfortune” that had befallen Denikin’s forces. “And it will be corrected,” Rodichev wrote, “but this will only happen when the passions of the pogromist, the bestial hatred of the ignorant masses, are destroyed. . . . The liberation of Russia cannot take place if ethnic hatred is to remain triumphant. This is why the fight against antisemitism is a fight for Russia, a fight for the renewal of the rights that have been destroyed by hatred, for a new life. The Southern Army will assist in this.”64 Of course, it was one thing to speak of assistance on the pages of the Parisian Jewish Tribune. It was quite another to see such “assistance” in all of its bloody glory during the pogroms in Fastov and Kiev.

The Kadet member and Zionist D. S. Pasmanik also believed that supporting the White movement was the only possible salvation for Russia’s Jews. He was one of the leading contributors for the semi-official, pro-Denikin newspaper Obshchee Delo (Common Cause), which was published by V. L. Burtsev. In the middle of September, 1919, Pasmanik published a programmatic article entitled “The Jewish Question in Russia”: “As a system, Bolshevism will lead to the complete destruction of the economic life of Russian Jewry, whose members predominantly belong to the middle and petty bourgeoisie.” Claiming to have personally observed the activities of Denikin’s army for a significant amount of time, Pasmanik categorically stated that, “This army has fought against Lenin’s authority with heroism and great resolve. It has experienced indescribable sufferings at the hands of the butchers Trotsky, Antonov, Muraviev, and Dybenko. It has no love for Jews, as a number of commissars have come from the Jewish population. The officers of this army forget that the Trotskys, Kamenevs, Zinovievs, and Larins are only Jews by birth, and that they have nothing in common with their people. Trotsky himself has cynically noted the same thing. But despite the Volunteers’ massive dislike of Jews, there has not been a single pogrom in the huge territory currently occupied by Denikin’s army.”

Pasmanik assured his readers that Denikin’s army “embodied the idea of a well-run state, the idea of a harmonious unification of all classes, peoples, and religious groups, into a united whole. This concept of civil governance is firmly against pogroms. This is why, despite the antisemitic attitudes of certain officers or soldiers, the army as a whole does not allow pogroms, which bear within them the seeds of civil dissolution.”
He called upon Russian Jewry to employ “all means in support of the efforts of these, the greatest of Russian patriots, in their struggle against the evil of Bolshevism, which threatens to destroy our entire culture.” “Jewish Bolsheviks are the vilest enemies of the Jewish people,” he continued. By supporting Denikin and Kolchak, the Jews “will not only save Russia itself, but also ameliorate the situation in all civilized countries.”

This article was written during the days when hundreds of utterly innocent Jews were being murdered by Denikin’s forces. The first victims of such massacres were often the members of delegations sent to meet the Whites upon their arrival, their hopes for the restoration of civil order repaid by indiscriminate violence and wanton destruction.

* * *

After Denikin’s defeat, the remaining White forces gathered in Crimea under the command of General Vrangel. The Kadets, who had played a prominent role in Denikin’s government, were faced with a series of choices. First, they had to come to terms with their recent past. Second, they had to decide whether or not to recognize and support Vrangel. Finally, they had to reconcile themselves to the reality that it was seemingly less and less likely that Bolshevism would be defeated through military means. On April 23 and 24, 1920, a meeting of prominent Kadet leaders took place in Paris at the home of A. I. Konovalov, a former Minister for the Provisional Government. Attendees included those who had managed to make the journey from Russia. M. M. Fedorov and V. A. Stepanov, active participants in the National Center, managed to reach Paris by way of Constantinople. P. N. Miliukov was also present, having come from London. Other attendees included M. S. Adzhemov, D. S. Pasmanik, V. D. Nabokov, A. A. Svechin, P. Ia. Ryss, I. P. Demidov, Iu. F. Semenov, and L. E. Eliashev.

By this point Miliukov had lost his leadership position. During the summer of 1918, while in Kiev, he had attempted to enlist the Germans in overthrowing the Bolsheviks. He was never forgiven by his fellow Kadets, and was practically run out of Paris at the end of 1918. Miliukov kept fairly detailed notes of the events that took place during the meeting.

On the first day of the meeting, P. Ia. Ryss was the only member who addressed the “Jewish question.” Miliukov writes, “Concerning the Jewish question, unheard-of speeches (Koiander: if you take away the spirit of hatred towards Jews, the Volunteer Army dies). Stepanov denies it.” The next
day Pasmanik, the very same person who had denied the existence of pogroms in White Russia, stated, “Yesterday we did not discuss the terrible phenomenon of the horrifying Jewish pogroms.” Miliukov’s entry continues with Pasmanik’s words:

The honor of the party was discussed. Something terrible has taken place. Even if Denikin’s army was better than Petliura’s, it’s still bad. K. N. Sokolov was the head of the propaganda ministry. Official documents indicate that it surpassed the period under Plehve. The former Social-Democrat Valerian (Prof. Lenskii) is sending around pogromistic proclamations, legends of gatherings in Kiev, articles like “Torture by Fear.”67 People close to us who have come from Kiev have given the most horrifying testimony. Sokolov said: “I don’t know what to do. Others call me Yids’ father [zhidovskii bat’ka], and you accuse me of antisemitism.” I believe in our future. There will be an armed struggle. But Europe’s opinion must be taken into account. I say this not as a Jew, but as a good Kadet. What took place in Kharkov is a black stain on the party. The patriarch could stop the Russians from being Bolsheviks. I’ll demand that we say something. I can’t sit at the same table as Sokolov. The pogroms helped lead to the dissolution of the Volunteer Army.68

Later on, Pasmanik echoed Eliashev: “We should have joined the government. But we shouldn’t have stayed. Obedience? But this is no Party congress. And no congress could force me to commit a crime. There’s nothing left of the Constitutional Democratic Party. And we sanctioned it. We rubber-stamped it. You misled us. I promised that there weren’t going to be any pogroms. You talked with [Woodrow] Wilson about recognizing Denikin. You didn’t keep your promises. You should have left. You compromised the Constitutional Democratic Party.”69

The only ones present at the meeting who admitted that the Kadets were at least partially morally responsible for the pogroms and widespread antisemitism were Jews. None of their Russian comrades found it necessary or possible to do the same, even though their stated goal was the transformation of Russia into a liberal, democratic state. Some, like Stepanov, even went so far as to deny that Denikin’s forces were antisemitic.

Baron B. E. Nolde was to have the final word in the discussion.
The Kadets refuse to recognize Jewish equality, while the Bolsheviks do much better.\textsuperscript{70} Armed struggle is immoral and will not give us anything. A muzhik from Penza kills a muzhik from Ryazan. It’s impossible to talk about this in a calm manner. I cannot stand for this. Armed struggle is compromised in its essence. I lived in Russia for two years and this I know for sure: they were waiting for their people to come and save them. You were serving an actual need. But instead of that you ended up just making a Soviet of Deputies of another color, a White Sovdep of the restorationist type. The landowner flogs his peasants. We have to conceive of an idea of order, justice, and so on. This is what the country needs. We have practically sacrificed all of these ideas for the sake of armed struggle. There can’t even be a hint of a restoration. . . . the country doesn’t want to simply be robbed in a different manner. Practically speaking, we must believe that we are of use to the country as cultured people, bravely deny the social and communist elements of our program, declare a bourgeois platform on the basis of seizing the land.\textsuperscript{71}

Though no serious decisions or resolutions were undertaken by the participants of the Paris meeting, one fact remained clear: the differences in opinion among the Kadets had gone too far. A schism was inevitable.
The attitude of the White leadership toward the Western democracies ranged from skeptical to outright hostile. In the opinion of some (including Kolchack and Denikin), the Western democracies were guilty of meddling in the internal affairs of Russia. Nonetheless, the Whites were forced to take the demands of the Western democracies into account, as the West provided military and material support for the anti-Bolshevik movement. In exchange, the Whites would pay lip service to Western demands that they move toward adopting democratic standards. For the most part, the Whites limited themselves to creating various announcements, declarations, and statements that allegedly demonstrated their support for democratic values, while simultaneously avoiding any actual measures aimed at achieving such goals.

Russian diplomats often found themselves in the role of “lobbyists,” as they best understood the cultures and political landscapes of their host countries. In particular, they were sensitive to the nuances of an environment in which the political leadership was dependent on public opinion and social pressures. Although some White leaders were suspicious of the “lessons” offered by representatives abroad such as V. A. Maklakov and G. E. Lvov (which they saw as attempts to undermine their authority) they could not afford to ignore the interests and attitudes of the Western governments and their respective constituencies.

The “Jewish question” was to be one of the key issues in White foreign policy. This was especially true in the case of the United States, which had a large and influential Jewish population. Probably the only country to come through World War I stronger than it had been previously, the United States
possessed nearly inexhaustible financial and material resources. Unfortunately for the Whites, the “Jewish question” had often served as a stumbling block in Russo-American relations. The most striking example of this occurred in 1911, when a trade agreement between the two countries was annulled by the United States. The main reason for the annulment was American dissatisfaction with the restrictions put on its own Jewish citizens while they were working abroad in Russia. Though they were not Russian subjects, American Jews were subjected to the same restrictions as the Russian Jewish population. The February Revolution (and the subsequent repeal of restrictions on Jews) was welcomed by the United States, which was the first country to recognize the Provisional Government.

In the days following the Bolshevik coup, the American government did not immediately decide to support the Whites. Instead, before deciding to support the anti-Bolshevik cause, the Wilson administration waited for the Bolsheviks to clarify their policy toward the war. On the American side, there were serious concerns as to the democratic intentions of many of the White generals, and the “Jewish question” often served as a litmus test for their tolerance and democratic credentials. As a result, the “proper” American perception of the Whites’ Jewish policy, both in political circles and in social opinion, was of vital concern for the movement.

S. A. Uget, a financial attaché at the Russian embassy in the United States, sent a telegram to the White leadership in Omsk and to Ambassador B. A. Bakhmetev (who was in Paris attending the peace talks) expressing his concern at the negative impressions of the White movement held by many Americans. At the time, several rumors had reached Washington that Jews were being persecuted in the territories under the control of White forces. Dated March 8, 1919, the telegram states, “The Jews, who have an enormous amount of influence with the government, are deeply disturbed. It would be desirable that such rumors be immediately and categorically refuted. It would likewise be desirable that statements satisfactorily explaining these or other measures be sent to the press. It is worth bearing in mind that the Bolsheviks and their sympathizers, thanks to their abundance of resources, actively make use of each and every such rumor in order to discredit Kolchak’s government.”

Apparently Uget had earlier asked Bakhmetev whether either the Russian Political Delegation or Kolchak’s government itself would make a “special statement on the Jewish question.” The ambassador responded that no such statement was under consideration for the “near future.”
However, Kolchak eventually felt compelled to make precisely such a statement, though it was not intended for widespread circulation. It took the form of a secret telegram addressed to Sazonov in Paris. At Bakhmetev’s request, a copy of the telegram was sent to Vinaver. Dated June 6, 1919, the telegram states:

Admiral Kolchak wishes to inform you that rumors have reached him regarding Russian Jews’ concerns regarding their future. The Supreme Ruler finds it advisable that his views, which have been repeatedly and openly declared, be kept in mind, namely, that the task of the Government is to guarantee equality before the law for all of the peoples of Russia, regardless of nationality or religious belief. This equality must in turn guarantee the personal safety of all citizens. He has expressed these views on several occasions in discussions with representatives of the Jewish community, who have approached him to assure him of their loyalty and patriotism, which they have demonstrated by making significant financial contributions toward the needs of the Army. It is the Supreme Leader’s belief that manifestations of ethnic strife, to the detriment of the peaceful flow of life of any part of the population, cannot be tolerated.

* * *

The White propaganda effort in the United States was headed by Arkadii Iosifovich Zak (Sack), a firm supporter of the democratic ideals of the February Revolution and someone who had never denied his Jewish heritage. Zak knew English well and had a firm grasp of the workings of American political culture. He was a perfect fit as the director of the Russian Information Bureau in the United States, formed in May 1917 on the orders of the Provisional Government. The Bureau began its activities in June of the same year and continued to operate up until Bakhmetev’s resignation in June 1922. The Bureau’s work encompassed three spheres of activity: “1. Publication of articles, announcements, brochures, and books about Russia. 2. Speeches and lectures about Russia. 3. Working with members of the American intelligentsia, including conversations and correspondence with American political and social figures and journalists.”

The Bureau’s efforts were financed by the Embassy. Based in New York, Zak received constant instructions from S. A. Uget and M. M. Karpovich,
Zak did not recognize the Bolshevik coup and fully supported the White movement. Zak published a series of English-language bulletins on the Bolshevik coup, including “General Kaledin and the Bolshevik,” “The Crime of the Bolsheviks against Democracy,” “Documents of the Bolshevik Revolt,” and “The Evolution of Bolshevism.” The first of these, in the words of Zak himself, contained “the first depiction of the Cossacks as an anti-Bolshevik democratic force.”

Zak placed particular importance on the “correct” depiction of Russia’s “Jewish question” in the American press. In doing so, he relied on his connections with prominent members of the American Jewish community, including Louis Marshall and Jacob Schiff, who were board members of the Bureau. Zak maintained a lively correspondence with both of these figures, in order to “bring them into a group, quite formidable in terms of politics and finances, that will recognize the necessity of assisting Russia to the degree required.”

In his attempts to convince Marshall and Schiff to support the anti-Bolshevik forces, Zak pointed to both the patriotism of Russian Jewry, and also their active participation in the liberal and revolutionary movement. Zak saw no contradiction between these two points: “Unfortunately, as it happened, although the Jewish population as a whole, and many of the Jewish leaders, among them such men as Vinaver, Gotz, Minor, Axelrod, and Deutch, have taken a definite anti-Bolshevist and patriotic stand, a great percentage of the Bolsheviks [sic!] are Jews.” Zak warned that this allowed reactionary elements to portray the entire Bolshevik movement as a Jewish movement aimed at the destruction of Russia. The ensuing wave of antisemitism both in Russia and beyond, would result in pogroms that would make the events of Kishinev pale in comparison. Thus, Zak concluded, one needed to take all possible measures to bring the bloodshed to an end.

Zak also met with members from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, including Mason. He requested their assistance in attracting donations to the Russian cause, and asked that they themselves help in any way possible. Zak wrote to the Embassy that “the possibility of establishing a special assistance fund would soon be discussed by the Joint Committee.”

Beginning in March of 1919, Zak started publishing a weekly newspaper, *Struggling Russia*. D. N. Shub, a well-known publicist and Menshevik, served as managing editor. Though mostly a vehicle for White propaganda, the
newspaper devoted significant coverage to the “Jewish question.” One can only imagine the shock Jewish inhabitants of the Ukraine would have felt had they had the chance to see how White policy was presented to the American reading public.

Zak supported the Kolchak government, and lobbied for its international recognition. In an article entitled “The Omsk Government Before the Judgment of the World,” he attempted to demonstrate how Kolchak’s regime was dedicated to the principles of democracy and federalism. The very same issue contained an appeal to American Jewry composed by the writer K. A. Kovalskii, a member of the Party of Social Revolutionaries. In America, he was acting as a representative of the Council of Congresses of Siberian Cooperatives. Though a democratic institution by any standard, in practical terms the Council did little more than occupy themselves with the spreading of pro-Omsk propaganda. Addressing his appeal to the people of “Heine, Mendelssohn, and Spinoza,” he warned that thousands of “innocent brothers, sisters, and children” would suffer for the crimes of the Bolshevik commissars. He also claimed that there had not been a single pogrom in non-Soviet Russia, and that the Russian communities of Omsk, Perm, and Ekaterinburg all supported the Siberian army.

Kovalskii admitted that pogroms had already taken place in Soviet territories and in Ukraine, and stated that such occurrences must not be tolerated in the future. He called upon American Jewry to proclaim their hatred for Bolshevism on the world stage: “Let the Siberian Army learn about it from your own resolutions and your telegrams. Let the hungry Russian peasants know about it as well.” Kovalskii also called for the establishment of an assistance fund in honor of Korolenko. In his conclusion, he declared that the democratic forces of Siberia and the Urals were going to establish civil order in all of Russia, and put an end to the dark chaos there that endangered Jew and non-Jew alike.

Zak was fully aware that anti-Bolshevik statements made by recognized or well-known members of Russian Jewry were vital to his task. “The Jewish question is always a stumbling block for Russian policy in the United States, just as the Irish one is for the British. Both problems are rooted in misunderstandings and wounds that have accumulated over centuries. I am convinced that in the given situation it is not so much a historical analysis of the situation that is important, but rather the recognition of its existence, the discovery of possible paths to solve it, and the quick execution of the proposed plan.”
Zak knew what he was writing about. A meeting protesting the pogroms in Russia took place in New York at the end of May 1919. The participants sent a telegram to Louis Marshall in Paris, demanding an end to the pogroms (Marshall was attending the Paris peace talks at the time, along with other leaders of the Jewish community). Marshall passed the telegram on to President Wilson, along with his own letter, which asked Wilson to take steps to ensure the safety of Russia’s Jews. Marshall asked Lucien Wolf, his British counterpart, to do the same with the British delegation.\(^{16}\)

Marshall had an audience with Wilson on May 27, 1919. The President assured him that all necessary measures would be taken to prevent future pogroms, and that a message to that effect had already been sent to Kolchak.\(^{17}\)

Upon discovering that Vinaver had arrived in Paris, Zak sent him a telegram via Uget, requesting that he make an announcement that outlined, “what the main tasks of the anti-Bolshevik movement are, and what position American Jewry should take in regards to the drama currently unfolding in Russia, as well as how the Jews in Russia view Bolshevism.” The latter was particularly important, as “Bolshevik propaganda had resulted in false representations of Soviet and anti-Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia is considered to be the kingdom of good fortune, in which all nationalities are equal and everyone is given the opportunity for a happy existence. The vast majority of American Jews consider the anti-Bolshevik movement to be reactionary and antisemitic.” Zak also requested that another member of the Jewish delegation, A. I. Kaminka, write a telegram to Schiff explaining the position of Russian Jewry, and that a third, P. M. Rutenberg, compose a similar telegram for the Jewish newspapers The Day and The Forwards (sic). Zak claimed that the later publication, “does everything to support Bolshevik sympathies among American Jews.”\(^{18}\)

Vinaver assented to Zak’s request, and agreed to defend both the interests of Russia’s Jews and those of the White movement. On June 5, 1919, Vinaver gave a speech at an event organized by the Alliance Israélite Universelle,\(^{19}\) in which he discussed the conditions of Russian Jewry in the present and the near future. The next day, Lucien Wolf, who had attended the speech, recorded his impressions of the event in his diary.

To the surprise of many of those present, Vinaver was fairly optimistic. He believed that in the event of a victory by Kolchak or Denikin, the danger of future pogroms would be insignificant. Vinaver’s own personal interactions with both leaders led him to believe that neither was a reactionary or antisemitic. Moreover, most of Kolchak and Denikin’s civilian advisers were Kadets, who did not hold the Jews accountable for the rise of Bolshevism.
Wolf then asked if it were true that the officer corps of the White forces were mainly from “the old regime,” and whether there was a danger that the Kadet civilian advisers would eventually become marginalized, or lose their positions altogether. Vinaver responded that such a danger did exist in Denikin’s army, as it was mostly a volunteer army with decidedly strong monarchist sympathies. However, he also claimed that there was no such danger in Kolchak’s forces, which relied on conscripts.20

Wolf noted that he was not very convinced by Vinaver’s optimism. Vinaver looked at the events taking place from within the anti-Bolshevik movement, and was naturally inclined to paint the picture that very same movement wanted the rest of the world to see. He unconsciously tried to defend the more reactionary elements in the anti-Bolshevik camp, and understated the degree to which they posed a threat. Wolf feared “that when the triumph comes, these elements and the army officers will make short work of the Liberals and Jews, including Vinaver himself.”21

Vinaver addressed one more topic of importance, namely, the re-creation of a united Russia. As a Jew and a Russian citizen, he was fully supportive of the idea. He entreated the Jewish communities of other countries to support it as well, and attempted to demonstrate that the dissolution of Russia into several states was not in the best interests of Russian Jewry. Such a situation would fragment the current Jewish community living in Russia, and undermine its social status and security. Any new states that replaced Russia would necessarily be nationalist and chauvinist, and a rise in antisemitic sentiment would be inevitable. Such new states would view the unassimilated portions of the Jewish population with fear and suspicion, and antisemitism would become a chronic phenomenon. A united Russia, on the other hand, under the conditions of a liberal regime, would be sufficiently self-confident and strong that antisemitism would disappear. Though Wolf agreed in principle with Vinaver’s remarks regarding the problem with smaller states, he was less convinced that a united Russia would pose less of a threat. In his opinion, this would depend on how liberal the new regime would be. Wolf found it highly unlikely that a sufficiently liberal regime would be established.22

Interestingly enough, on the very same day Wolf was recording his thoughts on Vinaver, he met with another representative of Russian Jewry, Baron Aleksandr G. Gintsburg. Gintsburg did not agree with Vinaver’s claim that there was little chance of pogroms after a Kolchak victory (though, according to Wolf, this didn’t seem to bother him much). Like Vinaver, Gints-
burg was most concerned that the anti-Bolshevik forces prove victorious in the conflict; all other concerns were of secondary importance.25

Although we do not know if Kaminka and Rutenberg ever fulfilled Zak’s assignments for them (or if they even received them) we do know that Vinaver quickly complied. By June 25 Uget had already received the Russian text of Vinaver’s article, which was published in the pages of Struggling Russia under the title “Bolshevism and the Russian Jewry.”24 Below I will cite the original version of Vinaver’s (Russian) text from his telegram to Washington, a copy of which is located in the papers of M. N. Girs in the Hoover Institute Archives, and occasionally compare it to the English version printed in Zak’s newspaper.25

Vinaver begins by claiming that “it is absolutely untrue that Russian Jewry approves of or tolerates Bolshevism.” Apparently Vinaver’s phrasing was not strong enough for Zak, who rendered it in English as, “The entire Russian Jewry struggles against Bolshevism.” He then continues “everywhere Bolshevism reigns among the Jewish population, with the exception of a small circle of privileged workers [here Zak renders “privileged workers” as “insignificant exceptions”] there reigns poverty and hunger . . . The Bolsheviks persecute the Jewish religion as much as they do the Christian religions, and are destroying Jewish social, cultural, and religious institutions.”26

As far as Jewish Bolsheviks were concerned, the “agitator-Bolsheviks themselves disavow any kind of connection with the Jewish people”.27 Vinaver claimed that fears of retaliation, based on the military nature of the anti-Bolshevik movement, were exaggerated, and argued that although the liberal democratic Russian intelligentsia may have been dispersed by the Bolshevik terror, they had not disappeared. “They are now gathered around generals Kolchak and Denikin, they work in Paris and London. The most pressing task of the current moment now being discussed in Russian political circles is the establishment of a democratic system of government, which will be carried out with the assistance of the Kolchak regime, which has already been recognized. This system of government will protect Russia from the dangers of a conservative reaction to the Bolshevik oppression. This path is the only one that will save the Jews of Russia. And the American Jewry would be rendering us an enormous service, if they were to collaborate with us in our labors, in our attempt to create a new anti-Bolshevik democratic Russia.”27

On the very next day after Vinaver sent his address to Washington, he participated in a meeting organized by Aleksandr Gintsburg. The announced topic of discussion was the “Russian question,” by which, of course, meant the
“Jewish question.” The attendees included Lucien Wolf, Salomon Reinach, and Louis Marshall. Gintsburg asked that the leaders of the Western European Jewish communities publish a manifesto against Bolshevism. Vinaver added that Kolchak and Denikin treated the Jews well, and that the Jews, in turn, should show their moral support. This was all the more necessary as Denikin was forced to fight against antisemitic influences among his own people.

Reinach and Marshall supported Gintsburg’s initiative. Marshall also took Wolf to task for the fact that the oldest Jewish newspaper, the London-based *Jewish Chronicle*, was openly pro-Bolshevik.

Wolf was skeptical of Gintsburg’s proposal. In his opinion, the “Jewish question” centered on the dispute as to whether or not Jews were a religious community. As a religious community, Jews could not have anything to do with politics, and no one present had the right to say that Judaism was closer to this or that political party. Wolf believed that Jews had the right to their own political opinions, and that no Jewish organization could repudiate another simply because they had differing political views.

Though opposed to all forms of socialism, Wolf took issue with Marshall’s claim that 90 percent of all Jews belonged to the bourgeoisie. Gintsburg’s proposed manifesto would only serve to make enemies of those who supported socialism; it was completely conceivable that another Jewish organization would then publish a counter-manifesto declaring their support for the Bolsheviks or some other form of socialist revolution. “We should then have it on permanent record that there was a strong tendency in this direction in the Jewish community. Hitherto we have been able to some extent to hide or obscure that fact,” Wolf admitted. Wolf concluded his speech with a rhetorical question, asking why the Jews, more so than any other confession, found themselves forced to react to accusations made against them and make all sorts of announcements and declarations.

Wolf proposed an alternative to Gintsburg’s plan, calling for a letter addressed to Vinaver that expressed support for democracy and liberalism and for its most ardent advocates in Russia, the Kadets. In the end, there was to be no collective anti-Bolshevik manifesto on the part of the international Jewish leadership.

* * *

The very same issue of *Struggling Russia* that featured Vinaver’s address to the Jewish people also contained the text of a resolution passed by the Jewish
community in Arkhangelsk on May 11, 1919. First published in the Arkhangelsk socialist newspaper *Vozrozhdenie Severa (Renaissance of the North)*, it was published in Zak’s newspaper under the title “Russian Jewry against Bolshevism.” The community council emphasized that Jews were just as active in the anti-Bolshevik camp as they were in the Bolshevik movement.29

A week later, a similar article appeared under the heading “The Omsk Government and the Russian Jews,” which reprinted information previously published in the *The Day* and the Vladivostok newspaper *Dal’nevostochnoe obozrenie (Far Eastern Review)*. The article included a statement by Kolchak’s Prime Minister, P. V. Vologodskii, claiming that the “Jewish question” did not exist in Siberia, and that Siberians had no hostile feelings to the Jews. He went on to state that antisemitism was limited to Ukraine and Poland, while in Siberia harsh measures were being enacted to combat the spread of antisemitism. In another piece, it was reported that members of the Jewish community of Ufa had presented Kolchak with a gift of 100,000 rubles for his troops during a dinner held in his honor.30

Nearly every issue of *Struggling Russia* would include similar reports. The August 2 issue included a discussion of Bolshevism by the Council of the Vladivostok Jewish Community,31 and the August 16 issue reprinted anti-Bolshevik statements that had been made by leaders of the Bund, including V. Medem, R. Abramovich, V. Kossovskii, and A. Litvak.32 The August 30 issue reported on the sufferings of the Jewish population under the Bolshevik regime.33

Zak did not hesitate to send instructions to the Kolchak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially when it came to dealing with American representatives of the Jewish community. On July 16, 1919, Uget sent a telegram to Omsk at Zak’s request. At the time two American Jewish activists, Dr. Frank Rosenblatt (representing the Joint Committee) and Samuel Mason (the Society for the Assistance of Jewish Immigrants), were visiting the Far East (Vladivostok and Yokohama, respectively). They were “to inform the leaders of American Jewry of the general conditions in the territories liberated from the Bolsheviks, and in particular the state of the Jewish question. It is most desirable that we maintain good relations with these individuals through the mediation of Jewish figures who support the government. The support of the American Jewry is important for our political and financial efforts here in the United States due to their significant influence in America’s political, financial, and cultural life.”34

The government in Omsk was much more concerned with presenting a positive image to the United States than Denikin’s forces were. This was
perhaps due to the presence of I. I. Sukin in Omsk, a former secretary of the Russian Embassy in Washington, who was well aware of the role played by public opinion and the “Jewish question” in American politics. This sensitivity for American concerns can be seen in a telegram Zak received from N. V. Ustrialov in September 1919.

The telegram expressed concern over the “rumors” of Jewish persecution in Siberia that had become more and more widespread in America. Ustrialov asked Zak to refute these “groundless rumors of provocation.” He continued, “the only people who are persecuted in Siberia are the Bolsheviks, irrespective of whether they are Jews or not. The persecution of Jews according to national identity is unthinkable.”

The information received by the leaders of American Jewry told a different story. They were particularly disturbed by the testimony of Dr. Rosenblatt, a representative of the Joint Committee. Rosenblatt had written about a number of pogroms that took place in a series of towns in the Urals after the departure of Kolchak’s army. The most damaging reports concerned events in Ekaterinburg, where the Ataman of the Semipalatinsk Cossacks, B. V. Annenkov, engaged in indiscriminate slaughter, resulting in the deaths of nearly 3,000 Jews (it should be noted that Rosenblatt’s figures were greatly exaggerated). Rosenblatt’s testimony was confirmed by General William Graves, the commanding officer of American forces in Siberia.

The Whites were to find an unlikely defender against these accusations in the form of the U.S. State Department, in particular Ernest Harris, then the American consul in Siberia. Harris claimed that no evidence of a pogrom in Ekaterinburg had been forthcoming, and he dismissed Rosenblatt’s telegrams as being overly reliant on rumors. Although a formal investigation of the events proved inconclusive, General Graves was convinced “beyond a shadow of a doubt” that a horrific pogrom had taken place. He wryly remarked, “We can’t bring the bodies of the dead to the State Department.” For all intents and purposes, the information Rosenblatt tried to relay to the Joint Committee was censored by the State Department, with some of his messages never reaching the Joint Committee. Frank Polk, the Undersecretary of State, dismissed Rosenblatt’s claims as “hysteria.”

Whatever its merits, Rosenblatt’s testimony represented a threat to the efforts of the entire anti-Bolshevik propaganda machine at work in the United States, as well as any hopes of assistance from the American Jewish community. Fortunately for Zak, the State Department facilitated the disavowal of Rosenblatt’s information; by mid-October 1919, the correspondence between
Zak and Schiff indicated that both had concluded that the events in question had not happened. On October 14, Karpovich wrote Zak that according to Sukin (Kolchak’s acting Minister of Foreign Affairs), “Harris had received a similar inquiry from the State Department and categorically denied the veracity of the information about the Jewish pogroms.” Zak relayed this information to Schiff, who replied that he had received similar information from State, and that he would ask Rosenblatt to be more careful in his reports.37

Though the Ekaterinburg “crisis” had passed, reports of Jewish persecution in Kolchak-controlled territory would repeatedly crop up. In December of 1919, Zak sent Karpovich a good portion of his correspondence with Schiff and Marshall. The letters included documentation of Jewish persecution in Siberia. Zak wrote, “In my opinion, these documents, which show the completely correct stance of the government in regards to the Jewish question, as well as its full understanding that outbreaks of ethnic strife must be fought against, also show the weakness of government policy in regards to this question.”38

Zak’s recommendations to improve the situation were basically the same as those he had sent the previous year. The new government (Kolchak had recently reformed his cabinet, which was now headed by V. N. Pepeliaev) had to be informed about the attitudes of American Jewish circles in regards to Russian Jewish policy, and should release a statement expressing its readiness “to fight against the manifestations of national hatred that are detrimental to the interests of the Russian government.” At around the same time, Zak wrote Schiff and Marshall, once more expressing his hope that the Jewish community would support “the movement for the reestablishment of Russian statehood.” Zak explained to them that the reported “excesses” were the result of a weak government, which was not receiving sufficient support from abroad.39

Bakhmetev approved of Zak’s line of reasoning. An undated telegram to the Kolchak Ministry of Foreign Affairs is attached to Zak’s letters and the copies of his correspondence with Schiff and Marshall. “The local Jewish leaders Schiff and Marshall have given Zak some materials alleging the existence of antisemitic activities in Siberia. They are mostly drawn from disparate newspaper articles and the resolutions of certain irresponsible organizations. I am informing you of this in the event the government should deem it necessary to reaffirm its earlier statement regarding the struggle with antisemitism.”40

While all of these letters and telegrams are certainly interesting from a historical perspective, they had few real consequences. At the time of Zak’s
letter, Kolchak’s forces were suffering one military defeat after another. Within two weeks Kolchak’s government would cease to exist.

* * *

Zak was to find it much more difficult to establish relations with the South of Russia than it had been with the Omsk government. The fact that communication with Denikin’s government was unpredictable and unreliable (telegrams would occasionally only reach their addressee after several weeks) did little to improve the situation. However, there were also concerns of a more political nature. Denikin and his inner circle were distrustful of foreigners, and were equally distrustful of Russians working abroad (in particular, they suspected that the Russian Political Delegation would attempt to usurp power). Nonetheless, Zak attempted to establish contact with Denikin’s head of propaganda, K. N. Sokolov, sending a letter that expressed his hope that they would be able to collaborate. Zak included some examples from his own publications, and asked Sokolov to send him information from the South.41

It is not known whether Sokolov ever received or replied to Zak’s message. On November 13, 1919, Zak sent a second letter, specifically mentioning his work on the “Jewish question” in the United States, and the importance of American Jewry for Russian-American relations and for possible financial assistance.42

Zak’s most difficult task was to dispense propaganda for Denikin’s army, especially in Jewish circles. This was no easy task given that Denikin’s forces had announced their arrival in Ukraine with a series of pogroms that, in terms of brutality, matched and occasionally even surpassed those of Petliura’s forces. In a letter to Schiff on September 30, 1919, Zak emphasized how important it was for Russian Jews that order be preserved in the wake of the inevitable (for Zak) Bolshevik defeat. It was precisely such a strong sense of order, Zak argued, that Kolchak and Denikin were attempting to establish. Zak denied the charge that the White movement was essentially reactionary, pointing to the makeup of the Russian Political Delegation in Paris as evidence.43 He also drew attention to the membership of Denikin’s Special Council, which included the Kadet N. I. Astrov and Professor M. V. Bernatskii, “a moderate socialist of the Plekhanov school,” according to Zak.

“This does not mean that excesses are absolutely impossible in the territories controlled by Admiral Kolchak and General Denikine.
Excesses may happen, and some of them are probably inevitable as the result of the utter sufferings and demoralization on the one hand and the comparative instability of the new Governmental centers on the other. But these Governmental centers are our only hope that the excesses will be stopped at the very start. For this reason, in addition to general patriotic considerations, a great part of the Russian Jewry definitely supports the Government of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikine.”

It is hard to imagine that the Director of the Russian Information Bureau was not aware of the fact that such excesses had already begun by the end of September 1919. Schiff replied that Zak’s letter was both interesting and important and that it would be discussed at the next meeting of the Joint Committee, which was to take place on October 12, 1919.

Meanwhile, pogroms taking place in Ukraine were claiming the lives of tens of thousands of Jews. News of the events quickly made the American press. In the beginning of October Bakhmetev sent a telegram to Sazonov, saying, “The New York Herald recently ran the statement of one John Devas, who was serving with the American Red Cross on the Southern Front. He claims that Denikin’s forces, who have joined forces with Petliura’s, are engaging in the wide-scale slaughter of Jews. I request that you send me information that can be used to repudiate this statement.”

Apparently Bakhmetev did not even allow for the possibility that the story from the New York Herald could have been true. In any case, even if he had such reservations, he most likely would have tried to refute the story anyway.

During this time the pages of Struggling Russia featured articles on a variety of topics, but none of them discussed the pogroms being carried out by the Whites. The September 6 issue of the newspaper featured an article by the Bund leader V. Kossovskii, which talked about pogroms taking place in Soviet territory. The article mostly discussed events that had transpired in Glukhov during the winter and spring of 1918 (more than a year earlier), as well as occasions where the Bolsheviks had made use of the antisemitic tendencies among some of the workers in their battles against the Mensheviks and SRs.

The newspaper consistently neglected to cover the pogroms being carried out by Volunteer forces, while repeatedly reprinting the orders of White generals (Denikin, Mai-Maevskii, Irmanov, and Shkuro) which declared the equality of all nationalities. It also published a number of inaccurate or
unsubstantiated rumors, including one that claimed that Denikin had ordered the execution of sixteen pogromists. Other rumors included a story that Denikin had relieved two generals and four colonels of their command for having allowed pogroms, and one that claimed that the Volunteer Army had donated ten million rubles to victims of the pogroms. Such stories were accompanied by citations from Pasmanik, *The Day*, and *Odesskie novosti* (*The Odessa News*), which all reported that White Army units had stopped a group of Makhnovites from carrying out a pogrom in Novo-Poltavka.37

Zak sent the above issue to Karpovich along with a letter claiming that these stories demonstrated that “the Volunteer Army was generally not participating in the pogroms in the South of Russia,” and that this indicated “a definite effort on the part of Denikin to fight these pogroms.”

The rest of Zak’s letter offers a clear indication as to why he felt it necessary to support Denikin’s forces:

It seems to me that the most recent events have placed the Volunteer Army in the leading role in the struggle against Bolshevism. The conclusion of this struggle is to a large extent dependent on whether or not the Volunteer Army receives supplies from its allies over the winter and early spring. These are the only conditions under which a new and hopefully decisive march on Moscow can take place.

In light of this it seem to me most desirable that we respond to this most recent campaign of insinuations currently being carried out against the Volunteer Army by the Bolsheviks on the one side, and the Ukrainians on the other. As the American press has dedicated a lot of coverage to the recent Jewish manifesto protesting the pogroms taking place in the South of Russia, I have sent all of our newspapers reprints of the documents referring to this question that have been collected in the latest issue of our journal, which I am enclosing.48

V. A. Maklakov, the Russian ambassador in Paris, shared Zak’s views and concerns. In an interview with *New York Times* correspondent Edwin James, he confirmed that Denikin was taking all possible measures in the struggle against antisemitism. He assured James that the principle of equal rights was non-negotiable and that no one would even think of repealing it. Attempting to explain the occurrence of pogroms in Volunteer territory, he
claimed that many of the locals believed most of the Bolshevik leadership to be Jewish, and that these strands of antisemitism were exploited by various political forces, particularly by Petliura. According to the ambassador, even the Bolsheviks made use of such latent racism; one such example took place in Kharkov, where the Bolsheviks attempted to turn the population against Denikin by claiming that he defended Jews. The ambassador went on to state that Denikin required his generals to be tolerant toward the Jewish population, and that in Kiev he had set up military courts that had passed severe sentences against those guilty of participating in pogroms. At the conclusion of the interview, Maklakov struck a note of reservation: “But it takes time and an iron hand to control the unchained passions of a country which has been so stirred up. General Denikin assures me that he can defeat the Bolsheviks.”

Though we can only guess whether Zak knew the truth of what was transpiring in the Ukraine, we do know that Maklakov was much better informed. While visiting the Don region in October of 1919, he received unfiltered information concerning the pogroms during a meeting with representatives from the Jewish community. In fact, Maklakov himself had insisted that the government take steps toward changing their policy toward the Jews and had written letters to Finance Minister M. V. Bernatskii and to Denikin himself to that effect.

Maklakov presented the situation differently to those outside of the movement. His reasons for doing so are obvious; the title of the New York Times interview was “Denikin Can Win If Supplied.” It would have been pointless to expect the United States and other Western countries to support a general who was unable to prevent pogroms being carried out by his own men. Thus the diplomat was ready to hold anyone and everyone else responsible for them, especially as most of the other parties (Petliura’s men, the Bolsheviks) were hardly without blame in their own actions toward Russia’s Jews.

Jewish support for the Whites in the West was determined by two factors: their dislike of Bolshevism, and their hope to bring an end to the pogroms by influencing the White command. In December of 1919, E. V. Sablin, then stationed in London, informed S. D. Sazonov that a new charitable organization had recently been organized to support the interests of the White movement. Its leadership included prominent political and social figures. “It is not without interest to note the presence of Lord Rothschild. According to my information, the local Jews are inclined to throw their active support behind Denikin in order to demonstrate their opinion of those Jews who are
supporting the Bolsheviks, in the hope that in this way they can stop the spread of pogroms.}

* * *

Despite Zak’s faithful service and dedication to the White cause, the Omsk government did not appreciate his efforts on their behalf. Zak’s Jewish heritage undoubtedly played a significant role in this, though there were surely other reasons as well. This can be seen in his personal interaction with members of the Omsk government, in particular his relationship with I. K. Okulich, who came to the United States during the summer of 1919 as a financial representative of the Omsk government. Although Okulich’s function and authority were rather poorly defined, Zak still found it necessary and useful to write him a letter outlining his propaganda efforts. Naturally, the “Jewish question” was to play a significant role in the correspondence:

In addition to our intensive work among the Americans, we are currently also at work with the million or so Jews who live here. Unfortunately, many of them have been infected by Bolshevism. The attitude of this population is important for two reasons. Firstly, the Jewish community plays a large role in American politics and economics; secondly, many of the Jews here, the Russian emigrés in particular, have a sincere love for Russia and want to see her as a great, powerful, and happy state. The Bolshevik tendencies of the local Jewish population can be explained by the fact that they are under the influence of demagogues and politickers who are pursuing their own goals, and who systematically distort news from Russia. They present the kingdom of violence and famine as if it were the Kingdom of God on earth, against whom the ‘imperialists of all countries’ have taken up arms.

Zak’s vision of the future saw the eventual collapse of the Bolshevik regime in the face of the White movement. The new government would then have to deal with its Soviet “inheritance,” including “millions of people who were cold and hungry and had lost their faith.” The government would require a “near miracle” to return life to normalcy, and such a feat could only be accomplished through loans secured from abroad from countries like the
United States. Zak believed that such a large-scale financial plan needed to be prepared beforehand, and that since at least a portion of these loans would have to be financed publicly, a good public image in the United States was of the utmost importance, and would in turn exert pressure on the American administration and Congress.

Zak believed that Russian Jewish emigrés had a vital role to play in this plan. Just as Russian Germans had served as important intermediaries in the formation of Russo-German economic relations, Russian Jewish emigrés would fulfill a similar function. "It is of the utmost importance that we form a pro-Russian faction among the local Jews. We must bring together all of the better elements of the local Jewry who are sympathetic and willing to help in the rebirth of a united, democratic, Russia. We have already organized a circle of Jewish activists under the auspices of the League of Friends for a United Democratic Russia, which has already published three heavily pro-Russia, anti-Bolshevik brochures in the Jewish language. We are also in contact with the daily and weekly Jewish newspapers. I am likewise corresponding with the most prominent Jewish cultural and business leaders, and am attempting to turn them to our side."

Okulich forwarded Zak’s letter to I. A. Mikhailov, the Finance Minister of the Omsk government and one of Kolchak’s closest advisers. Okulich felt that the letter contained extremely important information. But it was not Zak’s financial schemes that attracted his attention. Instead, he was concerned that the group of Jewish business leaders Zak corresponded with (Oscar and Nathan Straus, Schiff, Warburg) “wield considerable influence over Ambassador B. A. Bakhmetev, and are also leading figures in the international Jewish agenda.” Okulich’s letter to Mikhailov was thus a denunciation of both Zak and Bakhmetev himself.

At this time numerous discussions were taking place regarding the possible closing of the Information Bureau. Zak’s removal was one of the most, if not the most, important goals of such a reorganization. Bakhmetev was largely out of the loop in the discussions. In September of 1919, he sent a private inquiry about the situation regarding the Bureau to I. I. Sukin, Kolchak’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. As Sazonov was more or less constantly in Paris, Sukin was the de facto head of the ministry, and was a member of Kolchak’s inner circle. Sukin had earlier been attached to the Washington embassy. In writing to him, Bakhmetev was clearly relying on their shared past in the hopes of getting a clear picture of the situation:
Ustrialov has telegraphed Bashkirov concerning the organization of a bureau of propaganda in America similar to the one in London, and has also been considering changing the leadership of the Information Bureau, which is currently run through the embassy. I am in complete agreement with the notion that reorganization has its advantages. However, one must keep in mind the character of the target country, as well as the fact that we have less personnel here than in London. It is also necessary to clarify the financial aspects beforehand. Please inform me as to whether the Ministry knew of Ustrialov’s telegram.55

However, the reorganization plan and Zak’s removal were not Ustrialov’s personal initiative. “Higher forces” were at play here, as can be seen from Sukin’s response.

There have been scathing critiques of Zak’s activities. It is claimed that his information, though useful to the government, nonetheless has a socialistic and semitophilic tint to it. These complaints have reached the ear of the Supreme Commander.

Personally, I can openly admit the value and significance of the services Zak has rendered us, but in light of the above I also recognize the inevitability of some kind of reorganization of the information agencies in America.

Sukin went on to discuss the planned reorganization, including the creation of a new non-governmental organization (which, of course, would still receive its funding from the Whites). As a result, the “official collaboration between Zak and the embassy, including the rendering of financial subsidies to him, must come to an end.” Sukin was acutely aware of the particulars of the American “propaganda market,” writing, “It would be most undesirable that Zak should take the proposed changes as a personal insult. However, the suspension of his official connection with the embassy and financial support cannot be put off.”56

Bakhmetev was hardly pleased at receiving such orders, and sought support from Sazonov: “The motives [for the reorganization] are the complaints in Omsk that Zak’s activities carry a socialistic and semitophilic tint. I told Omsk that I was firmly in support of creating an independent information organization but that I doubt it will be successful, given the local climate and
the lack of sufficient manpower. I likewise expressed my conviction that the charges made against Zak were unfounded, and my concern that we are in danger of losing his services as a result of the current circumstances."\textsuperscript{57} Although Bakhmetev was forced to accept the reorganization (which mostly entailed closing the Information Bureau), he nonetheless continued to defend Zak:

These complaints about the socialist “tint” were probably a result of his collaboration with Breshkovskaia and other right-wing socialists during the height of the struggle against Bolshevism. Over the past few months, the newspaper’s viewpoint has undergone a fundamental change. Efforts to attract members of influential Jewish circles to our cause have had substantial results. Zak indicated that emphasizing the democratic aspects of the Government and its effect on the Jews required telegrams from Ustrialov. Zak received no indications from Omsk regarding changes in his work, and a telegram he received from Ustrialov in the beginning of September stated that his activities had been approved.\textsuperscript{58}

Zak was not the only one to be targeted for “reorganization.” Both in the South of Russia and in Omsk, Bakhmetev was considered to be too far to the left, or even outright hostile to the White governments. His social-democratic past was never forgiven, and his independent behavior offended many. From a legal point of view, he was untouchable; after all he was recognized as the Russian ambassador by the United States, whereas Kolchak had no formal international recognition whatsoever. Whatever Bakhmetev may have thought about the policies of the various White governments, he acted in accordance with his place in the command structure and served the White movement honestly and dutifully. In any case, Omsk soon requested that M. M. Karpovich (one of Bakhmetev’s closest associates in the Embassy) return to Russia. Though there was truly a lack of capable personnel at the time, one cannot ignore the fact that the request was probably directed at Bakhmetev himself.

