Notes on Time and Aspect

Andrew Haas

The Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Published online: 03 Mar 2015.

To cite this article: Andrew Haas (2015): Notes on Time and Aspect, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2014.996245

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2014.996245
Notes on Time and Aspect

Andrew Haas

Abstract

What is time? Neither the numbering of the motion of things nor their schema, but their way of being. In language, time shows itself as tense. But every verb has both tense and aspect. So what is aspect? Irreducible to tense, it is the way in which anything is at any time whatsoever. Thus the way things are, their being, is not merely temporal – for it is just as aspectual.

Keywords: time; aspect; being; unity; metaphysics

We are time’s subjects, and time bids be gone

(Shakespeare)

So we are the subjects of time, subjected to time, and it bids us be gone. But what is this time to which we are subjected? How can we be the subjects of time? And how can it bid anything at all? And why are there, supposedly, so many different times? Even a time for everything, so that everything has its time: a time for being born, a time for dying; a time of sowing, and a time of reaping; a time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together? Or rather, if all of these times are temporal, do we today have an answer to the age-old question: What is time? Or must we still say, with Augustine: If you ask me what time it is, I can tell you; if you ask me what time is, I do not know? And is it a problem that we do not know what time is? Or does it not seem far more that we think we do know – and so, not knowing that we do not know, the problem is no problem at all, which does not seem to have stopped us from developing the study of time (chronology in the etymological sense of the word, the λόγος of χρόνος). Then can time become a problem for us? Once again, or perhaps for the first time? Even problematic? And will we then be able to answer the question, ‘What is time?’ And so, ‘What is temporal?’ Or must we look to that which is not temporal and so not time – but maybe the other of time?
Time as the Order of Things

Regardless, it seems that normally, we think we know (and that we know), what time is. As Aristotle argues: time is a counting or numbering of motion – not μέτρον, but ἀριθμὸς. Time is the number of the movement of things, of the becoming of being, in terms of (the positions or places of) before and after; not the instrument with which we tell time, more or less accurately, whether a sun-dial or atomic-clock; nor the thing moved – but the telling. And so time is not a thing which changes, not something in time, an object, like a tree or forest, a word or deed or thought, whether here or there, now or from the past or the future; nor a quality of things, their profanity or sacraity, whether supposedly natural or cultural, nor the change from one to the other – rather it is how much it does so. Time has parts therefore, in order to order the parts of whole moving things, whether as wholes or parts, (such as day and night), or the series of nows and forms or modi of change (before and after); or the modes of duration (permanence, whether temporal or eternal duratio), succession (past-present-future), coexistence (simultaneity). So whether we think of it objectively, as an objective standard, or relative to the velocity of things, or subjectively, as the Weg des Beobachters, and our way of constituting experience (so without the soul’s distentio, there is nothing temporal); time remains that by which the motion of objects, the change of states, the happening of events, are ordered in terms of number – the order of the becoming of being.

Time then, numbers movement – for as the numbering order of things, it continues to be, even if things do not, even if they change, move, become, come into presence and go out into absence. And even something that supposedly moves eternally, endures eternally, such as a bodiless divinity (and so, is not in time, at least not like words and deeds, animate and inanimate objects), moving in an unceasing circle, would be subject to time. For its movement qua complete, perfect, would continue to be so, with eternal duration. This unceasing movement is its continuity – for it has always already gotten where it is going: it is actuality, ἐνεργεία, and its time is that of eternity, infinite temporality.

But what is time, such that it can order things around in these ways? And if this is the understanding of time that has ‘stood the test of time’, can it explain the difference – not only between temporal and eternal things, finite and infinite ones – but also between the order and the ordered? Or is time not something in which things are ordered, nor that which orders them, but what allows them to take an order?

The Critique of Time

So, the question ‘What is time?’ is answered by Aristotle by number, by the order of things in terms of before and after. And this is the dominant understanding of time – at least until Kant. For with the ‘Copernican revolution in
thought’, the order of the order of things is reversed – time is not number; number is time:

The pure image of all magnitudes (quantorum) for outer sense is space; that of all objects of the senses in general is time. But the pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis), as a concept of the understanding, is number, a representation which comprises the successive addition of homogeneous units. Number is therefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the intuition.7

In other words, things are not in time because of number or numbering; on the contrary, number is possible thanks to time. And being numbered is merely one way in which time schematizes objects in accordance with quantity: if it is, it is one, whether of this magnitude or that – and so can be numbered (1, 2, 3), a unit of units.

