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"WESTERNIZATIONS" FROM PETER I TO MEIJI: WAR, POLITICAL COMPETITION, AND REFORM

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Radical “Westernizing” transformations in extra-European countries, from Peter I’s Russia to Meiji Japan, are traditionally presented as a response to threats from the more militarily and technologically advanced European powers. This corresponds to the general tendency to view war as the driving force behind early modern state-building. Yet, how exactly did such transformations become possible? How were the rulers able to pursue policies that threaten large sections of their own military elites, from strel’tsy and mamluks to janissaries and samurais? And why did some of the extra-European states failed to “Westernize” in response to external threats, while others rapidly Westernized when the threats was ephemeral, at best? This article seeks to complicate this “bellicist” narrative of Westernizing transformations by shifting the focus of analysis to the rulers’ quest for political survival. It argues that when the domestic balance of power is stable, incumbent rulers tend not to embark on reform, even in the face of external military threats. Conversely, such reforms tend to occur when the domestic balance of power is disrupted to such a degree as to lead to the emergence of challengers, who launch “Westernization” as they seek to expand their power base and undermine that of their rivals. Factional political struggles accompanying such transformations are interpreted here not as a conservative reaction against reforms, but as a process that precedes and enables reforms by facilitating the creation of an alternative ruling coalition.

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At one point or another, in the period between the late 17th and the late 19th centuries, nearly all major extra-European powers experienced periods of radical “Westernizing” transformations. While the earliest and, perhaps, the paradigmatic case of such a transformation was Peter I’s Russia, other key examples include the Tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire, Muhammad Ali Pasha’s Egypt, China of the “self-strengthening” era, and Meiji Japan. At their most profound and far-reaching, such transformations were violent and convulsive and affected not only the structures of government, but also the patterns and forms of everyday life, symbolic, and religious systems; they resulted in the dislocation or destruction of entire social classes. Not surprisingly, these episodes occupy a central place in national historiographies and national mythologies of respective countries; the roots of modernity in the extra-European world – whether viewed as a blessing, a curse, or both – are often traced to them. Indeed, contemporaries and historians alike sometimes refer to them as “revolutions.”

These transformations are usually understood as driven by war. This view goes back to reformers themselves, who justified considerable social shocks caused by these “Westernizations” by evoking the need to roll back the Swedes, repulse the infidels, expel the barbarians, etc. In the 20th century, these arguments have been echoed in works that belong to the modernization paradigm: a classic summary holds that, as their traditional military forces were rapidly becoming obsolete, the governments of some non-Western societies proved to be “strong enough” to effect the necessary reforms, “and also realistic enough in the long run to know that unless they introduced modern reforms they would ultimately succumb to foreign rule” (Black 1966:121). The only broad comparative overview of these “Westernizing” episodes currently available in English likewise holds that “all the reformers really wanted was to defend [their countries] against aggression from abroad” (Ralston 1990:173-174).

In recent decades, this deeply traditional view of Westernizing transformations has dovetailed well with two dominant and interrelated paradigms, the “military revolution” thesis in history and the “bellicist” thesis in historical sociology, habitually associated with Charles Tilly (1990). According to this view, the qualitative shift in Western Europe towards a modern centralized state circa 17th century was provoked by the “military revolution” with its shift to

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3 The shortcomings of this term are obvious: “Westernizations,” arguably, only made these countries “Western” in a very limited sense, if at all; indeed, it is doubtful that there ever was such a thing as the “West” – not to mention the unwelcome assumptions of Western cultural superiority potentially implicit in the term itself. While I am aware of the problematic nature of this term, I find it expedient to use it below as a shorthand, especially since these reforms were usually understood by contemporaries as a transfer of military and administrative practices and cultural forms from the “West.”
centrally-maintained regular armies and expensive innovations in artillery, fortifications, and ship-building.\textsuperscript{4} Faced with external competition, states responded by intensifying the extraction of resources and by building up administrative infrastructure in order to support their ever more numerous armed forces. To be sure, Tilly’s famous dictum that “war made the state” does not necessarily imply equating war with international confrontation, and he pays significant attention to the protracted efforts by the states to monopolize coercion within their own borders. Indeed, historians stress that in the premodern period the boundary between interstate and domestic wars was blurred anyway (Glete 2010:302). In practice, however, scholars tend to limit their discussion of the drivers of early modern state-building to international competition. Social scientists, in their attempts to test this hypothesis quantitatively, are especially prone to focus on the duration and intensity of interstate conflicts, as these are much easier to observe and measure (most recently, Karaman and Pamuk 2013).\textsuperscript{5} These theoretical accounts of early modern state building explicitly built on the Western European historical experience, and extra-European powers typically received no serious attention or were treated as outlying cases.\textsuperscript{6} Lately, however, a growing number of scholars have used the “military revolution” prism to explore the early modern “Westernizing” reforms in the non-Western world (among others, Lorge 2008; Ágoston 2014; Ágoston 2011; Poe 1996; Poe 1998; Paul 2004; Roy 2012).

It is true that efforts to upgrade the military were indeed at the heart of these transformations when they did take place, but this does not mean that impersonal “war” was the “cause” of Westernization; certainly, it did not automatically provoke change. Empirically, although the Ottomans suffered numerous defeats in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, they did not embark on reforms until well into the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and although the Qajars in Persia experienced heavy pressure from the Russians and the British throughout the entire 19\textsuperscript{th} century, there was no successful reform at all. The Russians, on the other hand, embarked under Peter I on a radical overhaul of their society, although they arguably faced no immediate military threat at that particular point in time. In Japan, a hugely humiliating, but still largely symbolic event – a brief


\textsuperscript{5} For an attempt to also assess the impact of intrastate rivalry, see, for example, Thies (2004).

visit of a US naval squadron – was supposedly enough to trigger a “modernizing revolution,” while in China even the catastrophic military collapse during the Opium Wars did not push the government and elites towards reform. It appears, at the very least, that even if the bellicist paradigm does capture an overall linkage between war and state-building, it is less successful in explaining the timing of reforms or the fact that some countries resorted to “self-weakening expedients” instead of “self-strengthening reforms” (Thompson 1995: 290-291; Hui 2005).

There is a number of ways in which this failure of many extra-European states to reform “in time” is explained in the literature. Quite often it is simply assumed that if no reform took place in response to an external threat, then either the threat was not serious enough, or the “Western” cultural influences had not reached a necessary critical mass, or, perhaps, the rulers and the elites were either not “far-sighted” enough to recognize and implement new methods of fighting or too “conservative” to realize their benefits. In the Ottoman case, in particular, it has been argued recently that throughout much of the 18th century the empire’s military weakness was not “obvious” enough to provoke radical reform (for example, Aksan 2007). It has also been suggested that the ways of fighting developed in Western Europe circa 1700 did not suit some terrains – the vast barren expanses of India or the Eurasian steppe, for example; in such cases, it was “natural” for rulers (and indeed, Western colonizers) to opt for traditional methods of warfare, or for some sort of synthesis (for example, Chase 2003; Roy 2005; Lorge 2008; Hoffmann 2015). In that case, a decision not to reform appears rational in the short term, albeit leading to grave consequences in the longer perspective. Finally, there is a strand of literature where methods of warfare are viewed as culturally conditioned, so that “the degree to which a technological or organizational innovation is accepted and developed depends upon the cultural context” (for example, Parrott 2005; Goldman 2006; Tuck 2008).

While these explanations contribute to our understanding of important dimensions of Westernizing transformations, they typically fail to identify the social and political forces that might have driven such reforms. Common to these accounts is the assumption that it is somehow natural for rulers to prioritize the modernization of their armed forces, and that it is their failure to implement such reforms that needs to be explained. In fact, the bellicist paradigm does not encourage the search for the driving forces behind such transformations, insofar as it hinges on the assumption that “extending the range of population and resources over which they wield power” (Tilly 1990:14) is the overarching priority for all rulers – a view that, again, dovetails well with the technological teleology of the “military revolution” thesis. It is fairly obvious,
however, that such reforms infringed on powerful vested interests and were usually associated with episodes of intense violence, if not outright civil wars. Not infrequently they ended in the defeat and death of reformers, and, when successful, they entailed the wholesale destruction – often physical – of large and powerful traditional service corporations. All of this significantly increased the political costs of reform for any ruler. Indeed, as far as these countries are concerned, the question should be not why some of them were late to reform, but rather why would they attempt to “Westernize” at all, given the degree to which such transformations threatened the immediate interests of entrenched traditional elites.