A new committee for White propaganda in the U.S. was formed, headed by the entrepreneur and social figure B. N. Bashkirov. Zak refused to join the new committee, and although his work was supposed to continue parallel to the committee’s, his official and financial ties to the embassy had been cut. By December of 1919, Zak had filed his final report as a representative of the
Russian Telegraph Agency. The report contained the last of his financial accounting, which included $5,000 that he had given to Bashkirov. In a moment of historical irony, the addressee of this final reckoning of accounts was not located in Omsk, but in Irkutsk. The Omsk government had fled there under heavy Bolshevik pressure, and would never recover its former stature. In the end, the Information Bureau was to operate longer than the government that had sponsored it.

The history of the Information Bureau does contain a small moral. In March of 1922, Bashkirov once more came across Zak, whom he had not seen since 1919 (Bashkirov had gone to see him in his capacity as head of the American division of the Industrial Trade Union). Bashkirov expressed deep regret for his role in the attempt to remove Zak and the closing of the bureau. In a letter to Uget, Zak reflected on the events with the benefit of hindsight. He wrote that he had “given himself to Russia’s service” from the moment he assumed his position as Director of the Bureau, but he realized that although “he wanted to live peacefully with all people,” the nature of his work had inevitably resulted in a series of attacks on him from the left and right.

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Boris Isaakovich Elkin, a former editor of the St. Petersburg journal Pravo (Law), was yet another defender of the White cause in the court of Western public opinion. Elkin moved to Berlin in the beginning of 1919, and ten months later had come to the conclusion that the Whites were losing the propaganda war against the Bolsheviks. “One needs to learn from a strong enemy,” wrote Elkin, arguing for the opening of a Berlin press bureau. The main goal of such an organization, he claimed, would be the distribution of information received from the propaganda department of the Volunteer Army.

Analyzing the state of the “propaganda market” in the West, Elkin noted with some concern that in addition to socialist publications such as Humanité, Avanti, and Rote Fane, “respectable” mainstream publications (such as the Daily Express, Manchester Guardian, Daily News, and Frankfurter Zeitung) portrayed current events in Russia in a way that was favorable to the Bolsheviks. “Having a large distribution and considerable influence, these publications render a much more needed and productive service than openly Bolshevik ones. By the strength of their authority, in the minds of large portions of society they reinforce the idea that Bolshevik rule is a form of governance by the people, whereas the anti-Bolshevik forces are a movement for restoration, whose
main goal is the elimination of political freedom and reintroduction of inequality.” Elkin also noted that a number of “separatist” causes had already set up their own press bureaus in Germany, including the Ukrainians, Georgians, Estonians and others.

Elkin’s attempts to “draw a more accurate picture of the Bolshevik regime” through private conversations with various German politicians and members of the press proved unsuccessful. The Germans would consistently draw comparisons between revolutionary Russia and revolutionary France. The Bolsheviks were the equivalent of the Jacobins, defenders of the Motherland, while the Volunteer Army were portrayed as the foreign-supported Vendeans.

The proposed bureau was to provide the Berlin and provincial press with first-hand information that came directly from the Volunteer Army headquarters. There were to be two main audiences: the German public itself, and the numerous Russian refugees (and prisoners of war) currently located in Germany. Elkin put his beginning operating expenses at about 4,500 marks per month. Among potential collaborators the only one he mentioned by name was I. O. Levin, who had earlier written for Russkaia Mysl’ (Russian Thought) and Russkie Vedomosti (Russian News).62

Elkin sent his proposal to S. D. Botkin, the head of the Russian diplomatic mission in Berlin, who relayed the message to S. D. Sazonov. Though Botkin thought that additional financing would be necessary, he supported the project, claiming that “it would be useful to have experience in organizing this kind of countermeasure aimed at the undesirable tendencies that can constantly be found in local newspapers.”63 Botkin also sent a letter to Baron B. E. Nolde, who was in charge of the propaganda efforts of the Russian Political Delegation. “It seems to me that despite all the difficulties in receiving information [from the South], we should nonetheless pay attention to this proposal, and send the relatively small sum of 2,000 francs a month.”64

According to Nolde’s report of February 20, 1920, the Delegation approved the organization of propaganda efforts in Germany in accordance with Elkin’s project. They contributed 100 pounds sterling for the first three months’ financing. This was equivalent to approximately 1,500 francs a month.65 It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which Elkin was able to realize his plans. In any case, he was forced to make do without any first-hand information from the Propaganda Department of The South of Russia; the defeat of Denikin’s forces and the ensuing retreat had directed resources elsewhere.

It appears that Elkin avoided discussing the pogroms that were taking place during the Civil War. He only mentions them indirectly at one point in
his correspondence. This occurs when he expresses irritation at the arrival of the “Kiev Jewish Bolshevik” Kats, the “Menshevik-internationalist and Bolshevik official” Kheifets, and the physician Granovskii, who had, in Elkin’s words, “exploited” the topic of Jewish pogroms.

Like many Russian emigrés, Elkin tended to associate any political opponents with Bolshevism. A particularly striking example was when he claimed that A. D. Marlogin, the former Deputy Foreign Minister for Petliura, was part of “a movement [within Petliura’s circles] that recognized the necessity of forming an agreement with the Bolsheviks.”

* * *

The first issue of the weekly newspaper Evreiskaia Tribuna (Jewish Tribune) was published in Paris in December of 1919. According to the paper’s tagline, it was dedicated to “the interests of the Russian Jews.” It was edited by R. M. Blank, a member of the Party of People’s Socialists, and the attorney M. L. Goldstein (who later went on to serve as the first publisher and editor for Poslednie Novosti [The Latest News]). Both had earlier been members of the Jewish People’s Group and were well acquainted with M. M. Vinaver. Although Vinaver was not listed among the editors of the paper, he was for all intents and purposes the acting director. One of the Jewish Tribune’s main tasks was to fight against antisemitism. It aimed to combat the danger posed by the depiction of Bolshevism as a Jewish phenomenon on the pages of European newspapers, including such mainstream, respected publications as the Times. The publishers of the Jewish Tribune sought to explain the reality of the Russian situation to foreigners who had at best a hazy understanding of the events transpiring there. The newspaper was published in Russian and in French, and an English version existed for a limited period of time. The Russian and French editions had a print run of 3,000 copies each.

Having their own publication gave Vinaver’s group the opportunity to formulate a position that reflected their own political beliefs. They were nationally oriented, anti-Bolshevik, largely patriotic Jews who were anti-Zionist but fully supportive of the liberal democratic point of view. After the outbreak of pogroms, they could not wholeheartedly endorse the White movement, and were forced to find new allies in their struggle against the Bolsheviks.

The idea of forming a newspaper was first proposed by Blank, who wrote Vinaver in September of 1919 arguing for the necessity of their own publication:
Antisemitism continues to grow without pause, and has already seized nearly all civilized countries. To leave the fight to the Zionists would be akin to entrusting a goat to guard cabbage. Other Jewish organizations and institutions must be founded that understand that the future of the Jews is inexorably linked to European culture and European progress... We need an information bureau, we need a publication, and an organization that can systematically lay out its own principles, its own politics, in order to demonstrate to the entire world that there exists a Jewish politics besides those of the Zionists and Bolsheviks. On one side, the public sees the insane Bolsheviks, who brutally trample all laws of man and God, who despise and have betrayed their homeland, and have trampled the very concept of the homeland. On the other, they see the zealots of Jewish nationalism, the Zionists, who can only see their homeland in a corner of the swamp they once had resided in for some centuries. What is the public supposed to think and feel when all it can see are these glaring facts and nothing else?

Blank believed that it was necessary to explain that “the majority of Jewry and its best representatives are bound to their Motherland body and soul, just as much as her other sons are, and that they are capable of serving her faithfully and truthfully.”

It is worth noting that the debate between the Zionists and the nationalists did not cease for a moment, even in the most difficult times during the Civil War. Hazofe, a writer for the Zionist publication Dawn, made light of the sufferings of the journalists who worked for Jewish Week, calling its Jewish ideologues “Ivan Moneybags” (after Ivan I of Moscow, often called “moneybags” [kalita] for his faithfulness to the Mongol Horde):

In this case, as in all other cases of Jewish sorrow, we come across the hopelessly derelict opinions of our “exiles” who seek salvation from the evils of exile in the very same kingdom of evil that begot them. The laws of exile [golus] are implacable. It was not Russian Jewry that dismembered itself in Brest. Nor will it be Russian Jewry that reunites the pieces of an enormous state striving for its former unity based on the borders of Russia. Any active kind of politics that is headed in that direction asks of the Jews an enormous, impossible, and pointless waste of strength.
But will this be understood by those champions \textit{[radeteli]} of Jewish interests who have grown accustomed to identifying their own interests with those of their surroundings?\textsuperscript{71}

The \textit{Jewish Tribune} was supposed to provide a forum for the opinions of those Jewish political figures who were not planning to break with Russia, and considered Russian problems to be their own. “Conscience cannot make peace with the fact that the victim is being treated as the accused . . . [we] cannot keep silent,” began the unsigned editorial of the first edition of the \textit{Jewish Tribune}.\textsuperscript{72} The second programmatic article, written by Blank, underlined the significance of the Russian Jewish problem for the West. Blank believed that the Jews, who dedicate “their efforts predominantly to industry and trade, to the major regulators of contemporary economic life,” belong to “the most civilized and active constituencies of Eastern Europe. Russian Jewry is currently not only an object of blatant injustice on the one hand, and magnanimous sympathy on the other, as it has been up until now, but it is also a political \textit{subject}, of an active political magnitude that must be reckoned with by every prudent governmental actor.” Thus the publishers found it necessary to make “a specialized publication appear in the center of the Western world that will consistently and systematically inform public opinion in the West as to the political character of Russian Jewry, its social strivings and its attitudes toward the great political and social problems of our times.”\textsuperscript{73}

Blank blatantly exaggerated the political weight of the Russian Jews. In addition, it was utterly impossible to speak of any kind of united “Russian-Jewish politics” at the time. Some, such as the Zionists wanted to leave Russia for the Palestinian “swamp,” to use Blank’s expression. Meanwhile those Jews who saw their future in Russia (or to put it more precisely, in the various state structures located within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire at the time) joined national political movements such as the Bolsheviks, or became supporters of Ukrainian independence, the Whites, or the numerous adherents of various “third paths.” Least of all could Russian Jewry be considered a political \textit{subject}.

Vinaver addressed the Jewish “Russian problem” in the first issue of the newspaper. Claiming that “two sores have developed on the body of Russia: separatism and Bolshevism,” he raised the question of the relationship of the Jews to these two problems. Vinaver attempted to demonstrate that Jews had no interest in seeing the body of Russia dismembered. “The economic and industrial spirit of the Jews finds the small cells that Russia is splitting into to
be too small. A long time ago this spirit grew larger and chose as the arena of its activity the only organism that, by the combined riches of its regions, is capable of giving it the opportunity to produce and transport goods on a large scale.”

Nor did the Bolshevik system of governance correspond to the interests of Jews, according to Vinaver. It stands for “equality according to the least, which is unavoidably connected to a disregard for personal initiative and competition.” The Bolsheviks’ economic program called for the elimination of private trade and industry. “The central, if not the only, weapon the Jew has had in the unequal, centuries-old battle with his environment is the spirit of personal initiative and resourcefulness, which has been ingrained in him by those foundations upon which the healthy competition of the so-called bourgeois order relies.” Vinaver also claimed that there were few Jewish members of the proletariat, and that the five or six million Jews in Russia were nearly all city dwellers largely engaged in trade or crafts.

As far Jewish complicity with the Bolsheviks was concerned, Vinaver claimed that the charge was inapplicable to the vast majority of Jews, five-sixths of whom lived in the Western regions where Bolshevism was least prevalent. Those who joined the Bolsheviks were the “scum of the Jewish youth who had been cast out to Moscow and Petersburg, who had returned from a foreign environment abroad as unbalanced individuals with sick fantasies, who had gone off track. These embittered youths, who in the old days would have been driven from the doors of their schools, they are the ones swarming the commissariats of Soviet Russia. They are the ones whose tumultuous agitation, and sense of superiority over the unenlightened, illiterate Bolshevik masses, create the image of Jewish sympathy toward Bolshevism. Regardless of the number of these rabid rejects—be it in the thousands or tens of thousands—their shadow will not eclipse the true face of Jewry, nor will the noise of their voices drown out reason, which maintains: the Jewish people are not guilty of their sins.”

Vinaver’s observations regarding the incompatibility between Bolshevik doctrine and the interests of the majority of the Jewish population contain a good deal of truth, as do his claims regarding the role of migrants in the Russian revolutions (many of whom had moved from the Pale to the capitals or had gone abroad, either by force or of their own free will). However, he clearly underestimated the size of the “Jewish proletariat” and did not take into account the changes that had taken place in the attitudes of the Jewish population in the western territories of Russia over the course of the Civil
War. According to one inhabitant of a Ukrainian town that had changed hands several times over the course of the war, the warriors of the Red Army were “heroes,” whereas Denikin’s soldiers (those who served under the command of Vinaver’s political allies) were “bandits.”

The first issue of the journal featured two articles in which the authors attempted to demonstrate the “percentage” of Jewish participants in the Bolshevik movement. The first was written by V. V. Rudnev, a member of the SR Central Committee who had been the head of the city council (Duma) of Moscow in 1917 before the Bolshevik coup. Rudnev would later go on to be an editor of one of the best literary journals of the Russian émigré community, Annales Contemporaines (Sovremennye Zapiski).

In addition to espousing the more theoretical claim that one could not hold the Jews responsible for the actions of the Bolsheviks, Rudnev relied on his personal knowledge of Moscow political structures to demonstrate the limited extent of Jewish involvement, pointing out that the Bolshevik leaders of the Moscow Soviet of Workers’ Deputies were almost exclusively Russian (V. P. Nogin, P. G. Smidovich, N. I. Bukharin, A. I. Rykov). In the Moscow Duma, the Bolshevik leadership was also Russian (I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov and V. N. Podbel’skii), and the overall percentage of Bolsheviks who were Jews was only 13 percent, whereas it was 17 percent for the SRs and 33 percent for the SDs (Mensheviks). Nearly the same situation was to be found in the list of candidates for the Constituent Assembly in November of 1917. As Rudnev claimed, “Here too we find no specific connection between Jewry and Bolshevism whatsoever.”

The second article was written by S. L. Poliakov-Litovtsev. He started his investigation with a question that was omnipresent in both the antisemitic and mainstream press, namely, “Who surrounds Lenin?” Enumerating a list of ten or so Jews who could be found in high positions in the Bolshevik hierarchy, he then made a list that was twice as long of the names of non-Jewish Bolshevik leaders. However, it should be noted that he often resorted to including relatively minor figures alongside those of true importance; for example he included individuals such as A. A. Bitsenko, M. Iu. Kozlovskii, and V. V. Veresaev, placing the latter between Bukharin and Dzerzhinsky, who were clearly more prominent in the movement. Whatever the weakness of this first attempt, Poliakov’s second question, “Who surrounds Trotsky?” was to prove much more convincing and effective. In his response to this question, he printed a long list of names of former Tsarist generals and officers who were now leading the Red Army. Without the military expertise of such
individuals, it is highly unlikely that the Bolsheviks would have been capable of overcoming their opponents.\(^78\)

Later on historians would provide convincing evidence that the Soviet myth of “people’s leaders” in the military such as S. M. Budennyi, K. E. Voroshilov, and V. I. Chapaev was aimed at hiding the stark reality of the situation: the high command of the Red Army was nearly exclusively composed of former generals and officers, many of whom were graduates of the Academy of the General Staff and other elite military institutions of Tsarist Russia.\(^79\) By definition, none of them were Jewish; Jews were not allowed to study at such institutions.

In the same issue of the *Jewish Tribune*, M. L. Goldshtein wrote an article entitled “The Plank in [Their] Own Eye,” in which he accused the antisemitic press and a large number of newly conservative Russian liberals of holding the Jews collectively responsible for Bolshevism, while ignoring the participation of others. Also included in the issue was an anonymous press review, which demonstrated the double standard at work in the journal *Vechernee Vremia (Evening Times)*, published by Boris and Mikhail Suvorin, the sons of A. S. Suvorin, who had earlier published *New Times*.

Among the more choice citations mentioned in the review are two penned by Mikhail Suvorin: “The earthly sphere is now populated by two great antagonists: The Jews, and the rest of humanity” (1919, no. 350) and “The Russian earth has long been shaking in fury and indignation at these invaders, these murderers of the Russian people” (1919, no. 377). For his part, Boris Suvorin demanded that the Jews “openly admit their sins and mistakes in the difficult times ahead” (1919, no. 358). Elsewhere in the same issue, Boris Suvorin had attempted to make a distinction between the Russian people and Lenin, Gorky, and (for some bizarre reason) the singer Fyodor Shaliapin.

The anonymous reviewer would go on to comment, “this is all there is to the ignorant mechanics of the fabrication of antisemitism. Lenin, Gorky, Shaliapin, a million Red Army soldiers and S. Kamenev (a Colonel of the General Staff, from 1918 the commander of the Eastern Front, and from July of 1919 commander-in-chief of the Red Army) should not be confused with the Russian people. Meanwhile Iu. Kamenev and Trotsky are ‘The Jewry,’ who should publicly repent before the brothers Suvorin.”\(^80\)

The first issue of the *Jewish Tribune* received a variety of responses, as one might expect. Russian Jewish circles in Germany were largely positive, while their German Jewish counterparts expressed dismay at Blank’s use of the phrase “Prussian militarism.”\(^81\) Goldshtein received mostly positive reviews,
save for two objections: “1) We support Denikin and 2) We have no right to call the Tribune the voice of the Russian Jews, as no one has designated us as such.” Both complaints are not without merit. A case in point is the fact that at the same time the Tribune was calling for a “united, indivisible Russia,” parts of Ukrainian Jewry believed it necessary to support the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.

“The Jewish assimilationists have taken a position that is clearly unsympathetic and antagonistic to the idea of the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. However, the nationally inclined portions of Jewry, in particular the Zionists and territorialists who are striving for the creation of a Jewish state, cannot help being sympathetic to the similar yearnings of the Ukrainian people. To the great misfortune of the Jewish assimilationists, who compose the most insignificant portions of Jewry, they have always been leaders of Russian unity movements, and have always acted in public as such leaders and have called attention to themselves” wrote Petliura’s emissary, A. D. Margolin. Of course, not all Jews who supported the idea of a united Russia were assimilationists, just as not all Zionists and territorialists were supporters of an independent Ukrainian state, particularly one headed by Petliura’s government. In all likelihood, Margolin was the only Jew who found the leader of the Ukrainian revolution to be “talented, brave, and at the same time a kind and pleasant person,” especially after the pogroms that were carried out by Directorate forces in 1919.

Margolin’s statements did not endear him to B. I. Elkin, then living in Berlin. When the former arrived in Berlin on the way to London, the latter took “special measures” to avoid having to talk to that “Ukrainian dignitary,” a Khlestakov-like character who, in Elkin’s words, was “to cause much more suffering and sorrow.” Margolin was to remain Petliura’s representative in London until November of 1920.

The prominent role of Jewish Bolsheviks in the revolution in Russia (as well as the numerous Jewish leaders of the revolutions in Germany and Hungary) was met with a variety of responses from the Jewish establishment in Great Britain, the United States and other countries. The association of Judaism with Bolshevism also brought forth a variety of responses from the non-Jewish populations of these countries, with some publications calling upon the local Jewish community to declare their loyalties and their views on Bolshevism. Although such events are beyond the scope of the current study, they resulted in having some Russian Jewish politicians, including
Blank, called upon as expert consultants for the British government and the British Jewish community.

Among the prominent British politicians “enlightened” by Margolin and Blank was Robert Cecil, one of the architects of the League of Nations.\(^{87}\) Winston Churchill was also deeply interested in the role of the Jews in the events in Russia, at one point writing an article entitled “Zionism versus Bolshevism: A Struggle for the Soul of the Jewish People,”\(^{88}\) in which he sympathized with the Zionist cause and compared the Bolsheviks to “the hordes of Petliura.”

From August to September 1920, Blank corresponded with the “Foreign Minister” of British Jewry, Lucien Wolf. They had first met in Paris during the peace talks. Wolf was disturbed by accounts in the British press about the participation of Jewish Bolsheviks in the murder of the Russian royal family. The source for the story was a report made by the British general, Alfred Knox, who was the British representative attached to Kolchak’s army. The report, sent to the Ministry of War on February 5, 1919, claimed that the execution of the Russian Tsar had been carried out by Jews.\(^{89}\) This report was forwarded without commentary to George V, the cousin of the murdered emperor. A year later, it found its way into the press. There soon followed a series of articles in the *Times* that were written by its Russian correspondent, Robert Wilton. The articles depicted the murder as having been carried out exclusively by Jews. The unofficial investigation of General M. K. Diterikhs also soon appeared in print.

The Unified Committee of Jewish Organizations in Great Britain sent a letter to the Foreign Office, expressing their concern regarding the publication of Knox’s report. The letter claimed that accusing Jews (members of the Ekaterinburg Soviet) as the main instigators of the Tsar’s murder could have a negative effect on the fate of the Russian Jews, especially in light of the tragic conditions now present in Eastern Europe.\(^{90}\) Of course, British Jewry was concerned not only with the fate of their Russian cousins. Such information could serve as a justification for attacks on Eastern European Jewish immigrants in Great Britain and even on the Jewish establishment itself.

Wolf asked Blank about the circumstances of the Tsar’s murder and the extent of Jewish involvement. Blank then met with S. S. Starynkevich, Kolchak’s former Justice Minister, and V. L. Burtsev, a well-known hunter of agents provocateurs. They both assured Blank that F. I. Goloshchekin, P. L. Voikov, G. I. Safarov, and Ia. M. Yurovsky were not Jews. In reality, only
Safarov was of non-Jewish heritage. Burtsev personally knew Goloshchekin, but it never once entered his head that he might be Jewish. A member of the Bolshevik Party since 1903, Goloshchekin had spent most of his life in Greater Russia, including a number of years in exile in Siberia. At no time did he associate himself with the Jewish community. Yurovsky was of particular interest for Wolf, as his was the lone name to appear in Knox’s report and in the Kolchak government’s official account. According to Burtsev, Yurovsky was “Ukrainian.” Blank wrote of this to Wolf, claiming that the photographs published in the Times strengthened Burtsev’s claim, asking, “Have you ever seen a Jew with such a physiognomy?”

As it turned out, Blank and Burtsev were mistaken. After sending off his letter, Blank met with Kerensky. Kerensky had just recently given testimony to the investigator N. A. Sokolov regarding the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the royal family from Tobolsk to Ekaterinbrug. While doing so, he used the opportunity to ask Sokolov about the validity of the information on which Wilton and Diterikhs had based their accounts. Sokolov confirmed that “Yurovskii’s parents had been Jews” (Yurovsky had converted to Lutheranism in his youth, but it is unlikely that his decision had any lasting effects). Sokolov rejected Wilton’s conclusion that the Jews had been responsible for the murder of the Tsar, and was disturbed that Diterikhs was using information from the investigation for antisemitic propaganda. Nonetheless, Blank still urged Wolf to deny that Yurovsky was Jewish, claiming that Starynkevich’s testimony was the most valid, as he was the most senior official who participated in the investigation.

The information that had appeared in the British press was extremely one-sided, and paid no attention to the role of other nationalities in the murder of Nicholas II. Even worse, the events were portrayed as a kind of Jewish conspiracy, along the lines of that depicted in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Blank’s “expertise” proved to be rather unfortunate; Wolf would be unable to use it in his fight against the politicians and journalists who were attempting to use the Ekaterinburg tragedy to fan the flames of antisemitism.

It could be said that when the Bolshevik leadership decided to sanction the murder of the royal family they were acting out of purely rational concerns. If the Tsar had been liberated by the anti-Bolshevik forces then approaching Ekaterinburg, he could have become a rallying force for counterrevolution. However, it is worth bearing in mind the fact that nearly all of the major European revolutions were accompanied by the bloody calling card of regicide. In this light, the danger that Ekaterinburg would be captured was more
of an excuse, rather than any kind of real motivating factor in the Tsar’s murder. The Russian revolution had long carried the seed of regicide within it; the annihilation of the dynastic line was a fantasy going as far back as the nihilist Sergei Nechaev.

Jewish participation in the murder of the last Russian emperor was both coincidental and appropriate.\(^{93}\) John Klier, pointing out that a Jew commanded the firing squad that killed the Tsar’s family, views this as an act of Nemesis in retribution for a Tsarist policy that had prevented Jews from becoming “faithful subjects,” and which had resulted in their joining the other side.\(^{94}\) One of the eyewitnesses to the event must have discerned a biblical parallel in the murder. On one of the walls in the basement where the murder transpired there is a German-language quotation from Heine’s “Belsazar,” which recounts a story from the Book of Daniel:

\[
\text{Belsatzar ward in selbigen Nacht} \\
\text{Von seinen Knechten umbgebracht}\(^{95}\)
\]

[Balthatzar was that very night \\
by his servants slain]\(^{96}\)

The anonymous scribe slightly changed the spelling of the first word of the quotation, embedding the word “Tsar” into his mysterious message.

The gruesome carnage that occurred in the Ipatiev House in Ekaterinburg was simultaneously a tragedy in Aristotle’s sense of the word. A hundred-year-old prophecy of the eighteen-year-old Aleksandr Pushkin had come to pass:

\[
\text{Самовластительный злодей!} \\
\text{Тебя, твой трон я ненавижу,} \\
\text{Твою погибель, смерть детей} \\
\text{С жестокой радостью вижу.}\(^{97}\)
\]

[Tyrannical villain! \\
I despise you and your throne \\
Your doom and the death of your children \\
I see with cruel pleasure.]

Nicholas II was no villain, just as Charles I and Louis XVI were not, at least not in comparison with their predecessors. Still, it was Nicholas II, a good
family man and a mediocre politician, who was forced to pay the price for the sins of the Romanov dynasty.

But let us return to the *Jewish Tribune*. The Tribune’s anti-Bolshevik, pro-Jewish stance soon attracted the attention of a number of members of the Russian diplomatic corps. E. V. Sablin, then in charge of affairs in Great Britain, wrote a letter to P. B. Struve, the head of Vrangel’s foreign policy, about a Bolshevik meeting that took place in London on Grosvenor Square, protesting the entry of Polish troops into Soviet Russia. In it he mentioned the *Jewish Tribune*: “According to Russian and English accounts, a large number of Russian Jewish youth were present, having come from their London neighborhood. In my opinion, it would be most useful if our government-minded Jewish intellectual circles took steps to counteract the harmful propaganda of Bolshevism among certain segments of London’s Jewish youth. In particular, I wonder if the very useful journal the *Jewish Tribune* will succeed in making inroads into the Russian Jewish environment. Is the newspaper published only in Russian, or is there an English edition as well? Is there a Yiddish edition? The latter is extremely necessary.” Sablin believed that if “the most revolting articles” were being published in British and American left-wing newspapers, than they should be counterbalanced with translations of the articles from the *Jewish Tribune*, in order to promote “healthy ideas among the Jewish youth.”

However, the language barrier was not the only obstacle. The Jewish youth had been listening to quite different voices for some time.

* * *

The Russian diplomatic corps were thoroughly demoralized by the widespread reporting of the pogroms taking place in Russia and the irreparable damage it caused to the White movement’s public image. Fully aware that the Whites would not be able to survive without Western assistance, they seized upon every possible opportunity to refute this kind of media coverage. There was also a certain portion of the diplomatic corps that supported the idea of emphasizing the particular role Jews played in the Revolution, in the hope that the public would cease to view Jews only as victims. A case in point can be found in the correspondence between P. K. Pustoshkin, the Russia emissary to the Netherlands, and S. D. Sazonov and M. N. Girs.

In a letter written in January of 1920, Pustoshkin reasoned that reports on Russia in the Dutch press were of relatively little importance, given its
limited influence. Still, he felt it necessary to mention to Sazonov that the well-known Dutch journalist Nijpels had recently written a series of articles inspired by his trip to Poland and Soviet Russia. The articles touched on a variety of topics, including the Polish relationship to the Soviet Union, the Red Army, and Denikin’s forces. Pustoshkin depicted Nijpels as a courageous and objective journalist, who had recently dared to claim that “the campaign of certain Jewish circles, who have accused all and everyone in the countryside of savage acts and horrifying pogroms against the Jews, is unfair, exaggerated to an extreme, and made possible by Berlin’s coffers. This made a big impression here, and the campaign has recently quieted down, despite the fact that Jews are very influential here, particularly in the press.”

Pustoshkin also mentioned to Sazonov that he was planning to make a trip to the village where Nijpels lived in order to meet with him.

Pustoshkin’s report attracted the attention of the Russian diplomats in Paris at the time. A. F. Shebunin, the Chancellory Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quickly sent a reply requesting that Nijpels’ article about the pogroms in the South of Russia be sent immediately, in the original and with an accompanying Russian or French translation. When Pustoshkin was slow in fulfilling the request, Shebunin sent a second letter, asking him to send the articles as soon as possible.

Pustoshkin found himself forced to explain that Nijpels had not written about the pogroms in the South of Russia in particular, that he had instead brought up the topic in passing while talking of the pogroms in Poland, and that the journalist had written twelve lengthy articles after his trip through Silesia, Western Galicia, and Poland. Pustoshkin stated that it was not worthwhile translating such a volume in its entirety, and instead offered his own brief summary of the “Jewish question” in the articles in question:

[When he] goes there, he is preoccupied with the horrors of the pogroms that he has heard about in Europe. To his great surprise, he discovers through his own personal interactions and conversations, with Jewish and non-Jewish figures, that the pogrom campaign is a complete and total exaggeration, if not completely fictitious. If there had been robberies with human casualties, it was more of a violent protest on the part of the population against the abuses of tradespeople in general. It is impossible to even talk about any sort of religious persecution. Significant hatred toward the Jews does actually exist. But Mr. Nijpels explains that it is foolhardy for...
Europe to believe that this is based on ideological reasons. The Russo-Polish Jew is completely different from the cultured Jew known in Western Europe. If Jews are hated in the East, then it is because they engage in trade in an unconscionable manner, and exploit the rural population. If they are despised, it is because they are filthy, dressed in ridiculous, greasy laperdaks, etc. In brief, Jews have made themselves hated by the local population because of their more negative characteristics.

According to Nijpels, however, this dislike would not have reached such an irrevocable and dangerous point if it had not been for the German government: “It has at every step attempted to prevent the normal solution to the Jewish question, assimilation, i.e. the gradual transformation of Jews into useful and patriotic citizens who speak and think in Russian or Polish.” Nijpels had conversations with a number of Jewish ‘assimilationists’ and heard many complaints . . . that [the German government] has prevented them from taking the Jews down this path.¹⁰¹

Such an understanding of the situation seems more in keeping with the eighteenth century than the twentieth; in any case, there was little in Nijpels’s articles that could have rallied people to the White cause. Pustoshkin’s next message, however, was to offer more promising material.

Pustoshkin’s next letter concerned the return of nearly a hundred Dutch citizens from Soviet Russia in May of 1920. They had remained in Russia after the revolution for a variety of reasons, the most common being their desire to recover property lost after the Bolshevik coup. Pustoshkin had had the opportunity to meet and interview a number of them.

One of my witnesses was an individual who has a local reputation for being quite intelligent and well-informed. In a candid discussion with me, he insisted on the fact that Lenin is essentially completely powerless. Power is actually held by a group of Jews, mainly non-Russian, including Trotsky, Steklov, Antonov, Radek, and others. They allegedly have the support of a powerful foreign organization, something along the lines of a secret Jewish masonic lodge which is active everywhere, undermining and disorganizing any possibility of fighting against the Moscow rulers. The center of this organization is allegedly in Germany, and serious activity has recently taken place in
England as well. Its goal is not Bolshevism. Bolshevism is only the means. The goal of its greatest adherents is a fight against Christian civilization and against all countries where the state imposes artificial obstacles to the triumph of the free development of Jewish forces. According to my informant, the organization also instigated the World War to a significant extent. In any case, one cannot argue with the fact that in Russia there is an entire group of capitalists freely gaining wealth who are exclusively Jewish. They are gradually taking into their own hands the possessions of those around them, with the blatant blessing of the Bolshevik rulers. In this situation capitalists of other nationalities can offer no bribe that would prevent the eventual confiscation of their property . . . It is not even worth mentioning the epidemic and widespread bribe-taking of the Jewish officials. All of the Russian commissars are assigned Jewish secretaries and assistants who control them. They themselves are powerless, and will confidentially admit as much. It seems that the triumph of evil is to be complete, everything must be drained down to the very bottom. But this bottom exists, and when it comes, so too will the Bolsheviks meet their end.

The goal of this “communist” government is the destruction of Russia and it has achieved blinding success.  

The “value” of this information, in all likelihood gleaned from a reading of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, is readily apparent. Perhaps the most salient detail is the claim that there existed an entire group of Jewish capitalists who apparently managed to make millions in Bolshevik Russia.

According to Pustoshkin’s informants, many in Bolshevik-controlled Russia were indignant at Europe’s passivity. Later in the same letter Pustoshkin writes, “No matter how much of an exaggeration it is to indiscriminately blame the Jews for all of Russia’s sorrows, there is an implacable antisemitism everywhere. Lenin knows this, and his colleagues deceive him by using Russian pseudonyms [for Jewish names] when asking for his approval of potential commissars.”

It is curious to note that some of those returning to the Netherlands believed that “Bolshevism will never be broken, and that through evolution it will come to take on more normal forms, having replaced the former bureaucracy and “aristocracy” with a new, less Russian one, which will be more energetic and capable.”
Pustoshkin’s conversations with the returning Dutch citizens were not limited to ideas of a Jewish conspiracy, although it was one of the central topics. Girs was extremely interested in the report, “In my opinion, it would be most useful if we could make use of these impressions in a broader social setting, in print in particular . . . It seems to me highly desirable that the Dutch testimonies you mentioned appear in print, directly from the participants themselves if at all possible.”

Pustoshkin replied that much of what he reported had already been printed in newspapers, although many of those who had talked to him in private did not want to fully publicize their opinions. However, he did note that Vap, the former Dutch Vice-Consul to Moscow, had given a series of lectures on the “non-Russian character of Bolshevism.” It seems fair to attribute the antisemitic rantings of Pustoshkin’s previous letter to the Dutch diplomat. Pustoshkin put Vap in touch with “an American correspondent who was traveling through the Hague,” and hoped that Vap would continue to work in a similar direction at his new posting in London.

Despite this minor success, Pustoshkin claimed to be having difficulty doing his job. He was particularly upset that his budget for “press notification” had been reduced to 120 guilders, and that his travel expenses had been capped at 150 guilders. “Neither newspapers nor journalists here will accept bribes,” he wrote, “but they are susceptible to being entertained in an environment that flatters the ego. Afterwards, when a more intimate acquaintance has been established, they are willing to be ‘lent’ 100–200 guilders. I have been able to place a good deal of information in the press in this manner. Several articles and political reports have been written under the influence of my conversations . . . now this is all much more difficult.”

But Girs was unable to assist Pustoshkin in this vital matter. The doyen of the Russian diplomatic corps limited himself to having Shebunin relay the message that he “recognizes the difficulties of working without means” and could only recommend that the emissary to the Hague continue his attempts to influence the press even under such difficult circumstances.

*   *   *

In the end, the attempts of White diplomats, politicians, and anti-Bolshevik Jewish figures to create a sympathetic portrait of the White movement as the bearers of democracy and tolerance in the eyes of Western public opinion resulted in abject failure. Of course, the White leadership’s inability and lack
of desire to put an end to Jewish pogroms and antisemitic propaganda played a vital role. No matter how many statements “for foreign consumption” were made by White leaders, no matter how many statements, interviews, and articles proclaiming Jewish equality were published by their representatives abroad, it was impossible to hide the brutal reality of the situation. However, it should also be noted that Western diplomats were more than willing to participate in such subterfuge for a time. Seeing the White movement as the only force capable of defeating the Bolsheviks, they were willing to turn a blind eye to the crimes being committed by White soldiers. It would seem that if the Whites had succeeded in taking Moscow, then the West would have forgiven them everything. However, this was not to be; the Allies soon came to the realization that they had bet on the wrong horse. Not only were the Whites unable to reach the finish line; they collapsed in a pool of filth and blood. In December of 1919, a representative from the State Department informed Bakhmetev that “The United States bears no responsibility for the fate of Russia.” Shortly thereafter, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George took the first steps toward normalizing relations with Soviet Russia. The days of the White movement were drawing to a close.
Battling Balfour: White Diplomacy, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Problem of the Establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine

Huddled in Odessa in February 1919, in the midst of the Russian Civil War, Platon, the Metropolitan of Kherson and Odessa and the representative of the All-Russian Patriarch in the South of Russia, had many problems to ponder. The Patriarch, Tikhon, was effectively under house arrest. The Orthodox faithful were slaughtering one another in terrifying numbers, to say nothing of their depredations against the non-Orthodox. The Metropolitan’s attention was, nonetheless, directed elsewhere: to the fate of the Christian holy places in Palestine.

On February 2 (15), 1919, Platon wrote to Anatolii Anatolievich Neratov, acting head of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Military Forces of the South of Russia, pointing out that the World War “posed a question about the fate of the country in which the earthly life of Our Lord Jesus Christ transpired.” “There are rumors about its fate that unsettle the Orthodox,” he declared. The Metropolitan’s disquiet was undoubtedly inspired by the issuing of the Balfour Declaration, which proclaimed the British government’s intention to assist in the creation of a “Jewish national home” in Palestine. Noting that the Russian Orthodox Church was concerned with protecting its interests in Palestine, as well as the welfare of thousands of Orthodox pilgrims who visited the Holy Land annually, Platon informed Neratov that he intended to ask the four Eastern Patriarchs, as well as the heads of other Christian churches, to produce a joint statement for the Versailles Peace Con-
ference; the statement should point to “the necessity of the liberation of Palestine and other Holy Places from the hands of infidels.”

Platon also took a number of concrete steps, organizing a meeting of “bishops from various dioceses as well as members of the All-Russian and Kiev local synods, historians, canons, specialists on Palestine, and church and public activists.” The participants intended, “with the blessing of His Holiness” (the Patriarch), to speak up as representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, they set out to prepare the necessary materials and to develop a plan of action, the essence of which was to send a delegation, whose composition was already tentatively laid out, to both the Middle East and Paris. A special commission under the chairmanship of Anastasii, the Archbishop of Kishinev, wrote a series of speeches for the delegation. The Metropolitan considered the cause to be of paramount importance for the unification of Russia and “a demonstration at the [Versailles] conference of our spiritual and national unity.”

Platon turned for assistance to Neratov. And he was not disappointed. Two short weeks later he received the following reply:

I consider myself obliged to express to you, Your Holiness, my deepest compassion for the grand and sacred cause undertaken by You, while adding that, from the political perspective, the proposed address to the Eastern Patriarchs and heads of other churches would be quite opportune and desirable for the purpose of demonstrating the spiritual power of the Russian People, who, at this time of terrible ordeal, will more than ever unite around their holy faith and the Orthodox Church, seeing in them the promise of their future moral revival.

But the experienced diplomat warned the Metropolitan against taking any hasty steps and gave him some practical advice: first, to raise the issue of protecting the interests of Christians in Turkey only in principle, and without advancing any specific proposals about the provision of protection; second, to coordinate the dates of the delegation’s visit to Paris or London with Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov; third, that the delegation be headed by Platon himself, as his “very high moral qualities, authority, wide connections, and thorough familiarity with the ecclesiastical life of Western countries are the surest pledge of successful completion of the great Christian mission, which is now being continued by the Russian Orthodox Church”; fourth, the trip
to Constantinople and Palestine should be prepared by diplomats—Sazonov was to coordinate the visit with the occupation authorities and obtain assurance that they would provide a reception “commensurate with the position of a high Russian Church official”; and finally, Neratov hoped that after consulting with Sazonov, the Metropolitan would find a way to address the Roman Pontiff and the Archbishop of Canterbury. According to Neratov, it was the latter who could, on the basis of Platon’s initiative, “send formal invitations to heads of churches for their representatives to attend a congress in London, the capital of the country most neutral with respect to ecclesiastical issues of the Eastern Church.” Some general considerations of a political nature were laid out in greater detail in a memorandum prepared by Neratov’s office, taking Platon’s letter as a starting point.

On the same day, Neratov mailed to Paris copies of his correspondence with Platon, the aforementioned memorandum, and copies of speeches that had undoubtedly been prepared by the commission headed by Anastasii. Simultaneously he sent a telegram to Sazonov, briefly relaying the contents of the correspondence and noting that the Commander in Chief had expressed complete sympathy with the Metropolitan’s initiative and had ordered 280,000 rubles to be dispensed for the trip. “Still remaining to be found,” Neratov continued, “is a source of funding to cover daily allowances during the stay in Paris amounting to 40,000 francs over two months.”

The notes on the “Palestinian issue” prepared in the White outposts of Odessa and Ekaterinodar are of great interest. They reflect not only the situation in the spring of 1919 but also the long-term notions of those at the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the political heads of the Russian state. The convergence of White foreign policy and the interests of the Orthodox Church was unambiguously confirmed by the author of one of the notes, Evgraf Petrovich Kovalevskii: “The Orthodox Church, which at present does not have the backing of All-Russian diplomacy and the Russian military forces, must take part in the discussions and, as far as possible, in any decision-making relating to the fate of Palestine, on the grounds of historical rights and the strivings of the faithful Russian people.”

The note entitled “Russian Foreign Ecclesiastical Policy in the Near East” was prepared by a man whose competence was not to be doubted. During the Great War, Kovalevskii had been the chairman of the Duma commission that prepared a memorandum for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the revision of Russian rights in Palestine “with regard to their expansion and security.” The memorandum assumed that, following the defeat of the
Central Powers and their allies, Turkish supremacy in Palestine would cease and there would be a “reallocation” of the rights of ownership and control over Christian holy sites—a longstanding matter of contention. Understandably, in the revolutionary years 1917–18 Palestine was not seen as a priority by either the Russian Orthodox Church or the anti-Bolshevik military formations.

The renewed interest in 1919, and the sudden outburst of diplomatic activity, was occasioned by a rumor about the “transfer of Palestine to the Jews.” It soon became evident that the Balfour Declaration was more than a rumor, and Kovalevskii prepared a range of arguments to rebut Jewish claims on Palestine:

The claims of the Jews to exclusive dominance in Palestine cannot be currently justified from a historical, religious, or ethnographic point of view, even if equal rights are to be granted to all other nationalities in Palestine. We also cannot rely upon the Wilsonian slogan of self-determination for nationalities because there is an insufficient percentage of Jews in Palestine—no more than 10 percent.

This proposal can be considered only as an exogenously imposed political formulation—a formulation of conditional significance which, as it is not based on real local interests, is attempting either to satisfy the romantic national interests of the Zionists or to use Palestine as an appropriate excuse or weapon against the rest of non-nationalist Jewry.

From the birth of Christ until the seizure of Jerusalem by Titus in 70 AD there remained the illusion of Jewish statehood—the Jewish kingdom lived on, although under Roman control. But then, for the span of eighteen centuries, Palestine became a homeland for various peoples, while Jewish power never returned.

During the last 800 years Palestine has had both Christian sovereigns, who occupied different regions of it for two centuries at the time of the Crusades, and Muslim rulers, who governed during the last 600 years. But even this latter dominion has evidently come to an end.

The aspirations of the Christian peoples, who sent their best sons to fight the infidels, are close to being realized.

Is it possible that at such a decisive hour the eternal interests of the Christian faith should be overcome by fleeting political
machinations, and the region that is a shrine for so many millions of Christians be audaciously exploited to satisfy a single group of the Jewish people, a group that is in the minority, and can achieve its national and religious goals like other nationalities, in a neutral international Palestine, without claiming state supremacy.  

In his summation Kovalevskii reproduced verbatim the conclusions of the memorandum prepared for the State Duma; as in the past, rational considerations combined with unmistakably mystical ones. The commission assumed that the best solution to the problem of Palestine would be to declare it a neutral country under a joint international protectorate. If Palestine had to be entrusted to a single Western power, the commission would have preferred that it be England, a country not interested “by way of ecclesiastical matters in the altercation between other churches, which is so acute in Palestine.” While recognizing that Palestine “is precious in a religious sense not solely to Christians but also to the Jews [emphasis added],” the commission acknowledged that the government of Palestine would have to be based on the equality of religions, even while remarking that “the preservation of the old Turkish rule there, or its transfer to a Jewish authority, is inadmissible in the religious sense since that would be an attempt to wrestle with Providence.”

