State University

Higher School of Economics

##### Department of Philosophy

Course Description (Program)

**The Enigma of the Mind:**

**Physicalistic and Anti Physicalistic Programs**

**in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind**

**For Masters**

**Author: Gasparyan Diana, Associate Professor**

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**The Enigma of the Mind:**

**Physicalistic and Anti Physicalistic Programs**

**in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind**

**Third Module**

**Syllabus**

**Instructor Information**

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**Text Information**

1. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, David Chalmers (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2002.

2. The Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition, by Jaegwon Kim (Westview Press, ISBN: 0195118278)

3. Numerous reprints of additional course readings. Additional readings will either be photocopies distributed in class or articles available in e-mail.

**Relevant Websites:**

Dave Chalmer’s Website: <http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/index.html>

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: <http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html>

A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind: <http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/index.html>

Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind: <http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/main.html>

**Course Description and Objectives**

In this course we will discuss the way in which physicalistic and anti physicalistic approaches has come a particular kind of hegemony over other subjects in philosophy of mind. We will try to understand why these two doctrines has come to prominence in recent decades and how they concern with the “Mind-Body problem”.

The branch of philosophy of Mind called the “Mind-Body problem” concerns our understanding of the mind’s place in the universe. We begin with our commonsense understanding of the mind, as that collection of properties, attributes, states activities and abilities that we refer to in our everyday use of psychological terms and expressions to characterize each other and ourselves. With this commonsense understanding in hand, we ask: What sort of entity is the mind? This is a metaphysical questions; it concerns the fundamental constitution of the universe, the things we find in that universe, and the way in which the mental exists in nature.

The focus of this course can be divided very roughly into four main sections, each of which, however, overlaps with and is many respects continuous with the other topics. (1) First, we address the traditional ‘mind-body’ problem – the question concerning the relationship between the mental and the physical world. We will canvass the most influential answers to the mind-body problem focusing on dualism and psycho-neural identity. (2) Second, we will examine in greater depth the doctrine of psysicalism and considerations for and against “reductive” and “non-reductive” physicalism. (3) Third, we will examine the problem of phenomenal consciousness and the proposal that the existence of “qualia” demonstrates that reductive physicalism is false. (4) Finally, we will examine the nature of phenomenal concepts – the cognitive tools our minds purportedly use to think and reason about phenomenal properties. Topics (1) and (3) we will occupy of our attention.

The primary aim of the course is to leave students with a firm grasp of many of the central problems and issues addressed in recent work by “analytic” philosophers of mind.

The course readings are for the most part quite difficult. In order to grasp, discuss and critique the ideas and arguments developed in the readings, students will find the material easier to manage if they attend all lectures and are committed to going over the readings on their own more than once. Moreover, it is strongly recommended that students have had substantive previous experience with reading philosophy and the technical aspects of critiquing arguments.

This course satisfies the advanced metaphysics requirement or an advanced elective requirement for the philosophy major.

**Grading Policies:**

Your grade in class will be determined by the following: reading discussion (40%), paper (30%), exam (30%).

**Papers:**

There will be one paper. You will be asked to write essay in response to very specific questions. Your answers should draw from course material – readings and lectures-and should demonstrate a thorough grasp of the material, both descriptively and critically. In other words, in addition to understanding the ideas, you should be able to grasp the argumentative structure of these ideas and, if asked, critique the accompanying arguments persuasively.

In addition, students will also be asked to choose a relevant article that's been published in a major philosophy journal or anthology within the past five years, on which they are to write a brief (2-3 page) commentary to be presented in the class.

**Parameters for suitable target articles**: Your target article should…

* have been published within the last 7 years,
* in an established philosophy journal (i.e., one indexed in the *Philosopher’s Index* ) or anthology,
* and deal with one of the following topics:
* Intentionality and Mental Content
* Mental Causation
* Consciousness (The Hard Problem, Explanatory Gap, Knowledge Argument, Qualia)
* First-Person Authority and Privileged Access (Knowledge of one’s own mind)

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| --- | --- |
| №. | **Topics for discussion** (tentative, stay tuned for updates and revisions) |
|  | Introduction, “Welcoming” remarks |
| 1. | **PHYSICALISTIC PROGRAMS** |
| 2. | *Dualism redux*: Descartes, Huxley, and Smullyan |
| 3. | *Behaviorism*: Ryle, “Descartes’ Myth” |
| 5. | *The Identity Theory*: Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”  Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” |
| 6. | *Token Identity*: Davidson, “Mental Events” |
| 7. | *Functionalism*: Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States” |
| 8. | Armstrong, “The Causal Theory of Mind”  Lewis, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications” |
| 9. | Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes” |
| 10. | Dennett, “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works” |
| 11. | Block, “Troubles with Functionalism” |
|  | **ANTI PHYSICLISTIC PROGRAMS** |
| 12. | *Mental Causation*: Yablo, “Mental Causation” |
| 13. | *Consciousness*: Chalmers, “Consciousness and its Place in Nature” |
| 14. | *The Knowledge Argument*: Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”  Lewis, “What Experience Teaches” |
| 14. | *The Explanatory Gap*: Levine, “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap”: Churchland, “The Rediscovery of Light” |
| 15. | *Representationalism*: Dretske, “Conscious Experience” |
| 16. | Tye, “Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited”  Shoemaker, “Introspection and Phenomenal Character” |
| 17. | *Intentionality*: Chisholm, “Intentional Inexistence”  Dretske, “A Recipe for Thought” |
| 18. | Horgan and Tienson, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality” |
| 19. | Brandom, “Reasoning and Representing” |
| 20. | Student Presentations, Readings |

**Exams:**

There will be one final exam - Quiz. The material covered by this exam will be drawn both from lecture and from the readings.

**Course Guide**

This Course is built as a *conceptual* one.

It’s structure is the following:

1. We put problem (s);
2. We give (all) possible solutions-approaches-theories;
3. We consider those main arguments.
4. We mention the most significant names if it needed.

# Consciousness

Nothing could be more ordinary and familiar to us than the phenomenon of consciousness. We are conscious at every moment of our waking lives; it is a ubiquitous and unsurprising feature of everyday existence – except when we are in deep sleep, in a coma, or otherwise , well, unconscious. In one of its senses, conscious is just another word for «awake» or «aware», and we know what it is to be awake and aware – to awaken from sleep, general anesthesia, or a temporary loss of consciousness caused by a trauma to the head and regain an awareness of what goes on in and around us.

# Aspects of Consciousness

***Phenomenal Consciousness: «Qualia».*** When you look at a ripe tomato, you sense its color in a certain way, a way that is different from the way you sense the color of a mound of lettuce leaves. If you crush the tomato and bring it close to your nose, it smells in a distinctive way that is different from the way a crushed lemon smells. Across sense modalities, smelling gasoline is very different from tasting it. Sensory mental events and states, like seeing a ripe red tomato, smelling gasoline, experiencing a shooting pain up and down your leg, and the like, have distinctive qualitative characters, that is, felt or sensed qualities, by means of which they are identified as sensations of a certain type.