But quantity is not the only way in which time schematizes. For quality is also temporal: the way in which an object is, its way of being – this is its way of being (in time). So if it is or is not, exists in anyway whatsoever or does not exist, it does so temporally, in relation to time – for existence and non-existence mean coming to presence at one time or not, being present now, or not-now but then. And although what is transitory comes to be and passes away in time, time itself is nothing temporal – it is not in time, and is subject to neither generation nor corruption. Indeed, time does not come to presence, nor go out into absence; on the contrary, as the schema of objects, of beings, and so of being, time is the way in which the temporal is and is one. As Kant writes: ‘the existence of what is transitory passes away in time, but not time itself.’8 Time does not run; things run in time. Thus insofar as being is understood as existence (and non-being or non-existence), the quality of being (and so of beings) is the degree to which it takes (and takes up) time, fills or does not fill it, comes to full-presence or goes out into absence, up to and including the vanishing-point of nothingness.9

And not just quantitatively and qualitatively – for time schematizes every relation between objects. Substance and accident, cause and effect, agent and patient – these are all temporal. The permanence of the substance of things is temporal abiding, remaining, staying, that which remains present throughout change. For the permanence of the permanent, the substance of the substantial, as well as the impermanence of the impermanent and the insubstantiality of the insubstantial, are temporal relations. And so if an accidental quality (or multiple qualities) can be predicated of an object’s substance, it is because it is done in time: Socrates is Greek means that he is now Greek and remains Greek, at least for the present and insofar as he presents himself as Greek and does not change his nationality. Or if an effect follows from a cause, it is because succession is a temporal schematization – so that causality itself is only possible
in accordance with a universal rule’, and takes place or comes to presence insofar as it submits to the order of time. Or if an agent is to have agency, or a patient to suffer the actions of another, uni-laterally or multi-laterally, it is because the being-at-same-timeness, Zugleichsein, of their relation is temporal: victim and perpetrator are related to one another, insofar as they are in time – for co-existence is a temporal determination, just as being is a matter of being temporally.

But then not only quantity and quality and relation – time is determinative for modality as well. Possibility, actuality and necessity are temporal modes. It is impossible for opposites to exist, for example, in the same thing at the same time, but only possible one after the other – for opposition is only possible thanks to time, and the modal possibility of being opposed is, at some time or another, zu irgendeiner Zeit. Similarly, the modality of actuality is a determination of existence in some determinate time, in einer bestimmten Zeit; while the mode of necessity determines that something must be at all times, zu aller Zeit. Thus the status of a thing is modally schematized by time – it is possible or actual or necessary for an object to be, whether in one way or another, because it is in time, or more precisely, because it is temporally.

But what does it mean to say that time is the schema, σχῆμα – especially if it is ‘a concealed art’ buried ‘in the depths of the human soul’, one whose truth, nature is unlikely ever to reveal? If it is some all-powerful secret? Or how is it possible to think time as the order of things, the shape or figure, that which has and holds, possesses and keeps (and therefore marks or brands, stamps or signs, touches and colors, individuates and characterizes) that which is schematized?

Kant answers: time schematizes because it is the name for ‘whether and how’, objects belong to concepts. Time correlates categories with things by providing the rules thanks to which predication and judgment (and so representation in accordance with the time-schema of imagination) is first possible. For time is the order of any possible object whatsoever; and time orders by schematizing objects in accordance with a priori temporal determinations, that is, in a series of units of before and after (time-series), existing and coming to presence and going out into absence or non-existence (time-content), permanently or not, successively or simultaneously (time-order), whether sometimes, at one particular time, or at all times (time-scope). And so time is how things can have meaning, for us – for human sensation and feeling, wishes and desires, words and deeds and thoughts, all have their time, just as the human and natural sciences, aesthetics and ethics, epistemology and metaphysics, are only possible as temporal.

Is time then, merely the schema of human intuition and imagination? Simply our way of seeing and feeling the world? Our means of representing things as they appear to us, as phenomena, not things in themselves?