Kovalevskii attached to the report a number of theses summing up his ideas. They were divided into Christian churches (1–9) and the Russian Orthodox Church (10–14). The first thesis is of special interest to us:

Christian peoples cannot allow the Holy Places to remain any longer under the authority of an infidel government, be it a Muslim or Jewish one. The high-minded ideas of the leaders of the Entente, who envisage a peace based on respect for the spiritual and national particularities of various peoples, oblige the Peace Conference to give Palestine an organization that will realize the millennia-long yearnings of the Christian world—to see the Holy Places delivered from the hands of infidels and placed under the control of Christians.

Somebody, possibly Sazonov, to whom the above-cited texts were mailed, underlined the words “Christian peoples cannot allow” and “Jewish.” Evidently, while the issue of the cessation of Muslim dominance in Palestine seemed predetermined, after the Balfour Declaration the possibility of the
restoration of the Jewish state appeared very real to the Russian diplomatic corps in Paris.

It is not difficult to see a contradiction in the very first thesis: one can hardly speak of respect for the spiritual and national particularities of various peoples while proclaiming the unconditional priority of Christian interests. The author’s partiality manifested itself even more markedly in the third thesis:

A simple equality of nationalities and religions in Palestine does not suffice. The places sacred to the popular Christian mind must be entirely under Christian ownership, and it is necessary not only to guarantee the complete inviolability of these places, but also to provide access for pilgrims and decent living conditions for them.

If, contrary to expectations, the Muslim authority should be preserved or a Jewish one established in Palestine, then the Holy Places need to be recognized as extra-territorial, with the right to protect them by force of arms and legal backing of the law on guarantees provided by the Vatican and the Papal Council in Rome, or a specifically designed international treaty.

Having declared that “due to the disintegration of the Russian Christian state the obligation to maintain and defend Russian rights in Palestine passes to the Russian Orthodox Church in the person of the Patriarch of All Russia,” Kovalevskii placed his hope on the ruins of that self-same Russian Christian state. He hoped that Russian diplomats in Paris would prepare the ground for Church leaders to speak in Paris (thesis 8), with the expenses for the development and printing of the necessary materials, as well as travel expenses, to be covered by General Denikin. He assumed that 100,000 rubles would suffice for the initial phase. In reality, three times as much would be required.

The memorandum prepared by Denikin’s diplomatic department in Ekaterinodar, though in essence similar to the previous one, was far more realistic. Supposing that if “the fundamental issue of the creation of such a Jewish state in Palestine is predetermined by the Great Powers, then it seems doubtful that Russia, given its current international impotence, would be in a position to oppose the realization of that project,” the author(s) considered it necessary to seek the creation of an international protectorate over the Holy Places, or, at least, to consent to a protectorate of one of the religiously
“neutral” Great Powers, preferably England or even Turkey, as a state that gravitated “more to the Orthodox world than to the Western powers.”

The principle of extra-territoriality seemed unworkable to the diplomats, considering the distances separating so many of the Christian Holy Places (Judea, Samaria, Galilee). The “Vatican principle” also aroused doubts among the diplomats since the Vatican was “ruled by the single-handed authority of the Roman pontiff,” while the “heterogeneous, often conflicting movements” with interests in the Holy Places would make it hard to establish peaceful cohabitation.

However, the diplomats were most of all disturbed by the intention of high-ranking church officials to raise the issue of a review of the status quo in Palestine, seeing it as “a fatal mistake that would have the most pernicious consequences precisely for the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian pilgrims.” Whether or not this was the author’s intention, the diplomats were again seeking to establish state direction of the Church, which had been freed from state oversight in 1917.

“The status quo in the Holy Places was shaped by history,” they noted:

It was considerably affected by the degree of influence which this or that great power exercised over Turkey at one time or another. Since the signing of the Kuchuk-Kainarji Peace Treaty forced the Sublime Porte to officially recognize her patronage of the Orthodox faith in the Ottoman Empire, Russia has been a powerful guardian of the interests of Orthodoxy in the Holy Places as well. It is clear to any visitor to Palestine that only the efforts and enormous moral prestige exercised by the Russian Empire in Turkey can account for the prominent position of the Orthodox Eastern Church within the contemporary status quo in the Holy Places. The Church, for instance, owns the greatest Christian sacred object—the Holy Sepulcher. Were it not for Russia and her influence, the majority of the sacred places would undoubtedly have slipped from the hands of the Greeks and passed to the infidels.

Clearly, in the expression “moral prestige” the word “moral” was no more than a euphemism. The diplomats were well aware that Russia’s weakened position on the international stage “provides absolutely no ground to suppose that we could improve the status quo in favor of Orthodoxy.” Quite the contrary, a review of the status quo could lead to the loss of the positions
of the Orthodox Church in Palestine that still remained. That is why the instructions given to Sazonov before his departure for Paris included a categorical directive to seek the preservation of the existing status quo in the Holy Land.

The White government in Ekaterinodar supported the intention of the Patriarch’s representative to address the Eastern Patriarchs and establish ties with the heads of other Christian churches, as clearly formulated in the previously quoted messages of Neratov. As for sending a delegation to the East, the Western European capitals, and Palestine, the heads of the Church were urged to wait for Sazonov’s recommendations.

Interestingly enough, on March 11, 1919 Neratov sent a telegram to Sazonov, raising another argument for the minister’s attention:

> The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would undoubtedly cause friction between the local authorities and Christian pilgrims. This situation could potentially affect relationships between Christians and Jews in other countries as well, where provocative actions and . . . consequences such as pogroms and mass violence are possible.

> For this reason the issue of settling the Palestinian question as per the Zionists’ suggestions should be treated with greater prudence for the sake of a more secure peace, which is the main goal of all the governments.¹³

The task of composing a report on the issues raised by Metropolitan Platon was assigned to A. F. Shebunin, the former Consul-General in Constantinople and now the head of the administrative department of the White diplomatic office in Paris. A statement issued by the Zionist Organization and marked “Strictly confidential” had fallen into his hands.¹⁴ The project was closely scrutinized, as numerous pencil marks on it attest. We cannot ascertain with certainty who made the marks, but, since Sazonov’s official archive was transferred to Girs, the most probable “author” of the marks was either the minister himself or Shebunin. Words about the historic rights of the Jews in Palestine were marked in the text, and careful attention was given to the passages stating that Hebrew was to become one of the officially recognized languages in Palestine. In addition, the Sabbath and Jewish holidays were to be official holidays.¹⁵

As early as April 15 Shebunin’s report “With regard to the Holy Places . . .” was discussed at a session of the Diplomatic Council. A copy of the report
Contemplating the future of Palestine, and seeking a protectorate whose policies would be most beneficial to Russia, Shebunin concluded, like an inhabitant of the Caucasus in a celebrated Russian anecdote: “Both are worse!” This conclusion was based on an analysis of the four powers concerned: France, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States. The first two were unacceptable because of their patronage of Catholicism, Great Britain “due to overly specific promises made by the British government to the Zionists,” and the Americans “because of their patronage of Zionism” (p. 9).

In the author’s opinion, in principle the transfer of the mandate to Great Britain would be preferable for Orthodoxy “in view of the impartiality that could be expected from it in the case of . . . controversies between the two contending forces,” that is, Catholicism and Orthodoxy. But “the categorical obligation in written form given by the English government to the Central Committee of Zionists on 2 November 1917 deprived England of the possibility of acting in Palestine in any capacity other than as a patron—not of Christianity but of the idea of the creation of a Jewish state there.” This, opined Shebunin, represented a danger to Russian interests. His sole option was to express the wish that England would arrive in Palestine “free of that obligation” (pp. 10–11). The conclusions of the author of the report coincided with the recommendations prepared in Ekaterinodar: to preserve, as much as possible, “the peculiarities of the ecclesiastical structure of the Holy Land” and sustain the status quo.

Shebunin devoted special attention to the Zionists’ program:

The religious issue is so deeply involved here that responsibility for one decision or another could be accepted only on the basis of a resolution jointly put forth by representatives of all the Christian confessions. This could be done most properly at a congress of representatives of major Christian churches, and realization of the idea of Metropolitan Platon would be of especially great significance for that matter.

The World Zionist Organization acts carefully, skillfully and persistently. The success of its preliminary negotiations with Allied governments allowed it, after securing a certain promise of support, not to limit itself to the modest idea of colonization, but to propose
to the Peace Conference a project for creating an independent Jewish state in Palestine. In the official and somewhat confidential declaration expounding and thoroughly justifying these proposals, proper attention is devoted to the issue of the Christian faith and Christian sacred objects in Palestine: freedom to exercise the faith is guaranteed, as is the protection of holy objects. In a private exchange of opinions with official representatives of the Zionist Organization the idea of the protection of sacred objects was given wider formulation by inclusion of a proposal for their extraterritoriality. But it is my deep conviction that the religious sentiments of the Christian, and his veneration of everything connected with the earthly life of the Savior, can hardly be reconciled with an arrangement that brings the monuments sanctified by these recollections down to the level of archaeological material stacked in a museum. A quick glance at the literature of the pilgrimage to Palestine, which is in all languages called the Holy Land, suffices to show what touching significance the pious worshipers attach not only to specific monuments connected with well-known events but to all of the environment in which the Savior lived and moved, the ground on which He might have stepped, the rocks in whose shade He might have rested, and the waters of the Jordan river and the stones of the desert in which He fasted. Can it be otherwise, given a true living faith? (pp. 12–14)

It is hard to believe that this speech, imbued with religious exaltation, was delivered not at a church council but at a meeting of a board of diplomats who represented a country that was deep in bloody chaos and seemed to have been abandoned by God.

All of the aforementioned speaks out definitively against the described project. The Jews claim their historical rights, as well as an opportunity to relocate to Palestine a portion of the poor from the Judaic populations all over the world, particularly Eastern Europe; the hope of raising the morale of the oppressed Jewish masses through the creation of an accessible high national ideal; and a promise to turn the barren countryside into a blossoming and abundant garden with the help of Jewish technology and Jewish capital. The absence of any religious motive to substantiate
the demands described above puts them in a completely different perspective as compared with the Christian considerations on the same issue, and this impedes comparison between the two. But since the historical and political interests advanced by the Jews in any case oppose the common, indivisible religious views and beliefs of the entire Christian world in its totality, there can be no doubt that, just as the Jewish yearnings are united in the declaration of the authorized central Zionist Committee, the Christian point of view has to be developed quite definitely, a task that could best be accomplished at an all-Christian congress of empowered Christian churches (pp. 14–15).

However, the author of the report was more reserved when it came to practical matters. On the one hand, because the Zionist project had already been submitted for consideration by the participants of the Versailles conference, the convocation of the congress proposed by Platon was “not to be postponed.” On the other hand, the author suggested that there was no reason to hurry with the congress, and that it was best to “prepare for its realization in the best circumstances,” since the Versailles conference had decided to dispatch special commissions to the Asian part of Turkey to study local conditions. The proceedings of the commissions were to extend over many months.

Unfortunately, the minutes of the discussion (assuming any were taken) are not preserved. The motives of members of the Diplomatic Council in accepting four of the six points of the conclusion and rejecting the other two were at the heart of the matter. The points accepted by the Council included the preservation of the status quo in Palestine as far as possible “in all issues that concern the interests of the Russian Church and Orthodoxy in general until the restoration of Russia’s international power”; the fact that “of the two possible outcomes of the Palestinian problem in favor of France or England, the former is less desirable for Orthodoxy, while the second is acceptable with the qualification that England be free from the promise given to the Zionists”; and “no matter what the solution to the problem is, it is necessary to insist on granting to the ecclesiastical order in Palestine the widest possible autonomy.” Of the two points that were rejected, one was a proposal that, given the ecclesiastical situation and the problems raised by Zionist successes, the opinion of all the churches should be canvassed, perhaps at a congress of church leaders of all faiths. The second proposal that was rejected envisioned
a preliminary survey of the churches to ascertain their attitudes toward such a meeting (p. 23).

The motives underlying these decisions are transparent: the diplomats could neither secure Russia’s official representation at the Paris conference, nor obtain formal recognition for any of the anti-Bolshevik governments (in the spring of 1919 the possible recognition of the Kolchak government was discussed); the Russian Empire was disintegrating before their very eyes, and her recent allies were inclined to sanction such a disintegration (on the day the Palestinian problem was discussed, the second issue on the agenda was “Finland”). Clearly, the problems of Bessarabia, Finland, and the Baltics, not to mention Ukraine, were much more urgent for the ambassadors. Absent the support of a powerful state, the diplomats recognized that their voice, or that of the Orthodox Church, would be largely unheard when the Palestinian problem was addressed.

But despite the fact that the diplomats decided not to support the Church’s initiative to convene a congress of Christian churches on the issue of the future of Palestine, and decided even more decisively not to seek to prevent the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, they continued to monitor the positions of various churches on the issue. Reports by the Russian envoy to the Vatican, A. I. Lysakovskii, containing information on the attitude of the Catholic Church toward Zionism, were copied and sent to the Provisional Ecclesiastical Office in the southeast of Russia, an organ which in 1919–20 presided over the clergy and religious communities in the territories under White control.17

The information provided by Lysakovskii is interesting not only because it describes the position of the Vatican, but also because it reflects the envoy’s own attitude to the problem of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. According to the publisher of his letters, Lysakovskii had “in the eyes of the democratic public a reputation as a diplomat of the ‘new school,’ an enlightened and widely educated person.” Lysakovskii was appointed to the ambassadorial position by the Provisional Government, during M. I. Tereshchenko’s tenure as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he presented his credentials on September 30, 1917.18

“Another issue that bothers the Holy See,” wrote Lysakovskii to Sazonov on March 24, 1919,

is the fate of Palestine and fear of Zionism. According to credible sources at the Vatican, an agreement was reached between England
and France, according to which Palestine goes to England. On the other hand, Lord Rothschild secured a written statement from Lloyd George on behalf of the cabinet to the effect that the British government entirely accepts the Zionists’ program. The latter has recently been expanded and now demands the immediate restoration of Judea, with Jerusalem as its capital. Fearing such a humiliating outcome for Christians, the Vatican is exerting every effort to prevent it.\(^{19}\)

Interestingly, in a conversation with Lysakovskii in May 1919, Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Gasparri showed him a letter from a French priest by the name of Renault who had visited Odessa and the Crimea. The letter had been written in Novorossiisk in the previous month. Lysakovskii reported that “Father Renault seeks ultimately to locate the roots of the Bolshevist movement in the Jewry (whose hatred of Russia is explained by oppression: Trotsky’s family was killed in a pogrom in Odessa).”\(^{20}\)

On September 25, 1919 Lysakovskii sent the minister a letter devoted to the problem of Palestine. He remarked that a speech given by Pope Benedict XV on the occasion of the seizure of Jerusalem by the Allied forces was reserved in tone only because of fears that a more emphatic statement could be interpreted as a breach of neutrality. The Pope sought to expand Catholic influence in Palestine by winning the support of England, President Wilson, and, naturally, the Italian government of Nitti and sent Cardinal Ceretti to Paris with a special mission—to ascertain the Allies’ attitude to strengthening the influence of the Catholic Church in Palestine. However, “he did not encounter much sympathy on that issue,” especially on the part of Lloyd George, “who is said to be in league with the Zionists.”

With the end of the war approaching, the Pope dispatched Cardinal Justini to Palestine as a legate, to examine the situation and establish ties with the British authorities. Justini was “a dexterous southerner, a relatively young and very ambitious member of the Holy College, and a patron of the Franciscans, who are celebrating the ‘seven hundredth anniversary’ of their ‘guardianship’ of the Holy Land this year.” In Lysakovskii’s opinion, the Holy See’s initial approach was to determine “the principles of their future policy pertaining to the Holy Places, which will, beyond any doubt, bear the imprint of the political engagement of the current Vicar of St Peter” after the Roman messenger returned home.
Battling Balfour

In the same letter Lysakovskii reported on a meeting with the British General Roland Storrs, the governor of Jerusalem, who happened to be in Rome en route to a new appointment in London. The general made a most favorable impression on the Russian envoy. It seems that Storrs did not stop in Rome by chance: he was received by the Pope and talked to the Secretary of State and his deputy, and, by the way, “left a favorable impression, especially through expressing anti-Zionist sentiments.”

Before mailing the letter the emissary added that Cardinal Justini’s report had already been received in the Vatican, and he reported significant fermentation among the Christian population of Palestine “in connection with the rumors of sympathy of the English government toward the Zionists; dissatisfaction can also be observed among the most prosperous part of the Jewish population.”

In January 1920, following Justini’s return, Lysakovskii reported that the Vatican had not managed to enter into negotiations with the British authorities, and his trip had not brought about anything new. In a conversation with the Russian representative, Justini confided that in Jerusalem he had hosted a delegation “of the local population consisting of Christians and Muslims, who pleaded with him not to permit any Zionism and expressed readiness to exterminate Zionists by the sword.” Justini claimed that the Zionists were also viewed negatively by the more religiously inclined Jews.

Cardinal Justini died shortly after his return to Rome. But, as Lysakovskii indicated to his new chief, M. N. Girs, not before he was able “to point out to the Vatican the danger of Zionism to Palestine, as it arouses the hatred not only of the local Christian population but especially of Muslims.” “Since that time all the intelligence the Vatican has collected from Palestine confirms the opinion of the deceased cardinal, and the Catholic press has begun to wage a campaign against triumphant Zionism; they are even pointing out that the Zionists are oppressing the Catholic clergy.”

At the same time, the Vatican was concerned with the resolutions of the San Remo Conference. Apparently Lysakovskii managed to familiarize himself with the protocols of the conference, with the help of friends close to the Papal throne. The decision made at the conference to found “a national home” for Jews in Palestine, wrote Lysakovskii, “through the efforts of the Mandatory power was a compromise between the opinion of Lloyd George, who thought that the Palestinian question was resolved due to the Balfour Declaration, and the demands of Millerand, who wanted to save face in the
event that France would have to give up her historical rights in that part of
the Orient.” The Vatican was determined to reassert its power in the debates
over the fate of Palestine.

Lysakovskii offered his personal comments on these developments:

In reality, by establishing such a restricted institution as “a national
home,” which has so far never been encountered in any interna-
tional treaties or in a single encyclopedic dictionary, Lloyd George
fulfilled a promise made to the Zionists. The second payment on
the same bill was the dispatch of Sir Herbert Samuel, in March this
year, to investigate the situation in Palestine, and his subsequent
appointment as the governor of the new British protectorate.

Lysakovskii evidently considered the appointment of Herbert Samuel, a
British Jew, to the position of governor of Palestine to be the fulfillment of a
promise made to the Zionists. Shortly before the Russian representative
mailed his report, Samuel visited the Vatican on the way to his new place of
work. He was received by the Pope and had a lengthy conversation with the
Cardinal-Secretary of State. “The latter is very reserved in his judgment of him
[Samuel],” wrote the envoy. The appointment of a Jew as governor of Pale-
stine caused the Vatican to speed up the dispatch to Palestine of Archbishop
Luigi Barlassina, who had been appointed the Catholic Patriarch of Jerusa-
lem. According to Barlassina, who had effectively been the patriarch of Jeru-
salem for two years and had only recently left this position for Rome,

the conquest of Palestine is being performed on a sweeping scale
by the Zionist Committee, which is purchasing all the houses and
plots of land, and assisting all the Jewish enterprises with its
inexpensive 3 percent credit. Besides, the local positions of author-
ity have been taken over by the Jews, with the removal of Muslim
and Christian elements, and the result of the liberation of Palestine
by the Christians from the Turkish yoke is its oppression by Zion,
which may cause bloody conflicts.24

Though Russian diplomats resigned themselves to accepting the in-
creased influence of the Catholic Church (or at least the attempts to make it
so), they also recognized that both the Catholic and the Orthodox churches
were in agreement in their hostility toward Zionism and toward the idea of creating a Jewish state in Palestine.

* * *

Meanwhile, the heads of “Russian diplomacy in exile” were not content with information obtained through others, particularly Catholics, and yearned to have their own representative in Palestine. The matter was complicated by the ambivalence of their own position as representatives of governments lacking diplomatic recognition. In addition, the British were not yet willing to see a Russian diplomat in the electrified atmosphere of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, Sazonov took several steps in that direction. On April 19, 1919 he wrote to the ambassador in Egypt, A. A. Smirnov:

The restoration of peace in Palestine, and the proposed changes in its internal structure, caught us without any agent there whatsoever. This void should be filled, and I intend to send B. S. Iakushev, who is now with our mission in Athens, and A. D. Kalmykov, now stationed on the island of Rhodes, to take official charge of Russian matters and offices there, while our diplomatic interests can remain in the hands of the Dutch, as is the case in Constantinople.25

Since negotiations with the English government might drag on indefinitely, the minister also asked Smirnov to use his own channels of information to ascertain the position of the Orthodox Church in Palestine and the institutions in Palestine, especially Russian ones, belonging both to the Russian government and to Palestinian society, i.e., to conduct an inventory of Russian property in Palestine. Sazonov also referred to the preoccupation with these problems of “our ecclesiastical Office, whose representative Platon, the Metropolitan of Odessa, contacted me on that matter and related his proposals regarding the steps necessary to protect our interests.”26

But a Russian representative in Palestine (more an informant than an envoy, given his status as representative of an unrecognized government) materialized only a year later, after permission was secured from the British authorities. In September 1919 Lysakovskii informed Sazonov of his conversation with General Storrs, the governor of Jerusalem, when the latter was passing through Rome. Storrs impressed Lysakovskii with his benevolent attitude
toward Russia, assuring him that he would not hinder the approval of a Russian envoy in Jerusalem. “I have reason to assume,” Lysakovskii concluded, “that while an official appointment of a consul would be opposed, it should be possible to dispatch one of the lower-ranking members of our department. Our envoy in Cairo, with whom the general sympathizes, could talk the general and the Anglo-Egyptian authorities into it.” Lysakovskii added that Storrs had impressed the Papal Secretary of State by expressing his “anti-Zionic [sic] sentiments.”

The new appointee, Aleksei Fedorovich Kruglov, learned of his role from the Russian representative in Cairo on 24 May. By that time he was already in Jerusalem. He was not, however, recognized by either the British or Egyptian authorities. Nor did he receive any instructions or allowances from the Parisian office, and for the moment had to maintain himself by selling his private belongings. “I remain here in the capacity of a private person,” he informed Sazonov on June 21, 1920, “and, due to a request of the ambassador [the Russian envoy in Cairo A. A. Smirnov], I do not refuse to help with advice and guidance in affairs that arise on the spot. Unfortunately, such a position compels me to official inactivity, depriving me of any opportunity, out of considerations of censorship, even to relate to you all the information that could be interesting for our cause.” He was, however, able to report the seizure of almost all Russian real estate, as well as the news that the list of Allied countries whose citizens could receive expedited passes to Palestine from special offices did not include Russia. Hence, a “Russian Christian” had to wait for 30 or 40 days to receive a pass that a “Russian Jew” would usually receive “in 3 or 4 days.” Kruglov writes, “Jews from Russia and perhaps even Bolsheviks are allowed entry in large numbers, while Russian Orthodox are almost never given passes.”

It is doubtful whether Kruglov’s letter ever ended up in the hands of Sazonov, at least while he was still a minister. Denikin was succeeded as commander of the White Forces by Vrangel, who appointed P. B. Struve as the head of his office for external relations. The diplomatic corps, however, had little confidence in their new boss, nor did they have much hope that Vrangel’s Crimean-based government would endure. They therefore added their own “shadow” minister, M. N. Girs, a senior diplomat and ambassador to Italy, who was now stationed at the focal point of world diplomacy—in Paris.

Kruglov sent his first “substantial” report to Paris on June 21, 1920. It was not until September 28 that the envoy in Egypt, A. A. Smirnov, sent copies of this report (along with those of August 21, 24, and 25) to Girs and to
Prince G. N. Trubetskoi, who was substituting for Struve in the Crimea. The new minister, like the previous one, spent most of his time in Paris. It is worth noting, by the way, that the amateur diplomat Struve accomplished more than the professional Sazonov. Under his guidance, the Vrangel government received de facto recognition from France at a time when it controlled no more than one province of what was formerly the Russian Empire.

Kruglov’s first report was devoted entirely to the issue that concerns us. “June 30 (New Style) marked the end of the period of the official military occupation of Palestine by the British forces,” he wrote. “The Jew Herbert Samuel, who was appointed by the British government as Supreme Commissar, arrived in Jerusalem via Jaffa that day with the purpose of fulfilling the promise and setting up the national ‘home’ for the Jewish people.” Samuel then went to the house of the Governor-General on the Mount of Olives, where power was transferred from General Bowls, “and they raised the English flag, which is now still flying over Palestine, over the Governor-General’s house.” Kruglov then burst into a passionate tirade, far removed from a dry diplomatic account: “This event—shameful to the entire Christian world—has come to pass: the Holy Land, trodden by the feet of our Savior, has again been transferred into the hands of His enemies, the Jews, for the price of 30 silver coins, supplied to the English by the American financial clique.”

Kruglov took malicious delight in noting that “30 silver coins are not enough to secure a sure foothold in Palestine,” pointing to a pogrom in Jerusalem during the week of the Muslim holiday of Nabi-Musa (April 1920). The newly-fledged diplomat saw the pogrom as an event that imprinted “a historically grave stain of ignominy on the authorities,” failing to see the irony of these comments from the mouth of a representative of the White movement, whose armed forces were themselves stained with the blood of Jews. Kruglov also claimed that Arab attacks on Jewish settlements had instilled fear in the Zionists.

Kruglov’s analysis of British policy included the claim that the British were divided into two camps: the governmental spheres counted on using the Jewish-Arab conflict to “remain rulers of the land,” while the group comprising the military and the clergy considered it necessary to revoke the promise given to the Jews. Kruglov believed that the latter were the organizers of protests by local Christians and Muslims, who shared their indignation at the appointment of a Jew as Supreme Commissar. It was precisely this, according to Kruglov, that caused the governor of Haifa, Deputy Governor-General Tailor Watersteller, and many other officials to resign in protest:
It would now certainly be premature to try to guess whether the Jew Herbert Samuel will decide upon ecclesiastical matters of the Jerusalem Christian communities and the Churches, including our Orthodox Church, or whether the situation will be changed root and branch. I consider it necessary to state the facts and mark the phenomena attracting attention here that could be utilized.

Kruglov insightfully observed that the Arab countries being formed could inevitably become a major factor to be employed by Russian diplomacy. We should take this into account, he advised Sazonov, and be ready, “as soon as God helps our country recover from the disease inflicted on it, to enter into relations with them, and set up very serious intelligence and diplomatic staffs there, and use them to find a way to employ these countries for our purposes.”

In a report to the envoy in Egypt on August 21, 1920, Kruglov complained about the seizure by the British authorities of the buildings belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian-Palestinian Society. The British justified their actions by pointing to a real estate crisis:

But Russian institutions, power, and Russian citizens are not to blame for it, and are not obliged to bear the responsibility out of their pockets . . . The problem is that the British authorities, having imposed extremely onerous limitations on the freedom of Russian Orthodox Christians to visit the Holy Places, a right for which Great Russia fought with Turkey over many centuries, are openly promoting the immigration of Russian Jews. They arrive in Palestine in groups of 500–600, and artificially create a numerical majority of the Jewish element over the original Arab one. They need this to secure dominance with a view to forming here “the Jewish home.” Therefore it’s quite natural that the influx of the Jews, which they themselves are stimulating, has prompted the demand for residential real estate—which the local authorities did nothing to provide for beforehand.

On November 7, 1920, Kruglov wrote, with some malevolence, to the Russian representative in Egypt, reporting further problems for the British:

At the end of last October there was the first real public action of the Jewish Bolsheviks in Jaffa. It was reported that a crowd of
about 250 of them gathered in the Jewish settlement of Jaffa in Tel Aviv, set out on a demonstration march through the streets, and, flying the red flag, started yelling “Down with the English, down with the Zionists, long live Bolshevism, long live Lenin and Trotsky!” Many decorated themselves with red bows, as in Petrograd at the outset of the revolution. Some of the rich Jewish Zionists became targets of the demonstrators, and, according to rumors, among them was our former subject Dizengoff, who reportedly even had to be rushed to a hospital.

The authorities dispersed the demonstrators, and arrested a number of their leaders, who were deported to Malta.

At the same time, wine cellar employees at the Jaffa colony of Rishon le-Zion declared a strike, but the owners managed to pacify them. The local authorities are keeping silent about it, as an event that does not benefit their plans, and people say that Herbert Samuel himself was in a very anxious mood all this time.

Kruglov apparently remained in Jerusalem until the end of 1922, but among his few surviving reports the Jewish theme arose only infrequently: the representative of what was now no more than “the Russian Paris” concentrated on the situation of Russian real estate and its seizure by the British authorities. But Russian diplomats continued to monitor the situation in Palestine, taking note of any manifestations of anti-Zionist sentiment and evidently sympathizing with them. The leading role in gathering intelligence was passed back to Lysakovskii, the representative at the Papal See.

On June 30, 1921 he reported that, at the initiation of Monsignori Ratti, Taci and Ragonesi into the rank of cardinal, Pope Benedict XV had delivered an uncharacteristically harsh sermon in which he “stood up against the Anglo-Zionist undertakings in Palestine.”

“The Pope pointed to the harsh conditions for Christians in the Holy Land, now finally liberated from the Turkish yoke, and admonished Great Britain, which had received the mandate of the Christian powers, not to forget that Palestine, even if not Catholic, was a Christian country and, while sheltering a Jewish population, remained a world shrine. The unsatisfactory actions of the Palestinian authorities concerned not only religious issues but political ones as well.”

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Almost a year later Lysakovskii reminded Girs:

The Holy See has a very negative attitude toward the English mandate in Palestine and toward the creation of a Jewish “home” there. The Catholic press has begun a virtual campaign against English policy in Palestine, pointing to the oppression of Christians, to the open facilitation of all the Jewish initiatives at the expense of the rights of the Christian and Muslim population. Moreover, the Catholic Patriarch of Jerusalem delivered an anti-Zionist speech in Rome openly attacking the English Jewish Commissar. . . . The Anglo-American Agreement on Palestine, and the consideration of the issue of the English mandate at the League of Nations, forced the Vatican to do all it could to change the policy of the London cabinet.37

A month later Lysakovskii reported on the contents of a secret Vatican memorandum in regard to the “Balfour project.” The memorandum, sent to the League of Nations on July 4, 1922, “stresses the privileged position that the aforementioned project creates for the Jews and strives to protect the interests of Catholics and ‘other nationalities and confessions’ [that is, the Arabs] as well.” He also devoted attention to the dangers inherent in the creation of a Special Confessional Commission made up of representatives of all confessions, recommending instead its replacement by a commission of consuls or special plenipotentiaries of the Powers.38

The diplomatic correspondence on the Palestinian problem concluded with Kruglov’s report of October 3, 1922, at which time he was still in “the indefinite capacity of a private person.” It was in response to a letter from Girs asking Kruglov to organize support for proclamations of Russian organizations abroad, compiled “with a view to drawing the attention of nations and their governments to the violation of Church rights by the Soviets”:

Without touching in principle on the issue of the practical effectiveness of this method of influence during the present time of blind force and violence, I cannot help remarking that in Palestine least of all can authors of proclamations count on any practical consequences from their appeals. Indeed, as Your Excellency knows very well, the country with its restless population is living through the most critical period of its history. The Jewish minority, headed
by the Zionist Executive Committee and the Supreme Commissar, which has never professed any benevolent sentiments toward us Russians or toward Russia, has now concentrated all its yearnings and efforts on using the world crisis, including our own, to occupy a dominant position here, seizing power with the help of the mighty organizations of their co-religionists. It is natural that it should be interested in eliminating all the factors that do not conform either to its world outlook or to its purposes.

However, after this indignant tirade against the activism of Jewish organizations and their British patrons, Kruglov confessed that the attitudes of Russian organizations in Palestine—the Spiritual Mission and the Department of Church Inns of the former Palestinian Society—were entirely cautious. The mission, temporarily headed by “the monk Meletii, unsuitable in all respects,” limited itself to attaching the seal of the spiritual mission in Jerusalem to its proclamations. The leadership of the second organization “still has not ventured to express independently its way of thinking—whether it is in favor of the execution of Veniamin, the Metropolitan of Petrograd, or against it.”

Russia’s “diplomacy in exile” represented non-existent or unrecognized governments and was incapable of influencing to a significant extent the attitude of the Western powers toward Russia. Even less could it influence any solution to the issue of a Jewish state in Palestine. But the correspondence of the Russian diplomats testifies as to what the position of Russia would have been had the Whites triumphed in the Civil War—not always an impossible proposition—with the consequent regeneration of Russia as a great power. The Jewish national movement would have been faced with a powerful opponent.
Jews and the Red Army

In the spring of 1919, the conscription of Jews into the ranks of the Red Army became a pressing issue for the Bolshevik leadership. This was due to two factors. First, the Bolshevik military leadership was under pressure due to the advancement of anti-Bolshevik forces on all fronts. Second, military action had begun to take place in former Pale territories, which contained a substantial Jewish population.

As the Civil War entered its decisive phase, the Jewish socialist parties changed their stance toward the Bolshevik authorities. This was due both to the advancing counterrevolutionary threat, and to a change in the Bolsheviks’ own attitudes toward the parties. Whereas previously the Bolsheviks had viewed such parties as enemies, they now saw them as potential allies in their struggle against the Whites.

There were two additional reasons for this change. For Jewish socialist parties, especially the Bund, the revolution in Germany seemed to justify the Bolsheviks’ actions; once considered reckless, the Bolshevik coup now seemed prophetic. World revolution no longer seemed to be a myth, but rather seemed a real immediate possibility. Even more importantly, the pogroms carried out by Directorate forces during January and February of 1919 pushed many Jewish socialist parties closer to the Bolshevik side.1

Shortly before the destruction of Hetman Skoropadskii government, Petliura met with M. G. Rafes while both were being held in prison. Petliura spoke to Rafes about his desire to realize the unification of Ukrainian and Jewish democracy. According to Rafes, “Enlisting the Jewish intelligentsia and merchant class in service to the idea of the Ukrainian state” would, in the opinion of Ukrainian nationalists, guarantee their concept of “self-determination.” The most ardent supporters of such an idea even spoke of the
creation of a “Ukrainian Judea,” in which Ukrainians and Jews would share a state.2

In November of 1918, Rafes was being held in the Lukianovskii prison in Kiev, along with a number of other socialist party members. Despite the various party affiliations of those imprisoned, they had one thing in common: nearly all of them were Jews. And despite the wide variety of political beliefs and sympathies among the prisoners, Rafes claimed that nearly the entire prison supported Petliura, whose forces were then approaching Kiev. “The barometer of social opinion could be measured by our jailers, who were all in support of Petliura’s movement.” As one of them put it, “The town has already chosen sides. The rich are with the Hetmanate, whereas all the poor, naturally, are waiting for Petliura.”3

Rafes’ memoirs from late 1918 and early 1919 recount the sympathies of Jewish socialists for Petliura’s movement at the time. Soon, this situation would markedly change. Only one year later, Rafes published a book in which he took issue with “various individuals outside of Soviet Ukraine,” who claimed that the radicalization of the Bund was a result of Petliura’s pogromistic policies. Rafes denied this view of events, claiming instead that the evolution of the Bund resulted from a reevaluation of “the fundamental questions of an entire worldview” that had taken place under the influence “of the revolutionary struggle that was developing inside Ukraine.” Though he did admit that the pogroms had infuriated many, they did not result in “any kind of specific, national, reaction among the ranks of leftist members in favor of communism.” “However,” Rafes concluded, “one should not completely deny the fact that Petliura’s pogroms had a marked influence on the group psychology of the Jewish masses, which drew the correct and necessary political conclusions from them.”4

Of course, the pogroms affected both the “masses” and the “avant-garde.” The Directorate had forbidden the publication of “simple descriptions of violence and robbery [carried out by] individual military units.” When members of various Jewish socialist parties visited V. K. Vinnichenko, then chairman of the Directorate, to demand that measures be taken against the pogroms, he was “cold and calm.” “Measures have been taken, the guilty will be punished,” Vinnichenko assured them, “but . . . Jews themselves are to blame for these pogroms, as they actively participate in the Bolshevik movement.” The delegation pointed out that such reasoning resembled the line of argument often used during Tsarist times. But Vinnichenko was unmoved, and said in parting, “Measures
will be taken, but convince the Jews not to participate in Bolshevik demonstrations."

Rafes believed that the question as to whether the leadership of the Directorate personally participated in and organized pogroms was of secondary importance: “The fact that the perpetrators of the pogroms were left unpunished was enough” to demonstrate where their loyalties lay. During the first day of the pogroms in January of 1918, when Directorate forces had proved incapable of preventing the Bolshevik capture of Kiev, there was a story making the rounds in political circles about a conversation between two members of the Central Rada, in which one of the participants tried to bolster the hopes of his confidant: “Just you wait, we have yet to use our greatest trump card. Bolshevism will be unable to overcome antisemitism.” After this “trump card” was played it was inevitable that the vast majority of Jewish socialists would join the Bolsheviks.

In Ukraine, the Bund, along with other Jewish socialist parties, moved decidedly to the left. Groups of leftist Bund members created the Kombund, and in May 1919 the more communist inclined members of the Fareinykte, who had formed the United Jewish Communist Party, joined them in the Communist Union (Komfarband). Although Belorussian Jewry had not experienced the level of pogrom activity found in Ukraine, the threat of a Polish invasion and of a restoration carried out with the support of the Entente powers led Bund members there to move “closer” to the Bolsheviks.

At the Eleventh Conference of the Bund, which took place in Minsk in March of 1919, the decision was made to recognize the Soviet government. Esther (M. Ia. Frumkina), one of the leading figures of the party, declared that “the Red Army is our army.” After the conclusion of the conference, all party members from the ages of 18 to 25 were mobilized. The Bund’s support of the Red Army did not necessarily entail unconditional support of Bolshevik policy. At the very same conference, party members criticized the Red Terror and Esther herself declared the Bolshevik dictatorship to be a dictatorship “over the proletariat.” Bund members did not agree with the Bolshevik program of total nationalization of business and industry, which had left many members of the Jewish lower class without work, and they disagreed with the Bolsheviks on a number of other points. Esther declared that her primary concern was “not to give power to the bourgeoisie” and that in that sense she was “against democracy” and “with the communists.” This shift toward the left would eventually result in the complete collapse of any kind of party discipline within the Bund (of course, the Bolsheviks played no small role in this process).
role in this). As Zvi Gitelman has aptly noted, by the spring of 1919, the only things that Bund members would have in common were support of the Red Army and disdain for the Soviet Evsektsia.9

On April 11, 1919, the Central Committee of the Latvian and Belorussian Communist Party sent a letter to the Central Committees of the Bund, Poalei Zion, and the United Jewish Socialist Party. Citing the threat posed by Polish invasion, it informed the parties of the mobilization of all communists. Recalling their earlier declarations of support for the Red Army (including their participation in the one-year anniversary demonstration, which had taken place earlier), the letter stated: “To this day we know nothing as to the concrete measures the indicated parties have undertaken to strengthen the Red Army and support our front lines.” The Jewish socialists were asked to “clearly and decisively declare their position in regards to this question” and fulfill their duty to the revolution.10

In its response, the Bund Central Committee referred to the resolution adopted at the Eleventh All-Russian Conference, which declared the Bund’s support for the Soviets “despite our many differences with [their] leadership.” As for the Red Army:

Besides the matter of the general significance of the Red Army as an armed force of the revolutionary proletariat and the working masses against the threat of counterrevolution, the matter of supporting the Red Army takes on particular significance for the Jewish proletariat in our young republic, inasmuch as the counter-revolutionary forces threatening our country are also antisemitic, and threaten to destroy and wipe out the Jewish proletariat and the laboring Jewish masses. (italics added)11

The Bund “considered it their duty” to inform the Communist Party that “to raise morale and enthusiasm in the struggle against the threat of counterrevolution” military mobilization alone was insufficient. “A general change in the course of policy is also much needed, [a change in which] the working masses themselves participate in government, [in which there is] an increase in the activities and independence of the Soviets, a broadening of their bases, and an end to the politics of terror.”12

Another letter, to the Council of Defense of Lithuania and Belarus, dated May 5, 1919, described the mobilization of party members in Minsk and the formation of units of Bund members from Slutsk, Mozyr, Vitebsk,
and Minsk itself. All such units were under the command of the War Commissariat.\footnote{13}

The United Jewish Socialist Party likewise made its choice. In May of 1919, the Central Committee made a radio announcement to all party members in Soviet Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belorussia, Latvia, and America, that the following decision had been made at the Second Party-wide Conference in Gomel (April 28–May 2 1919):

“[The Party] has decisively put an end to the period of ideological vacillation and organizational disorder. The resolutions and directives of the Second Congress of the [Fareynikte] show that the party has once and for all taken the position of communism as embodied by the Russian Communist Party, and has joined the Communist International.”\footnote{14}

Both the Bund and Fareynikte informed their Jewish constituencies that they were planning on creating a united communist organization of the Jewish proletariat, and reminded them that “only the existence and strengthening of Soviet Russia provides a reliable guarantee for the final triumph of the worldwide socialist revolution.”\footnote{15}

Menshevik leaders were less inclined to “self-identify” with the communists. However, under the conditions of armed conflict with the old regime, they considered it necessary to present a united front with the Bolsheviks against their common enemy. G. Ia. Aronson defended the necessity of neutrality in the war between the Reds and the Whites in a series of disputes with the Menshevik leader Iu. O. Martov in 1919, claiming that significant portions of the White forces were composed of peasants who were rebelling against Bolshevik tyranny. Martov responded by referring to the Jewish pogroms that had accompanied the White advance, and reminded Aronson that the persecution of Jews was a concrete indication as to whether any given political movement was reactionary or progressive, concluding, “Do I have to remind you, a Bund member, of this litmus test?”\footnote{16} The Central Committee of the RSDRP likewise announced a party-wide mobilization, though this did little to save them from Bolshevik persecution.

On April 16, 1919, Bund, Poalei Zion, and SERP received a letter from N. I. Podvoiskii (then in charge of military and naval affairs in Soviet Ukraine) regarding the enlistment of Jews into the Red Army:
In the interest of eliminating antisemitic propaganda among the troops, the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Ukrainian Front requests that you provide us with Jewish volunteers or at the very least mobilized Jewish workers to be enlisted in the ranks of the current army as soon as possible. Our experiment in Berdichev has demonstrated that after 300 Jews were added to two antisemitically oriented regiments, the members of these units, having fought side-by-side with Jewish Red Army men, became so close to them under the conditions of war that they were completely cured of antisemitism and changed their attitude toward the Jewish population.\textsuperscript{17}

Podvoiskii called for 2,000 volunteers total, to be sent to the Military Commissar in charge of the Kiev okrug.

In Ukraine a Jewish Military Section was formed (Evvoensek for short—the official title was The Jewish Section of the Department of International Propaganda of the Political Administration of the People’s War Commissariat of the Ukrainian SSR), which had at least thirteen offices in a number of cities and towns. According to the Jewish Communist press, the mobilization of Jews into the Red Army was mostly successful: in the town of Smela 200 individuals enlisted, with an additional thousand each from Odessa and Cherkassy, respectively. According to press accounts and memoirs of the time, the opportunity to avenge their families and loved ones who had perished in the pogroms was a motivating factor in several instances. Others simply thought it better to die fighting than to be a defenseless victim. A case in point: at a railroad station in Kalinovka, the Zionist L. Shapiro was shocked to see a group of Red Army soldiers composed almost entirely of Jews, some of them still bearing side-locks. As it turned out, most of these new revolutionaries were yeshiva students from Proskurov, where Petliura’s troops under the command of I. Semesenko had carried out one of the bloodiest pogroms of the entire Civil War era. They had joined the Red Army in order to get revenge. At a later point, Shapiro witnessed one Jewish Red Army soldier from Berdichev driving his bayonet into the wounded left behind after the Petliurists retreat, shouting "this is for my murdered sister, this is for my murdered mother."\textsuperscript{18}

In contrast to most other Jewish socialist parties, Poalei Zion insisted on the formation of separate Jewish units.\textsuperscript{19} Having met resistance at the lower
levels of the Bolshevik hierarchy (particularly from Jewish communists), the party leadership appealed directly to Lenin in a memorandum dated April 25, 1919:

With the spread of Soviet power to Belorussia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, where the Jewish masses comprise a significant percentage of the total population, there has arisen the real necessity for the creation of regular Jewish units within the Red Army, to serve alongside the already existing Latvian, Polish, Ukrainian, and other national formations in the interests of more efficiently defending Soviet Russia. These national Red Army units, closely connected by a common language and way of life, will respond more readily to education in the revolutionary socialist spirit and could play an enormous role in the cohesiveness of the Red Army as a whole.

In particular, the creation of special Jewish units, which would remove the laboring Jewish masses from the influence of the Jewish bourgeoisie and its accomplices, would facilitate the development of the class consciousness of the destitute Jewish masses, strengthen among them the idea of Soviet power, and serve as a powerful propaganda weapon in the hands of the revolutionary parties. The formation of regular Red Jewish units, which would be the best troops for the struggle against any and all White or antisemitic demonstrations, would simultaneously free the Jewish Red Army soldier from the oppressive atmosphere of antisemitism which is currently widespread among the poorly educated masses of the Red Army.  

Emphasizing their role as “a party of the worldwide Jewish proletariat,” Poalei Zion highlighted their ability to play “a large role in the development of the idea of Red Army beyond the borders of Soviet Russia.” With the appearance of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and formation of the Hungarian Red Army in March 1919, this claim did appear to have some standing at the time. However, the central motivation for insisting on separate Jewish units was nevertheless “the pogrom movement, which has inundated a number of cities and towns, and whose influence is likewise to be found in the ranks of the Red Army.”
Antisemitism in the Red Army proved to be a constant problem for Bolshevik leadership throughout the Civil War. Bolshevik ideologues did not attribute antisemitism to the historical traditions and cultural differences between the Jews and their fellow soldiers. For the most part, they associated its appearance with the relatively small number of Jews serving in the ranks, and the influence of propaganda efforts by “elements” who were hostile to Soviet power.

