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HOMO ANIMAL AMBITIOSUM: EARLY MODERN THEORIES OF SOCIABILITY BETWEEN COMMERCE AND METAPHYSICS

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HOMO ANIMAL AMBITIOSUM: EARLY MODERN THEORIES OF SOCIABILITY BETWEEN COMMERCE AND METAPHYSICS

The article deals with the epistemological background of the early modern theories of sociability: taking as a starting point the ‘prudenti theorems’ from the sixth chapter of Hobbes’ Leviathan, the author examines in consecutive order the Cartesian foundations of sociability in Samuel Pufendorf’s theory of the natural right, the sensualist scienza del commercio of Celestino Galiani, and the refutation of both Cartesian ‘hypothetical metaphysics’ and ‘politics of merchants’ on the grounds of ‘practical Platonism’ by Paolo Mattia Doria.

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Samuel Pufendorf, one of the founders of the Modern natural law, theoretician, and a strong influence on Adam Smith, used to characterize the political science of his time by the words of the old men at the Scaean Gate from The Iliad: ‘Truly others compete for this Helen’ (verum super hac Helena alii certent). The ‘discursive anarchy’, generated by the massive attack on political Aristotelianism at the turn of the 16th century, ignited heated debates among the citizens of Respublica letteraria and gave birth to a prolific posterity of the modern political categories: ratio status, Polizeistaat, arcana imperii, including the important notion of sociability (lat. socialitas) among them. The term has been coined by above-mentioned Pufendorf: until the beginning of 18th century and further his neologism enjoyed a broad reception in political and juridical polemics. The discussions on sociability were focused on the minimal foundations of communication and absolute beginning of the political life – an aporia of the state of nature. In the present article we set ourselves the goal to consider the problem of sociability against the background of various versions of the political epistemology, carried out by the early modern theoreticians, starting from the Hobbesian mathesis politica to the ‘practical Platonism’ of the Neapolitan Settecento intellectuals. We will review, in consecutive order, the moral science of the heir – and, at the same time, the opponent, – of Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf; the conception of the commercial basis of sociability in the writings of some Netherlands (brothers J. and P. De la Courts) and Italian (Celestino Galiani) authors and finally, the doctrine of virtuosa subjectio, developed by one of the most zealous critics of the ‘commercial republicanism’, the aristocratic platonic Paolo Mattia Doria.

The 17th century in the North-European Protestant countries witnessed the predominance of the political version of philosophia novantiqua: political Aristotelianism, though gradually losing its position, served as a foundation and nutrient medium for other political theories. As far back as 1605, Henning Arniseus called Aristotelianism the ‘genuine method’, genuina methodus, of politics, but already in 1700, Stagirite’s political method, supplanted by the natural law in Pufendorf’s vein, had almost disappeared from the Lutheran German universities.

Pufendorf’s key role in the discussions around sociability is not confined to the invention of the term: he created his theory of sociability at an intersection of different disciplinary discourses: syncretic ‘prahistory’ (which was known in the early modern times under various

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3 Reference to Iliad, III, 156–157: ‘Small blame that Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans should for such a woman long time suffer woes’.
6 Ibid. P. 249.
names, e.g., *philosophia mosaica, Urgeschichte*; natural law (the German jurist sought to coin its original version, combining Thomas Hobbes scientific method and Hugo Grotius juridical doctrine\(^7\)); and, finally, ‘moral science’ (Pufendorf dedicated to its epistemological status a special chapter of the treatise ‘On the law of nature and nations’ (*De jure naturae et gentium*)\(^8\)).

We find different solutions of the natural state aporia, an ‘absolute other’ of sociability, in the early modern civil sciences: in Hobbes the *state of nature* remains in the transitory area between mental experiment, Biblical exegesis and historical reconstruction\(^9\); Giambattista Vico explicitly presented his reasoning on the first principles as a ‘history’, and Isaac La Peyrère – as an exegetic hypothesis\(^10\). In Pufendorf’s case, the problem of the primordial history of mankind obtained somewhat paradoxical overtones: his interest in *Urgeschichte* is motivated by the necessity of a new, presentist model of historiography: in his Einleitung zur Historie der vornehmsten Reiche und Staaten Pufendorf claimed the necessity to make the history of the contemporary epoch – *Historie der neulichen Zeiten* – the central object of historical interest, in contrast to the humanist-like ‘antiquarian’ model of historical writing. In this respect he was in opposition to such authors as the famous historian Johan Christoph Becmann. Becmann believed that the study of the contemporary history could not add anything to the universal scenarios of historical events, exemplary descriptions of which are provided by the ancient sources, because *perpetuae veritas est illud: Nihil novi sub Sole*\(^11\). On the contrary, Pufendorf thought the solution of the ‘absolute beginning’ necessary for the needs of the ‘pragmatic historiography’, and the logical aporia of the state of nature acquires the fundamental significance for the *reappolitik*.

Pufendorf carried out a special investigation of the problem of moral certainty in the second chapter of the treatise ‘On the law of nature and nations’. The analysis of the ‘moral essences’ (*entia moralia*) is placed in the section dedicated to ‘preliminary knowledge, indispensable for the study of the discipline’ (*praecognita*). The emergence of Pufendorf’s treatise, according to its author’s declaration, was conditioned by institutional reasons: the Palatine Elector founded a chair of Natural and International Law in Heidelberg and invited Pufendorf to be at its head – thus, *De jure* was in a large measure due to the necessity of

