

# DANIEL KARABEKYAN

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Birthday: May 7, 1986

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## EDUCATION

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- 2012            PhD in Economics, National Research University Higher School of Economics
- 2009            MSc in Economics, National Research University Higher School of Economics  
(*summa cum laude*)
- 2007            BSc in Economics, National Research University Higher School of Economics (*summa cum laude*)

## CURRENT EMPLOYMENT

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- 09.2013 – present    Assistant Professor, *Department of Theoretical Economics, National Research University Higher School of Economics*
- 02.2014 – present    Senior Research Associate, *International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis, NRU HSE*
- 02.2014 – present    Deputy Dean for Research, *Faculty of Economic Sciences, NRU HSE*

## PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT

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- 09.2015 – 10.2015    Visiting Fellow, *Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow*
- 04.2013 – 05.2013    Postdoctoral Fellow, *Department of Economics, Harvard University*
- 02.2013 – 12.2013    Research Associate, *International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis, NRU HSE*
- 07.2010 – 12.2012    Junior Research Associate, *International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis, NRU HSE*
- 09.2009 – 08.2013    Lecturer, *Department of Economics, National Research University Higher School of Economics*
- 09.2007 – 07.2009    Teaching Assistant, *Department of Mathematics, National Research University Higher School of Economics*

## PUBLICATIONS

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### Articles

Articles and papers in English in peer-reviewed journals

1. **Aleskerov F., Karabekyan D., Sanver R., Yakuba V.** (2012) "On the Manipulability of Voting Rules: the Case of 4 and 5 Alternatives" // *Mathematical Social Science*, Volume 64, pp. 67-73
2. **Aleskerov F., Karabekyan D., Sanver R., Yakuba V.** (2011) "An individual manipulability of positional voting rules" // *SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association*, Volume 2 № 4. pp. 431-446

3. **Aleskerov F., Karabekyan D., Sanver R., Yakuba V.** (2011) "On the degree of manipulability of multi-valued social choice rules" // *Homo Oeconomicus* Volume 28 № 1/2. pp. 205—216

Other articles in English

4. **Aleskerov F., Ivanov A., Karabekyan D., Yakuba V.** (2015) "Manipulability of Aggregation Procedures in Impartial Anonymous Culture" // *Procedia Computer Science, Volume 55*, Pages 1250–1257
5. **Karabekyan D., Yakuba V.** (2010) "Estimating the degree of manipulability of voting rules for weak manipulation" // *AIP Conference Proceedings Volume 1281*, pp. 2151-2154
6. **Aleskerov F., Karabekyan D., Sanver R., Yakuba V.** (2008) "Computing the Degree of Manipulability in the Case of Multiple Choice" // *Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2008)*, Ulle Endriss & Paul W. Goldberg (eds.), pp. 27-38

Books in Russian

7. **Balsevich A, Karabekyan D, Podkolzina E, Yudkevich M** «Institutional Economics: Problem Set. Part 4: Contract Theory» 2009, 112p

Articles and papers in Russian in peer-reviewed journals

8. **Karabekyan D.** (2009) "On extended preferences in a voting" // *Economic Journal of Higher School of Economics* Volume 13 (1), pp. 19-34
9. **Aleskerov F., Karabekyan D., Sanver R., Yakuba V.** (2009) «Evaluation of the Degree of Manipulability of Known Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choice» // *The Journal of the New Economic Association* Volume 1-2, pp. 37-61

Other articles in Russian

10. **Karabekyan D.** (2011) "On manipulability of q-Paretian voting rules" // *Mathematical modeling of political systems and processes" Workshop Proceedings* Volume 1, pp. 142-156
11. **Karabekyan D.** (2005) "Oligopolistic competition and cellular services tariffs in Russia" // *Proceedings of the Student conference "Modernization of the economy and institutional development"*, pp. 27-40

Working papers (unpublished)

1. **Karabekyan D.** "Price and income-dependent preferences"  
*Abstract:* In this paper main results of consumer choice theory are revised for the case of price and income-dependent preferences. We have shown that in general some results are no longer true especially demand homogeneity property. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the demand function to be homogeneous of the degree zero (no money illusion property) are formulated. We also found that in order to this condition to be satisfied it is sufficient that marginal utility is homogeneous of the degree  $\alpha > 0$  for prices and income. In addition, the modified Slutsky equation is derived for this case. One of the results is that even if the good is normal (demand is increasing in income) the demand for this good can be increasing in its price, the opposite of what holds in the standard model. In other words, classical Slutsky decomposition is no longer true. At the same time, this result incorporate Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption.
2. **Karabekyan D.** "Manipulation in Sequential Voting"  
*Abstract:* There are a lot of allegations about whether FIFA world cup hosts countries were chosen honestly or not. We analyze the results of FIFA Executive Committee voting and reconstruct the set of possible voting situations compatible with the results of each stage. In both elections we identify strategic behavior and then analyze results for honest voting under all compatible voting situations. For 2018 FIFA world cup election Russia should be chosen for all profiles. For 2022 FIFA elections results depends on the preferences of the FIFA president Sepp Blatter who serve as tie-breaker in the case of equal amount of votes. If Sepp Blatter prefer Qatar over South Korea and Japan, then Qatar should be chosen for all profiles.

