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**ACADEMIC LIFE**

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In This Issue:

A. Tatarkin, Ye. Andreyeva, A. Ratner: “Most developed countries have by now exhausted available measures to stimulate the economy (near-zero interest rates, high budget deficits, critical debt burden). The situation in Russia is fundamentally different: low level of government debt (by any criteria), no excessive debts of households, and the advantages of high-priced commodity exporter. Consequently, our country has a chance to pursue an active government policy aimed at stimulating social and economic development.”

A. Rubinstein, V. Muzychuk: “What do the experts see as the main problem preventing the development of modern Russian culture? The first place in the survey went to the ‘underestimation by the ruling elites of the strategic importance of culture for the successful modernization of society and economic growth.’”

V. Maslov: “To advance mathematical modeling of historical processes scientists must study the statistics of rebellions and mutinies, the emergence of pockets of discontent as well as the statistics of economic trends during revolutionary periods.”

D. Ofitserov-Belsky: “The national isolation of the USSR practically ended by the late 1920s. The country embarked on industrialization. It was clear that eventually the USSR would achieve full international recognition, join the League of Nations and probably increase its military and economic might. This would make it still more difficult for Warsaw to strike a political bargain with Moscow. Therefore the Polish diplomats were going out of their way to conclude an agreement with the USSR.”

Ye. Gushanskaya: “In some ways he (A. Volodin) reminds one of the American author Jerome David Salinger. One gets a feeling that Someone launched two versions, two incarnations of one and the same artist (something like Karmic twin soul mates) to have the second version as if in store, so that if something untoward happened at least one of them could fulfill the mission ordained from above.”

K. Troitsky: “...at every stage and to every idea of Lev Tolstoy Weber has an anti-idea: the ethics of persuasion is matched by the ethics of responsibility, ‘unworldly love’ is contrasted with worldly camaraderie, pacifism with heroism in war and responsibility for Machtstaat, and finally, the meaning of life with the meaning of death.”

A. Lukin: “While the fight for liberalization in present-day Russia has been monopolized by the politeiaclasts and primitive Westernizers unconcerned with
Russia’s national goals..., the fight for the Russian national goals has been actually monopolized by the supporters of a dictatorship. The latter tendency has been manifested with particular clarity against the background of events in Ukraine... People should be offered a third way that will meet the aspirations of the majority.”

V. Konnov: “This point of view warrants a hypothesis that the scientific community’s practices are shaped by values shared by its members who generate them under the influence of two value systems simultaneously—the world science and a national culture, which in the process of professional training merge into a national scientific research culture.”

Ye. Danilova: “The theme of winners and losers is clearly articulated at times of cardinal change... ‘Winners and losers’ is an ideological construct that influences people’s identity and behavior and creates ideas about success. This dichotomy is placed in the sphere of the struggle for symbolic dominance... is established in public space by various ideological sides thus maintaining the discourse.”
Imperatives of Current Economic Development: World Trends and Russian Reality

Aleksandr TATARKIN, Yelena ANDREYeva, Artyom RATNER

The world economy in the 21st century is witnessing fundamental changes caused by the redistribution of economic influence on a global scale: on the one hand, the leading economic centers are losing ground and, on the other hand, the geopolitical role of some countries in the “periphery” is growing. Some believe that we are looking at processes that signify a change of epochs, the need to design a new postcrisis system and a new growth model in the changed conditions (described as New Normal), which rules out the possibility of a return to the precrisis conditions of the development of the world and national economy.

Posterisis Recovery of the World Economy:
New Role of Developing Countries

The world economy is recovering from the 2008-2009 crisis and its aftermath. True, it is hard to assess the depth of the crisis phenomena due to imperfect methods of measuring the economic growth indicators. Thus, according to the IMF (Table 1), the world gross product declined most dramatically (by 5.5%) on GDP in current prices, while in constant prices it dropped by a mere 0.6%. World GDP according to PPP (purchasing power parity) in fact increased in 2009 on 2008 by 0.001%.

GDP dropped substantially above all in the developed countries (−3...−5% in the G7), while in the group of the 8 biggest developing countries GDP dropped only in one half of the countries, with the biggest fall in Mexico (−6%) and Russia (−7.8), while the other countries reported significant growth: 9.2% in China,
5% in India, and 4.6% in Indonesia. Beginning from 2010 GDP growth in all the countries within that group was considerably higher than the world average ensuring positive dynamics of economic growth in the world of 10.6% in 2011 against the background of insignificant GDP growth in 2010-2013 in some developed G7 countries and continuing decline in Japan (–0.6% in 2011), Italy (–2.4% in 2012) and negative growth in France (–0.1% according to the forecast for 2013).

Table 1
GDP Dynamics in National Currency in Constant Prices
(in % to the previous year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013 (forecast)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries, G7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>–4.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>–3.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>–3.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>–0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>–5.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>–5.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>–2.4</td>
<td>–1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>–5.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>–0.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biggest fast-growing countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>–0.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>–6.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>–7.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>–1.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World as a whole, in USD</td>
<td>–0.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World, current prices, in USD</td>
<td>–5.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World, PPP, in USD</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013.

All this attests to the emerging trend in the world economy that sees a change of the balance between the world economic center and the world economic periphery as some countries in the latter group acquire “previously uncharacteristic economic power and geopolitical significance.” Economic growth is focused in the biggest developing countries (Table 2).
Table 2

GDP Growth in Developed and Developing Countries in 2001-2012 (times)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developed countries (G7)</th>
<th>Major developing countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: see Table 1; our own calculations.

While the crisis in the EU and the USA was quite sharp, most notably manifesting itself in the growth of government debt, in the SCO (The Shanghai Cooperative Organization) and BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)—the consequences of the crisis were felt far less. Thus, in 2007-2012, the total government debt in Germany grew from 65 to 82% of GDP, in France from 64 to 90, and in the USA from 66 to 107% (calculated from IMF data). In 2010, the share of the developing countries in the structure of the world GDP (according to PPP) was 45%, in the structure of world export, 40%, and import 38%, in the structure of the world industrial exports, 70% (versus 12% in 1960), in the structure of foreign direct investments (FDI) 45% (versus 26.8% in 2007), in the outflow of FDI, 21% in 2009 (compared with 6% in 1985), in the structure of foreign assets of transnational companies, 9% (compared with 1.1% in 1995).4

The developing countries are in the upward wave of the economic cycle, with the biggest of them having some advantages for keeping up economic growth in the future:

— abundance of resources and accordingly great potential of economic development. Thus, while the EU and NAFTA (The North American Free Trade Agreement) possess 7.1 and 6.5% of world human resources respectively, the SCO and BRICS have 21.0 and 41.8% respectively; while the EU and NAFTA account for 2.3 and 4.9% of the world gas reserves, the SCO and BRICS account for 26.9 and 25.8% respectively; while the share of the EU and NAFTA in the world iron ore reserves is 2.8 and 6%, that of the SCO and BRICS is 27.8 and 52.9% respectively;5

— the major developing countries in producing their GDP and getting IRR (Internal Rate of Return), save much of it channeling it into accumulation. This economic development strategy is called the Asian systemic accumulation cycle.6
The common interests of the SCO and BRICS are being institutionalized while the global regulatory mechanisms created under the Bretton Woods system (IMF and the World Bank) are becoming less effective. The world financial and economic crisis has shown that a new architecture of global economic regulation including the developing countries (for example in the G20 format) is needed. Another important feature of the recent decades is the increased role, in the world economy, of the financial sector which has come to dominate the real sector. The recent crisis marked a watershed in the development of global economic management revealing the inefficiency of the world economic management system based on the subjugation of the real sector to the financial-speculative one.7

The Emergence of the Postindustrial World

The world economy is becoming less and less industrial; while the share of agriculture and industry is falling, that of the tertiary sector—the services—is rising. The change is characteristic both of the world as a whole and of the developed and developing countries (Table 3).

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP Structure in Developed and Developing Countries (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major fast-growing developing countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: our calculations based on Central Intelligence Office data, 2013.

The leaders in the share of the tertiary sector in the structure of the GDP are the USA (79.7%) and Great Britain (78.5%). Great Britain and Ireland are the leaders in deindustrialization. By contrast, in Germany the postindustrial real sector is developing through the introduction of the “New Normal” economy
achievements in the traditional sectors such as engineering, chemistry, energy, etc.\textsuperscript{8} Germany entered the world economic crisis on the wave of the new industrialization. It pays special attention to the development of new, nontraditional energy sources, and ecological aspects of industry and vital activities and social protection of its citizens.

The German alternative energy market is booming. The company Roth & Rau, located in a small town in Saxony (a spectacular example of new industrialization of Eastern Germany), is a “hidden champion,” the absolute world leader in the production of modular lines for cutting silicon crystals.\textsuperscript{9} It is not by chance that the term “hidden champions” was coined in Germany although its author\textsuperscript{10} believes that such hidden champions exist in many countries—small companies that create unique markets with their own rules of the game, which often gives them 100% dominance in these markets.

Among the developing countries the highest share of services is in Brazil (68.5\%) and India (65\%). In Russia the tertiary sector accounts for 58.4\%, so it is more similar to the German development model (the share of industry in these countries is 37.5 and 30.5\% respectively). China has an even greater share of the industrial sector, which accounts for 45.3\% of GDP, i.e., more than the services sector (44.6\%). That is why it plays the role of the world’s “industrial workshop.”

Changes in the GDP structure have influenced the labor and education markets. The character of labor has changed as the intellectual component has become more important. New forms of employment have appeared: part-time employment, daily or weekly, outsourcing (use of nonstaff freelance and distance workers), virtual forms of employment, etc. This leaves more time for self-education and skills upgrading (lifelong education is a growing concept), for sport, tourism and recreation, which in turn stimulates the corresponding services sectors and boosts employment in them.

The postindustrial economy must be more “real”, i.e., the development of the services and the “New Normal” economy sphere should be oriented toward the traditional, or real economy. Innovation should be harnessed to production or to enhancing the human condition, i.e., be socially oriented. The state should set the priorities of postindustrial economy through its policies in the scientific-technical, industrial, environmental, social fields, etc.

\textbf{The New Industrialization}

In the development of the new industrial economy an increasingly important factor is intangible intellectual assets that can be parlayed into innovations and contribute to the modernization of the national economy. In the early 21st century the developed Western countries had concentrated 90\% of the world scientific potential and controlled 80\% of the global high technology market worth $2.5—3 trillion, which was more than the estimated value of the market of raw materials and energy resources. Exchange of patents, licenses, know-how and industrial specimens is the most dynamically growing aspect of trade in tech-
nologies which increased from $50 billion in the early 1990s to $500-700 billion in the early 2000s.11

Among the biggest fast-growing economies this trend is most visibly manifested in China. Back in 2006, the State Council of the PRC proclaimed innovation to be a new national strategy and the country is gradually evolving from “the world workshop” into “the world laboratory,” i.e., innovation-driven economy.

Chinese higher education centers were turning out four times more engineers than those in the US as early as 2009. In 2004, China outstripped the USA to become the world’s biggest exporter of information and communications technologies ($180 billion).12 On the whole, in 2001-2011 it far outpaced other countries, including developed countries, in terms of scientific-technological development: its gross domestic spending increased by 5.19 times (against 1.61 times in the world and 1.74 times in Russia); the number of scientists increased by 74.2% (compared with 22.3% in the OECD, and a drop of 12.3% in Russia); the export of high-tech products increased sixfold (compared with 63% in the world and by almost 3 times in Russia).13

Another new industrialization success story is Kazakhstan which has been implementing a crash industrial innovation program since 2010. It has already yielded early results: in 2011, the fastest growth was registered in the processing industry (18.6%) which for the first time developed faster than the mining industry; export of manufactured products grew significantly; more than 400 new production facilities were built and 136 projects implemented in 2010-2012.14

In Russia, too, the need to coordinate scientific-technical, innovative and industrial policies is recognized. A. Frolov15 points out that the world trends of the growing role of the technological factor in the modern economy and greater role of the state in science and technology development contribute to the spread of innovative policy in the broad sense in the three abovementioned areas of state policy.

The Russian regions will also inevitably opt for science and technology development. Thus, in the period until 2050 the Far East may develop according to one of two scenarios: the first envisages conservation of the current structural-technological parameters and the second, modernization of the economic structure on the basis of technological innovations and implementation of the concept of new industrialization which would combine technological and economic programs in the production and functional sectors and offer favorable conditions for internal institutional transformation and facilitate integration into the world economy.16

However, in spite of all the efforts Russia has not yet embarked on the path of innovation-driven development. Many of the plans in this field have not been implemented. The comparatively high level of patent activity in the Russian industry (170 patent applications per 1 million citizens in the early 21st century) puts Russia on a par with the most developed countries, but has not yet led to profound technological shifts. In the early 21st century, only 2% of innovations were introduced in the Russian industry. Intellectual products account for only about 3% of the total value of export (compared with more than 5% in Brazil and 25% in China). The RF is competitive in the nuclear technologies market, in space technology and services and some types of electronics.17 But on the whole
Russian export is dominated by commodities. Table 4 compares Russia and Germany in terms of the world innovation index and its components.

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World innovation index</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human capital and research</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and technology generation</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patents of residents</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest-tech and medium-high-tech enterprises</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of new knowledge</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-tech export (less re-export)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer and information services export</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative goods and services</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative goods export</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Dutta, Lanvin, 2013, pp. 177, 236.

The **High-Tech Strategy for Germany until 2020** (*Hightech-Strategie für Deutschland-2020*) envisages a combination of the following factors:

— identifying priority areas of science whose development “contributes to the creation of new jobs and prosperity of the state.” These include 17 areas, including nano-, bio-, micro- and optical technologies;

— upgrading the interaction between scientists and businessmen, development of the grants system;

— speeding up the introduction of developments, creation of new financing instruments in the least bureaucratic form and subsequently reform of the tax system. An additional target is improving the funding of new venture projects through bank loans or investors’ capital;

— improving the terms of financing small and medium-sized innovation businesses.

Spearhead research in Germany (one of the leaders in the innovation sphere) is to be organized in the framework of the so-called “Projects of the Future” that pursue specific technological development goals for the next 10-15 years. The key elements of the German policy in the field of science are the **Higher School Pact** (*Hochschulpakt 2020*), **The Cluster Initiative**, and **The Research and Innovations Pact** (*Pakt für Forschung und Innovation*).18
The Russian scientific-technical policy model is similar to the German one. Thus, in December 2013 the Russian Government adopted The Forecast of the Scientific and Technological Development of the RF Until 2030 which identifies intersectoral thematic scientific and technical areas that can make the biggest contribution to national security, speeding-up economic growth, increasing the country’s competitiveness, the solution of social problems by developing the technological base of the economy and science-intensive industries. In 2014, the RF Government made a list of 16 priority scientific targets in line with the science and technology development priorities approved by Presidential Decree No. 899 of 7 July 2011. It was announced in early 2014 that Russian science would in future be financed by grants, and not by the budget although the system of instruments and mechanisms of such transition have yet to be developed.

All talk about creating conditions for financing small and medium-sized enterprises has not yet led to any practical outcomes. Beginning from 2006 attempts have been made to create a favorable tax environment to stimulate research and innovative activities, but one has to admit that the tax benefit instruments have been ineffective.

Considering the strategic importance of science and technology policy today it is necessary to study the experience of advanced countries. However, foreign mechanisms and instruments should not be transposed or grafted, but adapted and interpreted with due account of the specificities of the Russian economy and science. Successful modernization of the Southeast Asian countries has been based on a marriage of national identity and innovation.19

An Industrial Policy for Russia: Private-Public or Public-Private Partnership?

The institution of partnership between the state and business makes it possible to implement industrial and infrastructure projects which, owing to their scale and social significance, cannot be financed by one of the parties. The model is indispensable in crisis periods when budgets tend to be sequestered, but the state still has to meet its social obligations to its citizens.20

The experience of partnership between the state and business in other countries shows that is makes it possible to conduct internal mobilization during certain periods and implement breakthrough projects. Let us cite some examples.

Public-private partnership in the shape of the KfW investment and credit bank in Germany after World War II when substantial resources were needed to restore the economy and meet the priority targets of a social market economy enabled the German state to act as a guarantor and put up part of the financial resources. The other part was raised by pooling the financial resources of major banks and financial institutions to finance key projects of the German economy, including export credits for German producers and foreign buyers of German products, which in turn made Germany a leading world exporter.

China has some useful experience in creating high-tech zones, economic and technological development zones with special tax, customs and visa arrange-
ments, joint research centers aimed at attracting foreign investments and high technologies. For example, the Tianjin development zone consisting of the industrial production and new technologies zones, an international airport and sea port accounts for nearly half of the city budget of Tianjin.21

Opportunities are broadening for financing major international projects that are important for a country’s economy or internationally financed projects. One example is transport and energy infrastructure development projects being implemented under the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program.22

If the state plays the leading role in partnership with business it determines the interconnection of various aspects of state policy—international, foreign economic, including export, industrial, innovative, environmental, social, budget, financial and other areas. The approach that takes into account all these areas of policy and the main socioeconomic priorities, goals, tasks and development mechanisms can be seen as an analog of the planning system in the USSR. A specialized structure similar to Gosplan can conduct indicative planning, monitoring and assessment of the results of plan fulfillment. The academic community has long been mooting the issue of creating a single agency—the Ministry of State Taxes—responsible for collecting all the taxes and duties in the country that would control the granting and assess the effectiveness of tax benefits.23

In November 2012 the RF State Duma passed the first reading of the Law “On State Strategic Planning” that envisages consolidation of disparate resources and efforts of all the economic agents, coordination of actions to achieve development goals between the federal and regional governments, business and society. The first reading of the draft Law “On Public-Private Partnership (PPP)” was passed on 26 April 2013. Creating conditions for effective PPP functioning has been singled out as a key area in the St. Petersburg declaration of G20 leaders.24

Most developed countries have by now exhausted available measures to stimulate the economy (near-zero interest rates, high budget deficits, critical debt burden). The situation in Russia is fundamentally different: low level of government debt (by any criteria), no excessive debts of households, and the advantages of high-priced commodity exporter.25 Consequently, our country has a chance to pursue an active government policy aimed at stimulating social and economic development.

NOTES
1 The article was prepared with the support of Program No. 12-M-127-2049 “Entropic-Probabilistic Approach to Description of Risk, Degradation and Sustainable Development of Critical Infrastructure Network.”
4 Ibid.

6 A. Ayvazov, “Results of the BRICS Summit in Delhi,” Mezhdunarodnaya ekonomika, 2012, No. 6, pp. 70-75.


9 Ibid.


17 V. Kharlamova, N. Filimonova, op. cit.


24 www.kremlin.ru/raedia/events/files/41d48a73994e28b71688.pdf


Translated by Yevgeny Filippov
Two characteristics of culture give it the status of a key element of the social system.

First, it accumulates centuries-old experience: the vast majority of values currently accepted in the country were created in the past, sometimes in the distant past, and they largely determine its future development.

Second, it is culture that molds human beings themselves, creates internal motivations for their behavior, and thus directs current and future changes in the country, helping to establish an open and rule-of-law society and promoting civil accord.

Culture itself has three unique resources: the creative potential of its creators, accumulated and developed from generation to generation; the cultural heritage, which is the result of the work of creators; and cultural traditions, materialized in the population’s interest in cultural values. The lack of immediate results demands from society to take special care of culture, protecting the accumulated cultural potential and pursuing a sensible state policy. But unless we provide the necessary conditions for the functioning of culture, these strategic resources of Russia may be lost within two or three generations. There is ample evidence of this.

History matters! In one of its dramatic moments, when the authorities were engaged in habitual ideological-patriotic “injections” into literature and the arts, they started an “optimization” of theatrical activity. A resolution issued by the USSR Council of Ministers on 4 March 1948 (No. 537) On a Reduction of State

A. Rubinstein, D. Sc. (Philosophy), professor, First Deputy Director of the Institute of Economics, RAS; head of the Art Economics Department at the State Institute of Art Studies; V. Muzychuk, D. Sc. (Economics), head of the Department of Social Sphere Efficiency at the Institute of Economics, RAS; leading research fellow at the Art Economics Department, State Institute of Art Studies; member of the Council on State Cultural Policy under the Chairman of the Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly. This article was published in Russian in the journal Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost (ONS), No. 6, 2014.
Subsidies to Theaters and Measures to Improve Their Financial Performance, began with the following words: “The Council of Ministers of the USSR considers that the practice established in theaters when the main source of funding for their activities is not income from the sale of tickets but subsidies granted to theaters from the state budget is wrong and pernicious.” The operative part of the document was even harsher: “In order to eliminate parasitic practices in the operation of theaters, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decrees:

1. As from 15 March, 1948, to end state subsidies for theaters under All-Union, republican and local jurisdiction and switch them to full self-financing in accordance with Annex No. 1.

2. To reduce subsidies and maintain them, as an exception, only until 1 January, 1949, for the theaters listed in Annex No. 2.

3. As from 15 March, 1948, to maintain subsidies from the state budget for 1948 for the theaters listed in Annex No. 3.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Resolution, to reduce the total amount of state budget subsidies to theaters projected for 1948 from 735 million rubles to 312 million rubles.”

Under that notorious decision, subsidies to theaters were cut by more than half. Eleven months later, it was followed by another resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers (No. 560 of 6 February, 1949), which slashed the annual amount of subsidies to theaters to 154.9 million rubles, once again reducing it by half. The effects of these “Stalin’s blows” were felt for a long time. The measures “to end state subsidies and switch theaters to full self-financing” led to the closure of many theaters, whose network shrank by almost half by the mid-1950s.

It took many years, a great effort and a vast amount of resources for Russian theatrical culture to regain lost positions. For example, 30 years later, in 1985, total attendance at Russian theaters was almost 70 million, or about 500 visits per 1,000 population. The situation with philharmonic activities was roughly similar: in 1985, attendance at classical music concerts was 80 million, or almost 650 visits per 1,000 population. The results of museum activities can also be seen as successful: an attendance of 78 million, or about 550 visits per 1,000 population. By the beginning of perestroika, the figures for educational activities were also high: in 1985, the number of books borrowed from Russian libraries reached 9.5 thousand per 1,000 population, and club attendance was more than 1.5 thousand visits per 1,000 population.

Thus, history does indeed matter. In this context, let us analyze cultural activities for the last 30 years: from 1985 to 2014.

Input Data

This refers to the data on the development of the cultural sector and the activities of cultural organizations subordinate to the Ministry of Culture of the
Russian Federation, with 30-year time series of such data (for 1985-2014) taken from the archive of the State Institute of Art Studies, including the following materials of departmental statistics: *Key Development Indicators for Branches of Culture for 1985; Key Development Indicators for Branches of Culture for 1989-1990; Economic Performance Indicators for Theaters and Concert Organizations of the RSFSR for 1985 and 1990; Performance Indicators for Libraries for 1990-1991; Performance Indicators for Cultural Education Institutions for 1990-1991; and Performance Indicators for Cultural Education Institutions for 1985-1990.*

Data on the activity of cultural organizations from 1995 through 2012 are contained in statistical yearbooks published by the Main Information and Computer Center of the RF Ministry of Culture: *Theaters of the Russian Federation in Figures; Concert Organizations/Companies and Circuses in Figures; Museums and Zoos of the Russian Federation in Figures; Public Libraries of the Russian Federation in Figures; and Leisure Institutions of the Russian Federation, Parks of Culture and Leisure in Figures.*

The amounts of funding for the arts and culture in the period from 1991 to 2012 were calculated based on the data published in the *Statistical Yearbook of Russia* in the “Finance” section (public finance/RF consolidated budget expenditures for social and cultural purposes), and also the data on the execution of the RF consolidated budget published on the website of the Russian Federal Treasury. Data on budget funding for the arts and culture in the subjects of the Russian Federation (RF subjects) are taken from the “Statistics” section (consolidated budget data) on the website of the Ministry of Culture of Russia.

- **Theaters.** It is a commonplace that there is no theater without an audience. Unfortunately, attendance at theaters has sharply declined over the last 30 years. **The total consumption of theater services has fallen by more than half:** from 70 million visits in 1985 to 33 million in 2012. The picture for visits to the theater per 1,000 population is just as bleak: this indicator has also fallen by more than half, from 487 visits in 1985 to 234 in 2012.

  Russian dramatic art has reached a juncture where the risks of passing the point of no return have significantly increased. We can identify two waves of falling attendance. The first one was in 1985-1995, when theater attendance decreased 2.3-fold: from 487 to 213 visits per 1,000 population. It was followed by a second wave, when attendance declined from 213 visits in 1995 to 191 in 2005. This negative trend showed signs of reversing only after 2005 with a one to three percent increase in attendance. But it is always more difficult to recover lost ground and bring audiences back to the theaters. This requires very significant resources. It should be emphasized that the slight increase in attendance (both absolute and relative) after two decades of negative dynamics was due to an increase in budget funding for the arts and culture in the Russian Federation.
- **Concert organizations.** The figures for concert organizations and independent companies show an even more dramatic situation: attendance at classical music concerts has decreased almost 4.5-fold (sic!). For example, philharmonic concert attendance fell from 90 million in 1985 to 20 million in 2012. The relative indicators for classical music (attendance rates) are also purely negative, showing a decline from 627 visits to philharmonic concerts per 1,000 population in 1985 to only 141 visits in 2012.

  In these decades of radical changes in the country’s political, organizational and economic spheres, the musical performance arts have experienced the already mentioned two waves of falling attendance, with audiences shrinking like the magic chagrin skin. The first wave (1985-1995) brought a four-fold decrease in philharmonic concert attendance, and the second wave (1995-2005), a further one-third reduction. From 2005, as in the case of theaters, there was a barely perceptible and very uncertain trend towards growth. A rise to 148 visits per 1,000 population in 2010 was followed by a downturn to 131 visits in 2011. Here, too, we can speak of losses that are costly and difficult to recover.

- **Museums.** The situation with museum attendance is more optimistic, although the drop in the total consumption of museum services that occurred in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century has not yet been overcome. For example, the total number of museum visits in 1990 was almost 90 million, and in 2012 it was more than 86.5 million. As for museum attendance per 1,000 population, the figure for 2012 was 607 visits, slightly exceeding the 1990 level of 601 visits per 1,000 population.

  From 1990 to 2000, museum attendance also tended to decline, and the trend was reversed only in 2000. Up to 2012, however, this was a catch-up growth. It was only in 2012 that attendance at Russian museums reached the level of 1990. But if we include average attendance (per museum) in our analysis of museum activities, we will find that it fell from 83.7 thousand per museum in 1985 to only 34.0 thousand in 2012. In other words, average attendance per museum has decreased almost 2.5-fold. And there is no sign of any change in this trend.

- **Libraries and leisure institutions.** Cultural education institutions—libraries and clubs—have suffered probably the heaviest losses in the last 30 years. Even the total number of libraries has fallen in this period by nine thousand: from 49,234 in 1985 to 40,238 in 2012. With such an unprecedented reduction in the library network, the consumption of library services measured by circulation (book loans) per 1,000 population has naturally declined as well. In 1985, the figure was 9,444 books per 1,000 population, and in 2012, 7,958 books, which means a reduction of almost 1,500 book loans.
Similar “man-made” dynamics are characteristic of club institutions, whose network has been reduced in this period in all agencies and departments. **The total number of leisure institutions has fallen by almost 15 thousand:** from 57,954 clubs in 1985 to 43,018 in 2012. Club attendance has also fallen.

Data on the number of visits to leisure institutions are available only since 1995, which is why it is impossible to compare their activity with Soviet times. But even in the 17 years from 1995 to 2012, attendance at these institutions decreased 1.7-fold: from 1,340 visits per 1,000 population in 1995 to 788 in 2012.

**Declining Consumption Trends of Cultural Goods**

A general analysis of statistical data shows that in the last 30 years, in the period of system transformations, modernizations and optimizations, there has been a clear downward trend in the consumption of cultural goods. This is due not only to the obvious under-funding of culture, but also to other reasons. One of these is that the decline in attendance at theaters, philharmonic concerts, libraries and clubs is caused by a decline in the demand for these kinds of cultural goods caused by the widening range of opportunities for leisure in Russia and increasing competition for people’s spare time and money.

The spread of mass culture with a simultaneous increase in at-home forms of art consumption—the development of television in the 1970s, of audio and video products in the 1980s, and of computer games, the Internet and social networks in the late 20th and early 21st centuries—is a fundamental trend that has determined the negative dynamics of the consumption of “live art” in Russia and the developed European countries. And although in this decline in attendance Russia was only “catching up” with the developed countries of Europe (where this trend appeared earlier, developed slower and had a milder effect), the rate of decline in the consumption of cultural goods turned out to be so high that towards the end of the 20th century Russia actually lost the leading position it had occupied in Soviet times. The abovementioned slight growth of the last decade has not changed the overall situation. This is evident from theater attendance statistics (see Table 1).

Two great civilization processes—globalization and rapid diffusion of computer, information and communication technologies—have transformed the institutional environment in a fundamental way, changing the value orientations and behavior patterns in Russian society which influence artistic preferences and the demand for cultural goods. Let us note that Russia’s distinctive feature—its traditional orientation towards artistic values—turns the rapid decline in attendance into a very alarming signal. If society remains “neutral” towards such a state of affairs and does not take purposeful action to correct cultural behavior, our country may lose one of its strategic resources which ensure the growth of its human capital.
The declining consumption of cultural goods in Russia, with its vast territory, harsh climate and low population density throughout the greater part of the country, is also fraught with other “worries”: regional disparities and growing inequality in access to and consumption of cultural goods.

### Regional Disparities and Inequality

Clearly, absolute equality in public access to culture in all Russian regions is impossible and probably unnecessary. Cultural activity has its own peculiarities in spatial diffusion. At the same time, one cannot help noticing the critically wide regional disparities that have emerged in the last three decades. For example, the highest level of theater attendance in 2012 was recorded in Moscow and St. Petersburg (594 and 568 visits per 1,000 population, respectively), and the lowest, in the Chechen Republic (34.6 visits). In other words, that year there was a more than 17-fold difference between the regions in theater attendance per 1,000 population.

The pattern of attendance at performances of concert organizations and independent companies also shows obvious regional differences. In 2012, the highest level of attendance for concert organizations was recorded in Belgorod Region (*Oblast*) with 800 visits per 1,000 population, and the lowest, in Altay Territory (*Kray*) with 46 visits. In other words, inequality in public access to classical music has also exceeded a 17-fold level. Museum attendance demonstrates even wider disparities: in 2012, the number of visits to museums per 1,000 population in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic was more than 65 times lower (sic!) than in the capital cities.