On the contrary, if time can schematize (empirical and transcendental) intuition and imagination, it is precisely because it is neither intuitive nor
imaginary, neither merely an aesthetic schema nor just a schema of representation. Rather, time is the *tranzendentale Schema* of the pure concepts of the understanding – not just of inner and outer sense, nor simply of imagination – and therefore determinative for any categorical schematism whatsoever. And it is this transcendental schema that provides the transcendental determinations of time – in accordance with which the concepts of the understanding mediate the subsumption of appearances under categories. In other words, transcendental time is the schema of schemata – and it is the order of things because it orders *a priori*, thanks to which they can be sensed or represented or thought, thanks to which we can speak of them and work with them insofar as they are temporal. For time is not only a universal category of the understanding (nor is it simply a form of intuition, and so determinative for any particular appearance whatsoever); it is rather, more universal than any universal, which is why Kant calls it ‘absolute time’, *absolute Zeit*.\(^{15}\)

**Onto-Chronology**

Time then, is not just a number that orders things, but their schema – for time is not the order in which things are numbered – number is the order of things in time. And yet, does this reversal not remain fundamentally loyal to the Greek understanding of time?

Indeed, from the Greeks to us, time is thought as something ‘in which’ events occur, thoughts and things happen, stones and animals and humans are.\(^{16}\) In this way, whether time is an order in which substances move, so they can be numbered or measured; or the schema in which objects appear to intuition or correspond to concepts – either way, it is because they are “in time”.\(^{17}\)

But time is precisely not something ‘in which’ things are – it is ‘the way they are’. And things do not *have* a time – they are temporally. For ‘in’ is a misleading (biased, prejudiced, somehow motivated) word to use with respect to time. And in-ness is a misleading way to think the temporality of time.

So what is time? If it is nothing that things are *in*, or *have*? ‘Time is the how.’\(^{18}\) It is how things are, the character of their being. Time is the way that beings and beings are, their way of being now and then, here and there, how they are in the present, past and future – and so not just insofar as they are present (as the philosophy of presence would have it), but also as absent, non-present, never-to-be-present or never-having-been-present. For time is how beings and their being are in anyway whatsoever.

And so we too, human beings. Just as we do not simply *have* love, but love; do not just *have* a job as a professor of philosophy, or are not just *in* a particular area of scholarship, but *are* philosophers, friends and lovers of wisdom – so too we are not in time; nor do we merely have time – we are temporal. For time is our how as well, our way of being, whether now or then (not-now), so that we appear in the present, past or future, in accordance with the ‘modi of
Thus our being is characterized by how it is temporal, and ‘the history of the concept of time ... is the history of the question of the being of beings’. If time then, is no longer thought as a thing or being in which other things or beings are – but rather their way of being – it is perhaps no surprise that Heidegger marks this paradigm-shift with a neologism:

The characteristics whereby these phenomena are zeitlich, we call their temporale characteristics. I am intentionally employing this foreign-word because the word ‘zeitlich’ has been mostly claimed by natural, pre-philosophical speaking where it simply means that something runs its course, or happens, or takes place in time. However, when we say that a phenomenon is temporal, we do not mean that this phenomenon is a process or a movement, much less that it happens in time. Therefore zeitlich in the sense of running its course in time, is not the same as temporale, which means first and foremost that something is ‘characterized by time’.

Here the little word ‘in’ marks the fundamental prejudice of the history of the philosophy of time, of chronology, from the Greeks to us – a prejudice that is to be undermined by thinking time as the character of being, how things are, their way of being, or the way in which anything is whatsoever. So not just us, but everything, any being, mortal or immortal, finite or infinite, animate or inanimate, human or animal or stone, real or imaginary. But then ‘temporal’ can no longer mean only ‘being in time’. The ‘atemporal’ and the ‘supratemporal’ are also ‘temporal’ with respect to their being; this not only by way of privation when compared to ‘temporal’ beings which are ‘in time’, but in a positive ... sense.

And if being must be grasped in relation to time, it can only be understood on the basis of temporality. So

the fundamental ontological task of the interpretation of being as such, thus includes the elaboration of the temporality of being. In the exposition of the problem of temporality the concrete answer to the question of the meaning of being is first given.

The meaning of being is to be found in time – but then, so too, the meaning of time in being. And if time is ‘the possible horizon for any understanding of being whatsoever’, so is being that through which we understand time. Then it might be unsurprising, if being is ‘the transcendens par excellence’ – time (as the temporality of anything whatsoever) is the ‘ekstatikon par excellence’. For being and time necessarily imply one another: time is the
how of being, the way beings are (were and will be); and being is what lets

time be, come into presence and go out into absence – and a time that did not

have being, that was neither present nor absent, would be no time at all.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Time and Tense}

So time is neither the order of things, nor their schema, but how they are, their

way of being – and yet do we, with this word ‘how’, know what time is? Have

we understood what it means for beings to have a temporal character? Or for
time to be the way in which being is? Or is ‘time’ – like ‘being’ – still perhaps
‘just an empty word and an evanescent meaning’?\textsuperscript{28} And if so, how might we
even attempt to illuminate what time is?