This article seeks to build an explanatory model of such transitions that would allow us to go beyond military-technological determinism in identifying actors whose self-interested actions resulted – albeit not necessarily intentionally – in these transformations. Fundamentally, my argument is based on a departure from Tilly’s assumption about the ruler’s motives. Instead, following Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), this article sees political survival as the rulers’ main concern; their actions, then, follow a different logic, that of maintaining support of a sufficient section of the elite (their winning coalition). From that perspective, international competition and effective response to external threats are only two of the many concerns on their agenda (Kadercan 2013). Indeed, not modernizing the military might be a rational choice if such a modernization would damage the ruler’s domestic position to an unacceptable degree. The question to be explored, therefore, is under what circumstances rulers would actually venture to carry out such radical reform, and how they would be able to secure the necessary winning coalition.

My hypothesis is that external military pressure alone might not in itself be a sufficient or even necessary trigger for Westernizing transformations to take place: I argue instead that these radical reforms were made possible and driven by intra-elite struggles after a breakdown of the domestic balance of power. Political regimes in these countries have been traditionally viewed as “strong” (as in “arbitrary and despotic”) – and that is why, allegedly, they were able to shove Westernizing reforms down the throats of an unwilling population. Shove they did, yet as the analysis below suggests, such reforms were, in fact, initiated at the moments of these regimes’ greatest weakness – and were born out of it. By employing the analytic categories of Bueno de Mesquita’s selectorate theory, I seek to explain why incumbent rulers were unlikely to implement such transformations, and how it was the dynamics of intra-elite conflicts, and not the international competition, that led to the formation of winning coalitions making such
transformation possible. It was the near-collapse of central power that pushed the leaders of such coalitions to fight for their survival and to take on the risk of dislodging some of the entrenched stakeholders who otherwise would have blocked any institutional restructuring. Such conflicts within the elite were nothing new for these countries, of course. What was new, however, was that instead of redistributing the resources and authority appropriated from their defeated opponents to their own supporters, as they would have done earlier, the winners now reached for the newly available “Western” technologies of government.

Most recently, an elite-focused interpretation of the transition to capitalism in Western Europe has been forcefully put forward by Lachmann (2000), while Wheeler (2011) focuses on the splits within the elites in his comparative analysis of early modern Prussia and Poland, and Cohen (2014) adopts a similar perspective in his study of Meiji Japan. What’s common to these accounts is their authors’ belief that intra-elite conflicts can be explained with reference to differences in the socio-economic positions of various elite factions – in Lachmann’s case, for example, the different modes of appropriating resources from non-elites. In that sense, they are not all that different from earlier Marxist-inspired attempts to explain Petrine reforms in Russia or Meiji restoration in Japan as driven by lower gentry and/or “bourgeois” (merchant) interests vis-à-vis aristocratic magnates. That is also their major weakness: not only do such accounts risk retroactively ascribing to members of the elite the “interests,” motives, and identities that they themselves would not have necessarily recognized, but also the actual fault lines between warring factions were never drawn along such neat socio-economic or status categories. There is simply no empirical evidence that the Petrine “Westernization” of Russia was some sort of a rebellion of the “gentry” against the “boyars,” and so forth. The model offered in this article seeks to avoid the need to look for “objectively defined” socio-economic groups to explain elite conflicts. Instead of conflicts being driven by pre-existing cleavages within the elites, the cleavages (and corresponding identities) are seen here as emerging in the process of factional struggle. In its focus on the contingencies of political processes, this account differs from models that present a neat matrix of structural factors and a clear taxonomy of outcomes where specific outcomes are linked to different combinations of these factors.

In the following pages, I begin by suggesting a stylized trajectory of early modern Westernizing transformation in the extra-European world and sketch out the connections

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7 On Japan in particular, see Jansen (1994) and Craig (1961). On Russia, see the 1920s works by M.N. Pokrovskii and his school.
between intra-elite conflicts and reform. In the next section, two in-depth case studies, of Peter I’s Russia and Qajar Persia, demonstrate this mechanism in action. Finally, I consider the experiences of other key non-Western powers to show the broader applicability of this way of thinking about Westernizations. The purpose here is not to present a comprehensive and balanced picture of these transformations, but, on the contrary, to magnify a particular dimension of this process that hitherto has not receive due attention. In particular, missing from the narrative below is a discussion of economic, cultural, and social differences between these regimes – certainly, Qajar Persia did not resemble Tokugawa Japan and the Ottoman Egypt did not resemble Muscovy in a multitude of ways, and these differences also affected the trajectories of reform in these countries. It also does not account for ways in which the experience of earlier transformations affected those taking place later in other countries by providing blueprints for action, or for the evolution of Western European modernity itself, which meant that the reformers were presented with very different sets of technologies and institutions to borrow. As is the case with any broad comparison, however, the task here is not to offer a definitive narrative, but to initiate a discussion about mechanisms of Westernizing transformations and of the role of war versus that of domestic political competition in propelling change.

Westernizing Reforms: Incumbents, Challengers, and Coalition-Building

Trajectories of Change

Similarly to state-building efforts in Europe, at the core of Westernizing transformations was a reorganization of local elites in the process of centralizing control over violence and taxation. Pre-reform systems could take different forms, but one way or another they were tied up with, in Max Weber’s terms, “military organization […] based on the principle of self-equipment” (Weber 1981: 320). Under these schemes, warriors received certain rents from the ruler, mostly in the form of land grants or economic privileges (the right to engage in specific trades, etc.); they could also receive cash or grain to buy weapons or uniforms and to feed themselves and their families. For the purposes of mustering and mobilization, warriors were usually organized into service corporations; the right to receive such rents was usually explicitly

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8 See William H. Sewell Jr.’s (2005: 95-96) critique of Theda Skocpol’s account. For early modern state-building in Europe this theme is most systematically developed by Ertman (1997).
linked to membership in service corporations, which also conferred a privileged legal status. Control over such corporations was typically captured by the servitors themselves, becoming the foci of opposition to any future modernizations. Transition to a centrally equipped and maintained army implied the destruction of these corporations and massive redistributions of financial, administrative, and symbolic resources – and thus, huge political costs for the ruler.

The initial stage of Westernizing transformations everywhere entailed *technical borrowing*: the importation of quantities of modern weapons and attempts to introduce among traditional troops elements of relevant tactical models and technical skills. Although some authors posit the existence of cultural and/or religious factors that slowed down the diffusion of military technologies, a growing body of literature seems to suggest that in societies across Eurasia rulers eagerly sought to adopt new weapons and military technologies as soon as these became available (Chase 2003; Lorge 2008; Grant 1999; Agoston 2005; Khan 2004; Roy 2012). This was followed by *organizational innovations*: setting up separate units of “new order” troops that would not only use the new weapons in accordance with the latest Western European tactical doctrines, but would also be trained on a permanent basis and therefore, recruited and equipped in a centralized fashion. Ensuring the permanence of the “new order” troops implied much higher per capita cash expenditures than in the case of traditional armies, thus putting a heavy burden on the treasury, and here the trajectories taken by different rulers diverged. In some cases, they moved to finance new units through a variety of “self-weakening expedients” (various “extraordinary” taxes, ad hoc revenues, currency manipulation, etc.); eventually the “new order” troops could be either disbanded completely or demobilized to a significant extent in the face of fiscal pressures. In other cases, rulers embarked on a deep *institutional restructuring*. More specifically, the fiscal dimension of this restructuring entailed abolishing certain feudal privileges and other exemptions, confiscating property from religious establishments, revoking existing tax farms, expanding tax coverage to include new population categories, etc. New mechanisms of taxation went hand-in-hand with new methods of troop recruitment, as soldiers had to be drafted directly by central authorities so as to break existing

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9 For the Ottoman Empire, see, most recently Tezcan (2010) and Kadercan (2014).

