Career Incentives of Governors in late Tsarist Russia

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Abstract

Recent empirical studies show that career concerns may be employed as a tool to improve the efficiency of a political hierarchy. This paper investigates whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career concerns to improve the performance of provincial governors. To that end, we have constructed a database of individual characteristics and career tracks of the majority of Russian governors in 91 provinces during 1895-1914. Measuring a governor’s performance by the intensity of peasant revolts and worker strikes in the province under his rule, we provide evidence that the central administration rewarded better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main provinces (gubernias). These results are robust to various sensitivity tests. In addition, we show that political connections had no significant effect on career mobility, and the performance evaluation of central authorities did not change significantly in the aftermath of 1905-1907 revolution. With these findings, we shed some more light on the period that led to the collapse of the Russian Empire.

\textit{Keywords: Career Incentives, Political Hierarchy, Russian Empire.}

\textit{JEL Classification: H11, J63, N43, P3.}

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1 Introduction

Career concerns are an important factor determining the efficiency of any hierarchical structure. For instance, Holmström (1999) shows that managers’ career concerns can create incentives for better performance.

In the context of political hierarchy, a number of empirical studies have shown that future appointment prospects can be a means to incentivize provincial leaders to work more efficiently. For example, Li and Zhou (2005) show that, in the post-Maoist China, promotion of provincial leaders hinged upon the economic growth of the province under their rule. Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2011) provide evidence that the Soviet central authorities also applied career incentives to provincial governors during Khrushchev’s Sovnarkhos reform. They also show that this scheme, in turn, benefitted local economic growth. Jia et al. (2013), on the other hand, refine the previous conclusions about the political system in modern China, and demonstrate that performance and personal connections are complementary determinants of a governor’s career.

In this paper, we study provincial governors in the last two decades of the Russian Empire, 1895-1914. To that end, we have first constructed a database of individual characteristics and career tracks of the majority of Russian governors in 91 provinces during 1895-1914. Then, we investigate whether central authorities employed career incentives based on gubernatorial performance. Our measure of performance is based on the intensity of social unrest in a province, i.e. on a governor’s ability to maintain peace and security in his province. Historians argue that, during the last decades of the empire, the main parameters of interest for the Tsarist regime were political
stability, peace and order in the provinces, and thus to secure regime’s survival. Therefore, we deem our performance measures appropriate for the specificities of the time period and the central administration’s agenda.

Using panel data fixed effects models and the number of peasant revolts and worker strikes as performance measures, we provide evidence that there was only partial application of career concerns in the empire. In the main provinces of the empire (gubernias) performance did not affect career mobility, however, career incentives were in place in the newly acquired peripheral provinces (oblasts). This effect was also economically significant. For example, one standard deviation reduction in peasant revolts led to a 13 percentage point increase in the probability of promotion for an oblast governor. Since the average probability of promotion was around 4%, one standard deviation change in peasant revolts in oblasts more than tripled the likelihood of promotion.

In addition, we test the effect of political connections on career mobility, and we find no significant effect. Moreover, we test whether central authorities had a more attentive policy of performance evaluation in the aftermath of 1905-1907 revolution, and find no significant change in their attitude towards career incentives.

Studying the time span of 1895-1914 is essential for several reasons. It covers the period since Nicholas II assumed tsardom until his last years in power. This allows us to have consistency in the pattern of governor appointments under the reign of a single tsar. Moreover, this question has historical importance, as it sheds light on to the causes of the Russian Empire’s collapse. We show that the central government failed

Lyons (1974) quotes Nicholas II, the last tsar, on the crucial role of officials in retaining the empire: "We are in the midst of a revolution with an administrative apparatus entirely disorganized, and in this lies the main danger."
to use career concerns to improve performance in the main parts of the empire (in the 
gubernias). Thus, in the absence of any reward or punishment mechanism, governors 
might have haphazardly managed their gubernias with no vision of improving their 
performance. This, in turn, results in poor performance of preventing the spread of 
the revolutionary movement, which eventually led to the demise of the empire.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section briefly 
describes the historical background building up to the reign of Nicholas II. Section 
3 puts forward hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 
presents empirical results and some sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes.