***Epistemic Subjectivity: Privacy and Special Epistemic Access****.* Subjectivity is often claimed to be of the essence of consciousness. However, subjectivity has no fixed, unambiguous meaning. One sense of subjectivity is epistemological, having to do with the supposed special nature of knowledge of conscious states. The main idea is that a subject has a special epistemic access to her own current conscious states; we seem to be «immediately aware», as Descartes said, of our own feelings, thoughts, and perceptions and enjoy a special sort of first – person authority with regard to them.

***Perspectival Subjectivity: The First – Person Point of View****.* Some philosophers have closely associated subjectivity of Consciousness with the notion of a first – person point of view, or perspective.

**Consciousness vs. Mind**

MIND is more psychological notion in cognitive or neuroscientific meaning;

It refers to processes of thinking, processes which are running in brain and so on; CONCIOUSNESS is more phenomenological notion; It supposes specific mental reality which presumably differs from physical reality.

**Easy and Hard problems of PM**

* “How could a physical system be the sort of thing that could *learn*, or that could *remember*” (D. Chalmers) – Easy Problem.
* “How could a physical system be the sort of thing that could *experience* pain?” (D. Chalmers) – Hard Problem.

**Names and Trends**

Most influential names and strategies in PM today are:

1. Daniel Dennett – Reductive Physicalism (Functionalism);
2. John Searle – Emergentism (AntiFunctionalism);
3. David Chalmers – Natural Dualism;
4. Mc.Ginn, St. Pinker (partially) – Sceptical point of view;
5. Noam Chomsky – MBP is a pseudo problem (philosophy of language technique)

5. Generally Speaking PM covers two main problems:

1. What is mind? and 2. How is it connected with matter, namely a brain?

Generally speaking there two possible answers to these questions:

1. On the one hand, we can assert that the mind it something material; therefore Mind is just a part of body.

2. On the other hand, it’s possible to state that Mind is not a material or physical one; therefore, it’s somehow connected with a body, but not reduced to it.

**The main argument of the *first point* of view is the following…**

It’s pretty obvious and evident that Mind is related to the brain and physical processes in the brain.

**For instance**, some brain traumas might cause changes in mental states.

**Moreover**, when we affect on the brain (particular parts of brain) some specific mental states can be caused as hallucinations or uncommon sensual states.

In these cases, a brain can be considered as a material part of a material body.

Consequently the mind is a material entity.

**The central argument of the *second point* of view claims that…**

It’s impossible to observe our thought as a physical phenomenon and, that there is no an access to our mental life, which is consists of private non-observed experience.

**For example**, when we conceive a yellow lemon or a pink elephant it doesn’t mean that someone can find them in my brain. The lemon and the elephant as my mental images are nonphysical objects.

Therefore mind is not a material entity.

According to these two approaches, we can distinguish *two main theories* in PM.

The f*irst theory*, which is named ***physicalism****,* insists on a physical nature of the mind. Philosophers who support this theory try to prove that mental states and physical states are the same, but because of number of errors (for example of language), we face the delusion that there are two realities – physical and mental.

The s*econd theory*, which is named ***dualism****,* rejects a physical nature of the mind and states that mental states are nonphysical. That means that these states are supposed to be independent and non-reducible to the physical processes. If so we have to admit two separate realities – physical and mental (nonphysical) and try to find out how they are connected and interacted.

However in modern PM this problem mostly put in it **Cartesian version**, namely, **how (Body) Brain is connected with Mind** and vice versa.

**Main philosophical difficulties** here are the following:

1. In terms of common sense we think that Body and it’s reactions are something physical, meanwhile Mind and it’s processes are non-physical. Therefore it’s not quite clear how they can interact, ‘cause they are different as properties;
2. In terms of common sense, scientific and philosophical point’s of view there is only one non-contradictive way to describe causality of the world – physical events causes only physical events, which means consequent process (no ontological gaps).

# The Argument from Simplicity

# The following two formulations are among the standard ways of understanding this principle:

1. Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.

2. What can be done with fewer assumptions should not be done with more.

**Is There a “Mark of the Mental?”**

What’s the **ontological status** of Mentality – is it Factual Truth or Deducible Truth?

The way of giving an answer on this question will determine the **epistemological status** of our theory.

**Criteria of having Mind (Consciousness):  
*Epistemological Criteria***

You are experiencing a sharp toothache caused by an exposed nerve in a molar. The toothache that you experience, but not the condition of your molar, is a mental occurrence. But what is the basis of this distinction? One influential answer says that the distinction consists in certain fundamental differences in the way you come to have **knowledge** of the three phenomena**:**

1. **Direct or Immediate Knowledge:**

Your knowledge that you have a toothache, or that you are hoping for rain tomorrow, is «direct» or «immediate»; it is not based on evidence or Inference;

2. **Privacy or First-Person Privilege:**

One possible response to the foregoing challenge is to invoke the privacy of our knowledge of our own mental states, namely, the apparent fact that this direct access to a mental event is enjoyed by a single subject, the person to whom the event is occurring;

3. **Infallibility or Transparency (Self-Intimacy):**

Another epistemic feature sometimes associated with mentality is the idea in some sense your knowledge of your own current mental states is «infallible» or «incorrigible», or that is «self-intimating» (or that your mind is «transparent» to you).

**Criteria of having Mind (Consciousness):**

***Ontological criteria:***

***1. Nonspatial Criterion of Mentality*:**

For Descartes, the essential nature of a mind is that it is a **thinking thing**, and the essential nature of a material thing is that it is a spatially extended thing. A corollary of this, for Descartes, is that the mental is essentially nonspatial and the material is essentially lacking in the capacity for thinking. Most physicalists would reject this corollary even if they accept the thesis that the mental in definable as thinking.

***2. Intentionality as a Criterion of the Mental:***

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Sholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional **reference to a content**, **direction toward an object, or immanent objectivity**. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

**Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations**

Why are we inclined to think that the brain is «the seat of our mental life», as Descartes might have put it? The answer seems clear: « There are pervasive and systematic psychoneural correlations, that is, correlations between mental phenomena and brain processes. This is not something we know a priory; we know if from empirical evidence.

*Mind – Brain Correlation Thesis.* For each type M of mental event that occurs to an organism v, there exists a brain state of kind B such that M occurs to v at time t if and only if B occurs to v at t. Two points may be noted about these brain – mind correlations:

1. They are «lawlike»: The fact that pain is experienced when certain of your neural fibers (say, C-fibers and A-fibers) are activated is a matter of Lawful regularity, not accident co-occurrences.

2. Even the smallest change in your mental life cannot occur unless there is some specific ( perhaps still unknown) change in your brain state.

***Сausal Interactionism.* Descartes** thought that causal interaction between the mind and the body occurred in the pineal gland. He speculated that «animal spirits» - fluids made up of extremely fine particles flowing around the pineal gland – cause it to move in various ways, and these motions of the gland in turn cause conscious states of the mind.

***«Preestablished Harmony» Between Mind and Body.* Leibniz**, like many of his contemporaries, thought that no coherent sense could be made of Descartes, idea that an immaterial mind, which is not even in physical space, could causally interact with a material body like the pineal gland, managing to move this not-so-insignificant lump of tissue hither and thither.