10 These changes also resulted in the emergence of a new officer corps, new bureaucracy, and new intelligentsia, which eventually become the drivers of what could be called “second-generation” modernizing episodes that mostly correspond to Timberger’s model of “revolutions from above” (Timberger 1978). Examples of such “second-generation” events would include, in my opinion, the failed 1825 Decembrist coup in Russia, the Young Turk movement, or, for that matter, the Chinese revolution of 1911. Unlike such second-generation episodes, which took place in the context of states that had already been partially modernized, and which are not considered here, the “Westernizing” transformations discussed below were about crossing a threshold from predominantly patrimonial to predominantly modern or proto-modern state institutions.
corporate, tribal, and feudal identities and loyalties. The social dimension of Westernization involved also changes to the mechanisms of elite reproduction. Finally, existing religious and symbolic systems were dismantled: this could be accompanied by radical calendar reforms, changes in dress, establishment of a new capital, and reform of court rituals and everyday practices of elite life. In short, in the course of Westernization political and economic structures were reshaped. Most dramatically, institutional transformation entailed the abolition of traditional service corporations, from Russian strel’tsy to Japanese samurai, which sometimes involved the physical destruction of a significant fraction of their membership. In effect, rulers carried out an absolutist coup against a large portion of their own military elite.

Thus, the reform of the military in these cases had larger political implications: it created broad uncertainty as to which members of the elite will continue to perform military service under the new scheme and retain their rents. The puzzle, therefore, is why a ruler would embark on such a coup. The bellicist paradigm does not see this as a relevant question, but if we focus on rulers’ political survival instead, the situation looks different. Indeed, early modern conflicts were not typically total wars, and in practice a complete takeover of their state by a foreign enemy was a far more distant threat for rulers than dethronement by their own subjects. Take the Ottoman empire and Russia in the 17th-18th centuries: while on more than one occasions rulers in both countries fell victims to palace coups, only one ruler was captured by enemy forces – Tsar Vasillii Shuiskii of Russia, – and even he fell into Polish hands in 1610 only after he had been overthrown by the elites of Muscovy. Thus, even if a ruler saw the benefit of adopting a new “Western” way of warfare, there was a distinct possibility that reform might carry such high political costs for him that they would outweigh the costs of “failure to modernize.” Defeat in war might result in the loss of a province, but reforms of such magnitude were likely to produce resistance and threaten both the ruler’s throne and their life. Indeed, the loss of a province might be preferable, especially before the advent of modern nationalism; empirically, we observe that early modern rulers routinely ceded entire provinces with little to no resistance on the part of their elites. Thus, in order to understand the timing and the very feasibility of Westernizing reforms we need to identify those conditions under which their political costs would be either mitigated or somehow outweighed by other considerations.

*Winning Coalition and Reform*
My hypothesis here is that Westernizing transformations are better understood as enabled and driven by intra-elite struggle. Useful analytical categories for explaining this process can be found in Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) selectorate theory. It holds that the primary goal of any leader is to survive politically, that is, to maintain a winning coalition, defined as a subset of the selectorate (those in the population who are entitled to express preferences regarding the selection of leaders) of “sufficient size such that the subset’s support endows the leadership with political power” over the rest of the selectorate as well as the disenfranchised population. Leaders maintain their winning coalitions by taxing the population and distributing private and public goods among the coalition members, and they seek to do so at the lowest possible cost. The key to my reasoning below is what Bueno de Mesquita et al. identify as the “commitment problem.” In order to come to power, a challenger has to convince a sufficient number of members of the current coalition to defect over to his side. However, the challenger is handicapped by his inability to make a credible commitment: members of the elite realize that he might not honor their word once they assume power. All things being equal, this advantages incumbents and explains their hold on power.

How do “Westernizing” transformations look in the light of this model? Traditional military elites in this case form an early modern ruler’s selectorate, as they play a role in approving or even installing new rulers (and, occasionally, dethroning incumbents). What was important about the “institutional restructuring” stage of Westernizing transformations, however, was that it implied a redefinition of the selectorate: as traditional forms of service were abolished, the criteria for membership of the elite were up in the air and, eventually, large sections of the selectorate were excluded. This created an unacceptable level of uncertainty for all members of the elite, who could not know the ruler’s intentions and reliably estimate their own chances of being included in the post-reform coalition. Thus, a ruler faced severe risks in carrying out this kind of institutional restructuring and might have abstained from it even if they believed that reforms were advantageous from the military point of view.

And, in fact, this is what we observe. Indeed, if we look at the extra-European powers that experienced Westernizing transformation, it appears that, despite the potential benefits of these reforms to the military, incumbent rulers tended not to embark on institutional restructuring. One case when Westernization had been attempted by an incumbent seems to underscore this point: Selim III (r. 1789–1807) tried to move from technological and organizational innovations (the creation of “new order” troops, a nizam-i Cedid corps) to a broader institutional restructuring – and was duly dethroned (and eventually killed), as large
sectors of the elites united in opposition against him. Likewise, there are numerous examples of leading ministers in these countries who put forward reform proposals and even began to implement them. And yet, none of them were able to consolidate sufficient authority under an incumbent ruler, capture existing state institutions, and effect a restructuring of a magnitude we are talking about here. Regardless of the severity of external military pressures, the ruler ended up removing such ministers – because their reforms threatened to destabilize the domestic balance of power, either creating risks for the ruler themselves or unduly increasing the minister’s power at the expense of the rest of the governing coalition.

Instead, Westernizing reforms appear to take place when the domestic balance of power is already broken. In practice, that means that either there emerged uncertainty regarding succession, or the incumbent is considered to no longer be able to reliably guarantee the maintenance of the status quo (and thus the provision of private goods to their coalition). In this situation, members of the elite are forced to make their bets. Some choose to back a challenger because of their idiosyncratic affinities of him, or because of their belief in his superior ability to provide private goods for them, but, many are forced to do so by their factional affiliations, as under a member of a competing clan their chances to receive private goods would be very low. Thus, the challenger’s coalition usually includes a combination of marginal elements of the elite (especially foreign or non-elite “professionals,” such as a cadre of the “new order” troops) and those members of the current winning coalition whose destinies are tied to the challenger’s by their kinship and patronage connections. A run-up to Westernizing transformations typically includes a sequence of progressively more violent confrontations between competing proto-coalitions, and at each stage a larger and larger proportion of the elite are forced to back a side in the confrontation. In that sense, a protracted political struggle is more conducive to radical Westernization, as it serves to solidify factions and to reveal loyalties. This showdown between the opposing camps takes place prior to any large-scale Westernization, and it is driven not by opposition to reform, but by domestic clan rivalries and power struggles.

There might be nothing particularly “Westernized” about the challengers themselves and their coalition, and their rivals do not have to be intrinsically “conservative”; the coalitions that bring these challengers to power are never uniformly “Westernizing” in their political outlook, but rather present an odd-mixture of both nativist and “reformist” elements. Yet, insofar as a challenger attempts to draft to their side the “new order” troops, their rivals often attempt to capitalize on this fact by portraying him as an apostate and a traitor beholden to foreign influences, while the challenger labels their enemies as retrogrades. Eventually, these labels
solidify into identities, which the rival parties accept and internalize. Indeed, the challengers themself actively foster such self-identification among their supporters as a way of boosting their loyalty and group solidarity. They insist, ever more forcefully, on introducing external elements of Westernization, as the symbolic acceptance of the “new” and rejection of the old and the traditional (often manifested in changes of dress and hairstyle, the adoption of foreign titles, the use of foreign terms, and other externally observable actions) becomes a rite of passage for members of the elite, bringing them into a confraternity of reformers, affirming their personal loyalty to the leader over traditional clan affinities. It also serves as an important signaling device, symbolically reconfirming affinities between the challenger and their supporters and marking the ruler’s commitment to include their “Westernized” supporters in the post-reform ruling coalition. Supporters who fail to pass this loyalty test and cast aside their old cultural and clan affinities are sorted out of the coalition, and the remaining members compete to prove their superior loyalty vis-à-vis others by becoming more and more symbolically “Westernized.”

The challenger’s political struggle against his opponents also drives Westernization in the sense that “reforming” traditional troops and government institutions to the point of elimination becomes a matter of political survival, not military or administrative efficiency. Furthermore, radical Westernizing reform provides a mechanism for the appropriation of resources and authority from the new members of the previous winning coalition and their redistribution as rewards for the victor’s own supporters. Once this process begins, the supporters of a victorious challenger push it further and further, identifying new areas that supposedly need to be reformed and regulated with their help, under their guidance, and in their favor, creating jobs and rent-extracting opportunities. This manifests itself either in the direct transfer of resources and authority from previous holders (traditional feudal and tribal elites and local communities) or in the introduction of regulation to spheres that hitherto have been governed by custom. For the challenger and their coalition members, “The West” serves as a menu of institutional blueprints that enable the expropriation and redistribution of resources and authority. Radical reform – conducted under the banner of defending the country against foreigners – also justifies such a redistribution and gives the victorious challenger and their associates a way to legitimize their regime and delegitimize their defeated opponents, presented as dangerous “retrogrades.” Once locked into this path, the new ruler ascribes every difficulty he faces to the machinations of his “conservative” opponents and to responds with greater reform and further “Westernization.”