2 Historical Background

Gubernias were major administrative units in the Russian Empire and were ruled 
by governors. Gubernias were first introduced by Peter the Great in 1708 and were 
maintained until the collapse of the empire. Although, initially Russian Empire 
was divided into 8 gubernias, by 1914, through subsequent reforms and territory 
expansion, the number of gubernias went up to 78.

The governor of a gubernia was considered as the "tsar's viceroy" in a province, 
appointed directly by the emperor, and, at the same time, an official of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs (Mosse (1984); Zaionchkovskii (1978); Robbins (1987)). According 
to the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire (Svod Zakonov), the main task of the 
governor was to guarantee the "inviolability of the supreme rights of the Monarchy, 
the benefit of the state and the universal, exact observance of laws, codes, supreme 
edicts, decree of the Senate, and the authorities’ orders." Secondly, the law prescribes 
the governor "to protect the public peace, the security of everyone and the observance
of the statutory regulations, order, and security laws." It should also be noted that the governor controlled the police and appointed the key police officers in the *gubernia*.

With the reforms of 1864 governors lost some of their judicial power and were constrained by local governments (zemstvos) in deciding on economic and social matters. However, in 1866, in the wake of Karakozov’s attempt on the life of Alexander II, the government issued laws augmenting the power of governors: the right to unannounced inspection of any provincial state body; the right not to approve any provincial official’s appointment on the grounds of political unreliability and the right to close any organization or society engaged in anti-governmental activities and in any activity threatening state security. In 1876, governors’ authority was extended to issue "mandatory regulations" which allowed them to prohibit meetings or to close newspapers (Zaionchkovskii (1978) and Eroshkin (1983)). In subsequent decades, governors’ powers were further reinforced, especially with Alexander III’s "political counterreforms" (Eroshkin (1983)). All things considered, by the time Nicholas II assumed tsardom in late 1894, governors were the masters of the province with extensive powers and they were an important part of the Russian bureaucratic structure.

In the period under study, in addition to regular *gubernias*, there were a number of territories known as *oblasts*. Majority of then-existing *oblasts* were in the periphery, located in the outlying regions of the Empire. These were mainly in the south, Caucasus, Urals, Siberia and Central Asia with their non-Russian minority populations (e.g. Kars Oblast or Transcaspian Oblast). Figure 1 highlights the spatial distribution of *gubernias* and *oblasts*. We observe that while *gubernias* were mostly in the main European part of the empire, *oblasts* were predominantly peripheral.
There were 21 oblasts in 1914.

Oblast were governed by special statutes\(^2\) While regular gubernias were ruled by civil governors, oblasts were mainly headed by governors with a military background possessing both civil and military powers. At the same time, oblasts were liable to the Ministry of War, while gubernias were liable to the Ministry of Interior. The aim of the central administration was to integrate oblasts into the regular system of imperial governance, which was hampered in the oblasts by local institutions of the minorities and strategic threats in the region (Abashin et al. (2008)). For example, in the Caucasus the inability to introduce general imperial laws and the military resistance of the indigenous population led to a military-popular government (Bobrovnikov et al. (2007); Abashin et al. (2008)). The essence of this system was the inseparability of military and civil powers, and keeping the traditional institutions of self-governance under the control of the Russian administration (Abashin et al. (2008)). Oblasts were meant to be temporary administrative units, and in fact, some territories were successfully turned into gubernias. However, despite the measures towards administrative unification with the rest of the Empire, the military-popular governments of oblasts lasted till 1917 (Bobrovnikov et al. (2007)).

On the whole, we can summarize the typical characteristics of the oblasts as follows:

1. Oblasts were usually peripheral regions marked by social and economic backwardness concomitant with a high share of non-Russian minorities.

2. They were ruled by military governors who possessed both military and civil

\(^2\)Svod Zakonov, Vol. II.
powers and were usually in the military service. They were appointed by the Emperor, yet the candidates were chosen by the Ministry of Interior in coordination with the Ministry of War.

3. The administrative apparatus of oblasts was on the whole more primitive and centralized than in gubernias. The military governor, through the system of oblastniye pravleniya (oblast board), exercised wide powers in the spheres of law, police, public finance and interaction with indigenous population. Importantly, zemstvos (elected local government bodies) were also absent in the oblasts.

4. Based on points 2) and 3), we can infer that the governors of the oblasts were more powerful masters of the entrusted territories than the rulers of the regular gubernias.