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obtaining professional competences at a new working place. The treatise starts with a rather modest statement of its secondariness: in its author’s words, Hugo Grotius’ doctrine of the natural right was developed so well that in a number of areas of this discipline his followers had only to polish some minute particulars (Pufendorf calls his own treatise specilegii laborem, a work of one who gathers the ears). Actually, a lavish harvest grew out of these ears: Pufendorf presented himself not only as a follower of Grotius, but as his opponent as well; the main target of his criticism was the Grotian category of appetitus societatis, an instinct of the positive sociability. Appetitus societatis emerged for the first time in Grotius in the context of the discussions about the possibility and nature of the international law, discussions, stimulated by a real precedent – the seizure of a Portuguese ship Santa Catharina by the Holland West-India Company in 1602 and confiscation of its cargo, the value of which was roughly equal to the annual income of the English Kingdom. The scale of this event provoked a heated polemic on the law of the sea and on the rights as such; in the arbitration tribunal, convoked on the request of Portugal, Grotius intervened as an advocate of Holland. He built his apology (written in a form of commentary, discovered only in the 19th century and titled ‘On the right of prey’, De jure praedae) on the conception of mare liberum or a particular nomos of the sea, developed by the Spanish Catholic theologians and jurists (Francisco de Vitoria, Vasquez) – a theme taken up by Carl Schmitt in 20th century, – but he threw in his own foundations of this conception: in contrast to the land territories, which can be matter of ownership, the sea spaces cannot be owned, because of the lack of the correspondent ‘aptness’ (aptitudo). Grotius considers dominium as the central source of the right and, thence, the main basis of sociability; this conception took shape in the construction of the state of nature, created by the Dutch jurist. The acquisition of property, realized without any prior arrangement (according to the metaphor, cited by Grotius himself, of the occupation of seats in the theater), occupatio, was presented by Grotius as an inauguration act of the civil state – the polemic stand to the Hobbesian version of social contract is obvious. However, we should take into account the difference between the theory of occupatio in the twelfth chapter of De jure predae and in the treatise ‘On the right of peace and war’: here occupatio loses its status of an autonomous source of right and becomes a type of contract – silent contract in contrast to the open expression of will. Grotius rejected the Hobbes-like solipsist theory of right: he discovered in the fundamental impulse of the ‘Hobbesian man’ the notion of self-preservation (conservatio sui of Latin and behoudenisse of the Netherlands’ writings of Pufendorf), an immanent social dimension (cognatio, communio).

According to Grotius, the foundation of the natural good consists in the social nature of man; good and fair are things, which contribute to the preservation and multiplication of the species (gemeene goed, haers geslachts vorteeling). Thus, the right has a social nature – implying a fundamental difference between Grotius and Hobbes, who emphasized the distance between right and obligation. The revision of the Hobbesian theory of obligation and the recognition of the social nature of right allows Grotius to create his theory of international right, the possibility of which Hobbes denied.

In the dense intellectual milieu of the Netherlands and Northern Germany, full of Cartesian controversies, Grotius’ theory of sociability quickly obtained the political-epistemological dimension. This transformation was due to Pufendorf, who had created an intricate synthesis of experimental medicine, Coccejan Föderaltheologie, and the Cartesian doctrine of method. Pufendorf’s construction of the natural right was collocated between two extremes, the ‘stoic’ and the ‘epicurean’: the stoic theory of friendship is mixed with the Aristotelian learning of the koinonia, natural sociability, restored on new grounds by Hugo Grotius and Richard Cumberland, and political science by Thomas Hobbes. The starting point of the Pufendorf’s political-epistemological reflexion constitutes the inward tension, characteristic of the Hobbesian science – a tension between the pretension of the highest certainty, based on the verum-factum principle and extension of the Cartesian mathesis to the political sphere, and the fragility of the anthropological foundation the whole bulk of Leviathan rests upon, which requires the application of the rhetorical toolset. The state of nature in Hobbes is in many respects similar to the matter in Plato: as matter, according to Socrates’ famous definition in Timaeus, can only be apprehended ‘by a kind of bastard reasoning’ (52b), so the chapters de statu hominum naturali in Leviathan include ‘bastard’ species of arguments, – if to judge by Cartesian standards – which Jon Parkin aptly defined as prudential theorems. The analysis of the state of nature not only allows, but rather requires the departure from the rigid canons of mathesis for the benefit of rhetoric: a strategy, inadmissible for the author of De cive, but fully acceptable for the author of Leviathan. For Hobbes himself, the contradiction between the precarious status of the ‘plasmatic sociability’ in the state of nature is resolved on the ground of

decisionism, but this element of the Hobbesian political science has been rejected by most of his contemporaries. The problem that faced Hobbes’ heirs consisted not only in corroborating the inward coherence of *mathesis politica*, but in substantiating the objectiveness of the moral law, reduced by Hobbes either to a rhetorical topos, or to a ‘prudential theorem’, or to a mere product of the sovereign decision. We should place the restoration of the epistemological significance of the moral law in the general context of reinterpretation of the Hobbesian political science in the neostoic vein – a program, launched by Richard Cumberland, the author of the treatise *De legibus humanae naturae*.

Samuel Pufendorf’s conception of the natural law heavily depends on Cumberland’s *De legibus*. Therefore, Giambattista Vico’s famous judgment on Pufendorf’s alleged ‘Epicureanism’ in the ‘New science’ sounds rather paradoxical:

And finally Pufendorf begins with an Epicurean hypothesis, supposing man to have been cast into this world without any help or care from God. Reproofed for this, he defends himself in a special dissertation, but, because he does not admit providence as his first principle, he cannot even begin to speak of law, as we have heard Cicero tell Atticus the Epicurean in his dialogue *De legibus*.