To sum up, my approach to understanding “Westernizing” transformations emphasizes the following key elements:
First, the centrality of regime breakdown and resulting intra-elite political divisions to the reformers’ motivations; to the emergence of conditions that make the destruction of traditional institutions possible and desirable; to the competing coalitions’ experimentation with new forms of military organization; and to the ways in which “Westernizing” reforms were used by the successful challengers to build and expand their own power base.

Second, the role of the political struggle itself (as opposed to preexisting social, economic, or ideological divisions) in shaping both the fault lines between warring factions and the horizontal and vertical linkages, bonds of affinity and loyalty within these factions that enable their leaders to take on the status quo. There can be no doubt that membership of the same social, economic, or, for that matter, religious groups is important, but mostly insofar as it implies personal contacts between members of the elite that make them trust each other more and facilitates further mobilization. In that sense, membership in specific clans or patronage networks might actually matter more than belonging to any class-like groups. Cultural reforms play a crucial role in this mechanism, as they serve to symbolically assert and deepen the fault lines between factions, solidifying their loyalties and identities.

Third, the probabilistic, open-ended nature of my explanation. The “Westernizing” transformations are not presented here as naturally following from some structural conditions, nor are they seen as unavoidable because “necessary” for the defense of the realm. Instead, these transformations – and in particular their timing – are contingent on the trajectories of intra-elite politics.

**Petrine Russia and Qajar Persia: Reform v. Non-Reform**

The model suggested above appears to correspond well to the actual trajectories of key Westernization episodes. The section below illustrates this point by presenting two case studies, of Imperial Russia, a power that Westernized early and, from a military point of view, successfully, and Qajar Persia, where no Westernizing revolution occurred despite significant external pressures. Common to both cases are the difficult transitions from technical borrowing and organizational innovations to institutional restructuring; the general tendency of incumbents to step back from institutional innovations even in the face of military pressures; and the key role played by domestic political rivalries in motivating reformers.
In Muscovy, attempts to borrow Western European military technological and organizational innovations begun early in the 17th century, yet these experiments were just as consistently soon abandoned for domestic political reasons. Faced with mounting costs of maintaining the “new order” army and the resulting social tensions, governments of the day preferred to resort to self-weakening expedients (Frost 2000; Stevens 2007; also Kurbatov 2014; Penskoi 2013). This involved providing the soldiers and officers of “new order” formations with land allotments in lieu of their salaries, so that most of them (especially the “new order” cavalry, the reitary) became indistinguishable from petty servitors of the traditional type. The soldiers were also allowed to return home for winter or in peacetime, which meant that they did not train regularly or uniformly. On occasion, these “new order” units were merged into regional service corporations, and by the end of the century a typical task force was an ad hoc combination of the “new order” troops with the “old” ones, most notably with the strel’tsy, which meant that the “new order” tactics could not be really used. So, even though the muster of 1680 indicated that Muscovy had over 200,000 soldiers on its rolls – a huge military indeed by contemporary standards, – the only true “standing” troops in the entire army were two “select” regiments, each of up to 4,000 people; and even here just one thousand troops (known as “the general’s”) in each of the regiments were truly standing units, the rest being mobilized only when needed (Malov 2006; Stevens 2007).

This hybrid system evidently worked well enough on the battlefield and was adequate to the threats that Russia actually faced. The defense of Chyhyryn in 1677–78 demonstrated Muscovy’s ability to put a large army in the field and supply it with necessary resources. It also vindicated the country’s reliance on such “non-modern” elements of its military organization as the fortified lines countering the Tatar raids from the steppe (Stevens 2007). Although, strictly speaking, the battle for Chyhyrin ended in failure, this was not the result of defeat on the battlefield or any demonstrable deficiencies in military organization, but rather of its commander’s, Prince Romodanovskii’s, sudden decision to evacuate the fortress – a decision that still has not been adequately explained. As usual, the war led to an acute financial crisis and was followed by a further round of “self-weakening expedients”: the army’s de-facto demobilization, cuts and delays in payments to troops and foreign officers, and the substitution of land allotments for cash salaries (Sedov 2006:321, 465-73). Likewise, the failures of Crimean expeditions in 1687 and 1689 were due to logistical problems – the army was unable to cross a
600 kilometre-long stretch of nearly uninhabited steppe devoid of any water or food supplies – and not some defeat in strictly military terms (Stevens 2007: 206-208).

To sum up, the military organization that Peter I inherited appeared adequate to the tasks at hand: although it may appear “backward” in retrospect, the existing military organization allowed 17th-century Muscovy to successfully pursue territorial expansion and to swallow up the Left Bank Ukraine and Kiev, among other things. After Peter’s accession, the strel’tsy participated in the Azov campaign, and there is no evidence that they performed noticeably worse than the guards or the “new order” regiments; in fact, this was not a campaign that saw much in the way of “regular” military engagements. Yet, it was Tsar Fedor’s government that had as early as 1680–81 planned a reform motivated by domestic, not military consideration – the strel’tsy were considered increasingly dangerous due to their strong corporative solidarity and propensity to riot to assert their privileges. So, Fedor’s government planned a transfer of a majority of strel’tsy away from Moscow that would leave just 6 of their regiments (5,100 soldiers) in the capital in addition to creating a 10,000-strong cavalry corps of “loaned” military slaves as a political counterbalance to the corporation (Sedov 2006: 472).

To understand the roots of the Petrine reforms we should instead recall that the political history of Russia during the last quarter of the 17th century was defined by the struggle between the clans of Miloslavskiis and Naryshkins, the relatives of the two wives of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (r. 1645–76) (most recently, Sedov 2006). Fedor and Ivan, Aleksei’s sons by the first wife, a Miloslavskii, were sickly; and the youngest son, Peter, who was born to Natalia Naryshkina, was underage when his father died. This created a situation of uncertainty or, at the very least, gave the two camps room to construe uncertainty. The Miloslavskiis, in their competition with the Naryshkins were not above inciting violent rioting in Moscow by the strel’tsy and urban population, or at the very least, benefitting from it. During the 1682 riots there were persistent rumors – probably spread by the Miloslavskiis – that the Naryshkins planned to disband strel’tsy altogether, provoking the latter’s fury against Peter’s relatives (Herd 2004:269). A number of Naryshkins and their allies were lynched. Ivan was declared a co-tsar, co-reigning with Peter I between 1682 and 1696, and a regency government was established with Princess Sofia, a Miloslavskii, as its head.

There is little evidence that the Naryshkin-Miloslavskii split reflected any deep cultural predispositions of these clans or mirrored divisions between pro-reform and conservative forces.
in the society at large. The Naryshkins themselves as a faction were not necessarily more reform-minded and pro-Western in their cultural leanings than their opponents. True, their leader A.S. Matveev was known for his interest in and familiarity with Western European ways, but so was Prince Vasiliy Vasilievich Golitsyn, Sofia’s chief minister in the 1680s (Hughes 1984; Sedov 2006; Bushkovitch 2001). In fact, the Miloslavskii government under Fedor, and then under Golitsyn during Sofia’s regency, initiated a number of modernizing reforms (Herd 2004; Stevens 2007). Conversely, when Peter eventually assumed power in 1689, he did so “with the support of those who embodied the Muscovite ‘conservative’ tradition: Patriarch Ioakim, the majority of the boyars, who had been alienated by Sophia’s patronage of Western influences, and with the passive support of the strel’tsy.” The “Naryshkin government,” which came to power in 1689 after Sofia’s regency was overthrown, did not pursue any notable modernization agenda; moreover, the Patriarch managed to push through a number of isolationist measures, such as the expulsion of Jesuits from Russia (Bushkovitch 2001).