***Occasionalism.*** According to **Malebranche**, another great continental rationalist, whenever a mental event appears to cause a physical event or a physical event appears to cause a mental event, it is only an illusion.


***The Double – Aspect Theory (Neutral monism).* Spinoza** (**Russel**) claimed that mind and body are simply two correlated aspects of a single underlying substance that is in itself neither mental nor material.

***Epiphenomenalism.*** According to **T. Huxley**, every mental event is caused by a physical event in the brain, but mental event have no causal power of their own, being the absolute terminal links of causal chains.

***Emergentism.*** This position holds that when biological processes attain a certain level of organizational complexity, a wholly new type of phenomenon, namely, concsiousness, “emerges” and these “emergent” phenomena are not explainable in terms of the lower-level physical-biological phenomena.

***The Psychoneural (or Psychophysical, Mind-Body) Identity Theory.*** This position, formulated and explicity advanced as a solution to the mind-body problem in the late 1950s, advocates the identification of mental states and events with the physical processes in the brain.

**Types of Causation**



# An Argument from Mental Causation

By mental causation we mean any causal relation involving a mental event. A pin is stuck in your hand, causing you to experience a sharp pain; the pain causes your hand to withdraw in a jerky motion. The pain also causes a momentary sense of distress and a desire to be rid of it. Such causal relations are part of our everyday experience.

# Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism

Perception involves the causation of mental events – Perceptual experiences –by physical processes. In fact, the very idea of perceiving something – say, seeing a tree – involves the idea that the object seen is a cause of an appropriate perceptual experience. Mental – to – mental causation also seems essential to human knowledge. Consider the process of inferring one proposition from another. Epiphenomenalism is the view that although all mental events are caused by physical events, mental events are only «epiphenomena» - that is, events without powers to cause any other event. Mental events are effects of physical (presumably neural) processes, but they do not in turn cause anything else, being powerless to affect physical events or even other mental events; they are the absolute termini of causal chains.

**PSYSICALISTIC PROGRAMS**

Since physicalism broadly understood is the basic framework in which contemporary philosophy of mind has been depated, it is useful for us to begin with some idea of what it is. If you are comfortable with the idea of the Star Trek transporter, that means you are comfortable with physicalism as a perspective on the mind-body problem. The wide and seemingly natural acceptance of the transporter idea shows how deeply physicalism has penetrated modern Western culture, although when this is made explicit some people would no doubt protest and proclaim themselves to be against physicalism.

What is the relationship between mind-body supervenience and physicalism? We have not so far defined what physicalism is, but the term itself suggests that it is a doctrine that affirms the priority or basicness of what is physical. With this very rough idea in mind, let us see what mind-body supervenience iimplies for the dualist view ( to be discussed in more detail in chapter associated with Descartes that mind are immaterial substances with no physical properties whatever (like mass and motion). Take two immaterial mindws. We have to say that they are exactly alike in all physical respects since neither has any physical property and it is not possible to distinguish them from a physical perspective. So if mind-body supervenience, in the form of (1),holds, it follows that they are alike in all mental respects. That is, under mind-body supervenionce(1), all Cartezian immaterial souls are exactly alike in all mental respects, and they must be exactly alike in all possible respects! That in seems to mean that there can be at most one immaterial soul if mind-body supervenience is true. A serious mind-body dualist-someone who believes in minds and bodies as separate entities-should find these consequence of mind-body supervenience intolerable. This is one way of seeing how the supervenience thesis puts pressure on us to move toward physicalism.

**TWO TYPES OF IDENTITY THEORIES**

* **Behaviourism** – Mental life and Behaviour are the same.
* **Identity Theory** (or **Physicalism**) – Mental life and Brain processes are the same.

**BEHAVIORISM**

**Behaviorism** arose early in the twentieth century as a doctrine on the nature and methodology of psychology, in reaction to what some psychologists took to be the subjective and unscientific character of introspectionist psychology. In his classic Principles of Psychology, published in 1890, William James, who had a major role in establishing psychology as an Independent field of science, begins with the following definition of the scope of psychology: Psychology is the Science of Mental Life of its phenomena and of their conditions. The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like.

**What is Behaviour?**

We may take «behavior» to mean whatever people or organisms, or even mechanical systems, do that is **publicly observable**.

*Four possible types of Behavior:*

Physiological reactions and responses: for example, perspiration, salivation, increase in the pulse rate, increase in blood pressure.

Bodily movements: for example, raising and waving a hand,

opening a door, throwing a baseball, a cat scratching at the door, a rat turning left in a T-maze.

Actions involving bodily motions: for example, typing an invitation, greeting a friend, checking a book out of the library, going shopping, writing a check, signing a contract.

Actions not involving overt bodily motions: for example, reasoning, guessing, calculating, judging, deciding.

**The main point of Behaviourism**

Behaviour is taken to be bodily events and conditions that are publicly observable and that do not give rise to the kind of first-person epistemic asymmetry for supposedly private mental phenomena.

**Types of Behaviourism**

Ontological Behaviourism – mind is a behaviour itself (Watson);

Scientific (Psychological) Behaviourism – mind is the operational process “input (stimulus)-black box-output (respond)” (Skinner);

Logical Behaviourism – mind is the outer meaning (Wittgenstein, Ryle).

# Scientific Behaviorism

# The only admissible evidence for the science of psychology is observable behavioral data – that is, data concerning the observable physical behavior of organisms.

1. Psychological theories must not invoke the internal states of psychological subjects; that is, psychological explanations must not appeal to internal states of organisms, not should references to such states occur in deriving predictions about behavior.

**Logical Behaviourism**

***Logical Behaviorism I.*** Any meaningful psychological statement, that is, a statement purportedly describing a mental phenomenon, can be translated, without loss of content, into a statement solely about behavioral and physical phenomena.

***Logical Behaviorism II.*** Every meaningful psychological expression can be defined solely in terms of behavioral and physical expressions, that is, those referring to behavioral and physical phenomena.

**The general idea**: if some mental states are meaningful it means they have some outer verifications, otherwise they are meaningless and there is no a reason to investigate them.

**Ontological Behaviorism**

Ontological behaviorism is a claim about the meaning of psychological expressions; as you recall, the claim is that the meaning of every psychological term is definable exclusively on the basis of behavioral – physical terms. But we can also consider a behaviorist thesis about psychological states or phenomena as such, independently of the language in which they are described. Thus, a behaviorist might claim: There are no psychological facts over and above behavioral facts; and there are no psychological states or events over and above actual and possible behavior.

**Hempel’s Argument**

The content, or meaning, of any meaningful statement is exhausted by the conditions that must be verified to obtain if we are to consider that statement true (we may call them «verification conditions»);

If statement is not have an intersubjective content - that is, a meaning that can be shared by different persons – its verification conditions must be publicly observable;

Only behavioral and physical phenomena are publicly observable;

Therefore, the content of any meaningful psychological statement must be specifiable by statement of publicly observable verification conditions, that is, statements describing appropriate behavioral and physical conditions that must hold if and only if the psychological statement is to count as true.