The political grounds of this Vichian saying are obvious: seeking to enlist the support of the influential Catholic clerics, such as Cardinal Lorenzo Corsini (future Pope Clement XII), Vico systematically indicated the polemical targets of his ‘New science’: the ‘impious philologist’ John Bale and ‘impious philosopher’ Tomas Hobbes, on the one hand, and the triad of the protestant theoreticians of the natural law, Grotius, Selden, and the ‘Epicurean’ Pufendorf. Of course, the reasons to enter Pufendorf and Hobbes into the same philosophical sect, though erroneously associated with the name of Epicurus, can be justified: the first commentators of Pufendorf’s writing, e.g. Jean Barbeyrac, already saw in it a synthesis of the Grotius’ juridical theories and Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. In his early work *Elementorum jurisprudentiae universalis* (1660), Pufendorf recognized his debt to the author of *Leviathan*; we should take into account the fact that by the 1670s Hobbes’ reputation had considerably deteriorated, bordering on that of a *bête noire* (in England after 1667, in Netherlands – after 1671), so that expressing public support to such a notorious atheist and

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materialist would have been rather dangerous. This could have been one of the most important factors rendering the exact definition of Pufendorf to Hobbes’ philosophy so complicated and controversial; be that as it may, presenting Stoicism, not Epicureanism, as a philosophical basis of the Pufendorf’s thought seems to be an established historiographical commonplace. Another detail seems even more intriguing: on closer consideration one can see the patent similarity between the interpretation of the state of nature in Pufendorf and the way of formation of the first human ideas in Vico; particularly striking seems the similarity between Pufendorf’s ‘astuteness of Providence’ (divina providentia mortalibus etiam astutissime disposita saepe eludere soleat, – says Pufendorf, explaining the way the God intervenes in order to support the sociability21) and the famous Vichian ‘cunning of Absolute reason’. Pufendorf explicitly rejected the possibility of natural social inclination, independent of God’s free will; nevertheless, he denied any immediate intervention of God, referring instead to the connection between the rational structure of the universe and the human social nature:

Qua ratione igitur actioni hominis competere aliqua affectio, quae ex necessitate intrinseca & absoluta, extra Dei impositionem & beneplacitum, promanet? Sic ut revera omnes motus & actiones hominis, remota omni lege tam divina quam humana, sint indifferentes; earum autem aliquae ideo tantum naturaliter honeste aut turpes dicantur, quod eas fieri aut omitti quam maxime requirat conditio naturae, quam Creator homini libere attribuit. Non autem, quod citra omnem legem in ipso motu, & adplicatione potentiae physicae per se insit aliqua moralitas22.

Contrary to Hobbes, Pufendorf believed it possible that moral laws existed in the state of nature; he came to such a conclusion, because he thought, in contrast to Hobbes, that reason in the state of nature is not a disruptive, but rather an integrative factor – use of reason should have made obvious the necessity of the communal life. According to Pufendorf, the empirical investigation of nature, improved by the use of clear and distinct perception in the Cartesian sense of the term, allows the man in the prepolitical condition to reveal objectively valid moral principles; the use of reason alone in the state of nature paved the way to sociability23.

In order to prevent the transformation of natural laws into the Hobbes-like ‘prudential theorems’, Pufendorf set forth a postulate, according to which we should not imagine the state of nature as a warre or bellum omnium contra omnes. Rational judgments which mankind was able to build, according to the German jurist, at all the stages of its existence, would inevitably have

22 Ibid. P. 19.
made the advantages and blessings of communal life evident for ‘natural man’. Thus, Pufendorf accepted the Hobbesian idea of self-preservation as a basic human instinct, but he combined it with Grotius’ conception of the ‘social affect’. The state of nature is not a primitive, but rather a derivative state, a result of deprivation, which inevitably comes after the crash of the boundaries of the first human community: *status autem naturalis inde emersit, quod multiplicati homines una societate non amplius continerentur*. Since reason makes unambiguously clear the advantages of communal life and “peaceful coexistence”, the natural state should be represented as that of friendly neutrality. According to Pufendorf, the main reason for Hobbes’ error consists in confusing mental experiment with historical reality. Pufendorf called into question the epistemological regime of the Hobbesian reasoning: the conception of a natural state can only be tolerated if we consider it as a mere hypothesis, abstracted from any real historical facts.  

In Pufendorf’s eyes, it was Erhard Weigel, an author of the treatise *Aristotelian Analysis Restored through Euclid (Analysis Aristotelica ex Euclide restituta)*, who constituted the standard of the epistemological accuracy: just this synthesis of the Aristotelian apodeixis, axiomatic acribia, characteristic to the geometrical method, and Cartesian model of the scientific certainty, was supposed to become a standard of the moral science. In Pufendorf’s opinion, the indeterminacy of the epistemological status of the moral disciplines is due to a misunderstanding: the majority of authors sustained the groundless position that in order to raise the discipline to the rank of an apodeictic science its objects should be *entia necessaria*, necessary existing entities. The accidental historical events and facts evidently cannot be considered as such; this led the philosophers to the conclusion that moral disciplines are not sciences in the strict sense of the word, i.e. they do not fit the criteria set forth by Aristotle in the *Posterior analytics*. But Pufendorf suggested the subject of the demonstrative proof to be not a simple term, but an enunciation (*enunciatio*) as a whole; therefore, the necessary connection (*necessaria connexio*) of the terms of enunciation is sufficient for the exactness of the proof. Thus Pufendorf resolved Aristotle’s aporia of the *scientia de singularibus*; still, the problem set by the Hobbesian *mathesis politica* – that of the semantic instability of the categories applicable to the analysis of *entia moralia* in the state of nature – remained unresolved. Let us remember that this instability in Hobbes correlated to the impossibility of a natural sociability: just because the common interest in the prepolitical state is dissolved in the sum of the private interests,  

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ethical categories (*justum, honestum* etc.) transform into terms semantically empty or unstable. In order to fix the meaning of the moral notions, Pufendorf called attention to the difference between mathematical and moral qualities, endowing moral values with only qualitative necessity and locating their quantitative evaluation in the human free will:

Ex hisce igitur genuinum discrimen inter mathematicas & morales demonstrations patere arbitramur; quod nempe illae circa quantitates potissimum, quae ex sua natura exactissime determinari aptae sunt, versentur, hae autem certam duntaxat qualitatem de subjecto demonstrare satagant, quantitatum moralium determinatione in laxiore fere voluntatis placi 27.