Indeed, immediately after the overthrow of Sofia, the young Peter was effectively sidelined by the ruling boyar clique. His earlier experiences, however, made it imperative for him to assert his authority – if only for the sake of his personal security – and also provided him with the means of constructing an alternative base of support for his personal rule. The core of Peter’s future regular army was composed, famously, of his “play” troops that eventually became the first two guards regiments, the Preobrazhenskii and the Semenovskii. Their roots go back to the early 1680s, when the regency government moved the young co-tsar Peter, along with his mother the widowed Tsarina and their Naryshkin supporters, away from the Kremlin, to a suburban estate. It was there that Peter began building an ever-growing band of retainers, arming and training them as an infantry unit. Their drilling as “regular” troops by foreign experts in Russian service apparently began a year later, in 1687 or 1688. These units played an important role in Peter’s showdown with Sofia in 1689 and in putting down the strel’tsy mutiny in 1698. It was here, in these “play” regiments, that the young co-tsar could make appointments in total disregard of traditional societal norms: in a sense, they were an institutionalized oasis where he could begin to practice unrestrained personal rule. Indeed, these loyal troops became a key instrument of Peter’s personal power in a myriad of ways. In later years, officers of the guards were commissioned as investigators whenever gross abuses or treason were suspected; even low-rank guardsmen, NCOs or privates, were regularly dispatched as the tsar’s personal representatives to “monitor” or to “urge” generals and governors vastly senior to them in rank and aristocratic status. Membership in the guards became a highly sought-after distinction;
nearly all of Peter’s trusted lieutenants were former or active guardsmen, holding their ranks in the “ordinary” army or in civil administration alongside those of the guards (Herd 2004; Boltunova 2011).

These “play” regiments became a platform for forming what Paul Bushkovitch describes as the tsar’s “personal following, a motley crew formed of his personal servants, scions of aristocratic houses, foreign generals, and foreigners of less exalted rank, all of them composing much of the future elite of Peter’s reign” (Bushkovitch 2001:177) – a nucleus of his future winning coalition. Bushkovitch traces the origins of this circle to the early 1690s, but most of these people already surrounded the young tsar in the late 1680s and helped him prevail in the 1689 showdown. This “company,” a circle of followers, shared in the tsar’s youthful entertainments and expressed their shared identity and rejection of the status quo by following “foreign” fashions in dress and in the way they fraternized with each other. Foreign dress thus became an important symbolic expression of the followers’ affinities and the ruler’s commitment to including them in any future winning coalition. It was also around the same time (1691/92) that we find the first mention of the All-Drunken Assembly that brought together many of the same men. As Ernst A. Zitser demonstrated, the supposedly comical Assembly, in fact, played a key role in symbolically asserting the tsar’s transformative role and autocratic charisma. Membership in the Assembly eventually also came to imply entry into a circle of the loyal, of true believers in Peter as the Father of the Fatherland, while the Assembly’s rituals were also geared towards delegitimizing pre-Petrine status quo (Zitser 2004).

Peter’s subsequent reforms were driven both by his own distrust of old institutions and also by the efforts of the circle that supported and encouraged his quest for personal rule. According to Paul Bushkovitch, “Peter’s conscious decision to try to rule relying only on himself and his favorites was responsible for changes in Russian government and administration in 1699–1708, not lack of planning or an impersonal crisis of the state system” (Bushkovitch 2001: 213). Note that all Peter’s wars were explicitly wars of choice: both his Azov campaigns against the Ottomans and the war against Sweden were initiated by the tsar himself. The Ottoman war of 1695–96 in particular is a curious case, since an aggressive stance against the Ottomans had previously been the hallmark of the Miloslavskii-Golitsyn foreign policy opposed by the Naryshkin faction. That Peter embarked suddenly on this campaign must be viewed as a symbolical move away from under the tutelage of his own clan’s senior members. Both this war and the war against Sweden, which was declared right after a peace with the Ottomans had been
concluded, gave Peter and his companions numerous opportunities to disregard traditional administrative channels and societal norms and to claim resources and authority in the name of military needs. Rather than war driving his centralizing policies, it was the logic of securing his domestic domination that arguably drove the external wars.

**Qajar Persia: External Pressure Without Westernization**

In Persia, the first attempts to create Western-style military forces took place during the reign of Fath Ali Shah Qajar (r. 1797–1834). From his uncle Aga Muhhamad Khan (r. 1794–1797), the founder of the Qajar dynasty, Fath Ali inherited a traditional tribal army and a state that was truly minimalistic in terms of administrative infrastructure. Using these traditional forces, Aga Muhhamad Khan conducted a number of highly successful campaigns, including devastating raids into Russian-controlled Georgia, so radical military reform could have appeared less than urgent at first. From the 1790s onward, however, Russia began to actively expand into Transcaucasia, putting military and diplomatic pressure on the Qajars. In addition, the Ottomans, various tribal forces, and eventually the British in India also presented significant military threats. As a result, throughout the 19th century Qajar rulers repeatedly came under pressure from their neighbors and were forced to make painful and humiliating concessions.

Indeed, military reform began very early in the reign of Fath Ali Shah (r. 1797-1834). Characteristically, it was spearheaded by Abbas-Mirza (1789–1833), Fath-Ali’s son and the governor of Azerbaijan, who moved to create “new order” troops, *nizam-i jaded*, in his domain. These troops were organized and drilled according to European manuals by foreigners, including Russian deserters. In 1807, a French military mission of about 30 civil and military advisers arrived, and Abbas himself underwent training by French officers. The French withdrew when Napoleon and Russia signed a peace treaty, so a British mission numbering close to 50 members was summoned. By 1812, Abbas Mirza’s *nizam* included about 13,000 European-trained infantry, cavalry, and artillery. These military reforms were accompanied by technical and organizational innovations, including inoculation against smallpox, attempts to develop local manufacturing, and the establishment of an arsenal. Guns were produced locally after a French pattern, and young men were sent to study abroad. Abbas Mirza also attempted to go beyond technical and organizational innovations: he designed and tried to implement in Azerbaijan a new, centralized system of recruitment and taxation (Martin 1996; Cronin 2008; Hambly, 1991).
So far, this story reads like a straightforward vindication of the bellicist paradigm, as the province of Azerbaijan was a key battlefront in the wars against Russia, in which Abbas Mirza was to act as a commander-in-chief. And not only Abbas Mirza in his childhood in Tabriz, but also he cited Peter I as a model of a successful reformer. He was convinced of his country’s military weakness and genuinely committed to reform. However, there were also compelling domestic political reasons for Abbas Mirza to pursue European-style military reform. Qajar inheritance rules were highly flexible, which created opportunities for power struggles between princes, and, as historian Stephanie Cronin points out, “it was essential that the heir apparent possess sufficient armed strength to impose his claim to the throne against the inevitable challenges on the death of the shah. Like Selim III in the Ottoman empire and his successors, Abbas Mirza intended that a Europeanized army would reduce and finally eliminate his dependence on tribal and provincial chiefs and notables for the raising of military forces” (Cronin 2008: 204).

Thus, even though appointed the governor of Azerbaijan, traditionally the domain of a crown prince, Abbas Mirza was never officially proclaimed an heir to the throne nor was he the eldest son of Fath Ali. Indeed, throughout this entire period Abbas Mirza’s right to succeed his father was implicitly challenged by his elder brother Muhammad Ali Mirza, barred from succession because his mother was a Georgian concubine, not a Qajar princess. Just like Abbas Mirza, Muhammad Ali was building up his own army in Luristan and Khuzustan. He is usually considered a conservative, and his troops were predominantly tribal, yet he too possessed a small corps of regular infantry, set up cannon foundries in his domains, and employed Russian and other European renegades (Hambly 1991). Still, Muhammad Ali made efforts to incite opposition to Abbas Mirza from the ulema by presenting the latters’ nizam-i jaded as being contrary to the principles of Islam. Abbas, in turn, presented his military preparations against Russia as a jihad, as this allowed him to claim extra taxes (Algar 1969). At the end, Abbas Mirza died before his father and did not have an opportunity to use his nizam to support his claim to the throne. What is notable, however, is the total absence of support for his reforms from Fath Ali Shah, who did not attempt to build a strong modern army of his own despite Russia’s encroachment and let the troops built by his son disintegrate.

