

Alexander Levkun

Education

Higher School of Economics,
Faculty of Economic Sciences,
Moscow, Russia.

Bachelor of Economics, cohort of 2012.

GPA – 8.8/10; Ranked 3/237. Member of research class.

Senior Year Major: Mathematical Methods in Economics.

Personal

Nationality: Russian.

Date of Birth: February 7, 1995.

Languages: Russian (native), English (advanced).

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Research Fields

Primary: Auction Theory, Game Theory, Behavioral Economics.

Secondary: Mechanism Design, Applied Econometrics.

Working Papers

UNDEGRADUATE THESIS *Breaking Combinatorial Clock Auctions: Are CCAs Actually Effective?* (in progress)
Supervisor: Prof. Maarten Janssen

I am trying to find gaming opportunities in combinatorial clock auctions. These auctions are represented as truthful bidding mechanisms but in fact CCAs are too complicated to understand what is the profitable deviation. It can be shown that gaming opportunities exist under the lexicographical preferences (raising rivals' costs).

3RD YEAR TERM PAPER *Overbidding in First Price Auctions with Boundedly Rational Participants*
Supervisor: Prof. Anton Suvorov

Experimental first price sealed bid auctions with private values yield higher revenues than risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) predicts. I propose a simple model of an auction with biased bidders that may underestimate the expected strength of the competitors (be optimistic) or overestimate it (be pessimistic). Pessimists overbid compared to RNNE, optimists underbid. The more pessimistic the bidders the higher the seller's expected revenue. If one biased and one rational bidder participate, then the rational bidder forms the best response and underbids for high private values. Even in the case of rational median player overbidding is present. Revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds for my setting.

2ND YEAR TERM PAPER *Auctions. Can the Price Rise with the Decrease in Demand?*
Supervisor: Prof. Boris Demeshev

Modeled a button auction and found monotonicity problems — a seller can earn more if he randomly removes one of the buyers. Also analyzed features of pricing on eBay auction.

Research Experience

Research Assistant, Center for Institutional Studies, Higher School of Economics, Research Group Public Procurement: Economic Analysis

“Auctions for Complements: Theory and Experiments“,
(with Prof. Alex Teytelboym and Prof. Daniel Marszalec).

Teaching experience

Teaching Assistant in Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Higher School of Economics, (since 2015).

Teaching Assistant in Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics, [Higher School of Economics](#), (2014–2015).

Computer skills

L^AT_EX, R, MATLAB, Stata, Eviews, Gephi

Interests

Chess, fencing (rapier)

Last updated: October 6, 2015