“For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.” This verse from the Gospel of Matthew best describes the process of transfor-

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**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Visits per 1,000 population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia 1970</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 1985</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria 2012</td>
<td>427</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy 2012</td>
<td>327</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany 2012</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 1995</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 2012</td>
<td>234</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
mation of inequality in the consumption of cultural goods into imbalances in funding Russian regions. For example, the share of expenditures on the arts and culture in the gross regional product (GRP) in 2012 varied from 0.38% in Chelyabinsk Oblast (without autonomous districts) to 2.77% in the Chechen Republic. And the share of expenditures on the arts and culture in the consolidated budgets of RF subjects in 2012 ranged from 1.98% in the Karachay-Cherkess Republic to 5.34% in the Republic of Mordoviya.

It should be noted that in 34 regions the share of expenditures on the arts and culture in the consolidated budgets of RF subjects was below the national average. Even greater inequality in 2012 was recorded for another indicator of financial support for cultural activities: in 53 regions of Russia, per capita expenditures on the arts and culture in the consolidated budgets of RF subjects were below the national level of 1,792 rubles per inhabitant.

Funding for the Arts and Culture

The fact that most cultural organizations cannot support themselves without outside assistance, their objective inability to self-support even under the market conditions, delayed social effect, and lack of immediate results require society to finance the creation, dissemination, preservation and consumption of cultural goods, ensuring normal conditions for cultural activities. Statistics show that in the almost 20 years of Russian sovereignty, expenditures on the arts and culture have not changed to any significant extent either as a share of GDP or as a share of total consolidated budget expenditures. The cultural sector continues to be financed “from the achieved level,” regardless of its actual need for support and further development. In the period from 1991 to 2012, expenditures on culture and cinema (excluding mass media) ranged from 0.4% to 0.7% of GDP, and their share in the total expenditures of the RF consolidated budget, from 1.5% to 1.9% (see Table 2).

Expenditures on culture and cinema as a percentage of GDP were highest in 2009: 0.67%. In subsequent years, they tended to decline: to 0.54% of GDP in 2012. The maximum percentage of these expenditures in the RF consolidated budget in that period was 1.89% in 2005. Let us emphasize that positive changes in the dynamics of consumption of cultural goods were recorded precisely from 2005. But in 2007 the figure was already down to 1.77%. And it is highly regrettable that a slight increase in 2008 was followed by a steady decline over the next four years so that culture slipped back into the previous pattern of declining attendance. In 2012, the share of expenditures on culture and cinema returned to the level of the late 1990s and early 2000s and amounted to only 1.47% of the RF consolidated budget (Table 2).

The consequences of the global financial crisis have naturally affected cultural funding in Russia. From the end of 2009, there was a tendency to reduce expenditures on the arts and culture in many RF subjects due to financial difficulties caused by the crisis. These expenditures were among the first to be
sequestered in order to balance the regional budgets as part of the fight against the budget deficit.

According to the Federal Treasury, actual federal budget expenditures on the arts and culture in 2012 were 3 billion rubles lower than approved at the beginning of the year, and expenditures from the consolidated budget of RF subjects, 13.8 billion rubles below the initially approved budget. In 2013, the situation with cuts in approved public expenditures on the arts and culture unfortunately repeated itself: federal budget expenditures were reduced by 2.5 billion rubles compared to the initially approved figure, and expenditures from the consolidated budgets of RF subjects, by 17.8 billion rubles.4

If we look at the situation with cultural funding in Russia in the context of international comparisons, we will find that our country has a very modest place on the list of OECD countries (see Table 3). With cultural sector funding at 0.5% of GDP, our country is comparable to Portugal. Whatever the flaws in comparisons between per capita expenditures on the arts and culture, the contrast between Russia and the OECD countries in this respect is particularly glaring. Table 3 shows that in terms of per capita expenditures on the arts and culture, Russia is low down on the list of 25 OECD countries (ranking only above Greece and Bulgaria) with little more than a quarter of Austria’s figure, a third of Germany’s, and half of Italy’s.

Culture is badly in need of financial resources to foster new talents and maintain the still existing creative potential, to keep up and develop the “genet-

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**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share of expenditures on culture and cinema in GDP(%)</th>
<th>Share of expenditures on culture and cinema in consolidated budget (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.40</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.47</td>
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</table>
ic” interest in culture among all strata of the population and people living in all regions of our large country. In addition, one should be very cautious with any

\[ \text{Table 3} \]

Per Capita Public Expenditures on the Arts and Culture (Euros 2002-2011)

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economic innovations and any measures designed to restructure the sphere of culture and “optimize” its activity. Our difficult historical experience shows that such measures, almost always motivated by the intention to reduce budget spending, mean unwarranted losses for both culture and society as a whole.

**What Can Be Expected in the Near Future?**

The desire to reduce public expenditures on the arts and culture is in conflict with an objective economic law of cultural activity, which suffers from a well-known ailment known as “Baumol’s cost disease.” Our research shows that the income deficit of cultural organizations caused by this law is another fundamental factor. This is why the development of culture and its potential with positive dynamics of production and consumption of cultural goods requires a constant increase in real public expenditures on the arts and culture at least in proportion to GDP growth.

It is a statistically proven fact that in the last 30 years cultural participation in Russia has declined. Forecasts of the economic performance of cultural organizations depend significantly on whether this tendency continues in the future. We must understand, in particular, whether the decline in cultural consumption has bottomed out or whether the process we have observed in the last 30 years is still continuing. This requires some qualitative assumptions.

Let us name at least three factors that can determine future attendance dynamics.

- The first of these is directly connected with the aforementioned globalization trend of change in the value orientations and behavior patterns in Russian society which influence artistic preferences and the relative numbers of consumers of various cultural goods.

- The second factor is a demographic one. Given the negative trends of recent decades and existing population forecasts, we must reckon with the possibility of a decline in the size of the active part of the population.

- The third factor characterizes the structural component.

This refers to quantitative and, most importantly, structural changes in the network of producers of cultural goods involving an increase in the number of employees in a situation of falling demand from audiences. It is hardly reasonable to expect a continuation of this state of affairs in the future.

In order to produce more accurate forecasts of cultural consumption dynamics, we need additional interdisciplinary studies, including sociological, cultural, demographic and economic analysis of the above factors. Meanwhile, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to make the following assumptions. It appears that the 30-year-old processes of change in the demand for cultural goods under the impact of the globalization trend and structural shifts in artistic supply accompanied by an increase in the number of employees have come or
are coming to an end. In the very near future, we can expect to see the emergence of a stable demand pattern and stabilization of infrastructure. As for demographics, there is yet no prospect of a change in the current trend. Thus, we can expect that the consumption of cultural goods will continue to depend on population dynamics.

A previously developed econometric model of the “cost disease” predicts, in an overwhelming majority of cases, an increase in the specific income deficit faced by Russian cultural organizations. Special attention should be paid to one of the consequences of this model: if the prices of cultural goods rise faster than inflation, this leads not only to a decline in their consumption and an undue increase in inequality in their supply to the population, but also to an increase in the income deficit of cultural organizations and the need for higher public expenditures on the arts and culture.6

Let us make another general remark. The genetic nature of the “cost disease” that causes the income deficit of cultural organizations, and the negative consequences of insufficient budget subsidies that do not cover this deficit indicate the risk of its turning into an “artistic deficit.” This refers to undesirable qualitative changes in the supply of cultural goods, to the appearance and proliferation of low-quality cultural substitutes. The losses that arise in this case are long-term and difficult to recover. Hence, let us emphasize that the state’s cultural policy should take account of the fact that the costs of eliminating the “artistic deficit” usually exceed the income deficit that causes them.

In this connection, it is appropriate to cite a statement by Paul DiMaggio, an American economist and student of culture. He believes that the government should have the courage and wisdom to take fuller responsibility for supporting areas of culture that neither the market nor private philanthropy can be expected to support.7 Let us note that at the back of this essentially benevolent attitude to culture and emotional words there lies a habitual misapprehension of the actual state of affairs and an underestimation of the true value of cultural goods, which have social utility. The ability of these special goods and services to meet society’s essential needs does not require courage or even wisdom from the government, but only rational behavior of an economic agent pursuing its own interests.8

In the light of this conclusion, we should view not only current government activities, but also any government’s intentions to modernize the existing system. It makes sense to evaluate past reforms and future innovations from these positions. This is also how we should look at the desire of the authorities to reduce expenditures on the arts and culture, a desire which can be considered rational only in the case of a deliberate change of priorities, that is, in a situation where society declares a reduction in its need for cultural goods and thus in the social utility of cultural activities. So, one can say that the only motive for cutting public expenditures on the arts and culture is a desire to reduce the production of cultural goods in accordance with a reduction in the social need for such goods.

In this context, let us cite Simon Mundy, another authoritative expert in the field of cultural policy. In his opinion, culture is a low priority for most modern
states (though in the past it was often second only to defense). It is as though “spending on the cultural health of the society is an insult to the bodily welfare of the citizens.” Critics of cultural spending often contrast putting money into opera with the money needed to buy kidney machines or build children’s hospitals. Mundy believes this is a deliberately false and emotive contrast. It would be far more logical if one wished to compare waste with necessity, to contrast spending on unnecessary traffic management schemes with spending on health, and funding for military parades with funding for opera.  

We will not look for examples of this kind in Russia. There is no need to strain one’s eyes to see all these senseless reenactments and military and sports parades or to compare them with the cultural heritage, many of whose monuments are in a critical state. This is not a matter of examples or comparisons. A much greater cause for concern should be the false contrast itself and the reason why it appears and why cultural organizations are obliged to prove self-evident things, to demonstrate their usefulness, sometimes resorting to polemical arguments such as a comparison of luxury with “waste.” Another way is to create a favorable institutional environment based on a Law on Culture and the cultural policy of the state.

The Cultural Policy of the State

Science has long known that the state’s expenditures on the arts and culture cannot be seen as a burden on the state or as sunk costs. Satisfaction of society’s needs associated with intellectual achievements and growth of human capital is the return that transforms cultural spending into human capital investment. That is why the main purpose of modern cultural policy should be to create an effective cultural environment and build human capital through adequate budget spending. Without this, any calls for “honesty, truthfulness, respect for law, love for the Motherland, selflessness, aversion to violence, theft, slander and envy, respect for family values, chastity, kind-heartedness, mercy, ability to keep one’s word, respect for elders, and respect for honest labor,” as in the draft Basic Principles of State Cultural Policy, will remain no more than empty calls.  And the 30-year-old negative trend in cultural participation of the population in Russia will continue to be combined with an “artistic deficit,” or the proliferation of low-quality cultural substitutes that distort the tastes and preferences of our fellow countrymen.

It is necessary to state that in the last two decades the development of culture in Russia has been reduced to individual programs and projects, to a mechanism for allocating limited budget funds. In these conditions, cultural activity depends not only and not so much on the Ministry of Culture as on other executive agencies pursuing their own departmental goals and often lobbying for the adoption of legislative acts disloyal to culture. The delayed social effect of cultural activity in general and of such a policy in particular has prevented a timely assessment of the consequences of the weakening of the country’s cultural and,
Accordingly, human potential for national development. As a result, cultural policy has dropped out of the state’s development strategy. The current situation demands a radical change in the existing state of affairs and the development of a cultural policy that can meet the challenges of modernization in all spheres of society.

In order to address this fundamental task, we need a strategy adapted to current economic and social conditions and containing both long-term and current goals, priority areas for the development of culture, and appropriate means necessary for their implementation. In this connection, it is necessary to rethink the basic concepts of cultural policy, revise and renew the legal framework for its implementation, and determine effective organizational and economic mechanisms and social technologies capable of integrating the efforts of the state and civil society to improve the cultural environment and enhance cultural activity.

It should be emphasized that the strategic directions of the state’s cultural policy cannot be determined if they are based on the current market situation or “from general considerations.” As a definite reflection of the society’s interests, they are formed in the process of political discourse. Depending on the society’s level of development and political system, these interests encompass the entire range of cultural needs based on socially approved values and ethical norms, the ideas of justice and good sense, and other social attitudes. In latent form, current and long-term cultural development goals exist as expert knowledge possessed by a certain part of society. This refers to those who can understand these interests and whom Plato called “philosophers,”11 R. A. Musgrave described them as an “informed group” of people,12 and K. Schmidt called them “politicians,”13 including those whom the rest of the population has “entrusted” with its votes and empowered to care for the common well-being.

The main purpose of a comprehensive study entitled Goals and Priorities of Cultural Policy in Modern Russia: Expert Opinion, carried out by the Institute of Sociology, RAS, the Institute of Economics, RAS, and the State Institute of Art Studies of the Russian Ministry of Culture in late 2013, was to identify this “expert knowledge” and formulate the strategic directions for the development of culture on its basis. This was a survey of experts which has made it possible to integrate the opinions of individual respondents into a representative body of expert knowledge about how Russian culture should develop, and in which strategic directions.

The survey was conducted with the participation of many prominent figures in the arts and culture: members of the Presidential Council for the Arts and Culture, experts of the Interagency Commission in the area of modern cultural policy and support for creative initiatives; representatives of Federal executive agencies and heads of RF subjects; heads of regional ministries and departments of culture, heads of cultural institutions, leading researchers in the sphere of culture and cultural policy, rectors of cultural colleges and universities, media executives, members of nongovernmental organizations and the RF Public Chamber. A total of 125 experts representing 8 Federal districts and 21 regions of Russia took part in the survey.
Expert Survey Results

Let us note that the processing of the survey data has not yet been completed. That is why for the purposes of this article we have used only the preliminary results based on an assessment of linear distributions of expert responses to the questionnaire.

What do the experts see as the main problem preventing the development of modern Russian culture? The first place in the survey went to the “underestimation by the ruling elites of the strategic importance of culture for the successful modernization of society and economic growth.” More than 80% of respondents recognize the need for a fundamental review of the attitude to culture on the part of the state, primarily its economic agencies, at the federal and regional levels. As it turns out, the devaluation of value attitudes to culture is often associated with a decline in the general level of the political and economic elite.

Another complaint of the expert community is a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Culture and those ministries and departments that influence, in one way or another, the country’s cultural life. This is such a hot topic that more than 60% of respondents think it necessary to reform the cultural administration and management structure so as to concentrate all the necessary functions in a single department while ensuring the “protection” of culture from the excessive influence of economic departments. About 55% of respondents point to the need to coordinate the efforts of government agencies and departments, the business community and civil society institutions. Almost half of those polled favor an enlargement of the powers of civil society institutions, including public councils for coordinating administrative efforts in the sphere of culture.

The respondents strongly disapprove of the legal framework for culture. Most of them support the immediate adoption of a new law on culture. According to one of the regional executives, such a law should “clearly regulate the attitude of all government bodies to cultural institutions and organizations and guarantee the state’s obligations to its citizens in providing cultural services, with a clearly defined mechanism to make public officials accountable for noncompliance with the new law on culture.”

One of the biggest social concerns today is the rejection of traditional Russian culture and culture in general by a significant part of young people. According to the experts, this problem is the first in importance on the list of the most urgent problems of cultural development. Targeted work to address this problem should become a productive “growth area” in which government, business and society should concentrate their efforts. About 90% of respondents are in favor of introducing a system of free cultural services for children and young people, primarily in the regions; more than 70% favor the development of special programs for teenagers and young people enabling them to participate in the work of cultural institutions and in implementing significant cultural projects, including their own; about 80% point to the need to include a cultural compo-
nent in educational programs at all levels, and every tenth respondent thinks it advisable to include a discipline called “Fundamentals of Culture” among the entrance examinations for higher education institutions; almost all respondents think it advisable to re-establish the system of houses of culture and palaces of children’s creativity.

A special role in the day-to-day existence of culture, in the opinion of the experts, is played by the mass media, which can ensure the transmission of cultural values and behavior patterns, foster the cultural needs and artistic tastes of the population, promote the development of civil society, and help to maintain the country’s unity. At the same time, the survey showed the experts’ obvious concern as manifested in a critical assessment of the direction and mechanisms of the state’s influence on the current information environment. Most of them—more than 60%—point to the negative trend of the last 20-25 years towards the spread of low-quality cultural substitutes distorting the tastes and preferences of our compatriots.

An absolute majority of respondents, while noting the key role of the Internet and its powerful positive potential based on virtually unlimited information resources and effective digital technologies, point to the obvious pollution of the blogosphere, which distorts the cultural environment. More than 80% of respondents emphasize the need to find effective forms and means of improving content quality in the media-information environment and the Internet while eliminating the persistent practice of administrative bans; 95% favor an expansion of the system of government contracts for socially significant cultural-information programs; and 86% want to see the adoption of a special government program to create Internet resources providing free access to the cultural heritage and the achievements of modern art.

The existing regional disparities and inequality in the supply of cultural goods, which violate the constitutional right of citizens to equal access to cultural values, are a special concern for the expert community. This problem is particularly acute and is high on the list of problems preventing the development of Russian culture: 88% of respondents are in favor of its immediate solution. Almost all of them associate the solution of this problem (one of the most urgent ones) with changes in funding mechanisms of cultural activities.

The cultural policy of the state, in the opinion of the experts, cannot be considered without its economic component. Most respondents agree that it is necessary to formulate government guarantees of financial support for cultural activity, with various forms of obligations and covering three types of its participants. It is necessary to establish government obligations to:

(1) consumers of cultural goods;
(2) employees of the state and municipal cultural institutions; and
(3) these institutions themselves.

More than 80% of respondents favor a return to statutory budget ratios for cultural funding, while 60% think that the share of expenditures on the arts and
culture in the federal budget should be in the range of 2% to 5%. As for regional and local budgets, virtually all respondents want to see a level of more than 5%.

In answer to the question about the advisability of introducing in Russia an institution that could be called “individual budget designations” (part of which is percentage philanthropy) providing for the right of each taxpayer to personally administer a small part of budget funds (in the amount of, say, 2% of the tax they have paid) and to direct these funds in support of a particular cultural activity, almost all respondents—more than 80%—said that this was advisable. It is interesting to note that only just over 15% said they would not exercise this right. The respondents also supported the formula “to spend without dissipating, to accumulate,” which provides for a combination of individual budget earmarks with another civil society institution: endowment funds (funds containing special-purpose capital). This means creating endowment funds to support various cultural activities (theaters, philharmonic music, circus, museums, libraries, cinema, preservation of the tangible and intangible cultural heritage, cultural education, etc.) and directing revenues from individual budget earmarks into these funds. Such annual contributions will be kept and accumulated in the respective endowments so as to ensure a growing stream of current income from special-purpose capital in support of cultural activities.

Naturally, the final processing of the experts’ responses may somewhat alter the preliminary results and, most importantly, reveal explicit and implicit correlations between their opinions that will make it possible to analyze the results of the expert survey in greater depth. Nor should one think that the survey has revealed the ultimate truth. Like any expert knowledge, it has only outlined the possible directions of our state’s cultural policy in the current situation. Their discussion and exploration will help to find a balanced decision and a socially approved definition of long-term goals for the development of culture, to estimate the resources required to achieve these goals, and to assess the consequences of their achievement.

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The inability of cultural organizations to support themselves and the objective need for outside financial assistance have unfortunately become the weak point in the social organism where the “pathogenic viruses” that accompany cultural activity have found a comfortable home. It is these viruses that cause both the “free-rider syndrome” (a slackening of the market activity of cultural organizations themselves) and the “Zverev—Kudrin reaction”¹⁴ (a kind of “budget spasm” accompanied by a build-up of pressure from economic agencies and departments demanding cuts in government support). One should not think that this can be avoided or that another government will be better. Due to their dependence on budget funds, cultural organizations will always belong to a risk group exposed to pathogens that may cause such an unhealthy reaction.
Let us take another look at history. As already noted, two resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers—No. 537 of 4 March, 1948, and No. 560 of 6 February, 1949,—led to a drop in the number of theaters. Thirty-three years later, the then Minister of Finance of the USSR, Vasily Garbuzov, addressed a memorandum (No. 05/142-5 of 20 December, 1982) to the USSR Council of Ministers, in which he returned to “a set of measures aimed at eliminating, in the next two or three years, the unprofitability of theatrical and entertainment enterprises and concert organizations.”

Another 20 years later, Aleksey Kudrin, Minister of Finance of democratic Russia, and Treasury head Tatyana Nesterenko set out their version of reducing the public expenditures on the arts and culture: “Institutions that do not want their extra-budgetary funds to be controlled can switch to contracts. In this case, they cease to be purely budget-funded entities”;15 “...after a sharp reduction in the number of institutions that create secondary liability for the obligations they assume, it is necessary to introduce goal-oriented budgeting for the rest of them.”16

Ten years later, the same “Zverev—Kudrin reaction” and the now almost regular “budget spasm,” this time manifested in the implementation of Russian President’s Decree No. 597 (paragraphs 1e, 2a and 1k) of 7 May, 2012, On Measures to Implement the State’s Social Policy, gave rise to “optimization”17 and an “independent assessment of the quality of cultural services,”18 which may lead to a loss of creative resources, depersonalization of already existing Presidential and Government grants with a resultant decline in the salaries of creative workers, the establishment of ratings for cultural organizations, and their funding based on these ratings. This is not the first time that economic agencies are trying to equate cultural organizations to dry cleaners and laundries, taking no account of the specific features of cultural activity: the impossibility of a quantitative assessment of the results of creative work.

Let us note that leading cultural figures have been trying, fully in accordance with Russian traditions, to resist such attempts and have been doing their utmost to protect culture from harmful government decisions. At the same time, both culture and our entire society need not only and not so much sporadic action on the part of its best representatives (although this practice has protected culture on many occasions) as legal norms that would protect this area of activity and create conditions for its normal development. We see the way out in forming institutions that would limit the unfriendly behavior of economic agencies and departments while “pushing” the executive authorities at all levels towards decisions that would ensure the necessary conditions for the creation, dissemination, preservation and consumption of cultural goods.

We hope that the Year of Culture will see the adoption of the Basic Principles of the State Cultural Policy and the Law on Culture and Cultural Activities, which are really capable of changing the situation and reversing the current negative trends in cultural dynamics. This will be an absolute breakthrough in the life of culture and society as a whole and raise hopes that every year can become a year of culture.
NOTES


4 See: http://www.roskazna.ru/konsolidirovannogo-byudzheta-rf/.

5 A. Rubinstein, Patronized Goods in the Cultural Sector: Symptoms and Consequences of Baumol’s Cost Disease.


10 See: Rossiyskaya gazeta, 16 May 2014.


14 Let us emphasize the essentially similar behavior of the “red” People’s Commissar for Finance of the USSR, Arseny Zverev, and the “market-oriented” Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation, Aleksey Kudrin.

15 A. Kudrin, “This is a Revolution in Funding Public Institutions,” Izvestiya, 1 June 2002.


17 One can only wonder at the distortion of the very concept of “optimization,” which originally means selection of the best option. In the minds of government officials, such an
improvement is inseparable from an actual worsening of people’s lives, unreasonable cut-backs, and an alleged increase in the salaries of public sector workers with a simultaneous reduction in the number of people working in the field of culture, education, science and healthcare, a bloated government bureaucracy and a very significant increase in the salaries of government officials.


Translated by Irina Borisova
Solzhenitsyn and the February 1917 Revolution

Viktor MASLOV

It will soon be 100 years since the Revolution of February 1917. Enough time has passed to attempt to look at our history and the people who made it without prejudice and not from the viewpoint of present-day mentality. We do not intend, reading the polemics between Cicero and Marcus Antonius, to judge from the vantage point of modern ideology what is better, dictatorship or democracy. And of course one should not lay blame on historical figures of the past from the positions of modern morality or politics.

And yet this is precisely what Vyacheslav Nikonov, a thoughtful political scientist, is doing. In discussing the issue of appointment of governors in present-day Russia Nikonov condemns Prince Georgy Lvov, the last Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire and Chairman of the Provisional Government, for saying that governors should be elected; Nikonov claims that this was the root of all the misfortunes that befell Russia since. Incidentally, Lvov merely said it, but in reality he appointed all governors. So, what he said had no real impact on the course of subsequent events.

Solzhenitsyn also quotes these words of Prince Lvov. But he “delves still deeper into our history.” He begins his search for the culprits who triggered the February Revolution from afar and, like Pushkin’s Yevgeny in The Bronze Horseman, blames everything on Peter the Great. According to Solzhenitsyn, Tsar Peter I “trampled under, foot the soul of the people” and “erected his somber creation in the north-western corner of our land.” And what about the people “created” by this “somber creation,” the wonderful people of Petersburg and Leningrad? I know how Muscovites evacuated during the war were harassed. Awakening such instincts and setting people against Petersburg is like letting the genie out of the bottle. It should on no account be done.

To go back to the Revolution. I read the minutes of the deliberations of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th State Dumas with the same relish as I once read Cicero. So much intelligence and eloquence were displayed by the advocates of opposing sides. The cream of Russian oratorical skill, intellectual brilliance, quick repar-

V. Maslov, full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The article was first published in Russian in the periodical In Defense of Science, Issue 3, Moscow, 2008.
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tee, precise arguments. And I read Solzhenitsyn’s essay Reflections on the Feb-
ruary Revolution that are full of hatred of all the Duma members stumbling at
every sentence and laboring to see the meaning behind the words.

So, let us begin with the last Minister of the Interior of the Russian Empire, Aleksandr Protopopov, “a psychopathic windbag, a liar, a hysterical coward,” according to Solzhenitsyn. Protopopov was deputy chairman of the Duma and spoke well during the sessions. But when he met Grigory Rasputin, the latter cast a spell on him as it were. The Tsar also had charm augmented by his exalted position. The fact that Protopopov fell under the influence of that whining team signaled a major change in his ideology, and we cannot blame people for changing their views.

People change and their worldview changes, especially during revolutions and wars. For example, Lev Tikhomirov (1852-1923), the “knight of the monarchy,” as Solzhenitsyn called him, and the only one of whom, it seems, he had a kind word to say, initially was the main proponent of terrorism in the People’s Will group (Narodnaya Volya) which assassinated Tsar Alexander II. The mastermind of all the evil deeds of the revolutionaries (as he was described in police circles) emigrated and 7 years later wrote to Alexander III asking him to pardon him. Upon his return he became a dedicated advocate of monarchism. Subse-
sequently, in a new letter of repentance of 8 March, 1917, he thus characterized these activities: “I have accomplished nothing and have been defeated on all points.” In the Soviet times he was, as a veteran revolutionary, admitted to a hospital run by the Central Commission for Improving the Welfare of Scientists under the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR (1921-1931) and lived until old age. He was a typical representative of the wishy-washy Russian intelligentsia so brilliantly divined by Dostoyevsky.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn himself initially conceived his novel about the rev-
olution from the Marxist-Leninist point of view and, as we know, later changed his position drastically.

Let us look at some other personalities. General Sergey Khabalov (1858-
1924), described by Solzhenitsyn as “a lethargic blockhead, mediocre, spineless
and stupid,” was in reality one of the most reasonable appointed atamans of the Urals Cossack Army who commanded great authority. The Cossacks called him “our Circassian.” He was later appointed commander of the Petrograd Military Garrison. The Tsar gave him one day to put an end to the disturbances, but by that time the Cossacks were refusing to shoot civilians. Solzhenitsyn laments the fact that the military cadets were not called in. Yes, Khabalov did not order the pupils at military schools to join the fray (I have a debt of gratitude to him because my uncle finished the Mikhaylovsky Artillery Cadet Corp).

Solzhenitsyn shames the cadets, holding up the Spaniards as an example to be emulated.

It is an odd current tendency to always look up to the West. After all, the Russian officer cadets joined the battle in late October and were killed. In his well-known song the popular singer Aleksandr Vertinsky asks: “Who sent them, with a hand that never trembled to die?” Solzhenitsyn’s hand did not tremble
when he wrote about it. On the contrary, it is the most emotional paragraph in his essay that is worth quoting:

“...Youths from military schools? They were not called to the rescue... But let us note that the military schools did not rush into battle themselves like the immortal Alcazar of Toledo did in 1936. In February 1917 no one here tried to stage a Russian Alcazar... not a single military school. There was some movement at the Nikolayevskoye military school, but it petered out.”7

To whom is this call addressed? Does anybody know what “Alcazar of Toledo” means? Yes, the people who last year celebrated the 70th anniversary of Alcazar, a jubilee of the uprising at the Alcazar Military School when youths came out against the Spanish Government on the side of the National-Patriot General Franco, who staged a rebellion with the support of Hitler and Mussolini, and were killed. No need to explain who can respond to a call “to stage a Russian Alcazar.”

They may “stage” it, and then Solzhenitsyn or his descendants would bitterly regret it, as often happens.

Solzhenitsyn continues: “...agitators, by throwing stones and threatening, forced the munitions factory workers to go on strike... but not a single one of them was shot.”8 The reproach misses the point: if there had been “stone-throwing agitators” the guards at the munitions factories would surely have opened fire on them.

Let us now look at the case of Prince Golitsyn, the last Tsarist Prime Minister (January 1917—February 1917). Solzhenitsyn describes Prince Nikolay Golitsyn as inept and passive: “Why was it that during these trying weeks for Russia they appointed as prime minister—by force and against his will—the inept and passive Prince Golitsyn, who shied away from power?”9 In reality the prince was a remarkable man and a talented administrator. As the governor of Archangelsk he improved the living conditions there so much that the population of the guberniya increased sharply. All his children (with the exception of Nikolay, a seaman) emigrated after the revolution. Nikolay refused to leave as a matter of principle and since he had nothing stashed away and being stripped of civil rights, he worked as a shoemaker.

Now about Nicholas II. A person’s character is thrown into high relief in difficult situations. My image of Tsar Nicholas II was formed by the stories of a family friend, Uncle Sasha, the son of the court doctor Lev Popov. He had spent a whole month by Nicholas’ bedside in the Crimea when he was down with pneumonia and nursed him to recovery. The same image emerged from the stories of Aleksandr Kerensky about the Tsar and his family after their arrest. Kerensky was simply charmed by the Tsar.

“A weak Tsar, he betrayed us,”10 Solzhenitsyn claims. One wonders whom he means by “us.” And it is not true that he was weak. He did not obey the Empress and Rasputin, and firmly adhered to the behest of his father to be an autocrat, while the Empress, like any wife, only sought to reinforce his conviction.

Against the objections of all the officials he rightly supported Vitte and introduced the gold chervonets—a great act.
He did not heed Rasputin who sent a wire to him urging him not to declare war on any account. He entered the war although for once Rasputin may have been right, but that would have run counter to Nicholas’ ideology and principles.

However, among the people who surrounded him there was absolutely no one (except the Empress, Vyrubova, Frederics and, among the generals, Count Keller) who shared his ideology. Lady-in-waiting Vyrubova remembered: “I was deeply aware of and sensed in all the surrounding people a bitterness against those I idolized and I felt that the anger was assuming a horrifying scale...”

How does one account for it? The reason is that the antiquated ideology was a brake on the spontaneous and rapidly developing market economy.