Further attempts at reform were undertaken during the long reign of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (r. 1848–1896) by two powerful chief ministers, Mirza Taghi Khan Amir-Nezam, a.k.a Amir Kabir (1807–1852), and Mirza Husayn Khan, Mushir al-Dawlah (d. 1881) (Karny 1973; Bakhsh 1978; Nashat 1982). Amir Kabir, of a very lowly social background, had risen up
through the service ranks and made himself indispensable to young Naser al-Din while the latter was still a crown prince and governor of Azerbaijan. With Naser al-Din’s accession to the throne, Amir Kabir quickly consolidated power: he assumed the titles of atabak (tutor, as in “tutor to the Shah”) and the offices of commander-in-chief and first minister were created specifically for him. During his short tenure he raised new nizam regiments, invited Austrian military advisors; developed the bunichah system of conscription, based on the one designed earlier by Abbas Mirza for Azerbaijan; and established a military and technical school, Dar al-Funun, staffed by European teachers (Cronin 2008). These activities were intertwined, not unexpectedly, with Amir Kabir’s efforts to strengthen the central administration, i.e. to expand his own powers. His efforts met with determined opposition from a wide variety of political forces. For example, in his attempts to rein in spending he restricted the payment of pensions, which caused unprecedented dissatisfaction in court circles. Eventually, Amir Kabir overplayed his hand and the Shah acceded to his rivals’ demands for the chief minister’s removal and execution (Amanat 1997).

In the 1870s, a new round of reforms was attempted by Mirza Husayn Khan, Mushir al-Dawlah, – the first official who had managed to consolidate in his hands the powers of a chief minister since Amir Kabir. Extensive plans for army reorganization were drawn up, which provided for the regulation of its budget, enforcement of conscription, and improved military education (Cronin 2008). Mushir al-Dawlah had significant experience of diplomatic service in Istanbul and was assisted and even encouraged to continue his reforms by officials with similar backgrounds abroad. The key element of his reform program was the establishment of a “modern,” i.e. centralized and functionally delineated, government. The cabinet, darbar-e a’zam, was supposedly drawing on European models, but whereas earlier reformers had argued that it was based on collective consultations and decision-making, with Mushir al-Dawlah’s ascent this line was changed: now Westernization meant strengthening the office of prime minister. Eventually, he consolidated in his hands a virtual monopoly on access to the Shah: not only did all communication between the ministers and the Shah go through him, but he even appointed the ministers (albeit with the Shah’s confirmation). Very soon, however, Mushir al-Dawlah was overthrown in a virtual coup staged by Qajar princes and rival officials jealous of his power: his self-strengthening reforms “agonized courtiers and ulema without building up a large body of partisans, and he failed to get reliable backing from the Shah” (Keddie and Amanat 1991: 186). The pretext was the so-called Reuter agreement (a broad economic concession granted to the British), even though many of the accusers were themselves signatories to that document (Bakhash 1978).
Naser al-Din himself was not a conservative: in fact, he repeatedly made traveled to Europe – a first for the Shah of Persia. However, in both cases the removal of the reforming minister led to the abandonment of reform. Surprisingly, despite a clear and present danger from Russia, no sustained effort at military reform was ever made under Naser al-Din. We might speculate whether the Shah preferred to rely on a strategy of balancing Britain and Russia against each other, or on the British guarantee (Hambly 1991). Yet the facts are clear: all by itself, significant external military pressure was not enough to break the existing balance of power and to spur the incumbent ruler on to a Westernizing revolution.

Curiously, the most comprehensive attempt at building an effective Western-style military in the later part of the 19th century was made not by the central government, but by prince Mas’ud Mirza Zill al-Sultan in his capacity as the governor of Isfahan. By 1886, his forces included two regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and three artillery batteries: they made a very favorable impression on a visiting Austrian military advisor by their demeanor, drill, and appearance, which sharply contrasted with those of the Shah’s own troops. Besides raising military units, the prince organized local production of weapons, ammunition, and cloth for uniforms and tents. A military school was set up for sons of the troopers, and a hospital and an arsenal were built. Barracks were constructed to house all the new troops in one place. Zill al-Sultan himself was not particularly liberal or Westernized: instead, his key motivation came from court competition. Even though barred earlier from succession by his father the Shah, he was still hoping to reverse his fortunes. According to a modern scholar, the reforms launched by the prince in Isfahan were a “crucial element to advance his political ambition and also had the goal of proving his talents and qualities to be superior to those of the current heir.” Eventually, he overplayed his hand and was dismissed – and his troops, the most modern and effective in Persia, disbanded (Walcher 2008: 79-87). By the end of Naser al-Din’s reign, after nearly a century of abortive attempts to build a modern military, the only effective and well-trained Western-style unit that the government maintained was the “Cossack” brigade, which was as much a function of its Russian commanding officers’ enterprising activity as of the fact that that the brigade was quartered in Tehran specifically to maintain security and internal peace around the capital (Kazemzadeh 1956). Eventually, the brigade played a key role in bringing to power the modernizing Pahlavi regime.

**Westernizations from Cairo to Kyoto**
This section draws on the experience of 19th-century Westernizing transformations in key extra-European powers, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, China, and Japan, in order to demonstrate how they might fit the proposed model. The focus in each case is on the interplay of “Westernizing” policies and elite politics: either the aspiring challengers moved to reform in the struggle for political survival or “Westernization” was enabled by the weakening of central authority to such a degree that regional power players could begin building up their own forces in order to confront rival magnates. Conversely, in none of these cases was a program of Westernizing reforms implemented by a politically stable regime; defense needs invariably took a back seat to maintenance of domestic political balance. In none of these cases, too, the conflict was between “conservatives” and “reformers”: rather, political alignments were shaped by clan and personal loyalties that cut across ideological divisions, such as they were.

Regime Breakdown and Reform

The most spectacular case of the collapse of central authority creating room for institutional experimentation was probably Muhammad Ali’s Egypt, where a fatal fragmentation of established elites allowed an upstart and outsider to make a bid for power. The Mamluks, who as a military corporation controlled the country during the preceding centuries, suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of Napoleon in the Battle of the Pyramids, their strength reduced by war against the French to just about 1,200 warriors. Central to the victory of Muhhamed Ali, initially an officer in the Albanian expeditionary contingent dispatched by the Ottomans to Egypt, was his ability to play the Mamluk factions of Uthman Bey al-Bardisi and Muhammad Bey al-Alfi off against each other, against other segment of local elites, and against the Ottoman government in Istanbul. Muhammad Ali’s final step towards consolidating unlimited power was, predictably, the physical elimination of what remained of the traditional military corporation of Egypt in the infamous Mamluk massacre of 1811 in the Cairo Citadel. It was this bloodbath that made the subsequent reform policies possible and, in a sense, inevitable, as a new force had to be created to fill the void (Marsot 1984; Fahmy 2009).

The road to the Meiji transformation of Japan was likewise opened up by political uncertainty and conflicts that resulted from a succession struggle within the Tokugawa dynasty. Undeniably, Commodore Perry’s visit (1852–54) and the subsequent negotiations with U.S. envoy Townsend Harris were a cause of very strong tensions and anxieties within the Japanese elite; and no less so was the shock of the Chinese defeat in the First Opium War (1839–42).
Central to the subsequent transformation, however, was the accession of the 13th Shogun, Tokugawa Iesada (r. 1853–58), who not only was young, physically weak, and ailing, but also died heirless, precipitating a succession crisis between two Tokugawa cadet houses. It was this rivalry that initiated a split within the larger Tokugawa clan and gave a greater political role to the Imperial court, as both sides appealed to it as a mediator. The choice of an underage candidate from the Kii branch, who succeeded as Tokugawa Iemochi, the 14th Shogun (r. 1858–66), initiated a period of regency, when rival parties jockeyed for power. This, too, provided further opportunities for the court to intervene and emboldened the so-called “outer” daimyo to challenge the Bakufu authority (most recently, Hillsborough 2014).

Conversely, in China even the disasters and humiliations of the Second Opium War (1856–60) did not drive the central government to adopt a modernizing policy. After 1864, when the war and the Taiping rebellion were over, there were many proposals for reform, but few attempts at modernizing from the center, as any such changes threatened entrenched interests and the domestic balance of power; maintaining this balance appeared more important for the survival of the dynasty. Thus, the central government did not disband the Eight Banners and the Green Standard forces, even though they showed themselves to be completely inadequate during the war and rebellion, and made very limited efforts to retrain them (Liu and Smith 1980, pp. 202-211). Prince Gong (1833-1898), who supported reform and pushed for modernizing measures, was constrained by court cliques and ultimately undermined in his efforts by Empress Dowager Cixi, wary of Gong’s potential accumulation of power (Kuo and Liu 1980).