Heidegger gives us a clue: language speaks – discourse discloses temporality
as the character of being. And our being too – insofar as we are a particular
kind of being, one which acts in a particular way – is articulated in speaking.
Indeed, discourse is temporal ‘since all speaking about …, of …, or to …’ is
grounded in temporality.\textsuperscript{29} And it is in language that time reveals itself as the
how of being.

So how does time show itself in discourse? How is temporality disclosed
and articulated in language? Or how is language zeitlich – temporal?

Here a clue from linguistics: the time of language is tense, or tenses,
\emph{tempora}. Phenomena appear in language as tensed: a sheep stood in the field
(past tense); the sheep are lambing in Winter (present); the lambs will be
slaughtered in Spring (future). And tense is a determination of verbs – which
is why verbs are called \textit{Zeitwörte} in German, time-words. But verbs disclose
and articulate actions: to stand or lamb or slaughter, to be standing or will have
lambed or have been slaughtered, to have sheep or be a shepherd; and to speak
or discourse, to have or to be, to care for sheep or to care at all, in anyway
whatsoever – all these verbs have tense. In other words, temporality is dis-
closed in the conjugation of verbs; and it is articulated in past, present and
future tense. Language does not just occur in time; rather it is temporal – as is
all discoursing, all speaking and acting, sensing and imagining, knowing and
understanding and thinking, having and being. Thus language, even by simply
being language, is tensed, that is, temporal; and so too are we: being born or
dying, sowing or reaping, casting away stones or gathering them together,
being this or that, in one way or another – all these actions disclose and
articulate themselves, not in time, but temporally.

Is then our way of being temporally an action that takes place in the past, or
present, or future? Not at all. On the one hand, our actions (and the action of
discoursing or speaking as well) are not merely zeitlich, but temporal; on the
other hand, actions are not disclosed in one tense or time (nor in a series of
tenses or present nows, in the order of the before and after); but rather as a
unitary phenomenon (as is being) – explain at one and the same time, we are
temporally present and absent (past and future) – for time is the character of being, that which allows beings (and being) to be what they are, have been and will be.\(^{30}\)

**The Other of Time**

Time then, is the how of beings like us; and also the way of being of what is not like us, other kinds of being, and being itself. For time is just as much being’s way of being, its character – which is why the verb, to be (from which the substantive is derived, being or Being, and the infinitive, to be), is tensed. But this is not the only articulation of verbs – for all verbs have tense (past, present, future; or present, non-present) and aspect (simple, continuous, completed; or complete, incomplete).\(^{31}\) And the difference between them is precisely not one of mood or modality (indicative, subjunctive, optative): ‘modality differs from tense and aspect in that it does not refer directly to any characteristic of the event, but simply to the status of the proposition.’\(^{32}\) Nor is it a difference of voice (active, passive, middle). Rather aspect is the other how of being, the other way in which being is and beings (like us or not) are; it is neither the schema nor the order of things, but the other of time.

Irreducible to tense then, aspect is that which verbs have (or more precisely, the way they are – so the way beings are, and being is) at any time whatsoever: at one and the same time, I fall and I am falling; I fell and I was falling, I shall fall and I shall have fallen – and the difference between these ways of falling (or being) is an aspectual difference. So if tense is articulated into three times (past, present, future) or two (present, non-present) – just as being is articulated into presence and absence – we should probably not be surprised if aspect too has three (simple, continuous, complete) or two (incomplete, complete) articulations.\(^{33}\)

And so too with being: at one and the same time, I continue to be, incompletely, and I completely am. But the difference between the way I am existing and I exist, how I am understanding and understand, how I shall be slaughtered and will have been slaughtered, or fell prey and was falling prey, how I am dying and am dead, sow and reap or am sowing and reaping, have cast away and gathered together or was casting away and gathering together – all this is not a temporal difference, nor a question of time; it is a difference of aspect, and an aspectual problem.