The day before Poalei Zion’s memorandum to Lenin was to be discussed, the Bolshevik Central Committee received a report from the Chekist G. S. Moroz, who had just returned from Ukraine. Moroz (who was himself of Jewish descent) relayed the reigning pogrom atmosphere that could be found throughout Ukraine: “In train cars, at stations, in cafeterias, bars, and even clubs you can hear: ‘The Yids are everywhere, Yids are killing Russia. Soviet power would be fine if it weren’t for the Yids,’ and so on.” Moroz recommended that Jews in positions of responsibility within the former Pale territories be replaced with Russians from the interior, and that Jewish communists be called up to serve in the ranks of the Red Army.22

The Evsektsiia was active in the former Pale of Settlement territories as well. On April 25, 1919, the Evsektsiia Committee of Bobruisk discussed the question of mobilizing committee members to the front in accordance with the orders of the Belorussian and Latvian Central Committees. On May 5, the committee resolved to send all members under 30 to the front “as they are younger, not tied down by families, and should be first in line to go to the front.” In total, forty-six people were chosen.23 On the whole, however, the influence of the “traditional” Jewish socialist parties in the former Pale of Settlement far outweighed that of the Evsektsiia, and mobilizing the “Jewish workers” into the Red Army proved difficult without their support.

It is difficult to state with certainty the number of Jews who served in the Red Army. Statistics according to ethnicity and religious background were not kept. During World War I, 400,000–500,000 Jews were called to serve in the Russian army. By 1918, however, the number of Jews available to be conscripted was significantly smaller. Large portions of the territories containing most of Russia’s Jews (Poland, Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltics, and Bessarabia) were controlled by anti-Bolshevik forces or were under German or Romanian occupation. This situation had changed somewhat by 1919–1920, but a large portion of the Jewish population was still beyond the reach of the Soviet military.
In 1917 nearly 6 million Jews lived in the Russian Empire; by the 1923 Soviet census (after the recreation of Poland and the Baltic states, as well as Romania’s annexation of Bessarabia), this number had decreased to 2,431,000. Even using the most liberal of estimates, the number of mobilized Jews in the Red Army was probably less than 40 percent of the number of Jews in the Tsarist army. And, much as in Tsarist times, the leadership thought it best if their presence was as unnoticeable as possible.

Naturally, Jews did not rush to serve in combat any more than anyone else, and desertion took place on a massive scale throughout the Civil War period. In 1918 nearly a million individuals deserted the Red Army, and by 1921 the number had grown to 4 million. Toward the conclusion of the Civil War, Trotsky received a report on the state of the Red Army from D. Fesenko and M. Vainberg. They quite justifiably pointed out that the Army included a core of volunteers from 1918 and 1919, who were “truly revolutionary, who had risen up to defend their lives and freedom.” The rest of the troops, by contrast, “[who] had ended up at the front as a result of mobilization or other methods, were supported by this core . . . occasionally being captured or deserting, only to return once more to their units.” Antisemitism, as prevalent among the ranks of the Red Army as it was among their enemies, served as an additional motive for Jewish desertion.

A survey of Jewish Red Army members conducted by Poalei Zion in the spring or summer of 1919 demonstrated the role antisemitism played in Jewish desertion. Fifty-one Red Army soldiers participated in the survey, most of them from the Second Vitebsk Rifle Regiment. Such a limited sample size is in no way conclusive with regard to the treatment of Jewish soldiers throughout the Red Army. However, when viewed in conjunction with a number of other sources, it is highly unlikely that the attitudes toward Jewish soldiers (or the soldiers own perceptions) were radically different in other parts of the Red Army. The central question of the survey was the following: Would you like to be transferred to a Jewish unit, and if so, why?

Of those surveyed only five individuals responded in the negative. For those who did express the desire to be transferred, many of the reasons were similar: antisemitism, poor treatment at the hands of other Red Army soldiers, and the desire to defend the Jewish population from pogroms. Most of those surveyed were craftsmen and workers, some of whom were illiterate. Some were members of Jewish parties, others were unaffiliated. Although survey participants were asked to include their full name, profession, and party affiliation, there seems little reason to doubt the sincerity of the re-
responses. A Poalei Zion member, Moisei Velman (an accountant), expressed his reasoning in an “intelligent” fashion: “Antisemitism is well-developed in the Red Army.” Others, such as soap maker Shloima Vulfovich, were less eloquent: “Because they always abuse me for being a Jew. It’s hard to live there. I want to be with my own kind.” Leatherworker Zelik Bogorad declared that he didn’t want to serve with Khokhi (a pejorative term for Ukrainians).

The journalist and poet Neukh Aizikov Gorelik described his desire to serve in a Jewish unit in lyrical terms: “As a poet, I need the Jewish atmosphere like a bird needs air, like a fish needs water.” Others used more mundane vocabulary. Leiba Dalkunov (worker, no party affiliation) responded, “because suffering all the time with Russians, I have nothing but the word Yid and hostile treatment.” Noa Gozman (tailor, unaffiliated) added, “Because of antisemitism I don’t want to be among Red Army members.” Zalman Khedekel (tinsmith, unaffiliated) declared, “Because of extremely hostile treatment of me as a Jew by non-Jewish Red Army soldiers. I think that at the front you’re most in danger of being killed by one of your own comrades’s bullets.” Meer Belenskii (leatherworker, unaffiliated): “Because of antizizmetsizem” (sic). Mordukh Levin (tailor, unaffiliated): “It’s antisemitism which among the Russian Red Army soldiers it’s so much that they’re ready to literally kill you.” Iosif Lekazh (baker, unaffiliated): “Because of the impossibly hostile relationship to myself, Jews, and everyone on the part of Christian Red Army soldiers, which is expressed in mockery and hazing, the only word they know is zhid , which is always said with hostility.” Mordukh Gorbuny (clerk, communist party) explained his desire to transfer, stating, “as supporters of communism we now have to show how Jews are supposed to fight.”

Aizik Korotkin, a student and member of the Union of Communist Youth, did not want to switch to a Jewish unit, “because among the Red Army soldiers you already hear voices everywhere saying that there isn’t a single Jew in the Red Army. They always call on us to be united as one family, but here there is only separation.” Israil Baitkin, a student at the Moscow Trade Institute, agreed: “As one whose convictions put me in the anarcho-communist Kropotkin school and as an internationalist, for me there are no Jewish or any other kind of units. There is only the Red Army itself.”

Future plans for a military career were important considerations for two respondents who were against being transferred to a Jewish unit. Berka Labovskii (a teacher and member of Tseirei Zion) was not necessarily against serving in a Jewish unit but wanted first to finish his officer training, for which he had recently applied. Neukh Liakher (accountant, unaffiliated) gave
the following justifications: “1. I’d prefer to finish officers’ school. 2. I don’t even take the idea of serving in a national unit into consideration, as it’s all the same to me.”

Mordukh Khorosh and Shmerka Segal, both students affiliated with the communists, were also against the idea of being transferred. The latter believed that “The Russian masses will . . . not trust the Jewish units, and they might think that the Jewish units are fighting for something different, and this could lead to increased antisemitism, which is already well developed as is.”

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the antisemitic attitudes prevalent in the Red Army that often led to pogroms. They tried to fight these tendencies through both propaganda and repressive measures. On February 12, 1919 Kh. G. Rakovskii, then chairman of the Provisional Workers and Peasants Government of Ukraine, published an address to the workers, peasants, and soldiers of the Red Army. Entitled “The Fight Against Antisemitism,” it spoke of the “plotters” and “dark forces” that were engaged in pogromistic agitation, not only among the workers and peasants, but also within certain units of the Red Army. Rakovskii pledged that any provocation would be punished without mercy, and that the government would put an end to “hooliganism and antisemitism, which bring shame upon the Ukrainian revolution and the Ukrainian workers and peasants.” “Should unit commanders or people in positions of responsibility be found among the perpetrators, either in regular units or among partisan brigades, they will be subject to the most severe and strict punishments.” Rakovskii also noted that the government had recently passed a law that “foresees all measures of punishment, up to and including the execution of such individuals.”

The Kharkov newspaper Kommunist occasionally reported instances of antisemitic violence carried out by Red Army soldiers and the corresponding punishments. On February 17, 1919 an article entitled “The Red Army Must Be Purged,” with the subtitle “They aren’t Red Army soldiers, they’re bandits,” recounted how members of the Red Army “had detained a number of Jewish citizens and beaten them.” When two of the perpetrators were arrested and imprisoned, a group of sixty soldiers surrounded the jail to free them. In the ensuing firefight several members of the militia were killed, as were two members of the local Soviet. The newspaper informed its readers that “decisive measures have been taken against these brazen bandits.”

Violence against Jews continued despite the introduction of punitive measures. Red Army soldiers carried out a pogrom in the village of Rossava
(population around 5000, with 210 Jewish families), which was located 20
versts from the city of Boguslav. The pogrom transpired from February 26–27
until March 3, 1919. In the town of Klevan in the Rovno uezd Red Army sol-
diers placed specially wound pieces of wire into the beards of Jews. When the
wire would unwind, it would rip hair out, causing unbearable pain. Another
favorite method of abuse was stabbing Jews in the buttocks with rusty pins.31
In May of 1919, Red Army units carried out pogroms in Uman and Liubar.

On March 20, 1919 Kommunist reported on the riots taking place among
conscripted soldiers:

Each and every honest worker and peasant has the right to his own
opinion, whatever it may be. However, should someone come and
try to incite him to rebel or engage in pogroms, then [that worker
or peasant] is required to detain them and hand them over to their
assigned Worker-Peasant Soviet authorities for immediate reprisal.
No matter what mask this dark agitator and instigator might wear
and no matter what he might call himself, be it Menshevik, Left
SR, Bolshevik, or anarchist, his incitement of rebellions and
pogroms must end in his execution.32

The Kiev-based intelligence organization Azbuka provided the White
leadership with regular updates on the events transpiring in Soviet territory.
One informant made the following claim regarding anti-Semitism in the Red
ranks: “The fact that such attitudes are slow to manifest themselves exter-

ally [i.e., as pogroms] can apparently only be explained by the practical diffi-
culties of [such people] joining together and taking action regarding this
matter.” The Azbuka reports also mention an anonymous pamphlet being
circulated among the conscripts of the Red Army that called on them to re-
fuse to serve under Trotsky. The pamphlet ended with the slogan, “Down
with Trotsky and horsemeat, and long live Nicholas and pork!”33

According to another report, from a White intelligence bureau located
in the Don oblast, “The Reds have a deep hatred for the Jews, as they do not
see them serving in the ranks. It is possible that pogroms against the Jews
will begin in Soviet territory over the coming days. Only Jews have positions
of responsibility in the Communist cells. The Soviets are overflowing with
Jews.”34

It is interesting to note that these reports of the growth of the “antise-
mitic movement” in Soviet Russia were largely gleaned from the Soviet press
itself. Unlike the Whites, the Reds refused to keep silent about the problem; moreover, they actively attempted to stop anti-Jewish violence, and were willing to use all means at their disposal to do so.35

Antisemitic sentiment was not limited to the Red Army stationed in Ukraine. While living in Elets, the writer M. M. Privshin recorded the following rumors regarding a Red Army division stationed nearby: “They say that many of the soldiers of our Forty-Second Division adhere to the following ‘wisdom’ of Makhno: ‘Down with the Jews and communists, long live Soviet power!’”36

In his diary, V. A. Amfiteatrov-Kadashev recounts an episode told to him by an acquaintance, Viktor Sevskii. It is worth bearing in mind that Sevskii’s story, both characteristic and humorous, was probably somewhat embellished. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the underlying reality. In the Cossack village of Konstantinovskaia in the Don oblast, the Red forces were led by a “hooligan who had been expelled from the realschule,” a certain Konstantin Pulatkin. Sevskii continues:

Having entered the Cossack village at the head of the inexorable army of workers and peasants, this military commander (23 years of age) immediately sent the following love letter to a local girl whom he had earlier courted, unsuccessfully: “Dear Lelia! I offer you my hand and my heart. In the case of [your] refusal—a bullet to [your] head!” The girl, naturally, acquiesced, though she insisted on a church wedding. Kostka [short for Konstantin] readily accepted the terms, declaring that he himself “wouldn’t stand for getting married like a dog [i.e. without a church ceremony].” The wedding itself had a Homeric quality to it: Kostka arrived at the church in a carriage belonging to the director of the very same school from which he had earlier been expelled, pulled by three white horses. The carriage itself was covered in carpets. Next to Kostka was a gramophone, which he would constantly wind up in order to hear the following words thunder out: “Glory to you, glory to our Russian Tsar!” After the wedding there was a tremendous amount of drinking, which eventually ended in a scandal. The young man proposed a toast to the revolution, concluding with a pathetic exclamation of “Beat the Yids!” which he then proceeded to carry out by grabbing the ears of a Jewish commissar sitting nearby. A firefight broke out, during which two people were
seriously wounded, and the newly crowned Mrs. Pulatkin was considerably roughed up.57

When Red Army units suffered military defeats at the hands of the Whites, they would occasionally take out their frustrations with “victories” over the local Jewish population. One brave soldier of the Red Army wrote, in a letter dated August 15, 1919, that on the way to Korosten “we beat up nearly 500 Jews along the way. In Zhlobin we killed a Chekist commissar and disarmed [the lot of them].” In order to save face, the commanders of the regiment, unable to do anything with the soldiers who had gotten out of control, sent half the regiment on leave, while the remainder was sent to fight against the Poles in Vilna. The soldier in question undoubtedly exaggerated the number of Jews he and his comrades had killed, but it is nevertheless characteristic that he found such “feats” boast-worthy to begin with.38

Despite the measures taken to combat it, antisemitism continued to exist in the Red Army, and its spread was not limited to conscripted peasants. A good number of the “newly converted” members of the Bolshevik party were guilty as well. The writer M. M. Privshin spent most of the Civil War period in the provincial town of Elets. Though by no accounts a semitophile, Privshin still found it necessary to remark in his diary of September 1919 that “Judeophobia is an organic phenomenon among the Bolsheviks.”39

* * *

On April 28, 1919 the Politburo of the Bolshevik party approved Poalei Zion’s petition to create Jewish-only military units, declaring that “the formation of Jewish battalions was to be permitted on the basis that these will be national battalions in mixed regiments, or national regiments in mixed brigades. Entirely Jewish brigades are not to be allowed.”40

Those in favor of the creation of Jewish units argued that the 500,000 Jews that had served in the Tsarist army had been too widely dispersed among a number of units and fronts, and that their presence in the ranks had gone unnoticed. This situation in turn led to the accusations that the Jews refused to serve on the front lines, preferring to engage in business far removed from the fighting. The proponents of Jewish units expected a similar turn of events in the Red Army.41

In terms of the Bolsheviks’ struggle against antisemitism, Jewish units were probably the worse solution possible. The Evsektsiia repeatedly tried to
sabotage the Politburo’s decision. All of the Jewish socialist parties in Ukraine (save Poalei Zion) came out against the Politburo’s directive. In Belorussia the decision was met with great enthusiasm, though it is worth noting that Poalei Zion had a large presence in the area.\textsuperscript{42} The head of the Evsektsia, S. M. Dimanshtein, laid out his objections to the plan in an article entitled “Zionism under the Mask of Communism.” In the article, Dimanshtein attacked Poalei Zion, calling the party a “political hermaphrodite”:\textsuperscript{43} Poalei Zion are in favor of a special Jewish Red Army, and this is perhaps logical for those who demand an independent Jewish state. During the time of this difficult civil war, where the political role of ethnic minorities and antisemitism is so great, they seek to create a prototype of the thing they are striving for (subjectively this is difficult to admit, although objectively this is the truth); one can hear them speaking of the creation of a trained Jewish army.

To agitate for the creation of a national army, especially a Jewish national army, is an extremely dangerous thing to do at this time. Our enemies are marching on us with a nationalist army. For us the very idea of a national army is bankrupt; we have only a communist army. If we were to have large Jewish units, the enemy would portray our army as being entirely made of Jews, just as they did in the beginning [of the war] with the Latvian infantry. Such a situation would only cause harm. Some have proposed the formation of small Jewish detachments that would be part of larger Red Army units. This could be debated, but there should be no talk of any Jewish army.”\textsuperscript{44}

In the beginning of May 1919, Poalei Zion announced that it had shifted to a war footing. The mobilization of all party members and sympathizers under 30 was announced on May 14. The next day saw the enactment of provisions for the militarization of the party. A Central Mobilization Committee was established, and on June 14 the Central War Department was formed. Regional departments were formed in Odessa, Kharkov, Chernigov, and Kremenchug. Instructions for the militarization of the party were distributed with the slogan: “Remember, the fight for Soviet power is a fight for our survival.” The mustering points for mobilized soldiers were located in Kiev and Minsk, where the assembled troops would be assigned regiments in accor-
dance with the orders of military command. Party members who were not subject to immediate mobilization were ordered to form local Poalei Zion units. Poalei Zion clubs were transformed into barracks, and each member was required to spend at least two hours a day working on military skills, including marching, shooting, digging trenches, standing guard, etc. A minimum of 96 hours was to be spent in training.  

At a conference in Gomel in August of 1919 the far left wing of Poalei Zion left the party and pledged their unconditional support to Bolshevism. The declaration announcing the formation of the new party, under the name Jewish Communist Party (Poalei Zion), included a number of inspired “hybrid” slogans:

Long live the worldwide Civil War!  
Long live the Third Communist International!  
Long live the Russian Federal Soviet Socialist Republic!  
Long live the armed Jewish working people!  
Long live the communist society in Palestine!  
Long live the Jewish Communist Party [Poalei Zion]!" 

* * *  

By the beginning of May 1919 the first Poalei Zion units had begun to arrive in Minsk. The local Minsk party organization sent sixty of its own members to serve in the Red Army, while the contributions from less populous regions were smaller in number. Most of those mobilized were assigned to the Minsk patrol battalion, but some were sent to serve in other units, sometimes even at other fronts in the war. A number of conscripts, including twenty from Samara, twenty-five from Kazan, and eight from Rechitsa, were sent to the Eastern front. Ten Poalei Zion members from Gomel joined the Gomel proletarian battalion. The Kletsk, Nesvizh, and Luninets chapters of the Poalei Zion formed their own detachments which operated in the Luninets region. Five reconnaissance soldiers reported to duty at the headquarters of the Lithuanian Division, and two party members were assigned to the artillery officers’ courses in Smolensk, with another four being assigned to infantry officers’ school in Minsk. Forty-five percent of those mobilized were between the ages of 17 and 20, while the remaining 55 percent ranged from 21 to 31. A total of 486 Poalei Zion members were mobilized, representing “the best workers of the party and entire committees.”
Local Bund committees also joined in the mobilization. The Konotop chapter sent thirty-one party members to the front while Voronezh sent twenty-two. The Slutsk organization sent twenty-nine, including a number who were not affiliated with the party, but who nonetheless sympathized with the Soviets. Vitebsk contributed fourteen party members, while the Kharkov chapter promised to send fifteen party members to Minsk, and noted that all those who had not been mobilized were accounted for and were to act in conjunction with the army. The Gomel organization had mobilized 10 percent of its members, with the rest ready to serve as reserves. Judging from the surveys filled out by members of the Konotop and Slutsk organizations, many of those mobilized did not come from the ranks of the proletariat. These included a tailor, a hatter, a cashier, a coppersmith, a barber, and the unemployed. Most of them had joined the party in 1917–18; they ranged in age from 18 to 24, and most of the older recruits had already served in the army. Women could be found among the recruits as well. The “active and dedicated Bund member” Khana Shmerkovna Goldshein was among those sent to Minsk from the Igumen party committee. However, women were not always allowed to volunteer. A young female enthusiast from Saratov sent the following telegram to the Central Committee, “Please immediately explain [the rules regarding] female volunteers. The local committee refused [to allow me to join]. A Bundist.”

Not all party members shared the desire to serve in the military. Several local committees received petitions asking that party members be relieved of their military duties in light of their indispensable work for the Party. One such request was received by the Kiev committee of the Kombund: “[please] release Comrade Isniuk, who manages the cafeteria in Podol [an area in Kiev], from party mobilization as he is a much valued and irreplaceable worker in the matter of feeding the working masses of the Society.”

Despite attempts on the part of some local commanders to prevent the formation of Jewish squadrons, some Jewish units were created, though they did not exist for very long. According to S. Kh. Agurskii, some regiments at the Minsk front were almost entirely composed of Jewish soldiers. However, this was mostly due to chance, and was the result of mobilization drives that took place in areas with a predominantly Jewish population. In the beginning of May 1919 several small Poalei Zion units participated in military action, as did two companies named in honor of Bronislav Grosser and Ber Borokhov. The First Minsk Guard battalion was formed from soldiers assigned to these units and other Jewish recruits: 70 percent of the battalion’s members came...
from Poalei Zion, 10 percent from the Communists, and 2 percent from the Bund, with the remaining 18 percent coming from local Jewish conscripts from Minsk. A number of Jewish conscripts could also be found in the Second Minsk Guard battalion.\textsuperscript{54}

The First Guard Battalion was originally formed to patrol the city and protect its inhabitants from attacks and pogroms. However, the battalion was sent to the front in the beginning of June 1919 at the insistence of its members. In its first battle with Polish troops near the Alekhnovichi railway station, 38 miles outside Minsk, the battalion succeeded in repelling the enemy attack, and forced the Poles to retreat several \textit{versts}. However the battalion was nearly destroyed less than two weeks later, and a number of its members were taken prisoner. As Agurskii aptly noted, “The particular heroism of the Jewish battalions can be seen in the ensuing pogroms organized by bands of Polish soldiers. The Jewish Red Army units were similar to the militia organizations that existed during the pogroms under the Tsar.”\textsuperscript{55}

At the same time, being a good party member was not the same as being a good soldier. A. Korol, a squadron commander for a Jewish Communist Party (Poalei Zion) unit, was concerned with maintaining martial discipline among the troops under his command. In an order dated December 27, 1919, he recounted two examples of lapsed discipline in his unit. The first occurred when two soldiers refused to comply with their commander’s order to report for duty. Reprimands and “the commander’s explanation of the illegality of their refusal” had little effect. One of the soldiers involved (a non-Party member) was expelled from the ranks, while the other was to be disciplined by the Party tribunal attached to the unit. The other incident concerned a certain “Comrade Brandt,” who refused to heed his platoon commander’s order to remain in the squadron’s quarters. The soldier left the premises, pushing the officer on duty out of his way on the way out. Korol reprimanded the soldier, saying, “One cannot simply push officers on duty and remain unpunished.” Comrade Brandt was likewise referred to the Party tribunal, and Korol warned that in the future that all similar occurrences would be immediately referred to the Revolutionary Tribunals (Revtribunal).\textsuperscript{56} In general, it is unlikely that military discipline in the small number of Jewish military units differed significantly from that in other non-Jewish units of the Civil War period.

Rather than demonstrating that Jews served in the Red Army “just like everyone else,” the Jewish units often served to provoke antisemitic outbursts. The archives of the Bund Central Committee contain a document that neatly illustrates this point. Reminiscent of Babel’s \textit{Red Cavalry}, the document in
question is a copy of a report from the Political division of the Twelfth Army on the Western Front and was signed by the commissar and political activists of the Fortieth Ukrainian Infantry. Though no date is indicated, the report was probably written during the summer of 1919.

The subject of the report was recently a formed Odessa regiment that was 80–85 percent Jewish. The regiment had received extremely little military training; during battle they were forced to ask for assistance in loading their rifles. This completely unprepared unit was quickly sent to the front and predictably was overwhelmed during its first engagement: “The morale of the regiment was such that the merest hint of a whistling bullet caused them to flee, and none of the measures usually employed in such circumstances were of any use. The material conditions of the regiment are extremely harsh. They are without overcoats, boots, or linen. The body of every soldier has been ravaged by parasites. Wages haven’t been paid for two months.” Of course, such conditions were par for the course during the Civil War. There were other matters that disturbed the authors of the report:

Comrades, the fact of the matter is that the existence of our regiment on the Petliuran front amounts to nothing more than anti-Soviet agitation. At the given moment, when the forces of the counterrevolution have chosen antisemitic agitation as their main weapon here in Ukraine, the existence of a regiment that is almost exclusively Jewish is a crime before the Great Revolution, as our appearance in any village is a live act of antisemitic propaganda. [In places where] the peasants are already prepared to consider Soviet authority to be the authority of the “Yids,” the appearance of such a regiment consisting largely of Jews has frightfully harmful consequences for the psychology of the peasants. If [a peasant] had been wavering and doubtful of the idea that, say, the “Yids” wanted to seize power, then the arrival of our regiment would only serve to convince him of it.

The authors of the report also claimed that the presence of a Jewish regiment served to demoralize their fellow Red Army members, who would be mocked by the local peasantry for “defending the Yids”:

Comrades, you must understand the reaction of our soldiers when everyone around them is throwing the word Yid [žid] at them,
and the confusion that would ensue, as many of the Jewish Red Army soldiers only entered the Red Army because they saw that Soviet power would save them from pogroms. Things have gotten to a point where Russian workers who joined the regiment in Odessa have refused to serve there because it’s a “Yid” [zhidovskii] regiment, and they desert the ranks soon after . . . We consider it to be criminal and clearly counterrevolutionary that such regiments exist at the front, for tens of thousands of proclamations could never have as much effect as a single appearance of our regiment, which, it must be said, is not made of proletarians, but mostly of members of the lumpenproletariat, and we find it to be of the utmost importance that the regiment be transferred away from the front. Otherwise this could result in extremely undesirable consequences.

On June 13, 1919 the Head Committee of Poalei Zion in Ukraine sent a memorandum to Soviet and party authorities in Ukraine, Russia, Belorussia, and Lithuania concerning the conditions of the Ukrainian Jewish population and the antisemitic excesses of the Red Army. Noting the danger of “mass extermination, which threatens the entire Jewish population of Ukraine” as a result of the pogroms carried out by bands loyal to Grigoriev, Volynets and others, they emphasized that this threat was deepened by the fact that “certain Red Army units that are sent to fight bands of counterrevolutionary soldiers continue to carry out illegal pogromistic activities themselves.” Pogroms in Uman, Cherkassy, Khristinovka, Kalinovka, and along the Pogrebishche-Uman railroad are mentioned in particular. Having actively encouraged Jews to join the Red Army, the leaders of Poalei Zion were particularly disturbed by the conditions of Jewish soldiers “who are treated with virulent hatred by their Red Army comrades, which has repeatedly resulted in violence against them.”

Jewish volunteers that had been sent to the Bessarabian front from Odessa and then later sent to fight against Grigoriev troops nearly perished at the hands of their own “comrades.” Command was forced to recall them back to Odessa. In Gaisin, Red Army soldiers slaughtered twenty-two of the twenty-four Jews serving with them. There were many other examples in the report that spoke to the “indescribable spiritual ordeals and cruel humiliations that Jewish workers were often exposed to in the ranks of the Red Army as a result of the antisemitic attitudes of their comrades.”
The authors of the memorandum were disturbed by the lack of effort dedicated to the struggle against antisemitic excesses. Keeping in mind both the threat of the physical annihilation of Ukraine’s Jewish population and the fact that Soviet authority was being undermined by the pogrom movement, the Head Committee found it imperative that extreme measures be taken. These included the dispersion of all “clearly counterrevolutionary units of the Red Army that are inclined toward pogroms,” and the purging of all local power structures of “the counterrevolutionaries that have taken up residence [in them].” They also called for the creation of separate Jewish battalions to take charge of the training of Jewish detachments and battalions, which would then be sent to the Red Army; and the creation of special units to secure the areas away from the front, which must include “the large impoverished masses of Jewry.” Finally, they called for the formation of reserve units “under the leadership and control of all of the Soviet parties” to act in case of outbreaks of pogroms, and the immediate rendering of assistance and aid to pogrom victims from all sides, which would be administered by a special organization created for this purposes in conjunction with the participation of the Jewish Soviet parties.”

The Ukrainian Evvoensek (Jewish Military Section), which was dominated by communists, came out against the formation of special Jewish units. On June 21, 1919 the Evvoensek sent a response to the Jewish Social Democratic Workers’ Party (ESDRP) (Poalei Zion) memorandum on Jewish units to the political division of the War Commissariat, with copies forwarded to People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, the Central Executive Committee, Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and the Ukrainian Komfarband. The Evvoensek agreed with the memorandum’s contention that antisemitic attitudes could be found among units in the Red Army:

The Evvoensek has also run across a large number of complaints from soldiers serving in the ranks that they are routinely mocked, threatened with death at the front and so on. These facts should attract the attention of the military authorities, especially in the provinces, where the working Jewish population often bears a large number of insults and humiliations from units that call themselves Soviet.

The Evvoensek believed the best way to combat antisemitic attitudes in the Red Army was to intensify the general political education of the soldiers, in-
cluding agitation against antisemitism, the inclusion of class-conscious urban proletarians into the ranks of the Red Army, the dismissal of counterrevolutionary elements from the army and Soviet institutions, and the dissolution of those units “who were incapable of being reformed.” However, the Evvoensek, along with the two main communist organizations represented therein (the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Jewish Communist Union of Ukraine) were decisively against “any kind of Jewish military units, whether openly or in secret, whether at the front or in the rear lines, whether they are general units or units formed for special purposes. [We are against this] due to general considerations, and in light of the political conditions of life in Ukraine . . . Jews can protect themselves from the danger of pogroms only by the strengthening and healing of the Red Army, and not by the formation of special Jewish detachments. For everyone, the defense of Soviet Power from counterrevolutionary bands on the internal and external fronts must become the sole defense against pogroms. Any other solution to the problem is fraught with consequences that might lead to the opposite effect.”

There were no representatives from Poalei Zion in the Evvoensek. Despite Poalei Zion’s pro-Soviet position and the execution of their mobilization program for the Red Army, restrictions on their activities were not lifted, and the party continued to occasionally experience various forms of repression. The Evsektsiia in Russia attempted to declare local Poalei Zion organizations in Samara, Elets and Orel illegal, tried to repossess a party club in the Nizhny Novgorod gubernia, and applied pressure through the Gosizdat (the state publication agency) to obstruct the publication of the Yiddish Dos Naye Vort (New Word) and the Russian-language Bor’ba (Struggle). In Ukraine, attempts to remove Poalei Zion from the political arena were even more blatant. According to a report of the Head Committee of Poalei Zion to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, “there was an entire campaign against the Palestinian movement [taking place] among Jewish workers”: In June of 1919 the authorities prohibited a meeting and concert in support of the Head Committee’s War section, and rejected the registration of the workers collective Fray Leben (Free Life), whose goal was to support the Jewish colonization of Palestine through the principles of collectivism and socialism. On July 23, the Society for the Support of Jewish Labor in Palestine was also closed. Poalei Zion members were not allowed into the Kiev Soviet, and when the party asked the Kiev gubernia Executive Committee for permission to create a weekly publication, they were only allowed to publish monthly.
In an attempt to normalize their relationships with other Soviet institutions, Poalei Zion asked the VTsIK (All-Russian Central Executive Committee) to allow for participation of Poalei Zion members, and to “request that all Soviet institutions and organizations not obstruct the political and mobilization efforts of the party,” to allow party members to serve on electoral boards, and to “explain to all Soviet organizations in all Soviet republics the inadmissibility of obstructing the work of the party with the proletariat of Palestine, which has the goal of creating a Jewish socialist society in Palestine.”

Despite the April 22, 1919 decision of the Politburo and Trotsky’s orders of May 10, the mobilization of Poalei Zion and the creation of Jewish Red Army units continued to face numerous obstacles. Skudre, the military commissar for Vitebsk gubernia, adamantly refused to form Jewish units, claiming, “I am aware of Trotsky’s order and am duty-bound to obey him, but I will not allow Jewish battalions for as long as I am at my post.”

Despite their clearly articulated Soviet position, Bund organizations were also discriminated against by communists in some areas. For example, Kh. Gorelik, one of the leaders of the Mozyr Bund organization, declared herself to be against the taking of hostages on August 20, 1919. On the very next day the local communist party demanded that “the Bund immediately expel Comrade Gorelik from the organization and send her to the Bund Central Committee to be judged by a party tribunal.” If the party refused to comply, Gorelik, “who has shown herself to be not a leader of a party that supports Soviet authority, but rather a counterrevolutionary element which is undermining the power of the Soviets,” would be subjected to prosecution “at the hands of the Cheka.”

In response to this and other instances of persecution in a number of cities (including Orsha, Gomel, Tolochin, and Vitebsk) the Bund Central Committee sent letters of protest to the VTsIK and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (b). In Gorelik’s case, it was mentioned that the individual in question was a member of the Central Committee, a former political prisoner, and an old revolutionary, “who enjoys tremendous popularity among the working masses of Mozyr.” Moreover, she was not, in fact, protesting the taking of hostages as such, but rather was against using the poor in such a fashion. In addition to this incident, the letters mentioned the closing of a number of party clubs, the arrest of numerous party activists, the cancellation of a charity concert in support of Der Veker (The Awakener), the main party publication, and open denunciations against the Bund in the commu-
nist press. In particular, they accused the newspaper Izvestiia Vitebskogo Gubernskogo Soveta (News of the Vitebsk Gubernia Soviet) of waging a campaign against them in which the Bund were accused of “supporting Jewish national units in the Red Army” even though they had actually “been firmly against this undertaking of Jewish-only units, which had received approval from the Center [Moscow].”

The Head Committee of the Jewish Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Poalei Zion) sent a memorandum to the Revolutionary Military Soviet (Revvoensovet) that detailed their work, in accordance with the decisions of the Politburo and Trotsky, regarding the formation of Jewish units, and simultaneously complained of the obstacles to carrying out said projects. The Poalei Zion Central Military Section, formed on June 14 with the assistance of Alibegov, then head of the okrug’s military reserves, “in continuing to mobilize the party, saw its main task as being the formation of Red Army units composed of Jewish workers, in which party members were to serve as the ‘cementing’ base, as a revolutionary element.” The Central Military Department had been carrying on a campaign to encourage “the enlistment of Jews in Red Army units in general and in Jewish units in particular.” Seven Poalei Zion instructors had traveled to forty different locations, and had released appeals to the local population in Yiddish and Russian, set up a number of meetings, and had begun to publish the newspaper Royte Armey (Red Army) in Yiddish. “The reports of the instructors and the surveys taken by the Jewish workers clearly demonstrate the military readiness of the Jewish proletariat to fulfill their revolutionary duty to the end. In conjunction with the latter, local Military Departments have been inundated with requests from mobilized Jewish workers that they be allowed to serve in Jewish units. An overwhelming number of them have indicated that in other Red Army units antisemitism runs rampant. This kills the Jewish soldiers’ revolutionary fervor for defending the revolution and Soviet power.”

At this stage the Poalei Zion Central Military Committee ran into resistance on the part of local military authorities, who interpreted Trotsky’s telegram as being applicable only to Poalei Zion members and volunteers, instead of to all of the “Jewish workers” who were being mobilized. It is worth remembering that the term “Jewish workers” was little more than a euphemism. Any educated Marxist would have relegated the overwhelming majority of Jews in the former Pale territories to the petty bourgeoisie or to “non-class” elements.

Poalei Zion offered a number of measures that it deemed necessary for the “precise and unswerving execution and realization of the directives of the
Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Comrade Trotsky’s telegram:

1. The creation of a general plan, to be worked out by the Central Military authorities, regarding the formation of Jewish Red Army units.
2. Clear instructions that all Jews without exception (including those already mobilized and those who are to be mobilized) must be allowed to join Jewish units, should they voluntarily decide to do so.
3. The formation [of these units] must be carried out by the Revvoensovet and the General Headquarters at locations specially designed for this purpose, from which the units will be sent to the Western Front.
4. To provide the Central Military Department with the informational and material means to carry out widespread agitation and propaganda among the Jewish working masses [encouraging them] to join the Red Army in general and Jewish units in particular.
5. To carry out political and revolutionary work in the Jewish units being formed in collaboration with the Agitprosvets and Politotdels [i.e. propaganda and political departments] of local Military Commissariats.
6. To inform all Okrug, Gubernia, and Uezd commanders of the military work of our party regarding the formation of Jewish units, and to enlist their support [in doing so].

In practical terms, the introduction of such measures would have resulted in the formation of “Jewish legions” within the ranks of the Red Army, not unlike the one that served in the British forces during World War I. The Bolshevik leadership was surprisingly receptive to Poalei Zion’s requests. It would appear that as Denikin’s troops made their way into Ukraine in August of 1919, Moscow was willing to temporarily ally itself with any one if it would strengthen the military capacity of the Red Army.

On August 9, 1919 the Organizational Bureau of the Communist Party ordered “that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine be informed of the desirability of concentrating Jewish Red Army soldiers in separate companies in light of the predominant antisemitism in the army.” It
Red Army even went so far as to rebuke those who had early obstructed Poalei Zion’s efforts, declaring that “the inadmissible attitude of the Vitebsk gubern[ia military commissar] should be drawn to his attention.”

Despite this, the Evsektsia’s Commission for War Propaganda was sending activists to the front to interfere with the creation of separate Jewish units and “to fight by all means available against the national separatism that Bund and Poalei Zion were attempting to maintain among Jewish Red Army soldiers.” For all intents and purposes, Jewish communists were forbidden from joining Jewish units. In the case at hand, the Evsektsia was motivated by a desire to defeat their competitors in influencing the “Jewish street,” as well as a number of completely rational concerns. The creation of armed Jewish formations in the conditions of the Civil War was dangerous, both for the Soviet authorities and for the Jews themselves.

The directive of the Politburo and the Orgburo (Organizational Bureau) were never carried out on any significant scale. This cannot be attributed to the efforts of the Evsektsia alone. The reality of the Civil War was such that military commanders “on the ground” sabotaged the project, which, had it been successful, would not have led to any real strengthening of the military capacities of the Red Army. Such an undertaking would have had extremely negative consequences in terms of propaganda. Moreover, Jewish units that were taken prisoner were generally executed en masse. Of course, this was often the fate of any Jewish Red Army soldier, with the Whites displaying a profound indifference as to whether the individual in question was a conscript or a volunteer.

After Denikin’s forces took Kharkov, the Volunteers placed captured Jewish soldiers in a separate group. The prisoners were then executed by machine gun. General B. A. Shteifon, the “master” of Chernigov during Denikin’s advance in 1919, obliquely hints at this “special relationship” toward “foreign” captives in his memoirs. He claimed that each group of captured soldiers would “give up the communists and commissars themselves, if such individuals were present among them. “Foreigners” were picked out by their appearance or accent. After the removal of these elements who were openly hostile toward the White army, the remaining soldiers became obedient and placid, and quickly accepted our ideology.” It is easy to surmise the fate awaiting the “openly hostile elements.”

A. G. Shkuro was more frank in his discussion of the matter: “The Cossacks were completely without mercy toward the Red Army Jews, and didn’t even pay attention to documents which attested to the fact that they had
been forcibly conscripted. The Cossacks were of the opinion that, given their inherent deceptiveness, the Jews could have avoided conscription had they truly wanted to.”

After taking a Red unit prisoner, the Cossacks would order the “Yids” to come forward, and immediately cut down all who did. According to Shkuro, “Jewish Red Army soldiers would put on crosses beforehand in order to pass for Christian,” but they would still be recognized by their accent. As a result, “the Cossacks stopped believing the crosses and carried out their own physical inspection of the prisoners, and would execute all of those who were circumcised.”

Even before the debates among the Reds, the Whites had long believed in the existence of “Jewish legions” in the Red Army. Shkuro mentions a battalion of Jewish communists who “entered the field of battle under their light-blue national banner”! According to him, such battalions were ruthlessly destroyed by the Cossacks. He also recalls a battalion of conscripted Jews that had been taken prisoner. Although the Cossacks wanted to deal with them in the usual fashion, Shkuro sent the prisoners away from the front under the escort of his own personal convoy. They were eventually loaded onto a train and sent to Novorossiisk, where they were used to unload ships’ cargo.

According to Professor N. N. Alekseev, who served in the ranks of the White Army in Crimea for a time in 1919, the Ukrainian peasants conscripted into the Red Army were akin to a flock of sheep, readily surrendering in large groups (and just as ready to surrender again to the Bolsheviks, should they experience “the least bit of success”). The dangerous regiments were composed of communists, sailors, and Jews.

During his meeting with Jewish leaders on July 26 (August 8) 1919, Denikin described the antisemitic attitudes of the army as the result of having “to fight the Jewish communist legions face to face.” To dispel any doubts the delegation might have, Denikin presented them with a “summary of information on Jewish units active on the Southern front” signed by the head of the intelligence department, Colonel Resniaskii. The list of units identified as being 100 percent Jewish included the Odessa Volunteer Detachment, two cavalier regiments, and a cavalry detachment. Those units identified as being 30–50 percent Jewish included the majority of the engineering brigades, half of the communist regiments and squadrons, troops under the command of the Cheka, and the punitive brigades. According to the document, a 2,000-member Jewish militia was active in Odessa, as well as a Jewish student militia, a 2,000-member Zionist regiment, and so on.
The heads of the Jewish community in Odessa later sent Denikin a refutation of the report’s claims, noting that the Jewish militia had been formed in 1917 exclusively to prevent pogroms, that it had existed while the Volunteer Army had controlled the city, and was dissolved by the Bolsheviks in March 1919. The only military unit that identified itself as Jewish was the “First Jewish Soviet Regiment, having a few hundred members, which had been organized by the Jewish Communist Union.” Seeing as there were no Jewish regiments in the Red Army, one is forced to conclude that the regiment in question was actually the Fortieth Ukrainian Infantry, discussed earlier, or the squadron led by the famous bandit Mishka Iaponchik (aka M. V. Vinnitskii), who had decided to align with the Soviets. In June of 1919, Vinnitskii’s squadron, which was composed mostly of individuals of dubious legal standing, was renamed the Fifty-fourth Ukrainian Soviet Regiment and was sent to the front on July 23 as part of a division under the command of I. E. Iakir. The regiment numbered approximately 700 individuals. Naturally, there were a number of Jews among them. The regiment successfully engaged in combat with Petliura’s forces, but abandoned their position the very next day for unknown reasons, and set off for Odessa. Along the way, Iaponchik captured a train that included a first class compartment and returned to his native city in style. On July 29 the train was intercepted by Communist and Chekist troops, who killed Iaponchik (as well as his wife and staff commander) in the ensuing firefight.

Such was the contradiction of the role of Jews in the Red Army. While the Bolsheviks worried about the absence of Jews in the ranks of the Red Army, the Whites saw themselves surrounded by Jewish legions on all sides.

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In the end, even Poalei Zion was forced to admit that the creation of Jewish military units was counterproductive. A report composed by the Head Committee addressed to the Commander of the Twelfth Army on January 29, 1920 claimed that although “the Jewish worker served with zeal and demonstrated his heroism in the ranks . . . one is forced to come to terms with the full-fledged antisemitism [in Ukraine] . . . the creation of special Jewish military units in Ukrainian territory can only lead to the strengthening of antisemitism.”

It is difficult to measure with any certainty the extent to which the Jewish communist and military organizations were successful in increasing the...
number of Jews serving in the ranks of the Red Army. According to a report of
the Evsektsiia Central Bureau from February of 1920, “The most recent mass
mobilizations carried out by Soviet authority have led to a significant number
of Jewish soldiers serving in many Red Army units, particularly in those
operating on the Western and Southern Fronts.”

Nonetheless, Jewish communists remained unsatisfied, both with the
“quality” of the Jews serving in the Red Army, and with their treatment at
the hands of their brothers-in-arms:

The masses of Jewish workers who have either volunteered or been
conscripted into the Red Army mostly represent the apolitical
element. They are still completely under the influence of the petty
bourgeois worldview. They do not understand the total significance
of our international goal; they often join the Red Army out of
hatred for the White pogromists, out of despair, and occasionally
as a result of compulsion. Upon arrival, they are greeted with the
hostile atmosphere of the barracks, and find nothing in their
military life that would bind them to our ideals. Any small dose of
idealism that they might be exposed to quickly dries up upon their
first encounter with the darker sides of military life.

Measures proposed to improve the lot of Jewish soldiers in the barracks were
clearly the product of a bureaucratic-party mindset. They included publish-
ing the Red Army newspaper in Yiddish, brochures, posters of an “agita-
tional, propagandistic and military-technological character,” Yiddish textbooks
for Red Army schools, and the organization of various meetings, lectures,
dialogues, libraries, etc.

In their report the Central Bureau did not mention any concrete statistics
as to the number of Jews serving, having only the vaguest notion as to
what the actual numbers might be. Even discounting the possibility that the
“significant number” of Jews was exaggerated, it is highly doubtful that they
would stick out among the masses of the Red Army. Of those Jews who did
serve (willingly or not), most probably had little desire to serve in the openly
“hostile atmosphere” of the barracks. Inevitably, many of them would quickly
leave the army, using both legal and illegal means to do so.

The idea that the presence of Jewish soldiers was a source of antisemitism
in the ranks of the Red Army was to be revisited at the outbreak of the war
between Poland and Russia. A report composed by I. Kaganov (head of the Training and Distribution Department of the Politotdel of the Southwest Front) and sent to the deputy head of the local Politotdel (Shneivas) speaks of the “extremely virulent antisemitism in the ranks of the Red Army” claiming that, “in addition to the numerous fronts of the revolution that must be resolved, one more must be added: the terrible front of antisemitism, which is pregnant with fatal consequences and whose destruction must not be delayed.” Kaganov wrote that political measures were not sufficient in combating the threat, and that one could not hope to weaken antisemitism by publishing pamphlets filled with propaganda: “Immediate and decisively revolutionary measures must be taken.”