**Example of behavioural translation**

1. “Masha is in love” **for introspectionist** means:

“Masha is in a specific, closed for outer observation, mental state, which she describes as “I am in love”.

2. “Masha is in love” **for behaviourist** means:

Masha is smiling and sighing;

At the question: “What’s the matter” she answers: “I am in love”;

Closer examination reveals that she has high degree of palpitation and blood pressure;

Her central nervous system shows such and such changes.

**Difficulties of behavioural translation**

. How it’s possible to “translate” the following Masha’s belief:

“Something tells me that the idea of behavioural translation is wrong”.

In this case we can’t see any specific behaviour instantiations.

It is much more difficult to associate higher states with specific patterns of behaviour.

2. Complex of mental states; and so on…

**N. Chomsky’s objection (which destroyed behaviourism)**

The argument itself was concerned about Language (for behaviourists language was a “response” to “stimulus”.

The meaningfulness of the mental state is the *other mental state* or *the mental state of the other person.*

Example: I`m reading a lecture. It displays as a sort of behaviour (which is outer), but the meaning of that lecture itself refers to your and also my comprehension, which is inner.

**The Psychoneural Identity Theory (1950-1960) H. Feigl, J. Smart, W. Place**

# What Does «Identity» Mean?

This position advocates **the identification of mental states and events with the physical processes in the brain.**

The identity theory states that mental events are identical with brain processes. Sometimes such expressions as «state», «phenomenon», and «occurrence» are used interchangeably with «event» and «process». As a specific example of psychoneutral identity, let us again consider the statement «pains are **C-fiber excitations**». This is something glossed as follows: «For a person (organism) to be in pain is for him to be in the C-fiber excitation state».

**Mind-Body Supervenience**

*Mind-Body Supervenience 1.* The mental supervenes on the physical in that things (objects, events, organisms, persons, and so on) that are exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ with respect to mental properties. That is, physical indiscernibility entails psychological indiscenibility.

*OR: No mental difference without a physical difference.*

*Mind-Body Supervenience 2.* The mental supervenes on the physical just in case if anything X has a mental property M, there is a physical property P such that X has P, and necessarily any object that has P has M.

OR: If things are alike in psychological respects doesn’t mean that they are alike in physical respects.

**Token Physicalism and Type Physicalism**

Consider now the standard statement of the identity theory:

* 1. Every mental event is a physical event.

On the present construal of events, this comes to:

***1.a.******Token Physicalism****.* Every event that falls under a mental event kind also falls under a physical event kind (or every event that has a mental property has also some physical property).

**1*.b.******Type Physicalism.*** Mental kinds are physical kinds; alternatively, mental properties are physical properties.

* 1. Events (and objects) that are alike in physical respects must be alike in all mental respects any more than «Every object that has a color has a shape» entails «Objects with the same color have the same shape». Type physicalism, in contract, is a form of «reductive», or «reductionist», physicalism, since the thesis that mental properties are physical properties is simply the claim that there are no mental properties over and above physical properties.

**Category Mistake** (**or Ghost in Machine**) of G. Ryle

“The Prime Minister is in London, and the Foreign Secretary is in Paris, and the Home Secretary is in Bristol, but where is the Government?”

The Government is not another person (essence) alongside its members.

Ryle used the notion primarily to claim that mind and body cannot be spoken of in parallel ways, but are in different 'categories'.

**Nomological dangler** of H. Feigl

1. **Pain occurs iff C-fiber stimulation (Cfs) occurs;**
2. **Pain = Cfs.**

Pain and Cfs are one and not two, and we are not faced by two distinct phenomena whose correlation needs to be explained. In this way, psychoneural identities permit us to transcend and eliminate psychoneural correlations laws, which are “nomological danglers”.

**Simplicity** of J. Smart

The following two formulations are among the standard ways of understanding this principle (Ockham’s razor):

1. Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.

2. What can be done with fewer assumptions should not be done with more.

**Modern Proponents of Identity Theory:  
Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker**

If we believe that heat is correlated with but nit identical to molecular kinetic energy, we should regard as legitimate the question why the correlation exists and what its mechanism is. But once we realize that heat is molecular kinetic energy, questions like this will be seen as wrongheaded”.

(*N. Block and R. Stalnaker ‘Conceptual Analisis, Dualism, and the Eplanatory Gap’).*

**Two versions of Explanatory Argument for Psychoneural Identity**

The two explanatory arguments differ on the question of what it is that is supposed to be explained by psychoneural identities – that is, on the questions of the “**explanandum**”.

**Explanatory argument 1** takes the explanandum to be **psychoneural correlations,** claiming that psychoneural identities give the best explanation of psychoneural correlations.

**Explanatory argument 2** argues that the identities rather than explaining the correlations, explain **facts about mental phenomena** that would otherwise remain unexplained.

**Explanatory Argument 1.**

Someone might be curious why Clark Kent turns up whenever and wherever Superman turns up??

The best, or the simpler, explanation will be:

“Because Clark Kent is a Superman”.

**“Pain occurs iff Cfs occurs**

**Therefore Pain = Cfs”**

Where Cfs – is a C-fiber stimulation

**Explanatory Argument 2.**

Cfs causes neural stat N

(C1) Pain occurs iff Cfs occurs.

(C2) Distress occurs iff neural state N occurs.

Therfore pain correlates with a phenomenon that causes a phenomenon with which distress correlates.

**Objections to the Psychoneural Identity Theory**

The Epistemological Arguments;

The Modal Argument;

The Multiple Realization Argument.

**The Epistemological Objection 1.**

The Epistemological Objection 1.

This objection assumes that the two statements “S knows something about X” and “X=Y” together entail “S knows something about Y”. But is this true?

For example, medieval people knew what is water, but they didn’t know what is H20 (they knew about pain, but didn’t know anything about C-fibers).

**The Epistemological Objection 2.**

Our knowledge is not based on evidence or inference; somehow we directly know. In contrast we have no such privileged access to our brain states. Neurologist probably have much better knowledge in our brain than we do.

Mental states are directly accessible, brain states – are not. So how can mental states be brain states?

**The Epistemological Objection 3.**

According to the identity theory, specific psychoneural identities are empirical truths discovered through scientific observation and theoretical research.

If X=Y is an empirical truth, the two names or descriptions, X and Y, must have independent criteria of application.

Otherwise, the identity would be a priori knowable, for example, identities like “bachelor = unmarried man”.

But in the case “the husband of Xanthippe = Xanthippe’s male spouse” we know that they are identical not only logical, but also empirical (by knowing about Socrates).

In that turn I in the case “mourning star is an evening star” we know that they are identical only because of reference to the object (Venus).

Therefore it’s presupposed that in case of identity “pain is C-fiber excitation” they both independently refer to some object, which is nor physical nor mental. What it could be?

**The Modal Argument (by S. Kripke)**

We have two types of identities:

Contingent Identity – one term is *rigid designator* (name) and another is nonrigid *designator* (description).

Necessary Identity – both of terms are rigid designators – names or natural terms.

“Pain is C-fibers stimulation” consists on rigid designators (they are natural terms).