And if every way of being has both tense and aspect, then everything that is said of time must be said of aspect. For not just (the interpretation of) time – but aspect would be the other horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being. So if time is the other of aspect, that is, how beings are, and being is – then being (and time and aspect) would have a double-character, one which is as temporal as aspectual. Then to be, and being, would not only be time-words – but also aspect-words. And the central range of problems of all metaphysics would have to re-articulated as rooted in the phenomena of time and aspect.
Or the privileging of time, perhaps even the entire ontology of time – and its concomitant philosophy of presence (even presence and absence) – might be undermined; or at least onto-chronology would be supplemented with a study of aspect (which perhaps should rightly then, take the name of ‘phenomenology’) – so metaphysics qua onto-chrono-phenomenology.

The Other of Being

So what then, is time? It is neither that which can be seen on watches nor a measure of motion, neither the order of things nor their schema – but neither is it simply the character of being nor the way that beings are, their how, that which temporalizes them, so that they come to presence and present themselves temporally. Rather time is the other of aspect – and aspect the other of time. For they imply one another, time and aspect, as the way in which beings are, and being is.34

But if aspect is the other of time – well then, what about being? Does it not also have another, the other of being?

Perhaps just a hint – once again from Aristotle, from metaphysics, that is, from what can no longer simply be called the science of being qua being, nor of being as substance or presence (but maybe now must rightly also consider unity as the other of being, henology – so metaphysics qua onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology):

Now, if being and unity are the same and are of one nature in the sense that they are implied by one another as principle and cause, but not in the sense that they have the same definition (though it makes no difference even if we suppose them to be like that – in fact this would even strengthen our case); for ‘one man’ and ‘man’ are the same thing, and so are ‘existent man’ and ‘man’ and the doubling of the words in ‘one man and one existent man’ does not express anything different (it is clear that the two things are not separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to be); and similarly ‘one existent man’ adds nothing to ‘existent man’, so that it is obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being; and if, further, the substance of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from its very nature something that is: – all this being so, there must be exactly as many species of being as of unity.35

The Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Notes

1 W. Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II, Act I, Scene 3.
3 Aristotle, 1957, 219b2; see Sorabji, 1983, pp. 87, 126.
4 Aristotle, 1957, 219b1-5, 221a1. As Aristotle recognizes (Aristotle, 1957, 220b23, 221b7), if time orders motion, motion also orders time – for each relative term may both be used as a standard for judging the other, just as equations represent convertible elements (E=mc²). But the fundamental problem of order is the problem of power; the constant circular motion of the heavens as the unmoving movement of the divine, is here determinative, not determined. And if, for example, eternal duratio (the duratio aeterna or praesentarius status of God) and temporal duratio are both duratae, there is only one duration; and the difference between eternity and time is simply a difference of kind: God (ens creans, so increatum) and creation (ens creatum) are one, and the duration of particular times is a moving explicatio of immovable-infinite time. Thus time is the duration or durability of both the eternity of immobile being, God and the infinite universe, as well as the temporality of mobile beings, the measure of their motion. The genus of time (infinite duration, tempus absolutum), immeasurable in itself, is that which provides the measure of its species (finite duration, tempus relativum et vulgarum). For Kant’s three modes of time, see Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1990), A182, A211, B219; and Heidegger’s (1975) interpretation thereof (Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 31, especially p. 149; hereafter GA plus volume number).
5 Aristotle, 1957, 279a11-279b4; see also, Plato, 1903, 37d-e; McTaggert, 1908, 17.
7 Kant 1990, A142-3/B182.
8 Kant 1990, A144/B183. As Kant writes: ‘If we ascribe succession to time itself, we must think yet another time, in which the sequence would be possible’ (1990, A183/B226).
9 Kant 1990, A143/B182-3.
10 Kant 1990, A144/B184. So the law of non-contradiction (Aristotle, 1957, 1005b15-21) must be understood temporally: the simultaneity of existence is the time of formal logic. But if the other of time is aspect, then logic is just as aspectual.
11 Kant 1990, A144-5/B184. So the law of non-contradiction (Aristotle, 1957, 1005b15-21) must be understood temporally: the simultaneity of existence is the time of formal logic. But if the other of time is aspect, then logic is just as aspectual.
12 Kant 1990, A141/B180-1.
13 Mann, 2002, Ch. 6.
14 Kant insists that prior to apperception lies imagination – at least with regards to knowledge, especially knowledge of experience; so that the two stems of finite human knowledge, empirical and transcendental, are rooted in imagination (Kant 1990, A118). Indeed, in the A Deduction, transcendental imagination serves as the unity of unities, the synthesis of syntheseis or ground of grounds the synthesis of reproduction in imagination mediates between the synthesis of apprehension in intuition and the synthesis of reproduction in a concept. The power of imagination provides the condition of the possibility for sensibility to meet understanding (and ultimately reason), that is, it gives us the schematism. Intuition gives objects, understanding concepts, but imagination allows them to correspond, to be one and true (understood as correspondence or unity of object and concept). This is why Kant insists that the ‘third thing’, the transcendental schema, the mediating representation, homogeneous with category and appearance, must be double, two-faced: on the one hand intellectual, on the other sensible – so a contradiction or paradox, an intelligible intuition or intuitive intellect (Kant 1990, A138/B177-8; see also, Kant, 1990 Opus postumum, Vol. 22, pp. 265, 487, 491, 494). And if the schematic contradiction provides the transcendental determination or formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever (of inner and outer sense, as well as the schema of the concepts of the understanding Kant 1990, A34/B50, A139-140/B178-179); it is
probably not surprising that Heidegger argues the essential difference between the Deductions is this: while in the B Deduction, transcendental imagination is absorbed by transcendental understanding; in the A Deduction, it provides the original unity of synthesis, the power or Kraft on which an univocal image, ein Bild, of experience and thought is built, Einbildungskraft – thus, for Heidegger, the first edition has priority over the second (GA3, §§31, 35). And ‘if the transcendental power of imagination, as the pure, forming faculty, in itself forms time – i.e., allows it to spring forth – then we cannot avoid the proposed thesis: the transcendental power of imagination is primordial time’ (GA3, §33).