So, the moral sciences necessarily demonstrate only the inherence of the quality to the subject – whereas the ‘intensiveness’ of the moral qualities depends on the human arbitrariness. Thus Pufendorf substituted, to use Vico’s words, the iron rule of mathematical certainty by the commercial *regula Lesbia*, which adjusts itself to the object measured instead of forcing it; the things involved in the commercial processes are considered as equal to each other, the difference between them being purely conventional:

Ast quantitates morales proveniunt ex impositione & aestimatione entium intelligentium & liberorum; quorum judicium atque placitum uti sub mensuram physicam non cadit; ita quod ista tanquam quantitatem sua impositione concipiunt atque determinant, ad similem mensuram revocari nequit, sed velut libertatem ac laxitatem suae originis retinet (...) Similis quoque latitudo in pretiis diversarum rerum, & actionum in commercium venientium occurrat, per quam vix aliaram serum, praeter quam quae functionem in suo genere recipient, pretia ad ungam exaequari possunt; de caetero fere pro aequalibus habentur, prout queque hominum conventio & placitum determinavit 28.

Appealing to commercial values seems to be more than a well-turned metaphor in Pufendorf’s political-juridical doctrine: referring to the economical factors of sociability allowed him to reconcile the recognition, by Hobbes, of the *conservatio sui* as a basic social affect, and simultaneously to explain the possibility of the preservation of the human society – *custodia societatis humanae*. It is not the case that Pufendorf chose the term *commertium* to designate the rational and mutually advantageous social interaction in the state of nature: this use of words allows the separation of the theory of society and theory of state: whereas commerce, not the sovereign imposition and ‘artificial person of state’, as in Hobbes, is the main factor of socialisation, so the civilized societies can also exist outside the states. The transformation of the commerce into the pillar of sociability was a tendency in vogue in the second half of 17th century

28 Ibid. P. 24.
into the 18th century. Let alone the role played by *jus commertii* in the conception of the international right in Francisco Vitoria, let us cite the famous characteristic of the *Age of Commerce* in Adam Smith: ‘propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another’;29; ‘Society may subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of utility, without any mutual love or affection’ – Smith stated in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*30. Commercial politics made a particularly successful career in the United Provinces of Netherlands.

In the Netherlands, the economic interpretation of sociability constituted the basis of the so-called commercial republicanism, the most prominent representatives of which were the brothers Johan and Pieter De la Court. They studied political science at Leiden University: politics made up part of the curriculum of the propedeutic Faculty of Arts as a section of rhetoric and ethic31. An important moment of the Netherlands’ universities’ didactic ideology was the stake on the integration, under the aegis of the syncretic *philosophia novantiqua*, of the scholastic Peripatetism and the new, i.e. Cartesian, philosophy. This synthesis has been realized in a very comprehensive form in the manuals of logic, moral philosophy, and politics by Franco Burgersdijk; in addition to them an important role belonged to the treatise *Idea philosophiae moralis, sive compendiosa institutio* (1623) by the Burgersdijk’s disciple, Adriaan Heerebord. But it was Marcus Zuerius Buxhorn who exerted the largest influence of the political learning of brothers De la Courts. His political course, given at the students’ request outside the official curriculum and published later (in 1643) under the title *Commentariolus de statu Confoederatorum Provinciarum Belgii*, was an attempt to popularize by means of numerous examples taken from contemporary political practice, the Tacitist political program and the reason of state theory32. Boxhorn’s manual incorporated the main elements of the political *philosophia receptorum*, taken mainly from the Hobbes’ heterodox political theory: the foundation of the human society consists not in sociability, but in fear and necessity; the denial of the natural sociability necessarily entailed the rejection of the mixed constitution; the combination of these two elements constitutes, in fact, the ‘crisis of political aristiotelianism’33. The de la Courts built their political science on Cartesian anthropology. The state of nature is rooted in the perinatal conditions: the stress of women. The commercial republicanism rests on

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32 Ibid. P. 33.
33 Ibid. P. 35.
the indefinite epistemological grounds – except for rather vague references to the experience, we cannot find any sound ‘discourse of method’ in the de la Courts’ political writings. Still, in the method of the de la Courts’ political science we can clearly discern the coordinates of the Lebenswelt of the Leiden enlightened patriciate – thence the centrality of the category of ‘experience’ (Ervarentheid) in the conceptual toolset of the de la Courts. The experience-oriented model of the political science in Netherlands was not only an epistemological resource – it provided the guidelines for the comparative study of the singular polities highly in demand in the 17th century in the ‘capital-intensive city-states’\textsuperscript{34}. Let us remember that a series of treatises in the pocket format (\textit{duodecim}), dedicated to comparative politics, came off the press in the Elsevier publishing house from 1620 to 1640 on the initiative of Johan de Laat, one of the chiefs of the West-Indian company. The idea of the necessity to put together philosophical studies and commerce has been programmatically expressed in the famous oration of Caspar Barleus, \textit{Mercator sapiens, sive oratio de conjungendis mercaturae & philosophiae studiis} (1633). The famous science of commerce grew and was transferred to the Southern Europe from the rhetoric of ‘mercator sapiens’.