Truly, “All the company except Lieutenant N. is marching with the wrong foot! (A. Kuprin. The Duel, translated by Allen & Unwin]. Apart from a small company of officers of the Moscow Regiment of the Court Guards, the “bicycle battalion, “ no one in Petrograd distinguished himself by defending the throne.” (It should be added that these people seized the Winter Palace, but the Palace Commandant turned them away. Then they headed for the Admiralty, their ranks thinning along the way. The Naval Minister Ivan Grigorovich also turned them away, so they returned to their barracks). So there was nothing the Tsar could do and it is wrong to say that he had betrayed “us.”

So, if “All the company except Lieutenant N. is marching with the wrong foot” are we supposed to take to task every private for marching out of step? “The Cossacks betrayed the Government,” fumes Solzhenitsyn whereas it was the Government that had betrayed the Cossacks. Because Solzhenitsyn had written an essay on Mikhail Sholokhov’s novel And Quiet Flows the Don he ought to be aware of this. However, that essay too turns everything upside down and rigorous proof has come to hand that everything in it is wrong and misleading.

Next. Of the Commander-in-Chief the Grand Prince Nikolay Nikolayevich Solzhenitsyn writes that he had acquitted himself as being “as fatuous a fool as Rodzyanko.” Nikolay Nikolayevich commanded great authority with the generals and the soldiers. The latter affectionately called him “Mikola.” Among Russian émigrés some monarchists (the so-called White Rus) made common cause with him preferring him to the legitimate heir to the throne, Kirill Vladimirovich. Among the adherents of Nikolay Nikolayevich was General Aleksandr Kutepov about whom Solzhenitsyn writes in very positive terms.

Mikhail Rodzyanko, the speaker of the 3d and 4th State Dumas, a monarchist and an ardent supporter of the reforms of Stolypin whom Solzhenitsyn also praises to the skies. Rodzyanko understood the situation and accurately predicted the imminent disaster. For a brief space of time he brilliantly reined in a rearing horse. But for him, amid the ensuing chaos power would have been seized by people embracing the ideology of the outstanding anarchists Mikhail Bakunin, Pyotr Kropotkin and Nestor Makhno. He was not responsible for the disarray that followed because Prime Minister G. Lvov was out of his control.

Next. Solzhenitsyn lectures us in hindsight what should have been done: for example, Alekseyev should have “telegraphed an ultimatum to Petrograd—and then even a minor feud would have been avoided, the census circles would
immediately have calmed down, perhaps the Council of Deputies might have put up some token resistance before disbanding.”

He seems to be prying into everybody’s soul. Kerensky “went to Moscow and said fine words about mercy, while fiery revolutionary impatience was eating through him like a worm: to prove the Tsar’s treason by an investigation and then put him on trial—what a splendid analogy with the Great French Revolution!”

In reality Kerensky did not intend to put the Tsar on trial. He was trying to save everyone he could from the raging mob, and he tried to send the Tsar’s family to England to his reigning close relatives, who at the last moment refused to receive him fearing the wrath of their own people.

To continue the gallery of Duma members and ministers provided by Solzhenitsyn: Professor Milyukov, a historian, is “a dry-as-dust petrified dogmatist, incapable of turning in the political stream”; the financier Guchkov is “tired and confused”; the lawyer Kerensky is “a Harlequin, not our man”; professor Nekrasov is “a demagogue and a mediocrity, a petty conman”; the financier Tereshchenko is “a foppish high-society womanizer”; the financier Konovalov is “a dark horse of murky circles”; the journalist Vladimir Lvov is “a madman and an epileptic”; associate professor Godnev is “a shadow of a man”; professor Manuylov, rector of Moscow University, an agrarian scientist, is “a hat unfit for purpose”; “only Shingarev deserves respect, ... but he too is a total dilettante.”

A veritable Gogol! Excellent labels for ministers and Duma members in a government newspaper. Will anyone use them some day?

The majority of the members of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Commission for Combating Pseudoscience and Falsification of Scientific Research expressed the view, orally and in writing, that Solzhenitsyn’s work is not a scientific work. As I wrote in Rossiyskaya gazeta, it has nothing to do with historical science and expresses the subjective opinion of an impressionable man.

To advance mathematical modeling of historical processes scientists must study the statistics of rebellions and mutinies, the emergence of pockets of discontent as well as the statistics of economic trends during revolutionary periods.

NOTES


2 Ibid., p. 467.

3 Ibid., p. 460.

4 State Archive of the RF (GA RF), stock 634, inv. 1, file 23, p. 80. Quoted from: http://www.voskres.ru/idea/tihomirov.htm

5 A. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 466.

6 Appointed (Nakaznoy) Ataman (Cossack chieftain) was appointed in the Russian Empire by the Tsarist authorities as distinct from an elected military ataman.
Solzhenitsyn and the February 1917 Revolution

8 Ibid., p. 461.
9 Ibid., p. 466.
10 Ibid., p. 477.
11 A. Taneyeva (Vyrubova), The Pages of My Life, Moscow, 2000, pp. 112-113 (in Russian). English translation A. Vyrubova, Memories of the Russian Court—http://www.alexander-palace.org/russiancourt2006/index.html. This passage has been omitted.
13 A. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 464.
14 Ibid., p. 463.
15 Ibid., p. 479.
16 Ibid., p. 478.
17 Ibid., p. 490.
18 Ibid., p. 492.
19 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10 March 2007.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov
Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1932
in the Light of New Sources

Dmitry OFITSEROV-BELSKY

In the late 1920s the Polish foreign policy was increasingly geared to holding on to its positions and preserving the status quo. The Locarno Treaties demonstrated that France and Great Britain were not prepared to guarantee the stability of borders in Eastern Europe. Poland’s biggest problems arose with its traditional ally, France, largely due to its Briandism policy which was aimed at bringing about a rapprochement between France and Germany. The French press mounted massive anti-Polish campaigns which were often financed by Berlin.

Poland’s relations with its neighbors under the Sanacja (Sanation) regime under Józef Piłsudski (1926-1939) were rapidly deteriorating. Germany officially announced its wish to revise its borders with Poland as early as 1925. Statements by German leaders and diplomats on the issue were becoming more aggressive with every passing year. A temporary ray of hope in the relations with the USSR on the eve of the May 1926 coup was followed by a prolonged period of diplomatic stagnation. The relations with Czechoslovakia were never mended, and as regards the relations with Lithuania, there was no question of any positive shifts without resolving the issue of the Polish-occupied Vilno area. Both countries readily gave shelter to Ukrainian terrorists, which also complicated their relations. Among all its neighbors, Poland had good relations only with Romania. But they were complicated by the unresolved Bessarabia issue in the relations between Moscow and Bucharest.

Polish and Soviet diplomats discussed the possibility of signing a non-aggression pact even before the May 1926 coup. The negotiations stalled after Józef Piłsudski came to power. Poland insisted on a collective agreement of East-European countries with the USSR. Warsaw was aware that a collective treaty would help to build a more stable security system and consolidate Poland’s leading role in the region. The USSR was committed to forming a body of bilateral agreements which would facilitate for the Soviet diplomats the task of pro-

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moting their interests and give room for maneuver after the treaties were signed.

The national isolation of the USSR practically ended by the late 1920s. The country embarked on industrialization. It was clear that eventually the USSR would achieve full international recognition, join the League of Nations and probably increase its military and economic might. This would make it still more difficult for Warsaw to strike a political bargain with Moscow. Therefore the Polish diplomats were going out of their way to conclude an agreement with the USSR.

The Polish scholar Michał Zacharias believes that the new stage of Polish-Soviet rapprochement began in September, 1930. In his opinion, the rapprochement between the countries was stimulated by a dramatic increase of the revisionist propaganda in Germany that began in March 1930. As early as the late 1930 Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko was insisting on the resumption of negotiations on a non-aggression pact. Practically all the Polish and the majority of Soviet scholars agreed that the initiative of resuming the talks came from the Soviet side. For many years Soviet historians cited this initiative as proof of the peaceful intentions of the USSR. Modern Russian scholar Oleg Ken suggested that Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko enjoyed considerable autonomy from Moscow in building up Soviet-Polish relations and did not always follow the recommendations of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. He is convinced that the appointment of Antonov-Ovseyenko as Ambassador to Poland stimulated the resumption of the Soviet-Polish talks on a non-aggression pact in late 1930. Citing Polish sources he claimed that the Soviet leadership was not against the settlement of relations and was ready to sign the pact.

The diaries of the Soviet Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov kept at the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) enable scholars to correct the history of the signing of the 1932 Soviet-Polish Pact. Taking the cue from the Polish Foreign Ministry the Polish press and news agencies claimed that the initiative to resume talks was put forward by the USSR. On January 5, 1931, Maksim Litvinov wrote in his diary about his meeting with the Polish envoy: “I drew the attention of Stanislaw Patek to the rumors in the press about alleged Soviet-Polish talks on a non-aggression pact and a trade treaty, but we have not recently made any proposals to Poland and have not received any from Poland. Patek was embarrassed and noted that he had long been telling me, comrades Stomonyakov and Krestinsky about the need to sign some kind of conventions and launch a conciliation procedure... To my remark that as far as I remembered he was making his proposals on his own behalf, and not officially, Patek replied that he was speaking with the knowledge of Warsaw and Pilsudski himself. I said that the conversations had taken place many months earlier, that we had not reported them and apparently Patek also had not disclosed them to the press, that there was a long way from a conciliatory procedure to a non-aggression pact and this did not seem to explain the rumors that had recently appeared in the press.”

The above passage from Litvinov’s diary shows that there had previously been no negotiations on the pact, that the Polish authorities were merely sound-
ing out the Soviet position and tried to influence third countries by spreading false information. Later precisely that false information would be recognized by historians as a fact. It would also be reasonable to assume that Stanislaw Patek, who acted unofficially, was fulfilling the instructions of Pilsudski of which the Polish Foreign Ministry had no full knowledge. Keeping up the appearance that a Soviet proposal had been made, the Polish Foreign Minister August Zaleski said in a conversation with the Italian Ambassador to Warsaw in January 1931 that a new non-aggression pact would be merely a replica and to some extent a weakening of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.³ According to Zaleski, the Polish government was prepared to study the pact on a Conciliation Commission without the arbitration, which the Soviet side sought to avoid. The agreement had to contain a clause ruling out the participation of one country in agreements directed against the other country. Because that clause would refer to defense allies as well, the Polish side insisted that the treaty should mention the Polish-Romanian defense alliance and should be disclosed to the Baltic states before the pact was signed. The Italian Ambassador to Moscow, Bernardo Attolico, told Litvinov about Zaleski’s talk with the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw with apparent knowledge of the provocative nature of his mission and at the same time trying to get as much information as possible about the true character of Soviet-Polish relations. Maksim Litvinov assured the Italian Ambassador to Moscow that the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact was a mystification. Bernardo Attolico replied that it was a very clever move on Poland’s part that speeded up the signing of the Polish-Romanian Treaty.

In 1931, Soviet and French diplomats were conducting negotiations on a non-aggression treaty. The agreement was expected to attract external reaction and provide the basis for further cooperation. It could have made irrelevant the Soviet component of the Franco-Polish Military Convention of 1921. The Soviet-French Agreement sealed a change of the French political course. Warsaw was alarmed. The non-aggression pact between the USSR and France, initialed on August 10, 1931, had an impact on the course of Soviet-Polish negotiations. The USSR used France as a go-between because France was again interested in a Soviet-Polish agreement. The Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry Philippe Berthelot reported on October 5, 1931, that Zaleski when shown the text of the initialed Soviet-French pact said it was also acceptable for the Soviet-Polish Pact.⁴ Some time later the Soviet representative Valerian Dovgalevsky said in a conversation with Berthelot that his government was ready to sign with Poland a pact similar to the one recently initialed with France.⁵ The Polish diplomacy was apprised of the conversation between Dovgalevsky and Berthelot in order to elicit an official response from Zaleski on the readiness to sign the pact. Another talk between Litvinov and Patek took place on November 14, 1931. It widened the gap of misunderstanding between the parties. “Mr. Patek, Litvinov wrote in his diary, had this to say on the matter: the text of the initialed Soviet-French pact had been read to Mr. Zaleski by Laroche in Warsaw. The text was not handed over to the Polish government either in Paris or in Warsaw. When asked by Mr. Berthelot, Mr. Zaleski in Paris replied that he saw nothing in the
Soviet-French pact that contradicted Poland’s interests. There was no conversation between Berthelot and Zaleski about the Soviet-Polish Pact. Further attempts to clear up the circumstances of the conversation between Berthelot and Zaleski made by the Soviet diplomacy suggested that the French diplomat probably sought to mislead the Soviet side in order to give a push to the talks. Modern Polish and Russian historians usually stress that France was interested in the signing of a Soviet-Polish pact at all the stages of the negotiations. In the opinion of Polish historian M. Wolos, French diplomacy showed an interest in a Polish-Soviet pact and even tried to link it to the signing of a Franco-Soviet non-aggression agreement. Most probably this was just part of the diplomatic game. The true aim of the French policy was to loosen its obligations with regard to Poland. This theory, proposed by Maksim Litvinov, is backed by O. Ken.

The Polish side rejected the Soviet proposal on the grounds that the Soviet-French pact was not good for Poland because it had much that was irrelevant for Poland and lacked what interested Poland most. Stanislaw Patek proposed to Soviet diplomats to revert to the draft pact of 1926 with additions that he made in the document handed in to Lev Karakhan on August 23, 1931. In Patek’s opinion, this document, apart from some additions made by himself and not by the Foreign Minister, differed from the Soviet draft only in that it mentioned the Kellog Pact and the Moscow Protocol. Maksim Litvinov remarked that since the previous Soviet draft gave rise to differences that could not be resolved during a period of five years, the text of the Franco-Soviet Agreement was proposed. The USSR was not insisting on it but believed that the document contained nothing that was irrelevant to Poland. In particular, it would help to have also in the Soviet-Polish Pact Clause 4 of the Pact, and especially its second part—on inadmissibility of military organizations and representatives of pseudo-governments. Litvinov assured that the Soviet side would not object to the Kellog Pact and the Moscow Protocol being mentioned in the new agreement. For the Polish side, the mention in the non-aggression pact of adherence to the Kellog Pact principles probably meant that in the event of non-compliance with these principles the pact would become null and void.

In the same conversation Stanislaw Patek noted that the Riga Treaty, the Kellog Pact and the Moscow Protocol were enough to guarantee peace between the countries and there was no fundamental need for another agreement that would deal with the same topic. Nevertheless the Polish envoy expressed the opinion that a pact would be useful, especially if it included new elements: the Polish government was interested in the USSR signing the pact with all the countries from Finland to Romania inclusive. If the USSR, Patek argued, wanted to avoid, in the negotiations on this topic, the possibility of Poland’s establishing of a protectorate over third countries, the Polish government would respect that without insisting on a specific form. Thus, the indifference of the Polish diplomacy to the form in which the USSR might conclude non-aggression agreements with its Western neighbors attests that in 1931 Poland was indeed interested in signing a non-aggression pact with the USSR.
The Soviet diplomats took a tough stand. Maksim Litvinov sent this reply to Stanislaw Patek: “Negotiations with Poland on our mutual relations with third states, let alone mentioning these relations in the Polish-Soviet document, are indeed unacceptable for us... If the Polish government is interested to see a pact between us and these countries, during the past five years it undoubtedly exerted considerable efforts to induce the governments of these Baltic countries to accept our proposal. If even that did not help, then obviously the problems do not lie with our side.”

Maksim Litvinov told the Polish envoy that the Soviet proposal to the Baltic countries remained standing and that pacts with these countries could be signed at any moment. And he added: “We would be glad if a pact were also signed with Poland the day after tomorrow” thus indicating that Patek’s demands would weaken Poland’s positions if the neighboring countries signed a pact with the USSR earlier. In that case Poland would have to make serious concessions to the USSR or else find itself in isolation if it refused to sign the pact.

On the Soviet-Romanian relations Stanislaw Patek suggested that a pact could perhaps be signed with Romania leaving the Bessarabia issue open, that is, Poland unofficially agreed to the existence of Soviet claims, something that could hardly be expected if Poland was less interested in an agreement with the USSR. In reply Litvinov noted that if Romania approached the USSR with a proposal of the kind mentioned by Patek, that proposal would have been considered favorably, but that such negotiations do not require the participation of third countries. Apparently expecting that the Romanian side would be briefed on the content of this talk Maksim Litvinov added that even in the absence of normal relations with the USSR Romania had enough opportunities to engage with Moscow. Later the problems in Soviet-Romanian relations became the main factor that caused Poland to procrastinate in the talks with the USSR and successful signing of the non-aggression agreements between the USSR and the Baltic countries gave a push to an early signing of the Polish-Soviet Pact without looking back on Romania.

The Soviet diplomats disclosed detailed information on the course of negotiations to France and reminded the Polish side of this fact whenever the negotiations stalled. In his conversation with German Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen on November 24, 1931, Litvinov said: “Either Poland retracts its demands or changes them and then it would be possible to sign the pact or we will recognize the fact of differences and report them to France.” In doing so he probably did not just report the true state of affairs but sought to make Germany still more nervous over the very fact that the negotiations were under way. As early as November 16, 1931, Herbert von Dirksen told Maksim Litvinov that the act was bound to have resonance with the German public opinion, especially since everybody knows that the USSR has resumed talks with Poland under pressure from France which allegedly limited the room for maneuver for the USSR. Dirksen said that Germany was particularly worried by the possibility that the pact would refer to the territorial integrity of Poland: if there could be no objections to such a reference in the Soviet-French Pact, the mention of this in the
Soviet-Polish Pact would produce a different impression. Berlin feared that this clause in the agreement could impede a future reconsideration of the territorial articles of the Treaty of Versailles that did not preclude their peaceful revision. This confers added importance on Litvinov’s reply to Dirksen’s remark: “As regards territorial integrity we are talking only about not infringing upon it by violent acts, and not about recognizing the legitimacy or justice of this or that border.”

German Ambassador Dirksen visited Litvinov on December 5, 1931, carrying notes on the draft Polish-Soviet Pact with which he was thoroughly conversant. The following were the main remarks prepared by the German Foreign Ministry lawyers:

1. Poland cannot be entirely bound by neutrality owing to Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant and thus the Soviet obligations would exceed those of Poland.

2. The Soviet government should reserve the right to renounce neutrality if Poland attacked a third state.

3. The reference to territorial integrity is superfluous, especially since it is close to the content of Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant.

4. The reservation on earlier agreements remaining in force was undesirable because that would imply also Poland’s obligations to the League of Nations and because Poland could have unpublished obligations.

In reply Maksim Litvinov made some remarks detailing the Soviet position on the pact with Poland. He said that the reference to neutrality was a Soviet requirement which Poland wanted to avoid implementing. Maksim Litvinov said he would be ready to think whether or not to insist on including the word “neutrality.” In any case the article would be couched in such a way as not to cover the cases of Poland’s attack on Germany or any other state.

Maksim Litvinov saw no problems with Poland’s obligations to the League of Nations although in the negotiations with the Polish representatives he strongly objected to mentioning them in the pact. He presented Dirksen with his arguments based on the thesis that the League of Nations could not force its members to render assistance to the targets of aggression or impose sanctions on the aggressor. “In practice, Maksim Litvinov said, the League of Nations can of course declare the defending side to be the offending side, but we too have this practical possibility because a precise definition of aggression does not exist.” Poland retains, of course, some advantages because in such cases it would invoke not its own definition of aggression but the League of Nations resolution; however the USSR could not propose to its negotiating partner to withdraw from the organization or make a proviso that would allow sanctions to be ignored.

On the mention of territorial integrity Maksim Litvinov reiterated to Dirksen all the earlier assurances, adding that the Pact did not determine the borders of the territory, but that in general the mention could not be avoided because it had
been proposed by Poland and was also contained in the French Pact. “One could for example imagine a situation when such a pact is signed between Lithuania and Poland,” Litvinov argued, “if it did not imply the recognition of Wilenszczyzna as Polish because Lithuania could consider that Wilenszczyzna was not part of Polish territory.”

By analogy one may claim that the Soviet agreement to include in the pact articles on territorial integrity did not signify a refusal, in principle, to change the Soviet-Polish border in the future.

By the early 1932 it became evident that the signing of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Poland was only a matter of time but, as the previous history of the talks showed, finalizing the agreement could take a lot of time. The decisive role in speeding up the process was played by factors outside the realm of bilateral relations.

In the summer of 1932 Poland made an unsuccessful attempt to influence the Romanian-Soviet negotiations on a non-aggression pact advising Romania to take advantage of the situation when the Soviet Union faced a threat in the Far East and would therefore be more amenable. The problems in the Far East did indeed play a substantial role in speeding up the negotiating process with the Western neighbors. However, Poland tended to exaggerate the significance of that factor: the April 20, 1932 issue of the newspaper ABC carried an article entitled “The Last Days of Vladivostok, with War about to Break Out,” and the newspaper Czas carried this comment on the Soviet-Japanese conflict: “It relieves Europe of the danger of Japanese competition in the Pacific.” The French diplomacy also saw the events in the Far East as a stimulus for the Soviet leadership to step up its efforts to ensure the security of its Western borders. Some modern Polish historians also believe that the events in the Far East speeded up the negotiations on the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact. However, this position is wrong for two reasons. First, an agreement with Poland at that juncture was much more important for the Soviet leadership than the change of the balance of forces in the Pacific; second, in spite of the tough anti-Japanese rhetoric in the Soviet press, which created an impression that the Soviet Union was ready for a showdown, neither the USSR nor Japan were going to enter into a conflict, as witnessed by the preparation and speedy signing of the Soviet-Japanese fishing agreement on August 13, 1932.

There were other explanations of the haste both Poland and the USSR exhibited on the issue of signing the pact. For example the French diplomat François Dejean suggested that the haste was prompted by the imminent opening of the Geneva Disarmament Conference at which each side wanted to avoid being criticized on suspicion of harboring aggressive plans against its neighbor. This interpretation holds no water because it obviously exaggerates the ideal motives in the actual policies pursued by Pilsudski and Stalin. However, the Polish scholar M. Wolos supports the view that it was partly motivating the leaders.

The Russian historian M. Meltyukhov points out that the negotiating process was substantially speeded up by French pressure, especially on the Soviet diplomacy, most notably the fact that on September 23, 1931, France declared that it was ready to link the signing of the Soviet-Polish agreement with the signing of
the Franco-Soviet Treaty. Both sides were indeed weary of the French pressure and claims to perform patronizing functions with regard to the negotiating partners so that the speeding up of the negotiating process was clearly connected with the wish of the USSR and Poland to secure the process against French interference. However, if this theory is adopted, it is unclear why the French diplomats were so worried about the haste displayed by the Soviet leadership.

Poland was led to speed up the negotiations by the signing of non-aggression agreements between the Baltic countries and the USSR. Less than a month before the signing of the treaty, on June 15, 1932, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck sent a cable to Zaleski in Geneva to the effect that "Pilsudski does not intend to heed Romania’s blandishments about a delay so that it would not produce too wide a gap between the actions of Poland and the Baltic countries." On the whole, speaking about the reasons for the speeding up of the negotiating process, one has to note that the haste was caused in many ways by mutual pressure and the increased diplomatic activity in Europe as a whole, which was fraught with an overall change in the terms acceptable for both sides.

In mid-1932 France and Great Britain signed l’entente cordiale in Lausanne. The French diplomacy regarded it to be broadly anti-German and the British diplomacy as a way to settle account with America whose Hoover plan seriously soured the relations with Britain. Commenting on the possible accession of Poland to the Pact the director of the German Foreign Ministry’s Political Department, Gerhard Köpke, declared that “Germany will not agree to Czechoslovakia or Poland being present or having a voice in the discussions of German affairs.” Poland declared its readiness to join the pact on July 20, 1932, and five days later a similar proposal came from Germany which hoped that in this way it would remove the anti-German thrust of the pact. Poland and the USSR signed the non-aggression treaty on July 25, 1932.

The Treaty was more the result of the changing political situation in the world than simply an expression of the goodwill of the two sides; it was made possible by the weakened positions of Poland in Europe. Polish and Soviet leaders and politicians were equally not inclined to see the pact as containing real guarantees and obligations, but they saw it as a possibility to normalize the relations and to send a message to third countries.

The signing of the non-aggression pact with the USSR was welcomed by all the parties and political forces in Poland, especially, of course, by the members of the Narodowa Demokracja party, which was constantly criticizing Pilsudski’s foreign policy.

Even the most conservative assessments of the Pact’s significance looked like praise of the Sanation government. This was the comment in the newspaper Państwo Pracy: “We are not deceiving ourselves that the signing of the pact... will make war impossible. However, economic cooperation... which will certainly follow ratification will prevent an armed conflict flaring up between the contracting parties.”

True, the excessive strain in the negotiations, unwarranted by the significance of the problems discussed, and the atmosphere of innuendo surrounding
the pact created some absurd situations, such as the outburst by Stanisław Mackiewicz in his newspaper *Słowo* against the signing of a Soviet-Polish military alliance.29

Shortly after the signing of the pact rumors began circulating that the non-aggression agreement was a stepping stone to a more important goal of Polish diplomacy, i.e., future rapprochement with Germany on more favorable terms.30 The wish to use the agreement and rapprochement with the USSR as a trump card bolstering Poland’s position in the relations with Germany probably appeared shortly before the ratification of the pact, that is, several months after it was signed. However, even if that intention originated earlier, during the course of the talks with the USSR, it is not open to question that it was not the motive for the signing of the pact.

The six months between the signing and the ratification of the Pact is a long enough period for the final procedure. The reason was, as before, the Romanian factor. It has been suggested that France demanded that Poland should not ratify the pact with Moscow until the latter reached an accord with Romania, but Poland allegedly brushed this demand aside.31 Considering the serious crisis in the Polish-French relations in the autumn of 1932 this point of view looks more convincing than the information put about by the Polish press shortly after the ratification to the effect that the timeframe for the signing of the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact (November 29, 1932) and the ratification of the pact with Poland (November 27, 1932) had been agreed in advance between Paris and Warsaw.32

Along with the ratification of the agreement major changes in the Polish foreign policy were expected in connection with the appointment of Colonel Józef Beck as the Foreign Minister because in France he was thought to be the real architect of the Polish-Soviet Pact. The Krakow periodical of the Polish Socialists (PPS)—(Polska Partia Socjalistyczna) *Naprzód* (Forward!) thus assessed the implications of Beck’s appointment: “It is nothing less than a shift of the center of gravity in our foreign policy from the West to the South and East, in other words, a rapprochement with Italy and Russia and still greater distancing from France.”33

Over the next two years, until the start of the argument on the draft Eastern Pact, the Soviet-Polish relations were extremely friendly, with the diplomats of the two countries constantly stressing their common positions on various international issues. However, the fate of the relations between the two countries could be predicted shortly after the ratification of the Soviet-Polish Pact. On December 12, 1932, the day following the resolution on German parity in arms, Piłsudski called an emergency meeting which had only one issue on the agenda: was it possible to count on an alliance with France and to what extent? The conclusion arrived at was: “No, it is necessary to try to change our policy as quickly as possible in favor of a rapprochement with Germany.”34 Thus the long story of the Soviet-Polish rapprochement and the search for a *modus vivendi* had no follow-up, and the agreement failed to become an important part of the new structure of Polish-Soviet relations.
Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1932 in the Light of New Sources

NOTES


2 *AVP RF* (Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive), stock 09, inv. 6, folder 47, case 1, pp. 2-3.

3 Ibid., p. 9.

4 Ibid., p. 28.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 31.


9 *AVP RF*, stock 09, inv. 6, folder 47, case 1, p. 32.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

12 Ibid., p. 33.

13 Ibid., p. 34.

14 Ibid., p. 45.

15 Ibid., p. 38.

16 Ibid., p. 39.

17 Ibid., p. 49.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 50.

20 Ibid.


22 M. Wołos, op. cit., p. 551.

23 Ibid., p. 552.


27 The discussion and the signing in 1932 of the non-aggression pact brought practically no change to the position of the Soviet leadership on the border with Poland. Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov said in a conversation with the German Ambassador Dirksen on December 5, 1931: “One may in general question whether we recognize Poland in its current borders. But that would be a general question that has nothing to do with the pact and a question that the pact does not resolve” (*AVP RF*, stock 09, inv. 6, folder 47, case 1, p. 50).
Państwo Pracy, 18.XII.1932.

AVP RF, stock 122, inv. 15, folder 51, case 8, p. 99.

For more detail on this see: K. Lyapter, “On the Polish-German Agreement of 1934,” Voprosy istorii, 1962, No. 10; D. Klimovsky, “German-Polish Rapprochement in 1933,” Drang nach Osten, Moscow, 1967; idem, The Sinister Pact, Minsk, 1968; idem, Germany and Poland in the Locarno System of European Relations, Minsk, 1975; I. Mikhutina, op. cit.; etc. (all in Russian).

M. Zacharias, op. cit.

Nasz Przegląd (Our Review), 30.IX.1932.

AVP RF, stock 122, inv. 15a, folder 75a, case 9, p. 9.


Translated by Yevgeny Filippov
Playwright Aleksandr Volodin: Reflections on the Occasion of His Birthday

Yelena GUSHANSKAYA

In February 2014 Aleksandr Volodin (10 February 1919—17 December 2001) would have been 95.

Aleksandr Volodin entered literature in the mid-1950s as “a harbinger of the Thaw” in the art of drama and theater. An obscure dramatist, he gently but firmly renounced cardboard cutout characters, clichés and wooden intonations, the well-meaning but futile fight of the good against the best. He introduced new characters—young, “unorthodox” and informal, created a new idiom, new plots, and identified new sore topics.

Soviet drama, because it has always been taken seriously by the public, is the most conservative art form in this country. And yet Aleksandr Volodin, without giving a thought to “the artist’s duty to his people,” from the outset wrote not what he should have been writing but what tormented him personally as a sad, thinking and perceptive intellectual, a phenomenon that was rare in the dramatic art of the time. The author assumed with ease the guise of a working girl, a failed actress, a woman working at a factory that produces galoshes... It did not matter what guise he assumed because he was still writing about what he knew best, his own human suffering.

In fact he worked as a genuine artist only until the early 1960s. His later brilliant professional pieces (scripts, renderings, parodies) were a kind of “meaningful absence.”

In some ways he reminds one of the American authors Jerome David Salinger. One gets a feeling that Someone launched two versions, two incarnations of one and the same artist (something like Karmic twin soul mates) to have the second version as if in store, so that if something untoward happened at least one of them could fulfill the mission ordained from above.

Both writers made a revolution in the art of the 1950s and 1960s and both, each in his own way, fell practically silent in the subsequent years. Volodin had to earn a living by literary work.
Both were born in 1919: Salinger in January and Volodin in February. Both were born into families that were remote from art. In 1919 it was more dangerous in Russia to be wealthy than to be poor. Poverty saved him. Volodin’s life was tragic from infancy. His mother died early, his father, adjusting himself to the laws of class struggle, became a self-employed artisan making cheap buttons. He farmed out his son to his brother’s family, a successful Moscow venereologist: loneliness and “a long time spent as an unloved child in the house of relatives” left an imprint on all his life and work.