An example of the “revolutionary” measures taken include Shneivas’s decision to “use Jews as political fighters [politboitsov] who, by participating in attacks at the front of their troop or squadron with their scarred, wounded bodies would prove to the hostile Red Army soldier that the Jew was not only capable of serving at the front, that he was not only ‘furthering the revolution in the commissions and executive committee of the back lines,’ but he was also willing to give his own life in battle for the revolution.” Kaganov found precisely this method to be the best form of propaganda against antisemitism.84

All this was taking place at a time when Jews were well represented in the high command of the Red Army. Trotsky was the head of the Revvoensovet of the Republic throughout the Civil War period, and his deputy was E. M. Sklianski, a former military doctor. For a time, A. P. Rozengolts and S. I. Gusev (Drabkin)85 served as members of the Revvoensovet as well. A number of Jews held prominent positions in local Revvoensovets of the various fronts and armies, and served as heads of local Politotdels and commissars of various divisions, brigades, and regiments. As the Civil War progressed, the belief that Jews were unsuitable for military duty, which had been so common among the leadership of the Tsar’s generals, was repeatedly disproved. The very same commissars who were originally to serve as the “eyes of the Soviet state” (to use Frunze’s expression) gradually became the administrators and organizers of the Red Army.86

A case in point was sixteen-year-old Iakov Smushkevich (the son of a tailor), whose family had been deported from the Lithuanian small town of Rakishka to Vologda in 1915. Smushkevich began his military career as a commissar in 1918. Later he would go on to become a hero of the Spanish Civil War and the Battle of Khalkhin Gol between the Japanese army and
Soviet forces, eventually becoming a Lieutenant General and the head of the Red Army Air Force. He was twice named a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Similarly, Grigroii Shtern began his military career as a commissar at the age of nineteen. The son of a Jewish doctor, Shtern went on to become a Colonel General, was the main Soviet military advisor for the Spanish Republic, and commanded troops during the conflict with Japan in the Far East. He was also awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Both Shtern and Smuskevich were arrested in June 1941 as part of a group of military commanders who allegedly did not agree with Stalin and his inner circle in regards to German-Soviet relations and the war readiness of the Soviet Union. They were executed on the same day in October of 1941.

During the Civil War, several Jews proved that they were talented military commanders. Such figures included the prominent Bolshevik activists M. M. Lashevich (Gaskovich) and G. Ia. Sokolnikov (Brilliant), and the lesser-known T. S. Khvesin. Though for these party members military command was only a passing episode, others were to remain in military service for a longer period. Such was the case of I. E. Iakir, the son of a chemist and a former student of Basel University who worked as a lathe operator in a military factory in Odessa at the outbreak of the war. When he joined the Bolshevik party in April 1917, he began what proved to be a remarkable military career. At the beginning of the war Iakir was a squadron commander, by the end he was in charge of an entire army. Other examples of military successes included S. P. Medvedovskii, who became the head of an infantry division, and D. A. Shmidt (Gutman) who led a Red Cossack cavalry division. Both were twice awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Dozens of other instances of Jews who ably served in positions of command at all levels could be added to this short list.

Still, the overwhelming majority of the Red Army commanders were not “foreigners” or even “workers and peasants”; instead, they largely came from the upper echelons of the Tsarist army. Experienced commanders and veterans comprised 85 percent of those in charge of various fronts, 82 percent of those in command of individual armies, and 70 percent of division commanders. On the front level 100 percent of Chiefs of Staff had served in the Imperial Army, as did 83 percent on the army level and more than 50 percent on the division level. The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic was Colonel I. I. Vatsetis, and later Colonel of the General Staff S. S. Kamenev. By the end of the Civil War there were approximately 70,000–75,000 former Tsarist officers in the Red Army, of whom 8,000
Red Army

volunteered, 48,500 were conscripted, and 12,000 switched sides from the Whites or were conscripted as POWs.89

* * *

The Polish invasion of April 25, 1920, in which the Polish army was allied with Petliura’s forces, was met with predictably hostile responses on the part of the Jewish parties. On May 3, 1920 the Jewish Communist Party (Poalei Zion) published an appeal “to all Jewish workers and laborers” under the title “Let’s finish off the final enemy!” urging them to once more answer the call to military service: “Here, in Ukraine, a country known for its pogroms, a country where the very air itself is full of the cries of disgraced [i.e., raped. —Trans.] wives and mutilated children, this truth is more evident than in any other place: only Soviet power is capable of defending and preserving the life and property of the Jewish masses” [italics in original].90

In May of 1920 the Central Military Department of Jewish Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Poalei Zion) gave the following order to all party organizations in much the same spirit: “The presumptuous antisemitic hooligans of the Polish landowners have sent their hordes for the conquest and enslavement of free Ukraine and Russia. The arrival of the Poles would destroy all of the accomplishments of the socialist revolution, [and would result in] a wave of new pogroms and humiliations.” The Central Committee of the party, in conjunction with the Head Committee in Ukraine ordered the mobilization of 10 percent of all party members, and 20 percent of the Central Committee, the Head Committee, and all other party committees to serve on the Polish front.91

Despite this call for additional Jewish soldiers, Jews continued to go unnoticed in the ranks of the Red Army, at least in the opinion of the Bolshevik leadership. On June 2, 1920 A. P. Rozengolts informed Lenin, Trotsky, and the Bolshevik Central Committee that the Polish troops were carrying out increasingly antisemitic propaganda, and “that as a result of antisemitism, which is noticeable in the local population, there is a serious danger of increased antisemitism in the Red Army.” Rozengolts solution to the problem was hardly original; he simply called for the mobilization of 500 Jewish workers by the Bolsheviks and Jewish socialist parties, who would then be sent to serve in active units on the Western front.

Trotsky sent the following response to Rozengolt’s proposal in a memorandum to the Orgburo on June 3, 1920: “The same story is repeating itself on
the Western and Southwestern Fronts. There are only a very insignificant number of Jews serving in active units. Thus the inevitable growth of anti-semitism. We must immediately command the Jewish communist organizations to mobilize the maximum number of Jewish workers and to form Platoons (or detachments at maximum) and introduce them into active units. This measure must be carried out with particular energy in the Ukraine.”

The very same day the Orgburo ordered the mobilization of 500 Jewish communists to be sent to the Western and Southwestern Fronts, and requested that pro-Soviet Jewish parties carry out similar mobilization efforts.92

It was precisely this “request” that was reflected in a letter from Poalei Zion leadership to local party organizations sent on June 22, 1920. “Voluntary enlistment in the Red Army, this should be the call that you send out to the masses, infect the masses with your idealism and draw them to the army en masse, this is our second revolutionary task.” “Red Volunteerism” soon became the new slogan of the day.93

As the Red Army began its advance toward Warsaw, the theater of war shifted to the territories of the former Pale. Rafes, then serving in the Politodel on the Western Front, turned to Trotsky, requesting instructions as how best to attract “Jewish workers” to the Red Army. Trotsky replied that although it was “vital to draw the Jewish proletariat into the ranks of the Red Army,” it was worth bearing in mind that “a significant portion of the Jewish workers have yet to disavow their petty bourgeois prejudices, thus it is necessary to turn to the workers’ organizations who, along with the Evsektsiia, could organize a special week for the recruitment of Jewish workers into the Red Army.”94

Rafes soon reported back to Trotsky that on September 9, 1920 the Belorussian Evsektsiia had ordered the creation of a special commission, charged with carrying out propaganda work to encourage Jewish workers to join the Red Army. Moreover, the commission was charged to admit “all Jewish parties that actively supported the Red Army, such as the Bund and Poalei Zion.”95 It was clear that when it came to influencing the Jewish “street,” the Bolsheviks still had to rely on the major Jewish parties. The head of a local politodel noted that as his division made its way from Brest to Radzivil they “found no underground workers [i.e. Communists] along the way, nothing except for Bund and Poalei Zion.”96

The Belorussian Communist Party sent a circular to all of its Evsektsiias claiming that “the Jewish proletariat has yet to fulfill its duty before its socialist Fatherland and the world-wide proletarian revolution” and that the
small number of Jewish workers in the Red Army could result in increased antisemitism in the ranks and lead to unfortunate consequences. In light of this, it was proposed that a campaign be carried out encouraging Jewish workers to volunteer to serve in the Red Army. The main sites of the proposed propaganda campaign (which was to take place from September 24 to October 20, 1920) were Minsk, Bobruisk, Borisov, and Pinsk. The campaign proved to be a failure, as a Polish counteroffensive compelled the Jewish youth to be extremely cautious in their interactions with the Soviet authorities, whose days in Western Belorussia were numbered. By October 12, 1920 the Polish and Soviet authorities had signed a cease-fire.

The brief Polish-Soviet War clearly demonstrated the two-sided relationship the Soviet authorities had with Jews. The Bolsheviks had planned on the support of Polish workers as well, and hoped that they would join the struggle against the Polish “gentry.” I. T. Smilga’s telegram to Lenin on August 12, 1920 shows that Soviet expectations did not come to fruition: “In the Polish territories under our control there is as of yet no workers’ movement in the countryside. Everything is dark and abandoned; the youth have been mobilized by the Whites. The urban workers and the railroad workers are for us, as is the Jewish population.” According to a report by the Revvoensovet of the Fifteenth Army, the Poles and bourgeoisie were glad to see the Red Army retreat at the end of August, 1920, while “the Jewish workers were disappointed.”

The Polrevkom (i.e., those who would have governed Poland had the Red Army succeeded in occupying Poland) believed that the Red Army’s nationalities policy was one of the reasons it failed. Its leader, E. Pruzhniak, wrote the following to Trotsky on September 17, 1920:

It is a fact that during the Soviet advance into Russia, when the Army was creating Military Revolutionary Committees [Voenrevkom], Soviet institutions at first fell into the hands of elements known to be bourgeois. It is indisputably true that one of the main reasons this took place in said institutions was the reliance on individuals from the Jewish community. Besides Bialystok, the army did not occupy a single city that was even remotely close to an industrial center. There are almost no workers in these cities; petty bourgeois Poles and counterrevolutionaries abound, and even the Jewish element is only sympathetic to Soviet power insofar as the latter do not attempt to root out speculation. Until then, they are happy to make themselves at home.
Iu. Markhlevskii would write in much the same vein: “There was . . . another factor that was undoubtedly harmful. In the territories captured by the army—the most backward part of Poland, by the way—there were an overwhelming number of Jews. They usually speak Russian (while Poles do not) and so the Voenvrevkoms attracted Jews first and foremost. Moreover, it was easy to see that a good number of individuals were seizing the moment. It is more difficult to convince Polish workers to rise up. As a result, the first impression of the populace was that the new authorities were mostly comprised of Jews, and that is why they did not trust them, especially in the villages.” Markhlevskii went on to note, however, that the mistrust of the workers in Bialystok in regards to “Jewish dominance” was quickly overcome. Markhlevskii claimed that the workers enthusiastically accepted the arrival of the Polrevkom.\textsuperscript{102}

A contrasting view can be found in a telegram written by a Red commander who managed to cross Polish-occupied Bialystok at the very end of August 1920: “We were forced to fight more with the population of Bialystok than with Polish troops. The Jewish population took an active role in hostile actions.”\textsuperscript{103} In all likelihood, this last claim is the result of the common stereotype (prevalent among Russian soldiers on all sides) that Jews would be willing to “shoot them in the back” if given the opportunity.

A good deal of attention was given to the nationalities question at a joint meeting of the Politotdels of the Third and Fifteenth Armies on September 11, 1920. One of the participants, Mitreev, considered the ethnic composition of the Revolutionary committees to be one of the reasons the Soviets failed to attract the Polish lower classes: “Those who were counting on the Polish peasantry misdiagnosed the situation. Antisemitism became stronger among the peasants. The revkoms were often headed by Jews. Unfortunately, there was no one else to be had. We discovered very few communists. In the voivods one should appoint anyone but a Jew to the revkoms; it is better to place Red Army soldiers or weaklings on the police force . . . anyone but a Jew.”\textsuperscript{104} Mitreev’s view was seconded by Feliks Kon: “the composition of the revkoms, their ethnic makeup is an incredibly important question. This question first appeared in July, when Jewish storekeepers were placed at the head of revkoms, and appeals to the populace (in Grodno) were written in a semi-literate fashion.”\textsuperscript{105} Shenderovich, the head of a division politotdel, boasted that in the countryside he had appointed “no Jews, no Russians, only Poles, even if they were only sympathetic [to our cause]. Russians could only be instructors, but were no longer to be in charge.”\textsuperscript{106} It would be extremely dif-
ficult to suspect the attendees at this meeting of antisemitism, if for no other reason than the simple fact that nearly half of them were Jews themselves.

During the Polish campaign, the Jews proved to be the most loyal and reliable segment of the population for Soviet authorities. However, relying on Jewish support inevitably led to resentment on the part of the local Polish population. This was by no means the only problem for the Bolsheviks. From a Marxist point of view, the overwhelming majority of the Jewish masses could hardly be said to come from the “working class.” Reliance on such “bourgeois elements” was politically dangerous and went against the grain of Marxist theory. Such a situation only exacerbated one of the central problems of the Polish-Soviet conflict, namely that the Poles were fighting the communists not only because of their political beliefs, but also because they believed the Russians to be invaders, attempting to reestablish their empire. Still, the Soviets had to have some base of local support. The Jewish population, who shared a common language with the Soviets and at least partially sympathized with their policies, were the only possible candidates. In the end, however, such support from the Jews served only to weaken the Soviet position.

The Jewish political parties were active in the fight against Vrangel as well. On August 7, 1920, the Jewish Communist Party Poalei Zion ordered a partial mobilization of its membership. The most “exotic” Jewish military force, however, was a cavalry brigade comprised of “mountain Jews” (gorskie evrei) that served on the North Caucasus front. While available sources cannot decisively prove that the unit was actually formed, it was mentioned in a Poalei Zion document dated June 25, 1920. In this document, party leadership requested that the Revvoensovet recall a certain L. M. Fuks from the Western Front to engage in propaganda efforts among units comprised of “mountain Jews” that were currently being formed. This in turn was a response to the brigade’s own request to Poalei Zion leadership that they send political workers to the brigade.

In the end, Soviet attempts to “infect” the Jewish masses with “revolutionary idealism” were as unsuccessful as the attempts to eliminate antisemitism from the ranks of the Red Army. During the retreat of 1920, Soviet forces would carry out the most vicious pogroms in the history of the Red Army.

* * *

Of all of the Soviet forces, Budennyi’s famed First Cavalry Army displayed the most virulent antisemitic tendencies. After a series of defeats and the...
ensuing retreat from the Polish front in 1920, Budennyi’s troops engaged in pogroms that differed little from those carried out by Denikin’s troops. Warning signs of such a possibility could be seen well before the pogroms themselves. A compilation of materials from a meeting of the First Army’s political workers on June 30, 1920 noted a general slackening in discipline, and an increase in cases of banditry, robberies, and drunkenness among the troops.\footnote{109}

In an analysis of the separate divisions of the army, S. N. Zhilinskii, who was then in charge of political propaganda, noted that the Fourth Division “was full of cases of banditry, prisoners were completely stripped of their possessions, and antisemitic propaganda was openly being promoted. On the whole, the political workers and party organs are unable to fulfill their function and struggle weakly against the aforementioned phenomena.” Similar remarks were made regarding the Sixth Division: “Harmful elements have attached themselves to the division, under whose influence there can be observed an increase in harassment against Jews, and an increase in banditry and acts of violence against the civilian population.” In the Eleventh and Fourteenth Divisions, which were primarily composed of deserters from Denikin’s forces and prisoners of war, an increase in looting, theft, and drunkenness was apparent. Moreover, the political workers in charge of these units either were incapable of controlling the troops under their control, or openly joined in such activities themselves.

This report resulted in Zhilinskii’s being removed from his post. Budennyi himself, along with two members of the Military Soviet of the First Cavalry Army (K. E. Voroshilov and S. K. Minin) and the head of the Political Division (I. V. Vardin [Mgeladze]) lodged a protest against the depiction of the army in Zhilinskii’s report. V. L. Genis took issue with the claim that “The First Army was ‘full of bandits and thugs,’ ‘antisemitic,’ and contended that ‘a significant portion—if not the majority—of its comrades believe that it is impossible that the Cavalry Army would contain no Jews, that in the Army commissars and communists are beaten, and that in its free time the Army would constantly engage in robbery and violence.’” The leadership of the Revvoensovet declared that such “outrageous views” were the result of hatred for the army on the part of “elements from the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia,” as it was the “the brightest example of the power and strength of Soviet Russia.” In their view, the Army “personified the peasant element, which had risen up against the Russian landowners and the rich Cossacks of the Don and Kuban.” As far as looting and pillaging were concerned, the authors continued, such activities were vital to the existence of any army.\footnote{110} When
one takes into account the conditions under which the army operated, in which supplies from the rear lines were more of an exception than the rule, this last claim does contain a kernel of truth. Indeed, such a method of maintaining military forces was widespread throughout the region among both the Reds and the Whites.

A case in point was the “requisitions” carried out by the First Cavalry Army on its way to the Polish front in May 1920 in the city of Krivoi Rog, when the troops seized everything of value in sight. When the peasants protested that they had already contributed goods to the war effort, the Army claimed that they had received nothing at the front, and that those who carried out the previous requisitions had either kept the good for themselves, or given them to the Jews. The goods seized included a typewriter from the local Party committee; the soldiers placed a machine gun in the doorway of the committee’s building to ensure there would not be any difficulties. The Army leadership was quite correct in their claim that the Army was primarily a peasant force; 71–77 percent of its members came from the peasantry, with an additional 20–25 percent coming from the workers, and 3–4 percent consisted of members of the intelligentsia. Cossacks, naturally, were included among the peasantry.

During the course of the Polish-Soviet War, Red and White soldiers often found themselves serving side-by-side in the same army. Many rank-and-file White soldiers (and a significant number of officers) had fallen into the hands of the Red Army after Denikin’s defeat at Novorossiisk. The prisoners were then mobilized into the Red Army. Of course, such soldiers were only admitted after their ranks were purged. In theory, only those who “had not sullied themselves with crimes against the authority of the proletariat and the peasants” were taken. Nearly 12,000 former White officers were serving in the Red Army before January 1, 1920. An even greater number of White officers were mobilized over the course of the same year.

Earlier, the Whites had displayed a similar attitude toward captured soldiers and officers. This represented a change from the attitude at the outbreak of the war, when prisoners were often mercilessly slaughtered. At this stage of the conflict, as a White colonel (B. A. Shteifon) wrote, “If they were not communists, captured officers and soldiers were usually accepted to our regiment without any special formalities . . . they were excellent soldiers.” In Shteifon’s Belozerskii Regiment 80–90 percent of the soldiers were captured Red Army soldiers or conscripts who had crossed over to the White side. As mentioned earlier, such tolerance was not extended to communists or those of “foreign extraction.”
The number of former Denikin soldiers in the Red Army was apparent even to the untrained eye. The Petersburg writer V. M. Fisher, who was in the town of Dashev (Kiev gubernia) for the duration of the Civil War, recorded his impressions of the Red Army entering the town during the summer of 1920:

The Bolsheviks moved in an unending cavalcade, and it was scary to think of what would remain of the place where they chose to spend the night. You could hear how they looted the homes of the Poles who had already left.

There were old acquaintances among Budennyi’s troops, former Cossacks who had torn through Dashev in November. We recognized them. But this time they didn’t pillage; they were in a hurry. A Jew pointed this out to me, barely containing his excitement, “You see comrade (he immediately started calling me comrade), this is Soviet power! Under Denikin, these people were the worst of bandits, you and I know this well! But they have gone under the red banner, and are now heroes!”

Of course, these “heroes” still managed to rob a local priest and a teacher on their way through the town.

However, let us return to the protest by the First Cavalry Army’s leadership in reaction to Zhilinskii’s report. The Central Committee did not agree with the content of the letter; Secretary N. N. Krestinskii believed Zhilinskii’s version of events and found the tone of the army leadership to be “unnecessarily nervous,” and he relayed his views on the matter to Trotsky. The First Army continued in its attempts to justify their actions. At the Ninth Party Congress in Moscow in September 1920, a member of the First Cavalry Army Revvoensovet, Minin, lodged the following protest with the Central Committee: “As of late, an entire group of communist workers, some of whom have served admirably and reliably, have leveled serious accusations against the First Cavalry Army, that this army is antisemitic, anticommunist, and full of bandits and thugs. They claim that it is incredibly difficult for a communist to serve in this army, and that workers who are extremely capable, but of non-Russian nationalities, seriously risk their lives by serving in this army.” It is easy to surmise which workers were most at risk while serving under Budennyi’s command.

Minin went on to point out that those claims that would seem to incriminate the First Cavalry Army were applicable to all Soviet armies, as they recruited from the bourgeoisie, who were “estranged from the process of
production and bereft of any culture, let alone communist culture.” Minin felt this was particularly true of the First Cavalry Army, as the majority of its members came from the “backwards” southeast territories. Minin also claimed that the needs of the army were greater due to its reliance on “fighters and horses,” and that the constant number of raids wore on the nerves of the army’s soldiers. The Party leadership clearly did not accept these justifications; when Minin tried to come to the defense of Budennyi’s army at the Party conference, the delegates refused to give him the floor.

In a brochure entitled “The Political Conditions of the First Red Cavalry Army (June 15–August 15, 1920),” Vardin (then head of the politotdel) claimed that “there was no active antisemitism in the army. There are anti-Jewish prejudices, there is also the groundless, passive dislike of Jews typical for the peasantry, but that is all. Hostile, pogromist attitudes toward the Jews are nearly completely absent.”

The diary of the renowned writer I. E. Babel shows how inaccurate Vardin’s claims were. Babel, who was serving as a war correspondent for the newspaper Krasnyi kavalerist (Red Cavalier) under the name of Kirill Vasilievich Liutov, kept a diary of his tenure with the army, portions of which still exist today. One entry recounts how on June 6, 1920 in Rovno, Babel was forced to remain in the home of a Jewish family in order to prevent soldiers from raping the mistress of the house. On July 11 (while in Belev), Babel records a conversation he had with a local Jew: “It’s the same old song, the Jews have been robbed . . . they waited for Soviet power to liberate them, and suddenly there are screams, whips, and Yids.”

Jews truly did view the Red Army as potential liberators from Polish domination. The secretary of the Revvoensovet of the First Cavalry Army noted the “particularly attentive” attitude the Jewish population of Novograd-Volynsk displayed toward Budennyi’s troops. Their hopes quickly dissipated, however. Babel writes, “The cobbler has been waiting for Soviet power, and now he see thieves and Jew-haters, and that there will be no work. He is shaken and looks around with mistrust . . . The hatred is the same, the Cossacks are the same, the cruelty is the same, the armies are different. What nonsense. Shtetl life. There is no escape.”

An old Jewish cemetery outside of Malin led Babel to come to following conclusion, “It has seen Khmelnitsky, now it’s Budennyi. Everything is repeating itself for the miserable Jewish population, Poles, Cossacks, Jews, everything is repeating itself with incredible precision. The only new part is communism.”
On July 21, Babel records a conversation he had with the head of staff of the Sixth Division, K. K. Zholnarkevich: “Do you know what our Cossacks are? Here are some of their qualities: boldness, a propensity to hoarding, professionalism, a revolutionary spirit, and savage cruelty. We are the avant-garde, what do you expect? The civilian population is waiting to be liberated, the Jews are waiting for their freedom, [and what they get] are Kuban Cossacks.”

A certain Maksimov, who headed an artillery division, was similarly realistic: “It’s not the revolution that is trying to take things for itself, but our army, a wild uprising of outlaws. We are simply the means. And the Party will not shy away from employing [us].”

On August 3, a Red Army soldier refused to give Babel bread, claiming, “I don’t have dealings with Jews.” On August 8 another soldier (apparently from among the 3–4 percent of those from the intelligentsia) told Babel his thoughts on political economy, and noted that the Jews are to blame for everything. Hardly an adherent of “political correctness” himself, Babel writes, “what a stupid, Slavic creature, who managed to fill his pockets during the pillaging of Rostov.”

In Komarov, Budennyi’s troops seized Torah scrolls from a synagogue and threw them onto the street. They kept the velvet covers—for saddles. “Last night we [italics mine] pillaged,” Babel writes. No matter what actions the Red Cavalry committed, Babel would always insist on counting himself among them.

Babel’s short story “The Letter” (Pis’mo), part of the Red Cavalry cycle, is perhaps the best short story ever written about the Civil War. In it, Babel depicts the attitude of the Red Cavalry toward Jews as a remnant from the previous world, one that must be destroyed by the warriors of socialism. The protagonist of the story is young and barely literate, which allows for a clearer depiction of the beliefs of his comrades in his speech and thoughts. The plot of the story is brief: a White prison guard cruelly murders his own son, a Red soldier who has been taken captive. The younger brother of the murdered son, in turn, kills his father, having tracked him down in city of Maikop. The events are retold from the point of view of the younger brother, who is dictating a letter to his mother with the assistance of Liutov (Babel’s fictional alter ego). “And what did we see in Maikop?” writes the son to his mother, “We
saw that those in the rear have no sympathy for the front, and that there’s
traitors everywhere and tons of Jews, just like under the old regime.”

The passive “dislike” for Jews that Vardin mentioned in his brochure of
August 1920 soon began to take a more active form. As they left the front in
September 1920, Budennyi’s troops (particularly the members of the Sixth
Cavalry division) carried out pogroms that equaled (or, as some have claimed,
even exceeded) those committed by Volunteer forces. The reports of the Rev-
voensovet of the Sixth division described the pogroms in Berezovo and Mly-
nov as “nightmarish.” Attempts on the part of division command to restore
order proved unsuccessful; those arrested for engaging in pogroms were lib-
erated by their comrades on September 24, and the renegade soldiers forced
the Revolutionary tribunal to flee the area. The Sixth Division was not alone
in such actions, a similar pogrom was carried out by members of the Four-
teenth Division in the shtetl of Rogachev.

When Commissar G. G. Shepelev attempted to thwart a pogrom by the
Sixth Division in the shtetl of Polonnoe, he was killed by the troops. The re-
port of the commission in charge of investigating the incidents, led by G. N.
Melnichaskii, related the gruesome series of events:

As the troops moved from the village of Polonnoe toward Novoe
Mesto, whose inhabitants are all Jews, screams could be heard
coming from nearly every house. When Comrade Shepelev entered
one of the dwellings at the request of a woman who had been
victimized, he saw the following horrendous scene: an old man
lying on the floor, an old woman and her son, who had all been
mutilated by blows from a sword, and an injured man lying on a
bed. In the apartment was one Rudykh, a paramedic of the Third
Squadron of the Thirty-third Cavalry Regiment, and a nurse,
Chumakova, who was attached to the same regiment. They were
filling their bags with stolen property. When the Commissar
entered, the Red Army soldier fled the house and attempted to
escape. Despite the command to stop, Rudykh continued to run
and was killed by the commissar.

The commissar arrested the nurse, but she managed to tell the other soldiers
that Shepelev had shot one of their own. According to the investigation, the
soldiers were particularly disturbed by the fact that Shepelev was “defending
Yids.” The mob set up a mock court and tried the commissar, who was first shot in the shoulder, and then killed. The names of the two soldiers who had raised their weapons against their political supervisor were established by the commission:

No one from command undertook any measures to find the shooters and the murderers. As the troops moved on to the village of Liubar, an organized pogrom took place in which nearly 60 Jews were killed. Again, the commanders took no measures to stop the pogroms or to capture those who had participated in it. Just after our arrival to the Sixth Division, then located at the villages of Priluki and Vakhnovka, there were additional pogroms and wineries were looted. In Priluki 21 people were killed, 12 were wounded, and many women and children were raped. According to the locals, women were raped on the streets in plain view, and many of the more attractive girls were taken captive. In Vakhnovka 20 were killed, and 18 homes were destroyed. The number of those wounded and raped is unknown.

During the pogrom in Priluki the entire commission was an eyewitness to the dissolution of the Sixth Division and the complete inaction, if not outright assistance, of the commanding officers. The pogrom was started by billeting officers of the Second Brigade in the presence of a squadron from the Sixth Division headquarters that had been left for security. They protected nothing, but stood aside while individual soldiers participated in the looting. The Commissar of the squadron personally tried to dissuade the crowd, but to no effect. The entire commission rushed to the location of the pogrom and dispersed the bandits, capturing two who were handed over to the squadron Commissar, but they were apparently freed by the soldiers. The main pogroms broke out that evening. When we arrived at division headquarters we were told that the commander in charge would personally see to it that units were sent to stop the pogrom. Although the order to send units was relayed to the commandant, it functioned only on paper, as was established after later questioning. Upon interviewing the commander of the Forty-seventh Division, then occupying Priluki, it became clear that the commander of the Sixth Division had visited him, warning the Forty-
seventh Division not to interfere if the billeting officers were to start acting up, in order to “avoid conflict.”

Fisher characterized the arrival of Budennyi’s troops in horrific tones, “During the fall [of 1920] we experienced the true feeling of terror when Budennyi’s troops arrived. It immediately became known that they were attacking Jews. But one must give them their due: they did not discriminate. They were able to overcome their nationalist prejudices and also did not ignore the Christian population . . . A lot of Jews were killed as well. When they attempted to bury the murdered Jews the next day, Budennyi’s troops attacked the funeral procession, dispersed it and set about killing those in attendance.”

V. M. Primakov, the commander of the Eighth Cavalry Division of the Red Cossacks, made the following report to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on October 2, 1920: “Yesterday and today the Sixth Division of the First Cavalry Army crossed the territory of the division under my command. Along the way, the Sixth Division had been engaged in massive numbers of robberies, murders, and pogroms. More than 30 people were killed in the village of Salnitsa, including the head of the revkom and his family. More than 50 people were murdered in Liubar. Military command and the commissars are taking no action. In the village of Ulanov, a pogrom is currently continuing . . . In light of the fact that command is partaking in the pogrom, the fight against the pogromists is quickly turning into an armed conflict between the Cossacks and Budennyi’s troops. Yesterday I talked with the commander of the Sixth Division (Apanasenko). The Division commander informed me a few days ago that the military commissar (voenkom) and other officers had been killed by the soldiers for having executed some bandits. The soldiers do not listen to their commanders, and, according to the division commander, do not obey him either. The Sixth Division is going into the rear under the slogan ‘beat the Yids, communists, commissars, and save Russia,’ and they speak of Makhno as the leader who has given them this slogan.”

Primakov’s testimony was confirmed by the findings of the Emergency Investigative Commission. According to its findings, the slogans “beat the Yids, commissars and communists,” “We’re going to purge the home front of Yids,” and “We’re going to join up with Makhno” all could be heard among Red Army soldiers.

The Sixth Division carried out a pogrom in the town of Samgorodok that lasted several days. According to witnesses, the perpetrators entered the
village “with cries of ‘attack the Yids, communists, and commissars’ and ‘an-
archy is the mother of order.’ They then dispersed throughout the shtetl and
started to attack the Jewish population. They met no resistance as the civilian
population was powerless to stop them. Meanwhile the local authorities, in-
cluding the regional military commissar and the militia, had left the village
the previous day.” Taking up positions in surrounding villages, Budennyi’s
troops, most of whom were drunk, continued to carry out raids on Samgoro-
dok in groups of 10–15 individuals, “looting, raping women, and setting fi re
to houses.” On the night of October 5, 1920, one group “took four girls to the
nearest outlying village and held them for their own pleasure over the next two
days. Nor did they spare elderly women. According to reliable sources, the
number of those raped exceeded 50. They also killed two women. During
this five-day riot all of the Jewish homes were robbed, and many parents with
small children were forced to hide in the fields and ditches in the cold autumn
night.”

The situation soon became intolerable, and on October 9, 1920 the Rev-
voensovet of the First Cavalry Army issued a command disbanding those
units that had participated in the pogroms and calling for the arrest of “all
murderers, vandals, instigators and those who assisted them,” i.e., the Sixth
Division. Disarming the culprits was no easy task. S. N. Orlovskii, the secre-
tary of the Revvoensovet and right-hand man of Voroshilov, paints the scene
in fairly sentimental tones, claiming that the division obeyed Voroshilov and
Budennyi’s order to disarm after the commanders arrived at their location.
Orlovskii claimed that the “officers and warriors burst into tears as they gave
up their arms and colors.” However, this was not a simple case of soldiers
obeying the indisputable authority of senior officers. At fi rst the division ac-
tually refused to disarm, and it was only on October 11 that the division,
surrounded by artillery, armored trains, and K. Stepnoi-Spizharnyi’s Special
Brigade, agreed to lay down their arms.

It is interesting to note that rumors concerning Budennyi were wide-
spread among the rebels. In one version, Budennyi was preparing to lead his
army in a march on the home front himself. Others claimed that Budennyi
had been arrested by “Jewish commissars.”

The regiments gave up 107 people who had “actively participated in ban-
ditry.” An additional 300 fi ed in order to escape what was coming to them.
Of these 60 were soon captured. The disarmament of the Sixth Division did
not put an end to antisemitic outbursts in the First Cavalry. A mere three
days after the Sixth Division was dissolved, a Party Conference was held during which a number of delegates demanded that the question “Why are there no Jews in the Red Cavalry?” be added to the agenda. Ten delegates were expelled from the conference as a result.\textsuperscript{136}

Meanwhile, pogroms continued. Jews were not the only victims, but they were a “preferred target.” Authorities in the Kiev gubernia sent the following telegram to Kh. G. Rakovskii, Chairman of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom on October 14: “Recently there has been a constant stream of complaints of excesses on the part of First Cavalry Army units passing through the region. In Tarashchansk . . . all civilians, Soviet workers, and even those in Soviet institutions were subjected to robbery. The total number of those killed was 150. On October 10, there was an anti-Jewish pogrom, the commissars were attacked, the prison opened, and four houses were razed. 30 people were killed and four were wounded . . . . In Skvira they report that after the First Cavalry passed through only 5 commissars remained out of 16, with the rest having disappeared. The Khodorkov factory was destroyed and many civilians were killed. Berdichev sent a telegram claiming that units from the First Cavalry are attacking Jews, and that they fear a pogrom will break out. The commissar of the Kiev gubernia reports that members of the First Cavalry shot members of a commission in charge of purchasing horses and seven Red Army soldiers at the railway station at Borodianka.”

Similar reports were coming in from Kremenchug on October 15: “First Cavalry units passing through the Cherkassk uezd are ‘terrorizing authorities’ robbing and shooting civilians and even the families of those serving in the Red Army, and are scattering all of the livestock. With cries of ‘attack the Jews and communists’ they are sweeping through villages and towns. There are casualties and many wounded, including several Soviet workers. The families of Red Army soldiers, Soviet workers, local commissars, risk being completely robbed and beaten half to death. There are also cases of Jewish Soviet workers being killed and executed. Civilians and the authorities are fleeing to the forests and fields in a panic. The results of these attacks are already noticeable: those villages that had supported the Soviets and were largely law-abiding now passionately hate the Red Army and the Soviet authorities.”\textsuperscript{137}

The condition of the First Cavalry Army particularly disturbed Soviet leadership as the army was about to head to the Black Sea to fight against Vrangel’s troops. A surgical solution was agreed upon. On October 18, the Revvoensovet ordered the tribunal in charge of trying the soldiers and officers
of the Sixth Division to not “be led by the formal aspects, but by their revolu-
tionary conscience and the importance of this moment for the First Cav-
alty Army.” “Revolutionary justice” was charged with rejuvenating “all
healthy, conscientious elements” in order to raise the combat readiness of the
army to “its requisite high level.” Of course it was understood that in order
to revitalize the healthy portions of the army, some recent “heroes” would
have to be put to death.

The task facing those in charge of political propaganda in the Red Cav-
alry was doomed to failure. In this case, it had less to do with the capabilities
or qualifications of the political operatives than with the “resistance of the
material.” Twenty percent of the Red Cavalry was illiterate, with a majority
only barely able to read or write. The army was constantly on the move and
was constantly occupied with the daily task of acquiring food, clothing, and
shelter in addition to their military exploits. Those in charge of political pro-
paganda (mostly educated urbanites who were occasionally Jews themselves)
were completely alien to those serving in the rank-and-file. As we have al-
ready seen, the soldiers in the army did not take kindly to outsiders.

The example of the Sixth Division shows that antisemitism was not the
exclusive domain of the Don Cossacks. Half of the division was originally
formed in Stavropol, with the other half coming from the Astrakhan and
Smolensk regions.

In the end, 387 members of the Sixth Division were arrested. Their trials
took place under the jurisdiction of a Special Session of the Tribunal of the
First Cavalry Army, and were conducted publicly October 21–23 in Elizavet-
grad. According to various sources, from 141 to 182 pogromists were found
guilty on the first day of the proceedings. These included 19 commanders. Of
those found guilty, 110 were sentenced to death and quickly executed, while
31 had their sentences commuted to prison terms of varying lengths. In the
second group the following day, 57 people were executed. It would appear
that the tribunal continued to operate until October 30, although most of its
additional work was done away from the public eye. By November, the tribu-
nal had completed its “pedagogical task.” According to some sources, the
number of those executed may have been as high as 400.

A group of commanders was likewise sent before the tribunal. They were
sentenced to be shot “so as to keep order.” In light of the fact that many of
them had joined the Red Army at an early stage, and in keeping with the
three-year anniversary of the October Revolution, the death sentences were
commuted. Instead, the convicts were to be sent to the Southern Front, to serve in cavalry units “at a significantly lower rank.” This decision corresponded with the procedures of the Whites, who also sent convicted pogromists to the front (wherever it happened to be at the time). The division commander, I. R. Apanasenko and brigade commander V. I. Kniga (who were both mentioned in Babel’s *Red Cavalry*) had their death sentences commuted to 15 years forced labor and were stripped of their Orders of the Red Banner. They were commanded to serve in cavalry units not attached to the First Cavalry, though they were allowed to serve as commanders. Apanasenko was limited to commanding a regiment, while Kniga would control no more than a squadron.

However, such unfortunate events did little to harm the career of Apanasenko, who appears in Babel’s work under the pseudonym Pavlichenko. Like many other former commanders of Red Cavalry, he became “untouchable,” and the waves of purges passed him by. Apanasenko would go on to command a number of military units, and was twice more awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In February of 1941 he was elected to the Bolshevik Central Committee and was given the rank of full general. On August 5, 1943, Apanasenko was serving as the deputy for the commander of the Voronezh Front and was mortally wounded. Delirious, he began to have visions of crossing the Styr in Ukraine on August 3, 1920. He began issuing bizarre commands that his accompanying adjutant could make no sense of. According to one account, the final words of the former commander of the Sixth Division were “Sons of the revolution . . .” A fitting end for a Babelesque character.

The harsh punishments carried out by the tribunal somewhat restored the martial discipline of the First Cavalry, but the army was still far from being a regular military formation. While fighting on the Southern Front, members of the First Cavalry found themselves in the famous wildlife preserve Aksania-Nova. Soldiers immediately set about hunting down rare animals. One brave soul even attempted to saddle an ostrich. The ostrich however, was able to take care of itself and dumped its would-be rider. Soldiers would often refuse to admit new commanders, especially if they “looked Jewish,” as was the case in one of the regiments. Timoshenko, who was then commanding the division in question, was powerless to do anything and returned the previous commanding officer to his post.

As S. Brown has aptly noted, one of the paradoxes of the Civil War was that the Soviet government, which sought to create a new communist society,
was forced to rely on the First Cavalry. With its peasant and Cossack uprisings and cruel and severe methods, the First Cavalry was reminiscent of a relic from the Russian Middle Ages rather than a modern war machine.\textsuperscript{148} Antisemitic sentiment in the army proved difficult to stamp out. In December 1920, P. Ia. Vitolin, then working for the Political Inspection of the Southwest Front, reported: “As one of the political operatives in charge put it, the soldiers were ready to fight: beat the Yids and communists and save Russia. And truly, these two elements were intertwined . . . the steady flow of pogroms and violence, and looting had temporarily quieted down. Or, which is more likely, had merged with the military operations and had become unnoticeable.” In April 1921, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Ukraine (G. I. Petrovskii) wrote to Moscow complaining that members of the First Cavalry were attacking requisition brigades (\textit{prodotriad}) in Lubny and Elizavetgrad. He claimed that the soldiers “were not allowing them to requisition bread and took everything for themselves, saying that the Yids and communists should not be fed.” Once more the same popular slogan was heard: “attack the Yids and commissars, save Russia!”\textsuperscript{149}

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During the Civil War, the Red Army participated in its share of pogroms. In contrast to the White command, however, Soviet authorities made real attempts to put an end to pogroms, and never even considered using antisemitism as an ideological rallying cry. After all, they had more than enough slogans to attract the masses. Showing no mercy to the pogromists turned out to be an effective tool; the Bolsheviks proved they would not refrain from mass executions should the situation demand it. As other historians have noted, Lenin once decided to file a report on the Zhitomir pogroms carried out by the First Cavalry “in the archives.” His reasons for doing so, however, are not indicative of indifference toward the events. The report, dated October 1, 1920, was only forwarded to Lenin by the Evsektsiia some two and a half weeks later. At this point the needed—and cruelly severe—reprisals had already been carried out. The disobedient units were disbanded, and those found guilty were condemned to a quick death.\textsuperscript{150}

By declaring trade and entrepreneurship to be criminal activities, the Bolsheviks destroyed the very foundations of Jews’ economic survival. They also attempted to destroy Jewish religious culture and practices, which they
considered to be “religious prejudices.” It is hardly surprising that the major-
ity of Jews found no reason to support the Bolshevik regime at the outset of
the Civil War. However, for Jews the choice between the Reds and the
Whites gradually evolved into a choice between life and death. It is hardly
surprising they chose the former.
Conclusion

The Russian Civil War of 1917–20 irrevocably affected the lives of Jews in the former Russian Empire. What had recently been the largest Jewish community in the world now found itself split among the several states that emerged after the conclusion of the First World War. The largest number of Jews now resided in Poland, which had annexed parts of Ukraine and Belorussia in accordance with the Peace of Riga. Large numbers of Jews lived in the newly independent Baltic states, while the Jews of Bessarabia were now Romanian citizens.

According to various sources, anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000 Jews were killed over the four-year period from 1918 to 1921. The slaughter of Jews during the Civil War was unprecedented in scale and scope; even if one were to take the most conservative estimate, the number of victims exceeded the number killed during the Khmelnitskii Uprising. Taking into account the countless additional cases of severe physical and psychological trauma (including the tens of thousands of widows and hundreds of thousands of orphans left in the wake of the destruction), it can reasonably be claimed that the pogroms of the Civil War directly affected nearly a million Jews.

The pogroms also led to the economic ruin of hundreds of thousands of people. Homes, stores, and workshops were destroyed, and goods and means of production were confiscated or “requisitioned.” This destruction of the economic foundations of survival was carried out not only by pogromists of various camps, but by Soviet authorities as well. Soviet power also outlawed free trade, the main occupation of hundreds of thousands of Jews, and fixed prices at a level that could not possibly cover the costs of production. The result was additional economic devastation.

Soviet power, first and foremost in the form of Jewish communists, led an assault on secular and religious Jewish institutions, as well as Jewish political parties. Property was confiscated, synagogues and houses of prayer were closed, and the teaching of Hebrew was outlawed. Though not formally prohibited, Zionist organizations were persecuted. After Jewish socialist par-
ties joined the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1919, most of the independent press was eliminated as well.

Ironically, Jewish institutions faced much less persecution in territories under the control of White forces. In fact, many Jewish community organizations came into existence at this time. At the same time, however, the lives and property of Jews living under White control were at greater risk than at any other time in Russian history.

Tens of thousands of Jews attempted to flee the pogroms, the Reds, the Whites and others by escaping abroad. The majority of these were refugees from territories within the former Pale of Settlement. Such a mass emigration was hardly new for Russia’s Jews. What made this particular wave of emigration different from its predecessors, however, was the fact that nearly the entire Jewish political, intellectual, and business elite decided to leave the country. Of the 253,069 former subjects of the Russian Empire living in Germany in 1925, 63,500 were Jews. The Russian Lawyers Union, formed in Germany in 1920 under the leadership of B. L. Gershun, I. V. Gessen, and I. M. Rabinovich, was almost entirely Jewish. In Paris, 20 percent of the membership of the Russian Trade and Finance Union came from Jewish origins. Both the Gintsburg and Brodskii families found themselves abroad, as did several famous lawyers (M. M Vinaver, Ia. L. Teitel, O. O. Gruzenberg, and G. B. Sloizberg), the historian S. M. Dubnov, right-wing Bundists, SRs, Zionists, Mensheviks, and numerous poets and publicists. A number of these would play leading roles in the culture of the Russian émigré community, while others would manage to make their way to Palestine, partaking in the “Third Aliya,” which took place from 1919 to 1923.

Nearly ten years after the revolution, V. G. Tan wrote that “Despite common opinion, the Jews paid a higher price for the revolution than anyone else, and received less for it. It is not so much that they created the revolution; rather they are enduring it.” Dr. Joseph Rosen, representative of the Joint in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, was of a similar opinion: “The Bolshevik revolution was neither made by the Jews, for the Jews, nor against the Jews. Our people in Russia were simply caught between the millstones of history and were confronted with a dilemma—either to be crushed and turned into historical dust, or to extricate themselves by a determined effort of readjustment . . . to the changed conditions, no matter how painful and tortuous this process should prove to be.”

With regard to the majority of the Jewish population of Russia, both of these opinions are correct. Like the vast majority of non-Jews, Russia’s Jewish
population “endured” the revolution which was soon to turn into the Civil War. However, there is another viewpoint to be considered as well. For many Jews, the revolution provided hitherto unimagined possibilities, including the chance to serve in positions of power. In other words, some Jews were presented with the opportunity to help create the revolution as well. Thousands of “young men from Kasrilevka” did not let this opportunity slip by. The “leather jackets” of the Cheka proved to be a perfect fit for them, and they became the most loyal soldiers of the revolution. After all, for them there was no turning back.