Among the South-European defenders of the commercial politics a special importance goes to Celestino Galiani – a bishop of Taranto and \textit{Capellano Maggiore} of Naples, one of the founders of the Roman \textit{Academia dei Concili}, which in the beginning of 18th century had become a kind of ‘recruitment office’ for the Papal Curia, and a hidden partisan of Epicurus, editor of Pierre Gassendi’s works. In Galiani’s library were kept, among other things, the works of Thomas Mun, translated by Antonio Genovesi\textsuperscript{35} – Thomas Mun was one of the authors of the ‘Whig’s oligarchy’ epoch, who had promoted the centrality of the category of fact in the discourse of modern politics\textsuperscript{36}. Indeed, a chair was created at the Neapolitan University of ‘mechanics and commerce’; the particular enthusiasm in promotion of the scienza del commercio in Italy manifested in a group of political economists, assembled around Bartolomeo Intieri, an attorney of the Medicean family in Naples. In his treatise \textit{Ricerche intorno alle prime origini della scienza morale}, extant in only two manuscripts, Galiani examined the point of intersection of the sociability theories and political epistemology, that is the way of forming the ideas of good and evil. Like Hobbes and Pufendorf, Galiani sets himself the goal to deduce the principle of sociability from the human nature as such, \textit{la sociabilità da fonti di istessa natura}. Embodying


the patterns of social behavior, or social habits, in human nature made the introspection a privileged method of social investigation. The two most prominent 17th century theoreticians of the civil science – Th. Hobbes and G. Vico – both supported the revealing potential of the introspection: the first, giving an original interpretation of the gnothi seauton-principle (Read thy self in order to discover the passions and thoughts of all other men)\textsuperscript{37}, the latter, pretending to ‘find the principles of the social world within the modifications of our own mind’\textsuperscript{38}. Since the history of mankind is compressed into the human body, analytics of the faculties can provide us with the principles of sociability. Thus the theories of sociability turned out to be intertwined with the progress of cognizione and the history of ideas in the early modern sense of the term\textsuperscript{39}.

Galiani defines reflexion as the driving force behind socialization; by means of reflexion (applicarsi a riflettere), men acquired the possibility to know the causes of their pleasures and sufferings. Reflecting on the causes of the pleasures and sufferings, men formed the first moral notions; the meditation on the causal order of the universe generated the idea of the eternal Mind (mente eterna), i.e., God. So, the idea of God in Galiani turns out to flow from the idea of pleasure; it does not mean, however, that Capellano Maggiore of Naples believed the religion to be an epiphenomenon of the primitive hedonism – as in Vico, the provenience of religion from the sensitive illusion is conditioned by the ‘cunning of Absolute Reason’. Originating from sensation, moral habits (costumi) are contrasted by Galiani with the Cartesian conception of the innate moral ideas (ideae innatae), on the one hand, and to the reduction of the moral principles to the ‘speculative judgments’ (giudizi speculativi) in theology on the other\textsuperscript{40}.

Confining the motivation of human actions to economic interest could not but provoke resistance. It is not the case that the question of thinking in the categories of commerce and national debt corrupts the statesmen became topical in the Europe in 1688 – 1776\textsuperscript{41}. Paolo Mattia Doria’s (1667–1746) political doctrine constituted one of the most remarkable episodes of that process in the intellectual culture of the Italian Seicento, which Eugenio Garin called a ‘return journey undertaken by Italian thought from Cartesianism to the Platonism of the Renaissance tradition’\textsuperscript{42}. Besides, many blamed Doria for having (like Ficino) ‘forced’ Plato to assert things he would never say. But we should take into account that Platonism in Doria is nothing but a

\textsuperscript{38} The New Science of Giambattista Vico… P. 85.
\textsuperscript{40} Stapelbroek K. Op. cit. P. 79.
synecdoche, and Plato himself was a commentator and eponym of the ‘ancient wisdom’ of Pythagoras, Egyptians and Indian Brahmans, *prisca sapientia*, the tradition, that ancient philosophical sects of Epicureans, Stoics, and Sophists, resurrected nowadays under the labels of Cartesians, Pyrrhonists, and Neostoics, sought to destroy. The Platonic-Pythagorean philosophy proved to be the most needed, according to Doria, when the Christian religion had been recognized by the state, and the Christian virtues became political ones. Doria associates the failed renaissance of the Platonic philosophy with the name of Marsilio Ficino: despite his unquestionable merits and achievements, Ficino committed some significant errors, in particular, trying to present Plato as a poet rather than a philosopher. Doria likened Ficino to Aelian, a Roman historian, who, having compiled commentaries on the Greek writers, didn’t understand anything within; even the epoch of the emperor Adrian when Aelian lived, resembled, according to Doria, that of Cosimo Medici, who had initiated the translation of the Plato’s *opera omnia* (*si rinnovellò nell’Italia la Filosofia Platonica*). After a short time and incomplete revival of the Platonic philosophy in Italy, it extinguished very rapidly because of the foreign invasions which befell the country. The new fall of the Platonic philosophy turned out to be even more disastrous, because it paved the way for the amateurs of unsubstantial science and superficial scholarship. One of the most interesting Doria’s theses consists in restoring the significance of the Quattrocento Italian philosophy, in the first place Platonic, unfairly pushed into the background by the Enlightenment intellectuals:

Difficile cosa però è ritrovare gli accennati libri di Ferrosi, e di Robortello, e ciò perchè noi Italiani abbiamo posto in obblio i nostri migliori Autori del xv. secolo per corer dietro agli Autori moderni, i quali nelle scienze, e nelle arti lisingano con la perniciosa facilità le menti pigre, e tutto ad un tempo ambiziose di apparire sapient, onde poi la Repubblica si è riempiuta di falsi sapienti. I Filosofi de’ nostri giorni si contentano di andar brancolando nelle conoscenze particolari, e pratiche della Fisica, e non sieguono altra Geometria, che una Geometria abituale, e meccanica, in tutto opposta alla Metafisica, e pongono in non cale quella Metafisica, la quale è sola valevole a formare una mente universale nelle sceanze tutte.\(^{43}\)

Sinking into the oblivion of Platonic metaphysics, which aims at forming ‘the universal man’ (*formar l’uomo universale*), was fraught with heavy scientific consequences, which, among other things blurred the vision of the pillars of sociability. Instead of an insatiable deficit of mutual acknowledgment and total distrust, the conduct of the men is guided by ‘abstract ratiocination’ and compassion:

Quest’abito di fortunato astratto raziocinio, che in Metafisica fa la mente umana, fa si che’l vero Metafisico formi nella sua mente le idee delle passioni, delle afflizioni, che gli altri uomini sentono nell’animo quando da altri vengono o con malizia, o con violenza afflitti nelle loro case, e formano altresì l’idea del dolore, che sentono gli altri uomini, quando vengono dale percosse tormentati nel corpo.