Both began their careers as soldiers. Salinger did not want to join his father’s business of producing kosher foods and entered a military school. Volodin was drafted into the army as early as 1939 after being successively an Aviation Institute student, a rural school teacher and a student at the country’s top theater institute GITIS (State Institute of Theater Art).

Salinger lived till he was 91. That Volodin lived till 82 attests to the standard of health service and the quality of life. It is one thing to live in seclusion in one’s own home without any financial constraints and it is another thing to live in the Soviet Union and Russia in-between the Civil War and perestroika, the period that took in the Second World War, the postwar hounding of “cosmopolitans,” the dreary 1970s, the rotten 1980s, and the “wild 1990s,” to experience abject poverty from early on in life until literary recognition and a sense of creative impotence at the end of the road. Vodka, to which he became attached due to the mandatory 100 ml shots at the front (one shot multiplied many times at the expense of those who did not return from battle), was as much a refuge for Volodin as seclusion was for Salinger.

Both survived the Second World War and returned home. Both discovered for the world the young post-war generation that seemed to begin human history with a clean slate, with the sacred teenage rebellion against a world of crass materialism, the world of narrow-minded philistines. Both quickly shed their illusions. ... Neither referred to the war directly, only in passing. Volodin’s front-line experience was probably more harrowing, if a comparison is at all appropriate. He recalled an episode: during a charge a soldier who was running behind Shura Livshits (Volodin’s real name), hits him in the side with his rifle butt (or so he thought) and Shura falls down, panting. As it turned out the soldier was mortally wounded and in falling, covered Shura with his body. What he took for a rifle butt was a shell fragment that hit his lung, so that Shura was only wounded, not killed.

Granted, Volodin is much less well known in the West than Salinger is in Russia, but he contributed at least as much, and even more to his native country’s culture.

For me there are three Volodins, three different persons, or hypostases.

- The first one is Volodin the author of his early and best plays: Factory Girl, Five Evenings, My Elder Sister and The New Appointment (1956-1961). The main protagonist in these plays is always the author himself, his alter ego, whether in the guise of a man or a woman (a woman in
some ways was even better, being more precise and sensitive) no matter whether the name is Zhenka Shulzenko or Nadya Rezayeva, Sasha Ilyin or Lyosha Lyamin. The first four plays are Volodin’s confession. They were about what tormented him most. He was revolting against hypocrisy, bureaucracy and tokenism that destroyed normal human life (Zhenka Shulzenko), he was distressed by the conflict of a creative individual and his close ones (Nadya Rezayeva), he was trying to turn the clock back (Ilyin) and finally, he presented his own vision of the social and moral principles of Soviet life (Lyamin).

- The second Volodin is a consummate professional, a writer at a time when the potential of lyrical confessions seemed to have spent itself, the author of charming tragedies about love (Do not Part with Those you Love), dramatic parodies, parables, renderings and sequels (Two Arrows, Lizard, Mother of Jesus, Dulcinea del Toboso), some of the best film scripts of those years (Adventures of a Dentist, The Magician, Daughters and Mothers), some of which became cult movies (The Autumn Marathon).

- The third Volodin is a myth, a man who wrote prose, poetry and notes of an indeterminate genre that were published but were not widely known. They formed the essence of his work in his last years. He began to articulate them himself in the 1990s. Volodin’s image at the time was associated with the diverse and numerous published interviews (they have never been collected or reissued and are practically unknown to the readers unless they were his contemporaries), video interviews, biographical made-for-TV films and his own physical and consciously cultivated presence in culture. That was an attempt to preserve and record his times with his own flesh and blood.

The first and third periods are the most interesting.

Volodin started as a prose writer. His first 170-page book under an uninformative title Short Stories was published in 1954.

Volodin attended the literary group of young prose writers at the Sovetsky Pisatel publishing house. The group’s leaders were Leonid Rakhmanov and Mikhail Slonimsky and the publishing manager was Margarita (Mara) Dovlatova.

In addition to professional matters, when the members read and discussed what they had written, they had a wafer-thin advantage over other “unorganized” budding authors: Sovetsky Pisatel published an almanach called Molodoy Leningrad (Young Leningrad) supervised by M. Dovlatova. It brought out first books by the members of the literary group. Short Stories was Volodin’s first published book.

He himself never recalled Short Stories and one can understand why: they do not reveal the hand, the poetic gift or the personality of the author. Even so,
it is an important book. “I knew I could not create plots and my composition was helpless,” he would later say about this work. But the main characters of his plays were already there, they were stirring and gradually assuming a life of their own.

Practically every story would be echoed—if only in small ways, in little traits and notes—in later works. The same images and themes run through Volodin’s writings throughout his career. Several stories would be echoed in terms of their plots and characters in later plays: Engineer Volodya Novikov in The New Appointment, Strong Character in My Elder Sister and the screenplay for the film Daughters and Mothers, Friends in An Incident that Nobody Noticed. The heroine of the short story Anechka, a silly, narrow-minded young woman, would appear as Zoya in Five Evenings.

The longest of the nine stories, Fifteen Years of a Life, is simply the material for Five Evenings. The period of time stated in the title is the first thing that strikes one. Fifteen Years of a Life is not a sketch, but material that would later unfold into the play Five Evenings and form what is perhaps Volodin’s main theme. The story is long-drawn-out, somewhat loose in structure and overloaded with details, but it contains the essence of the author’s perception of the world and his suffering. The theme of the story is war and life after the war, odd though it may sound considering that the writer never addressed the war theme upfront.

The main character is a man of about 35, Sasha Ilyin (Volodin himself was 35 when he wrote the story). It is a story of his life, especially the latest ten mis-spent years. He used to work as a teacher at a rural school before being called up to the front. After the war he studied chemistry at a Technological Institute. He was in love with his classmate Mara, so much so that he flunked his exams... As a result he first became a conductor on a long-distance train, then signed a contract to work in the North and ended up working as a janitor at the Technological Institute where he once studied. He meets a former classmate, Timofeyev, who is by now a respectable associate professor, and a bloated aging woman Mara has become. The text mentions another girl, Nadya, one of his former pupils...

Life in a students’ boarding house, loneliness, illness...

This shiftless, misdirected type has the physical traits and the destiny of its author (the author too has a shell fragment lodged in his lung and in the early 1950s he thought of himself as an all-round loser): “The mine fragment hit him in the side, pierced his chest without touching the ribs and got stuck in his lung. The wounded were taken to the medical battalion in the body of a truck. Ilyin was sitting in an unnatural pose, leaning backwards. He felt like a vessel filled with blood to the brim: he felt that if he leaned forward blood would flow through his throat. He could only breathe in shallow little gasps: slightly up to inhale and slightly down to exhale. Not a millimeter more. A man cannot breathe like this for long. So, this was the end. He was thinking: if only he was given to live one more year... Just one year. A huge year consisting of tens of thousands of endless minutes. He thought of all the things he could do within a year. He
Playwright Aleksandr Volodin

would work in the lab for sixteen or twenty hours a day. Perhaps he could make a chemical discovery of some sort...”

And in Five Evenings we read:

“I remember how I was wounded. A bumpy ride in the body of a medical vehicle, squeezed against the side. A shell fragment hit my lung. I feel that if I lean forward, blood will flow from my throat. I can’t last long like this. That’s it. I had only one thought in my head: if only they had let me live another year. A million endless minutes. How much I could accomplish during one year. I would work for sixteen or twenty hours a day. Who knows, perhaps I could have done something worthwhile...”

Volodin would later repeat like a litany: “At the front I had an ambitious dream: if I were allowed—later, after the war was over... to live a little longer and be Down There and just have a glimpse... And I was allowed... I had to be happy. It is shameful to be unhappy.”

Before passing on to Five Evenings a short digression is in order.

None of Volodin’s four main plays passed unnoticed. Each of them provided a starting point, an inspiration and an impulse for works written in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Thus, Factory Girl was rewritten and expanded by Valentin Chernykh in Moscow Doesn’t Believe in Tears, explaining with the benefit of more recent experience how the young generation (young women working in industry) entered life in the 1950s and how it should have been in accordance with socialist realism.

A straightforward interpretation of The New Appointment gave a new focus and a new twist to the “industrial” prose. Anatoly Grebnev in The Last Screenwriter’s Diary quoted film director Lev Kulidzhanov, who said he had accepted his post of the head of the Film Makers’ Union after seeing the Sovremennik Theater’s production of The New Appointment.

It was thanks to Volodin (though he was not the first to invent the plot) that the test of time, a meeting of characters many years later became a favorite subject in the Soviet theater. Plays in which the protagonists look back on and analyze past conflicts include: The Fourth One by Konstantin Simonov, Traditional Reunion of Former Classmates by Viktor Rozov, Climbing Mount Fuji by Chinghiz Aytmatov, to mention but a few... Indeed, Vampilov’s Duck Hunt is structured like a look back. The method gives some important insights.

Five Evenings has inspired Viktor Rozov’s Traditional Reunion... The play shows a reunion of the alumni of a famous old Moscow school, a trip down memory lane, recollection of youth and half-forgotten loves.

On the face of it, the differences between Traditional Reunion and Five Evenings are obvious. Volodin’s play tells a poignant, very personal and lyrical story of just two people. Speaking (somewhat coyly) about Five Evenings Volodin said it had become so widely popular because stage director Tovstonogov had chosen to portray “the people whose lives had not turned out well with the amount of detail these miserable characters did not deserve.”

Rozov’s play about the meeting of former classmates looks back on their common history, the history of a generation. It is at once a collective snapshot
and an epic canvas. Each of Rozov’s characters is portrayed with gusto, each in his or her social role belongs to a different social stratum and each of them strikes a perfect balance between the typical and individual traits. Rozov has his own concept of the individual. The innate personality of a child relates to that person’s present social status as the numerator and the denominator of a fraction, the social role being the denominator and the human personality the numerator. The bigger the denominator the less the value of the fraction and the more puny the personality.

The play seeks to answer the question: who is a worthier character, he who has put the stake on success suppressing his natural instincts for the sake of a career or he who chose to live a simple, obscure and honest life without striving to gain social status, but without betraying anyone (it was tacitly assumed that career growth inevitably involved betrayal).

The question is answered through the portrayal of Sergey Usov, who used to be the darling of the class, the leader of the boys and the idol of the girls... When he entered the room everyone perked up, turned to look at him, but nothing happened. The charisma was still there (at least the actor had to portray it), but the social role was not. What was behind his inner freedom, or rather uninhibited behavior, remained a secret. Sergey turned out to be a character not anchored in real life, an absolutely free man, free from any social role or mask, with no past and no present. Whether or not an individual is free becomes clear from the circumstances of his life. But there were no circumstances at all. An attempt to create an absolutely free individual in a test-tube was doomed to fail.

Not so in Volodin’s play.

Five Evenings was his second play.

The plot is as old as the world and could well make the short list of the most popular plots in world drama. The main character returns to his native town and meets the woman who was his first love. He finds an ossified, moth-eaten spinster. Five Evenings (unlike any other of his works) reveals the author’s skill in portraying the tragedy of life in general and do it in a way that “when people dine, just dine, their happiness is formed and their lives are ruined” (Anton Chekhov). Volodin paraphrases it as follows: “his characters were having tea and were slowly perishing, while our heroes were having tea and slowly blossoming”). It was like in Chekhov’s Cherry Orchard: people were yearning, dreaming, making a fuss, trading, counting their money, matchmaking, marrying, quarreling and making it up, and all the while the world around them—charming, inept and sad—was crumbling. ... Indeed it was the passing of an age. In Chekhov’s play this was presented with vivid physicality: the pace of events was accelerating, time was contracting and shrinking, space shriveling: time and space were pushing out their characters.

Something similar happened in Volodin’s play (perhaps the only such instance in Soviet drama art). Two people met again after many years, while on the stage the events that had set them apart were unfolding, what had made the “star” Tamara a foreman at a galoshes factory and the former talented student Sasha Ilyin a driver of a truck whose “tires cracked and broke like cardboard.” It
was as if the sound of the axes cutting down the cherry orchard was echoed by
the historical steamroller that crushed people’s lives. This was a fantasy... a play
that broke new ground.

When the stage director Tovstonogov announced that he would “produce a
play with ‘magic’ (as quoted by Volodin),” he hardly knew what the “magic”
would consist in. The dramatist would later attribute the magic to “compassion,”
attention to the people and events “that at the time were not accepted to be shown
and pronounced from on stage.” In the play, though, the magic was created not
by psychological nuances, but resorting to poetics and its techniques that gave
insights into social and historical layers of tragedy.

People were drinking tea or wine, quarreling and making peace, fretting
about the young generation, laying the table, tossing the plates off the table by
pulling the tablecloth from underneath, putting flowers in jugs, throwing flowers
out of the jugs (the jugs were too dear to be thrown out) as history was unfold-
ing before our eyes. With Chekhov tragedy emerged from time and space. With
Volodin, it was engendered by the war and memory, just a mere human memory
which alone perhaps, turns an ape into a human and, more importantly, forms
culture and the socium.

Volodin once noted in a TV interview that when *Five Evenings* was being
filmed, Nikita Mikhalkov was urging him to remove the final sentence in Tama-
ra’s concluding monologue, the key words that distilled the film’s message: “all
I want is that there be no more war.” Mikhalkov argued that this was a hangover
of Soviet mentality... The author left that sentence in. Still, the director shot the
film as though that sentence was not there, a film about the odd folks of bygone
days, in some ways pitiful, in some ways funny, charming in an odd sort of way,
slow moving and slow speaking.

Volodin in *Notes of a Man Who Is Not Sober* relates a minor episode con-
ected with the film. “At the head office they asked me, ‘Was the film made for
foreign consumption?’ ‘No, why?’ ‘They’ll think that all our people still live in
communal flats.’” The censors had a point (only, their conclusion was monu-
mentally hypocritical). The communal flat depicted in *Five Evenings* is unusu-
ally beautiful, impressive, cozy and poetic. Nikita Mikhalkov almost made the
interior the main protagonist in the film. The visual part turned out to be the
film’s dominant feature.

Elsewhere in his notes Volodin writes: “There was a small country in Europe
where the film was strangely successful. People there took it for a film of the
absurd. They thought that the heroine lived in a haunted apartment peopled by
ghosts who apparently reminded her of her past sins. There was an Armenian
woman (a hint at the ethnic issue), a boy riding a bicycle in the hallway (refer-
ence to some secret guilt?)”—also a sharp observation. Such an apartment must
be haunted by ghosts. Unfortunately, only the art director did justice to the main
theme of the play, but memories merely added some extra colors to the narrative
without becoming the film’s core.

The main message of the film is that Tamara, a stern woman, took Ilyin at
face value when he posed as a “big cheese,” a big boss, and felt that she was
beneath him in her social status and as a personality. Their problem seemed to be their unequal social status. However, when the heroine learned that he was in reality a humble working man like herself there were no more barriers. Tama-ra’s final sentence in the film takes on a banal “feminine” meaning, especially since she makes a subtle change in Volodin’s sentence to make it sound like a folklore ditty.

Volodin does not portray types. Ilyin as played by Yefim Kopelyan in Georgy Tovstonogov’s 1958 stage production and Ilyin as played by Stanislav Lyubshin in Nikita Mikhalkov’s 1981 film would not have recognized each other, although the director diligently tries to reproduce the period atmosphere of the 1950s. The dazzling Zinayida Sharko in Tovstonogov’s production of *Five Evenings* has as little resemblance to a worker in a hazardous workshop as the regal Doronina has to a harassed tally-clerk in a factory (the film *Elder Sister*).

The conflict here is not between Sasha Ilyin and Tamara, but between what people were like and what the war/time had done to them—this is the message of the historical canvas.

“There is no social criticism in *Five Evenings,*” Volodin recalls. True, there were no party bosses who handed down punishment and rewards.” Fair enough. But there was history, the atmosphere of the time, the things that shaped human destinies and would go on shaping them, robbing them of their smiles, light-heartedness, naivety, openness and charm, and the things that enabled people to preserve these qualities even as they matured, grew coarse and embittered... This is Chekhovian writing, when ‘people dine, just dine, while their lives are being ruined.”

Throughout the play the hero awakens the heroine by reminiscences. His background, his personality—not masculinity (this depends on the attitude and skill of the actor), but memories. Memories of the past are the unnamed hero of the play, the third protagonist in the narrative. *Five Evenings* is a play of memory.

It has no list of *dramatis personae* (at least in the initial early publications). The play opens not with the dramatist’s remark, but with a lyrical introduction: “*It happened in Leningrad,* in one of its streets, one of its houses. Winter, it snows in the evening. The snow evokes memories of school vacations, dates in house entrances, past winters...” (In Leningrad’s Grand Drama Theater, or *BDT,* the text was read by Tovstonogov himself).

The dramatic action is provided by the juxtaposition of the here-and-now, which is casual and fickle, and the past, which is eternal and genuine. Even before we know anything about the characters the theme has been declared before anything happens. In the first scene we see a conversation between a man and a woman, Zoya, a salesgirl, and Ilyin, who meet by chance. Zoya, the hero’s new girlfriend, is flushed with her little feminine victory: “It happened so quickly between us. We had known each other for less than a week.” Ilyin replies out of sync, reacting not to her words, but to what he sees outside the window: “this was our very own by-street (Vilensky Pereulok is a by-street linking Vosstaniya Street and Radishchev Street.—Ye.G.) And our own cinema (called *Luch,* or
“Ray”—Ye. G.). And our own sky. Winter. Night, and it’s blue in spite of all. It’s dangerous to come back to the places where you were happy at nineteen.”

*Five Evenings* lacks what may be called a dramatic conflict. There is a vignette, the story of young love (Slava and Katya), a favorite of many actors, there is a sketch about Ilyin and Timofeyev and there is a casual love affair between Ilyin and Zoya, but there is no conflict between Tamara and Ilyin because it is clear from the start that they are still in love with each other. The action in *Five Evenings* is structured by memories.

The play persistently and somewhat ingenuously contrasts the romantic view of the past represented by cosmic phenomena and categories (“winter, night, but the sky is blue in spite of all”) and the daily, humdrum, material world. This world seems to be distorted by an evil witch’s little piece of glass: everything becomes prosaic. A cover girl turns out to be a bitch (“this one stopped appearing on the front covers, must have quarreled...” “or maybe she married a rich man”), a peaceful conversation explodes into a row that ends up with curses and threats (“Oh, hell, Sasha, you are abusing my kindness... I’ll never come back. I’ll push you down the stairs... Just don’t you come back.”)

Tamara, a former beauty (“she was a beauty, they don’t make them so beautiful these days. A star. Her friends called her ‘the Star’”), also leads a dreary life, only of a different kind. She has nothing to remind her of the past, neither “her own” sky or the place she remembers, or museums (“we may go to Lake Krasavitsa. I haven’t been there but they say... Pavlovsk is also very beautiful... I haven’t been there but they say...”) She has nothing left except what forms the day-to-day values and the values of the socialist community. “My life is not bad. I don’t grumble.” I am a foreman at the Red Triangle plant. I have an interesting and responsible job.” It is all highly revealing: she does not say “I live well,” but “my life is not bad,” she does not say “I am happy,” but “I don’t grumble.” She lists her blessings twice during the course of one scene, she has nothing to add.

What Tamara has left is a register of party dues payments, spick and span order in her room, the tram in which she wants to “ride, ride and never arrive anywhere” and in which everyone addresses her as *mamasha* (a common way of addressing women past their prime), and Marx’s letters... It is not so much the fact of reading the founder of Marxism as a symbol of an established authority.

The plot of *Five Evenings* is “the story of how people’s feelings are awakened.” This has become a commonplace in reviews of the productions of the play. But few people gave thought to how the revival of emotional and physical sensitivity and emotionality is reflected in the fabric of the text. During the course of the play Tamara’s speech changes from stilted Soviet clichés—“he is active in the community,” “a communist can demand more from the Party bureau,” “how are you doing, have you achieved your goals?” to sincere human language: “You’re so honest. So clever. So good. Remember that you offered me to go move somewhere? Well, I’ll go if you haven’t changed your mind.”

As a counterpoint to the reminiscences of Tamara and Ilyin and their spiritual recovery, Zoya’s memories are all about undeserved losses, wastage and attrition. “I used to be better than you, take my word for it. Look what I was
like”; “I myself introduced my friend to him. I met her recently. She’s all dressed up. And it could have been me”; “She wants to live all her life with him and he up and walks out on her. Then she meet another man. Not quite her type. But she got used to him. And he too jilted her...”

The dialogue between Ilyin and Tamara is woven from reminiscences. The words “do you remember” are a constant refrain: “do you remember that house entrance?” “do you remember the first time you kissed me?” The action is permeated with two poetic refrains: Sergey Yesenin’s “Life of mine? Did you come in dreams to me?” and Pushkin’s “where I suffered, where I loved and where I buried my heart.” And also by the refrain of a popular song: “Sweetheart, take me along with you.” The farewell song (an anonymous girl tries to hold on to the past) is a multiplied remembrance, the characters’ past, their secret love talk which in the end erupts into an undisguised plea: “take me along with you.”

Sending Tamara’s nephew, Slava, to study chemistry at university is also a tribute to the past. Every meaningful action is bolstered by the authority of the past. “When there is a white tablecloth with flowers on the table it is somehow not right to be petty, rude and angry. A tablecloth should have creases from ironing, it evokes childhood memories.”

In the culmination scene Ilyin and Tamara recall, in parallel, how new conscripts were being dispatched to the front: “...all the women around me are weeping, and she looks up at me and says: ‘You see what an insensitive wife you are going to have.’ Why “insensitive” and why, judging from the context, this quality is supposed to make her superior to other women? As soon as the vehicle drives off Tamara falls into a state of anabiosis as if she were under an anesthetic that enables her to survive. Throughout the play the anesthetic wears off and it hurts. Everybody knows what a painful and excruciating process it is. And what is more, this is the historical period of the Thaw.

The ability to “drop out of reality” to overcome extreme stress or grief or pain is an autobiographical trait:

“In a field hospital near Rzhev a young woman surgeon was removing a fragment from my lung. For some reason they did not have what was needed for general anesthesia. The young woman said, almost apologetically, ‘You can scream, and groan, it’s alright, it’ll help you to bear the pain.’

But I never moaned. When the ordeal was over, she said, ‘You are something phenomenal, you didn’t even moan.’

I muttered: ‘I was looking at your hands.’ The sleeves of her (blood-bespattered) operating gown were rolled up to her elbows. Then there were the rubber gloves, but her arms, her beautiful white arms. She was a beginner, though, and the fragment is still in my lung.”

So great is the anesthetic power of Volodin’s text that nobody seems to have noticed that the surgeon’s rubber gloves reach, judging from the description, above the elbows and that the patient cannot see the surgeon’s hands because they are inside the wound. (Come to think of it, he may be describing a critical situation when the patient sees everything that happens from above as it were, and then the picture is authentic).
Another abiding theme in the play is the cold. The characters recall winter, the action takes place in winter, it is cold on the stairway and cold in the house entrance, it is cold in Timofeyev’s apartment. And Ilyin comes from a place where there is permafrost and “tires break like cardboard...” Cold is the natural temperature of life.

Throughout the play the heroine gradually sheds the icy crust moving from “I don’t grumble” to “Lyusya died during the siege, and Slava survived;” from “I have an interesting and responsible job, I am canvassing on all the social issues” to “oh, don’t kiss my hands, they’re dirty, don’t kiss my blouse... Don’t worry about me, I lived well here. I had a lot of happiness in my life, more than most...” She concludes her final monologue about their future and impossible bliss with Ilyin (impossible because the past cannot be repeated and brought back) with the words that distil the motif of the play: “all I want is that there should never be another war.” This makes Five Evenings a historical canvas and fills it with ontological suffering: for 20th-century Russia the Great Patriotic War was the defining event in its history.

Twenty years later Volodin came up with an unexpected sequel, or rather a rhyme, to Five Evenings in the shape of the 1979 film The Autumn Marathon. (Unlike Mikhalkov’s film of Five Evenings which only used the scenario, this later film warrants a discussion not only of the script, but also of the film directed by Georgy Daneliya). The script of The Autumn Marathon, like in earlier years, reflects the author’s own suffering. It is confessional from beginning to end. Volodin here does not disguise himself as a factory girl or a driver released from a labor camp.

The events in The Autumn Marathon are lifted out of the author’s own life, except that [real] “Allochka” bore a son to [real] Buzykin and then suddenly died several years later leaving him to sort out the mess. The children (the son in real life) left not for the North but for the South, “more to the south than before,” to America, which spelled a lot of trouble for his kin who stayed behind. But the events are secondary. Translator Buzykin, like the playwright Volodin, is a character all of a piece. He is only happy at his writing desk where he is his own man, managing all his credits, while all the rest breeds a sense of guilt, weariness, and resentment of the rude dailiness of life.

The physiognomy of actor Basilashvili who plays the part of Buzykin looks grey even on color film. He has a harassed look, his pants are too short for him and his shirts are shabby with ill-matching buttons (Allochka is anxious to smarten up her hero). He has a writer’s stoop, a timid manner, an unmanly gait that brings to mind Gogol’s character Akaky Akakiyevich, and even his name Buzykin somehow does not suit him. In short, he is an unlikeliest character for romantic escapades: Basilashvili conveys this sense in a very credible and articulate manner.

A very penetrating portrayal of a historical type, a genuine, sincere and utterly unpractical man... Unable to grab even what is coming his way (a young mistress, a chance of having links with abroad), not “pushy,” forever mutely resenting his bosses, Buzykin was the last hero of the Soviet era. The hero that first had
the guise of Vasily Aksyonov’s “stellar” boys of the 1960s, then imperceptibly morphed into the characters of Yury Trifonov who looked as if they had been born already battered by life, Buzkin defies strict social pigeonholing: he is not a university professor, nor a writer and translator, nor a personality in culture, nor a husband nor a lover. That is why he evokes a reaction of mixed puzzlement and hatred on the part of Allochka’s next-door neighbor, a “normal” pensioner. The old man cannot place him: he is a man without a face and without a labor union membership card.

In the key scene in The Autumn Marathon the main character, after being told by Allochka that they were through and being stunned and relieved at the same time, narrowly misses being run over by a car. Then follows a brilliant sequel. After the driver makes sure that the passer-by is unscathed, he goes on the offensive and demands payment for a dent in the car body. Buzkin would be happy to see the incident closed in this way. But at that point Allochka, ever ready to defend him, steps in and Buzkin is forced to play the part of a real man and behave like a fighting cock. A karate wrestler who is passing by is attracted by the noise and, thinking that Buzkin is the assailant, twists his arm professionally, but discovering that the culprit is the other guy, just as nonchalantly tackles the driver. Allochka is sure she has once again saved her oafish suitor. Buzkin realizes that he is trapped again. What makes the scene remarkable is that everyone takes everyone else for someone he/she is not: the short and unpossessing passer-by turns out to be a karate master, the bumbling Buzkin is taken for a hoodlum, the arrogant driver for his victim and the busybody Allochka for a gawker. It is always like this: Allochka takes Buzkin for a lover, his wife for a husband, his dean for a rebel, Varvara for a gold fish and his students take him for their mentor...

Volodin was never one to pigeonhole his characters socially, but in this case he shows a riot of identities, an alarming gap between reality and appearance, between a person’s essence and his/her social role. Nina and Buzkin pretend to be a happy family, a neighbor (played by Yevgeny Leonov) behaves as if he were the boss in Buzkin’s apartment, Buzkin, who accompanies a Danish translator in his morning jogs, looks like God knows who...

Volodin feels the fabric of life falling apart: everyone is a misfit, especially the weak and decent, like Buzkin. Everything is still neatly organized and pretty, but people in this reality are already scattering like roaches. The most futile thing is doing something together: singing in a duet, split a bottle of vodka among three people—somehow togetherness does not seem to work anymore. There are never more than two people in a screen frame. When there are three (Nina, Bill and Andrey) (Andrey-Alla-Shershavnikov) they feel ill-at-ease and an iron taste of falsehood pervades the scene. Basilashvili’s character lives only when he is alone in the frame.

The world portrayed in Factory Girl and Five Evenings could still have been changed by drive, energy, honesty, panache, audacity of talent and brains, or, finally, by tenderness and love. By the time of The Autumn Marathon that world ceased to exist. The time when life could be set right (or at least one could try to
do it) by youthful revolt or by love, talent and brains is gone. *The Autumn Marathon* is about the tail end of the Soviet civilization. When the social slots are so spacious that the individual no longer notices them, this is normal, but if everyone feels like a square peg in a round hole, then the pigeonholes start breaking of their own accord like mirrors in a home presaging misfortune.

The film uncannily presages what life would be like in some ten or fifteen years, in the “wild 1990s.”

While in the works of Vasily Aksyonov and Yury Trifonov one can easily read the characters’ past, Volodin’s hero has surprisingly, a clear future.

At best he will get hooked by a starry-eyed, silly blonde student like the one who was holding up her hand to be allowed to read her class translation. Failing that, an untidy, lonely old age on the brink of survival (Buzykin’s relationship with vodka never took off). Buzykin’s command of foreign languages, which could be a comfortable source of income during the Gorbachev perestroika, would not save him. He is destined to earn the wage of a street Sweeper. He is an outsider even in relatively comfortable times, an outsider simply because he is a decent fellow. His other qualities are not even considered.

Two of the decade’s best actresses, Marina Neyelova and Natalya Gundareva, toned down their fiery temperaments and performed as if they were appearing in an ethnography film. The future of both is thoroughly predictable. Allochka would learn the computer, proof reading and photo shop. In the Soviet years they produced good professionals, so the girl would become a good publishing worker (competition would teach her to be punctual and precise). Allochka would buy an apartment of her own and give it a European facelift, she would buy herself a mink coat and would spend her holidays in Turkey or Egypt...

Nina (who works as an interpreter with the Intourist agency) would open a small travel firm... She would visit her children in Boston over Christmas, go to Karlovy Vary for her health in spring and to Switzerland to admire the lakes in the autumn.

Yevgeny Leonov’s character would manage to grab a house basement and privatize a couple of tool sheds. He would not change his life style because he is allergic to change, but his sons would not miss their chance and would open fitness centers in the basement after stealing some weight-lifting equipment from the school next door and set up car tire repair shops in the tool sheds.

Varvara would turn out to be a talented poet whom the Soviet government had allegedly prevented from fulfilling her talent. She would live in Europe, for example, in Germany. She would sell her apartment and the benefits of her new position would make it easy for her to come to terms with change.

Adding to the sense of authenticity was the fact that the urban space, like in *Five Evenings*, was highly concrete. The publishing house was in the *Dom Knigi* (Book House) (Buzykin’s conversation with the director was actually filmed in the editorial office). The characters walk on the Moyka Embankment opposite the Summer Garden, they go to the Leningrad Movie House near *Tavrichesky Sad*, Buzykin lives on Vasilyevsky Island and the Dvortsovy draw bridge is always one of the first to be lifted.
The minutiae of daily life were also authentic.