In the Ottoman realm, the military setbacks suffered throughout the 18th-century, beginning with defeats at Slankamen and Zenta and the Peace of Karlowitz (1699), signaled the military and organizational weakness of the Ottoman Empire and led to a series of abortive reforms, including technological borrowings and some organizational innovations; yet, rather than risk radical institutional restructuring, the empire’s rulers resorted to “self-weakening expedients” and adopted a defensive stance in Central Europe for much of the century. Against this backdrop, Selim III (r. 1789–1807) was a rare example of an incumbent ruler who had actually attempted to move from technical borrowing and organizational innovations (which included training and equipping his “New Order” troops, nizam-ı Cedid, in a European style and with the help of foreign instructors) to institutional restructuring. As an incumbent ruler, Selim had to act within the confines of an inherited winning coalition. He attempted to maintain a balance of power within the elite by convening an advisory council in 1789 to elaborate on reform measures in an attempt to build a broad consensus behind them. However, even the most
radical reformers did not dare propose what they believed to be politically impossible, the disbanding of the Janissary cops, while the sultan himself resorted to splitting reformers into rival factions and playing them off against each other and against the conservatives. This, however, only undermined him in the longer run. Indeed, while the nizam troops were willing to fight for him, his own officials were not, deciding against “Muslims massacring other Muslims.” It was the overthrow of Selim, however, that opened up room for further feuds within the elite. Those who felt themselves to be on the losing side of the revolution, including the nizam survivors, formed the Rusçuk Committee and were instrumental in the attempt to restore Selim III (Shaw and Shaw 1976; Shaw and Shaw 1977; Aksan 2007; Uyar and Ericson 2009).

Mapping the Coalitions

The coalitions that brought about Westernizing transformations invariably formed not along preexisting social or ideological lines, but shaped up in the course of ongoing power struggle. In Egypt, Muhhamed Ali defied the Mamluks and Hursid Pasha, the new governor appointed by the sultan, by relying on his alliance with the populace of Cairo and shaykhs of al-Azhar, who could hardly be counted among the “reformist” or “Westernizing” forces; indeed, it was the ulema who proclaimed Muhhamed Ali the new ruler of Egypt. In the Ottoman case, Uyar and Ericson stress the role that the rivalries between various patron-client networks played in shaping the dynamics of reform attempts under Selim, when “the reforms themselves became a way to gain more power prestige, and income) (2009:121). Virginia Aksan notes the “spontaneous and fragile nature of Selim’s reform ‘party,’ a cobbled-together set of ideas which attracted adherents according to the self-interests of the parties involved” (Aksan 2007, p. 264; also Levy 1982). Neither were the members of the Rusçuk Committee especially “Westernized.” In particular, their leader Mustafa Alemdar Pasha, Serasker of Silistre, was not a reformer, but actually an opponent of centralization who resented the new government’s decision not to appoint him to the post of the Grand Vizier. At the same time, we already observe symbolic “Westernization” becoming an important element of power relations during Selim III’s reign, as imposing new uniforms on the traditional corps was seen by all the parties involved as an expression of dominance, – and was, as such, rejected by the troops, leading to a rebellion (Dunn 2011).

In Japan, there certainly had long existed a tradition of reformist intellectuals who advocated greater openness and called for studying Western technologies and methods of war;
and Japan also had a powerful and vocal nativist tradition (Jansen 2000; Sawle 2009). Yet the political fault lines that emerged in the 1850s–60s did not follow ideological alignments – quite the opposite. By the 1860s, the Bakufu certainly could not be described as a conservative camp; while it did include a number of die-hard nativists, it also launched a number of important modernizing initiatives, including the establishment of military schools, weapons factories, navy, etc. Their opponents the Loyalists, gathering under the Imperial banner, likewise included both the reformist samurai and conservatives who actually raged against the Bakufu for being too open towards the West. Naturally, the “foreign threat” was an extremely handy slogan for rallying opposition: Tokugawa’s enemies did not miss the chance to criticize the Bakufu for their inability to expel the barbarians – something that the Loyalists themselves, once victorious, never contemplated doing. The ensuing civil war was a “struggle of powers, not ideologies” (Beasley 1989:300; Hillsborough 2014: 17-18), and the anti-Bakufu coalition has been called “unnatural” (Totman 1980). It was only after winning the war that the victorious alliance had to think of a program for their government.

**Political Struggle and Military Experiments**

Finally, in all of these cases reforms were an extension of the challengers’ attempt to respond to political threats and to build a loyal security force. The Westernizing reforms of Muhhamad Ali in Egypt should be understood in the context of his drive to consolidate power. His first fiscal innovations were designed to undermine the power base of his potential opponents, i.e., Mamluk beys and the ulema, as well as tax-farmers. Thus, fellahin villagers after his reforms joyously retorted to their former masters that they were now “pasha’s peasants” (Marsot 1984: 140-143). The monopoly on external trade in cereals, sugar, and later in most other cash crops, as well as the taxation of waqf, were introduced before the creation of the new army, not as a response to defense needs (Masrot 1984:67-60; Fahmy 2009: 42): arguably, the new army was created to defend the centralization of revenue, and not the other way around. Indeed, a key element of Muhhamed Ali military policies was increasing the troops’ personal loyalty: initially, he planned to create an army of slaves, a traditional way of building a loyal force. It was only after the Ottomans cut off the supply of slaves from other parts of the empire and the use of black slaves from Sudan proved impracticable that he was forced to turn towards a “modern” idea of mass conscription of the fellahin peasants. To ensure his control over the troops, however, the officer corps continued to be recruited from among former slaves and other outsiders, such as Circassians (Fahmy 2009: 126-127). Not surprisingly, the wars fought by
Muhhamed Ali likewise reflected his domestic political priorities: thus, a campaign in Hijaz allowed him to ship away troublesome Albanians, while the expedition to Sudan (1820–21) was launched specifically to capture slaves for his army who would not be associated with social or political interests within Egypt.

In the Ottoman realm, the pattern of military reform driven by domestic political considerations can, in fact, be traced back all the way to the founding days of the empire. The Janissary corps that eventually became the key obstacle to reform was itself initially created in the 14th century in order to provide an independent power base for the ruler and as a counterweight to forces maintained by local warlords. As was the case with standing armies in Western Europe centuries later, the Janissaries were especially convenient for the sultan because of their recruitment model: raised and maintained in a centralized fashion, slave soldiers were supposed to be loyal directly to him, not to individual provincial magnates (Uyar and Erickson, 2009). Similarly, the creation of the timar cavalry based on conditional landholdings and thus answerable directly to the ruler was driven by the latter’s desire to limit his dependence on the Turkish aristocracy (Agoston 2011: 292). As historian Baki Tezcan emphasizes, an attempt by the ill-fated Osman II (r. 1618–22) to recruit an army made up of the sekban (mercenary infantry armed with muskets) was motivated by his desire to assert his absolutist claims against the limitations imposed on the sultan’s power by the service corporation of the Janissaries and other vested interests. This attempt to upset an existing balance of power by an incumbent sultan ended in 1622 in regicide (Tezcan 2010).

Events of the 18th and 19th centuries also fit this pattern. Virginia Aksan points out that Selim III’s policies were driven not only by external, but also by internal threats, both from the local notables-ayan and from the emerging Muslim heterodox movements that went as far as questioning the sultan’s status as the Caliph of Islam. In fact, she recognizes that “the internal challenge was more immediately pressing to the survival of the dynasty” (Askan 2007: 214; see also Ustun 2013). In Istanbul, the sultan’s authority was de-facto constrained by the Janissaries – hence his focus on recruiting in the countryside in order to build a force that would, above all, be loyal to him personally. Indeed, Selim’s advisors suggested recruiting nizam from among orphans and the rootless, landless poor, thereby creating “a real kul (slave) army, commanded by the slaves of the sultan.” The immediate purpose of the military initiatives of sultan Mahmud II, the author of the Tanzimat, were likewise driven by his domestic weakness. One of his first actions was to build a loyal force, called this time segban-i-Cedit; this force, in turn, was also destroyed by mutinous Janissaries in November 1808, further emphasizing the sultan’s
extremely tenuous hold on power. Mahmud II’s reform efforts for the next decade and a half were focused on turning small auxiliary units of the traditional corps, such as the Topçu and Arabaci (gunners and gun transporters), into an effective personal guard. Reaching about 15,000 to 20,000 in number by the mid-1820s, these units could hardly matter in the wars against the Russians or the Austrians; rather, their value was that they were disciplined and loyal and led by trustworthy officers (Shaw and Shaw 1977). It was with the help of these units that the sultan moved to destroy the Janissaries in the Auspicious Event of 1826. And, characteristically, this near-collapse of central authority was important not only because it pushed the sultan into action, but also because it enabled and stimulated experimentation by provincial warlords: according to Avigdor Levy, “some of the notables who resisted military reform by the state were themselves modernizing factors in their own realm” (Levy 1982:241). Indeed, even Selim III’s nizam had its origins in the experiments of Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha, who, late in 1791, organized for presentational purposes in his military camp a European-style training of a small number of renegades, prisoners of war, and his own private guards (Shaw 1965/1966).