The main threat to Doria’s ‘virtuous politic’ was, along with the Cartesian ‘hypothetic metaphysics’, the ‘commercial politic’, imported from England and the Netherlands by the Neapolitan Epicureans – manifest as well as hidden threats (e.g., Celestino Galiani). Doria launched the attack on the Neapolitan partisans of the commercial politics indirectly: the ‘official’ target of his criticism was the philosophy of John Locke. In Doria’s opinion, among ‘natural inclinations’ of the man we should count, in addition to the seeking of the self-preservation (conservatio sui), the desire of self-knowledge, that is, according to Doria ‘the appetite (appetito) of the soul to know the truth’, or, in other words, ‘certain appetites of the soul, which guide it by its own nature to the apprehension of the truth of any kind’ (certi appetiti all’anima, che alla conoscenza di tutto il vero per sua propria natura la guiderebbero), and the urge towards ‘improving oneself and seeking the salvation from the misadventures’.

This triad of the natural inclination substitutes the Hobbesian ‘two most certain postulates of the human nature’ (duo certissima naturae humanae postulata), formulated in the Episola deductoria of De cive: according to the first, natural cupidity makes men desire common goods; according to the second one, they naturally fear death. Characteristically enough, even the self-preservation in Doria is interpreted not as a fully egocentric impulse: it is not the case that Doria sees the manifestation of that impulse not only in the fear of death, but in caring about posterity as well: ‘quell’amore innato eziandio, che abbiamo verso i propri figlioli, i quali miriamo come quelli, in cui abbiamo riposte tutta la speranza della nostra propagazione, figliola du quest’innato desiderio, che abbiamo di prolungare la nostra vita, e la memoria di noi stessi’.

However, love and sympathy for the ‘innocent children’ (innocenti fanciulli) are not generated by the sentimental mood: the concern for posterity is motivated by the innate ‘idea of the eternal and the infinite’ (idea dell’eterno, e dell’infinito): in our children, we see the image of our immortality. In this regard, Doria’s point of view is substantially different not only from that of Hobbes, but from that of Giambattista Vico, the friend of Doria and the opponent of Hobbes (let us remember that Vico dedicated to Doria De antiquissima italorum sapientia): according to

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44 Id. La vita civile. Napoli : Angelo Vocola, 1729. P. 17.
47 Doria P. M. La vita civile. P. 22.
48 Doria considers Hobbes and Machiavelli as his main opponents (cf.: Ibid. P. 23).
the ‘New science’, the concern for posterity emerges only after the postdiluvian exiccation of the Earth and the appearance of lightening, filling the souls of the primordial giants with the supernatural terror. This discrepancy of positions is due to the fact that the spiritual impetus, bridling the frenetic affects of the ancient men – conatus⁴⁹ – in Vico is not innate, in contrast to Doris’s inclinazioni innate: it is introduced into the hypertrophied bodies of giants from outside under the influence of a complicated mechanism, including natural phenomenon (emergence of lightning) and the distorted effects of the rough fantasy of giants (finsero i corpi di esser dei). Doria shared the ‘Platonic’ idea of the ‘seeds of truth’ (semi del vero) inserted in the bodies of all men. But these ‘seeds’ are deeply ‘buried’ in the body (the metaphor of ‘burring’ was also used by Vico for characterizing the mental abilities of the primitive men), and few people are able to use their cognitive faculties, because the sensitive perceptions act on the human soul very intensively: questi semi in tanto non si fecondano in tutti, e queste idee non si schiariscono, in quanto che pochi son quelli, che sappian vincere quella naturale ripugnanza, che sente l’anima nello astrarsi dale immagini delle cose sensibili lei sempre presenti⁵⁰. This attractiveness of the sensitive images constituted the foundation of the sensualist gnoseology of John Locke. But according to Doria the confusion of the ‘natural light’ of reason and the first perception originating from senses was a heavy epistemological error of the modern philosophers, which led to the false conception of social integration. The true foundation of the communal life, in Doria’s opinion, is provided by the continuous transcending, surpassing of oneself: ardente amore di virtù, e di gloria, il quale innalza l’anima sopra se stessa.