Lastly, the institution of governorate-general was another important element of the imperial system of administration. A governorate-general spanned over several gubernias or oblasts and was ruled by a general-governor, who, like military governors, also had both military and civil powers. Their powers were very wide, and they could intervene into all spheres of administration in the provinces and overrule governors. For instance, Poland, Caucasus or Siberia were all subject to governorates-general, which might have been a result of military and political considerations such as proximity to potentially hostile states or military resistance by the local population (Eroshkin (1983); Damesheck et al. (2007)).
3 Hypotheses

Robbins (1987) argues that while favouritism and patronage continued to play a role in political hierarchy, expertise and efficiency became ever more important in appointment decisions in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The ministry of interior achieved a more consistent procedure in the selection of officials and there was a growing "professionalisation" (Robbins (1987)). Despite absence of any order in governors’ appointments in the legislation, the ministry was working to improve appointees’ professional qualities and was elaborating formal criteria of selection (Blinov (1905)).

Previous studies on the institutions of imperial governorship in Russia mostly addressed the issue of selection criteria for the candidates of governorship. This paper, instead, focuses on whether governors’ performance and personal characteristics influenced their subsequent career paths.

The first hypothesis we test is whether gubernatorial performance affected further careers of governors. We argue that, during the time period we consider, the ability of governors to maintain peace and security in provinces was the main measure of performance evaluation by the central government. Robbins (1987) argues that "peace was the governor’s profession. Among many duties assigned to His Excellency, none was more central than the maintenance of law and public order. The Svod Zakonov listed numerous obligations: protecting the state against its enemies, preserving the security of the tsar’s subjects from attacks by thieves, swindlers, and bandit gangs, suppressing civil disturbances, and upholding public morality." Therefore, we measure a governor’s performance by the number of peasant revolts and worker strikes.
In the province under his rule.

In fact, there are a number of cases when governors’ ability to manage the political situation in a province influenced their further appointment. For example, Pyotr Stolypin, who successfully suppressed the unrest in Saratov gubernia, was promoted to the Minister of Interior and the Chairman of Council of Ministers in 1906. On the other hand, irresoluteness in the face of the escalating revolutionary movement showed by Samara governor Dmitry Zasyadko (1904 - 1905), Minsk governor Alexandr Musin-Pushkin (1902 - 1905), and Yaroslavl governor Alexei Rogovich (1902 - 1905) led to their demotion (Aleksushin (1996); Brigadin and Lukashevich (2009); Marasanova and Fedyuk (1998); Koshko (1916); Witte (1923)).

A second hypothesis is that favoritism and patronage remained important in shaping governors’ careers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that connections played a prominent role in official appointments in the Russian Empire. For instance, Alexei Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, Tver governor in 1903 - 1904, was dismissed due to his rather eccentric treatment of political opposition. Yet, as he was in Nicolas II’s and his wife’s good graces, he immediately received an appointment to the Senate (Dmitriyeva and Sereda (1996)). We test this hypothesis using proxies for political connections: having

3 Among other examples, Vladimir Launitz was appointed as the mayor of Saint-Petersburg after his pacification of Tambov gubernia in 1905. Kharkov governor (1902 - 1903), Ivan Obolensky, vigorously suppressed peasant unrest flogging peasants across the gubernia, and these actions, endorsed by Pleve, the Minister of Interior, brought him the position of Finland’s governor-general (Witte (1923)).

4 In addition, Tomsk governor Azanchevskiy-Azancheev, after the pogroms in Tomsk accompanied by the fire in the theater and numerous deaths, was dismissed and later was not able to resume his service (Urusov (1908)). Alexei Lopukhin, the head of Estliand gubernia, was reposed in 1905 because he was suspected of his "too liberal" approach towards the revolutionaries (Witte (1923)). He was attached to the Ministry of Interior and later dismissed from the Ministry due to his critique of the police. Vikentii Raaben lost his office of the Bessarabia governor in 1903 because of his indecisiveness during the Jewish pogrom in Kishinev (Urusov (1908)). Ivan Kholschevnikov, the military governor of Zabaikalaslaya oblast in 1906, was dismissed and sentenced to prison because of his arguable lenience to the revolutionary movement (Rediger (1999)).
a court title and previous work in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of war.