Therefore this identity must be necessary, which means that it is impossible to conceive one without other – pain without brain reactions.

But we can easily conceive pain without brain stimulation and vise versa.

So mind-body identity is false.

# Functional Properties and Their Realizes: Definitions

The definition does not specify and specific P that x must have; the causal work to be done in many different ways. There are the familiar spring-loaded traps, and there are wire cages with a door that slams shut when a muse enters; we can imagine high – tech traps with an optical sensor and all sorts of other devices. This means that there are many – in fact, indefinitely many – «realizers» of the property of being a mousetrap; that is, all sorts of physical mechanisms can be mousetraps.

**Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims**

Machine functionalists claim that we can think of the mind as a Turing machine (or a probabilistic automaton). This of course needs to be filled out, but from the preceding discussion it should be pretty clear how the story will go. The central idea is that what it is for something to have mentality – that is, to have a psychology – is for it to be a physically realized. Functionalism acknowledges that having a brain of a certain structural complexity is important to mentality, but the importance of the brain lies exactly in its being a physical Turing machine. It is our brain, computational powers, not its Biological properties, that constitute our mentality. In short, our brain is our mind because it is a computing machine, not because it is composed of the kind of protein – based biological stuff it is composed of.

**The Multiple Realization Argument (H. Putnam)**

How we can be sure that all pain-capable organisms have C-fibers.

**Argument from verification (V.Vasilyev)**

It’s impossible to verify that mental state is the same that brain state, because we don’t have here such empirical *third* object as Venus in the case of Morning and Evening Star.

**Elimanativism (P. Churchland)**

Mind or mental states are the extra *linguistic* essences which have to be *eliminate* from the scientific dictionary as a *Folk Psychology* term.

**Functionalism**

What makes something a tea-kettle or a vending machine is its ability to perform a certain *function*, not any specific physicochemical structure or mechanism. Many concepts seem to be functional concepts (for example, catalyst, gene, heart) appear to have an essentially functional component.

# Functionalism as Physicalism

# Objections and Difficultes

Consider the question: What do all instances of pain have in common in virtue of which they are pains? You will recognize the functionalist answer: their characteristic causal role – their typical causes (tissue damage, trauma) and effects (pain behavior). But isn`t there a more obvious answer? What all instances of pain have in common in virtue of which they are all cases of pain is that they hurt. Pains hurt, itches itch, tickles tickle. Can there he anything more obvious than that? The Cross – Wired Brain the qualia we experience are causally dependent on the inputs: As our neural system is presently wired, cuts and pinpricks cause pains, not itches. But this is a contingent fact about our neural mechanism: It seems perfectly conceivable (even technically feasible at some point in the future) to reroute the causal chains involved so that cuts and pinpricks cause itches, not pains, and skin irritations cause pains, not itches, without disturbing the overall functional organization of our behavior.

**Functional Properties, Disjunctive Prioperties and Causal Powers.**

The functionalism claim is often expressed by assertions like, «Mental states are causal roles», and, «Mental properties (kinds). We should get clear about the logic and ontology of such claims. The concept of a functional property and related concepts were introduced in the preceding part, but let us briefly review them before we go on with some difficulties and puzzles for functionalism.

**Mind as Computing Machine**

According to Functionalism it is possible to say that there is nothing more except functional work in the mind.

Therefore, **Mind is the Function.**

**The multiple realizability of mental properties.**

If mind is a function it can be realized in the different devices.

It has only one requirement – it must be embodied, but “bodies” could be different.

**Realizers of Functional Properties**

X is a tea-kettle = X has some property F that F enables X to keep and boil water.

X is the mind = X has some property F that enables X to …

The causal work could be done in many different ways. This means that there are many – in fact, indefinitely many – «realizers» of the property of being a tea-kettle (being the mind)

**Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science**

*Realizer Functionalism.* My experiencing pain at time t is Identical with my C-fibers being activated at t (where C-fiber activation is the pain realize in me); the octopus. Experiencing pain at t is identical with its X- fibers being activated at t (where X- fiber activation is the octopuses pain realizer); and so on.

*Role Functionalism.* My experiencing pain at time t is identical with my being at t in a state that plays causal role R (that is, the role of detecting bodily damage and triggering appropriate behavioral responses); the octopuses experiencing pain at t is identical with its being, at t, in a state that plays the same causal role R; and so on.

**Brain as a Computer**

Functionalism acknowledges that having a brain of a certain structural complexity is important to mentality, but the importance of the brain lies exactly in its being a physical machine.

It is our brain, computational powers, not its Biological properties, that constitute our mentality.

In short, our brain is our mind because it is a computing machine, not because it is composed of the kind of protein – based biological stuff it is composed of.

**Functionalism and Behaviourism (Similarity).**

Both functionalism and behaviorism speak of sensory input and behavioral output – or «stimulus» and «response» - at central to the concepts of mentality. In this respect, functionalism is part of a broadly behavioral approach to mentality and can be considered a generalized and more sophisticated version of behaviorism. But there is also a significant difference between them.

**Functionalism and Behaviourism (Difference).**

*Functionalist* is espousing *mental realism* – a position that considers mental states as having a genuine ontological status and counts them among the phenomena of the world with a place in its causal structure.

For *Behaviourist* mental states are real too, but only as behaviours; for him there is nothing mental over and above actual an possible behaviour.

For the *Functionalist*, mental states are inner causes of behaviour, and as such they are “over and above” behaviour.

# The Turing Test

The gist of Turing, idea can be captured in a simpler test: By asking questions (or just holding a conversation) via keyboard terminals, can we find our whether we are talking to a human or a computing machine? (This is the way the Turing test is now being performed). If there is a computer that can consistently fool us so that our success in guessing its identity is no better than what could be achieved by random guesses, we must concede, it seems, that this machine has the kind of mentality that we grant to humans. But the Turing, Thesis seems incorrect: Input – output equivalence does not imply equal mentality. This does not necessary invalidate the Turing test, for it may be that given the interest richness and complexity of the imitation game, any computing machine that can consistently fool humans – in fact, any machine that is in the ballpark for the competition – has there is no real chance that this machine could be operating like a gigantic filing system with a superfast retrieval mechanism.

**How it works?**

The **Turing test** is a test of a machine’s ability to demonstrate intelligence.

A human judge engages in a natural language conversation with one human and one machine, each of which tries to appear human. All participants are separated from one another. If the judge cannot reliably tell the machine from the human, the machine is said to have passed the test. In order to test the machine's intelligence rather than its ability to render words into audio, the conversation is limited to a text-only channel such as a computer keyboard and screen.

**Judge**: Do you think that American soldiers should go to Bosnia?

“**Therapist”:** I think that what Clinton has done in sending 20,000 peacekeepers to Bosnia will ensure a lasting peace.

**Judge:** Do you think most Americans feel the way you do?

“**Therapist”:** What did you mean when you said do you think that American soldiers should go to Bosnia? Did anyone ever tell you that you think too much? Oh, I think most Americans feel the way I do?

**Judge**: I think. I do research. I write. I love. I live.

**“SEPO”:** I wonder whether you think sometimes! I am feeling like the judge here!

**Turing thesis**

If two systems are input-output equivalent, they have the same psychological status; in particular one is mental just in case the other is.