The most persuasive manifestation of the ‘cognitive affect’ in men is, according to Doria, the imposition of names, volontà di imporre i nomi alle immagini che dalle cose esteriori abbian ricevute⁵¹. The act of imposition and the following activity of the power of judgment, which constructs the conclusions from the terms, introduce rational order into the chaos of senses; thanks to language the universe of Platonic ideas appears through the phenomenal world⁵². Therefore, the rational impetus and the basic social affect coincide in what Doria calls ‘natural geometry’ (geometria naturale): in his opinion, this natural geometry manifests itself not only in primitive men, but also in children. The child’s spontaneous desire to give names to all the objects around him is analogous to the activity of a geometer, forging his definitions: the ‘first ratiocination’, primo raziocinio of the children, agli assiomi, o sien prime notizie di

⁴⁹ Let us remember the Vichian definition of conatus: ‘And what the theorists of mechanics call powers, forces, impulses, are insensible motions of bodies, by which they approach their centers of gravity, as ancient mechanics had it, or depart from their centers of motion, as modern mechanics has it’. The New Science of Giambattista Vico… P. 114.
⁵⁰ Doria P. M. La vita civile. P. 25.
geometria in tutto equivale. It would be instructive to compare the semeiosis in Doria and in Vico in order to grasp the difference between their political-epistemological projects. As is known, in Vico’s poetic logic the process of semeiogenesis moves from the mute language of gestures through the language of sensible images and metaphors to that articulated and conventional. Let alone the first stage totally absent in Doria, let us focus on the second one. The dominant tropes there were metonymy and, via synecdoche, metaphor; both were taken from the bodies and generated what Vico calls piccole favolette, ‘little fables’: ‘the Poets created Myths from the bodies, and each metaphor turned out to be a little fable’; ‘metonymy of cause for effect produced in each case a little fable’. Thus, ‘sensible metaphysics’ gives birth to a ‘sensible logic’; however, the ‘descending’ of metaphysics into the sensible world can be seen only from the philosophical, ‘deductive’ point of view – for the philological, ‘inductive’ one, the logical signs precedes the metaphysical. The semeiotic is connected with ‘metaphysics of truth’ (metaphysica del vero), as far as geometrical notions and figures are the signs of the metaphysical (see the chapter ‘On points’ in De antiquissima italorum sapientia). The geometrical synthesis becomes a necessary link between inarticulate sensible signs and abstract notions: thus, applying geometry to tracing letters of the alphabet by the ancient Greeks paved the way for reasoning in abstract categories.

Vichian ‘sensible metaphysics’ is clearly opposed to Doria’s pure ‘Platonism’ – let us focus on the difference in the mode of forming the ‘first human ideas’, i.e. the mechanism of socialization. According to Doria, the first human ideas are not ‘little fables’, but ‘little syllogisms’ (the axioms, resulting from the children ‘first ratiocination’, are also syllogisms), necessary for our self-preservation (da questi piccoli siblogismi nasce quel giudizio alla nostra conservazione necessario). These geometrical entities form the universal mathematics, a ‘universal custom’ of mankind (questa parte di matematica fatta universale costume di tutti gli uomini). By introducing ‘the real difference into the appearances of the sensible world’ (una differenza reale a tutte le apparenze di questo mondo sensibile), universal mathematics provides a solid foundation for communal life. But paradoxically enough, in the long run the further progress of ‘natural geometry’ produces the disintegrative effects: the abundance and intricacy of theorems and problem, syllogistically deduced from the first axioms, provoke boredom and rejection in the human mind, and it starts confusing intellectual operations with the sensible

56 Doria P. M. La vita civile. P. 27.
perceptions (primi assiomi formati sopra gl’impeti naturali, che col lume naturale per precipitio di giudizio di leggieri confondono57). This fundamental qui pro quo explains the sensualist theory of Locke, this Epicurus redivivus.

Still, the noble cognitive appetite is not, according to Doria (and in contrast to the ‘Hobbists’), ‘a painful appetite of the soul, an annoying desire, which the nature had instilled in us for our torment and pain’ (un tormentoso appetito dell’anima, una nojosa volontà, in noi dalla natura per nostro tormento e nostra pena instillata58). The ‘cognitive affects’ constitute the alternative to the ‘jealousy of trade’; by discerning the Platonic essences behind the singular things, man acquires the ability to act not only for his one sake, but for the ideal, social purposes as well. Thus the ‘virtuous metaphysics’, the pillar of the civil life, is contrasted to the ‘corrupted metaphysics’ (corrotta metaphisica) of ‘merchants’ and ‘Cabbalists’59. The sake for the self-preservation results in the sake for self-improvement; society needs the virtuous affects for its own safety. The particular importance acquires the figure of the ‘virtuous prince’ (principe virtuoso60), a person who has developed his cognitive appetites to the highest degree.

One of the most important advantages of geometry in its ancient, practically oriented form, is its applicability to the ordaining of the regular army in the vein of the Orangist military reform; thus, ‘practical Platonism’ turns out to be a necessary premise of the revival of virtù militare. As in the case of the letters, the geometrical figures provide the link between metaphysical virtue and sensible world, that is, the real army (per ordinare un’esercito in tutte le possibili figure). Incorporating metaphysical principles in the ‘military body’ should be implemented by the philosophical and geometrical skills of the army commander (vero Capitano Eroe), according to the XXIII axiom of De capitano filosofo. Doria even found the historical incarnation of such a ‘heroic captain’ – general Montecucoli, to whom he dedicated De capitano. Thus the war, conducted for the fair purposes, is presented by Doria as ‘the most virtuous exercise’ (virtuosissimo esercizio)61, and the military success directly depends on the Platonic virtue – that is why the impious and malicious practice Hannibal was defeated by the philosopher Cornelius Scipio Africanus and Marius, who despised philosophy and by Sulla who respected it.