In Allochka’s room there is a bed where she lives (sleeps, lies when she is sick, makes love, talks on the phone, watches television, sews, knits and eats) and under the bed stand little battered felt boots (valenki). Everything is authentic: it is Indian summer outside, but central heating is not switched on in September so that old buildings are dank... Incidentally, Allochka’s valenki into which she so expertly thrusts her feet while still sitting on her bed first appeared in Tovstonogov's production of *Five Evenings* where warm clothes and footwear hinted at the place from which Ilyin returned.

In the 1980s Volodin became his own hero. He could not seriously write about the rising tribe of fraudsters, underground millionaires, petty merchants starting their businesses, wheeler-dealers and their shenanigans. (“Who am I supposed to play? A hired killer’s mum?” actress Anastasiya Vertinskaya wondered during the perestroika years. The films of the period were filled with people whose souls and not only hands were unclean.

Volodin took to writing poetry that “did not pretend to be poetry” (Sergey Yursky), bitter and funny, simple and aphoristic. And he continued *The Notes of a Man Who Is Not Sober*. He began to appear on the screen as a vestige of a bygone era, lending authenticity to history by his physical presence which in the 1990s and 2000s was arguably the form of art that had the greatest impact.

NOTES
3 Ibid., pp. 404-499.
4 The name is a farewell gesture of sorts. Leningrad writer Viktor Kurochkin, a fellow member of the literary group, had a character by the name of “Buzykin,” who appeared in the story *Notes of People’s Judge Semyon Buzykin*.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov
Max Weber As Anti-Tolstoy

Konstantin TROITSKY

On November 20, 1910 Lev Tolstoy was dying at a remote railway junction of Astapovo in Ryazan Province ten days after stealthily leaving his famous family estate of Yasnaya Polyana. This last journey, or escape, came as a surprise for society, but not for the writer himself, who had long contemplated it. The motif of escape is found in many of his works and is probably one of the focal ideas of the second half of his life. 1 His act was a blow to his wife Sofia, but it did not come as a surprise to her. A chase of the “fugitive,” who was accompanied only by doctor Dushan Makovitsky, was organized quickly from different quarters: from the public, journalists set out in search of him, from the family, his daughter Aleksandra and—after Tolstoy’s “vacillation” and “standing before the Optina Pustyn’ hermit community”—the Orthodox monastery’s hegumen Varsonofy sallied forth in search of the writer. Some of them caught up with Tolstoy, but he was not destined to return to society, family or the Orthodox Church.

As Tolstoy lay dying in Astapovo, in another part of the world, in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, the first congress of the German Sociological Association (November 19-22) was being addressed by Max Weber concerning Ernst Troeltsch’s report Das stoisch-christliche Naturrecht.

This was the first time he publicly² mentioned the concept of “unworldly love,” (“akosmistische Liebe”) taking Lev Tolstoy’s ideas as an example. The speech was pivotal to the theory that loomed large in Max Weber’s sociology of religion and to the evolution of his ethical views.

The article below traces the main stages in the famous German scholar’s attitude to Lev Tolstoy’s ethical thought. It identifies four stages, each linked with a theme or problem that was important for Weber (I call them “variations”) and on which he challenged the Russian writer.

— The first stage saw the development of the ethics of persuasion and the contrasting ethics of responsibility and coincides in time with the First Russian Revolution of 1905;

— the second stage centers on the concept of “unworldly love” and begins at the time of Tolstoy’s escape and subsequent death;

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— the third stage unfolds against the background of the First World War and is connected with Max Weber’s criticism of pacifism and the germination of his idea of “the struggle of the gods”;

— the fourth stage is highlighted by his programmatic report/article *Science As a Vocation* and coincides with the October 1917 Revolution in Russia; in it he addresses the issue of the value and meaning of life/death in the era of “disenchantment.”

In spite of the separation which demonstrates the dialectics of the development of Weber’s ideas in his “distance” polemics with Tolstoy’s views, all the stages are interconnected and do not end with the beginning of the next stage, rather they intertwine, enriching one another. Indeed, in a certain sense one can discern all the four themes in the first stage, albeit not in an articulated form. One or the other theme comes to the fore gradually, often under the impact of historical events. The culmination is arguably Max Weber’s speech/article *Politics As a Vocation*, the German thinker’s last significant work. In this work all the four themes are present explicitly, adding up to an articulated world view of “responsible ethics of persuasion.”

**Variation One**

**The Russian Revolution of 1905-1906 and “the Ethics of Persuasion.”**

His 1910 speech was not the first time that Max Weber linked his ethical ideas with Lev Tolstoy. This happened earlier in connection with a milestone event in Russian history. The events in the Russian Empire assumed a particular relevance for Europe after the First Russian Revolution. In 1905-1906 Weber immersed himself in the study of Russia’s past and present. He read scholarly studies and periodicals and took up the study of the Russian language. The result was two major articles dated 1906: *On the Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia* and *The Transition of Russia to Pseudoconstitutionalism*. These articles span a wide range of topics from the economic role of the Russian peasant commune (*obshchina*) and the significance of the *Zemstvos* for the development of liberalism to the characteristics of Russian politics and the worldviews of the intelligentsia. Lev Tolstoy is mentioned in an important context in each of the articles.

Describing Russian thought in the article *On the Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia*, Max Weber writes about the absolute rejection of the ‘ethics of consequentialism’ (*Erfolgsethik*) in the area of politics too.” The “rejection of the ‘ethics of consequentialism’” means that “the unconditional ethical imperative is valid as a possible lodestar of positive action... the only possibilities are *either* the fight for what is right or ‘holy’ self-abnegation,” this alone is a duty and an obligation; “because all values other than ethical ones have been excluded, when one has done what one perceives to be one’s positive
‘duty,’ then unconsciously those words from the Bible come into force again, words which have penetrated most deeply into the soul not only of Tolstoy but indeed of the whole Russian people, namely ‘Resist not evil.’” Weber wraps up this thought in the following way: “The abrupt switch from tempestuous, energetic action to resigned acceptance of the situation results from a refusal to acknowledge that the morally indifferent exists or to accept that the morally indifferent is a possible ‘value.’”5 Weber also mentions here Vladimir Solovyov’s panmoralism, essentially identifying its definition with Tolstoy’s ideas. Thus Weber posits the existence of the dominant ethical value that rules out other values. According to Weber, the motive of “resist not evil” is deeply ingrained in the Russian people, which however, does not preclude abrupt outbursts of unbridled violence. He sees Tolstoy almost as “the mirror of the Russian revolution” with its contradictions and, most importantly, with absolute conviction that brooks no compromises. The emphasis is on renouncing, on ethical grounds, of any political means, among which Weber considered violence to be the key means. It is no accident that in his second article in this cycle, *The Transition of Russia to Pseudoconstitutionalism*, Weber describes Tolstoy as apolitical.6

After the start of the war Weber elaborates the theme of the ethics of persuasion and Lev Tolstoy as one of its main proponents, insisting on the literal interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, especially the part dealing with “non-resistance to evil.”7 Weber links Tolstoy’s ethics of persuasion with the concept of “unworldly love” juxtaposing it to the ethics of responsibility, which the German thinker identifies and formulates proceeding from the Russian writer’s worldview. Weber’s attitude to Tolstoy’s pacifism will be dealt with below when examining the second and especially the third theme.

Thus, at the first stage Tolstoy is an advocate of an absolute ethical commandment, a panmoralist for whom any other “commandments” are either subordinate to the absolute or ignored. Subsequently, these thoughts will be fleshed out to form Weber’s “ethics of persuasion,” while “commandments” would come from different value “gods” that are independent from each other. It is through his critique of “panmoralism” as “ethical monotheism” that Weber will pursue the central ideas of his ethical/value thought, namely, the ethics of responsibility and value “polytheism.”

**Variation Two.**

**Lev Tolstoy’s Escape and Death.**

“Unworldly Love.”

Thus, during the final tragic events in Tolstoy’s life when he tried to break with his former way of life and the habitual world of Yasnaya Polyana, Weber for the first time formulates his idea of “unworldly love” as a “world-denying love.”8 There is one other known detail of Weber’s attitude to Tolstoy at the time. Shortly before the abovementioned events, on November 1, 1910, Max Weber, who suffered from insomnia for much of his life, writes to his wife Marianne that
he reads Tolstoy at night and exclaims, "After two hours of reading Tolstoy I fall asleep!!" This casual remark proves that Weber’s reference to the Russian writer in his speech to the congress of the German sociological association was not fortuitous. Shortly after the congress Weber offered the first evidence of his intention to write an article about Tolstoy which then evolved into an intention to write a book. He was thinking about it for several years. Perhaps the last time this wish of his was mentioned goes back to 1913 when Marianne Weber wrote in a letter to her mother-in-law: "‘our’ Tolstoy book’s turn has still not come, but I will not let him (Max Weber—K.T.) go—except he write it."9 The First World War was approaching, and we do not know whether after it began Weber still wanted to write a book about the Russian writer.

In his 1910 speech Weber enlarges upon the subject of the place of love in the Russian religious tradition, the Russian sects, the “antique mysticism” still present in the Orthodox Church, mentioning a propos Aleksey Khomyakov, Vladimir Solovyov, the novel The Brothers Karamazov, but the emphasis is still on Lev Tolstoy. Weber says that the Orthodox Church retains “a special, mystical, abiding (unverlierbar) faith in the land of the East where brotherly love, love of one’s close ones is so original and presents itself in such unfathomable human relations that are glorified by the great religions of salvation. This faith paves the way not only to secondary social effects, but to understanding the meaning of the world and to a mystical relationship with God. We know all this from Tolstoy, who turned to this mystical faith again and again.” The same ideas inform the novels of great Russian writers such as The Brothers Karamazov and War and Peace. Weber continues: “Thus the first impression is of the utter meaninglessness of actions and passions (Durcheinander von Leidenschaften),” and this, Weber elaborates, “is rooted in the sneaking suspicion that this life, formed politically, socially, ethically, by literature, the arts and the family, is indeed meaningless compared with the foundation (Untergrund) stretching underneath. This has been embodied in peculiar forms demonstrated by Russian literature, which however, we find it very hard to understand because they are based on the simple and patently antique Christian thought.” Weber then passes on to the central thought of love for one’s close ones “that would be rewarded with access to the gates of eternity, timelessness and divinity.” All this adds up to “an artistic wholeness that we are wont to overlook in the works of Russian literature.” And Weber concludes: "On this acosmistic (akosmistische) foundation there rests the entire Russian religiosity and the peculiar natural right (Naturrecht), the kind you find in Russian sects and also in Tolstoy.” Weber goes on to contrast the above ideal of Russian writers to the “acting man” who acts visibly “on the world stage.”10 The latter remark elaborates the abovementioned theme of opposition which will evolve into an opposition between the proponents of the ethics of persuasion and the ethics of responsibility.11

What is “acosmistic love” or, as Weber would call it shortly before his death, once again linking this line of thought with the moral aspect, “acosmistic ethics of love” (die akosmistische Liebesethik)?12 It may be that he never planned to give a rigorous definition of this concept, just like he never gave definitions of
other important concepts. The American scholar Robert Bellah in an article about “acosmistic love” attempts to identify its most salient features and thus gain an insight into the concept. He singles out:

1) rejection of this world;
2) declaration of brotherly love and;
3) nonviolence.13

Indeed, like Tolstoy, Weber singled out three figures that most fully embodied his “acosmistic love.” These are the figures of Buddha, Christ and Francis of Assisi. All the three did not have a permanent abode or home, for all three love as the principle of being was supreme, all the three came out against violence,14 and for the purpose of this article, all three exerted colossal influence on the evolution of Tolstoy’s thought. It has to be added that Weber observed attempts to “escape from the world” in order to implement Tolstoy’s social projects when, in Switzerland in 1913-1914, he visited Ascona where the Russian writer’s ideas had faithful admirers.15

Thus, love is added to persuasion. And added to an absolute and dominant persuasion is an all-embracing, boundless “acosmistic love.” A love that embraces the Cosmos (not an accident is the reference to Antiquity), but without being reduced to the Cosmos, confers order and meaning on it while being outside the world. Max Weber believes that the Russian religious perception of the world is based on “acosmistic love” which he derives from Russian history and especially the ideas of Lev Tolstoy. This concept would later become one of the principles of interpreting a special type of religious ethics.

Variation Three.
The First World War. Lev Tolstoy’s Consistent Pacifism and Weber’s “Struggle of the Gods.”

With the start of the war Max Weber comes to perceive Lev Tolstoy above all as a representative of convinced pacifism that seeks to carry the idea of pacifism to its logical realization. This is borne out by the text of a comment Max Weber made in 1916. It was made in the shape of a letter concerning the discussion “Between Two Laws” (Zwischen zwei Gesetzen) in the Austrian magazine Die Frau. The discussion between Gertrud Baumer, a friend of the Weber family, a politician and feminist, and the Swiss pacifist Gesine Nordbeck, revolved around the Christian law and the law of Motherland and which law was more important and what was the connection between them. In his short comment published in the same magazine Weber picks up the theme of the two laws and writes: “The Gospel can be left outside these discussions or else it can be taken seriously. In that case there is nothing but the consistency of Tolstoy. He who pays one penning in taxes must pay other taxes,” and he who does not adhere to Tolstoy’s consistency “should know that he is bound by the rules of this world that include, for an indefinite time, the possibility of inevitable war for power.” In his comment
Weber again refers to Tolstoy’s escape from his home, which shows that Weber had taken note of this event. Weber writes that the Russian writer first put into practice the Gospel idea of “escape from the world” only “when he faced death.” But before his escape Tolstoy, like the others, is “within the world,” and this is probably where the theme of “polytheism” of values and “the struggle of the gods” first makes its appearance. Weber writes: “In reality he who is in “the World” (in the Christian meaning) cannot but experience within himself the struggle between a multitude of value sets (Wertreihen), each of which considers itself to be obligatory. One has to choose which of the gods he will and must serve and when to serve one or another. But he will forever be locked in the struggle against one or several gods of this world.”16 Thus, Weber invokes the Russian writer in formulating his key theme of “polytheism of values.”

The theme of the opposition of the “otherworldly” pacifism of the ethic of persuasion and the “worldly” heroism of the ethics of responsibility is elaborated in a later work entitled Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions in which he again mentions Tolstoy, this time in connection with his novel War and Peace. Weber develops the theme of the “struggle of the gods.” He fleshes out with more detail the main protagonists; the ancient gods of war are opposed by the God of love and brotherhood: “The ancient god of war as well as the god who guaranteed the legal order were functional deities who protected the undoubted values of everyday routine. The gods of locality, tribe, and polity were only concerned with the interests of their respective associations. They had to fight other gods like themselves, just as their communities fought,” but barriers of locality, tribe, and polity “were shattered by universalist religions, by a religion with a unified God of the entire world. And the problem arose in full strength only when this God was a God of ‘love.’ The problem of tensions with the political order emerged for redemption religions out of the basic demand for brotherliness.”

Weber transposes this historical reminiscence to modernity, linking for the first time all of Tolstoy’s four themes: the theme of “persuasion,” the theme of “acosmistic love” and brotherhood, the theme of pacifism and the theme of the meaning of life. Weber opposes these themes with his own “responsibility,” worldly love, national togetherness, heroism in war and the meaning of death. This is expressed in the lines that are worth quoting in full: “The mutual strangeness of religion and politics, when they are both completely rationalized, is all the more the case because, in contrast to economics, politics may come into direct competition with religious ethics at decisive points. As the consummated threat of violence among modern polities, war creates a pathos and a sentiment of community. War thereby makes for an unconditionally devoted and sacrificial community among the combatants and releases an active mass compassion and love for those who are in need. And, as a mass phenomenon, these feelings break down all the naturally given barriers of association. In general, religions can show comparable achievements only in heroic communities professing an ethics of brotherliness. Moreover, war does something to the warrior which, in its concrete meaning, is unique: it makes him experience a consecrated meaning of
death which is characteristic only of death in war. The community of the army standing in the field today feels itself—as in the times of the war lords ‘following’—to be a community unto death, and the greatest of its kind.”

This brings us to the fourth and final part which will address and elaborate the theme of the meaning of life/death.

**Variation Four.**

The Bolshevik Revolution, the End of War. Lev Tolstoy and the Meaning of Life/Death

Weber delivers his famous speech *Science As a Vocation* in Munich in 1917, at the height of the war, precisely on the day of the Bolshevik October Revolution in Russia on November 7 (new style). Germany’s defeat in the war is imminent, and Max Weber has less than three more years to live. The issues he addresses in his speech are, on the one hand, topical and, on the other hand, extratemporal, having to do with the worldview. He speaks about specialization and progress, calculation and inspiration, the meaning of life and death and finally about the value of science.

Several themes run through the whole speech: the theme of choosing between conflicting gods (from the above-quoted letter to *Die Frau* magazine), the theme of the contrast between the times of Abraham when it was possible “to be fulfilled by life” and the impossibility “to be fulfilled by life” at the age of progress when one can merely “be weary” (from *Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions*), and the theme of polytheism and the “struggle of the gods” from both these works. All these themes revolve around the central theme of the meaning of life and death. The “answers” Weber provides in *Science As a Vocation* also invoke Lev Tolstoy. He cites the Russian writer when raising the questions in the beginning of his work and when answering them at the end of it. Tolstoy seems to accompany Weber’s thought.

Formulating the key theme Weber writes: “This question is dealt with at the level of principle in the works of Lev Tolstoy. He came to the subject in the most curious way. The entire problem with which he was wrestling revolved around the question: ‘Is death a meaningful phenomenon or not?’” Thus the question of the meaning of science feeds into the question of the meaning of death. Weber stresses the fact that it is death, although Tolstoy’s reflections about science in his *A Confession* deal with the meaning of life. Perhaps the shift of emphasis is not accidental.

The difference of the answer to the question about the meaning of life/death is that for Tolstoy the world “must” have a meaning and the meaning could be found through faith whereupon one can start implementing it in one’s own life. It was not by chance that in his 1910 speech Weber stressed the key importance of the meaning of the world for the Russian religious intelligentsia. On that issue too Weber takes a different view. Meaning is not inherent in the world but is imputed to it by man through his actions. This brings us to Weber’s very last
significant work, *Politics As a Vocation*, in which he sets forth his position regarding the search for meaning: "The follower of the ethics of ultimate ends cannot bear the ethical irrationality of the world. He is a cosmic-ethical 'rationalist.'" 22 Because Weber did not consider himself to be a champion of the ethics of persuasion, the world was "ethically irrational" for him, hence the question of the meaning of the world and the meaning of life in it could not be approached in the way in which it was approached by Tolstoy.

The meaning of death, yes, because in borderline situations 23 a person is capable of sacrificing or taking his own life and this would be a conscious act of will even in a meaningless world. It is interesting that Weber raises some issues that are important for current practical ethics, for example, the problem of euthanasia. Weber links it with the problem of suicide and, more broadly, with the place of the idea of death. For lack of space let us note just some aspects germane to the subject of the article.

Joachim Radkau cites a letter in which Weber writes that it is barbaric “to prevent sick people from committing suicide under any conditions.” And he mentions another letter, which extols “stoical” suicide prompted by “revulsion at the world.” On the other hand, probably challenging Kant and his “thing in itself,” Weber writes: “It is undignified (Würdelosigkeit)... to consider life to be “a value in itself” (Wert an sich)” and proceeds to elaborate: “If only our officers—like the Chinese and Japanese—had had the dignity, instead of writing ‘war memoirs,’ to draw the consequences that an honest person draws when life has condemned them to lose a great game. The impression would be different.” 24 According to Weber, the ethics of responsibility requires that one answer for the consequences and, in his opinion, in certain situations it would be more dignified for responsible persons to commit suicide than to look for excuses and indulge in reflections. Quotations can be multiplied, but the main roadforks have already been identified. One may argue about the scientific value of Freudian separation of human instinctive aspirations for Eros and Thanatos, but in this particular case it could be helpful in assessing the driving instincts in the lives of Tolstoy and Weber.

Thus, at every stage and to every idea of Lev Tolstoy Weber has an anti-idea: the ethics of persuasion is matched by the ethics of responsibility, “unworldly love” is contrasted with worldly camaraderie, pacifism with heroism in war and responsibility for *Machtstaat*, and finally, the meaning of life with the meaning of death. Lev Tolstoy was the element with whose help Max Weber shaped his ethical thoughts and although for the most part he rejected the ideas which Tolstoy embodied, Weber’s own ethical ideas as they have come down to us would have been impossible without them.

**Conclusion**

Weber also experienced “an escape” of sorts. It happened shortly before his death. In 1919 he accepted an offer to head up the economics chair at Munich
University where he moved in late June. He did so in spite of the fact that conditions in post-war and post-revolutionary Munich were appalling. Rainer Lepsius advances several arguments against this choice. 1. Weber could have accepted an offer more attractive in financial and scientific terms (for example, universities in Berlin, Frankfurt am Main and Bonn). 2. As late as May armed clashes in Munich carried away about 600 lives. 3. Munich had problems with coal and food supplies and the housing conditions left a lot to be desired.25

Weber “escapes” from his wife and, unlike Tolstoy, he does not leave an explanatory note. He “escapes” while keeping up the appearance of remaining with her. In a certain sense it was a more secret “escape” than Tolstoy’s. He never “had it out” with Marianne with whom he had lived for many years as an ascetic (unlike Tolstoy) and of whom Joachim Radkau noted in half-jest: “If you ask me why Weber has become a classic in the social sciences while Simmel or Sombart have not, one answer is: because others did not have a wife like the one he had.”26

Max Weber “escaped” to Munich to be close to his secret mistress for whom in his sunset years he believed he experienced real passionate “nonacosmistic” love.

Lev Tolstoy’s escape was an escape to life according to his principles, whereas, as Max Weber’s nephew Eduard Baumgarten wrote, being torn between his wife and mistress “added a hidden wish for death” to Weber’s illness.27

Within a period of less than a year after he moved to Munich Max Weber lost some of the people closest to him: his friend and political ally Friedrich Naumann died on August 24, 1919, Weber’s mother died on October 14, and his sister Lily Schaefer committed suicide on April 7, 1920. Max Weber died after being sick with pneumonia for ten days, like Tolstoy, on June 14, 1920.

NOTES


2 The first mention of “acosmistic love” probably occurs in Max Weber’s 1907 letter to Otto Gross, a controversial figure from the world of political radicals, “the sexual revolution” and psychoanalysis. In the letter Weber writes that he would be prepared to respect Otto Gross’ “acosmistic love” if the latter stopped invoking ethics. A German scholar Edith Hanke, who cites this letter, notes that it is basically about consistency, an idea Weber would develop in his later works. The erotic sphere has its own laws and he who has chosen it as his guiding principle (Lebensführung), should not invoke ethics to justify his behavior. See: E. Hanke, “Max Weber, Leo Tolstoy and the Mountain of Truth,” Max Weber and the Culture of Anarchy, Ed. by S. Whimster, Basingstoke, 1999, p. 153-154. However, the link between the erotic sphere and “acosmistic love” is unclear because subsequently Weber associated the latter with asceticism and even antisexuality as found in Lev Tolstoy’s later works. There are few traces in Weber’s writing of the idea of two types of “acosmistic love” (erotic and ascetic). Here one probably finds the germination of the concept which took more or less final shape between 1910 and 1914. Robert Bellah does not mention this letter and dates the first mention of “acosmistic love” to 1910, which is an omission in his work. See: R. Bellah, “Max Weber and World-Denying Love: A Look at the Historical Sociology of Religion,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 1999, No. 2. The theme needs further study.
“The responsible ethics of persuasion” is an expression used by the prominent Danish
Weber scholar Hans Henrik Bruun, see: H. H. Bruun, *Science, Values and Politics in Max

“The ethics of success” gradually evolves into the ethics of responsibility, “success”
meaning orientation on ultimate ends.

in Russia,” Id., *Political Writings*, Ed. by P. Lassman, R. Speirs, Cambridge, 2003,
p. 42.

Weber did not go into details, reducing and simplifying the formula “Do not resist evil
with violence” to “Do not resist evil”; the only time he uses the full formula (“Widerstehe
nicht dem Übel mit Gewalt”) is in *Politics As a Vocation*, see: M. Weber, “Politics As
a Vocation,” *Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocation*, New

Weber refers to “acosmistic love” either as “die akosmistische Liebe,” or by the com-
ound word “Liebesakosmismus”; Robert Bellah proposes ‘world-denying love” as the
English equivalent, see: R. Bellah, op. cit., p. 277-278. It has to be added that Weber uses
the adjective akosmistisch in other combinations with words that usually imply “love.”

For analysis of the opposition of “the ethics of persuasion” and “the ethics of responsi-
bility” through a comparison of the thought of Weber and Tolstoy see: Yu. Davydov, *The
Ethics of Persuasion and the Ethics of Responsibility: Max Weber and Lev Tolstoy*,

Or “the ethics of unworlly love,” see: M. Weber, “Politics As a Vocation,” p. 197.

See: R. Bellah, op. cit.

Other scholars take a broader view of the issue including “acosmistic love” in the broad-
er concept of “brotherly love.” See: M. Symonds, J. Pudsey, “The Forms of Brotherly


msen in Zusammenarbeit mit G. Hübinger, Tübingen, 1984, S. 97, 98.


Stauth and Turner, discussing the influence of Nietzsche on Weber, write about Nietzsche
as an unknown quantity or a dark quantity in the work of Max Weber. See: G. Stauth,
B. S. Turner, “Nietzsche in Weber oder die Geburt des modernen Genius’s im professio-
nellen Menschen,” *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 1986, No. 2, S. 82. Perhaps this is even more
applicable to Tolstoy.

M. Weber, “Science As a Vocation,” *Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and


Karl Jaspers repeatedly stressed the importance of Weber’s ideas for the evolution of his philosophy.


Translated by Yevgeny Filippov
Chauvinism or Chaos: Russia’s Unpalatable Choice

Aleksandr LUKIN

The events of the last few months in connection with Ukraine and the Crimea, as well as certain related tendencies in Russia’s domestic political life are confronting us with a new reality. It is quite likely that the entire system of international relations and domestic life in Russia will no longer be the same as before. The very paradigm of our life that took shape after the disintegration of the USSR and provided the framework for the functioning of Russia and its main partners both in the Yeltsin period and afterwards is changing. This system can be defined as post-Soviet consensus. What are its principal traits? Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia, basically, was regarded as the West’s partner. It was not, of course, as close an ally of the West as the members of its own economic and political alliances, but was thought to share its main foreign policy and home policy goals. Certain differences (for example, over Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, etc.) were put down to its size or insufficiently long exposure to Western influences and were settled rather quickly. Russia’s specific home policy approaches were also explained by the imperfection and youthfulness of Russian democracy (Moscow leaders said so themselves) and certain national peculiarities. Russia’s position could be compared to that of Turkey, Ukraine, or Mexico—big states, which were not entirely up to the Western standards but sought to measure up and were achieving certain progress.

The Demise of the Post-Soviet Consensus

The post-Soviet consensus was based on an understanding that Russia and the West would move towards a closer cooperation, respect the interests of each other, and make mutually acceptable compromises. In practice, it was only Russia that abided by these terms. While not renouncing fully the idea of national interests, Russia demonstrated that it was ready to sacrifice some of them for the sake of cooperation with the “civilized world” in order to become its part. But

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the “civilized world” itself, despite a lot of encouraging verbiage, was thinking in Cold War terms and sincerely believed that it was the winner. Forgetting all its promises (for example, not to expand NATO to the East), the West was seeking to achieve whatever it had failed to during the Cold War because of the USSR’s resistance, incorporating in its sphere of influence increasingly more countries and territories and pushing its military facilities closer to Russia’s border, including to the territory of its traditional allies.

There are different explanations for this approach. The Russian ruling circles today believe that the West’s real foreign policy is determined exclusively by geopolitical aims, including subjection of increasingly more countries and territories and emergence as the sole dominant force in the world (a “unipolar world”), while all sorts of values (like democracy and human rights) are just an ideological cover-up. This understanding is explained by the fact that the current Russian leaders mostly hail from the law enforcement agencies of the late Soviet period, when few people believed the official communist ideology and it was, in fact, a cover-up for real politics.

Today’s Western society is much more ideology-driven that Russian society. In actual fact, the West is the only remaining ideological empire. (As for communist countries like China or Vietnam, we cannot actually see them as driven by ideology, because their official ideology is no more than a ritual and has been that way for rather long; even their leaders cannot clearly explain what is so communist about it). In the West, practically everyone believes in its own ideology which is imbibed since early years at kindergarten and school, university and workplace. This ideology of “democratism” (as described, among others, by Ilya Smirnov) is rather simple: Western society, though not ideal, is more perfect than all other societies; it is the pinnacle of social progress and everyone in the world should strive for the Western model such as it is at this moment. In principle, this is a variety of primitive cultural chauvinism characteristic of many peoples, ethnic groups and countries, from small tribes to major civilizations, which looked upon themselves as the center of the world and all others as barbarians. What sets the West apart in this sense is solely its scale.

The West’s foreign policy is based on this faith. The key direction of the foreign policy thought is determined, paradoxical though it may seem, by pragmatic ideologists. For them, the best way to make the “barbarian” peoples and countries join the world of “freedom and democracy” is to subject these to political influence by means of economic and political alliances. For this, forces conscious of their own benefit (that is, oriented to the West) should come to power in these countries, something that needs to be helped in every possible way. There is no tragedy even if these forces are not entirely up to the “democratic” standards. Let them first submit economically and politically. Later the West will influence them into rising up to the needed standard. It is for this reason that Europe will only mildly reprove the regimes in Estonia and Latvia for withholding civil rights from the majority of local Russian speakers. Even though the official reasons of this myopia are not advertised, they occasionally come to the surface. A case in point is a report on the situation in Estonia, published by an inde-
ependent German foundation (Bertelsmann), which comes to this conclusion: “Estonia has never had any direct or indirect challenges to its democratization or transition to a market economy... Although Estonia’s ethnic cleavages remain serious, the restrictive citizenship policy has meant that Russians have much less political power, which otherwise might have enabled them to slow the pace of reform.” The implication is clear: Russians in Estonia are the only obstacle to Westernization and this made the authorities restrict their rights.

This is the same reason for not seeing the radical nationalists in Ukraine: after all, they “work for progress” and can be vindicated historically. The West could even turn a blind eye to some of their crimes (as was the case with the Kosovo nationalists or the Croatian army in Serbian Krajina, etc.). Another case in point is EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, who denounced the Right Sector’s attempt to seize the Verkhovna Rada after the anti-Russian takeover, but actually supported similar actions, when the Rada was dominated by “bad guys” not entirely oriented to the EU. At the same time, crimes committed by the forces of “regress” should be fully exposed and condemned to the hilt.

