

*Walter Trockel*

**Course on:**

## **Implementation Theory and the Nash Program**

**Moscow, June 2013**

### **Syllabus**

Unit 01: Introduction and Background

Unit 02: Basic concepts from Social Choice Theory

Unit.03: Mechanisms and Implementation

Unit.04: Implementation in Dominant Strategies Equilibrium

Unit.05: Implementation in Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium

Unit 06: Nash Implementation

Unit 07: The Nash Program

Unit 08: Embedding the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory

Unit 09: Implementations of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Unit 10: Implementation of other cooperative solutions

### **Literature:**

#### **BOOKS:**

Osborne & Rubinstein (1994): A Course in Game Theory, Chs.7, 10, 15; MIT Press Cambridge, Mass.

Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green (1995): Microeconomic Theory, Chs.21 – 23; Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford

Binmore & Dasgupta (eds.) (1987): The Economics of Bargaining, Chs. 2, 4, 11; Basil Blackwell, Oxford

#### **BACKGROUND**

Mechanism Design Theory (2007): Scientific background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel **Compiled by the Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences**

Roger B. Myerson (2009): “Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz”, *Rev. Econ. Design*, **13**, 59–75

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