In China, according to Peter Lorge, “Western incursions may have damaged the Qing regime's crumbling authority, but it was the accumulation of dissatisfaction among the general populace that was the real threat to the dynasty’s continued survival. Western governments were a problem, without being an existential threat” (Lorge 2008:169-170; also Kuo and Liu 1980). Instead, the key role in China’s attempts at self-strengthening belonged to competition between various warlords. As the Taiping rebellion severely undermined the central government, it opened up room for them to attempt to build up their own local power bases and experiment with different styles of warfare and types of military organization. The Taiping themselves formed regular military units and attempted to drill them (Lorge 2008), and it is as a response to them that new types of governmental military forces emerged, including the foreign-led ones (the Ever Victorious Army), as well as the forces built by local governors, such as the Hunan army and the Ahwei army, which tried to use new weapons and new tactics. Subsequently, the “Self-Strengthening” program of modernization was most actively pursued by those “vigorous generals” who played a key role in defeating the Taiping and emerged, as a result, as semi-independent barons in their provinces (Kuo and Liu 1980). These governors, especially in maritime regions, worked to build up their power base vis-à-vis local competitors and the center and experimented with modernizing their troops and even creating military academies, navies, and arsenals (Powell 1955; Liu and Smith 1980).
In Japan too, it was the competition between rival lords that drove them to experiment with modernization. To some extent, this was already the case in the early decades of the 19th century, well before Perry’s arrival: according to the historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki, once “one domain had begun to acquire Western military and metallurgical techniques, the dynamics of the Tokugawa system created a predictable chain reaction. [The domain of] Saga’s newly obtained knowledge was a disturbing element in the delicate balance of power between domains and Shogunate, and provoked a swift competitive response” (Morris-Suzuki, 1994:58). Later modernization programs were likewise initiated by powerful outer domains, such as Satsuma, that sought to improve their standing vis-à-vis their rivals (Lorge 2008; Taniguchi 2003). In the 1850s, the progressive collapse of the Bakufu authority created a power vacuum in which some key outer domains could experiment with Western technologies and warfare methods. It was the Loyalist faction in Choshu that first decided to draft peasants into their units in order to win a civil war within this domain. The Bakufu themselves, of course, attempted to do the same; among other things, they sought French support in constructing iron foundries to build ships and manufacture weapons, ordered rifled cannons, etc. In the Boshin war, not only did the pro-Imperial Choshu and Satsuma alliance rely on Western-style forces, but the Tokugawa (with its French-trained Denshutai units) and the northern alliance did so as well (Totman 1990; Hillsborough 2014; Gordon, 2003). Nor was this experimentation limited to the military sphere alone. As a matter of fact, by the mid-1860s the Bakufu leaders were already planning for a centralized government, which would have involved the conversion of han domains into prefectures – something that was actually implemented by their victorious opponents only a decade later (Hillsborough 2014:338). Needless to say, this reform, in Bakufu view, had to be implemented under their own leadership so as to strengthen their regime and undermine the insurgent daimyo. Note that even though “Westernization” was ostensibly driven by military considerations, it was not until the mid-1890s that the reformed Japanese army ventured abroad – and earlier calls for foreign military adventures were successfully defeated by the reformers. It was against the domestic enemy, its own fellow countrymen, that the new regular army had been fighting battles in the first decades of its existence.

Conclusion

As Peter Lorge pointed out recently, “guns did not cause institutional change, or at least not irreversible institutional change” (2008:10), Although early modern Westernizing
transformations in extra-European countries did result in the creation of regular military forces and the fiscal and administrative infrastructure necessary for their maintenance, these episodes should be understood within the context of domestic political struggles within these countries. Such reforms implied massive redistribution of resources and authority and were therefore politically costly for any ruler; the costs were especially high in extra-European societies, where these transformations involved the wholesale destruction of well-entrenched traditional service corporations. That is why incumbent rulers did not embark on such transformations even when facing serious external threat, as such reforms might be even costlier for them politically than military defeat. Indeed, in case after case, incumbents preferred to abandon their pursuit of aggressive foreign policy or even cede entire provinces to foreign powers rather than risk undertaking deep institutional restructuring necessary for military modernization.

In short, it appears that external military pressures alone might not have been enough to trigger “Westernizations.” Instead, these were enabled by breakdowns in domestic political balance in these countries and driven by power struggles between challengers emerging in the course of such breakdowns and their opponents. The way rulers came to power mattered for their subsequent willingness to modernize: challengers who had to fight for their survival on the way to the throne prioritized the creation of a loyal and effective force they could use to suppress their opponents. It was not by chance that in the early stages of their rule the supposed “modernizers” in Russia, the Ottoman empire, and Egypt all toyed with the idea of building a slave force. In their bid for power, the challengers were likely to reach out to those interested in changing the status quo, especially those outside of the traditional service corporations (including foreigners and relatively marginalized groups within the elites), and to experiment with new, foreign ways of training and fighting. It is not a secret, of course, that the episodes of Westernization in countries from Peter I’s Russia to Meiji Japan were marked by outbursts of intra-elite violence. This violence is usually interpreted – and this interpretation dates back to the Westernizers themselves – as driven by opposition to reform from the more conservative forces. However, instead of reforms provoking intra-elite struggles, it was the intra-elite conflict that provoked, enabled, and drove reform. And instead of “Westernizations” produced by strong central power we see reforms that take place when the central power nearly collapses, creating openings for such infighting. Once challengers came to power, Westernization provided them with a mechanism for expropriating resources and authority from their opponents and redistributing them among their supporters on new terms. Allegedly conducted in order to defend their country, it also served to legitimize such expropriation. Cultural “Westernization” here functioned as an important signaling device, visibly expressing the affinity between the
challenger and his followers and the latters’ loyalty and willingness to cast away their links with the traditional social order.

This interpretation, it should be noted, is not fully incompatible with the bellicist paradigm: Charles Tilly, after all, appears to view state-building as driven by efforts to monopolize coercion in a broad sense, and not exclusively by external wars. Moreover, the line between external and internal wars was likely to be blurred: should the struggle between Muhhamad Ali’s Egypt and the Ottoman government of the day be understood as a proper international conflict, or as an intra-elite struggle within the same polity? The same goes for the Chinese warlords of the late 19th century and the rival daimyo in Japan in the 1860s, who in many respects resembled the “warring states” of the German lands in the 17th-century. This actually fits well with the argument that China’s success in imposing Pax Sinica in South-East Asia might have stalled military and administrative innovation in the region as compared to the permanently fighting Western European states (Kennedy 1987, and most recently, Hoffman 2015): as soon as political control by the center broke down, conflict-driven innovation and experimentation ensued.

These observations also offer a way of reading radical reform episodes elsewhere. Discussion here has been limited to early modern Westernizing reforms in extra-European countries. Consider, however, that, at first glance, the Glorious Revolution in England would also fit this model. Developments in England could be described as an attempt by James II, an incumbent ruler, to move from technical and organizational innovations similar to those described above (inter alias, building a standing army for largely domestic political reasons, as external threats were met by the navy) towards institutional restructuring – and, in the end, failing to create a winning coalition willing to support the expropriation of authority and resources from the elite (Pincus 2009). More generally, Jan Glete also stressed the role of domestic conflict in launching the transition towards centralized fiscal-military states in Western Europe (Glete 2010: 311-314). The hypothesis regarding the unwillingness of incumbent rulers to embark on Westernization also fits recent findings of Daniel Treisman, who points out that 20th-century dictators were more likely to introduce liberal reforms, but also to intensify repressions, make major constitutional changes, even to initiate militarized interstate disputes in the first years of their rules (Treisman 2014). In that sense, the observations and case studies presented in this article might contribute to our understanding of the role of domestic power struggles as drivers of radical reform in general.
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