Third, administrative status of a province could shape the way performance evaluations factored into governors’ promotions and demotions. As detailed in the previous section, in oblasts, unlike in gubernias, governors had both civil and military powers with wide authority. In addition, economic, social and political circumstances in oblasts differed from those in gubernias, given that oblasts had large shares of non-Russian minority and were in the peripheral regions. On the one hand, enhanced gubernatorial powers in oblasts rendered those governors more responsible (in the eyes of central administration) for the state of affairs in the entrusted oblast. On the other hand, given the local particularities of the oblasts, central government had higher expectations from oblast governors in terms of peace keeping and security. Therefore, accountability of oblast governors for social unrest in the respective oblasts could be more deterministic for future careers than for gubernia governors. We capture this with a dummy variable for oblasts and test whether performance was rewarded differently in oblasts and gubernias.

The last hypothesis to test is the role of the revolutionary period of 1905-1907, which could render a governor’s ability to cope with disturbances more indispensable to the central government in the subsequent period. After 1905, the tsarist administration may have become more attentive to the ability of governors to promote peace and security, and may have rewarded them accordingly. Indeed, Lieven (1984a) notes that "to some extent the events of 1905 - 1906 shocked the monarch and his advisers into appointing much younger and more vigorous men to key posts"[^5] We test this

[^5]: Robbins also argues that by 1906 the Ministry started to systematically evaluate "the moral
hypothesis by interacting governors’ performance with a post-1905 dummy.

4 Data

Combining several sources, we have constructed a database on more than 300 governors with their personal characteristics and pre- and post-gubernatorial appointments between 1895-1914. Data on the periods of governors’ rule come from Morukov and Samokhvalov (2003). Biographical data on governors come from a wide range of published and online sources. The entire list of resources we have consulted is in the Appendix A.

Taking into account all available information and relying on Lieven (1984b)⁶ we have coded career mobility either as a promotion, equal to 1, or same level, equal to 0, or a demotion, equal to -1, with respect to governorship. Appendix B provides a discussion of the coding procedure of career mobility and Table 1 presents the complete taxonomy of the coding. Out of all 1712 career pattern entries for governor-year, 69 (4.03%) are promotions, 116 (6.78%) are demotions and 1527 (89%) are the same level.

Additionally, we have data on other individual characteristics of governors. These characteristics include age, tenure, education, military background, noble title, rank, previous work in the central apparatus and court title.

We have two measures of a governor’s performance: peasant revolts and worker strikes. Data on peasant revolts were collected from several documents. Number of peasant revolts between 1895 - 1904 and June 1907 - July 1914 were obtained from the records of peasant movements by Shapkarin (1959, 1966) and Anfmov and the service qualifications of candidates.⁸

⁶Lieven (1984b) maps out how officials rose through the state service to top political office.
All cases of unrest chronicled at the end of each volume were counted or taken directly from the figures therein. Data on peasant revolts between 1905 - June 1907 were instead constructed from the collection of 18 volumes documenting 1905-1907 revolutionary period. Appendix C contains a breakdown of all cases counted towards peasant revolts.

Data on our second measure of performance, number of worker strikes, are taken from Varzar (1905, 1908, 1910) for 1895 - 1908, and directly from the Collection of the Factory Inspectors' Reports. Overall, we have the number of worker strikes in 65 provinces where the Inspectorate of Factories operated between 1895-1913. The Inspectorate of Factories covered the majority of manufacturing enterprises and workers in those provinces.

Lastly, we have a set of macro-variables at the province level. These capture whether a province was an oblast, whether a province was under a governorate-general, urban population, rural population and grain yield.

The definition and summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2.