In the West, there are also idealistic ideologists who say it is a shame to befriend even “progressive” dictators; they censure even “their own” authorities, criticizing them for a departure from the ideals of “democratism.” But they have no influence on real politics and are seen as impractical armchair dreamers who only get in the way of real business. As a result, the quest for global geopolitical domination intermixes with ideological agendas and it is hard to say which has the precedence.

Interestingly, there was a similar dispute going in another ideological empire, Soviet Russia, when the communist values were as yet articles of faith. Shortly before the Brest Peace was signed with Germany, some idealistic communists said they would rather die than negotiate with the “class enemy.” They almost carried the day, but the more pragmatic Lenin managed to convince his colleagues that there was no point in dying and that the main thing was a regime of ideologists, not immaculacy of ideas. While they were in power, it was a cinch that ideology would gradually triumph the world over, but their death would obliterate this chance. It is also interesting how the Bolsheviks debated whether they should fulfill the promises contained in the so-called Karakhan Declarations whereby Moscow had renounced all of the Russian Empire’s rights and privileges in China. The Russian representative in China, Adolf Ioffe, estimated Moscow’s unwillingness to fully abide by these promises as a pernicious tendency towards a revival of imperialism. In response, Lev Trotsky pointed out that Russia was poor and that the strengthening of its material standing as the basis of the world communism was not imperialism.

Even the man accused of reviving the traditional Russian imperialism—Stalin—pursued a foreign policy that retained a considerable ideological element. In 1927, he said in one of his addresses: “An internationalist is someone who is ready to defend the USSR unquestioningly, without hesitation and without conditions, because the USSR is the basis of the world revolutionary movement and
this revolutionary movement cannot be defended and promoted unless we defend
the USSR.” The USSR’s territorial expansion was not traditional imperialism but
an effort to strengthen and expand the area of world progress.\textsuperscript{4}

The West is doing exactly the same. It was all fine and good while it spread
its influence to small countries in East Europe. But Russia proved a stumbling
block. It refused to be fully integrated into the Western system and insisted on its
own approaches at least to some issues of particular importance for itself. It is
not that its leaders were natural anti-Westerners. Quite the contrary: both Boris
Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin started off with concessions in an attempt to induce
partners to reciprocate. But what they got in exchange were just empty promis-
es. Forced by the circumstances, they had to adopt a tougher stand.

What were these circumstances all about? According to numerous polls, the
majority of Russians do not think that the Western society is ideal. It is in this
regard that Russia is distinct from East Europe. But even there the West encoun-
ters certain problems: both Poland and Hungary have powerful communities of
Catholic conservatives who abhor the morality of modern Europe; Bulgaria and
Romania are characterized by widespread corruption and weakness of democra-
tic institutions. All these countries, however, are relatively small and could be
gradually swallowed. Their alliance with the West can also give them hope of
prosperity in the future and security guarantees. Russia is a different case. It is
too big and its Westernization is unrealistic unless supported by the majority of
the population. But the population is reluctant to Westernize and has a dim view
of Western problems, including human rights, women’s equality, homosexual
marriages, and the like. Many of these are seen as irritants. Russia is witnessing
a powerful revival of religious organizations, both Orthodox and Muslim, which
view the West as the focus of sin and insist on a path of their own. Russia regards
insistent Western attempts to impose unwelcome values, build barriers between
itself and its culturally congenial neighbors and deploy military forces closer to
its borders as a policy of encirclement and strangulation.

Of course, a Westernized minority has taken shape in Russia, particularly in
its big cities, but it is not numerous. Coupled with the West’s hostile foreign pol-
cy, the Western-type democracy, where the majority sets the official course (or
at least actively seeks to influence it), itself makes increasingly popular the lead-
ers who turn to this traditional majority. For ideological reasons, the West is
unable to understand this. As shown by studies, any ideology tends to reject the
facts that fail to match its precepts. A characteristic example in this sense is
Michael McFaul’s position, the majority of whose predictions for Russia and the
world have proved wrong, but who, for ideological reasons, is still regarded as
the leading US expert on Russia, because he strongly believes in “democratism.”

In 1999, Mr. McFaul claimed that Russia’s democratic system, though imper-
fect (he called it electoral democracy), was sufficiently institutionalized and
therefore Yeltsin’s successors would be unable to renounce it. He wrote: “...The
current electoral democracy in place possesses the same staying power as the
illiberal features... [of the regime]. Russian democracy will not be able to survive
if the economy continues to deteriorate for a sustained period of time. Russia
needs a quick economic turnaround that will create more propitious conditions for the consolidation of liberal democracy in the future. Ironically, however, the most surprising outcome of Russia’s recent financial meltdown has been the demonstration of democracy’s resilience, not its weakness. Declarations of the demise of Russian democracy are premature.”

In reality, it was the other way around: a rapid economic upturn bolstered precisely the illiberal features of the regime. I indicated this possibility in a commentary published in the same issue of the *Journal of Democracy*, where I said that the high level of pluralism was guaranteed by Yeltsin’s personal qualities, rather than the institutions, and that a next leader could do practically whatever he wanted, including to curtail pluralism: “‘Electoral clanism’ is unlikely to evolve into liberal democracy. It may move closer to the situation in Chechnya today or in China after 1911, with the central government present in name only and local military-administrative clans constantly fighting with one another. Or it may be consolidated by a strong nondemocratic leader. In both cases democratic freedoms are bound to be further curbed. In view of the role that supreme leaders have traditionally played in Russia, a future Russian president... may be able to alter the current temporary balance of power, either by changing the constitution or by abolishing it altogether...”

Later Mr. McFaul served as US Ambassador to Russia. Following the talk he gave at the Carnegie Moscow Center on May 25, 2012, when he among other things defended the US support for the revolutions in the Arab world, I asked, whether it did not seem to him that democratization and deposition of the authoritarian secular regimes would lead to the same consequences as in Algeria, that is, a victory for the Islamists and chaos. After all, the Muslim political culture clearly rejects the Western values and the people will vote for the leaders they can better understand. McFaul replied that, in US experts’ view, the situation was likely to follow the Indonesian, not Algerian, scenario; in Indonesia, the collapse of authoritarianism had eventually led to democratization. This analysis can, of course, simply ignore the considerable differences existing between the Islam of the Middle East and the mild Islam of the South East Asia, where it was influenced by the more tolerant religions like Buddhism and Hinduism. But the most important thing in this context is the ideology-driven wish to see the desirable rather than the reality. The result of the Western policies is clearly in evidence: chaos is rampant in Libya, where Islamists killed the US ambassador; Syria is in a grip of a cruel civil war; Egypt is again ruled by a military regime that alone proved capable of stopping the chaos unleashed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Today Mr. McFaul has again misunderstood the main point of current developments and is urging isolation of “misguided” Russia as part of the “democracy vs. autocracy” ideological campaign and continue to bring pressure to bear on all anti-Russia fronts: in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This approach is certain to lead to an even greater confrontation and to the final disintegration of these and possibly other post-Soviet states. Moreover, it will considerably strengthen the hand of those supporting authoritarianism in Russia itself and prepare the ground for an anti-Western alliance of Russia, China and probably some other Asian states (Iran, Pakistan, etc.).
Today the West’s ideology-driven expansion is tearing apart Russia’s closest
neighbors. It has led to territorial cleavages in Moldova and Georgia; today
Ukraine is falling into pieces before our own eyes. These countries are peculiar
in that the cultural divide runs directly through their territory. They could have
preserved unity provided their leaders would have taken into consideration the
interests of both regions gravitating towards Europe and those in favor of tradi-
tional ties with Russia. The one-sided reliance on pro-Western nationalists in
post-Soviet states has caused fierce internal conflicts and harassment of the
Russian-speaking people, to which Russia could not remain impartial. When it
came to “fraternal” Ukraine and the threat of NATO entering the Crimea (for
which Russia has a special feeling and whose residents in their majority have
always identified themselves with Russia), the now strong Russia decided that
no further retreat was possible.

Moscow’s reaction clearly caught the West unawares. In March of 2014
Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe Gen. Philip Breedlove declared
with surprise that “Russia is acting much more like an adversary than a partner.”
But this is hardly surprising: suffice it to consider that NATO has done the same
since its inception and, to all intents and purposes, its approach to Russia has not
changed even after the end of the Cold War. A change in Russia’s policy was just
a matter of time.

What can this change portend? Of course, one would like reason to prevail in
the West and Russia’s proposals on how to secure the rights of pro-Russia leaning
populations in the former republics of the USSR to start being reckoned with in
earnest. Today Russia is putting forward quite reasonable proposals which, if
accepted, could bring about a settlement of the Ukrainian crisis: a coalition gov-
ernment that would take into account the interests of eastern and southern regions,
federalization, neutrality, an official status for the Russian language, etc. But for
the Western ideologists this would mean a breach of an ideological taboo. In their
eyes, this is not a solution acceptable for all sides, but a case of “bad guys” putting
a brake on Ukraine’s advance towards “progress.” Accepting the Russian propos-
als would mean that there is someone else except the West who has the right to
define the meaning of social progress and decide on what is good and what is bad
for other societies and states. The ideology of “democratism” is unlikely to allow
this. Chances are that the West will choose a different approach and start support-
ing pro-Western radicals across the post-Soviet space, something that will cause
new conflicts. Under these circumstances, Russia will have to radically reorient its
policy to the South and the East. On the one hand, this can help address Russia’s
strategic task of developing its own Asian regions. But on the other, this may sig-
nify a new dependence on strong Asian partners, primarily China. But the West’s
hostility and incomprehension leave Russia no other choice.

A False Choice

Like any other country, Russia has the right to defend its interests as they are
understood by its elite and the majority of people and will inevitably defend
these interests. This said, one cannot but note the following tendency. For some reason, the majority of supporters of society’s liberalization in present-day Russia have no understanding of its national objectives and disdain the feelings and values shared by most Russians, whom they dismiss as retrogrades and creatures incapable of understanding the advantages of Europeanization and progress. Many liberals believe that contracting the Russian influence in the world as a negative influence is propitious for domestic liberalization and should inevitably accompany it. At the same time, those who favor Russia’s playing a role of its own in the world and building up its influence are often supporters of a stringent home policy regime, authoritarianism, and even a revival of Stalinism.

Many see this rigid connection between foreign policy and home policy agendas as something self-evident. Meanwhile, this was not always the case in Russia. In the Russian Empire, the conservatives were not, as a rule, supportive of an active foreign policy. Suffice it to recall the Slavophiles, who would like Russia to follow a special path of development, or the cautious course steered by Alexander III, who declared that the Balkans were not worth the life of a single Russian soldier (during his reign, Russia was not involved in any wars). An active foreign policy was usually pursued by the liberals. It was Alexander II, the liberal reformer, who liberated the Balkans; Pavel Milyukov of the Constitutional Democrats’ Party was even nicknamed Dardannelsky for his appeals to continue the war on the side of the Allies until the victorious end, including the partition of Turkey.

For the Russian conservatives patriotism meant preservation of the country’s resources and the lives of its residents and a protest against wasting its wealth on promoting strange and incomprehensible external aims. At the same time, the majority of liberals held that a modernized and even Westernized Russia should become a legitimate and powerful part of the Western world, but possessing its own interests, rather than remaining the appendage of the West. Many also believed that Russia’s mission should consist in Europeanizing and Westernizing the Eastern countries, of which it had a better understanding by virtue of its geographical location and the fact that there were sizeable Muslim and Buddhist populations at home.

It is hard to imagine that in the past anyone of the outstanding Russian cultural figures would support turning a reformed Russia into a junior partner of Britain or France, let alone a possibility of its partition. Meanwhile, the idea that it is possible and even desirable to divide Russia into “several small and wealthy Switzerlands” is fairly widespread among the Russian liberals. For the first time, I heard this proposition from a well-known dissident, Kronid Lyubarsky, when he lived in Munich. Soon, however, these views were reflected in a draft Constitution compiled by Andrey Sakharov, who suggested that all peoples and ethnic groups inhabiting the USSR should form republics with the right to secede, while Russia itself should be divided into several districts, each possessing full economic independence. 9

There are two points that strike one in these proposals. First, they display full incomprehension of the fact that the partition cannot be bloodless; it will
lead to numerous bloody conflicts likely to result in several Bosnias or Lebanons rather than several Switzerlands. The subsequent disintegration of the USSR graphically illustrated this point. This is a pragmatic feature bespeaking their ignorance of or unwillingness to know the political realities.

But there is a more important moral point. Planning to partition one’s own country is evidence of its authors’ failure to recognize the country’s historic and cultural value and, in effect, of their ideological hatred for it. After all, if we accept that any country, however small, is of huge interest for mankind due to its unique history, national representations and culture, then a big country like Russia, which has played a significant role in world history, should be of even greater value, and its partition into a lot of small entities ought to cause at least regret.

To be fair, one should say that an ideological hatred for Russia, or Russophobia as it is called now, was characteristic of certain liberals even under the Tsars. Such was, for example, the concept of Pyotr Chaadaev, who claimed that Russia had no history because true history could only exist in the Catholic West. But in the 19th century, views of this sort were not typical of the liberal majority and were regarded as odd.

In the late USSR and in independent Russia, however, politiealastic ideas came to dominate the liberal movement. Evidently, this was linked to several reasons.

- First, the movement came into being under the Soviet system that governmentized all spheres of life. Under these circumstances, the fight for freedom was inevitably associated with the fight not only against the concrete Soviet state but also state as such. Some interesting admissions in this sense can be found in Valeriya Novodvorskaya’s memoirs: “In August 1968, I became a true enemy of the state, the army, the navy, the air force, the Party, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. I stalked the streets like an undergrounder in an occupied territory. It was at that time that I decided that all these affairs... merited just one punishment—the destruction of the state. Now that it is half-destroyed and lies in blood and dust, its demise along with the entire people seems highly probable. But I feel neither pity, nor remorse. Perish the day, on which the USSR was born! Let it become a common grave for all of us.”10 Maybe these ideas are excessively radical and “poetic,” but they reflect a tendency.

- Second, the Russian liberals were educated in the spirit of Soviet ideology and saw its rejection as the making of a new ideology with an opposite sign. For example, if the authorities viewed the USSR as a great progressive state and an alternative to the socially backward West, their opponents had to regard it as an evil state that should be subordinated to the “civilized” West. This attitude has been extended to independent Russia which, from the point of view of the opposition forces, is increasingly reminiscent of the USSR.

- Third, a role was played by inadequate education and poor knowledge of Russia’s history and culture, particularly religious culture (also a conse-
quence of Soviet official atheism), with its unique treasure that differs considerably from the European tradition.

Incidentally, supporters of global democratization, liberals and human rights defenders in the West are totally unopposed to foreign policy and even military undertakings of their governments. Their only demand is that these undertakings should be in the interests of “democracy.” Thus, the ideology of democratism is only a new guise for the traditional Western expansionism. If the crusades were ostensibly undertaken in the name of the true religion and colonialism was palmed off as a civilizing mission of progressive societies, today’s bombing attacks on “dictators” and “violators of human rights” are launched in the name of enforcing these same rights. The hypocrisy and senselessness of this approach was well illustrated by the famous Internet meme which represents Barack Obama as saying: “Syrians killed Syrians, so now we must kill Syrians to stop Syrians from killing Syrians.” The politieaclasm in the West, particularly in the USA, is more typical of extreme conservatives, but not the liberals.

Thus, the domination of the politieaclastic ideology in today’s Russian liberal and human rights movement is essentially the same survival of the Soviet system as attempts to directly restore the attributes and symbols of the USSR, albeit with an opposite sign. While the fight for liberalization in present-day Russia has been monopolized by the politieaclasts and primitive Westernizers unconcerned with Russia’s national goals and ignorant of the fact that their country cannot be an appendage to the Western system for a number of reasons (geographical location, size, cultural traditions, and values shared by the majority of the population), the fight for the Russian national goals has been actually monopolized by the supporters of a dictatorship. The latter tendency has been manifested with particular clarity against the background of events in Ukraine, when the basically good aim of reunifying with the Crimea became a pretext for public reappearence of the most odious—and almost forgotten—characters of the recent Soviet past: semi-fascists, Stalinists and ideologists of the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP), who became the main supporters and advocates of this event. Earlier, they would not have been allowed within a hailing distance of the state TV channels. Meanwhile, dissenters are being expelled from the media community and the opposition media are being closed. Radio and television are speaking in a single voice that occasionally is raised to a chauvinistic shout and trumpet calls for a nuclear war. Many TV shows increasingly often remind one of the Soviet KGB’s kitch jobs intended to “rebuff” the “class enemy.” The seemingly defunct worldview of the Soviet special services postulating that the government is surrounded by external and internal enemies who must be fought without mercy is again coming to dominate the information space.

The current situation is confronting Russians with this dilemma: either they should be for the democratization and against Russia strengthening its positions internationally, which means being a junior partner and tributary of the West, or they should favor Russia’s strengthening, which mandates a dictatorship, nationalism and all-round projection of threat. And no middle ground!
The former stance is suspiciously in tune with the interests of the corrupt comprador stratum headed by the oligarchs and high-level public officials who fear for their fortunes and real estate in London. For them, the chaos and disintegration of the 1990s was a godsend: by manipulating their contacts in the government they were able to plunder the nation with impunity and evacuate the spoils abroad. A certain measure of pluralism is even useful in this context, because a dictatorship could turn against stealing. We should not forget that it was Benito Mussolini, who fought the Italian mafia most effectively.

The basis of the second tendency is the ideology of the special (secret) services, which is increasingly engulfing Russia. This ideology is characterized by a famous theory of the authoritarian “hook,” allegedly the only means that could have saved Russia from disintegration, the besieged fortress psychology, and a pervading suspicion tending to see an enemy in every neighbor and a traitor in every dissenter. Unlike the Soviet and Yeltsin times, the bearers of such an ideology are no longer contained by political power (the establishment) because it is they who are now the establishment.

Whom should one choose? On the one hand, “thieves are better than the bloodsuckers,” who are capable of bringing back the Gulag; but, on the other hand, I sympathize with the “recovery and bringing together of the Russian lands” and a greater rationality of the current state, because authoritarianism will sooner or later go, whereas Russia will stay. It is highly doubtful that it will be preserved by the present West-oriented opposition, many of whose members served as senior government officials and became notorious for their encouragement of thievery and chaos.

The situation is extremely complex. For me, this complexity is symbolized by the singer and song writer Aleksandr Gorodnitsky, who composed a song in 2007, titled “Sevastopol Will Remain a Russian City,” which became the city’s informal anthem, but in 2014 signed a letter by the intelligentsia against the “annexation of the Crimea.” But why do we have to make this choice at all? Why cannot we support a free but strong and independent Russia? After all, it is for this kind of country that Russian liberalism had always fought for. The West was its ideal only because of certain elements of its internal political system. However, the Russian liberals never idealized its pragmatic and often anti-Russian foreign policy. And it was only the arch-terrorists and enemies of the Russian state like the Bolsheviks, who advocated the “transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war.”

The close interconnection between democracy and the West’s foreign policy goals is not more than a myth advocated by the Russian liberal opposition. While strictly abiding by the rule of law inside their countries, the Western leaders are much more pragmatic in relation to international law. It is not Russia but the West that buried the idea of establishing a new system of international politics based on international law, for which there was a chance after the collapse of the USSR. It was not Russia but the West with its faith in the “end of history” that used its temporary omnipotence to create a world where it is permissible to grab whatever is lying about, destroy any borders, and breach any agreements for the
“good end.” It was not Russia but the West that consistently destroyed the post-war legal system based on respect for sovereignty of the states and promoted the theories of “humanitarian interventions,” “responsibility to protect,” etc. It was not Russia but the West that brought pressure to bear on the International Court of Justice which ruled that Kosovo’s unilateral independence was not in breach of international law. Russia repeatedly warned that the bombing attacks on Serbia, Kosovo’s secession, and the operations in Iraq and Libya would create the precedents that were likely to undermine the system of international law, including the Helsinki principle of the inviolability of European borders. If not the UN Security Council, then any strong power will decide on its own what its “good end” is and what piece of the cake to grab.

As a result, Russia regards the Western position on the Crimea, one invoking the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, as profound hypocrisy. In a new situation, where might makes right and ideology is a cover for force, it is necessary to define what force should be directed to and how it should be used. One should think that the will of the population should be taken into consideration, if inviolability of borders has misfired. If the Crimeans want to live in Russia, why cannot they do that in the same way as the Catalonians want to secede from Spain and the Scots, from Britain? After all, this proved possible, for example, in South Sudan, East Timor, etc. I am struck by the approach of those in Russia, who oppose the reunification with the Crimea. It is a pro-Western doctrinaire stance that prioritizes Western abstract principles intended exclusively for outside consumption and never used at home, over the aspirations of millions of people.

At the same time, one does not relish the prospect of living in a besieged fortress, where the authorities see enemies everywhere and view any dissenter as a traitor and member of the “fifth column.” There is no doubt that the majority of Russians would not like to make this choice. According to numerous polls, this majority is fond of their country and would like it to be strong and prosperous. But they also value free travel and are concerned over official corruption and irresponsibility. Neither do they dream about the restoration of Stalinism or a nationalist dictatorship.

The need to make a choice compels many talented people to leave the country. I know many students who do not see any particular employment opportunities anywhere aside from the government and administrative agencies, where high incomes are possible. All other jobs—in science, education, medicine, industry or private business—promise better earnings abroad, where, moreover, life is more tranquil and comfortable. Today they talk about emigrating not only to the West but also to Asian countries like China, Thailand, India, etc.

There is only one way out in this sense. People should be offered a third way that will meet the aspirations of the majority. This way combines moderate patriotism that comes natural to residents of a great country, being proud of its history, with moderate liberalism expressed in a striving to live more freely, in accordance with the law, without stealing and corruption, and with a well-developed self-government.
Rather than subordination to the EU interests, Russia’s European way or European vector of development should mean the borrowing of positive and acceptable elements of the European political system of state governance, primarily, the rule of law, a constructive interaction with Europe and the USA, and consistent work to explain Russia’s position, accompanied by an uncompromising defense of its national interests. Supporters of this way should not advertise the values of “democratism” (like feminism or homosexual marriages), which leave disinterested and irritate the majority of citizens in Russia. They ought to concentrate on real problems of concern to the population: the fight for an independent judiciary and against corruption, illegal migration, privileges of the ruling caste, nationalism and xenophobia. In so doing, it is necessary to explain that it is these phenomena that prevent Russia from becoming a great and powerful country. It is only this truly liberal movement that holds out a promise for the country and can make living in it comfortable for the majority of Russians and the country itself, popular and attractive in the world.

NOTES

8 Quoted from: A. Croft, “NATO Says Russia Has Big Force at Ukraine’s Border, Worries over Transdniestr,” URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/23/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUSBREA2M0EG20140323
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Translated by Aram Yavrumyan
Sociopsychological Foundations of National Scientific Research Culture

Vladimir KONNOV

In psychology, cultural research implies, as a rule, either a study of various characteristics of entire nations, or a study of activities and relationships accepted within some or other organization. The former is the case of national cultures, the latter, organizational cultures. A much more infrequent case is represented by studies directed at defining the distinguishing characteristics of groups that exceed the framework of individual organizations while fitting into national borders. This unevenly distributed research focus can be explained by the fact that a cultural influence is stronger when enclosed within formal borders, such as those of a nation or the legal relations with a certain corporation. As for the groups located between these two levels and possessing cultural features of their own, the psychologists identify among these as objects of study mostly ethnic groups, religions, and professional communities.

Studying ethnic groups is closely related to ethnic psychology, but it is clear that national and ethnic borders do not always coincide. The main criterion used in marking the limits of an ethnic group is the ability to identify with it, for which a mere declaration is not always enough. The originator of ethnic psychology in Russia, Gustav Shpet, said: “A person, in fact, defines himself spiritually and identifies with a certain nation; he can even ‘change’ his nation and join the body and spirit of another nation, but again this is achieved through long and persistent work aimed at reforming his determinant spirit rather than ‘by fiat.’”

Religions are identified in the same way. They may form part of national or ethnic cultures, reside within borders separating these cultures, or overlap them. The main criterion of belonging to a religion is also an individual’s active self-identification with it. According to Dutch psychologist Jacob Belzen, it is this active affinity that creates a religion as a special culture: “In the same way as there can be no private language, there exists no private religiosity: it is always constituted by, modeled after, and maintained through (repeated) commitment to culturally pre-given arrangements, conventions and agreements.”

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Analyzing professional activities, in turn, is closer to studying organization-al cultures. Being part of a specific professional group, on the one hand, may be subject to affiliation to an organization, as is the case, for example, in layers’ associations, whose activities can be practiced only by members of the Bar. In this event, the professional community can be delimited on the basis of this formal indicator. On the other hand, labor remuneration is accepted as the main criterion. To quote Ewald Zeyer, “A profession is a socially valuable area for the application of human physical and intellectual forces which enables one to receive the necessary means for existence and development in exchange for labor inputs.”

The scientific community stands apart from the groups studied by psychology. Scientific status is, as a rule, an important component of its owner’s identity, which in terms of influence is sometimes comparable with nationality. There is a tradition opposing affiliation to a nationality and commitment to science, which is manifested in the choice of some language as the international “scientific” lingua franca. In different periods, these were Latin and German; today it is English. This is also expressed in scientists’ self-representation as citizens of the world and in the concept of “invisible colleges” as groups of specialists from different countries who maintain closer contacts with their college brethren than with their fellow countrymen. This opposition can hardly be found in other professions. Besides, the scientific community is not a professional group in the strict sense of the word, comprising as it does a variety of different professions split primarily into natural sciences and the humanities. Their approach to scientific practice is specific as well. A scientist may regard himself as such while having no relation to any organization or professional association and working without remuneration. At the same time, he or she can gain public recognition by publishing results of their studies. Currently this situation is rather an exception than the rule and it is hardly possible, for example, in high energy physics with its large-scale experiments, but it may well become a reality for a mathematician.

If the scientific community is a distinct group of people possessing specific traditions, it may be assumed that it has a specific culture.

The aim of this study is to analyze the specific features of the development of science in Russia with the help of the “national research culture” category. Its tasks in this context are to consider the sociopsychological content of the basic notion of “culture” and an opportunity for using it to describe the characteristic features of the national scientific community, as well as to define the inner structure of this category and reveal its ties with other notions—“values,” “discourse,” “ethos,” and “social roles”—used in psychology and sociology to characterize scientists as representatives of a specific community.

The Content of the Notion of Culture

The most influential works in the area of cultural psychology today are those by Geert Hofstede, who defined culture as psyche’s software. The popularity of
this essentially metaphorical definition is explained by the widespread awareness of what hardware and software are all about. Echoing this perception is a definition of culture suggested by Yury Lotman, who uses this term to denote “a totality of all non-hereditary information.”

Hofstede, for his part, emphasizes that “we cannot directly watch psychic programs. What is within our reach is behavior: words and deeds. The conclusion about the existence of a stable program can only be drawn from observations of behavior.” Expressed by “word and deed” and thus demonstrable, values and practices are elements of culture. The values and practices are stable methods of adaptation to the environment and social entourage. From the point of view of orientation of practices, they can be shared by most different cultures, something predetermined by the existence of universal tasks that have to be addressed by all human societies. For example, US scientists Alex Inkeles and Daniel Levenson have identified four fundamental functions that any culture is supposed to perform: regulating power relations, constructing individual—society relationship, articulating masculinity—femininity ideas, and settling conflicts. At the same time, intercultural differences are manifested in forms that impart stability to practices. According to Hofstede, these include symbols, heroes and rituals. “Symbols are words, gestures, images and objects, which in certain cases have a special meaning realizable only by the bearers of some particular culture.” “Heroes are persons (living or dead, real or imagined), who possess traits that are highly valued by this culture, and whose behavioral models are a thing to emulate.” Rituals are collective activities, which are not necessary from the point of view of goal achievement but are seen as socially needed and by this virtue are performed by an individual under the influence of collective norms.

Hofstede believes that values are preferences related to this or that state of affairs, including entire categories embracing wide spectra of different situations. For example, making a choice in favor of such value as “quality of life” may be manifested in everything related to personal comfort, rest and recreation, free choice of occupations, etc., while simultaneously standing in the way of “success” that encompasses such things as income growth, acquisition of powers, and various forms of social recognition, like important positions, titles, membership of prestigious communities, etc. But if the case in point is more specific priorities, then, as a rule, the reference is to attitudes or convictions. But a system of values accepted by an individual or a group is not always internally coordinated. Hofstede writes that “it is important to distinguish between the desirable and desired: how people think the world ought to be versus what people want for themselves.” Obviously, there are frequent contradictions between these two parts of culture, with the former more often realized in “deeds,” while the latter, in “words.”

Hofstede also distinguishes between three main levels of culture: universal, collective, and individual. The upper level is general human culture, while the lower level is the culture of an individual with all the specific features of his or her upbringing, education, career, etc.
Culture of the Scientific Community

Judging by practices and values of culture of the scientific community, it can be referred to the collective level, but there is a multilevel system inside it. Moreover, the fact that this system has a well-expressed international stratum does not rule out the existence of national science in this or that country. One of the main distinctions between national scientific cultures is the different ratio and different principles of division of the social sciences/the humanities and natural sciences. There are always two cultures—the humanities’ and natural scientific—represented inside each country’s scientific community. Each of these, in turn, is subdivided into different disciplines, and, finally, because science chiefly exists within the framework of specialized organizations, each discipline generates different organizational cultures.

The bearer of all these levels of culture is always an individual scientist who may be conscious of being simultaneously a representative of the world community of scientists and a citizen of a concrete country, a scholar or a natural scientist, a specialist in a concrete discipline, and, as a rule, an employee of a certain scientific organization. Thus, the multiaspect nature of scientific culture is a reflection of the complexity of science as a type of activity.

The combination of different aspects of scientist’s identity is analyzed by Russian psychologist Mikhail Yaroshevsky, who believed that an individual researcher was inevitably influenced by the world scientific culture, but his liaison with his nation was preserved and even strengthened owing to the influence of scientific schools. These schools are united by something more important than a mere investigative interest of their members: “In reality, this system is created by people nurtured by a definite national culture. They absorb the riches of this historical culture and its original socially determined traditions. It is not a matter of indifference for the direction and style of their thinking as they discover, choose and solve strictly scientific problems. Standing behind each choice and solution is a personality whose work concentrates, with a different degree of urgency, the needs and pains of his people, rather than an abstract individual with its standard information handling apparatus.”

Similar reasoning is demonstrated by modern German psychologists Bernd Schäfer and Bernd Schlöder. They stress as they describe the formation of international scientific standards, or the so-called “scientific mainstream,” that the new methods should be matched to the content, grounds and prospects of a relevant nationally determined scientific culture, while their success depends on being accepted within a corresponding cultural context.