The “Jewish question” was a central one of the Russian Civil War. As a result of numerous historical and religious stereotypes and erroneous beliefs held by a majority of the population, in the social consciousness Jews were destined to become the embodiment of absolute evil, bent on the destruction of Russia. Such xenophobia, which was more in keeping with the late nineteenth century, found new strength as numerous politicians of Jewish origin took an active part in the events of the revolution. Prejudice was not limited to the unwashed masses. Even the Russian intelligentsia, including those who had earlier defended the Jews from persecution, was susceptible to antisemitic ideology during a time when their normal world had collapsed and when the concepts of good and evil had been washed away. The Kadet resolution adopted in Kharkov in 1919, which essentially placed the blame for the horrific events in Russia on Jews as a whole, represented the low point of the “most European” party of Russia, which had thrown in its lot with the White movement.

Meanwhile, Russian Jewry, much like the rest of the country, found itself shattered into pieces. At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 a number of Jewish politicians supported the Volunteer Army. The liberal slogans proclaimed by the Whites at the beginning of the conflict, and the fact that there was an entire group of liberal-democratic politicians among its supporters, made the Whites an attractive option for many Jews. In contrast, the Bolshevik program aimed to destroy the foundations of Jewish spiritual and economic survival.

A small but significant number of Jewish youths, including some of the first Jewish officers commissioned after the February revolution, took up arms in support of a new Russia, one that promised equal rights and a path towards freedom, democracy, and prosperity that was in danger of being usurped by the Bolsheviks.

However, as the White movement continued to grow in strength, it soon found less need to rely on Jewish politicians and activists. This change was
motivated largely by the antisemitism present both in the ranks of the military and among the civilian population at large. Unable to come up with slogans of their own capable of winning over the hearts of the population, the White leadership turned a blind eye to antisemitic propaganda, employing it, consciously or unconsciously, as a means to mobilize the masses. Still, whatever their own opinion of Jews might have been, the high command of the White forces did not organize pogroms, nor did it encourage their spread. Admittedly, their position was due largely to political concerns (including foreign public opinion) and the need to maintain army discipline.

However, when pogroms began to occur regularly as the White forces entered Ukraine, White commanders found themselves incapable of stopping them, lacking both reliable troops and sufficient decisiveness to do so. Anti-Jewish pogroms led to the moral dissolution and the destruction of discipline among the troops and became one of the important factors leading to the defeat of the White movement.

The Vrangel period of the White movement demonstrated that, given sufficient political will and desire, pogroms and antisemitic propaganda could in fact be thwarted, despite the prejudices of the rank-and-file and the officer corps, even in the conditions of the Civil War. Still, it should be kept in mind that the Vrangel “experiment” existed in a particular place and time; it lasted little more than six months and was limited to only one of the gubernias of the former Russian Empire.

Russian responses to the “Jewish question” clearly demonstrate a mythologically inclined mode of thought, one that was characteristic not only of the semi-educated (or completely uneducated) lower classes. Many Russian intellectuals were entirely incapable of explaining the destruction of the country and the bestial transformation of the people (narod), whose common sense and kindness they had once believed in. Faced with this monstrosity, many Russian intellectuals preferred to place the blame on foreigners and non-Russians (inorodtsy).

The ranks of the Red Army were infected by antisemitism no less than those of their opponents. The First Cavalry of the Red Army, which was later canonized during the Stalinist period and whose actions were captured in the prose of Isaak Babel, could claim several pogroms and hundreds of ruined lives to its credit. However, the Bolshevik leadership did demonstrate sufficient political will to stop the pogroms, and did not refrain from disbanding those units that participated in pogroms and executing the perpetrators en masse. The White leadership often announced such punishments, but never
carried them out. The Reds carried them out, but never announced them. As a result of this and other factors, the choice between the Reds and the Whites gradually became a choice between life and death for Russia’s Jews.

Studies on the Russian Civil War have often promoted the notion that the pogroms of this period can be viewed as a kind of harbinger and prologue to the Holocaust. In my opinion, such similarities can be found in the methods and psychology of the Whites and various other anti-Bolshevik factions: the indiscriminate slaughter of Jews, singling out Jewish POWs for execution, widespread antisemitic propaganda, and (perhaps most importantly) the belief that attacking Jews was a central goal of the war, a belief that sprang from the notion that Bolshevism was a Jewish invention. The massive scale of anti-Jewish violence and the participation of numerous military units in the widespread murder and pillaging leads one to the conclusion that even the term “pogrom” (a local, isolated occurrence of violence), is hardly sufficient in understanding this historical phenomenon. The violence perpetrated against the Jewish population during the Civil War was of an entirely different magnitude.

Though it may have been the “soul” of the Volunteer Army, antisemitism never became an official doctrine of the White movement, and never became the policy of the White leadership. As Denikin once wrote, “if, in the current climate, we had given ‘official’ status to the attacks on the Jewry, or if we had given the troops even the slightest indication that the high command condoned pogroms, then the fate of the Jews of the South of Russia would have been incomparably more tragic.” Of course the fact that the pogroms did not receive “official” approval provided little solace to those families who had lost loved ones and had their lives destroyed. However, there is a grain of truth to Denikin’s claim. Certain portions of the clergy and the intelligentsia did try to create official justifications for antisemitism. However, only a few of them were willing to go so far as to call for the “crushing of Jewish skulls.”

Walter Laqueur and Richard Pipes see a direct connection between the Russians on the Right who espoused antisemitism in its bloodier, pogromistic form and their European counterparts, the Nazis. According to Laqueur, the Black Hundreds were “Hitler’s mentors” and assisted in the formation of the idea that Bolshevism was a Jewish creation that endangered the world. Pipes claims that this is the origin of the belief that communism is somehow inherently connected with Jewishness. Without denying the degree of influence of certain Russian anti-Semites on the Nazi movement (for example, F. B. Vinberg and other Russian conservatives who emigrated to Germany and distrib-
uted a German-language version of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, as well as the Baltic German Alfred Rosenberg, who had a noticeable influence on the formation of Nazi ideology). I do not believe that such influences played a decisive role. Pipes’s claims that “the rationale for the Nazi extermination of the Jews came from Russian right-wing circles” and “[the Jewish Holocaust thus turned out to be one of the many unanticipated and unintended consequences of the Russian Revolution”⁹ would seem to be greatly exaggerated. This is nothing more than another iteration of the claim that Nazism was a “response” to Bolshevism, i.e., the belief that the Jews’ participation in Bolshevism led to the destruction of European Jewry during the Second World War. This claim, whose most succinct formulation can be found in the works of Ernst Nolte,¹⁰ has been criticized in Richard Evans’s study, In Hitler’s Shadow.

In discussing the origins of Nazi antisemitism, Evans quite correctly points out that “Nazi anti-Semitism was gratuitous: it was not provoked by anything, it was not a response to anything. It was born out of a political fantasy, in which the Jews, without a shred of justification, were held responsible for all that the Nazis believed was wrong in the modern world.”¹¹ Everything else was little more than “window-dressing” in the Nazis’ attempts to rationalize the irrational.

For the majority of Russia’s Jews, the Civil War was a clear indication that they would be safe only under the Soviet regime. Moreover, the Soviet regime presented a number of new opportunities and possibilities for Jews, in education, politics, and various professions. The price of such opportunities, however, was the loss of their religion, language, and culture, i.e., the loss of the essential national identity that the Jewish people had preserved over millennia, including their 150-year stay in the Russian Empire.

In the 1920s the Jewish population in the Pale territories was undergoing a generational change, which was captured by a number of ethnographic expeditions. In Rogachev, “the grandfathers study the Talmud, their sons are communists, and the grandchildren . . . are not circumcised,” while in Gomel a group of children sang the following song in Yiddish and Russian: “Down, down with the monks, rabbis, and priests!” In another reported episode, a Jewish grandfather took his uncircumcised grandchild to a synagogue, sat him down near the Torah, and asked him, “Berka, what are you going to be when you grow up?” The grandfather received the following response: “First of all, my name’s not Berka, it’s Lentrozin [an acronym from Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev]. And I’m gonna be a Chekist when I grow up.”¹²
The village boys moved to the cities in order to become Chekists, engineers, poets, chess players, and musicians. They considered their provincial home, with its religious beliefs and bizarre customs, alien and uninteresting. The Russian revolution became a revolution on the Jewish “street” as well. And it came not only from without, but from within. As John Klier once wisely noted, the “Great October Revolution” was good for the Jew, but bad for the Jews. The Jews finally achieved equality... having ceased to be Jews themselves.

Those Jews who continued to support the White movement and refused to abandon it, claiming that the pogroms were isolated instances of excess, or part of a general pogrom in Russia, were to experience a particularly ironic fate. Refusing to believe in the specifically anti-Jewish character of the pogroms, they soon found themselves in emigration along with hundreds of thousands of other Russian citizens. Even there, many Russians refused to accept them as their own. The famous philosopher I. A. Ilin, who, according to a contemporary, “spent the whole of the White movement in Moscow reading lectures at a Red university,” was exiled abroad in 1922. He engaged in a regular correspondence with Vrangel, to whom he was totally and completely devoted, even going so far as to sign his letters “White.” In October 1923, Ilin sent Vrangel a report on the state of political affairs in the émigré community. Criticizing the opinions of P. N. Miliukov, Ilin was forced to admit that Miliukov “did not hate Russia,” although “behind him there is another clever person who deeply hates Russia—M. M. Vinaver.”

Ilin believed that Jews would only be useful for a potential anti-Bolshevik coup if they could “secure for themselves a guarantee against future reprisals.” “In an attempt to test the ground for this, they have brought forth... a group of penitent patriots” (Pasmanik, Bikerman, Landau, and Mandel) that has cleverly provoked conservatives into public demonstrations. This group, which “defends” the White Army, is known to enjoy the—completely unjustified—trust of certain respected social figures (P. B. Struve), and in the person of Bikerman has even carried out negotiations with the High Monarchist Council (for counterintelligence). Vrangel deemed Ilin’s analysis to be both “deep and brilliant.”

Such was the gratitude afforded to those like Vinaver, who stood up for a United Russia and called on the leaders of American, British, and French Jewry to support Kolchak and Denikin; Pasmanik, who tirelessly defended the policies of anti-Bolshevik military leaders on the pages of Common Cause; and Bikerman, who once wrote that Jews should not focus on their own fate...
while all of Russia was undergoing a pogrom. As history demonstrated, such individuals truly were “tending others’ vineyards.”

Perhaps the most ironic fate was reserved for Abram Alperin, one of the first “sponsors” of the anti-Bolshevik movement, who emigrated to France after the revolution. Having survived the Compiègne internment camp during World War II, in 1945 Alperin headed an organization called the Society for Rapprochement with Soviet Russia! In a year’s time, the Society ceased to exist; despite the hopes of many immigrants, the Soviet leadership had decided not to liberalize the Soviet regime.¹⁹

Soon afterward the Soviet campaign against the “cosmopolitans” was launched, clearly demonstrating the empty character of the “proletarian internationalism” of the ruling party.²⁰ And the Jews, the most loyal Soviet citizens of the 1920s and 1930s, soon found themselves in a familiar position—that of an undesired and disliked minority. But that is another story.
INTRODUCTION

1. The term *Russian Jewry* is used here to mean the Jewish population of the former Russian Empire, including Ukraine, Belorussia, etc.

2. S. Baron has claimed that the number of victims could easily be more than 50,000 (S. Baron, *The Russian Jews Under Tsars and Soviets*, 2nd ed. [New York, 1976], 184). N. Gergel likewise claimed that even according to the most conservative figures, the number of people killed could be placed between 50,000 and 60,000 (N. Gergel, “The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1918–21,” *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* 6 [1951]: 249). Nora Levin also uses the 50,000–60,000 figure (N. Levin, *The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917* [New York, 1988], 149). Sh. Ettinger places the number of victims at 75,000. (Sh. Ettinger in *A History of the Jewish People*, ed. H. H. Ben-Sasson [Cambridge, Mass., 1976], 954). S. Gusev-Orenburgskii in his *Kniga o evreiskikh pogromakh na Ukraina 1919* (Petrograd, no date), 14, uses 100,000, while Iu. Larin’s *Everei i antisemitizm v SSSR* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1929), 55, places the number at 200,000. Zvi Gitelman holds that 30,000 Jews were killed, while the inclusion of those who died as a result of injury or disease connected with the pogroms would put the number at 150,000 (Z. Gitelman, *A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present*, 2nd ed. [Bloomington, Ind., 2001], 70). O. Figes prefers the figure calculated by Soviet Jewish organizations, which amounts to approximately 150,000. See O. Figes, *A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924* (New York, 1998), 855 and GARF (Gosudarstvennii Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii), f. 6764, op. 1, d. 775, l. 3–4.


3. In addition to the Jewish population living in Polish territories, the Russian Empire also acquired Jewish populations in Crimea (3,000), Georgia (around 6,000), Dagestan and Northern Azerbaijan (15,000), and Bessarabia (20,000). As a result of Russian military conquests in Central Asia, an additional 2,000 Bukharian Jews became subjects of the Russian Empire. “Rossiia,” 383–85. For more on Jewish marital practices in the Russian Empire see C. Freeze, *Jewish Marriage and Divorce in Imperial Russia* (Hanover, N.H., 2002).

4. This number included three Jewish merchants who registered with the First Merchants’ Guild of Moscow.

5. The administrative terms *gubernia* and *oblast* are roughly equivalent to a province, *namestnichestvo* was temporarily used from 1775 to 1796.
7. In 1888, the Rostov *uezd* (district) and the city of Taganrog were removed from the Ekaterinoslav *gubernia* and added to the Don *oblast*, which meant that those territories were now located outside of the Pale. As such, Jews were forbidden from living in them, although Jews who had been living there since before May 19, 1887, were allowed to remain.
8. In 1893, Jews were forbidden from living in Yalta.
10. The first use of the term *Russian Jews* occurred in a report of the Interior Ministry in the year 1836. (See B. Natans, “Za chertoi: Evrei, russkie, i ‘evreiskii vopros’ v Peterburge (1855–1880),” *Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta v Moske*, no. 2 [6] [1994]: 28, n. 1.) According to N. V. Iukhneva, the term was used to imply all of the Russian Empire’s Jewish subjects. In the sense of “Jews who have become (partially or wholly) Russian” it was first used by I. G. Orshanskii in the book *Evrei i Rossii: Ocherki ekonomicheskogo i obshchestvennoy byta russkikh evreev* (St. Petersburg, 1877), 183. (See N. V. Iukhneva, “Russkie evrei kak novyi subetnos” in *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 [2003]: 481–82.) In using terms such as *Russian Jewry*, I am fully aware of their contingent nature. As M. Mints once noted, “Russian Jewry existed as a united whole only in the fantasies of Jewish activsts in Petersburg and Odessa . . . Of course in reality, Russian Jewry was not a united whole. The Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, Polish, and Bessarabian Jewish populations formed separate, discrete communities” (see M. Mints, “Natsional’nye dvizhenia evreev i drugikh men’shinstv v natsional’nykh gosudarstvakh” in *Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta*, no. 5 [23] [2001]: 202).
14. For a more detailed study see Iu. Gessen, *Istoria evreiskogo naroda v Rossii*.
17. *Evreiskaiia Entsiklopedia* (St. Petersburg, 1913), 9:804. Although most scholars are of the opposite view, Klier maintains that the Russian government did not attempt to force the Jews to convert to Orthodoxy in any sustained or purposeful manner (with the exception of the years 1843–1859). Moreover, he claims that the State’s “enthusiasm” for such converts has been highly exaggerated by historians. See J. D. Klier, “State Policies and the Conversion of Jews in Imperial Russia” in *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, ed. R. Geracy and M. Khodarkovsky (Ithaca, N.Y. and London, 2001), 92–112.
19. Jewish dietary laws place restrictions on what foods may be eaten and how those foods must be prepared.
20. Hasidim are followers of a branch of Judaism that emphasizes mysticism and personal religious experience.


22. *Maskilim* were supporters of the Haskalah.


26. One pood is equivalent to 16.38 kilograms.


32. However, even in cities with a majority Jewish population, Jews were not allowed to have more than a third of the votes in the city Dumas, and could not be elected to the head of city governments.


34. For more on the Gintsburgs and Poliakovs, see B. V. Ananich, *Bankirske doma v Rossii: Ocherki istorii chastnogo predprinimatelt’stva* (Leningrad, 1991).


39. Rieber, Merchants and Entrepreneurs, 84.
40. One desiatin equals 2.6 acres or 1.09 hectares.
42. Rieber, Merchants and Entrepreneurs, 106–7.
43. Rieber, Merchants and Entrepreneurs, 267; A. N. Bokhanov, Delovaia elita Rossii. 1914 g. (Moscow, 1994), 21.
44. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviia na rubezhe 1870–1880 godov (Moscow, 1964), 22.
47. The Minister of the Interior, Ignatiev, indicated that one of the first tasks facing the government was the “eradication of rebellion” through the collective efforts of the “social forces” of the country. These included the anti-Jewish riots that were attributed to the revolutionaries. “The movement against the Jews,” he wrote, “that has recently appeared in the south is a lamentable example of what happens when people loyal to the throne and the fatherland . . . of their own initiative participate in vigilantism, thereby unconsciously acting according to the designs of the rebels. Such civil disturbances should be strictly dealt with and carefully warned against.” Later Ignatiev became convinced that the revolutionaries had nothing to do with it, and reported to the Emperor the following: “Detailed investigations of the punishments carried out by the people on the spot clearly prove that these riots had nothing to do with the socialist movement.” (See Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviia, 385.)
48. Ignatiev had at first proposed much harsher measures, but ran into resistance from nearly all the other Ministers, in particular the Minister of Finance, N. Kh. Bunge (see Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviia, 413–19).


51. Although emigration reached its peak in 1881, it had begun as early as the 1870s. According to Ia. Leshchinskii, 50 thousand Jews emigrated during this period (see Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, 50). In 1917, there were nine cities with a Jewish population of more than 100,000. Three American cities (New York, 1.35 million; Chicago, 250,000; Philadelphia, 175,000) made the list, with arrivals from the Russian Empire playing a major role. Other cities included Warsaw (308,488 in 1910), Budapest (203,687 in 1910), Vienna (175,318 in 1910), London (181,300 in 1915), Berlin (143,975 in 1910), and Odessa (52,364 in 1904). (See the Jewish annual Kadima na 1918–1919, ed. B. A. Gol’dberg [Petrograd, 1918], 8.)

52. Klier believes that Pobedonostsev’s statement was apocryphal (see Klier, State Policies and the Conversion of Jews in Imperial Russia, 106–7).


54. V. M. Kabuzan, Emigratsiia i reemigratsiia v Rossii v XVIII-nachale XX veka (Moscow, 1998), 176.

55. “Rossiia,” 384; Kabuzan, Emigratsiia i reemigratsiia, 176.

56. For an English translation, see L. Pinsker, Road to Freedom: Writings and Addresses (Westport, Conn., 1975).

57. See I. Maor, Sionistskoe dvizhenie v Rossii (Jerusalem, 1977).


64. Leshchinskii, “Èvreiskoe naselenie Rossii i èvreiskii trud,” 209.


70. The article was presented in the form of an anonymous letter, although the title was Suvorin’s own editorial addition. The article expressed concern regarding the number of Jews currently enrolled in *gimnaziums* and other educational institutions (see *Novoe Vremia*, March 23, 1880). For more on the historical context and reception of the article, see Klier, *Imperial Russia’s Jewish Question*, 403–7; Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 258–59. The Russian word *zhid* is difficult to render in English, as its meaning is largely historically contingent (for a brief history of the term, see J. D. Klier, “‘Zhid’: Biography of a Russian Epithet,” *Slavonic and Eastern European Review* 60, no. 1 (January 1982): 1–15. By the late nineteenth century, the term had become a pejorative often employed by non-Jews in antisemitic publications.


78. A. S. Tumanova, *Samoderzhavie i obshchestvennye organizatsii v Rossi*. 1905–1917 *gody* (Tambov, 2002), 303–5. The governor was unsuccessful in his quest. Starikov’s patrons at court, as well as the leading figures of the local nobility, were of a rather different opinion regarding his musical talents.


80. H. Rogger, “The Jewish Policy of Late Tsarism: A Reappraisal” in *Jewish Policies*, 35–37. The Russian title of Suvorin’s publication seems to indicate that he published excerpts from Chamberlain’s *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*.


82. I. V. Gerasimov, “Pis’ma odesskikh vymogatelei i problema evreiskoi prestupnosti v Odessе nachala XX veka” in *Istoriiа i kul’tura rossiiskogo i vestochnevropeiskogo evreistva*, 150–51, 169.

83. Ibid., 149–50, 166 n. 22.
84. Lev Trotsky was among the 3 percent who did not claim Yiddish as a native tongue. He spoke a mix of Russian and Ukrainian from childhood. The young Trotsky was taught to speak Russian without a Ukrainian accent by his cousin (see I. Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921* [New York, 1965], 1:11–12).


86. B. D. Brutskus, *Statistika evreiskogo naselenia: Raspredelenie po territorii, demograficheskie i kul'turnye priznaki evreiskogo naselenia po dannym perepisi 1897 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1909), 41, 61.


88. S. E. Trubetskoii, *Mishnevshch* (Moscow, 1991), 50–54. Curiously, only Trubetskoii and Goldenveizer were to come out against socialism.


94. An *okrug* is roughly equivalent to a district, and was an administrative subdivision of a gubernia or oblast.


97. See Chapter 2 of this study.

98. Of course, political engagement is in and of itself a form of integration.


Recalling his student days at the Odessa Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences in 1920, the historian S. Ia. Borovoi recounts how a large number of the enrolled students came from backgrounds that previously would have prevented them from gaining a higher education. “They were mostly Jews from ‘old’ Odessa . . . who had not had the opportunity to study either due to financial reasons or because of quotas . . . now, though some of them weren’t that young . . . they were able to realize their dreams.” (See S. Borovoi, *Vospominaniiia* [Moscow, Jerusalem, 1993], 91–92.)


See Engel’, *Evreiskii vopros* v russko-amerikanskikh otnosheniakh.


V. S. Diakin, “National’nyi vopros vo vnutrennei politike tsarizma (nachalo XX v.),” *Voprosy istorii*, no. 11–12 (1996): 48. It should be noted that the Emperor temporarily relaxed these prohibitions on July 16, 1914, in the face of numerous protests from Russian industrialists.

E. Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire*, 59. In 1911, right-wing circles raised a scandal over the number of Jews and Poles working in high-level positions for the southwestern railroad. F. F. Trepov, the Governor General of the area, demanded an explanation from the head of the railroad, an engineer by the name of Nemeshaev. Nemeshaev responded that Poles and Jews comprised 6 percent and 0.14 percent of railroad employees, respectively. He assured Trepov that he would use all the means at his disposal to free the railroad from “the foreign element.” (V. Khiterer, ed., *Dokumenty, cbrannye Evreiskoi istoriko-arkheograficheskoi komissiei Vseukrainskoi Akademii nauk* [Kiev, Jerusalem, 1999], 160–61).

As counted by the author according to the data presented in A. N. Bokhanov, *Delovaia elita Rossii* (1914), 68–265. The author of this directory included businessmen who held at least two positions in the management of joint stock companies. Although somewhat arbitrary, I do believe such a definition to be representative. The individuals listed could be found in the management of two-thirds of corporations active in Russia. There were 2303 such corporations in Russia as of July 1, 1914. Jews played a major role in a number of sectors. They controlled approximately a third of all sugar factories in the Ukraine, which accounted for 52 percent of all lump sugar production in the country. (See Kahan, *Notes on Jewish Entrepreneurship*, 91.)


2. Ilovaiskii was hardly the only one to hold such opinions. The Minister of Internal Affairs, N. P. Ignat’ev, claimed in August of 1881 that the most fertile “ground for a secret nihilist organization” could be found in the Polish and Jewish populations. (See P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviia na ruhezhe 1870–1880-kh godov [Moscow: MGU, 1964], 380.)


11. Also called the October Manifesto, it was issued on October 17 (30), 1905.


14. Gosudarstvennii Arhiv Rostovskoi oblasti (Rostov Oblast State Archive [GARO]), f. 829, op. 1, d. 1157, l. 16.


16. The Don Committee of the RSDRP released the following proclamation after the pogrom took place: “Proclaim with the workers: Death to Tsarism, the perpetrator of Jewish massacres in Kishinev, Gomel, Zhitomir, etc., death to the Tsarism that in the form of its police agents and spies has once more incited the poor against the Jewish population . . . down with the government of provocateurs!” (See GARO, f. 829, op. 1, d. 1250, l. 55.) The Social Democrats stubbornly placed all of the responsibility for the pogrom on the government, ignoring the fact that some of those very same workers (who they claimed to represent) took part in the pogrom.


20. Wynn, Workers, Strikes and Pogroms, 219–26; Friedgut, Iuzovka and Revolution, 153. A significant portion of the workers were hostile to the intelligentsia in other areas of the country as well. See H. Reichman, Railwaysmen and Revolution: Russia, 1905 (Berkeley, Calif., 1987), 230–31; L. Engelstein, Moscow, 1905: Working-Class Organization and Political Conflict (Stanford, Calif., 1982), 161.


24. Ibid., 177.

25. Ibid., 128–29. The literary scholar Il’ia Gruzdev once told Roman Gul’ about Blok’s diaries, which he had prepared for publication in the 1920s. “We can’t publish them in their entirety, we simply can’t. You couldn’t even imagine the repugnant antisemitism [in them],” (See R. Gul’, La unes Rossiiu, vol. 1 [New York, 1981], 278.) Some of the more Judeophobic portions of Blok’s diaries can be found in S. Nebol’sin, “Iskazhennyi i zapreshchennyi Aleksandr Blok,” Nash sovremennik, no. 8 (1991): 181–83.

26. P. N. Miliukov accurately called this attitude “aesthetic nationalism.” Their polemic took place in 1909. Miliukov claimed that if Struve and his supporters were ever to meet the consequences of their words in reality, they would “learn to weigh their words more carefully and realize their social significance.” Ensuing events were to exceed Miliukov’s worst fears. (See A. Ia. Avrekh, Stolypin i Tret’ia Duma [Moscow, 1968], 40.)

27. As quoted in Avrekh, Stolypin i Tret’ia Duma, 41. Rech’ was the main Kadet publication. The “radicals” Tyrkova mentions were her fellow Kadet party members mentioned above.

28. Programmy politicheskikh partii Rossii. Konets XIX–XX v. (Moscow, 1993), 326–27. Similar declarations were to be found among smaller parties, including the Party of Democratic Reform and the Party of Peaceful Renewal (Partia Mirovogo Obnovlenia) (ibid., 351, 359). At their Second Party Congress in May of 1907, the conservative liberal party Union of October 17, taking into account the antisemitic attitudes of many of its members, limited themselves to a resolution that called for a “gradual” solution of the “Jewish question,” and thus did not include a similar declaration (ibid., 341).


31. S. M. Dubnov, Kniga zhizni (St. Petersburg, 1998), 383. M. L. Goldshtein made similar comments before the Council of the Republic not long before the Bolshevik coup. Talking about the Bolsheviks, he claimed, “I was forced to deny my Jewishness three times. I had to reject my nationality, I had to reject my religion, and I had to reject my own name” (see S. Pozner, “Evreiskii vopros v Sovete Respubliki” Evreiskaia nedelia, no. 42 [October 22, 1917], 5).

32. N. A. Berdiaev, Smyl istorii (Moscow, 1990), 68–83. Berdiaev wrote, “Karl Marx was a typical Jew, and in this late historical period attempted to solve the age-old Biblical problem: gaining one’s daily bread by the sweat of one’s brow. The same Jewish demand of earthly bliss can be seen in Marx’s socialism, but in a new form and in a completely new historical context. Marx’s teaching openly breaks with the religious traditions of Judaism and goes against any sense of the sacred. The messianic idea, which had been widespread among the Jewish people as the chosen people of God, is carried over by Marx to class, to the proletariat. And just as Israel was the chosen people, the new Israel is the working class, which is now the chosen people of God, a people called to liberate and save the world” (N. A. Berdiaev, Smyl istorii, 70). Similar ideas can be found in the thought of Georgii Fedotov: “This acute sense of justice, raised by the Bible and centuries of oppression, is where contemporary socialism overlaps with the ancient prophets, creating the leaders of the proletariat, the high priests of the social revolution, and the agents of the International.” Fedotov later ironically remarks, “The Jewish revolutionary intelligentsia is uprooting the very capitalism that the Jewish bourgeoisie had felt so at home in.” (G. P. Fedotov, “Novoe na staruiu temu (K sovremennoi postanovke evreiskogo voprosa),” Taina Israilia [St. Petersburg, 1993], 452.)

33. Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, 140

34. M. P. Batorgin, Pered sudom tsarskogo samoderzhaviia (Moscow, 1964). Brailovskii was sentenced to death, although the sentence was commuted to fifteen years’ labor. He eventually fled Siberia and emigrated to the United States.

35. L. Trotskii, Moia zhizni: Opyt avtobiografii (Moscow, 1990), 2:63.


41. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova i P. A. Stolypina,” Krasni arkhiv, vol. 5 (1924); 105; V. N. Kokotsov, Iz moego proshlago: Vospominania 1903–1919 gg.: V 2 kn., kn. 1 (Moscow,
1992), 206–8. For more on Stolypin’s attempt to repeal restrictions on Jews, see Ubiisto Stolypina: Svidetel’stva i dokumenty (Riga, 1990), 54–65.


43. Ustrialov’s “Patriotica” was originally published in the collection Smena Vekh (1921). Here it is cited according to V poiskakh puti: Russkaia intelligentsia i sud’by Rossii (Moscow, 1992), 253–54. Nearly analogous thoughts were expressed at a later date by Daniil Pasmanik: “Jewish revolutionaries were not relying upon Jewish national strength, but were merely the representatives and interpreters of a Russia force . . . they were the peddlers and stewards of the revolution, not its masters.” (See D. S. Pasmanik, Russkaia revoliutsia i evreistvo (Bol’shevizm i iudaizm) [Paris, 1923], 150.)

44. Dubnov, Kniga zhizni, 379.


47. Dubnov, Kniga zhizni, 379.

48. Ibid.


51. Beizer, Evrei Leningrada, 185. “Netsakh Israel” is from the Hebrew for the “Eternity of Israel,” one of the names of God.

52. S. Agurskii, Evreiskii rabochii v kommunisticheskom dvizhenii (1917–1921) (Minsk, 1926), 19; Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, 92–93.


54. Ibid., 74.


58. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, 78–79.

59. Beizer, Evrei Leningrada, 40

60. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, 80–81.

63. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, 81–82.
64. My calculations are based on information from Politicheskie deiateli Rossii. 1917: Biograficheski slovar’ (Moscow, 1993). It should be kept in mind however that due to the historical circumstances of the period, political figures from Kadets and further left tended to predominate. For more see O. V. Budnitskii, “V chuzhom piru pokhmel’e: Evrei i russkaia revoliutsiia” in Evreii i russkaia revoliutsiia: Materialy i issledovaniia, ed. O. V. Budnitskii (Moscow, Jerusalem, 1999), 3–21.
65. Stepun, Byshee i nesbyvesheesia, 2:53.
66. S. Borovoi, Vospominaniiia (Moscow, Jerusalem, 1993), 64, 80–82.
68. Ibid., 10.
70. Priazovskii krai, no. 158 (July 2, 1917).
71. Priazovskii krai, no. 154 (June 27, 1917).
72. Priazovskii krai, no. 160 (July 5, 1917).
77. “Evreiskii Miting,” Evreiskaia nedelia, no. 24 (June 18, 1917), 15–19; Dubnov, Kniga zhizni, 383.
79. Stepun, Byshee i nesbyvesheesia, 2:113. For more on antisemitic violence in Petrograd during the summer of 1917, see Beizer, Evrei Leningrada, 42–45.
81. Dubnov, Kniga zhizni, 389.
82. Ia. S. Lure’e, Istoriiia otdnoi zhizni (St. Petersburg, 2004), 75.
83. S. Borovoi, Vospominaniiia (Moscow, Jerusalem, 1993), 66.
85. Ibid., 29. The Smolny monastery was serving as Bolshevik headquarters (and a prison for Provisional Government officials) at the time.


89. The newspaper was edited by N. N. Zhedenev, a member of the Union of the Russian people, and Chairman of the Society for the Study of the Jewish Tribe (*Obshchestvo po izucheniiu iudeiskogo plemeni*). See *Padenie tsarskogo rezhima*, vol. 7 (Moscow, Leningrad, 1927), 339.


91. *Groza*, November 5, 1917. Cited in *Natsional’naia pravaia*, 119. Vernadskii recorded his own impressions from an underground meeting of the Provisional Government: “From the Salvation Committee [the Committee for the Salvation of the Homeland and Revolution] there were Voitinskii, Tsereteli, Bramson, Filipovskii. Only one Russian among the four.” (See V. I. Vernadskii, *Dnevnik 1917–1921*, 37.)


94. Lur’e, *Istoria odnoi zhizni*, 76.

95. Cited in *Natsional’naia pravaia*, 164.


97. Ibid.


100. Ibid., 25.

101. Ibid., 26–27.


103. *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 43–44 (November 19, 1917), 3. The author of “In the Chaos of Destruction” was S. Pozner.


105. “Pokhrony evreev-iunkerov,” *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 43–44 (November 19, 1917), 36–37. In the same issue, an article entitled “Victims of the Civil War” (*Zhertvy grazhdanskoi voiny*) listed the surnames of the five Jewish Cadets from the Vladimir academy who had perished in battle with the Bolsheviks.


110. Ibid., 406.

111. Ibid., 408.
2. Ibid.
4. I. Nazhivin, Zapiski o revoliutsiii (Vienna, 1921), 93.
5. This number does not include various guards and other low-level employees, none of whom were Jewish. If these are included, the total number of those employed would be 60.
6. GARF, f. 130, op. 1, d. 99, l. 1 ob. The list of those receiving salaries runs from October 25, 1917 to March 1, 1918. Although the Sovnarkom moved to Moscow on March 11, 1918, the personnel remained mostly the same. (See GARF, f. 1235, op. 93, d. 41, l. 117.)
7. GARF, f. 1235, op. 93, d. 41, l. 116.
11. GARF, f. 1235, op. 93, l. 54–56.
14. V. Shklovskii, Sentimental’noe puteshestvie (Moscow, 1990), 214. Ironically, Shklovsky himself was forced to leave the country at this time for fear of being arrested.
15. N. Lenin, O evreiskom voprose v Rossi (foreword by P. Lepeshinskii, with an introduction by S. Dimanshtein) (Kharkov, 1924), 17.
17. A charity sponsored by Grand Duchess Tatiana, daughter of Nicholas II.
24. Z. Mindlin, “Peryye itogi poseleniia evreev vo vnutrennikh guberniiakh,” Evreiskaia nedelia, no. 27 (1915), 14–15; Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 149.

26. *Evreiskii ezhegodnik*, 6; *Evreiskoe naselenie Rossii po dannym perepisi 1897 g. i po noveishim izotechnikam* (Petrograd, 1917), V–X.


29. Ibid., 39–40. From 1922 to 1924 the number of mixed marriages decreased somewhat, but still remained very high (27.9 percent).


35. GARF, f. 1235, op. 93, d. 41, l. 115.

36. See GARF, f. 1235, op. 93, d. 72, l. 418–20.


39. Of course, the import of the Civil Codex was somewhat lessened by its very first statute, which claimed that civil rights could only be realized to the extent that they did not contradict the interests of the workers and peasants. Maklakov claimed that “this was just how it was in the old days. You have the right not to be whipped up until the moment they whip you.” (*Sovershennno lichno . . .*, 2:492.) By the second half of the 1920s Goikhberg’s career was on a downward trajectory. He survived the 1930s, but in 1948 he was arrested for “anti-Soviet agitation” and was sent to the Kazan psychiatric hospital for treatment. He was freed only in 1955.

40. GARF, f. 1235, op. 93, d. 41, l. 125.


49. Ia. Sh. Sharapov, *Natsional’nye sektii RKP(b)*, 239, 245. Ten years after the revolution, there were 49,511 Jews (or 4.33 percent) among the 1,147,074 members of the Bolshevik Party. In both relative and absolute numbers they were the third most prominent ethnic group after Russians (743,167—65 percent) and Ukrainians (134,340—11.72 percent). (See *Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 11:531.)

50. There is a large body of literature regarding the Evkom and Evsektziias, including two seminal studies: Z. Gitelman’s *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Section of the CSPU* (Princeton, N.J., 1972) and M. Altshuler’s *Ha-yevsektsia bi-vrit ha-moazot* (1918–1930) (Tel-Aviv, 1980). Other noteworthy studies include G. Estrakh, “Evreiskie sektsi kompartii: Po materialam byyshego Tsентральнogo partarkhiva,” *Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve*, no. 2 (6) (1994): 35–45; N. Romanova, “Evreiski ot-del Petrogradskago komissariata po delam natsional’hostei (1918–1923 gg.),” *Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve*, no. 3 (10) (1994): 56–69; Beizer, *Evrei Leningrada*, 60–66; Kostyrchenko, *Tainaia politika Stalina*, 60–87. It should be noted that Soviet Jewish organizations were not only occupied with eliminating their “competitors”; they also attempted to assist with various social challenges facing the Jewish population. They provided assistance to refugees and the unemployed, and also provided financial support for a number of educational and cultural institutions (including orphanages, kindergartens, schools, theaters, etc.) Such cultural institutions, of course, were considered valuable channels for the spreading of communist ideology.


53. Ibid., 17.

54. M. Ravich, “K raskolu sredi ‘Poalei-Zion’ (Pis’mo iz Moskvy),” *Khronika evreiskaia zhizni*, no. 4–5 (December 8, 1918), 22.

55. Lenin, *O evreiskoi voprose v Rossii*, 61. The article “Jewish National Culture” (“Evreiskaia natsional’naia kul’tura”) was first published in the journal *Protvovchenie* (1913, no. 10–12).

56. Izvestiia, June 19, 1919; GARF, f. 631c, op. 1, d. 1, l. 113.


58. GARF, f. 631c, op. 1, d. 1, l. 112.


61. GARF, f. 631c, op. 1, d. 1, l. 116.
69. GARF, f. 631c, op. 1, d. 1, l. 138.
70. A. A. Gol’deneizer, “Iz kievskikh vsopominanii,” *Arkhiiv russkoi revoliutsii*, vol. 6 (Berlin, 1922; reprint, Moscow, 1991), 250.
73. Ibid., 183.
75. Ibid., 56–57.
77. From the article “Partiinaia zhizn’” (“Party Life”) from the newspaper *Bor’ba* (Struggle) no. 4–5, 1918. Cited in Beizer, *Evrei Leningrada*, 138.
78. For more on this period, see Chapter 10 of this study.
79. One contemporary even went so far as to call the Bolsheviks “the party of the spontaneously-demobilizing army.” See F. Rtischchev, “Partiastikhiniio-demobilizuiushcheisia armii,” *Bolsheviku i vlastи: Sotsial’no-polititcheskie itogi oktiabr’skogo perevorota* (Moscow, 1918), 71.
85. Ibid.
86. “Iz materialov dlia istorii sovremennosti (rasskaz pogromnogo begletsa),” *Rassvet*, no. 18 (May 26, 1918), 14–16.
88. S. P. Mel’gunov, Vospominaniiia i dnevnikii (Moscow, 2003), 353.
89. V. Sevskii, “Dva kazaka. I. Podtelkov,” Donskaia volna, no. 7 (1918), 3.
91. A. S. Lokerman, 74 dnia sovetskoi vlastii (iz istorii diktatury bol’shevikov v Rostove-Donu) (Rostov, 1918), 37.
92. Ibid., 3–4.
94. G. Aronson, Na zare, krasnogo terrora (Berlin, 1929), 86.
95. Ibid., 64.
97. Cherikover, Antisemitizm i pogromy na Ukrainie, 144.
98. Kostyrchenko, Tainaia politika Statina, 55.
99. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 71, l. 8.
102. Larin, Evrei i antisemitizm v SSSR, 9.
103. Evrei, klassovaia bor’ba i pogromy publ. Petrograd Sovdep (Petrograd, 1918), 5.
104. Ibid., 7–8, 9.
105. Ibid., 9–10.
106. Ibid., 11–12.
107. Ibid., 13.
109. Vragi li evrei rabochim i krest’ianam? publ. Petrogradskii Sovet rabochikh i krest’ianskih deputatov (Petrograd, 1918, 1919); N. Gorlov, Temnye sily, voiska i pogromy publ. Petrogradskii Sovet rabochikh i krest’ianskih deputatov (Petrograd, 1918); A. A. Divil’kovskii, Genenie na evreev—genenie na samikh seb’ia! publ. VTsIK (Petrograd, 1919); P. Eletskii, O evreiah publ. Ukrtsentrag (Kharkov, 1919); A. A. Karelin, Zlye rosokazni pro evreev publ. VTsIK, (Moscow, 1919); Doloi pogromy! [Odessa] publ. Polit. Upravlenie pri Odesskom voennom okruzhnom komissariate (Odessa, 1919); Doloi pogromy! publ. Ukrainskoe tsentral’noe agenstvo pri Narodnom komissariate (Kharkov, 1919); Kontrevoliutsiiia i pogromy publ. Kurskii gubernskii ispolnitel’nyi komitet Soveta rabochikh, krest’ianskih, i krasnoarmeiskikh deputatov (Kursk, 1919); I. Shelit, Doloi pogromy publ. Komissariat po voennym delam Ukrainy (Kiev, 1919); D. A. Petrovskii, Kontrevoliutsiiia i evreiskie pogromy publ. Gosizdat (Moscow, 1920).
110. V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 38:243.
111. Dekrety sovetskoi vlastii (Moscow, 1971), 5525.
117. Ibid.
125. It is somewhat curious that Dubnov, an ideological opponent of Dimanshtein, likewise saw things that were not present in Gorky’s text, writing in his diary, “Gorkii rendered us a dubious service in claiming that Jews had the leading role in the (Bolshevik) revolution. In his desire to reconcile the Reds towards the Jews, he will increase the pogroms on the side of the Whites, who slaughter Jews in the name of vengeance against the Bolsheviks’” (See Dubnov, *Kniga zhizni*, 431.)
127. Ibid., 273.
128. Ibid., 274.
130. Ibid., 227.
133. Ibid., 235–40.
Although Baron makes the claim that many Jews served in the Cheka, he noted that the question had never been studied in detail. See S. Baron, “Introduction” in Violence and Defense in the Jewish Experience, ed. S. Baron and G. Wise (Philadelphia, 1977), 12.


Ibid., 330.

Litvin, Krasnyi i belyi terror v Rossii, 53; Krichevskii, “Evrei v apparate VChK-OGPU,” 331.


“Iz deiatel’nosti ChK,” 210–11.

M. I. Bolerovskii, a former investigator for the Kiev Cheka who served under the pseudonym “Valer,” found himself taken prisoner by White forces. Bolerovskii, “32 years of age, of the Orthodox faith, and of the nobility,” claimed that there had not been a single Jew executed by the Kiev Cheka up until May 1919, with the single exception of Kats, a Chekist who had certainly been guilty. Bolerovskii also claimed, however, that on May 1, 1919 an order was given to execute a number of Jews for agitation purposes. In addition, people were told not to appoint Jews to high-profile positions. Admittedly, Bolerovskii is not the most reliable source; he consistently tried to cover up his own participation, claimed to have tried to establish connections with the Volunteer Army, and so on. Nonetheless, his allegations regarding these “show executions” of Jews seem believable. As we will see further on, the Bolsheviks were known to employ similar “propaganda events” (see “Chekist o ChK,” 132, 137).

“Iz deiatel’nosti ChK,” 210–11.

Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, no. 10 (1924): 5–6; Spirin, L. M. Krakh odnoi avantis-ury: Miatezh levykh eserov v Moskve 6–7 iulia 1918 g. (Moscow, 1971); Golinkov, D. L. Krushenie antirusovskogo podpol’ia v SSSR: V 2 kn., (Moscow, 1978), 1:60.

V. I. Lenin i VChK: Sbornik dokumentov (1917–1922 gg.) 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1987), 141.


For perhaps the only time in its history, the workers of the Odessa Cheka participated in the May Day celebrations following the reestablishment of Soviet power in 1920. The future historian S. Ia. Borvoi, then in attendance, was struck by the large number of “hunchbacks, extremely unattractive and decrepit people and large number of Jews” among the Chekists (see S. Borovoi, Vospominaniiia [Moscow, Jerusalem, 1993], 77).
154. V. I. Lenin i VChK, 172.
155. GARF, f. 1235, op. 93, d. 201, l. 28 ob. According to Komarov, a chronic alcoholic by the name of Malinin was serving as the Chairman of the Kostroma Cheka. The problem of requisitioning vodka at a time when there was a state monopoly on alcohol was handled very simply. Malinin simply appointed one of his subordinates commissar of alcohol distribution.
156. Litvin, Krasnyi i belyi terror v Rossii, 72.
157. Abram Iakovlevich Belenkii (1883–1941) was the son of a Jewish master craftsman. At the age of 11 he began work as an apprentice in a private leatherworking workshop, and he later worked in workshops in the Mogilev (1894–99) and Kharkov (1899–1903) gubernias. He was arrested in 1903, imprisoned, and eventually exiled to Orsha. He emigrated to Paris in December 1904, and continued to work in the leather trade (1904–7) before finding employment as a typesetter in a private print shop (1907–17). It was in Paris that he first met Lenin. He “finished up” his education at the Party school in Longjumeau. He returned to Russia in May 1917 and ran the Bolshevik press Trud until December 1917, when he joined the Cheka as a commissar responsible for overseeing printing presses. From 1919 to 1924 he was the head of Lenin’s security detail. The rest of his biography saw him pass through the various incarnations of the Soviet secret police. He was arrested in 1938 for “anti-Soviet agitation” and was given a remarkably light sentence for the time, five years’ imprisonment. However, this sentence was repealed after the beginning of World War II, and on July 7, 1941 he was tried again and sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out on October 16, 1941. For more, see N. V. Petrov, and K. V. Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD: Spravochnik (Moscow, 1999), 102.
158. Litvin, Krasnyi i belyi terror v Rossii, 50–51, 72.
159. GARF, f. 1235, op. 93, d. 201, l. 148, 163.
163. S. P. Melgunov had also pointed out the original source of Latsis’s words. See Krasnyi Terror v Rossi. 1918–1923 (Moscow, 1990), 44. Melgunov’s book was first published in 1923.
164. Litvin, Krasnyi i belyi terror v Rossii, 66.
167. Ibid., 331.
168. Litvin, Krasnyi i belyi terror v Rossii, 53.