On average, a governor was 52 years old, had been in office for 4.7 years and had an average rank slightly lower than 4. 63% of the governors had higher education, about one third had a court title, more than half of them had a current or former military affiliation and 16% carried a noble title (e.g. duke, count). It is important to note that these figures almost coincide with those given in Zaionchkovskii (1978) and Robbins (1987).
5 Analysis

Following the methodology of Li and Zhou (2004) and Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2011), we estimate a fixed effects model of the following generalized form:

\[ C_{it} = \beta U_{it} + \delta U_{it}D_{it} + \gamma P_{it} + \varphi X_{it} + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \]  

Our main dependent variable is \( C_{it} \) which captures career mobility of a governor, coded "-1" for demotion, "0" for staying at the same level or a lateral move and "1" for promotion. \( U_{it} \) is a vector of social unrest, peasant revolts and worker strikes. \( P_{it} \) is two dummies for personal connections, court title and previous experience in the central apparatus. \( D_{it} \) is a vector including two dummies, one for oblasts and a post-1905 dummy. \( X_{it} \) is a vector of controls, including personal characteristics of governors and social and economic indicators of provinces. \( \alpha_i \) and \( \lambda_t \) stand for province and time fixed effects, respectively. \( \varepsilon_{it} \) is an error term that allows for within province correlation as we cluster errors at the province level. We have chosen to employ OLS methods rather than ordered probit or logit in order to avoid incidental parameters problem when biased estimates of fixed effects may lead to further bias in other coefficients of interest. We have validated that all the results carry over if we use ordered probit or logit instead of OLS.

5.1 Main Results

Table 3 presents main estimation results. Columns 1-4 present the results using peasant revolts as a performance measure and columns 5-8 present the results with worker strikes as a performance measure. We start in column 1 by testing whether central authorities used career incentives to improve the efficiency of province governors.
Measuring performance by the number of peasant revolts and conditioning on a rich set of personal and provincial characteristics, we show that governors’ performance did not have a significant effect in shaping their future careers. This result persists when we control for other variables in the following specifications. Our finding is in line with what some historians suggest.

In column 2 of Table 3, we test whether favoritism and patronage played a role in governors’ promotions. We use having a court title and previous experience in the central apparatus as a proxy for political connections, and show that these two measures had no significant effect on governors’ careers. Thus, we find no statistical evidence for the claim that favoritism and patronage were rampant in the Russian Empire and could shape one’s career.

In column 3, we test whether governors’ performance was evaluated differently in oblasts and gubernias. Our findings suggest that although there were no career incentives to improve performance of governors in the gubernias, career concerns were applicable for oblasts governors and their performance was rewarded accordingly. The estimate of the interaction of peasant revolts and oblasts is negative and significant. Therefore, we show evidence that the governors of oblasts were more likely to be promoted if they performed well in the office, and be demoted if they performed poorly. This effect is also economically important. One standard deviation reduction in the variable Peasant Revolts led to a 13 percentage point increase in the probability of promotion. Since the average probability of promotion was around 4%, one standard deviation change in the Peasant Revolts variable more than tripled the likelihood of

\footnote{For instance, Robbins writes about the MVD’s persistent inability or even unwillingness to weed out the unworthy in the gubernatorial ranks.}
promotion.

In addition, Figure 2 provides us with an illustrative understanding of the evolution of average careers and peasant revolts in gubernias and oblasts over the years. We observe that while there was no clear pattern between career and peasant revolts in gubernias, there was a remarkable link between career and peasant revolts in oblasts. Often, a change in peasant revolts in oblasts was met with a change of career in the opposite direction. In other words, on average, in oblasts, a reduction in the number of peasant revolts was associated with more promotions, and an increase in peasant revolts was associated with more demotions.

This result confirms our conjecture that performance of an oblast governor could be more influential for future career prospects than for a gubernia governor. Wider responsibilities of military governors under more tense political circumstances in oblasts might have made central authorities more responsive to governors’ ability to maintain peace and security, and hence better incentive schemes to improve governors’ efficiency were in place.

Finally, in column 4 of Table 3, we test whether authorities have become more reactive to governors’ performance in the post-revolutionary period of 1906-1914. We find no significant effect of performance on promotion in the post-1905 period.

In columns 5-8, we replicate the same tests with our second measure of performance, worker strikes. The results are remarkably similar to our previous findings. Governors’ performance influenced their career only in oblasts, but not in gubernias. Political connections had no significant effect on securing a promotion, and post-1905 period did not witness an increased sensitivity of authorities to governor performance.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis

We present in Table 4 further robustness checks. We start by assessing the effect of economic growth in a province. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we take into account grain yield growth as a measure of economic growth. We show that grain yield growth had no significant effect on promotion, while the impact of governor’s performance on their career is the same as before. It has an impact only in oblasts, but not in gubernias.