However, international “invisible colleges” emerge on the basis of national scientific schools and owing to the resources they involve. They form around knowledge and methods that have the same meaning for people from different ethnic groups, whereas the culture specific elements are sidelined. These colleges evolve paradigms characterized by clearly expressed supranational features, which constitute the key element of a scientist’s professional training and eventually form part of his inner world.
In describing how a paradigm is integrated in an individual researcher’s psyche, Yaroshevsky introduces a new notion, “supraconscious,” which is set in opposition to the “unconscious.” He explains: “The history of philosophical and psychological thought has linked with the term ‘unconscious’ numerous associations that hinder the separation of what has been experienced by an individual, but is not consciously perceived at this particular moment, from what is being created by him in keeping with the objective requirements of the logic of science. We prefer to term the latter phenomena as the supraconscious rather than the unconscious or subconscious, because the world of categorical development of scientific values, one hidden from an individual’s contemplation, represents the ‘heights’ of the human psyche rather than its underlying, impersonal ‘depths.’”

It contains the schemata that are shared by the community but are not always realized and acquire content through personal experience of scientific research. In principle, not only methodological attitudes but also values can well lie on the same plane. This conclusion is suggested by the concept of postnonclassical science which recognizes that a cognizing individual’s value orientation can directly influence his research.

**Natural Sciences and the Humanities As Specific Cultures**

National scientific communities are divided into natural scientists and those engaging in the humanities. In the UK, this fact is reflected in “The Two Cultures,” Charles Snow’s widely popular 1959 Cambridge lecture. Mr. Snow, a chemist and at the same time a successful writer, opposes two intellectual professions that express the specifics of the two cultures in the purest form: “Literary intellectuals at one pole—at the other scientists, and as the most representative, the physical scientists.” He believes that the key difference between the two is the time orientation: the intellectuals are mostly oriented to the past, which occasionally leads to unreasonable criticism of the present, while the physicists are oriented to the future and their infatuation with it often makes them appear as naïve dreamers. Wedged between these two poles is the entire spectrum of intellectual disciplines. At the same time, Mr. Snow sticks to the characteristic British understanding that the spectrum of the humanities includes philosophy, history, philology and history of art, which, strictly speaking, are not sciences, as distinct from psychology and sociology, whose representatives, although sharing common interests with the intellectuals, are, methodologically, scientists.

In Germany, the idea that the humanities and the natural sciences are divided by fundamental differences was thoroughly elaborated in the neo-Kantian philosophical tradition. Wilhelm Windelband, for one, divided sciences in accordance with the aims of cognition: natural sciences are characterized by nomothetic thinking that seeks to discover general laws, while cultural sciences, by ideographic thinking aimed at studying unique and specific cases. Windelband focuses on the mutual complementarity and equality of these two approaches. Heinrich Rickert, in turn, writes about generalizing and individualizing sciences.
In the USSR, the problem of mutual unintelligibility of the supporters of both approaches was expressed in the notorious division of the intelligentsia into “physicists” and “lyricists” in the 1960s. The debates revolved around public functionality of these two types of activity: the former accused the latter of impracticality and unreality, while the latter reciprocated by reproaching them for technocratic attitudes and disdain of humanistic ideals. The psychologists and sociologists found themselves in between the two camps.

In the USA, the mutual incomprehension of the two cultures resulted in the so-called “scientific wars” in the 1990s. There were debates in the press on whether it was proper to apply the postmodernist research methods that were popular among the intellectuals engaged in the humanities to research in natural sciences.15

Certain scientific disciplines whose content is in many respects determined by their combined methods can be regarded as specific cultures as well. German sociologist Karin Knorr Cetina suggests characterizing disciplines as “epistemic cultures” and defines them as “amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms—bonded through affinity, necessity, and historical coincidence—which, in a given field, make up how we know what we know.”16 These arrangements and mechanisms constitute practices used in different sciences. Although all of them seek authentic knowledge, their progress towards this goal is widely different. For example, the general concept of “experiment” can mean different things in different sciences. In sociology, as a rule, the case in point is a maximally realistic reproduction of a phenomenon under study, such as a court session, commercial negotiations, teacher—student teamwork, etc. Biology most often recreates only individual processes that cannot be watched in the natural environment in isolation from concomitant phenomena. In physics, an experiment can be solely aimed at gauging certain signals indicative of presumed phenomena and basically inaccessible to direct observation. Moreover, the practices of organizing so different a set of experiments can make what scientists do in one discipline utterly dissimilar from what is done in some other disciplines.

Formal and Informal Scientific Cultures

Aside from the obvious interdisciplinary differences, there is also a less obvious discrepancy between the formal (declared) and an informal scientific culture. (The latter contradicts the declared culture and often prevails in practice.) The value component was described by Robert Merton as the “ethos of science,” which includes four main imperatives: universalism, collectivism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.17 But towards the end of his career (1970s—1980s), he tended to share the view that the imperatives were sooner certain ideals that were not always honored. The real scientific activities are regulated by more controversial requirements, between which a scientist has to balance.18

The idea regarding the controversial nature of social regulation of science was developed by Ian Mitroff, who suggested 11 pairs of opposites: universal-
ism—particularism, individualism—social cohesion, disinterestedness—self-interest, and others.19 According to Mitroff, objectivity of a scientific result is contingent on identical perception of research results by all “normal” scientists and not on respect for social standards in the course of research effort. This normalcy, in turn, depends on one’s ability to keep psychical equilibrium while balancing between controversial requirements, rather than on whether one’s behavior meets a certain set of rules. Another important aspect of Mitroff’s approach was his criticism of Merton’s decision to describe imperatives of science’s ethos as norms external in relation to the scientist. For Mitroff, imperatives are sooner personal attitudes. This point of view was corroborated by the fact that Merton had derived the imperatives from the analysis of pronouncements of prominent scientists, which were, in fact, the declared attitudes of people who excelled in science. That the norms are not respected is a psychological problem linked to the vagueness of personal attitudes’ influence on the personality’s behavior rather than to the imperfection of public control mechanisms.

British sociologists Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay also focused on the inner contradictoriness of research activity’s regulation. They analyzed the discourse of scientists engaged in bioenergy (a trend in biochemistry) and discovered that it fell into two types of descriptions or, to use their term, descriptive repertoires: “When scientists write experimental research papers, they make their results meaningful by linking them to explicit accounts of social action and belief... accounts of action and belief presented in the formal research literature employ only one of the repertoires of social accounting used by scientists informally... these formal accounts are couched in terms of an empiricist representation of scientific action... this empiricist repertoire exists alongside an alternative interpretative resource, which we have called the contingent repertoire... this latter repertoire tends to be excluded from the realm of formal discourse ... and... the existence of these formally incompatible repertoires helps us to begin to understand the recurrent appearance of interpretative inconsistency in scientists’ discourse.”20 The empiricist repertoire predominates in scientific literature and is regulated by such requirements of science’s ethos as universalism, which prescribes that research results should be considered in isolation from their author’s personality, and collectivism, that sees any result as a common property of the entire scientific community. Within the framework of this repertoire, experimental results are presented as if someone who obtained them had no preliminary preferences or intellectual prejudices in favor of this or that experimental outcome. Results are often described in such a way as to convince one of their full dependence on the methodologies used and independence from those who obtained them. Scientific publications mostly use impersonal constructions or the plural, “we,” that designates both the authors and the reader and can be regarded as pointing to the scientific community as a whole.

Descriptions used by scientists in informal conversations about their work focus, first, on speculative constructions that are put forward by scientists and can later cover both the content of their investigations and interpretations of their results, and, second, define unique skills, interpersonal relationships and influ-
ence characterizing individual scientists or research teams. Having a direct impact on research work, these circumstances make scientists follow a totally different set of values than the one dictated by the ethos and seek to turn the true history of a research into an empiricist interpretation earmarked for publication. But the “situational” set of values and practices surfaces not only in confidential interviews. According to Gilbert and Mulkay, this repertoire, though excluded from publications, makes itself felt at scientific events (such as public interventions) and actually predominates in informal discussions. Moreover, the inconsistency of the two repertoires is often a butt of scientific jokes, such as an ironic remark by one of Gilbert’s and Mulkay’s respondents: “...There are strong individuals in the field who want to interpret everything in terms of their theories... Of course, those are the other guys, not us... We’re interpreting it even, balanced [general laughter]... The other ones are the ones who are doing that.”

The difference between the ethos and real behavior, norms and antinorms, empiricist and situational repertoires can be explained in terms of distinctions between the desirable and desired values (Hofstede). The former is about what scientists think should take place in science, the latter is about the orientations that really guide them in the process of work: they do feel the discrepancy but do not become cynical. More often than not, a conduct that is at odds with the norms is interpreted as a forced reaction and justified by the imperfection of science.

**A Scientist’s Social Roles and Cultural Practices**

Values related to both “repertoires” are implemented as scientists perform their professional role which, as Merton believes, falls into four main components prevailing at this or that stage in a scientific career: researcher, teacher, administrator and “gatekeeper” (expert). He emphasizes that in an overwhelming majority of cases a scientist’s status is not determined by one single role and represents a certain role combination. The relations within it are not permanent and may change.

The centerpiece is the investigating role, because it is its performance that secures an inflow of new ideas. Merton writes: “...If there were no scientific investigation, there would be no new knowledge to be transmitted through the teaching role, no need to allocate resources for investigation, no research organization to administer, and no new flow of knowledge for gatekeepers to regulate.” Accordingly, researchers enjoy most respect in the scientific community, although this is not always reflected in the allocation of powers and resources. We should refer to their practices not only the direct scientific methods that are to the greatest extent independent of national cultural specifics, but also the approaches to choosing and substantiating R&D projects; schemata used to inform colleagues of research results as they write articles, address conferences, participate in debates, etc.; the accepted quotation rules; the rules for forming a list of authors to be mentioned; acknowledgments, etc. In this case, the existence
of national specifics is predetermined by the speech practices that naturally depend on the language to which they belong.

The linguistic practices are also involved in the teaching role performed not only in the course of the educational process but also in the context of teacher—student research relations. While cooperating with postgraduate students, assistants, and junior research fellows, a senior researcher facilitates their instruction by his own example and critical guidance rather than by direct lecturing. This area may display certain national cultural specifics linked to the “power distance,” a parameter identified by Hofstede. Comparing the educational systems of countries with a low power distance indicator (English-speaking and Scandinavian countries) with those with a high power distance indicator (countries in Southeast Asia and East Europe), he notes that in the latter, “the educational process is highly personalized: especially in more advanced subjects at universities, what is transferred is seen not as impersonal ‘truth,’ but as the personal wisdom of the teacher.” Given a low power distance indicator, “the educational process is rather impersonal; what is transferred are ‘truths’ or ‘facts’ that exist independently of this particular teacher.”

A power distance level has the greatest impact on the administrative role, which a scientist may assume both episodically by sitting on academic boards, committees, etc., and permanently by filling director, dean and other positions. Merton’s remark that, from the point of view of scientific career, the transition from research to administrative status can be perceived as a step down is more characteristic of countries with a low power distance level: in these cultures, it is held that a privileged status within one type of activity must not be extended to other spheres; moreover, a person who has excelled in some area is not expected to demonstrate the same high performance in others. Accordingly, a scientist leaving research for an administrative job is regarded as someone who has given up a key role in science and this reversal may be judged as a demotion. In cultures with a high power distance level, on the contrary, a person in a high place is expected to be successful in all areas and a successful scientist’s acceptance of an administrative position is perceived as a logical continuation of his career not detrimental to his status as a researcher; an administrator, at the same time, is expected to be competent as a researcher and able to confirm this by scientific degrees, publications, membership in scientific societies, etc.

The “gatekeeper” role is closely associated with the administrative role, but it is aimed solely at promoting scientific knowledge and has little to do with administration or managerial practices. The “gatekeepers” display their influence in the following areas of science: first, they estimate the potential of candidates for scientific positions and thereby determine the inflow, mobility and distribution of research personnel; second, editors and reviewers at scientific journals decide whether or not to publish articles, monographs, etc., and, in this sense, shape a system of knowledge; third, experts decide on various forms of funding, including prizes, scholarships, grants, and so on. It is in the latter case that the influence of a national culture may be displayed most graphically: in considering a bid, an expert has to evaluate, not the results, but only the plans of research teams and the
inevitable lack of information in this case compels the expert to fill in the gap by using his “cultural toolkit.” In cultures with a high power distance indicator, there will be a focus on the bidder’s formal status: his scientific degrees and titles may be regarded not only as the recognition of his achievements in the past but also as a guarantee that he is able to achieve outstanding results in the future.

Values influence all components of the research role simultaneously, while each of these includes its own complex of practices. Moreover, the latter are an element most amenable to outside observation, something that facilitates their study. But the widely used sociological approach based on a comparison of practices characteristic of different cultures and identification of their links with economic, political and other factors external in relation to culture is insufficient from the point of view of explaining their stability in a highly volatile social environment. This stability can be regarded as an indication that the social practices are psychologically determined, with both their psychological representations (in Hofstede, these are symbols, heroes and rituals) and their related values capable of being seen as the determinants. Of course, this view should not be accepted as the only possible explanation but it can be recognized as the main one from the psychological point of view. This standpoint is conveyed by Andrey Yurevich: “Without asking, which of the views on the main vector determining the man—society system is more ‘correct,’ let alone represents ‘the only correct’ attitude, a question that reminds one of the egg-or-hen puzzle and looks particularly absurd in postnonclassical science, one should still note that each sociohumanitarian discipline creates a hierarchical vertical in this system and the vertical characteristic of psychology reverses the traditional views on the basis and the superstructure. According to the hierarchy of realities predominant in psychological science, human psychology is the basis, while what happens in society is the superstructure, which is equivalent to referring psychology to the “basic,” not “superstructural” sociohumanitarian disciplines.”

This point of view warrants a hypothesis that the scientific community’s practices are shaped by values shared by its members who generate them under the influence of two value systems simultaneously—the world science and a national culture, which in the process of professional training merge into a national scientific research culture. The value element of this culture proves more stable by comparison with the culture’s practices. The correctness of this assumption could be assessed on the basis of material derived from the history of the two Russian societal overhauls in the 20th century—the 1917 October revolution and the socioeconomic formation change in 1991. These transformations were accompanied by a powerful push to replace old research practices by new ones which, however, did not lead to the metamorphosis of the Russian scientific community. Symbolizing this stability is the Russian Academy of Sciences, which in both cases was the main target for the radical reformers—in 1917, as a community of “class alien specialists” unprepared to accept the new order, and in 1991, as an institution incapable of transitioning to the market economy. Despite the political pressure, however, the Academy retained its main organizational principles and its role as the main center of scientific life.
Conclusion

With account taken of these examples, culture can be seen as a system of practices and values possessing common features with the personal “attitudes—behavior” system. Changes within this system are explained by the cognitive dissonance concept. Influenced by external reasons, behavior may well be at odds with the attitudes but later this will entail either a change in the attitudes, or a search for explanations of the problem actions, which make it possible to restore a semblance of consistent behavior. The same can be said for the introduction in society of new practices discordant with the values of culture, which compel either a change in these values or a realization that these actions are forced or erroneous, with the values remaining intact.

Cultural psychologist David Cohen believes that detailed characterizations of situations, in which psychological and sociocultural phenomena are studied, might be more productive than hasty attempts to involve these phenomena in cause and effect relations. The accumulation of this descriptive material may facilitate the making of well-substantiated hypotheses on interconnections between, for example, certain values of a culture, on the one hand, and stability or rejection of certain practices, on the other.

Comparing research practices of the scientific community before and after the turning points in Russia’s 20th-century history, defining the sociopsychological characteristics of Russian science as well as practices and values contributing to its stability can be, as we see it, important vectors in studying Russian research culture. The just suggested pattern of culture involving isolation of its formal and informal components may also be used in comparative studies aimed at comparing Russian and foreign scientific research practices and can generally play an important role in identifying the specific features of Russian science and evaluating them. This evaluation would make it possible to establish, to what extent they hamper successful development or, on the contrary, can serve as the basis for new achievements.

NOTES

7 G. Hofstede, op. cit., p. 10.
8 G. Hofstede, G. J. Hofstede, M. Minkov, Cultures and Organizations; Software of the Mind, New York, 2010, p. 28.


21 Ibid., p. 174.


23 G. Hofstede, G. J. Hofstede, M. Minkov, op. cit., pp. 69, 70.


*Translated by Aram Yavrumyan*
The theme of winners and losers is clearly articulated at times of cardinal change. The question of “winning” or “losing” in postsocialist countries is a fairly speculative one because it does not so much reflect objective processes as imposes interpretations; the framework for interpretations is set by the prevailing discourse. The purport of this article is to construct “winners” and “losers” as a result of Russian transformations. This is always a very sensitive theme for the self-identification of people in the countries where social and economic reforms take place. Being a “winner” is one thing, but nobody wants to be “a loser.” “Winners and losers” is an ideological construct which influences people’s identity and behavior and creates ideas about success. This dichotomy is placed in the sphere of the struggle for symbolic dominance or classification power, and is established in public space by various ideological sides thus maintaining the discourse. The expert community, social scientists, above all economists and sociologists, have played a major role in maintaining the discourse.

Long live material and individual success! For all the complexity of the picture and twists and turns in the development of events one has to admit that neoliberal ideas permeated the reformist movements in Russia and other East European countries which have joined the global market system. The reforms being conducted clearly reveal a dominant ideological idea in spite of the apparent political pluralism of ideologies. One cannot help noticing the changes in the mass consciousness, especially in the new generations, and these changes, as a rule, have to do with values.

Without going into the details of the political and economic content of the neoliberal doctrine let us note some points that are important for this article. The neoliberal concept of man in a free market posits a “self-sufficient individual” who is in control of his life and can establish relations with others like him. The problems and setbacks, for example unemployment or poverty, are seen as the result exclusively of not trying hard enough and not having enough entrepre-
neurial prowess (not enough effort and money invested in one’s human capital, for example in upgrading one’s education and health) without any reference to the shortcomings of the social system.

The simplest thing that citizens have learned during the years of reform is the principles of distinguishing “winners” and “losers.” Material well-being is the sole criterion of success. If one adds the principles of “here and now” and “winner takes all” one gets the picture of success strategies in Russia at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries.

The “winner takes all” principle has spread to all the spheres of life. Typically, it is associated with economic success. The conventional wisdom is that this principle creates a competitive environment in the economy, boosts efficiency in all spheres, stimulates innovation by encouraging inventiveness and hard work. It is assumed that the adoption of this principle significantly raises the living standards because the poor and middle strata increase consumption. Thus, neoliberal ideologists maintain that this principle is built into the ontology of the variable sum game, i.e., a game in which everyone is the winner.

However, in Russia this principle is embodied in simplified forms and in a conflict ontology because there is the other side to the construct, namely, “the loser.” This dichotomy immediately acquires the function of a classification scheme and the principle becomes a typical instance of the zero sum game. The losers, the flip side of the coin, are a very important part of the classification reproduced in public and socioscientific milieus roughly in the following logic: in this discourse the “winners” are those who instantly cracked the code of the mode of functioning of the free market. Those who have “won” typically had better starting conditions, abilities and means, greater social and cultural capital and were better integrated into networks. That is why they have “won.” In the literature such groups have been referred to as “resource,” “modernized” and “advanced.” But it is not only the case that some people succeeded and others did not in the complicated socioeconomic conditions. Interpretations of the “winners” that arose in public space imputed “progressive” features to these winners. It is assumed that such individuals pose no problems for reforms. By contrast, it is widely believed that “progressive” traits cannot be prevalent among those who have proved to be unfit, uneducated, “not modern” and unable to adapt themselves. “Losers” are constructed as “others.” The losers have only themselves to blame. This kind of discourse helps the winners to legitimize the current state of affairs that enables them to feel themselves to be winners.

There is yet another important consideration. Success depends on many factors, but the emerging hegemony associates it only with material and individual achievements. The material basis of success is given pride of place. It is practically the only factor that determines success and many other aspects of life, it is self-sufficient, as witnessed by the laments of contemporaries about a compulsive striving for material success and by many surveys where income is the key criterion based on which people consider themselves to be winners/losers. Many studies have revealed a rigorous link between success and support for reforms and material well-being; and studies of work values have revealed the greater
importance of material incentives compared to any others. In that respect Russia differs significantly from other countries.

The “winner takes all” thesis is intertwined with marketing technologies and is reflected in advertising slogans: “Take everything from life,” “You deserve it,” “Believe in yourself,” “You can do it,” etc. Comparative studies show that Russians, especially young Russians, set great store by a sense of personal dignity and embrace the values of self-assertion. The values of caring for others and of responsibility are less widespread. From the results of the surveys, the “winners” have higher personal ambitions and drive for self-assertion, but are less concerned about honesty and responsibility by comparison with the “losers.”

The nature of success is highly individualized. Many surveys reveal that the bulk of the Russian population relies only on their own efforts in achieving success, this is particularly true of successful groups and young people, even though they still expect the “nanny state” to help them.

Opposed to the winner in the quest for material success is the loser. The winner’s sense of superiority goes hand in hand with the loser’s sense of social envy (ressentiment). It is not only lack of material success that generates a sense of ressentiment. Leonid Ionin, following Nietzsche, defines ressentiment as envy of the others’ success. More precisely, “it is the success of the other that I perceive as my humiliation.” In his opinion, ressentiment is today widespread in “societies that live in the mode of comparison.” Other states of deprivation (moral, status-, age- and territory-related) may create a sense of “losing” when the person has no respect for his occupation, his past, the place where he/she lives. It is believed that the state of deprivation is characteristic of the generations socialized under the Soviet regime. Radical reformers hoped that such generations would die away to be replaced by new generations for whom ressentiment is alien. But unfortunately, the reproduction of “winners” and “losers” continues. The task of the prevalent discourse consists in legitimizing social inequality.

The individual and material nature of success that lies at its basis indirectly serves this purpose. If you do not possess the required qualities, are a poor worker and have no abilities, you are stuck in your past and you are yourself to blame for your position of “loser” (this English word has become part and parcel of post-Soviet vocabulary).

The role of social scientists in shaping the discourse. The reforms in Russia and Eastern Europe are inevitably perceived as ambiguous and call for theoretical interpretation. “Knowledge bearing people” as a rule try to objectivize phenomena through adequate classification because they consider that a new order will inevitably be created.

Antonio Gramsci believed that the intellectuals have the leading role in establishing hegemony. Hegemony means cultural dominance, it forms the social and moral language, “common sense,” the concept of reality that predominates informing with its spirit diverse modes of thinking. We believe the structural-activist position of Bruno Latour and Michel Foucault is more interesting. While Gramsci ascribed a special role to open civil structures in establishing hegemony, Latour stressed the role of closed networking relations and network
organization of the “bearers of knowledge.” As a result of concrete actions of agents, networks of discursive relations are built up, agents are built into them through the support of colleagues, public explanatory activities, discussions, conferences, research financing, etc. Network links mobilize resources and, in Latour’s opinion, it is the discursive relations networks that reproduce and spread institutional forms.

Such networks of the “bearers of knowledge” are constituted by the academic, expert milieu and the people surrounding it. Proceeding from the premises of Latour, Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal have revealed the mechanism of the spread of the neoliberal ideology in some postsocialist countries, which had a strong network of liberal economists at the start of reforms. The authors attribute the success of neoliberalism not to the pressure of international organizations, the wish to copy and imitate, not to the need to be recognized by financial institutions and not to the vigorous efforts on the part of America to impose its norms and rules on passive recipients in Eastern Europe, but to the mechanisms of network structures in the intellectual sphere. Even before 1989 there emerged international network structures through which neoliberal ideas penetrated postsocialist countries; the actions of the parties were easily coordinated and agreed. The dialogue among them had begun during the Cold War years; the reformers, many of whom were engaged in this dialogue, did not only embrace the neoliberal ideas of reforms, but became active promoters of these ideas on the national and global levels. Thanks to their influence neoliberal ideas and recommendations were quickly taken on board in the countries of Eastern Europe after 1989. Neoliberalism seized the normative positions there before the IMF committed the power of its institutions to support specific ways of reformation.

The new field of the study of transformations in the early 1990s adopted that general approach. In Poland, for example, the study by sociologists of postsocialist transformations was intertwined with the targets of the neoliberal political agenda of bridging the “civilization gap” that had risen under socialism. The Polish author Tomacz Zaricki says that neoliberal capitalism is inevitable because any alternative left-wing ideologies are still strongly associated with the failure of the Soviet project.

Sociological interpretations have exerted a measure of ideological influence. The Polish sociologist Michal Buchowski speaks about the black-and-white logic of the arguments of intellectuals and political leaders at the start of reforms, a logic that many regard as an axiom to this day. He cites the words of Piotr Sztompka: “Communism has contributed to cynicism, nepotism, collectivism, egalitarianism and a diffuse individual responsibility; to the prevalence of a sense of impotence and even a kind of mystical attitude to fate. On the contrary, under capitalism we see the triumph of individualism, realism, efficiency, freedom of creativity, individual subjectness and responsibility, and this future-oriented society requires social engagement along with democracy.” The black-and-white logic was particularly prominent in many such texts in the 1990s.

One can easily discern the familiar strategy of accusing from “the victims of reforms” and revealing the features that are supposed to be the cause of their own
failures. Boris Yeltsin made very similar observations. In the Russian literature, Mikhail Chernysh notes, the ideas of a “good proprietor” go hand in hand with the description of “an inefficient common Soviet man.” The question suggests itself why the losers—the poor people, as well as teachers, military men, peasants and workers—are branded and constructed as Others. The creation of the “inferior categories” of people is an intellectual process that shares this logic and mode of thinking and legitimizes the political practice and policy. There are several grounds for this. On the one hand, intellectuals thereby seek to distance themselves from the “losers” and join the camp of winners, and, on the other hand, to urge the need to re-educate the losers. The losers must be disciplined in accordance with the ideas of a new “normality.”

The neoliberal discourse sets the task of fostering a *homo economicus* instead of the *homo soveticus*. The Bolsheviks in their time set themselves essentially similar tasks. At the time the work of the research community was geared to bringing up the new man, “the builder of communism,” who works for society, embraces the higher collective interests. Today the projects of the ideological makeup seek to educate a new man, a generation of independent people, not “free riders” who are efficient and enterprising. To motivate the population to be independent and responsible is an important but extremely difficult task. Hopes were pinned on the figure of the owner and entrepreneur. But “the new man” is not automatically born as reforms are implemented. Many Russian experts have seen a failure of their expectations: “contrary to expectations an overnight process of getting rid of Soviet poverty and humiliation, impotence and unfreedom, a sense of inferiority and duality did not happen.”

In public and academic discourse mentality, “character” and “culture” also are invoked to explain the failures of reforms, slow growth of efficiency, poor competition and work motivation. This brings up the eternal question, “who is to blame” for reforms stalling and going the wrong way; one of the obvious and old answers is that “we have the wrong kind of people.” The words “culturally backward, not modern, uncivilized” have penetrated not only academic but also public discourse. In Russia, in addition to the endless talk on the East-West theme the reflection has again strengthened on the worthless “Other,” on losers constantly produced by the people. Buchowski believes that the maneuvers of intellectuals addressed to economic liberalism and the advocates of the theory of modernization have several typical characteristics that lead to the kind of discourse in which entire peoples and territories may end up being included in the category of losers. He also notes the condescending tone of these writings. In Russia the same logic is applied to the human material inherited from the Soviet era. There is an entire body of Russian studies of the mentality of the population and values as an important factor and main brake on the reforms under way which have long been noted by writers on cultural, political and social topics.

“Demoralized and orphaned victims of the past” have to assimilate new standards, change their mentality if they are to join the progressive part of humanity. Otherwise they will remain “uncivilized” and they would have only
themselves to blame.”19 Any failure is attributed to their “mentality”. One may cite the telltale results of the European Social Study (ESS)20: “To educate Russian society to be open to change and to be considerate of other people and nature a long-term cultural policy is needed comparable in scale of the tasks to the ‘program of progressive cultural change’ formulated by Lawrence Harrison.”21 One often finds in these texts attempts to classify the population into “advanced” or “backward” groups, groups that are ready and not ready for modernization.22 Many write about an alleged cultural inadequacy of Russians: “... a very popular myth has it that Russians are passive. That is wrong... Russians are aggressively immobile.”23 Another paradoxical statement is that “Russian culture has critically lost its effectiveness. Entertaining and articulating this knowledge is taboo.”24 The studies of “the Soviet man” and his values have been a vast and independent area of knowledge, and value studies are popular today because reformers stress the idea of the relationship between culture and the possibilities of modernization.

All this is rather the result not of purposeful theorizing, but of spontaneously following the hegemony that reveals features of “orientalism” (the term introduced by Edward Said,25 refers to a set of discursive practices with the help of which the West constructs the Other, i.e., the East) and naïve social Darwinism. One can go along with Buchowski that the logic of dichotomy renders the scholars blind to the fact that the objects they approve or stigmatize, like themselves, are the products of the historical process in which they are all involved.

It is important to note that these ideas are neither true nor false. Their strength lies in constructing and interpreting social differences. But one has to bear in mind that people are not “frozen” in the shape of homo soveticus but change in the course of daily practices, interpret them and constantly update them. The so-called “losers” are not the victims of their own mentality and habits, their position is the result of the transformations and consequences of globalizing and structural processes.

Who resists reforms more in practice? There is no doubt that large-scale reforms meet with resistance. In addition to sociological interpretations that stress that the population is not prepared for reforms “mentally” there are the opinions of economists on the same matter. The first and earliest opinion links the stalling/failure of reforms with the resistance of the “losers,” who resent change. The second (the so-called “capture of the state” theory) blames the failure of reforms on the winners.

Robert Kaufman and Stephan Haggard thus present their argument. The burden of market reforms—, for example, the reduction of subsidies, freezing and delays in the payment of wages, elimination of trade protectionism, cuts in social spending, etc.—is attributed to the activities of certain groups; the possible advantages of reforms—social benefits, a stable currency, reduced budget deficit and reduced inflation—are distributed in a diffuse manner. The groups of losers during the course of reform have more incentives to organize themselves against reforms whereas the winners find themselves in the trap of the “logic of collective action.” They are unable to move reforms forward in the direction and on a
scale that they desire because “selfish” individuals do not exert efforts towards achieving common goals unless there is external coercion compelling them to do so, or else, the group itself is diffuse. Thus, in order to start moving reforms forward, a powerful, autonomous and cohesive state is needed. Such a state is better able to protect reform against the pressure of the organized losers. In that sense the countries of Eastern Europe and Russia are examples of reforms initiated from the top and implemented by the state. However, the snags involved in this approach are great and difficult to circumnavigate.

Another line of reasoning draws attention to the emergence of patron-client mechanisms. Joel Hellman draws attention to the concrete results of reforms. His observations boil down to this: in Eastern Europe the market reforms are more likely to produce strong “concentrated” winners and weak “diffuse” losers, and not vice versa, contrary to the opinion of Kaufman and Haggard.