15 Kant 1990, A215/B262.
16 GA2, §80.
17 GA2, §81. For Heidegger, Hegel remains loyal to the metaphysical onto-theological-chronology that stretches from the Greeks to us: time is a space or place in-to which historical World-Spirit falls: ‘History, which is essentially the history of spirit, runs its course “in time”… [Thus] ‘the development of history falls into time’ (GA2, §82). But for Heidegger, “Spirit” does not first fall into time, but exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality. Temporality temporalizes world-time, in whose horizon “history” can “appear” as an occurrence within time. “Spirit” does not fall into time, but factual existence “falls”, in falling prey, out of primordial, authentic temporality’ (GA2, §82). I have taken this up in Haas, 2007a.
18 GA64, p. 124.
19 GA21, p. 199. As Heidegger writes: ‘The meaning of the being of that being we call Dasein proves to be temporality’ (GA2, §5). For ‘temporality temporalizes, and it temporalizes possible ways of itself” (GA2, §65). Both being and time must be absolute – just as transcendens is analogous to ekstatikon: being presences; time temporalizes – being is temporally, and time lets being present. Being is the other of time, and time the other of being – for each is the other of the other.
20 GA20, §14.
21 GA21, §15. Similarly, time cannot be understood as something that belongs to things, which would be marked by the genitive case or the word ‘of’. Time is not that of which we are conscious – for example, in internal time-consciousness (Husserl) – rather, we are conscious temporally; or if consciousness is conscious of time, it is only because it is temporal consciousness. The issue of the foreignness or non-Germanic nature of the word ‘temporal’ would take us too far from the task at hand in this text – so too the possible prejudice, racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia implied thereby.
22 GA2, §5.
23 GA2, §5. For this reason, being is the ground ‘within’ which time is rooted (GA2, §5).
24 GA31, §11.
25 GA2, ‘Front-piece’.
26 GA2, §7 and §65.
27 Hence the project of Being and Time: ‘The question concerns the “and”, i.e. the and-relation of both. If this is not an external relation, not merely dragging-together and pushing-together, if it is rather a primordial relation, then it must originate equi-primordially from the essence of being and the essence of time. Being and time seek one another and are woven into one another. The “and” is the title for a primordial belonging-together of being and time from the ground of their existence’ (GA31, §11).
28 GA40, §17.
29 GA2, §68.
For Heidegger, our time (like time itself) is one (here understood as necessary or possible wholeness: present falling-prey remains included in the future and in the past as having-been; futural understanding is grounded in anticipation or awaiting is always a present that has-been; attunement temporizes itself primarily in having-been, in the past, but always also as a future that makes present. In all our actions, all our ways of being temporally, "at one and the same time, the present "arises" from, or is has-been. [For] temporality temporizes itself completely in every ecstasy, that is, in the ecstatic unity of the actual, complete temporalizing of temporality is grounded the wholeness of the structural whole of existence, facticity and falling prey, that is, the unity of the structure-of-care’ (GA2, §68). I have taken this up in Haas, 2007b, Ch. 1.