The governors of oblasts were mostly military men. In our entire sample 87% of governors in the oblasts were in the military, while only 17% of governors of gubernias were military men. One may think that some unobservable characteristics of governors could lead to such differences in career determination between oblasts and gubernias. Alternatively, the career pattern in the army might lead to promotion independently of performance, and that might be the reason why we have a differential finding in oblasts and gubernias. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we test whether the governors in the oblasts get promoted just because they are army-men. We find no such evidence. The effect of being in the military is insignificant both in oblasts and in gubernias.

Another possible criticism may refer to the construction of the dependent variable, which may overvalue or undervalue the status of some promotions. We have experimented with some alternatives and created a new variable called Career2 and also created a promotion dummy that treats same level changes and demotions as zeros. In order to create Career2 variable, we lowered the status of some military offices (chiefs of staff and logistics, previously promotions, were considered as lateral
transfers, the office of a corps commander became demotion), and raised the status of some civil ones (membership in the Council of the Minister of Interior and Consultation of the Ministry of Justice, becoming aide of a governor-general were considered as lateral transfers). In columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, we observe that even with the new dependent variable, Career2, previous results go through. And in columns 7 and 8, we use the promotion dummy as a dependent variable, despite the fact that this reduces the variation considerably. We see that the results are similar to previous findings, although there is some weak effect now in the gubernias in the case of peasant revolts. This is probably due to the fact that there are only 69 promotions and there is very little variation.

Lastly, we have reproduced, not reported, our baseline specifications with ordered probit and ordered logit models, and previous findings go through.

6 Conclusion

This paper shows that the central authorities of the Russian Empire employed career incentives to improve the efficiency of provincial governors only in the newly acquired peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main provinces of the empire (gubernias). This finding is important in that it sheds more light on to the causes of the Russian Empire’s collapse. Failure to incentivize governors to improve performance in the main parts of the empire (in gubernias covering a larger part of the territory and the population) might have been reflected in poor performance of preventing the spread of the revolutionary movement, which eventually led to the demise of the empire.

We also show that political connections had no significant effect on career mobility,
and the central authorities did not change in their attitude towards career incentives in the post-1905 period.
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8 Appendix A


*Almanakh sovremennikh russkikh gosudarstvennikh deyatelei* [Almanach of the Modern Russian Statesmen], Sankt-Peterburg: Tip. Isidora Goldberga, 1897.


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Since Peter the Great there existed an order of official ranks. According to the Table of Ranks, officials’ ranks (chin) were listed together with the classes (klass) of positions that could be occupied by them (Lieven, 1984a). For instance, this formal system of the classes ranked the office of Minister, Deputy Minister, membership in the State Council and the Senate higher than the governor’s office. In addition, Lieven (1984b) writes that for top officials working in Saint Petersburg the pay, conditions of service, and career prospects were far better than for those who worked in the provinces. Governors could be transferred to Petersburg and most of such transfers were considered as a promotion. For example, ministership or deputy ministership were a promotion in comparison to governorship; and the membership in the State Council or the Senate were popularly perceived as a sinecure (Zaionchkovskii, 1978). Thus, these positions are coded as a promotion. On the other hand, the Council of the Minister of Internal Affairs was seen as the last resting ground for the failed official, and hence, was a demotion (Lieven, 1984a).

However, the Table of Ranks does not provide fully satisfactory guidance that can
be applied to every type of position. The sphere of influence of an official was also a factor that one needs to take into account. For example, a governor ruled over up to several million people, while a brigade commander commanded about 5000 people, although both had the same class. Therefore, moving from governorship to a brigade commander or a division commander is coded as a demotion. Moreover, as mentioned before, positions in Saint Petersburg were more attractive than the provincial positions of the same class due to future career prospects they offer (Lieven (1984a)). Thus, the head of a ministerial department is coded as a promotion, although it had the same class of a governor. Finally, to measure the real relative status of different positions, it might be instructive to look at salaries, as some offices of equal class might have differed with respect to material gains. According to the figures provided in Zaionchkovskii (1998), in the early 1900s governors were paid 9600 to 12620 rubles per year, while the division commander and the corps commanders received 6000 and 9300 rubles per year, respectively. As far as some civil offices are concerned, the Deputy Minister of Interior received 15000 rubles per year and a member of the State Council earned between 12000 - 18000 rubles per year.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\)Saltykov-Schedrin, in Pompadours and Pompadouresses, describes the unenviable fate of a retired governor who was forced to retire without ever becoming a senator: "He left everything that was dear to his heart, and left not in order to decorate by himself one of the halls of the magnificent building with the windows overlooking the Senate Square, but in order to join the ranks of those murmuring and vainly hoping, who in these days somewhat peculiarly overcrowd the squares and streets of Petersburg".