171. Much of this biographical information on Jewish Chekists can be found in Petrov, and Skorkin, *Kto rukovodil NKVD*, 91, 95, 107–9, 126–27, 133–34, 154–55, 363–64, 374–75.


175. For more see Krichevskii, “Evreii v apparate VChK-OGPU,” 332–45.


177. ChON (Special-purpose units—chasti osobogo naznacheniia) were military units loyal to the party who engaged in punitive actions and assisted the Soviet authorities in their fight against “counterrevolution.”

178. Chastnye pis’ma, 222.


187. The SR L. V. Berman, son of the well-known Jewish activist V. L. Berman, was among those captured during the days of the Red Terror in the autumn of 1918. Berman managed to escape execution. I. L. Fleitman, the son of a typographer, was not so fortunate (see Dubnov, *Kniga Zhizni*, 411, 416). G. B. Sliozberg, along with his elder son, was held in the infamous Kresty prison for 3 weeks under suspicions he sympathized with the Kadets (see G. B. Sliozberg, *Dela minuvshikh dnei: Zapiski ruskogo evreia: v 3 t.* [Paris, 1933–34], 1:1, 3:365–66).

188. Litvin, *Krasnyi i belyi terror v Rossii*, 180–83. According to testimony given by Kannegiser’s father, Leonid was particularly shaken by the fact that the execution orders had been signed by two Jews, Uriskii and Ioselevich. Nevertheless, there is little to support the version of events propagated by those (such as M. A. Aldanov) who claim that...
the assassin was motivated by the “feeling of a Jew who wanted to place his name in opposition to the Uriitksys and Zinovievs in the minds of the Russian people and history itself.” For more on Kannegiser see Leonid Kannegiser: Stat’i G. Adamovicha, M. A. Al’danova, Georgiia Ivanova; iz posmertnykh stikhov Leonida Kannegisera (Paris, 1928).


193. V. V. Romanova, Vlast’ i evrei na Dal’nom Vostoke Rossii: Istorii vzaimootnoshenii (vtoraja polovina XIX v. – 20-e gody XX v.) (Krasnoiarsk, 2001), 153.


195. Popova, Politika SSSR na Dal’nom Vostoke, 240.


197. Shklovskii, Sentimental’noe puteshestvie, 213.

198. Korolenko, Dnevники 1917–1921, 297, 304. Entries from May 26 (June 8) and June 1 (14), 1920.


200. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 79, l. 117.


CHAPTER 4

1. Petrovskii-Shtern, Evreii v russkoi armii. 1827–1914 (Moscow, 2003), 298.


4. The memorandum is entitled “O pravovom i ekonomicheskom polozenii evreev v Rossi” and is cited according to V. V. Cherapukhin, “‘S. Iu. Vitte i evreiskii vopros v preddverii revoliutsii 1905 goda,’” Arkhiv evreiskoi istorii, vol. 1 (Moscow, 2004), 252–53.

5. Ibid., 266 n. 1.


7. For a detailed analysis, see Petrovskii-Shtern, Evreii v russkoi armii, 186–204.
8. Ibid., 294.


10. Ibid., 285–86.

11. Petrovskii-Shtern doubts that the results of this survey are, in fact, indicative of the officer corps stance on this issue. He argues that the generals were attempting to appease Nicholas II and finds it somewhat peculiar that “among those surveyed there was not a single colonel,” or anyone else who “had direct contact with Jewish soldiers, [who] did not judge them either according to the opinion of [the Emperor], which was being spread by the conservative press, or the prejudices of the day” (Petrovskii-Shtern, Evrei v russkoii armii, 343). I find this argument less than convincing. Colonels were purposefully not given the questionnaire, as it was intended for higher-ranking officers (generals). Naturally, generals are made, not born, and all of those surveyed had at some time been colonels and junior officers, and had personally come across Jewish soldiers. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that all fifty or so generals were playing the role of “cunning courtiers” and not giving their true opinion. Of course, colonels and junior officers were just as capable of reading the conservative press and being swayed by the “prejudices of the day”.

12. Petrovskii-Shtern, Evrei v russkoii armii, 297.

13. Ibid., 344–51.

14. P. Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-making in the Era of Lenin and Stalin, ed. R. G. Suny and T. Martin (New York, 2000), 115. At the turn of the century the following textbooks on military statistics were used: A. M. Zolotarev, Zapiski voennoi statistiki: v 2 t. (St. Petersburg, 1885); A. M. Zolotarev, Voennoo-geograficheskii ocherk okrain Rossii: Kurs voennykh i iunierskikh uchilishch (St. Petersburg, 1903); V. R. Kannenberg, Voennaia geografija: Kurs voennykh uchilishch primentitel’no k programme 1907 g. (St. Petersburg, 1909); Col. G. G. Gisser and S. L. Markov, Voennaia geografija Rossii, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1910). In all of these textbooks one can find mention of how to evaluate the loyalty of certain populations. See Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate,” 135 nn. 20–24. For more on “the politics of populations” see P. Holquist, “Total’naia mobilizatsiia i politika naseleniia: Rossiiskaia katastropha (1914–1921) v evropeiskom kontekste” in Rossiia i pervaia mirovaia voina (Materialy mezhdunarodnogo simpoziuma) (St. Petersburg, 1999), 84–91. S. L. Markov would later go on to become one of the founders of the White movement.


16. “Tiazhele dny (Sekretanye zasedaniia Soveta Ministrov 16 iulia–2 sentiabria 1915 goda),” ed. A. N. Iakhontovii, Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii, vol. 18 (Berlin, 1926; reprint, Moscow, 1993), 42–51. S. V. Rukhlov, Minister of Communications, was the only Minister to come out against the effective repeal of the Pale of Settlement, which had been passed by the Council of Ministers in August, 1915.

18. Denikin, Career, 204.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. V. M. Kabuzan, Emigratsiia i reemigratsiia v Rossii v XVIII—nachala XX veka (Moscow, 1998), 176.
25. Denikin, Career, 204.
26. A. A. Brusilov, Moye vospominaniia (Moscow, 2001), 141–42.
27. Evreiskaia nedelia, no. 5 (January 29, 1917), 37.
28. Brusilov, Moye vospominaniia, 142.
34. Sirotiner, “Iz zhizni Vozdukhotresta” in Tan, V. G. Evreiskoe mestechko v revoliutsii: Ocherki (Moscow, 1926), 14, 98.
35. Evrei na voine, no. 3 (1915), cover.
36. V. Dymshits and V. Kel’ner, Evreiskii mir v pochtoyakh otkrytakhk (Moscow, 2002), 134.
37. Dzh. Sanborn, “Bezporiadki sredi prizyvnikov v 1914 g. i vopros o russkoi natsii: Novyi vzgliad na problemu” in Rossia i pervaya mirovaia voina (Materialy mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kolokviuma (St. Petersburg, 1999), 214 n. 31.
39. Ibid., 130, 133.
43. Evreiskaia nedelia, no. 5 (January 29, 1917), 11; no. 7 (February 12), 27–28; no. 8 (February 19), 19. The Cross of St. George was awarded to more than 3,000 Jews over the course of the war. Eleven of them became full Cavaliers of the Cross of St. George (i.e., received the Cross of St. George of all four degrees). See A. Shneer, Plen’, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 2003), 5.
44. N. A. Teffi, “Dva estestva” in _Kontrrevoliutonnaia bukva_ (St. Petersburg, 2004), 29–33.


46. L. Liuks, _Tretii Rim? Tretii Reikh? Tretii put’? Istoricheskie ocherki o Rossii, Germanii i Zapade_ (Moscow, 2002), 211. In the first years of Hitler’s dictatorship, German Jewish veterans of the First World War managed to compile and publish a list of 10,623 Jews who had perished at the front as proof of their loyalty to the Fatherland. See S. Baron’s introduction to _Violence and Defense in the Jewish Experience_ (Philadelphia, 1977), 5.

47. The articles from _Novoe Vremia_ (January 10, 1915), _Russkoe Znamia_ (August 23, November 4, and December 18, 1914), and _Groza_ (July 6, 1915) are cited in El’iashevich, _Pravitel’stvennaia politika i evreiskaia pechat’_, 490–91.

48. Ibid., 490, 707, n. 34.


50. Ibid., 394, 403, n. 37, 38.

51. Shmi, “Zametki” _Evreiskaia nedelia_, no. 9 (February 26, 1917), 7.

52. V. Shklovskii, _Sentimental’noe путешествие_ (Moscow, 1990), 53–54, 68–72. Shklovsky would later participate in suppressing Kornilov’s attempted coup in August 1917.


55. _Evreiskaia nedelia_, no. 22 (June 4, 1917), 23.


59. Ibid., 5. There were 25 Jews among the 140 junkers sent to the front in a shock battalion at the end of June. The SR Gandler, a twenty-year-old volunteer and delegate of the first Congress of the Soviets, left for the front immediately from the Congress. He perished in the advance. (See Frenkin, _Russkaia armiia i revoliutsiia_, 252.)


63. _Evreiskaia nedelia_, no. 22 (June 4, 1917), 30.


By the second half of May the military censors had noticed the displeasure of the masses, who had come to believe that “German dominance” was being replaced by a “Jewish” version. Many officers believed that the Jews were planning to seize power. (See Frenkin, _Russkaia armiia i revoliutsiia_, 250.)
65. Shklovskii, *Sentimental’noe puteshestvie*, 43. Particularly striking was the large number of Jewish doctors and paramedics in higher level soldiers’ committees. (See A. Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt* (March—April 1917) [Princeton, N.J., 1980], 248.)

66. Shklovskii, *Sentimental’noe puteshestvie*, 81. The figure of 40 percent may have been an exaggeration. However, 20 (or 10 percent) of the 194 soldiers elected to the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets were of Jewish heritage. (See A. Abramovich, *V reshaiushchei voine: Uchastie i rol’ evreev SSSR v voine protiv natsizma*, vol. 1 [Tel-Aviv, 1981], 45–46.)

67. General S. L. Markov was imprisoned in Bykhov during the October coup. Having received a false report that Nakhamkes was to head the War Ministry, he wrote the following entry in his diary: “Russia has fallen—a spy now rules her and a Yid (zhid) leads her army,” (See “Rai za reshetkoi: Iz tiuremnogo dnevnika miatezhnogo generala Markova (1917 g.),” *Rodina*, no. 10 [1990]: 38.)

68. L. Fridland, *Desiat’ mesiatsev* (Leningrad, 1927), 8–9.


71. Nordshein, “Evreiskoe naselenie g. Rostova-na-Donu,” 175. According to Binsh-tok and Novosel’skii, the Jewish population of Petrograd may actually have been as high as 30,000 given that there was no question regarding religious faith in the Census. In all likelihood, the Jewish population of Rostov was larger as well. See V. I. Binshhtok, and S. A. Novosel’skii, “Evrei v Leningrade (Peterburge) 1920–1924 gg.: Demograficheskii ocherk,” *Voprosy biologii i patologii evreev* (Leningrad, 1926), Sb. 1, 33.

72. See Vos’ Rostov i Nakhichevan’-na-Donu (Rostov-na-Donu, 1914).


75. Litvin, “Derzkii evrei.”

76. A. I. Serkov, *Russkoe Masonstvo 1731–2000*, 54. Later on Alperin (1888–1968) emigrated to Paris and took an active role in Jewish intellectual circles and organizations, and became well-known for his philanthropy. In June of 1941, he was imprisoned in a camp in Compiegne along with many other Russian citizens, before being transferred to Drancy, where he was eventually liberated in November 1942, and then participated in the Resistance movement. He was also a member of the “Maklakov group” that visited the Soviet embassy in Paris on February 12, 1945. Later, he admitted that he had been mistaken in his hopes for change in the Soviet Union. See G. Gazdanov, “Pamiati Al’perina,” *Russkaia Mysl’,* October 17, 1968; O. V. Budnitskii, “Popytka primireniiia,”
Diaspora: Novye Materialy 1 (Paris, St. Petersburg, 2001), 179–240; Serkov, Russkoe Ma-

77. V. Amfiteatrov-Kadashchev, “Stranitsy iz dnevnika,” ed. S. V. Shumikhin, 
Minuvshie: Istoricheski Al’manakh (Moscow, 1996), Vypusk 20, 568–623. Recorded by 
Amfiteatrov-Kadashchev according to the testimony of Ia. M. Lisovyi and Viktor Sevskii.

78. V. Zeeler, “Pamiati B. A. Gordon,” Russkaia Mysl’ (Paris), May 14, 1952, 4. A 
member of the First Merchant Guild, Gordon (1881–1952) had a number of business inter-
ests, including a tobacco factory, a publishing company, and a newspaper (Priazovskii 
Krai). In emigration in Paris, he continued his publishing efforts, and he eventually 
emigrated to the United States due to the Nazi threat in 1942. He died in New York in 
1952.


80. I. V. Nam, and N. I. Naumova, Evreiskaia diaspora Sibiri v uslovniakh smeny 
politicheskikh rezhimov (mart 1917–fevral’ 1920 gg.) (Krasnoyarsk, 2003), 168; I. I. Sukin, 
“Zapiska,” Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (henceforth HIA), Russia, 
Posol’stvo (France), Box 35, Folder 11.

81. Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Co-
lumbia University (henceforth BAR), Paul Miliukov Papers, Box 1. The political program 
of General Kornilov. Typewritten copy labeled “secret” and containing L. G. Kornilov’s 
corresponding signature.

82. BAR, Paul Miliukov Papers, Box 1.

83. Denikin, Career, 11.

84. Ibid., 23.

85. Ibid., 13.

86. Ibid., 47.

87. Ibid., 48.

88. Denikin, Career, 48.

89. Ibid., 62.

90. Ibid., 202.

91. Ibid., 203.

92. A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoj smuty, vol. 5 (Moscow, 2003), 534–35.

93. Ibid., 534–35.

94. Vasilii Mikhailovich Chernetsov was a participant in World War I. After the 
Bolshevik coup, he formed one of the first anti-Soviet partisan brigades. On January 21 
(February 3) 1918, half of his regiment was captured by Red Cossacks. Most of the capt-
vives were killed. Chernetsov himself was killed by F. G. Podtelkov, then chairman of the 
Don Cossack Revolutionary War Committee.

95. See Doniskaia volna, no. 19 (1918), 26; no. 26 (1919), 28.


97. Ibid.


B. Frezinskii, and V. Popov, Il’ia Erenburg: Chronika zhizni i tvorchestvo (o dokumentakh,
100. I. Erenburg, *Liudi, gody, zhizni: Vospominaniiia v trekh tomakh*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1990), 301.
101. L. S. Fridland, *Desiat’ mesiatsev* (Leningrad, 1927), 175.
102. Ibid., 221.
103. See L. S. Fridland, *Nachalo mira: Iz proshloga*, ed. M. Slonimskii (Moscow, 1966). This version of Fridland’s memoirs was heavily censored.
104. I. B. Schechtman, *Pogromy Dobrovol’cheskii armii na Ukraine (K istorii antisemitizma na Ukrainе в 1919—1920 gg.)* (Berlin, 1932), 54.
110. M. Vinaver, note, 1918, YIVO Archives, M. Vinaver Papers, RG 84, folder 765.
112. GARO, f. 151, op. 3, d. 246, l. 1
113. GARO, f. 151, op. 1, d. 330, l. 2.
114. GARO, f. 151, op. 3, d. 436, l. 2.
115. During the First World War, Warsaw University was transferred to Rostov.
116. GARO, f. 151, op. 3, d. 394, l. 8.
117. Ibid., l. 8 ob.
118. GARO, f. 151, op. 3, d. 358.
119. GARO, f. 151, op. 3, d. 548.
120. GARO, f. 151, op. 3, d. 507, l. 2–3.
121. Ibid., l. 6–6 ob.
125. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), f. 440, op. 1, d. 43a, l. 121. Addendum to political report No. 192 (July 17, 1919).
129. Ibid., 140.
130. Ibid., 140–41. Defending himself from attacks that claimed he “collaborated with the antisemitic pogromists,” Pasmanik wrote the following: “Yes, I defended the
Volunteer Army, which had many faults and committed many mistakes. But in its tireless struggle against the Bolsheviks it fought with such heroism, and did so much to save European culture from the barbaric invasion of the Bolsheviks . . . [that] I can only exclaim: take off your hats and bow in prayer before the White Army, before those who perished in battle, and those who now eat the bitter bread of exile” (141). Pasmanik’s anti-Bolshevism was the main factor in his absolute support for the White movement: “I see in Bolshevism a globally pathological phenomenon, which is a mortal danger for our entire culture and civilization. Thus I consider it my moral obligation as a cultured individual to fight against it by any means at my disposal” (140–41).

131. GARF, f. 1339, op. 1, d. 399, L. 19.
132. GARF, f. 1339, op. 1, d. 399, l. 19–21.
133. GARF, f. 1339, op. 1, d. 399, l. 21–22. It is worth noting that the dismissal of Jewish officers from the Volunteer Army did not go unnoticed in the Soviet press. (See “Uvol’nenie ofitserov-evreev,” Izvestiia, October 8, 1919.)
136. Ibid.
138. Ibid., 18.
140. Denikin, Ocherki, 5340; Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovols’cheskoi armii na Ukraina, 278–79. The July 26 (August 8), 1919 meeting was attended by M. S. Bruk (Ekatierinoslav), L.V. Vilenskii (Kharkov), Z. Gol’denberg (Rostov-na-Donu), and A. Ia. Evinzon (Taganrog); in Odessa Denikin met with I. S. Mogilever, Z. I. Temkin, and L. V. Raukhverger.
143. A. A. Gol’deneveizer, “Iz kievskikh vospominanii,” Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii, vol. 6 (Berlin, 1922; reprint, Moscow, 1991), 269–70.
144. Pavel Dm. Dolgorukov, Velikaia razruckha (Madrid, 1964), 147. For more on Dolgorukov’s acquaintance with Shneerzon see 103–4. Unfortunately, there are apparently no other extant accounts of the “former rabbi.” Most likely Denikin had in mind I. S. Schneerson, a Kadet who later emigrated to Paris and was elected to the Kadet party.
committee located there. It is also possible that Dolgorukov was mistaken, and that the project was presented through the chairman of the National Center M. M. Fedorov. The archive of one of Denikin’s secretaries contains a memo written by Fedorov which discusses the organization of provisions for Moscow and Northern and Central Russia using Shneerson as an intermediary. Denikin rejected the proposal on December 9, 1919. (See GARF, f. 466, op. 2, d. 122, l. 612.)

145. See M. E. Benenson, Ekonomicheskie ocherki Kryma (Simferopol, 1919).

146. P. N. Vrangel’, Vospominaniia (Moscow, 1992), chast’ 2, 220–21.

147. N. Ross, Vrangel’ v Krymu (Frankfurt-on-Main, 1982), 254.


150. Ibid., 353; Obolenskii, “Krym pri Vrangele,” 386. According to Vostokov’s own memoirs, Vrangel’ summoned him on September 22, 1920 and demanded that he cease his “religious and patriotic” propaganda under the threat of exile. A manuscript of Vostokov’s memoirs can be found in the Bakhmeteff Archives at Columbia University.

151. V. A. Maklakov to A. V. Krivoshein, October 11, 1920, Evrei i russkaia revoliutsiia, 282.

152. Ibid.

153. V. A. Maklakov to A. V. Krivoshein, October 29, 1920, Evrei i russkaia revoliutsiia, 284.

154. A. A. Neratov to Ambassador (Krivoshein to Maklakov), October 30, 1920, HIA, Girs 6–2; Vrangel’, Vospominaniia, 357.

155. P. N. Vrangel’ to D. S. Pasmanik October 18 (31), 1920, HIA, Girs 6–2, The full text of Vrangel’s directive from October 12 (25) 1920 can be found in Vrangel’, Vospominaniia, 392–96.


CHAPTER 5

1. Argunov to Svatikov, July 4, 1921, Fonds Eugene Petit, carton 6, chemise 3. Bibliotheque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC), University of Paris X.


4. See Chapter 6 of this study.

5. Sergei Stepanovich Chakhotin (1883–1974) would later leave Russia to live in Zagreb, Berlin, and Paris. In February of 1921, he became one of the Smenovekhovtsy, a group that accepted the Bolshevik regime. He was co-editor of the pro-Soviet, Berlin-based Nakanune in 1923–24. In the 1930s he adopted an anti-Fascist position, and he participated in the Resistance during World War II. He also happens to be the author of one of the first studies of mass propaganda. See Chakhotkin, S. The Rape of the Masses: the Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda (first published in French in Paris, 1939; London, 1940). In 1944, Chakhotkin became a member of the Union of Russian (later, Soviet) Patriots, and later accepted Soviet citizenship. The former head of the Osvag returned to the USSR in 1958. Unlike other Smenovekhovtsy who returned during the 1920s and ’30s, Chakhotkin arrived after the purges and managed to lead a more or less peaceful existence. He worked as senior research fellow at the Institute of Cytology in Leningrad and later at the Institute of Biophysics in Moscow.


10. L. Fridland, Desiat’ mesiatsev (Leningrad, 1927), 130.

11. “Church bells” (kolokol’chiki) were 1000 ruble notes issued by Denikin’s forces. They got their nickname from the depiction of the “Tsar’s bell” on the banknote.


14. Molchanov, Gazetnaia presa Rossii, 84.

15. V. A. Miakotin’s evaluation of the Osvag was typical for those in liberal-democratic circles: “The Osvag, having fallen into the clutches of bureaucrats and bureaucratic aca-
demics, either dully repeated the government line, or directly engaged in pogromistic propaganda, often with the assistance of the most inadmissible means.” (V. A. Miatkin, “Iz nedalekogo proshlogo (Otryvki vosminanii),” Na chuzhoi storone, kniga 9 (1923): 294.)


18. K. N. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina (Sofia, 1921), 103, 105.

19. Sergei Grigorievich Svatikov (1880–1942) was a historian, publicist, and Social Democrat. In 1917 he served as a Commissar for the Provisional Government and was in charge of the liquidation of foreign intelligence agencies. Paramonov invited him to serve as the deputy head of the Propaganda Section, but his choice was not confirmed by General Dragomirov. This served as one of the reasons for Paramonov’s eventual exit. See O. V. Budnitskii, “Bolshevistskii Karfagen”; S. M. Markedonov, S. G. Svatikov—istorik i obschestvennyi deiatel’ (Rostov-na-Donu, 1999).


21. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina, 104.

22. GARF, f. 446, op. 2, d. 122, l. 203–4. Pronin’s letter was accompanied by 29 pages of correspondence, but unfortunately, they seem to have been lost.

23. Ibid. l. 203. Sokolov claimed that the first order he received from Denikin included the following: “as they say, all the Jews in Rostov have gone to work at the Propaganda Section in order to avoid military service, and that a commission composed of reserve Generals must be formed in order to review the personnel” (Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina, 104). Denikin believed that the “participation of Jews in government propaganda was inappropriate and, under the current conditions of pitched struggle, harmful” (A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, [Moscow, 2003], 5:334).


25. Among the lecturers at the academy there actually were Jews, including a certain Vladimirskii (Rabinovich). In Bataisk, he had once read a lecture on the “worker question.” A secret report on indoctrination efforts in the Don region notes that he laid out the principles of the Menshevik position, thought highly of the Kerensky government, and was silent on things regarding the Volunteer Army. (See GARF, f. 452, op. 1, d. 32, l. 5.)

26. GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 120, l. 1–1 ob.

27. GARF, f. 446, op. 2, d. 122, l. 184, 182.


29. V. Shverubovich, O liudakh, o teatre, i o sebe (Moscow, 1976), 209–10.

30. It was only after the defeat of Kolchak and Denikin that Vrangel was willing to make concessions to the “nationalities.” (See N. Ross, Vrangel’ v Krymu [Frankfurt/Main, 1982], 241–53.) Among other things, Vrangel was willing to “meet halfway all anti-Bolshevik forces who stood for a federation with Russia” (251).

Bakhmetev that these German officers “were known to us by name.” The only German name, however, belonged to someone who was a full-blooded Russian, the future Soviet marshal Vasilii Konstantinovich Bliukher, who commanded the Fifty-first Rifle Division during the storming of Perekop.


33. Local Osvag organizations would record the reactions of those attending Osvag lectures. One lecture, conducted by someone named Naumov, was highly successful. The orator noted in his speech that “our revolution has taken place under the influence of foreigners: Jews, Latvians, and the Chinese.” GARF, f. 453 op. 1, d. 32, l. 5. *Donskaia agita-[
]

tionnaia svodka s 18 po 25 maia 1919.

34. For more on Sokolov-Krechetov’s activity during the Civil War and later in emigration, see O. V. Budnitskii, “‘Bratsvo Russkoi Pravdy’—poslednii literaturnyi proekt S. A. Sokolova-Krecheto,” *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie* 64, no. 6 (2003): 114–43.

35. GARF, f. 440, op.1 d. 64, l. 1–tob.

36. Ibid., l. 3 ob., 4.


38. V. N. Mantulin, *Pesennik rossiiskogo voina* (New York, 1983), 2:76–77; N. P. Pol-

toratskii, “‘Za Rossiiu i Svobodu . . .’: Ideino-politicheskaia platforma belogo dvizhe-


40. Cited in Eremeeva, “*Pod rokot grazhdanskikh bur’ . . .*” 95.

41. GARF, f. 9114 op. 1, d. 72, l.42; Eremeeva, “*Pod rokot grazhdanskikh bur’ . . .*” 239–40.

42. D. Glikman, “Nedavnie Byli,” *Evreiskaia letopis’,* sbornik 4 (Leningrad, Mos-

cow, 1926):175.


44. V. A. Miakotin, “Zloe Vremia,” *Utro Iuga*, June 8 (21), 1919. Cited in I. Ia. Kus-


45. GARF, f. 9114, op. 1, d. 72, l. 61; Eremeeva, “*Pod rokot grazhdanskikh bur’ . . .*” 163–64.


50. Ibid.

51. Eremeeva, “*Pod rokot grazhdanskikh bur’ . . .*” 241. Cited from F. Kasatkin-

Rostovskii’s poem “Miasniki.”
52. Ibid. Marshak’s “Two Commissars” was first published on March 14 (27), 1919 in the Ekaterinodar newspaper Utro Iuga.

53. Ermeeva, ‘Pod rokot grazhdanskikh bur’ . . .” 252. The poem “Spekuliant” was published in the Odessa newspaper Izvnoe Slovo on November 17 (30), 1919.


59. Ibid. 279.

60. Kon, Blagoslovenie na genotsid, 67–68.


62. Fridland, Desiat’ mesiatsev, 184–85.

63. GARF, f. 6224, op. 1, d. 130, l. 2, 5.

64. Ibid., l. 2–3.


66. GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 78, l. 3

67. Ibid., l. 3

68. Ibid.

69. GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 78, l. 4–5.

70. Ibid., l. 4

71. Denikin, Ocherki, 5:538.

72. GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 34, l. 60 “Polititcheskaia Svodka No. 131 ot 17 maia 1919 g.”

73. GARF, f. 452, op. 1, d. 32, l. 6.

74. GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 12, l. 12 ob.

75. GARF, f. 440, op.1 d. 11a, l. 74. From “Ezhednevnyi obzor pechati No. 25 za mart–mai 1919 g.”
76. In all likelihood, Colonel Aleksandr Semenovich Rezanov, who before the revolution worked for Novoe Vremia in the Military Section. (See Minuvshee, no. 20 [Moscow, 1996]: 631. Note by S. V. Shumikhin.)
78. Ibid., 598.
79. Blagovest’, a “journal of Russian political thought,” was published in 1919.
81. V Moskvu was edited by A. N. Varlamov. There were seven issues in total, the last of which came out November 4, 1919.
82. Drozdov, Intelligentsia na Donu, 57.
83. Amfiiteatrov-Kadashev, “Stranitsy iz Dnevnika,” 530, 539–40, 620. During the last years of his life, Venskii (Evgenii Osipovich Piatkin, 1884–1943) was working on a novel on Faddei Bulgarin. Unfortunately, the manuscript is not extant. One wonders if the choice of subject matter (Bulgarin was the epitome of servility) was not born of some soul-searching. Venskii’s life ended in a tragic fashion. He was arrested in Moscow on October 17, 1942 and sentenced to five years in a camp. Suffering from paralysis, he died November 4, 1943 in a Krasnoiarsk hospital from dystrophy.
84. Narodnaia Mysl’ opened November 24, 1919 with V. Ilin serving as editor.
85. Maliuta Skuratov was one of the leaders of the oprichniki (a predecessor of the secret police) under Ivan IV (the Terrible). Maliuta Skuratov was well-known for his cruelty. It is unknown who was standing behind this historical pseudonym.
87. Priazovskii krai, no. 137, (1919).
88. Drozdov, Intelligentsia na Donu, 57.
90. Amfiiteatrov-Kadishev, “Stranitsy iz Dnevnika,” 538, 546. In addition to his open letter, Grekov published an order that proclaimed, “Once more in Rostov proclamations have appeared with the cry ‘Proletarians of all countries, unite!’ I must admit I cannot understand why these proletarians have to come together here, in Rostov. It’s crowded enough as is. These proclamations were hung by Ms. Rebekka Iliashevna Albaum [sic]. She should be shot [my emphasis] but I will limit myself to exiling her to the Bolsheviks she serves.” According to a review under the direction of S. N. Tregubov, Albam’s participation in the hanging of the posters could not be proven. See V. Sidorov, Entsiklopediia starogo Rostova i Nakhichevani- na-Donu (Rostov-na-Donu, 1999), 5:250, 5:254; Donskaiia rech’, no. 18 (1919); I. Kalinin, Donskaia vandeia (Moscow, Leningrad, 1926), 1921.
92. The Bureau was led by Aleksandr Konstantinovich Klafton, a Kadet from Samara. He was a member of the Eastern Section of the Central Committee, and later its chair. Like his colleague, the former Duma deputy V. N. Pepeliaev, Klafton was captured by the Bolsheviks and shot.
94. Ibid., 239.
99. GARF, f. 6224, op. 1, d. 129, l. 1–3.
103. In autumn of 1918 the Ekaterinodar “moderate socialist” publication *Rodnaia Zemlia* was closed for having sympathized with the Provisional All-Russian Government and for having carefully criticized the Volunteer Army. Its editor, G. I. Shreider, was formerly head of Petrograd City Council and had attempted to organize forces against the Bolsheviks in 1917. He was arrested, treated in a harsh manner, and exiled (see Sokolov, *Pravlenie generala Denikina*, 53).
104. *Ocherki geografii Vsevelikogo voiska Donskogo* (Novocherkassk, 1919), 439. *Priazovskii krai* was a daily newspaper funded by B. A. Gordon.
106. Ibid.
112. Treplev, “Roza Kaplan”.
113. One of the Petrograd Bolsheviks was also assassinated. However, the murderer of V. Volodarskii (M. M. Gol’dshtein) was unknown and thus could not be used for propaganda.
115. I. Malinovskii, “Kto vinovat?” *Priazovskii krai*, August 1 (14), 1918.


120. V. Chernyshev, “Eshche ob antisemitizme,” Utro Iuga, April 12 (25), 1919. Here and further articles from Utro Iuga are cited according to Kutsenko, S. ia. Marshak v Krasnodare, 217–21.


122. Iakovlev, “Ob antisemitizme.”

123. V. G. “Mrakrobesy,” Utro Iuga, May 21 (June 4), 1919.

124. V. Ropshin was the literary pseudonym of B. V. Savnikov.

125. Grishka Otrepev (also known as False Dmitry) was a successful usurper of the Russian throne during the Time of Troubles. Claiming to be the son of Ivan the Terrible, he reigned from July 1605 until May 1606, having seized the throne from Boris Godunov. Emelian Pugachev led a Cossack revolt during the reign of Catherine II (1773–74). Savnikov was one of the leaders of the Combat Organization of the SR Party, and Deputy War Minister under the Provisional Government.


127. Ibid., 341.


130. Kutsenko, Marshak v Krasnodare, 363–64.

131. Eremeeva, “Pod rokot grazhdanskikh bur’ . . .” 249–50. The two poems were first published in the Odessa Izobmoe Slovo on September 11 (24) and August 29 (September 10), 1919, respectively.

132. Published in Kiev’skaia Zhisn’ on September 27, 1919. Cited according to V. Popov, and B. Frezinskii, Il’ia Erenburg: Khronika zhizni i tvorchestva (v dokumentakh, pis’makh, vyskazyvaniakh i soobshcheniakh pressy, svidetel’stvakh sovremennikov) 1891–1923 (St. Petersburg, 1993), 1:57.

134. Popov, *Il’ia Erenburg* 173–74. Published in *Kievskia zhizn’* October 9 (22), 1919, the day after Shulgin’s article.


136. A number of Ehrenburg’s articles are reprinted in *De Visu*, no. 0 (1992): 5–11.


139. For more on intelligence and propaganda under Vrangel see Ross, *Vrangel’ v Krymu*, 265–86.

140. Ross, *Vrangel’ v Krymu*, 255.


142. Ibid.


150. V. Vostokov, “*Nezabvennye krymskie vechera letom 1920 goda,*” Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Columbia University, New York, Vladimir Vostokov, Memoirs. It should be pointed out that Vostokov only found out about his daughter’s death a year after her murder. His antisemitic sermons had begun at a much earlier date.

151. Georgii Shavel’skii, *Vospominaniia poslednego protopresvitera russkoi armii i flota,* (Moscow, 1996), 2:345, 346. According to Vostokov, Shavel’skii gave him a “serious warning” from General I. P. Romanovskii for his statements about Jews at the church council. Vostokov believed the general to be sympathizing with “the Red international” and retorted, “How can one not speak about those who still breathe with Jewish malice?” (Vostokov, “Nezabvennye krymskie vechera letom 1920 goda”) Vostokov also called those who had criticized his actions a “Jewish synedrion” (see Shavel’skii, 348).

152. Obolenskii, “*Krym pri Vrangele,*” 385.

153. According to Vostokov’s memoirs, Bishop Beniamin (Fedchenkov) actually asked him not to mention the Jews in his sermons, as his speeches “made many uncomfortable.” (See Vostokov, “Nezabvennye krymskie vechera letom 1920 goda.”)


155. Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolaevich (1871–1944). Publicist, philosopher, economist, social figure. In the 1890s, was a “legal Marxist.” Made the evolution “from Marxism to idealism.”
Deputy of the Second State Duma. Contributor to *Vekhi* (1909) and *Iz glubiny* (1918). In June of 1918 entered the priesthood. Moved to Crimea in July, where he became a professor at Tauride University in Simferopol. Exiled from Russia in 1922. Bulgakov’s works on the “Jewish question” have been collected in Bulgakov, S. *Khristianstvo i evreiskii vopros* (Paris, 1991).

156. Maklakov to Bakhmetev, October 21, 1921, in “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel’no!” 1:256–57.

157. Bulgakov’s antisemitism was hardly “sudden,” although there was no way Mirskii could have known about this. See S. N. Bulgakov, “Agonia,” in *Khristianskii Sotsializm* (S. N. Bulgakov): *Spyry o sud’bah Rossi* (Novosibirsk, 1991), 313. Bulgakov would only publicly display his antisemitism by 1920.


160. For more on the Russian Orthodox Church during the revolution and Civil War see D. V. Pospelovskii, *Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’ v XX veke* (Moscow, 1995), 35–60.

161. Neratov to Ambassador (Krivoshein for Maklakov), October 30, 1920, HIA, Girs. 6–2.

162. “Pod fl agom religii: V stane fon-Vrangelia,” *Revoliutsiia i tserkov’,* no. 9–12 (1920): 53. It would appear that the authors of the Soviet anti-religious journal somehow managed to get information from Paris. An anonymous Soviet publicist, speaking of Bulgakov as the author of pogromistic proclamations, cited a “very famous Russian diplomat.” This could only have been Maklakov.


CHAPTER 6

1. See the Introduction to the current study (n. 2); see also “Pogromy,” *Kratkaia evreiskaia entsiklopedia* (Jerusalem, 1992), 6:569–75; “Ukraina,” *Kratkaia evreiskaia entsiklopedia* (Jerusalem, 1992), 8:1226.

2. In May of 1919, The Editorial Board of the Collection and Publication of Materials on Pogroms in the Ukraine (*Redaktsionnaia Kollegia po sobiraniu i publikatsii materialov o pogromakh na Ukraine*), founded by the Central Committee for the Assistance of Pogrom Victims in Kiev, released the following statement: “Jews! The terrible curse of pogroms has descended upon our cities and towns, and the world knows nothing of it; We ourselves know little of what is taking place.” They asked witnesses and victims of pogroms to send in their own accounts of events. The testimony received served as the foundation for the Archive of Eastern European Jewry, which was located in Berlin from 1921 onwards. After Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, part of the archive was sent to Vilna, while another part went to Paris. In 1942, Nazis destroyed the Vilna portion of the archive, while the materials in Paris were sent to New York, where they are now located in the Institute for Jewish Research (YIVO). See D. Roskies, *Against the Apocalypse: Responses to Catastrophe in Modern Jewish Culture* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 138–40.


7. Letters from the Dolginovo and Velizh Vilna gubernia (July 26, August 9, 1919) in “Chastnye pis’ma epokhi grazhdanskoi voiny (Po materialam voennoi tsenzury),” *Neizvestnaia Rossia*: XX vek, vypusk 2 (Moscow, 1992), 240–41.


9. Gergel, “The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1918–21,” 250–51. See also the Introduction to this study (n 2)


11. Headed by I. M. Cherikover, the Editorial Board of the Collection and Publication of Materials on Pogroms had originally planned to publish a seven-volume work entitled *The History of the Pogrom Movement in Ukraine*. Cherikover’s *Antisemitizm i pogromy na Ukraine, 1917–1918*, was published in Berlin in 1923, while *Di Ukrayner pogromen in yor 1919* (in Yiddish) was published posthumously in New York in 1965. Other works included Schechtman’s *Pogromy Dobrovol’cheskoj armii*, Shitf’s planned monograph on insurrectionist pogroms exists in manuscript form, while the other works were never completed. See Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government*, 175–76.


17. Gusev-Orenburgskii, Bagrovaia Kniga, 3.
18. Cherikover, Beloe dvizhenie i evrei, 7.
20. Pavliuchenkov, Voennii kommunizm vRossii, 258.
21. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 676. The Ukrainian historian V. Sergiichuk, has published a valuable collection of documents relating to the pogroms. He is more inclined to defend “his own” and accuses the Bolsheviks of “trying to put responsibility for the pogroms on the Ukrainian national liberation movement.” According to him, antisemitism first came from external forces who robbed Jews, who then “blamed us for everything.” (See V. Sergiichuk, Pogromi v Ukraini: 1914–1920. Vid shtrukhnikh stereotipov do girkoi pravdy, prikhuwanyKH v radians’kikh arkhivakh [Kiev, 1998], 15–16, 56.)
22. In Russia, the Whites carried out pogroms in Balashov (twice) in Tsaritsyn (Saratov gubernia), Biriuch (Voronezh gubernia), Belgorod (Kursk gubernia), Tambov, Kozlov (Tambov gubernia), Elets and Livny (Orel gubernia). See Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovol’cheskoi armii na Ukraine, 385.
23. Chastnye pis’ma epokhi grazhdanskoi voiny, 240, letters from Balashov and Arkadsk (Saratov gubernia) from July 23 and August 11 1919.
29. Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 106.
30. Ibid.
31. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 677–78.
32. Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 101.
33. Ibid., 104–5.
34. A. I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smutny, vols. 4–5 (Moscow, 2003), 5:120.
35. Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovol’cheskoi armii na Ukraine, 153.
36. According to Brutskus, “in all of the events of 1917–1918 we constantly come across one phenomenon that must be deemed typical for Ukraine. No matter who or why was starting a pogrom in a Jewish village or town, the Ukrainian peasant would hitch his horse in order to carry off the Jewish goods, and then gradually start to join in the pogrom itself” (see Hoover Institute Archives [HIA], Petr Struve Collection, 25–26). This observation would mostly hold true for ensuing years as well.
happened on a fairly regular basis, including the mobilization of 1914, which many believe to have been largely peaceful. In conflicts between conscripts and the police 12 senior policemen were killed and 94 injured. Among the lower ranks 247 were killed and 258 wounded (not including the Minsk and Mogilev gubernias). Minister of Internal Affairs N. A. Maklakov telegraphed the following to the governors of Tomsk and Minsk: “You need to shoot while pacifying these riots. These pogroms are inadmissible, they ruin the reserves and undermine authority, they must be put to an end without mercy” (see A. B. Berkevich, “Krest’ianstvo i vseobshchaia mobilizatsiia v iiule 1914,” in Istoricheskie zapiski, vol. 23 [Moscow, 1947]: 41).

42. “Iz ‘chernoi knigi,’” 271.
46. M. Ronge, Razvedka i kontrrazvedka (Moscow, 1937), 103.
47. V. Nikolai, Tainye sily: Internatsional’nyi shpionazh i bor’ba s nim vo vremia mirvoi voiny i v nastoiashchee vremia (Moscow, 1925), 71.
51. See Chapter 4 of this study (163–64 in original)

when available

53. According to M. Altshuler, 500,000–600,000 Jews were deported or resettled during the war (see M. Altshuler, “Russia and Her Jews: The Impact of the 1914 War,” The Wiener Library Bulletin 27, no. 30/31 [1973]: 14); while J. Frankel believes that the total had already reached a million by the end of 1915 (J. Frankel, ed., Studies in Contemporary Jewry: An Annual. 4: The Jews and the European Crisis, 1914–1922 [Bloomington, Ind., 1988], 6). See also the materials published by M. M. Vinaver, D. O. Zaslavskii, and

55. S’ezy i konferentsi konstutionno-democraticeskoi parti, vol. 3, kniga 1, 146.
56. Aschheim, Brothers and Strangers, 143.
Entry from October 29, 1914.
60. Ibid., 93–94.
64. Ibid., 72.
65. Ibid., 75.
66. Ronge, Razvedka i kontrrazvedka, 104.
67. Grekov, Russkaia kontrrazvedka, 104.
69. Ronge, Razvedka i kontrrazvedka, 94–96.
70. “Iz ‘chernoi knigi,’” 196.
72. “Iz ‘chernoi knigi,’” 228.
75. Ibid., 282–83.
76. Ibid., 292–95; Evreiskie pogromy v Rossiiskoi imperii, 233–39.
78. D. A. El’iashevich, Pravitel’stvennaia politika i evreiskaia pechat’, 491. Citation from Armeiskii Vestnik (October 18, 1915) and Razvedchik (April 20, 1915).
82. “Evreiskie pogromy v Rossiiskoi imperii,” 221.
83. Ibid., 229.
84. Ibid., 224.
89. *Evreiskie pogromy*, 225. The letter, dated August 5, 1915 and seized by the censors, attracted the attention of the director of the police department.
92. *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 27 (July 9, 1917), 19.
94. Ibid., 2.
95. *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 27 (July 9, 1917), 20; no. 28 (July 16, 1917), 16–18.
96. S. Pozner, “Neobkhodimo rassledovanie,” *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 32 (August 13, 1917), 1–2. In the same issue there is information (dated July 30) related to pogromistic activity in Kiev. (Ibid., 18–19.)
98. Homo Longus, “Pogrom na Solianke (Pis’mo iz Moskvy),” *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 35 (September 3, 1917), 4–7.
101. One versta is approximately 1.07 kilometers.
106. V. V. Kanishchev, *Russkii bunt—besmyslenyi i besposhchadnyi: Pogromnoe dvizhenie v gorodakh Rossii v 1917–1918gg.* (Tambov, 1995), 100, 84.
113. “Pogrom,” *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 41 (October 15, 1917), 20. Many of the details in the *Evreiskaia nedelia* account were taken from an article in *Utro Rossii*.
115. *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 11 (May 18, 1918), 17.
120. Ibid., 3.
126. Ibid., 196.
127. V. A. Poliakov, “Zhutkie dni na Ukraine,” *Evreiskaia letopis’,* sbornik 2 (Petrograd, Moscow, 1923), 21–23. In Slobodka, then under White control, a nurse was brought for treatment from Kiev, where she had allegedly been attacked with sulfuric acid by “the Jews.” Later it was discovered that she had spilled boiling water on herself (ibid., 32–33). Naturally, few were interested in the real version of events.
128. V. A. Poliakov, “Pytka strakhom,” *Evreiskaia letopis’,* Sh. tretii (Leningrad, Moscow, 1924), 61.
132. Ibid., 54.
137. S. A. Pavliuchenkov, *Voennyi kommunizm v Rossii*, 255.
138. Ibid., 256.
140. Ibid., 227.
143. Kievlianin, December 2 (15), 1919. Cited according to the excerpt from GARF, f. 5974, op. 1, d. 27.
144. E. N. Trubetskoi, “Iz putevykh zametok bezhentsa,” Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii (Berlin, 1926; reprint, Moscow, 1993), 18:184–85. Trubetskoi’s remarks are particularly valuable in that they were not influenced by ensuing events (his memoirs were completed by June 22, 1919). N. N. Alekseev’s recounting of the requisition process, by contrast, was more sympathetic in regards to the acts of violence carried out (see N. N. Alekseev, “Iz vospominaniiii,” 18: 206–7).
146. Trubetskoi, Iz proshloho, 187.
149. V. Korolenko, Dnevnik 1917–1921. Pis’ma (Moscow, 2001), 255–56.
150. Ibid., 230–37. Entry from July 18 (31), 1919. The Cossacks seemed to sincerely believe that pillaging was their right. When a Jewish delegation came to A. G. Shkuro during the pogrom in Ekaterinoslav with donating proposal to donate money to the army, Shkuro gave them the following response: “If you think this will stop the pogrom, you are mistaken. Cossacks prefer stolen goods to those given to them freely” (see V. A. Miakotin, “Iz nedalekogo proshloho,” Na chuzhoi storone, kniga 10 [1925], 216). In an interview with the Rostov newspaper Parus, Shkuro announced that command would undertake all necessary measures to stop pogroms, claiming that “as far as the Cossacks are concerned, they feel no enmity towards the Jews.” According to Shkuro, the Cossacks were being provoked by “certain segments of the population.” He likewise claimed that no Jewish had been killed by the troops under his command. Though he admitted there were instances of robbery and rape, he professed that he took severe measures in such cases (see “Shkuro o pogromakh,” Evreiskaia Tribuna, April 9, 1920, 6–7). Shkuro presents a similar version in his memoirs, although he does note that the very same Cossacks who allegedly had no hatred for the Jews massacred every Jewish Red Army soldier that they managed to capture (see A. G. Shkuro, Zapiski belogo partizana [Moscow, 2004], 221–23).
152. V. V. Shul’gin, Shto nam v nikh ne nравится (St. Petersburg, 1992), 75.