Otherwise there are some chances that South Korea or Japan may be chosen as host country.

3. **Karabekyan D.** "Voting with variable votes"

*Abstract:* In this paper, we introduce an algorithm of adding new members and changing votes and quota. Making quota and votes be dependent of time allows us to increase the committee size without increasing of voting power for existing members. We can show that if the initial number of votes for a new member is 0, and the number of votes and the quota increase with the same velocity, then at some point all voters will have equal voting power. Moreover, voting power of each voter in this case will always decrease over time, so the paradox of new members will not be observed.

4. **Karabekyan D.** "Voting rule design"

Translations **Bowles Samuel** «Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution» Russian Translation, 2011, 576p (one of the translators)

## SELECTED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

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- 2015 · XVII April International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development (Moscow, Russia, April 2015)
- 2014 · 17th World Congress of International Economic Association (Dead Sea, Jordan, June 2014);  
· 12th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (SCW2014) (Boston, USA, June 2014);  
· 89th Annual Conference of Western Economic Association International (WEAI 89) (Denver, USA, June 2014);
- 2013 · 88th Annual Conference of Western Economic Association International (WEAI 88) (Seattle, USA, June 2013);  
· 10th Biennial Pacific Rim Conference (Tokyo, Japan, March 2013);
- 2012 · 11th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (SCW2012) (Delhi, India, August 2012);  
· 87th Annual Conference of Western Economic Association International (WEAI 87) (San-Francisco, USA, June 2012);
- 2011 · 7th Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING7) (Paris, France, July 2011);  
· 33rd Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design (Bodrum, Turkey, July 2011);  
· 16th Congress of International Economic Association (Beijing, China, July 2011);  
· 86th Annual Conference of Western Economic Association International (WEAI 86) (San-Diego, USA, June 2011);
- 2010 · 2010 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET-2010) (Alicante, Spain, October 2010)  
· 8th International Conference of Numerical Analysis and Applied Mathematics (ICNAAM-2010) (Rhodes, Greece, September 2010)  
· 10th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (SCW-2010), (Moscow, Russia, July 2010) + one of the organizers
- 2008 · 2nd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2008) (Liverpool, England, September 2008)  
· 9th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (SCW-2008)

(Montreal, Canada, June 2008)

- 2007
- Workshop «Simulation and other quantitative approaches to the assessment of electoral systems» (Alessandria, Italy, June 2007)

## GRANTS

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- Scientific Foundation of National Research University Higher School of Economics № 12-05-0036 «Ranking with collective choice methods»
- Russian Foundation for Basic Research № 08-01-00039A «Manipulability of voting rules in the case of non-resolute social choice function», 2008-2010
- Scientific Foundation of National Research University Higher School of Economics № 10-04-0030 «Collective choice models», 2010-2011
- Scientific Foundation of National Research University Higher School of Economics № 08-04-0008 «Collective choice models», 2008-2009
- Scientific Foundation of National Research University Higher School of Economics № 06-04-0052 «Collective choice models», 2006-2007

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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- Social choice problem: problems of manipulation in a voting
- Consumer choice theory: utility and preference models. Ranking sets of objects problem
- Behavioral economics: preferences over the sets
- Asymmetric information problem
- Economics of education
- Theoretical Industrial Organisations

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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- Lecturer
- Graduate level courses: Microeconomics-3, Behavioral Economics
  - Undergraduate level courses: Microeconomics, Microeconomics of Collective Actions
- Teaching assistant
- Undergraduate level courses: Collective Choice Theory, Optimization and Mathematical Methods of Decision Making, Discrete Mathematical Models

## ACADEMIC SERVICE

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- Reviewing for journals
- Annals of Operations Research, Journal at New Economic Association (in Russian), Voprosy Ekonomiki (Economic issues – in Russian)
- Conference committees
- Member of Program committee of International Workshop on Experimental Economics and Machine Learning
  - Member of Organizing committee of 10th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare

## MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

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- Awards
- «Golden Vyshka» award for outstanding achievements in study, 2007
  - Adam Smith Award, 2007
  - Oxford-Russia Fund Scholarship 2005-2007
  - Gaidar Fellowship for graduate students , 2011-2012

Summer  
Schools

- Summer School "Interdisciplinary analysis of voting rules", July 2014
- 24th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory: "Decision Theory", June 2013
- Department of Economics HSE Summer School: "Economics of Education", July 2007
- Summer School "Baltic Practice": "Cost and Benefit Analysis of Nordstream Construction", July 2006
- Summer School "Baltic Practice": "Quantitative Political Economy", July 2005