# The «Сhinese Room»

John Searl has constracted an intriguing thought – experiment to show that mentality cannot be equated with a computing machine running a program, to matter how complex, «intelligent», and sophisticated it is. Searle invites us to Imagine a room – the «Chinese room» - in which someone, who understands no Chinese is confined. He has a set of rules (the «rule book») for systematically transforming strings of symbols to yield further symbol strings. Consider the position that Searle himself favors: Mentality can arise only in complex biological systems, like the human brain. It seems that the same neurobiological causal processes will go on matter what the neural states involved represent about the world or whether they represent anything at all. Neural processes seem no more responsive no meaning and representational content than are computational processes. Local physical – biological conditions in the brain, not the distal states of affairs represented by them, are what drive neural processes.

**Searl’s deduction**

**Mentality can arise only in complex biological systems, like the human brain.**

It seems that the same neurobiological causal processes will go on matter what the neural states involved represent about the world or whether they represent anything at all. Neural processes seem no more responsive no meaning and representational content than are computational processes. Local physical – biological conditions in the brain, not the distal states of affairs represented by them, are what drive neural processes.

Imagine that we read two novels.

Novel №1:

Scene one: a bloody murder has occurred;

Scene two: Two lovers finally have met each other;

Scene three: A big robbery has happened in the museum;

Scene four: Group of terrorists hijack a plain;

Scene five: In the middle of the city people found huge casket with treasures.

Do the machine notice that something wrong with “novel”??

Novel №2:

Scene one: Mr. Smith has fallen in love

Scene two: Mr. Smith has been attacked with gangsters;

Scene three: Mr. Smith has learned about theft which happened in the museum;

Scene four: Mr. Smith has met an old friend of him;

Scene five: Mr. Smith visits a psychotherapist.

Do the machine notice that something wrong with the “novel” at this time??

**Three models of reduction**

1. **Bridge-Law reduction** (E. Nagel) – the reduction of a higher-level theory to a more fundamental theory. For example, the reduction of optics to electromagnetic theory or genetics to molecular biology.
2. **Identity Reduction;**
3. **Functional Reduction.**

**NON-REDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM (EMERGENGENTISM)**

*Doctrine of Property Emergence.* When aggregates of material particles attain an appropriate level of structural complexity, genuine novel properties emerge.

*Irreducibility of Emergent Properties.* Emergent properties are not reducible to their “basal conditions” – the underlying conditions from which they emerge.

*Doctrine of “Downward” Causation.* Emergent properties have causal powers to influence phenomena at the level from which they have emerged.

**Other types of monism**

Type and Token physicalism;

Neutral Monism (B.Russel);

Anomalous Monism (D. Davidson).

**Token and Type Physicalism**

*Token Physicalism.* Every event that falls under a mental event kind also falls under a physical event kind (or every event that has a mental property has also some physical property);

*Type Physicalism.* Mental kinds are physical kinds; alternatively, mental properties are physical properties.

**Neutral Monism (B. Russel)**

There are only ONE substance of the World – **Event**, which has space and time coordinates. These events could be described by using mentalist language (description) or physicalist language (description). Despite these two descriptions in fact there is only kind reality, which is **neutral** and neitherphysical neither mental.

**Anomalous Monism (D. Davidson)**

According to Davidson there are 4 possible theories:

**Nomological Monism** (Materialism);

**Nomological Dualism** (Pre-Establishd Harmony, Theory of Translation);

**Anomalous Dualism** (Cartesian Dualism);

**Anomalous Monism** (Davidson’s version).

# Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism? Counterfactuals and Mental Causation

The counterfactualist is likely to reply as follows: The counterfactual account goes beyond a mere reaffirmation of mental causation, for it opens up the possibility of accounting for mental causation in terms of an account of how mental – physical counterfactuals can be true. To show that there is a special problem about mental causation, you must show that there is a special problem about the truth of these counterfactuals. Moreover, by adopting the counterfactual strategy, we divorce mental causation from contentious questions about psychophysical laws.

# Psychophysical Laws and «Anomalous Monism»

The expulsion of Cartesian immaterial minds perhaps brightens the prospect of understanding how mental causation is possible. For we no longer have to contend with a seemingly hopeless question: How could immaterial souls with no physical characteristics – no bulk, no mass, no energy, no charge, and no location in space – causally influence, and influenced by, physical objects and processes? Today few philosophers or scientists regard minds as substances of special nonphysical sort; mental events and processes are now viewed as occurring in complex physical systems like biological organisms, not in immaterial minds.

**Davidson’s scheme**

**Nomological Monism** (Classical Materialism) - each mental event is a physical event and therefore it is possible to predict mental state due to *psychophysical laws*;

**Nomological Dualism** - mental events are independent from physical, but still are able to be predicted due to physical states which strictly corresponds to mental;

**Anomalous Dualism** – mental events are independent from physical, therefore it’s impossible to make any predictions about mental events;

**Anomalous Monism** – each mental event is a physical, BUT it’s impossible to make any predictions about mental events. Therefore it’s called Anomalous Monism.

**ANTI PHYSICALIST PROGRAMS**

**DUALISM**

In this part we examine a philosophical theory of mind, due to Rene Descartes, which is built on a view of this kind. One caveat before we begin: Our goal here is not so much a historical exegesis of Descartes as it is an examination of a point of view often associated with him; as with other great philosophers, the interpretation of what he «really» said, or meant to say, continues to be controversial. For this reason, the dualist view of the mind we discuss is better regarded as Cartesian rather than as historical Descartes.

Two types of Dualism:

**Substance Dualism**;

**Property Dualism or nonreductive Physicalism**.

**Substance Dualism. Cartesian Dualism**

The dualist view of persons that Descartes formulated and defended is a form of substance dualism. Substance dualism is the thesis that there are substances of two fundamentally and irreducibly distinct kinds in this world, namely, minds and bodies-or mental stuff and material staff-and that a human person is a composite entity consisting of a mind and a body, each of which is an entity in its own right.

**4 main thesis** of Descartes dualism:

**1.** There substances of two fundamentally different kinds in the world, mind and bodies. The essential nature of a body is to be extended in space; the essence of a mind is to think and engage in other mental activities.

**2.** A human person is a composite being (“union”, as Descartes called it) of a mind and a body;

**3.** Minds are diverse from bodies;

**4.** Minds and bodies causally influence each other. Some mental phenomena are causes of physical phenomena and vice versa.

**The «Pairing Problem»**

**Causal Argument**

We will develop causal argument against Cartesian substance dualism. If this argument works, it will show not only that immaterial minds cannot causally interact with material things situated in space but also that they are not able to enter causal relations with anything else, including other immaterial minds. Immaterial objects would be causally impotent and hence explanatory useless; positing them would be philosophically unmotivated. It is metaphysically possible for there to be two distinct physical objects, a and b, with the same intrinsic properties and hence the same causal potential or powers; one of these, say, a, causes a third object, c, to change in a certain way, but object b has no causal influence.