157. Kievlianin, no. 37 (October 8 [21], 1919). Cited according to Shul’gin, Shto nam v nikh ne nravitsia, 81.

158. Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 133.

159. In the work of the Jewish author Sholem Aleichem, “Egupets” was used as a term for Kiev.


161. Ibid., 297. A slightly different version of this episode was recorded by Ehrenburg’s acquaintance, Ia. I. Sommer: “The shy little officer came by the Kozinetsv’s and stuffed a silver cigarette case in his pocket, abashedly mumbling ‘I’ll take this to remember you by’” (see Ia. Sommer, “Zapiski,” Minusvess: Istoriicheskii al’manakh vypusk 17 [Moscow, St. Petersburg, 1994], 135).


164. Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 134.


166. Nazhivin, Zapiski iz revoliutsii, 179.

167. GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 110, l. 35–35 ob.


169. Pasmanik, Revoliusionnye gody v Krymu, 150.


171. V. Shverubovich, O liudiakh, o teatre, i o sebe (Moscow, 1976), 210.

172. D. Glikman, “Nedavnie byli,” in Evreiskaia letopis’, sbornik 4 (Leningrad, Moscow, 1926), 175. Glikman witnessed how Cossacks outside the city forced Jews to get off a train headed for Kharkov. He himself (along with his wife and son) were forced to spend a night on the station platform while waiting for the next train to Kharkov. Fortunately for him, he did not have an overly Jewish appearance. In all likelihood, this saved his life, or at the very least prevented him from being robbed (ibid., 170–74).


174. Ptashkina, Dnevnik, 315.


176. HIA, Russia, Posol’stvo (France), 36–7. O. Figes is mistaken in his assertion that Mai-Maevskii ordered pogroms (see Figes, A People’s Tragedy, 678).
177. HIA, Russia, Posol'stvo (France), 36–7.
178. Ibid.
179. I. B. Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovol'cheskoj armii na Ukraine, 347–48; Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 135.
180. HIA, Russia, Posol'stvo (France), 36–7.
181. Ibid.
182. Neratov to Poklevskii, HIA, Girs, 5–1.
183. HIA, Petr Vrangel Collection, 38–24.
184. Ibid.
185. HIA, Vrangel, 38–1.
186. Ibid.
188. Denikin, Ocherki, 538.
189. HIA, Russia, Posol'stvo (France). I cite the typewritten copy of the document that was located at the Russian Embassy in Paris. Although it is impossible to tell who may have made the marks in pencil (V. A. Maklakov, and S. D. Sazonov are but two possible candidates), it is interesting that marks were only made in the section of the text that addressed pogroms. It would appear that pogroms were a particularly pressing issue for the diplomatic corps at this time. One can be certain that the Commander-in-Chief read this report as well.
190. Alekseev, Iz vospominani, 230.
191. A podporuchik by the name of N. F. Sigida, who at the time served as a counterintelligence agency for the Volunteer Army, was in Rostov during the spring of 1918 when German forces occupied the city. Along with a poruchik by the name of Belov, Sigida was given the right to engage in an independent search for those suspected of Bolshevism. In most cases, he arrested people on the basis of “testimonies of witnesses, denunciations, or a document that put them under suspicion . . . deliberations never took more than one day. After this period of time the person under arrest, no matter who he might have been, was either freed . . . or shot. We had no other punishment, and were extremely careful in our decisions. Naturally [italics mine], we showed no mercy to the Jews, but they themselves are to blame for that” (see “‘Nashi agenty ot militsionera do narkoma’: Vospominaniia belogo kontrrazvedchika Nikolaia Sigildy,” published by V. Bortnevskii, Rodina, no. 10 [1990]: 66–67). This case was hardly exceptional. The writer Leri (real name V. V. Klopotovskii) had the following to say regarding the “particular breed” of Volunteers who preferred “peaceful labor” to the battles at the front:

On the walls of the honorable counterintelligence service,  
Where the young officers were not threatened by the smoke of war  
Where, like jackals in a cage,  
One could hear a heartrending call (though hardly new)  
“Save Russia—beat the Yids!”

See Leri, Onegin nashikh dnei: satiricheskaia poema (Berlin, n.d.), 88–89.
192. HIA, Russia, Posol’stvo (France), 21–6.
193. Jews were often accused by intelligence agencies of spreading rumors harmful to the Volunteer Army. A case in point is the following report made on October 19, 1919 by a certain Lieutenant Fedorov, who worked for the intelligence division of the Commander-in-Chief. Describing the numerous civil disturbances occurring in Kharkov, he has the following to say regarding the Jewish population: “In concluding my examination of the reasons for the given state of affairs, it must be noted that the Jews, in their discontent and irresponsible criticism, have played an extremely harmful role. The local Jews have served as the best conduit for all kinds of gossip and panic-inducing rumors. All insinuations regarding the Volunteer Army, according to our information, are of Jewish origin . . .” (see HIA, Petr Vrangel, 38–15).

194. Denikin, Ocherki, 536. Here Denikin is referring to information gathered by the Extraordinary Commission in charge of investigating Bolshevik atrocities. Although the members of the Commission claimed that “they never put before themselves the task of specifically examining the role of the Jewry in the Bolshevik movement,” they nevertheless compiled a “brief report” consisting of 29 typewritten pages dedicated to precisely this issue. The report also included calculations of the number of Jews in various Soviet organs (on occasion the numbers reflected reality, in other cases they simply included anyone with a “suspicious” name among the Jews), and some rather fantastical accounts of female Jewish machine-gunners and other unlikely events. The report was sent to all Russian representatives stationed abroad; it would seem that the diplomatic corps mostly ignored its contents (see HIA, Russia, Posol’stvo [France], 28–8). Although Denikin in all likelihood did not believe the entirety of the report’s contents, he did seem to take at face value the claim that Jewish communists were rabidly anti-Christian: “Particularly in those places where the Church was persecuted, those in charge of the persecution were unbaptized foreign Bolsheviks, carried away by their hatred for Russian Orthodoxy to such an extent that they took no measures to lessen their leading role in the persecution” (see Denikin, Ocherki, 536–37). Even if Jewish Bolsheviks did play a particularly visible role in the persecution of the Church, they pursued the destruction of Judaism with equal (if not greater) zeal. Militant atheism and the “international proletariat” attacked all ethnic and religious “prejudices” with equal vigor.

195. Denikin, Ocherki, 540; Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovol’cheskoi armii na Ukrainе, 286–87.
197. Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovol’cheskoi armii na Ukrainе, 281–82.
199. “B. V. Savinkov i evreiskii vopros,” Obshchee Delo, October 18, 1920, 2. Savnikov’s article was published in the Warsaw newspaper Svoboda on October 16, 1920.
200. S. N. Bulak-Balakhovich’s units operated in Belarus in 1920 under the command of B. V. Savinkov as part of the Polish army. By this time, Bulak-Balakhovich’s troops were already known to have committed acts of violence against Jews. The peak of their bloody “accomplishments,” however, took place in 1921. They killed 120 people in the small town of Kopatkevichi on July 9, 1921. Seven days later (July 16, 1921) they slaughtered an additional 84 individuals in the shtetl of Kovchitsy. On November 23, they claimed an additional 72 victims in the town of Bolshie Gorodiatichi (see “Pogromy,” 6574).


205. V. V. Shul’gin, *Dni*; 1920 (Moscow, 1989), 286–87.


210. Peter Kenez is mistaken in the claim that “the Volunteer Army killed as many Jews as all other armies taken together” (*Pogroms and White Ideology*, 302). In this case, first place goes to the troops of the Directorate and its allies. However, it is worth noting that the Volunteer Army was a more or less disciplined and organized military force whose membership included graduates from the military academy.


215. Pipes, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*, 106. Soon after the collection *Rossiia i evrei* was published, Schechtman wrote the following: “One of the leaders of the Bund, the deceased Medem, claimed that during the time of the 1905 revolution and accompanying pogroms ‘Jewish blood was the oil that greased the wheel of the Russian revolution.’ Now we see Bikerman, the Jewish apostle of the Russian counterrevolution, likewise demand that the Jewish people attribute the blood spilled by the Whites not to pogroms, but to the Civil War in general. The Jewish people should be satisfied with this, and should extend their hand to those who have spilt their blood, and be happy that it served as the oil that greased the wheel of the Russian reaction” (Schechtman, “Grimasy golusa,” *Narodnata mysl’* [Riga], December 23, 1923, 3–4).
CHAPTER 7

1. V. Kel’ner, “Dva intsidenta,” Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve, no. 3 (10) (1995): 192–93. The “Chirikov affair” involved a scandal regarding the writer E. N. Chirikov’s comments regarding a play by the Yiddish-language dramatist Sholem Asch. Chirikov’s remarks were interpreted as a protest against the influx of Jews in Russian literature.


9. Ibid., 62. S. N. Miasoedov was a Russian colonel accused of assisting the Germans in 1915. Although the evidence against him was rather insignificant, he was none the less sentenced to death on March 18, 1915. It appears that Miasoedov’s fate was tragically similar to that of Tolstoy’s character Vereshchagin from War and Peace.

10. Ibid., 80.

11. Ibid., 80–82.

12. Ibid., 85.

13. Ibid., 89.


15. Ibid., 269.

16. Ibid., 706.

17. Ibid., 741.


19. N. K. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina (Sofia, 1921), 52–53.

20. Protokoly, 484.

21. Ibid., 485.

22. Aleksandr Abramovich Vilenkin (1883–1918) was a member of the Party of People’s Socialists. A cavalry officer, he served on the Army Committee for the Fifth Army at the Northwestern front, and then worked for the Moscow Union of Jewish Soldiers.
After the Bolshevik coup, he participated in the Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom, for which he was eventually arrested by the Cheka and shot.

23. Ibid., 488–89.
24. Ibid., 489.

25. Vostokov, Vladimir Ignatievich (1868–1957); see 269–71 of this study. [Please revise when English edition page numbers are available]


28. G. N. Trubetskoi, Gody smut i nadezhd. 1917–1919 (Montreal, 1981), 169–70. See 189–92 of this study. [Please revise when English edition page numbers are available]


31. Protokoly, 490.
32. Ibid.
33. “Protokoly zasedania TsK, Ekaterinodar 2, iunia 1919 g. ’’ in Protokoly, 499.
34. Sokolov, Prawlenie generala Denikina, 93–94. Sokolov’s claims would seem to ring true. He so rarely appeared at the Department (which was based in Rostov-on-Don) that he earned the nickname “the invisible minister.” See V. Amfiteatrov-Kadashev, “Stranitsy iz dnevnika,” Minuvshee: Istoricheskii al’manakh, vypusk 20 (Moscow, St. Petersburg, 1996), 595.


37. V. V. Shul’gin, Doi; 1920 (Moscow, 1990), 181.
38. Here it should be noted that I am only talking about those Kadets who actively participated in the White movement while in Russia. Several Kadets who had remained abroad managed to maintain more “traditional” Kadet values.

39. See Chapters 3 and 10 of this study.
42. S’ezdy, 1918–1920 gg., vol. 3, kniga 2, 147.
44. Kievlianin, no. 70 (November 16, 1919).
46. Ibid., 136.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 137.
49. Ibid., 136.
50. Ibid., 138.
51. Ibid., 139.
52. Ibid., 141.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., 142.
55. Ibid., 142–43.
56. Protokoly, 521.
57. Ibid., 522.
58. “Beseda s P. P. Gronskim,” Evreiskaia tribuna, no. 7 (February 13, 1920).
64. Ibid.
67. Here, Pasmanik is referring to Shulgin’s article “Tortured by Fear” (Pytka strakhom).
68. BAR, Paul Miliukov Papers, Box 10, Paul Miliukov’s diary, 710–11. Entry from April 24, 1920.
69. Ibid., 712.
70. Having spent two years in Bolshevik hands, Nolde (a former deputy Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government) repudiated nearly every action the White Kadets had undertaken.
71. Ibid., 724–25.

CHAPTER 8

1. The decision to annul the agreement was passed by Congress in December of 1911, though it did not take effect until January 1, 1913.
3. S. A. Uget to Posol [V. A. Maklakov], March 8, 1919, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Girs Collection 1–2 (hereafter cited as “HIA” and “Girs”).

4. The Russian Political Delegation (RPD) was a group of Russian politicians and diplomats that was founded due to initiative of B. A. Bakhmetev and V. A. Maklakov in Paris in December 1918. The goal of the organization was to defend Russian interests during the Paris peace talks. As none of the anti-Bolshevik governments were recognized by the European powers, the Delegation served as a kind of “surrogate” for national diplomatic representation. The delegation was headed by Prince G. E. Lvov, and it members included S. D. Sazonov, the Foreign Minister for the Denikin and Kolchak governments, M. N. Girs, the Russian ambassador to Italy, P. B. Struve, and others. It was dissolved in July of 1919. See J. M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, N.J., 1966), 66–81; O. V. Budnitskii, “Posdy nesushchstvuusichei strany” in “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel’no!” B. A. Bakhmetev—V. A. Maklakov: Perepiska 1919–1951 v 3 t. (Moscow and Stanford, Calif., 2001–2), 157–59.


8. HIA, Russia, Posol’stvo (U.S.), 211–1.

9. A. I. Zak to M. M. Karpovich, September 13, 1918, Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and Eastern European History and Culture, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (hereafter cited as BAR), Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 24.

10. Ibid. In the letter cited earlier Zak included large fragments of his English-language correspondence with Schiff and Marshall.

11. A. I. Zak to M. M. Karpovich, October 28, 1918, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 24.

12. D. Shub, “Iz davnikh let,” Novyi Zburnal, kniga 110 (New York, 1973): 280–95. David Natanovich Shub (1887–1973) also worked for the anti-Bolshevik newspaper The People’s Newspaper (Narodnaia Gazeta), which was a joint publication of the SRs and SDs published in New York from March 1918 to August 1919. Founders and contributors included the SDs S. M. Ingerman, M. Kolchin (who also wrote for the Yiddish-language press), the SR K. M. Oberuchev, and others. The newspaper took a moderate position, neither supporting nor opposing Kolchak outright. According to Shub, this was because they understood there was no other way to fight Bolshevism. See D. Shub, “Iz davnikh let.” Novyi Zburnal, kniga 107 (1972): 86–92; kniga 110: 288–89.

13. Struggling Russia, June 14, 1919, 182–84.

15. A. I. Zak to S. A. Uget, June 11, 1919, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 24.


17. A. I. Zak to S. A. Uget, June 11, 1919, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 24.

18. Ibid. Uget’s telegram to Maklakov that included Zak’s message to Vinaver has been published by A. D. Stepanskii in *Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve*, no. 1 (11) (1996): 198–99. According to the version of a copy held in the YIVO archives. The text cited here is from Zak’s letter to Uget dated June 11, 1919. There are insignificant discrepancies between the two texts.

19. The Alliance Israélite Universelle was an international Jewish organization founded in Paris in 1860 for the assistance (particularly in regard to civil rights) of all Jews worldwide. In later years the alliance focused mostly on projects in the sphere of education.


21. Ibid., 342.

22. Ibid., 342–43.

23. Ibid., 344–45. Although Wolf agreed with Vinaver and Gintsburg that a united Russia was in the interests of Jews at large, he also believed that Jews must recognize (and submit to) the interests of the country they were citizens of. See Levene, *Wars, Jews, and the New Europe*, 241–42.


26. For a comparison see “Bolshevizm i russkoe evreistvo,” 199; and *Struggling Russia*, July 12, 1919, 251.

27. V. A. Maklakov to Poverennomu v delakh v Washington (Vinaver to Zak), June 25, 1919.


35. N. V. Ustrialov to A. I. Zak, September 4, 1919, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 25.
36. Z. Szajkowski, Kolchak, Jews and the American Intervention in Northern Russia and Siberia, 1918–1920 (New York, 1977), 72. For a full account of the “diplomatic history” surrounding the Ekaterinburg pogrom, see 68–73 in the same study.
37. M. M. Karpovich to A. I. Zak, October 10, 1919; A. I. Zak to J. Schiff, October 15, 1919; J. Schiff to A. I. Zak, October 17, 1919, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 25.
38. A. I Zak to M. M Karpovich, December 19, 1919, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 24.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. A. I Zak to K. N. Sokolov, September 24, 1919, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 24.
42. Ibid.
43. The Russian Political Delegation in Paris was headed by Lvov. Its membership included Maklakov, Sazonov, and N.V. Chaikovskii. In order to strengthen its democratic credentials, it later extended membership to B.V. Savinkov. The delegation was approved by Kolchak.
44. A. I. Zak to J. Schiff, September 30, 1919, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 25.
45. B. A. Bakhmetev to Ministru [Sazonov], October 4, 1919, HIA, Girs 4–2.
47. See Struggling Russia, November 29, 1919, 595–96.
48. A. I. Zak to M. M. Karpovich, December 2, 1919, BAR, Boris Bakhmeteff Collection, Box 25.
51. E. V. Sablin to Ministru [Sazonov], HIA, Girs, 5–1.
52. A. I. Zak to I. K. Okulich, July 2, 1919, State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. 197, op. 5, d. 102, l. 2–3.
53. GARF, f. 197, op. 5, d. 102, l. 2–3.
54. I. K. Okulich to I. A. Mikhailov, July 9, 1919, GARF, f. 197, op. 5, d. 102, l. 1.
57. Girs, 5–1.
58. Posol to M. I. D., October 14, 1919, HIA, Russia, Posol’stvo (U.S.), 3–1.
59. Posol to M. I. D., October 17, 1919, Ibid.; Tovarishch M.I.D. to Posol v Vashingtone, October 22, 1919, HIA, Russia, Posol’stvo (U.S.), 3–2; Posol to M.I.D., December 12, 1919, HIA, Russia, Posol’stvo (U.S.), 4–1.
60. A. I. Zak to S. A. Uget, March 7, 1922, HIA, Russia, Posol'stvo (U.S.), 211–1.
61. Leeds Russian Archive (hereafter LRA), Zemgor Collection.
62. LRA, Zemgor Collection.
63. S. D. Botkin to S. D. Sazonov, December 26, 1919 (January 8, 1920, old style), LRA, Zemgor Collection.
64. S. D. Botkin to B. E. Nol’dé, December 28, 1919 (January 10, 1920), LRA, Zemgor Collection.
66. B. I. El’kin to M. M. Vinaver, February 16, 1920, GARF, f. 5818 op. 1, d. 38, l. 5–6.
67. The first issue of the journal that is located in the Russian State Library is dated February 27, 1920. This is a clear typographical error. As the publishers themselves wrote five years later, in the final edition of the Jewish Tribune, the first edition appeared on December 19, 1919. For more on the Jewish Tribune, see V. Kaplan, “‘Evreiskaia Tribuna’ o Rossii i russkom evreistve,” Evrei v kul’ture russkogo zarubezh’ia, no. 2 (Jerusalem, 1994):167–80; V. E. Kel’ner, “Dolgoe proshchanie (M. M. Vinaver i izdanie zhurnala Evreiskaia tribuna) in V. E. Kel’ner, Ocherki po istorii rusko-evreiskogo knizhnogo dela vo vtoroi polovine XIX-nachale XX v. (St. Petersburg, 2003), 158–70.
69. The letters from Blank to Vinaver from September 26 and an undated letter from September 1919 are cited according to Kel’ner, Ocherki po istorii rusko-evreiskogo knizhnogo dela, 159–60.
70. The word used in the original is galusistov. Galut (or golus) is Hebrew for exile. In the Jewish tradition, it is most often associated with the forced departure from Israel.
72. Evreiskaia tribuna, no. 1 (February 20, 1920), 1.
75. Ibid., 4.
76. Ibid.
78. S. Poliakov, “Kto okruzaet Lenina?” Evreiskaia tribuna, no. 1 (February 20, 1920), 8–9.
79. See A. G. Kavtaradze, Voennye specialisty na sluzhbe republike Sovetov (Moscow, 1988).
81. B. I. El’kin to M. M. Vinaver, February 16, 1919, GARF, f. 5818 op. 1, d. 38, l. 4 ob., 5.
82. Kel’ner, Ocherki po istorii rusko-evreiskogo knizhnogo dela, 162.
83. A. Margolin, Ukraina i politika Antanty (Zapiski evreia i grazhdanina) (Berlin: Izdatel’stvo S. Efron, 1922), 56.
84. Ibid., 127.
85. B. I. El’kin to M. M. Vinaver, February 16, 1919, GARF, f. 5881, op. 1, d. 38, l. 6.
89. For more on Knox and his relationship with Jews, see R. Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, November 1918-February 1920 (Princeton, N.J., 1968), 30.
90. School of Slavonic and East European Studies Library, University of London, Lucien Wolf Papers, Box 1. The package that contains the collected materials on Jewish participation in the murder of the Tsar’s family includes various letters and statements on the question, and also includes excerpts from British newspapers, including The Westminster Gazette, Pall Mall Gazette, The Times, The Evening News, and others.
91. P. M. Blank to L. Wolf, [August] 26, 1920, School of Slavonic and East European Studies Library, University of London, Lucien Wolf Papers, Box 1. The originals are all in English.
93. The murder of the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich, a possible successor to the throne, was carried out by “Orthodox Russians.” See G. Miasnikov, “Filosofia ubistva, ili Pochemu i kak ia ubil Mikhaila Romanova” in Minuvshee: Istoriicheskii Al’manakh, vypusk 18 (Moscow and St. Petersburg, 1995), 7–191; N. A. Soklov, Ubiistvo tsarskoi sem’i (Moscow, 1990), 318–22; V. Khrustalev, Gibel’ imperatorskogo doma. 1917–1919 gg. (Moscow, 1992), 90–125, 275–311.
95. Soklov, Ubiistvo tsarskoi sem’i, 218.
96. [My translation. —Trans.]
103. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
1. Platon (Porfiri Fedorovich Rozhdestvenskii) (1866–1934), an experienced politician, well versed in international affairs, deputy (from Kiev) of the Second Duma, head of Department of External and Internal Missions of the Holy Synod of Russian Orthodox Church (1917–18).

2. Anatoly Anatolievich Neratov (1863–?), professional diplomat, from 1910 to 1917 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, member of State Council; from autumn 1918 effective head of the Department of Foreign Affairs at the Special Council under the Commander in Chief of Military Forces of the South of Russia (Denikin).

3. Platon to Neratov (copy), February 2 (15), 1919, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Girs Collection, 41–8 (hereafter cited as “HIA” and “Girs”).


7. Evgraf Petrovich Kovalevskii (1865–1941), landowner, right-wing liberal, member of the Academic Committee of Ministry of Public Education, Deputy of Third and Fourth State Dumas, Chairman of the Commission of Public Education of the State Duma.

8. It is interesting to note that Kovalevskii had earlier touched upon the topic of a Jewish state in a response to a survey titled “The Future of Palestine” in the journal Evrei na voine (Jews at War). “For all my sympathy and [desire] for a successful resolution to the Jewish question, I must say that England’s intent to create an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine is premature.” Kovalevskii felt that Great Britain’s interests in the region were minimal, and that Russian and France should play the leading roles in Palestine. He also believed that the interests of Palestinian Jews must “be discussed” but that “the thought of creating a Jewish state in Palestine, where the Jews would comprise 15 percent of the population and Muslims 85 percent” was hopelessly utopian (Evrei na voine, no. 3 [Moscow, 1915]). In 1915, the “intent” of Great Britain had not been declared in any sort of document, not even one as vague as the Balfour Declaration.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Neratov to Sazonov, March 11, 1919, Girs, 1–2. The complicated and unreliable system of communications employed by the Whites meant that telegrams took a long time to be delivered. The aforementioned telegram of Neratov thus reached Paris on
March 15, simultaneously with another telegram regarding Platon’s initiative that was sent on March 4.


15. Ibid.


18. Ibid., 138.


23. Following Sazonov’s dismissal by Vrangel, Girs became the senior White diplomatic representative abroad. The Department of Foreign Relations was headed by P. B. Struve, while Girs was stationed in Paris, where Lysakovskii sent his reports. Girs’s position was equivalent to that of Sazonov. Sazonov was formally a minister, but spent all his time in Paris rather than divide it between the headquarters of two of his governments (Kolchak’s and Denikin’s). At this point the ministry (the Department of Foreign Relations) was headed by P. B. Struve, but Lysakovskii still sent his reports to Paris, where Girs was permanently stationed, while retaining his position as ambassador to Italy on paper.


26. Ibid.


29. Kruglov was slow to adopt the Gregorian calendar, which was introduced in Russia in July. Thus, his report was dated June 21, although it was devoted to events that occurred on the 30th of the same month; evidently, the Russian diplomat dated all his messages in the old style. In any case, on the typewritten copies of his letter it was noted that it had been received at the Diplomatic Agency in Alexandria on July 19; therefore, the date on Kruglov’s letter was not a misprint, i.e., it was prepared not on July 21, as one might have supposed, but in the first days of July, right on the heels of the events.


32. Ibid.

33. Kruglov to the envoy in Egypt, August 21, 1920, Girs, 42–2.
34. Meir Dizengoff (1861–1936) a native of Bessarabia. A participant in the populist movement, he was also an activist for emigration to Palestine and later a supporter of the Zionist movement. Dizengoff eventually became one of the founders of Tel Aviv and its first mayor.

35. Kruglov to the envoy in Egypt, November 7, 1920, Girs, 42–1.
37. Lysakovskii to Girs, May 17, 1922, HIA, Russia, Missia (Greece), 54–24.
38. Lysakovskii to Girs, June 14, 1922, Girs, 42–1.
39. Kruglov to Girs, October 3, 1922, Girs, 42–2. The trial of Metropolitan Veniamin on charges of stealing church valuables took place from June 10 until July 5, 1922. There were 86 defendants placed before the Revolutionary Tribunal. Ten of these were sentenced to death by firing squad, although six of those convicted had their sentences commuted to prison terms. On the night of August 12, 1922, the Metropolitan of Petrograd and Gdov Veniamin, the archimandrite Sergii Shein were both executed as were Iu. P. Novitskii (a legal scholar and chairman of the Governing Society of Orthodox parishes in Petrograd) and I. M. Kovsharov (a lawyer’s apprentice and likewise a member of the Governing Society). Judging by the context, Kruglov was still unaware of the Veniamin’s execution. During the trial Iakov Samuilovich Gurovich served as the Veniamin’s counsel, at the latter’s request. Despite Gurovich’s legal mastery, as well as the protests of people around the world, it all came to naught. The sentence was decided beforehand. Gurovich emigrated to France the following year and died in his bed in 1936. Moisei Solomonovich Ravich, who had served as counsel for Novitskii, decided to remain in the Soviet Union and was executed in 1938.

CHAPTER 10

2. M. G. Rafes, *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukrainе* (Evoliutsiia i raskol “Bunda”) (Moscow, 1920), 134. For more on Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the revolution and Civil War period, see Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*.


5. Ibid., 132–33. The parties that comprised the delegation included Bund, United Jewish Socialist Workers Party, Ukrainian Social Democrats, and Menshevik Internationalists.


10. GARF, f. 620, op. 1, d. 6, l. 3–3 ob.

11. RGASPI, f. 271, op. 2, d. 15, l. 19.

12. Ibid., l. 19 ob.

13. RGASPI, f. 271, op. 2, d. 15, l. 15.

14. GARF, f. 620, op. 1, d. 6, l. 5.

15. Ibid.


17. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 2, d. 25, l. 52; V. Sergiichuk, *Usia pravda pro Evreiski pogromi: moviu nevidomikh dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev, 1996), 29.


19. Interestingly, the idea of forming Jewish units of varying sizes was proposed by numerous individuals in differing political contexts from the summer of 1917 onward. In June 1917, Staff Captain Zagarovskii proposed the formation of a Jewish army on the Caucasian front, which would fight against the Turks for the liberation of Palestine. The Union of Jewish Soldiers (Soviets evreiskovo-vozvodov) in Kiev also submitted a plan for forming Jewish units to the War Ministry of the Provisional Government. The organization’s appeal to the government included slogans along the lines of “For a free Russia,” “For a united democracy,” and “For an independent Jewish Palestine.” Similar ideas concerning
the formation of a Jewish volunteer army and militia units were submitted to Konovalov by a delegation from the Petrograd division of the Union of Jewish Soldiers led by S. O. Gruzenberg. Konovalov, a minister in the Provisional Government, reacted positively to their proposals, though he did not take concrete steps toward their realization. (M. Frenkin, *Russkaia armiia i revoliutsiia. 1917–1918* [Munich, 1978], 251–52, 543–44). In June 1918, the Simbirsk Sovdep discussed the possibility of forming Jewish units composed of “refugees from the front.” (See Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Ul’ianovskoi oblasti [State Archives, Ulianovsk oblast], f. R-200. “Protokol Simbirskogo Soveta krest’ianskih, rabochikh, i krasnoarmeiiskikh deputatov No. 62 ot 16 iunia 1918” as recorded by I. E. Sivoplias.) The precedent for such ideas came from the British armed forces, which had formed Jewish units as early as 1915 and later featured the Jewish Legion (38th Royal infantry). The success of these units had a profound effect on Jewish members of the military, and on representatives from Poalei Zion. See Dzh. Patterson, “Sevreiskim otriadom v Gallipoli,” with an afterword by V. Zhabotinskii (Petrograd, 1917); V. Zhabotinskii, *Slovo o Polku: Istoriia evreiskogo legiona po vospominaniiam ego initiatorsa* (Paris, 1928; reprint, Jerusalem, 1988).

20. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 79, l. 3–4.
21. Ibid.
23. GARF, f. 631 c, op. 1, l. 19 ob.–20.
26. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 86, d. 149, l. 2. “Doklad komandiru 4-i strelkovoi brigady 2-i Dondivizii D. Fesenko i voenkoma brigady M. Vainberga, 18 oktiabria 1920.”
28. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 454, l. 1–51.
29. “Bor’ba s antisemitizmom,” *Kommunist* (Kharkov), February 12, 1919.
32. “S pogromshchikami besposhchadnaia rasprava,” *Kommunist* (Kharkov), March 20, 1919.
33. GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 110, l. 10–10 ob., 18 ob. “Doneseniia Kievskogo otdeleniiia ‘Azbuki’ ot 28 marta i 3 aprelia 1919 g.,”
34. HIA, Petr Vrangel Collection, 38–22; GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 52, l. 11–11 ob. “Biuiletten No. 7 Otdela propagandy Osobogo soveshchanii pri shtabe Glavnokomanduiushchego Vooruzhennymi silami luga Rossii ot 21 iunia 1919 g., g. Rostov-na-Donu.
35. GARF, f. 440, op. 1, d. 52, l. 11–11 ob. “Biulleten’ No. 7 Otdela propagandy Osobogo soveshchaniia pri shtabe Glavnokomanduiushchego Vooruzhennymi silami Iuga Rossii ot 21 iiunia 1919 g., g. Rostov-na-Donu.


38. Chastnye pis’ma, 246.


40. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 79, l. 5.


42. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, 167, note 54.


45. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 453, l. 2, 5–5 ob, 23.

46. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 2, d. 3, l. 2.

47. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 453, l. 23. Other members came from Slutsk (15), Bobruisk (16), Klintsy (21), Borisov (15), and other cities and towns.

48. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 453, l. 20.


50. RGASPI, f. 271, op. 1, d. 55, l. 24.

51. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 453, l. 23.

52. Bronislav Grosser (1883–1912) was a lawyer and publicist. A member of the Bund Central Committee, he also served as an editor for a large number of Bundist publications.

53. Ber Borokhov (1881–1917) was a major ideologue and organizer of the Poalei Zion movement.


55. Agurskii, Evreiskii rabochii, 146–47.

56. GARF, f. 8373, op. 1, d. 9, l. 1.

57. RGASPI, f. 271, op. 1, d. 112, l. 82–82 ob.


59. Ibid., 97.

60. Ibid., 98–99.

61. RGASPI, f. 271, op. 2, d. 112, l. 13–13 ob.

62. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 79, l. 116–116 ob.

63. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 79, l. 116–116 ob.

64. RGASPI, f. 271, op. 2, d. 15, l. 31.

65. RGASPI, f. 271, op. 2, d. 15, l. 30–30a ob.
Thousands of conscripts attempted to avoid service in the Red Army through numerous means, including bribery. In this there was little difference between “Greek and Jew.” The Bolsheviks dealt with deserters harshly. Among the punitive measures employed were execution, confiscation of personal property or property of their relatives, beatings, and, on occasion, the execution of family members and relatives. For examples, see Chastnye pis’ma, 219–23. Sometimes completely legal and legitimate means of avoiding service ended tragically. Iona Lur’e, the younger brother of the historian S. Ia. Lur’e, enrolled in a dentistry school in Samara, which allowed him to avoid conscription. Despite this he was arrested and charged with desertion “on the way to enroll in the dentistry school.” When his quarters were searched, authorities discovered his father’s (the doctor Ia. A. Lur’e’s) collection of scientific materials, which had been brought to Samara from Mogilev. The Samara authorities knew nothing of the famous doctor, and added robbery to the list of charges before sentencing him to death. Iona’s older brother set off to Moscow to try to prevent the sentence from being carried out. He was ultimately successful, and a corresponding telegram was sent to Samara with instructions to repeal the sentence. However, when S. Ia. Lur’e arrived back in Samara, his brother had disappeared without a trace. Supposedly the younger brother had been released from prison and had left for parts unknown. According to one version of events, Iona had attempted to find another brother, Anatolii Lur’e, who was then serving as a military doctor in Kolchak’s army. According to another, Iona had sent out for Central Asia, and from there planned to go on to India (or anywhere as far away from Russia as possible). Finally, it is completely plausible that he had been executed before the telegram reached Samara, or even that he had been killed despite the order to repeal the sentence. In any case, his family never heard from him again. After Kolchak’s defeat, Anatolii Lur’e was mobilized by the Red Army and soon died of typhus, as did his mother, who contracted typhus in Samara at around the same time, with none of her sons nearby to take care of her (see Ia. S. Lur’e, Istoriia odnoi zhizni [St. Petersburg, 2004], 85–87).

73. Shkuro, Zapiski belogo partizana, 233; for more on the murder of Jewish Red Army soldiers, see Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovol’cheskoi armii na Ukraini, 256.
74. Shkuro, Zapiski belogo partizana, 223.
76. Schechtman, Pogromy Dobrovol’cheskoi armii na Ukraini, 279, 282–83.
77. Ibid., 284–85.
78. The prototype for Isaac Babel’s Benia Krik.
80. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 453, l. 211.
82. Ibid.
83. By April 15, 1919, 1,450,000 individuals were mobilized into the Red Army. However, the actual number of battle-ready troops never exceeded 450,000. By the end of 1919 more than 3 million people were serving in the Red Army, and by the end of 1920 the number had grown to 5.5 million. (See Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia [Moscow, 1965], 6:59: 13:127)
84. RGASPI, f. 271, op. 2, d. 22, l. 162–162 ob.
86. M. V. Frunze, Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Moscow, 1957), 2:157, 293. At the culmination of the Civil War in 1919, there were approximately 60 members of Revolutionary Military Soviets (Revvoensovet) attached to various armies and fronts, and nearly 3200 commissars attached to divisions, brigades, battalions, and so on. Of the 60, seven members were Jews. According to A. Shneer, the total number of Jewish commissars on all levels did not exceed 300. A. Shneer, Plen’ (Jerusalem, 2003), 2:11–12.
87. Samuil Iakovlevich (Iankelevich) Khvesin became fascinated with Christianity as an adolescent and converted in 1909, taking the name Tikhon Serafimovich. He lived as a novice in a monastery in Samara for more than a year afterwards. Soon Marxism displaced his interest in Christianity. To make ends meet, this future military commander worked as a barber. After joining the Red Army, he was placed in command of the Fourth Army (which included Chapaev’s famous Twenty-fifth Division). Up until 1931 Khvesin indicated that he was a Russian in all forms, as he believed himself to be, given his previous religious beliefs. (See V. S. Gol’dman, Tikhon Khvesin: Revoliutsioner. Voenachal’nik. Gosudarstvennyi deiatel’ [Jerusalem, 2001].)
88. For a list of the commanders and members of the Revvoensovets on the Front and Army level during the Civil War, see Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia, 6:85–90. For a more detailed list including those who served at lower positions, see Direktivy komandovaniia frontov Krasnoi Armii (1917–1922 gg.) (Moscow, 1978), 320–95. A list of Jews who occupied command and political positions down to the regiment level can be found in A. Abramovich, V reshaiushchei voine: Uchastie i rol’ evreev SSSR v voine protiv natsizma (Tel-Aviv, 1981), 1:49–61. Unfortunately, the list is incomplete.
90. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 2, d. 3, l.9
91. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 453, l. 61
93. RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 453, l. 62.
95. RGASPI, f. 445, op. 1, d. 9, l. 2.
97. RGASPI, f. 445, op. 1, d. 9, l. 39, 41–43 ob., 102.
100. Ibid., 2:112.
101. Ibid., 2:46.
102. Ibid., 71–72. Markhlevskii’s report was composed in September of 1920; the exact date is unknown.
103. Ibid., 5–6. Member of the Sixteenth Army Revvoensovet G. L. Piatakov’s telegram on the panicked retreat of army units to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Bel’sk, August 28, 1920.
104. Ibid., 2:34–35.
105. Ibid., 36.
106. Ibid., 35.
107. GARF, f. 8373, op. 1, d. 126, l. 116.
108. Ibid., l. 44–45.
109. This was hardly news. The capture of larger cities (such as Voronezh and Rostov) by the First Cavalry was often accompanied by violence against civilians and even communists (see S. Orlovskii, *Velikii god: Dnevnik konnoarmeitsa* [Moscow, 1930], 35–37; V. L. Genis, “Bataiskaia probka.” *Voprosy istorii*, no. 1 (1993): 153–58). One of Babel’s fellow soldiers talked “about days when he spent 20,000 or 30,000 [rubles]. Everyone has gold that they seized in Rostov, they would put money in a bag, throw it across their saddle, and take off” (see I. Babel’, *Dnevnik 1920 g. (konarmeiskii)* in I. Babel’, *Sobranie sochinenii: v 2 t.* [Moscow, 2002], 1:463–64.
114. See R. Gul’, *Ledianoi pokhod: (S Kornilovym)* (Berlin, 1921); A. I. Denikin, *Ocherki russkoi smuty* (Paris, 1922; reprint, Moscow 1991), 2:237. On p. 238 of the same work, Denikin describes how a group of captured Red officers were actually pardoned by a military field tribunal who believed their guilt had not been proven. This was an extremely rare and unusual event.
Genis, “Pervaia Konnaia,” 69–70.

Babel’, Dnevnik 1920 g., 426, 428.

See Babel’s remarks on the hatred felt toward the Poles, who “tore out beards,” and on the horrors of the pogroms carried out by Polish forces and the “White Cossacks” under the command of Iakovlev, who were serving under Pilsudski (Babel’, Dnevnik 1920 g., 422, 445, 486.)


Ibid., 437. Entry from July 18, 1920.


Ibid., 441.

Ibid., 481. Entry from August 21, 1920.

Ibid., 466.


Prisiazhnyi, Pervaia Konnaia, 13.


Genis, “Pervaia Konnaia,” 72.

Orlovskii, Velikii god, 114.

The Special Brigade (Osobaia Brigada) was worthy of its name. It was not subordinate to any of the four divisions of the First Cavalry and answered directly to the Revvoensovet of the army. Thirty percent of its membership were communists, which was nearly twice the average.

Prisiazhnyi, Pervaia Konnaia, 17.

Brown, “Communists and the Red Cavalry,” 86.

Orlovskii, Velikii god, 114. Orlovskii would later write that “here in the First Cavalry we have significant number of Jews among the political workers and their assistants. They are also present in the command structure. Despite extremely difficult work conditions, they acquitted themselves heroically in battle and are loved by their fellow comrades. Many of them have received the Order of the Red Banner for the actions in battle.” With the exception of one Jewish soldier, Orlovskii neglects to mention any Jewish soldiers in the First Cavalry by name. The Jewish machine gunner Merkin, singled out by Orlovskii, was honored for his bravery in battle, in which he advanced beyond the Red ranks alone, as his partner had disappeared. Orlovskii described this feat as being “truly heroic” (Ibid., 115). Of course, the soldiers of the First Cavalry were dissatisfied with the lack of Jews in the ranks, not in the political division. The “love” felt toward their fellow Jewish soldiers was an exercise in wishful thinking on the part of Orlovskii. If Merkin’s heroics were not, then he quite possibly could have been the only exception to the rule.

Genis, “Pervaia Konnaia,” 72.

Prisiazhnyi, Pervaia Konnaia, 19.

Brown, “Communists and the Red Cavalry,” 94.

Prisiazhnyi, Pervaia Konnaia, 20.

Genis, “Pervaia Konnaia,” 73; Prisiazhnyi, Pervaia Konnaia, 19.
142. Genis, “Pervaia Konnaia,” 73.
143. Orlovskii, Velikii god, 126.
144. A. Lysenko, Iosif Apanasenko (Stavropol, 1987), 340–41. In this apologetic biography which came out at the beginning of Perestroika, the period from August 1920 to the beginning of 1921 is simply left out.
145. Orlovskii, Velikii god, 125.
146. In this case the Red Cavalry soldiers were mistaken. Their appointed commander, Samokhin, was actually a Russian. He was forced to flee from his own subordinates.
147. N. Pakitin, Zapiski konarmeitsa (Moscow, 1931), 191–92.

CONCLUSION

1. For one of the most recent works on the topic see S. Stampfer, “What Actually Happened to the Jews of Ukraine in 1648?” Jewish History 17 (2003): 207–27.
3. Documents pertaining to the Union can be found in GARF, f. 5890.
10. In an article entitled “Negativnaia zhiznennost’ Tret’eego Reikha,” first published in 1980 (a revised version was published in H. W. Koch, ed., Aspects of the Third Reich [London, 1985], 17–38), Nolte writes, “Auschwitz was not the result of traditional antisemitism and, in its essence, was not a ‘genocide’; in this case we are dealing with something born of fear, a reaction to the processes of destruction from the time of the Russian revolution.” (Cited in S. Zemlianoi, “‘Spor istorikov’ v FRG i Evropeiskaia grazh-
Evropeiskaia grazhdanskaia voina (1917–1945): Natsional-sotsializm i bol’shevizm (Moscow, 2003), 517.) A more detailed argumentation can be found in Evropeiskaia grazhdanskaia voina (in the German original: Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus. [Munich, 1997]), in which Nolte claims that the interrelationship between Bolshevism and Nazism can be described with the help of the framework: “call and response, original and copy, equivalent and superequivalent” (see Nolte, E. Evropeiskaia grazhdanskaia voina, 22).


16. The authors of the collection Rossia i evrei (Berlin, 1923).


18. P. N. Vrangel to I. A. Il’in, November 29, 1923, in Russkoe proshloe, 228.


20. See G. V. Kostyrchenko, Tainata politika Stalina: Vlast’ i antisemitizm (Moscow, 2001).
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Forces of the South of Russia
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Host
f. 620  Central Committee of the Jewish Social-Democratic Workers’ Party “Poalei
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f. 631c. Jewish section of the Bobruisk organization of the Communist Party of
Lithuania and Belorussia
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f. 5974  V. V. and E. G. Shulgin
f. 6224  L. I. Sheinis
f. 8373  Central Committee of the Jewish Communist Part “Poalei Zion”

f. 9114  Collection of illustrations, lithographs, portraits and caricatures, collected by
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gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rostovskoi oblasti (garo) / state archive of the rostov oblast

f. 41 Court of Novocherkassk
f. 151 Don oblast court
f. 826 Don security section
f. 829 Don oblast police administration

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f. 17 Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
f. 271 The General Jewish Labor Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia (Bund)
f. 272 Poalei Zion organizations in the USSR
f. 445 The Central Bureau of Jewish Communist Section under the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

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