57 Ibid. P. 28.
58 Ibid. P. 35.
59 ‘Ma allo ’ncontro i mercadanti sono allo stato in tutti dannosi, quando vogliono mischiarsi in quella politica, la quale dipende da altri principi di filosofìa’. Ibid. P. 334 – 335.
60 Ibid. P. 35.
So in Doria’s thought the Platonic renaissance meets the process of ‘scientification of the military art’ (Verwissenschaftlichung der Militarwesen), to use the G. Österreich’s term.62

Doria paid special attention to the mechanism of the power of judgment, the crucial problem for the applicability of the Platonic metaphysic to the political practice; so, he examined the way the application of the general maxims of the ‘practical Platonism’ are extended to the singular cases (Paticella VII of La vita civile). The failure of this mechanism led to one of the most dangerous errors of his time – delegation of the political governance to the ‘learned practitioners’ (colti pratici) instead of the partisan of the Platonic metaphysics. But the ‘learned practitioners’ are not fit for the state affairs; the atheoretical ‘practical prudence’ (prudenza pratica) is equally not sufficient for that purpose. The sense of danger, caused by the transfer of the political initiative to the ‘middle brows’, was shared by many intellectuals of the Neapolitan Settecento; let us remember G. Vico’s famous letter to Edouard de Vitry, in which he complained about the universal enthusiasm for the superficial learning, contained in the compendia and encyclopedias, and considered the decline of political science as one of the numerous negative consequences of this phenomenon.63 In addition to the failure of the power of judgment, the ‘Cabbalistic politics’ and the triumph of commerce are rooted in the errors of induction and the hypertrophy of imagination: ‘altra cosa non essere il commercio, che un’affinamento dell’arte d’immaginare, e di dar prezzo alle cose per lo mezzo de’ segni inventati dagli uomini per liberarsi della necessità del trasporto e della premutazione (…) si affinarono con l’immaginazione, e diedero prezzo reale alla parola, a stabile fede appoggiata: il che è l’essenza, e la natura del commercio’.64 Doria connected the distortion of commerce with the Great geographical discoveries: facility of getting profit by means of the exploitation of the newly discovered lands paved the way to ‘fictitious and ideal commerce’ (commerce finti, ed ideali). Doria opposed the mercantilist commerce highly in vogue at the beginning of the 18th century, the doctrine of the ‘real’ ‘internal’ trade; his stake in the commercio interno66 and rejection of the ‘ideal’ colonial trade even made Doria praise the Turkish Empire as a sample of

64 Doria P. M. La vita civile. P. 318.
65 Ibid. P. 336.
66 ‘Commercio interno, il quale perché è tutto fondato sù della buona politica, è il buon commercio, ch’è a’regnì utile, e profittevole’. Ibid. 346.
a closed nation-state. Focus upon the ‘real economy regarding our own lands’, reale economia delle proprie terre, allowed many researchers to see in Doria a forerunner of physiocrats. The characteristic feature of commercial thought is the fixation on the immediate profit rather than on the long-run economic strategy: nowadays, complained Doria, all ‘wish to be Tirians’ (tutti vogliono fare da Tirij), that is, all are seeking after momentary results, presentanei profitti. Behind the merchants, rather enigmatic figure of the ‘political cabbalists’ is looming: sono ruputati dotti nelle civili virtu solamente i mercantanti, e buoni economi dello stato, ed anco i cabalisti. The anthropological constitution of the merchants combines two seemingly contradictory features: ‘the broad intelligence’ (vasto ingegno) and the ‘ordinate and meticulous mind’ (mente ordinata e minuta). The paternalistic Platonism of Doria relies upon the ‘vigilance of the political magistrates upon the life and costumes of the family fathers and landlords’ (vigilanza de’magistrati di politica sovra la vita e’costumi de’padri di famiglia padroni de’campi). The economic misbalance and prevailing of the ‘abstract economy’ and ‘corrupted commerce’ leads to the unbridled freedom of the imagination: the lack of the ability to pay taxes results in the supplanting of the real value by the imaginative one, that is, in inflation. Doria warned against men endowed with a pure mechanical thinking, gente meccanica, whose only interest consists in levying taxes and getting financial profits.

The digression to Doria’s political economy was needed for revealing the role of the cognitive faculties, including imagination, in the maintaining the body political. We can see how the proportion of the cognitive faculties modifies the models of sociability, carried out by the early modern political theoreticians. Thus, the ‘prudential theorems’ of natural men become in Thomas Hobbes a correlate of the ‘plasmatic sociability’; the clear and distinct ideas of the entia moralia in Pufendorf provide the foundations of the natural sociability; the mechanism of induction and the category of fact underpin the social nature of man in the ‘commercial politics’; finally, in Paolo Mattia Doria the appetiti coniscitivi that enable man to discern the Platonic essences under the veil of the phenomenal world are presented as a mode of preservation of the society. The simultaneous examination of the different versions of the political epistemology and sociability theories gives the opportunity, among other things, to discover new dimensions in a number of fundamental problems of the history of European political thought, problems, the significance of which is by no means confined to the chronological limits of the early modern

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67 Ibid. P. 347.
68 Ibid. P. 348.
69 Ibid. P. 315.
70 Ibid. P. 323.
71 Ibid.
times. We can rank among these problems the opposition of two mainstream directions in the historiography of politics, analyzed in details by Pocock: historical-juridical one, focusing on the man a subject of rights (natural law paradigm, to put it in Pocock’s words)\(^{72}\), and the history of republican (civil) humanism, which considers man chiefly as a subject of virtus. In fact: the unwillingness to consider virtus as an important factor of the social integration is characteristic not only to the ‘commercial republicanism’, but also to the natural right doctrines of the epoch; their common premise is the anthropological reduction, neutralization of the both cognitive and integrative impetus, acting beyond purely egocentric Hobbesian instincts, be it Machiavellian virtù or Doria’s virtus platonica. However, there was also a third way, in opposition both to the practical Platonism, jusnaturalistic theories and commercial politics: that proposed by G. Vico, the philological-philosophical civil science. The optimistic image of the virtuous subjection, depicted by Doria, was implemented – and moderated – by Vico, to adjust the Platonic view of the human nature and political life by the Tacitus’ ones: ‘Habes, sapientissime Paulle Doria, metaphysicam humana imbecillitate digna, quae homini nec omnia vera permittat, neque omnia negat, sed aliqua’.

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\(^{72}\) Pocock J.G.A. Virtue, Commerce and History… P. 37.