Moreover, since there was no compulsory age of retirement, retirement is considered as demotion, except when there is a clear indication that the governor in question was seriously ill (Koshko (1916)).
Cases of arson, damage to cattle, illegal tree cutting and plowing were counted by the number of involved estates. When the peasants of several villages participated in a single act, it was considered a single case. Repeated incidents in an estate over a short period were considered a single episode. Full destruction of an estate (or a rich peasant’s farm) was also counted as a single episode. Peasants’ armed clashes with the troops or the policemen were taken as separate episodes.

Agrarian workers’ strikes (which were frequent in the Western gubernias) were counted by the numbers of folwarks that went on a strike. Cases of violent expulsion of workers by peasants were also counted.

Cases of illegal propaganda (if the agitator gathered a peasants meeting); resolutions (prigovori) of peasants’ meetings (skhodi) containing political and economic requirements addressed to the authorities; processions and demonstrations with banners; laying economic claims to landlords by peasants were counted separately.

Illegal deposition and re-election of the local administration, refusal to pay taxes, clashes with security forces restoring order, attacking police in order to release prisoners were also counted.

In late 1905 - early 1906, there were armed rebellions in Kurliandskaya, Lifliandskaya, Estliandskaya and Kutaisskaya gubernias. Such episodes of resistance to the authorities were counted.

Revolts sweeping over the entire gubernia were counted as a single case. If particular revolts were explicitly mentioned, they were counted separately.
Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of *Gubernias* and *Oblasts* in the Russian Empire in 1914

Figure 2: Governors’ Careers and Peasant Revolts in *Gubernias* and *Oblasts*
### Table 1: Coding of Governors’ Appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| -1   | Aide of a governor-general  
Aide of the commander of a Current Military district  
At disposal of the Chief of General Staff  
At disposal of the Minister of War  
Chief of staff of a Current Military corps  
Chief representative of a regional Red Cross society  
Division commander  
Divisional brigade commander  
Founded the Community of the Sisters of Mercy of the Red Cross  
Head of the Nikolaev Maritime Academy  
Honorary guardian and the steward of a prince’s court  
Honorary guardian of the Guardian Council of Empress Maria’s institutions  
Joined the General Staff with no particular office  
Joined the Ministry of Internal Affairs with no particular office  
Joined the troops of a Current Military district with no particular office  
Lawyer  
Member of the Board of Consultation of the Ministry of Justice  
Member of the Council of the Minister of Internal Affairs  
Member of the Current Military Council  
Retired  
Surrendered to the enemy  
Tried in Court Noble Title and possibly sentenced to prison  
Vice-governor |
| 0    | Deceased  
Joined the army on his own initiative  
Left office after being wounded  
Current Military corps commander  
Resigned because of illness  
Transferred as a governor to another province  
Temporarily left the governorship but resumed it the next year |
| 1    | Chief of logistics of an army  
Chief of staff of a Current Military district  
Commander of an army  
Commander of a Current Military district  
Deputy minister  
Governor-general  
Head of a department of the General Staff  
Head of a ministerial department  
Mayor of Saint-Petersburg  
Member of the State Council  
Minister  
Senator |
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<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>N</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
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<td>1287</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Peasant Revolts</td>
<td>Log(1+number of peasant revolts)</td>
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<td>1.068</td>
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<td>1.51</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>Indicator for governorate-general</td>
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Notes: Controls include Age, Age Squared, Tenure, Education, Current Military, Former Military, Noble Title, Rank, Governorate-General, Rural Population, Urban Population. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis

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<td>0.026</td>
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Notes: Controls include Court Title, Central Apparatus, Age, Age Squared, Tenure, Education, Current Military, Former Military, Noble Title, Rank, Governorate-General, Rural Population, Urban Population. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.