In German, this is the difference between Zeitstufen and Aktionsarten (GA2, §68). Heidegger cites two linguists, both whom explicitly differentiate between tense and aspect (Wackernagel, 2010; Herbig, 1896). Unfortunately, in the English translation of Being and Time (Heidegger, 1996), Stambaugh renders Aktionsarten as ‘kinds of action’ – thereby covering over the grammatical meaning of aspect – while J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Heidegger, 1962) choose ‘aspect’. But they both translate Heidegger’s use of the Latin tempura as ‘tenses’ – thereby concealing its literal meaning, ‘times’, whereby it may be differentiated from the grammatical term for tenses, namely, Zeitstufen. For a discussion of grammatical aspect, see Comrie, 1976.

Palmer, 2001, p. 1. Husserl too, at least in the Cartesian Meditations, seems to think time as mode or form. On the one hand, as modality of being and consciousness (albeit transcendental consciousness in relation to its intentional object), time is understood merely as transcendental subjective ‘way of being’. The noematic description takes up, ‘for example: the “modalities-of-being”, like certainly-being, possibly- or presumably-being, etc.; or the subjective-temporal modes: present, past, or being-future’; which are combined with the noetic description of the cogito, and its modal differences, in the ‘unity of the concrete ego itself’ (Husserl, 1973 [hereafter CM], §§15–16.;). On the other hand, as form of consciousness, time is ‘the fundamental-form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing internal consciousness-of-time. Its correlate is immanent temporality itself, in conformity with which all the life-processes belonging to the ego that can ever be found reflectively must present themselves as temporally ordered, temporally beginning and ending, simultaneous or successive, within the constant infinite horizon: immanent time’ (CM, §18). Unfortunately or not, when it comes time to think continuity as the form of synthesis ‘in which’ intentional objects are (ideally – not really) constituted for consciousness, Husserl (like Heidegger) reduces it to a temporal determination, but thereby fails to grasp (continuous) aspect as the other of time (CM, §18). Obviously, this implies that the existential analytic in Being and Time would have to be rewritten with regards to the aspect (that has been forgotten) of being-in-the-world, the worldliness of the world, being-with, being-in, care as the being of Da-sein, being-toward-death, authenticity, anticipatory resoluteness, etc.

Aristotle, for example, differentiates between movements with incomplete aspect which do not have their ends in themselves (dieting, building, curing), but are rather done for the sake of some other end (being thin, shelter, being cured); from actualities which also have their ends in themselves (seeing, living well, being happy, thinking), and so exhibit aspectual difference at one and the same time (Aristotle, 1957, 1048b18-34). And for the past decade, McDonald’s has used the slogan: ‘I’m lovin’ it!’, incomplete; rather than, ‘I love it!’, complete aspect.

30
31
32
33
34 As C. Kahn (2003, p. xii, n11) argues: ‘a single occurrence of *einai* [Plato, 1903, 901c8-d2] provides the verb for three clauses, although in the first clause (where the verb occurs) the syntax is absolute and the meaning existential, whereas in the second and third clauses (where the verb is [implied] and must be supplied) the syntax is copulative with an adjectival predicate.’ This is why being and unity, time and aspect, should perhaps rightly be called ‘implications’ – not only if they necessarily or possibly imply one another as being and being one, temporally and aspectually; but maybe primarily because this seems to be the most pressing problem of metaphysics. See Haas, 2007a, and Haas, 2014.

35 Aristotle, 1957. 1003b22-34. Unity is often thought as a predicate of being – so that ‘being is one’ means that oneness belongs to being, or so that being is univocal, of one form or material, etc. But for Aristotle, if ‘being is one’, then ‘unity also is’. So unity is predicated of being as much as being of unity – for being and unity imply one another. Being is one and unity unites being. But then chronology must be rethought: not just the being of time – but of unity as well, at least insofar as the unity of time lies in its way of being one. And the study of aspect too, phenomenology, might also have to consider the being and unity of aspect. I have taken up these issues here: http://www.youtube.com/user/AndrewHaasPhilosophy.

**ORCID**

*Andrew Haas*  [http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4469-5102](http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4469-5102)

**References**


Plato (1903) *Opera*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