**Arguments for the Thesis that Minds and Bodies are Distinct**

***Argument 1***

I am such that my existence cannot be doubted;

My body is not such that its existence cannot be doubted;

Therefore, I am not identical with my body;

Therefore, the thinking thing that I am is not identical with my body.

***Argument 2***

My mind is transparent to me - that is, nothing can be in my mind without my knowing that it is there;

My body is not transparent to me in the same;

Therefore, my mind is not identical with my body.

***Argument 3***

Each mind is such that there is a unique subject who has direct and privileged access to contents;

No material body has a specially privileged knower-knowledge of material things is in principle public and intersubjective;

Therefore, minds are not identical with material bodies.

***Argument 4***

My essential nature is to be a thinking thing;

My body, essential nature is to be an extended thing in space;

Therefore, I am not identical with my body. And since I am a thinking thing (namely a mind), my mind is not identical with my body.

***Argument 5***

If anything is material, it is essentially material;

However, I am possibly immaterial-that is, there is a world in which I exist without a body;

Hence, I am not essentially material;

Hence, it follows (with the first premise) that I am not material.

***Argument 6***

Suppose I am identical with this body of mine;

In 1995 I existed;

In 1995 this body did not exist;

Hence, from the first premise, it follows that I did not exist in 1995;.

But this contradicts the second premise, and the supposition is false;

Hence, I am not identical with my body.

***Argument 7***

Suppose I am identical with this body of mine;

Then, by (NI), I am necessarily identical with this body-that is, I am identical with it in every possible world;

But that is false, for (a) in some possible worlds I could be disembodied and have no body, or at least (b) I could have a different body in another possible world.

Therefore I am not identical with my body.

# Immaterial Minds in Space?

Most popular notions of minds as immaterial spirits do not seem to conceive them as wholly nonspatial. The proposal to bring immaterial minds into space is fraught with complications and difficuities and probably not worth considering as an option. First there is the question of just where in space to put them. Is there a principled and

motivated way of assigning a location to each soul? We might suggest that I locate my soul in my body, you locate your soul in your body, and so on. That may sound like a natural and reasonable suggestion, but it faces a number of difficulties. Second, what about disembodied souls, souls that are not «united» with a body? Since souls are supposed to be substances in their own right, such souls are metaphysically possible.

**Substance dualism. Thought Experiment**

[David Chalmers](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers) recently developed a [thought experiment](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thought_experiment) inspired by the movie [The Matrix](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Matrix) in which substance dualism could be true:

Consider a computer simulation in which the bodies of the creatures are controlled by their minds and the minds remain strictly external to the simulation. The creatures can do all the science they want in the world, but they will never be able to figure out where their minds are, for they do not exist in their observable universe. This is a case of substance dualism with respect to computer simulation. This naturally differs from a computer simulation in which the minds are part of the simulation. In such a case, substance [monism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monism) would be true.

**Arguments against dualism**

**Argument from causal interaction.**

One argument against Dualism is with regards **to causal interaction**. Dualism must explain how consciousness affects physical reality. *One of the main objections* to dualistic interactionism is lack of explanation of how the material and immaterial are able to interact. Varieties of dualism according to which an immaterial mind causally affects the material body and vice-versa have come under tough attack from different quarters, especially in the 20th century. Critics of dualism have often asked **how something totally immaterial can affect something totally material** - this is the basic *problem of causal interaction*.

**Argument from brain damage**

This argument has been formulated by [Paul Churchland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Churchland), among others. The point is simply that when the brain undergoes some kind of damage (caused by automobile accidents, drug abuse or pathological diseases), it is always the case that the mental substance and/or properties of the person are significantly compromised. If the mind were a completely separate substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when specific parts of their brains are damaged. So the question for the dualist to try to confront is how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its properties are ontologically independent of, the brain.

**Argument from biological development.**

**Another common argument against dualism consists in the idea that since** human beings (both [phylogenetically](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phylogenesis) and [ontogenetically](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontogenesis)) begin their existence as entirely physical or material entities and since nothing outside of the domain of the physical is added later on in the course of development, then we must necessarily end up being fully developed material beings. Phylogenetically, the human species evolved, as did all other species, from a single cell made up of matter. Since all the events that later occurred which ended up in the formation of our species can be explained through the processes of random mutation and natural selection, the difficulty for the dualist is to explain where and why there could have intervened some non-material, non-physical event in this process of natural evolution. Ontogenetically, we begin life as a simple fertilized [ovum](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ovum). There is nothing non-material or *mentalistic* involved in conception, the formation of the [blastula](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blastula), the [gastrula](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gastrula), and so on. Our development can be explained entirely in terms of the accumulation of matter through the processes of [nutrition](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nutrition). The postulation of a non-physical mind would seem superfluous.

**Argument from simplicity**

The argument from simplicity is probably the simplest and also the most common form of argument against dualism of the mental. The dualist is always faced with the question of why anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities (mind and brain), when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one. It is a heuristic principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is necessary for clear explanation and prediction (see [Occam's razor](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor)). This argument was criticized by [Peter Glassen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Glassen) in a debate with [J. J. C. Smart](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._J._C._Smart) in the pages of [*Philosophy*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_%28journal%29) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Glassen argued that, because it is not a physical entity, Occam's Razor cannot consistently be appealed to by a physicalist or materialist as a justification of mental states or events, such as the belief that dualism is false.

**Argument from unlikeness of being Immaterial Minds in Space.**

There is the question of where in space to put minds. Is there a principled and motivated way of assigning a location to each soul? We might suggest that I locate my soul in my body, you locate your soul in your body, and so on. That may sound like a natural and reasonable suggestion, but it faces a number of difficulties:


**1.First,** what about disembodied souls, souls that are not “united” with a body, and so on.

**2. Second**, if your soul is located in your body, exactly where in your body is it located?

**PROPERTY DUALISM**

It has seemed to most contemporary philosophers that the concept of mind as a mental substance gives rise too many difficulties and puzzles without compensating explanatory gains. In addition, the idea of an immaterial and theological constraints and associations that many of us would rather avoid.

**Property dualism** describes a category of positions in the PM which hold that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance - the physical kind - there exist two distinct kinds of properties: [**physical properties**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_properties) and [**mental properties**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_properties). In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical substances (namely brains).



**PROPERTY DUALISM  
explanation 1.**

* “Property” is used in a broad sense: Mental properties comprise mental functions, capacities, events, states, and the like, and similarly for physical properties. It is a catchall term referring to events, activities, states, and the rest.
* So property dualism is the claim that mental properties are **diverse from and irreducible to physical properties.**

**PROPERTY DUALISM  
explanation 2.**

* Property dualism is a **compromise position between** [**substance dualism**](http://www.philosophyofmind.info/substancedualism.html) **and** [**materialism**](http://www.philosophyofmind.info/materialism.html)**.**
* Like materialism, it holds that **there is only one type of substance: physical.** Property dualism **denies the existence of immaterial minds** that somehow interact with the physical world, animating unconscious bodies.
* Where property dualism parts with materialism is that **it does not attempt to reduce mental states to physical states**. **Mental states,** according to the property dualist, **are irreducible; there is no purely physical analysis of mind.**
* Property dualism thus holds that although there is only one type of substance – physical, there are two types of property - physical and non-physical. **Our bodies have physical properties such weight and height, and mental properties such as beliefs and desires.**

**COUNTERARGUMENT 1.**

By Property Dualism the brain owns two types of [properties](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Properties): physical and mental. Therefore all conscious experiences are properties of the underlying substance which manifests itself physically as the brain. It seems as **a logical mistake (of classification), namely Mental and Physical are parts of Physical.**

**COUNTERARGUMENT 2.**

In this line of thinking **consciousness is itself a property.**

It leads to absurd inferences, namely **if this is true then I (and you) am (are) a property(ies).**

This is the main argument against Property Dualism: the conscious self is an entity, not a property, and mental states are various aspects, or states, of that entity.

The entire argument is based on the intuitive falsity of this assertion which follows from Property Dualism, "I am a property."

**COUNTERARGUMENT 3.**

Properties must by definition inhere in something, and in fact, it is impossible to imagine a property as separate from an entity in which it might inhere. It is for example, impossible to imagine the colour red as divorced from the surface of which it is a property. It is impossible to imagine the property "four-sided" as separate from some shape.

Consciousness, however, can easily be imagined as divorced from what it is purportedly a property of.

To put it another way, I can easily imagine myself, that is my conscious self, I, me, as separate from and unrelated to that physical substance which my brain is the physical manifestation of. In fact, I can conceive of my conscious self as inhering in nothing at all, i.e. not being a property.

**Therefore, consciousness and the mental states attendant upon it are not properties.**

**Non-reductionism**

* Mind is not Consciousness;
* There is something more (over and above) physical events in the brain;
* It could be very plausible that human mind has natural limitations to succeed in mind-body problem (R. Penrouse, C. McGinn, S. Pinker, N. Chomsky).

**Phenomenal Consciousness: «Qualia»**

When you look at a ripe tomato, you sense its color in a certain way, a way that is different from the way you sense the color of a mound of lettuce leaves. If you crush the tomato and bring it close to your nose, it smells in a distinctive way that is different from the way a crushed lemon smells. Across sense modalities, smelling gasoline is very different from tasting it.

Sensory mental events and states, like seeing a ripe red tomato, smelling gasoline, experiencing a shooting pain, up and down your leg, and the like, have distinctive **qualitative characters**, that is, felt or sensed qualities, by means of which they are identified as sensations of a certain type.

1. Qualia are the way things seem, look, or appear to a conscious creature;

2. If a perceptual experience represents an object to be F and if this experience is true, than the object is F.

**Epistemic Subjectivity: Privacy and Special Epistemic Access.**

Subjectivity is often claimed to be of the essence of consciousness. However, subjectivity has no fixed, unambiguous meaning. One sense of subjectivity is epistemological, having to do with the supposed special nature of knowledge of conscious states.

The main idea is that a subject has a special epistemic access to her own current conscious states; we seem to be «immediately aware», as Descartes said, of our own feelings, thoughts, and perceptions and enjoy a special sort of **first – person authority** with regard to them.

# Phenomenal Consciousness:

# The «Explanatory Gap» and the «Hard Problem»

Most philosophers accept mind – body supervenience in something like the following form: If an organism is in some mental state M at t, then there must be a neural – physical state P such that the organism is in P at t, and any organism that is in P at any time is necessarily in mental state M at the same time.

**Perspectival Subjectivity:   
The First – Person Point of View or “what-is-likeness” (T. Nagel).**

Some philosophers have closely associated subjectivity of Consciousness with the notion of a first – person point of view, or perspective.

There is no impersonal “**what is like to be**”; it is always what is like *for a given subject* (for you, for me, for humans, for bats – strictly speaking only *for me)* to see yellow, to taste pineapple, to echolocate a bat in flight.

**«Explanatory Gap» (J. Levine)**

It is the claim that consciousness and human experiences such as qualia cannot be fully explained only by physical mechanical processes. Proponents of this view claim that the mind is substantially and qualitatively different from the brain and that the existence of something metaphysically extra-physical is required to 'fill the gap.'

In the end, we are right back where we started. The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature. But so long as we have countervailing reasons for doubting the latter, we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the former.

**«Hard Problem»**

* “How could a physical system be the sort of thing that could *learn*, or that could *remember*” (D. Chalmers) – **Easy Problem**
* “How could a physical system be the sort of thing that could *experience* pain?”

(D. Chalmers) – **Hard Problem**

**Zombie argument (D. Chalmers)**

A zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks consciousness, qualia, or sentience .

Since a zombie is indistinguishable from human beings physiologically and contains all processes that are required to maintain a human being; its hypothetical possibility is an argument for the presence of advanced human consciousness which is more than the sum of human neurological pathways and brain state.

For example, when you pick zombie with the needle ha says “Oh”, but in fact he doesn’t feel any pain.

The sum of physical facts do not give us the Qualia-experience

*or*

Physicalist’s description of the human being give us the description of Zobmie.

**Objection to the Zombie Argument (D. Dennett)**

One of the arguments against the zombie argument is the idea of verificationism sentience.

Verificationism states that for words to have meaning their use must be open to public verification. Using the definition of zombie states that the presence of qualia cannot be verified by others. Since it is assumed that we can talk about our qualia, the existence of zombies are impossible.

**Sceptical points of view**

C. McGinn;

R. Penrouse;

S. Pinker;

N. Chomsky

**Colin McGinn and “Cognitive Closure”**

We have **problems** and **mysteries**. Mind-body problem is not a problem, it’s a mystery.

The operations the human mind can carry out are incapable in principle of taking us to a proper appreciation of what consciousness is and how it works.

Mind-body problem doesn’t have any appropriate solution for human beings.

**R. Penrouse and Theory of Incomplicity**

According to Penrose the (computational) brain itself cannot be the basis for what we think of as our minds.

This is not to say that there is nothing about our brains that is computational or combinatorial. It is rather to say that the computational account of mind **is incomplete** and, will always be so.

**S. Pinker and Modules**

We do not have the Meta-Modules to *completely* explain how brain works.

The human mind is a biologically given system with certain powers and limits . . . The fact that “admissible hypotheses” are available to this specific biological system accounts for its ability to construct rich and complex explanatory theories. But the same properties of mind that provide admissible hypotheses may well exclude other successful theories as unintelligible to humans. Some theories might simply not be among the admissible hypotheses determined by the specific properties of mind that adapt us “to imagining correct theories of some kinds,” though these theories might be accessible to a differently organized intelligence.

**N. Chomsky**

The naturalistic temper . . . takes for granted that humans are part of the natural world, not angels, and will therefore have capacities with specific scope and limits, determined by their special structure. For a rat, some questions are problems that it can solve, others are mysteries that lie beyond its cognitive reach; the same should be true of humans, and to first approximation, that seems a fair conclusion. What we call “natural science” is a kind of chance convergence between aspects of the world and properties of the human mind/brain, which has allowed some rays of light to penetrate the general obscurity, excluding, it seems, central domains of the “mental.”

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