One feature of societies in transition from a planned to a market economy is “rent-seeking” connected with the development of patron-client relations. Market reforms are aimed at gradually separating the state from the economy. During the course of this process the sequence of reforms offers opportunities of deriving rent everywhere. At various points in the implementation of reforms there is always an economic and temporary “profit margin.” For example, liberalization of prices without matching progress in access to the market or in liquidation of monopolies has enabled some producers to earn monopoly rent. It takes more time to develop new rules and a new system than to stop the application of old ones, which makes rent inevitable. Interest rates can be changed more quickly than commercial banks capable of evaluating credit applications can be created. Restrictions on internal trade can be imposed faster than the mechanisms of compliance with contracts. In other words, the simple fact that transition requires time already contributes to the spread of rent-seeking behavior supported by the emerging patron-client networks.

In Hellman’s opinion, the state in the transitional period needs not only to protect its autonomy from the pressure of losing groups. Even more importantly it must protect itself from the growing pressure of the groups of “winners” who have formed patron-client networks. Mechanisms of control of government on the part of society are needed. But that is another problem which has been on Russia’s agenda for centuries. A similar position is taken by Hector Schamnis, who has studied the experience of Latin America. He examines how the market reforms in these countries “turned” into a headlong race for rent and comes to the conclusion, again challenging Kaufmann and Haggard, that the process of market reform is not promoted by an autonomous and isolated state; on the contrary, the state has been taken over by ruling socioeconomic groups.

The explanations considered above complement one another. But as far as Russia is concerned the picture presented by the two last mentioned authors is more plausible. The Russian situation has pronounced features of the second model: the “consolidated” winners who have captured the state: a strong administrative class, the prevalence of informal rules and weak market mechanisms. Reforms are obstructed not so much by the organized groups of losers
as by the patron-client networks of “winners” who seek rent from partial reforms.

The development of the Russian transformations and discourse. The networks of winners and the networks of “bearers of knowledge” are interconnected. Each power group is linked with its own network of the “bearers of knowledge” that legitimizes its position. The hegemony of neoliberalism in the official ideological rhetoric in modern Russia is strongly disguised. In Russia one constantly hears the “mantra” about the social state. Russian capitalism is like a two-faced Janus: neoliberal reforms are conducted by the state administrative class and the oligarchy, but under the guise of the social state.29 This combination manifests itself in a “bubble-like,” speculative policy that is a derivative of illusions and dogmas. The first illusion entertained by part of the ruling economic elite is that the neoliberal model is successful and that the market can solve all the social and economic problems. The points is that the majority of the ruling elite lives on redistribution of the state budget and support of state companies, while market conditions and mechanisms are rudimentary; however, the dogma of “effectiveness of the market” is not questioned and forms the basis of the rhetoric that sets the goals of reforms.

The other illusion feeds into the faith of the population in its paternalistic state which takes care of social well-being. The social component is invariably presented in official rhetoric as the basis of the state’s policy; the Constitution which declares the state to be a social state is invoked. In reality social support is in many ways a simulation, with the population getting small increases of pensions and benefits while the lion’s share of government money goes to support state companies. Social spending has diminished during the years of reforms, even in recent years the increase of social benefits has fallen short of the share of the budget that goes for social needs in welfare countries.

Both theories are part of the official discourse. Gramsci introduced the concept of transformismo, whereby the ideas of counter-ideology can be coopted into the predominant or hegemonistic ideology in order to diminish the power of counter-ideologies. Examples in point are the Greens or the anti-globalist movements whose ideas are being absorbed into the neoliberal idea of globalization. The concept of “sustainable development” means that societies should enjoy rapid economic development without damaging the environment or upsetting the ecological balance. This has become the mainstream idea taken on board, for example, by the World Bank, to describe the development of market forces and free enterprise.30 Another example is the idea of social justice borrowed by the governing party in Russia from left-wing movements, or the appearance of the liberal platform within that party.31 The governing party in general is noted for its capacity to absorb the ideas of the opposition, thus weakening it, in order to preserve the social status quo.

Metaphorically speaking, the exploitation of “bubbles” (speculative ideas) in official discourse introduces confusion into people’s minds. Any protest initiatives that awaken the healthy forces and popular activity are dampened or turned into a farce because of discrepancies in the views of representatives of various
ideologies. As a result Russia today has a weak economic liberalization, a weak social security system, but a strong administrative class which definitely stands to gain from the existing social order, a fact that the population is aware of.

Resistance to liberal reforms comes precisely from the “winners,” and not from the “losers” described as inherently unfit for reforms. The burden of change is redistributed in such a way that its main share is borne by the most vulnerable groups of the population. The losers were unlikely to seriously challenge reforms not only because there were not enough resources and “energy of the masses” to organize at the initial period of reforms, but also because large sections of the population remain psychologically demoralized, demobilized and apathetic. These are the consequences of the discourse that treats entire social strata as worthless “losers,” stigmatizing and marginalizing them. As a result the groups of losers passively accept the roles prescribed by the hegemony. This is part of the reason for the apathy and passivity that are constantly being cited. The authorities have taken advantage of this condition: ostensibly to protect “the weak and naive” citizens “still unprepared for democracy” from the dishonest and criminalized candidates to elective office they abolished, for example, the elections of governors. In recent years even successful groups are increasingly uncomfortable and vaguely discontented because the limits of growth and rules of the game that have been set are at odds with the principles of the market economy and the principles of the social state. The real winners appear to be not the successful groups but only the representatives of the administrative class.

These winners are interested only in partial reforms. They gravitate towards each other creating their own social capital and networks, a code of success based not on competition, as commanded by the market, but on relationships that yield rent. The patron-client networks need closed structures and not market competition. These anti-structures impede modernization and challenge the logic of competitive relations. They turned out to be a factor that substantially changed the direction of reforms in Russia. Incidentally, from the start of reforms the stake was put on rapid privatization and not on the development of a competitive environment like in other postsocialist countries and in China.

Although the neoliberal ideas about the basic conditions of social success do not correspond to the real foundations of success in Russian society, the discourse of the winners and losers is still key to the social and political life in Russia. The intellectual efforts to apportion the blame, coupled with the traditions of the Russian intelligentsia of revealing the “soul of the people” and its imperfections, contribute to social disunity. It is hard to imagine such a large amount of texts and studies devoted to undesirable features of the American, French or the people of any other Western country.

The discourse of winners and losers tends to dissociate and confirm opposing values in mass consciousness. A game with a limited sum, like in the past, remains the prevalent ontological principle in assessing present-day reality in Russia. The argument of course is between different sides which reproduce the discourse and perpetuate the confrontation. In the mass media and in the blogosphere this takes the form of mutual recriminations and slang expressions that
brand winners and losers. On the one hand, there are the sovki (slang for “people with Soviet mentality”), “losers,” “mildew,” “small fry,” “hamsters,” “the sweaty lot,” “pimply scum,” “dregs” and “the herd.” And on the other hand, there are “majors,” “progressors,” “liberasts,” “luxury,” etc.

Impoverishment, differentiation of incomes and marginalization are considered to be natural states at the times of radical transformations. The objective state is aggravated by the subjective state. Even those who objectively are not outcasts feel themselves to be on the margins of society. Psychologically marginalized individuals are known to be more inclined to support authoritarian leaders and “strong fist” regimes which offer populist recipes and solutions to the situation in which these people feel themselves to be on the margins, and hold out the promise for them to occupy a worthy place in society.

The discourse at the start of the reforms was based on the conviction that any social losses are acceptable if they keep at bay the threat of the revival of the Soviet system. Today there are clear signs of nostalgia for the Soviet past in public rhetoric and politics. Vladimir Putin has been gradually changing public rhetoric in the populist spirit, which met the expectations of part of the population. For many, such rhetoric restored recognition and a sense of dignity. As a sign of gratitude... Putin is reelected. Rhetoric and language, pandering to the people, restoring the rituals and symbols of the Soviet era have also helped him to win the elections. The comparatively high approval rating of the President opened up new opportunities for increasing the authoritarian character of power.

The discourse that claims that the people are not fit for reforms could not but, on the one hand, provide the basis for legitimization of the already contemptuous attitude of the elites to the populace. On the other hand, it strengthened the case for the authoritarian regime; and because subjective marginalization of large sections of the population had begun back in the 1990s, the 2000s saw a growing ressentiment among citizens brought up on egalitarian values. Not surprisingly, part of the population is looking to the authoritarian regime.

There is another important consideration. The winners always provide models for imitation, models of success. The established hegemony created the legitimacy of material success per se, no matter how it has been achieved. Conspicuous consumption is especially widespread in Russia. The winners demonstrate their success and the media publicize it. Leonid Ionin writes about the particular arrogance of the rich in Russia. Rather than hiding their wealth they, “on the contrary, deliberately set themselves up as targets for the media.” This cannot but give rise, on the one hand, to sentiments similar to ressentiment feelings, and on the other, the wish to imitate them. The author points out that when the masses are angry “the blame should not be put on the media or the common people... It is the rich who parade their quick success that are to blame.”35 One has to make it clear that the discourse that encourages conspicuous consumption and tempts people with the image of the “winner” is also to blame.

As a result the winners have nothing in common with what liberal ideas and values are all about. Nor does the image of winners meet the market ideals. The
reason is that winners and losers were not identified during the course of competition. Many market reforms are still theoretical and have nothing but a new language. Truly market practices in post-Soviet Russia are extremely rare. In the opinion of Oleg Kharkhordin, this happened with the term “social” that was a Soviet-era cliché, when after the revolution people, who were still traditionally steeped in social estate and religious ideas, found themselves caught up in the machine of Soviet cultural practices. Before the revolution people knew the old “community” (rural community, in Russian obshchina) and in the Soviet times the new “Soviet public activists” but not “society” in the British or French interpretation. At that time everything was “social” and today, by analogy, without really being exposed to the evolving market practices, everything has become “pro-market.” Ideological ideas set the tone of interpretations. But the practices and the a posteriori results may be a far cry from the essence of the theoretical model. In the same logic, “winners” and “losers” do not correspond to the market essence of the neoliberal model.

And one more thing. Imitating winners is a natural impulse. The identity of a winner is tempting because “the winner takes all.” Everybody wants to join the winners and hates to be a loser. That classification is also appealing because it feeds into the imitation mechanism. Many have written about the power of the imitative attitude to another. René Girard writes that a person is under thespell of the enemy. The more the other insults you (or ignores and thus insults) the more important place he will occupy in the world of the “insulted.” The population is mesmerized by the image of the current winners, it sees oligarchs and bureaucrats as enemies, but in reality it seeks to imitate them.

It is worth mentioning the role of the intellectuals some of whom as a rule gravitate towards the winners. For all the critical approach to the authorities they unwittingly imitate the winners, distancing themselves from the losers (“the masses”) by creating classification schemes and interpreting their observations. “The present-day world of the intellectuals’ consciousness reveals the same fascination with the enemy: fascination with power and the embodiment of that power by one person—Putin... the “liberal” intelligentsia is mesmerized by Putin and the conservatives and the left are mesmerized by the liberals... All of them think that they are concerned about Russia, but in reality they think about one another. It is the same mechanism: people think a lot more about Putin than about the problems that should be engaging their minds as responsible citizens.”

Conclusion. In the ideological context of Russian transformation neoliberal content forms the basis of interpretations and the distinction between winners and losers. In accordance with the distorted idea of the “survival of the fittest” it leans heavily towards material and individual success. The discourse of winners and losers involves ideological legitimization of social inequality and the social order that emerged in the process of Russia’s transformation. It simplifies and reduces to a dichotomy the diverse social phenomena and impedes the understanding of the complex processes of economic and social dynamics. It is notable that social scientists also reproduce that symbolic social hierarchy.
NOTES


22 N. Tikhonova, “The Human Potential of Russian Modernists”....


32 See, for example: S. Green, op. cit.


Translated by Yevgeny Filippov
In recent years, the problem of human capital has attracted the attention of Russian and foreign researchers. Human capital refers to society’s main resource: people, without whom social and economic life is impossible. At the same time, there are different (and sometimes opposite) views on how to define, measure and assess human capital. There are also different views on how to maintain and build this capital, how to use it to the best advantage, and how to get people to take a real interest in increasing it.

These and other questions related to human capital in modern Russia are examined in depth and detail in a new book by Natalya Pliskevich (2012). She wrote it based on the results of years of research and reflection on the sociocultural aspects of Russian economic reforms and the transformation of Russian society. What is human capital in modern Russia and what role can it play in the modernization of the country and the solution of numerous problems? Before considering the answers to these questions, the author tries to find out whether the concept of “human capital” is a strictly scientific category or whether it is a kind of metaphor. If this concept is recognized as a metaphor, will this mean that a scientific study of such metaphors is deficient or altogether impossible? Moreover, can human capital be weighed and measured from every angle using various quantitative indicators or will there always be something that can only be considered based on so-called qualitative research methods? N. Pliskevich convincingly shows the limitations of a restricted approach to the concept of “human capital.”

As a rule, quantitative methods of measuring human capital dominate in economic and sociological studies. Many authors have no doubt about the exhaustive completeness of their calculations and empirical measurements and regard qualitative approaches as useless “lyrics,” evaluating human capital in terms of how the level of education and competence helps to occupy a certain position in

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Moreover, some authors believe that human capital should generate profit because otherwise it is not capital.

N. Pliskevich argues against such views and shows that such a narrow approach to the assessment of human capital is unacceptable. Of course, she recognizes that quantitative studies are necessary for some concrete purposes, but their authors should understand that their interpretation of data obtained based on purely instrumental, quantitative characteristics (mainly indicators of educational level and assessments of the usefulness of knowledge and abilities, professional skills, etc.) is tentative and does not reflect all aspects of real life.

But even a broader approach, as proposed in the Human Development Index (which takes into account educational levels, GDP per capita and life expectancy), cannot be considered sufficient for an adequate assessment of reality. In this case, the analysis does not cover many aspects that are part of cultural capital and, in effect, constitute the basis of indicators that reflect the quality of human capital. Moreover, an indicator such as the literacy rate of the population can hardly play a key role in the postindustrial world (Russia, for example, occupies a respectable 10th place in the world in this indicator but cannot boast of high education standards). That is why quantitative methods can and must be supplemented with qualitative ones.

The author’s interest in qualitative methods is perfectly justified, as well as her desire to interpret the concept of “human capital” as broadly as possible, because a restricted approach to human beings and their activities tends to distort rather than clarify the true state of affairs. Can one speak of the human dimension of the economy and human capital while ignoring important things such as cultural traditions or internal motivation? One cannot study this special type of capital without regard to the entire flow of events that affect socioeconomic behavior, the specific features of the current age, and the political context.

An assessment of human capital based on qualitative analysis can be more accurate even if this places such capital in the category of metaphor. “Such analysis can provide a more valid basis for the subsequent interpretation of the currently applied quantitative indicators and for the development of new ones.” Metaphoricity is not in conflict with economic analysis but makes it more comprehensive and multifaceted, more accurate and adequate to reality. For example, Deirdre McCloskey believes that each step in economic reasoning, even the reasoning in the framework of the official rhetoric, is metaphoric. As a result, metaphor plays a key role in economic thinking, however formal. But the definition of the “human capital” concept in itself is also very vague. When speaking of human capital, Gary Becker mentions, among other things, a person’s emotional involvement, and Douglass C. North includes in it not only the stock of knowledge humans possess, but also the beliefs they hold and even the institutions they create on the basis of those beliefs.

N. Pliskevich analyzes what happens to human capital in societies that have gone through or are going through revolutionary upheavals because such upheavals change the whole sociopolitical system, break the thread of tradition, disrupt the habitual way of life, and change the conditions of cultural and social
reproduction. All of this has a profound effect on human capital and its characteristics.

The author puts forward an interesting idea: in revolutionary times, a part of society’s accumulated human capital is, so to speak, “conserved,” and this applies not only to its obsolete types, but also to perfectly viable ones that are necessary in the new conditions. In times of revolutionary change, institutions that ensure the functioning of viable types of human capital are destroyed or disabled. Such a situation also has an extremely negative (and sometimes tragic) effect on many bearers of human capital required by society (compelling them to change the necessary profession they love) and on the society as a whole.

The ability of human capital to realize its accumulated potential in the new conditions will depend on whether society creates new institutions helping to unlock this potential or “enables” the old institutions that are necessary for this. In the modern world human capital is a “perishable good.” And the higher its quality, the more sensitive it is to interruptions in the reproduction process and the faster it deteriorates. In other words, aptitudes, skills and abilities that are highly valued in one context may turn out to be useless in another context only a few years later, not to mention the fact that they are quickly lost without use.

The current situation with human capital in Russia should be assessed taking into account two factors. First, in the 20th century Russian history witnessed not one but two tectonic shifts: the revolution of 1917 and the collapse of the Soviet system in the 1990s. Today, the quality of the country’s human capital is influenced by the consequences not only of the second, but also of the first shift. For example, according to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey conducted by the Higher School of Economics (RLMS—HSE) and designed to monitor the economic situation, education and healthcare in Russia, in 2010 only 1.4% of the population were fluent in foreign languages, and in the 20-29 age bracket the figure was 2%. In the group of executives, only 21% of respondents said they had some knowledge of foreign languages (at “tourist” or any other level).5

Second, the “power-property” system is still dominant in the country. The author uses this term, coined by Leonid S. Vasilyev and used by a number of other researchers such as Rustem M. Nurceev and Anton B. Runov, although this phenomenon is also known under other names. Today we speak of the “natural state” (versus “open access orders”) due to the popularity of the North—Wallis—Weingast concept. But in all cases this means that relations in society, primarily property relations, depend on one’s position in the power hierarchy. The specifics of the situation with the formation and development of human capital cannot be understood outside this broader context. That is why the author builds her analysis based on the fact of domination of “power-property” relations in the society.

In Chapter Four, the author makes an interesting and detailed analysis of the Soviet period from these positions, and in Chapter Five, of the current situation. When analyzing the ability of modern Russian society to address the challenges of modernization, N. Pliskevich identifies various structural types of human cap-
ital. The leading role in modernization processes is played by elite human capital that drives innovation, but competent distributors of innovations are just as important. People without sufficient education have a significant influence on general modernization processes, which is why they and their children should be provided with adequate incentives to improve their human capital and so to raise their living standards. The author believes that unless this is done, the country's modernization may slow down.

When considering the formation of human capital in the current conditions, N. Pliskevich analyzes why the 20 years of the post-Soviet era have not produced the desired results, including in the economic sphere. She emphasizes that after the revolution of 1917, no matter how one views it, there was an explosion of the creative energy of the masses, and after the breakdown of the Soviet system in the 1990s there was only a short surge of activity and enthusiasm. In the author's view, one of the reasons for this is that the new institutionalization of the habitual “power-property” system blocked bottom-up initiatives and prevented the development of a civil society. In addition, the psychological discomfort associated with the rule of money has deepened in modern Russia so that the bearers of human capital spend their energy not on creative breakthroughs but on survival and on coping with psychological overstress.

In analyzing this problem, the author comes to the conclusion that the most important thing for the development of human capital is the system of values. On the one hand, in terms of general value preferences Russians fit quite well into the overall European picture. On the other hand, there are institutions in the country that act as a brake on modernization impulses and the development of human capital. These institutions are part of the “power-property” system dominant in the country. This system dictates to people a rational survival strategy involving specific social networks constructed based on a separation of administrative and natural rents. In such conditions, the individual seeks to increase the specific social capital created on the basis of these networks.

Human capital loses its priority, is suppressed by social capital, and often acquires purely formal features. Importance is now attached not to the quality of human capital but to its formal attributes and symbols (diplomas, etc.), a fact confirmed, among other things, by the campaign to expose mass plagiarism of dissertations.

The author suggests a way to stimulate broad strata of the population to raise the real and not the formal level of their human capital. According to the studies of Ronald F. Inglehart, the role of survival values is high in all ex-communist countries, especially in Russia, which is why a review of priorities in payment for work—so as to put a higher value on work requiring higher levels of education—could spur the development of human capital. But so far the state's economic and social policy has pursued protective rather than modernization goals. Take the budget priorities of recent years: an increase in the share of expenditures on defense and industry (with a corresponding increase in the income of people employed in these areas regardless of their qualification level) and a decline in the share of expenditures on education, healthcare, science and culture.
(the announced pay rises in these sectors, as practice shows, have turned out to be fictitious). At the same time, the income of government officials has been growing, which also orients people to join the appropriate social networks and to acquire social capital. In this situation, human capital turns out to be secondary.

N. Pliskevich draws a number of important conclusions. The level of development of human capital is “a mirror reflecting both positive and negative signals” sent to it by the socioeconomic environment. Successes in the transformation of this environment, especially in the efforts to achieve genuine postindustrial modernization, depend to a great extent on whether the state of human capital accumulated in a society is consistent with the tasks facing this society. One can agree with the author of the book that many difficulties in building human capital are related to the still unresolved problem of the gap between the needs of the modern economy and the institutions of the “power-property” system that stand in its way. The prospects for the development of human capital in Russia and the country’s future depend on whether this problem is resolved in the short term.

NOTES
5 N. Pliskevich, op. cit., p. 69.
7 N. Pliskevich, op. cit., p. 216.

T. Koval
Translated by Irina Borisova
I. BUZDALOV. Rural Russia and Peasantry in the Grip of a State Monopoly Environment, Moscow, GNU VSTISP (The State Scientific Institution—The All-Russia Institute of Selection Technologies for Gardening and Plant Introduction Nurseries of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences), Moscow, 2013, 225 pp.

This monograph by academician Ivan Buzdalov carries on a series of his exploration works on topical issues of Russia’s agrarian economy. The title of the monograph reflects serious imbalances in the development of the agricultural sector, gaps in intersectoral relations, nonobservance of parity in exchange, including due to the outpacing growth of prices of industrial products.

A special place is taken in the book by an analysis of destructive tendencies and macroeconomic imbalances as the causes of crises in the agroeconomic relations. Notably, this analysis is retrospective in nature: the author traces the trends of socioeconomic changes in rural areas over the period from the abolition of serfdom in 1861 to the present day. We agree with the author’s argument about the need to grant to the peasantry the rights equal to those of other classes of society and to overcome the hidden imbalances in the use of labor (“pumping-over” in the words of Buzdalov). The author holds that making up for the factor of capital deficiency with the labor factor is an erroneous policy under all political regimes.

The author criticizes the social policy in rural areas as resulting in the impoverishment (reduction to indigence, according to the author) of the rural
population, labor potential degradation, dismal performance of rural demography, decline in the quality of social and engineering infrastructures and outflows of the able-bodied workforce from all rural areas. All this results in the decline of the agroindustrial sector, a reduction in the output of agricultural raw materials and domestic foodstuffs.

Undoubtedly, we have to recognize that Russian agriculture today cannot fully satisfy the needs of the population for foodstuffs. But a large-scale backing of foreign producers by local governments under the rules of the World Trade Organization creates a favorable institutional field for the inflow of imported foods to the Russian market. Buzdalov not only uncovers serious contradictions in Russia’s economic policy but also brings in significant statistical data to support his conclusions and proposals.

The author of the monograph consistently substantiates the need for changes in agricultural economic policy and favors transition to a protectionist approach, citing the example of developed countries, including those that have no fertile soils such as Russia. Most indicative is the example of Israel, where, according to the author’s data, the volume of gross agricultural production over half a century increased 20-fold on the basis of the highest technological level of production. Agrarian protectionism is actively used as an instrument of economic policy in the developed countries (EU, USA, Japan, and Israel), where government subsidies per one hectare of arable land are dozens of times greater than in Russia. At that, the size of arable land in many countries is considerably less than in Russia.

But even as regards the provision of subsidies to agricultural producers, Buzdalov calls for moderation and reasonableness in order, on the one hand, to support the growth and competitiveness of agricultural production and, on the other, to avoid fueling parasitical sentiments in rural areas. His argument must be recognized as being reasonable. The author examines in detail all the past and present programs of support for farming, their advantages, disadvantages and effects. The author points out that the goal of increasing the competitiveness of agricultural producers is in stark contrast to the “objective features of the reproduction process in agriculture on a market basis, which presupposes a balanced government policy of agrarian protectionism” (p. 14).

The book traces the evolution of land relations in agriculture. The author adduces data on the concentration of land resources in the hands of a small group of oligarchs in some regions (the Moscow region for one). Monopolization of land resources is not conducive to the development of agriculture because, after the acquisition of agricultural plots of land, they are transferred into other land categories (for example, for individual housing construction, where their market value is much higher).

According to the author, certain provisions of the Land Code of the Russian Federation restrict the development of civilized market relations (p. 143). Having analyzed the extant systems of economic protection of land and of economic relations between the land users and landowners, Buzdalov suggests taking into account the positive experience of Denmark, Greece, Norway, South Korea, the United States and other countries (p. 144).
The author explains in detail the land rent theory and his own understanding of the problem from the point of view of the current economic situation in the country and the world. Buzdalov offers his own set of tools of tax incentives for a more efficient use of land (Section 4.2).

In exploring the social structure of the agrarian sector, Buzdalov holds that stability is a vitally important feature of rural life. One of the factors for achieving sustainability in rural areas is, of course, the structure of the agrarian sector as a whole and, primarily, the legal and organizational structure for agricultural producers in the first place.

The author comes up with a rigorous scientific substantiation for the application of the social market economy concept to agriculture (Chapter VI). Building upon the works of Walter Eucken and Aleksandr Chayanov, Buzdalov pays tribute to the cooperative movement and proves that cooperative arrangements are friends with “profitability” (p. 230).

The book clearly links the problems of development of rural areas with the structural elements of the agrarian economy. The author adduces convincing proof of the need of cooperative principles for the development in agriculture. While exploring the social structure in rural areas he shows that the work on the land is closely linked with the social factors in the development of society as a whole.

The last chapter contains the author’s suggestions aiming to direct changes of the situation in the Russian agrarian sector. Buzdalov considers specific tools for augmenting the agricultural sector in conjunction with its social structure, examines the issues in improving the intersectoral and territorial division of labor, gives suggestions for achieving sustainable agricultural development, and suggests ways of intensification of agricultural production as the basis for further development of the agricultural sector. Admittedly, somewhat overemotionally but fairly the author calls on the authorities to pursue a socially oriented agricultural policy and to alter the regulatory role of the government in this matter.

A significant part of Buzdalov’s book is devoted to the land issue and the modern land market problems and prospects. In Russia, land is not only the basic means of production for agriculture, but it is also a complex object in sociolegal relations. It is from a position of understanding land versatility as an object of study that this question is examined in the book. A detailed analysis of the existing leasing arrangements in the agricultural sector makes the author note that the right to private ownership of land remains unregulated in Russia (p. 180). That is a rather contentious issue. As the private land ownership is concerned with regard to agricultural areas and arable land, the following must be noted. First, under the current conditions, given an undeveloped industrial and social infrastructure and no proper support of agricultural producers by the government, private land ownership may unleash plots of land speculation and profiteering. Second, private ownership of land does not appear to be the mandatory prerequisite for the emergence of market relations (the Netherlands, Israel and some other countries are examples of this). Thirdly, the experience of developed countries shows that the civilized landowner is a product of a long evolutionary develop-
ment, i.e., of an evolutionary process in the course of which both an adequate mentality and the economic base are formed; the relations to property ownership will undergo transformation in line with this process.

Back in 350 BC Aristotle formulated a seemingly paradoxical idea that “wealth does not lie in ownership but in the use of things!” This dictum has a direct bearing on the current land-related issues. In our opinion, the most preferable option in building land relations in Russia is a predominantly public land ownership. Private land ownership should be made available for private personal subsidiary farming, horticulture and market gardening. At that, land leasing, including long-term leasing on condition that land has to be used specifically for agricultural farming purposes, must be widespread. The right to land acquisition should not be obtained through the act of buying and selling as a form of alienation of land ownership, but in the form of acquisition of the right to land as an object of management for the purpose of earning an income. Land should be regarded as an object of economic management, which does not exclude the possibility of a land market (not for purposes of acquisition of land ownership rights but of the right to manage economic activity).

In conclusion, we note that an undoubted advantage of the monograph is the author’s style of presentation. The text is easy to read because the author’s arguments are logical and convincing. The monograph brings in extensive historical materials and cites works of foreign and domestic scientists. With good reason, the agrarian scientist’s monograph can be recognized as a significant contribution to modern science.

A. Zeldner, V. Osipov

Translated by Vadim Polyakov
Those who write about power and violence are either tempted to analyze the mechanisms and functions of the state machine or concentrate on the victims to stir up an emotional response from the readers caused by the primordial fear of death. Aleksandr Vatlin has avoided both extremes, having fit the impersonal and personal aspects into the framework of his program. The result is an amazingly balanced and amazingly touching story.

He writes about his book (with a touch of doubt) as microhistorical investigation (microhistory), the term which invites ambiguous responses even from those historians who work within its limits and, yet, are reluctant to specify it to avoid the pinching limits of conclusions of the lower level. In reality, microhistory is a history of objects found in immediate proximity and posing very specific tasks, the need to re-verify conclusions based on macrohistorical analysis being one of them.

The author’s representative sampling is best suited to the aim he has posed himself: close-ups of human fates as a reflection of the focal points of the history of the Soviet Union of the 1920s, 1930s and partially 1940s. He selected a very narrow group of victims of repressions which stood apart not only from the rest of other victims of the terror, but also from the rest of the population of the Soviet Union and Germany, their lives being fantastic combinations of highly inordinate life circumstances. These people born in Germany and conventionally referred to as “Germans” crossed the Weimar Republic and the ideological borders of the Third Reich to join Soviet realities brimming with “fairness, happiness and idealistic expectations” only to discover the other side of the medal: court sentences of various degrees of severity which came as a bolt from the blue.

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to those who believed that what they had done was absolutely legitimately right. This book can be described as a scrutiny over the tragedy which deals not only with human sufferings but also with the historical paradox of the Russian and German history of the 20th century.

A “collective biography” is the best analytical instrument applied to a very distinctive social group; the book under review belongs (with certain reservations) to this genre: it concentrates on people, the machine of repressions coming second and, consequently, on the question of how the Germans in the Soviet Union acquired common ideas and attitudes to life, that is, common mentality. The 20th century, its sudden U-turn and extremes make it hard, or even very hard, to put into a nutshell the self-awareness of a narrow social group (even if there is no shortage of varied and mutually complementary sources). In this particular case the process of the emergence of a community of Soviet Germans was disrupted by repressions. The author has pointed out that the available documents proved to be useless when it comes to an in-depth analysis of self-awareness of repressed German emigrants and to the task of establishing the “degree of their integration in Soviet realities” (p. 228). The author, however, has drawn an uninterrupted historical line across the events of the 1920s—1930s and has remained fully aware of the highly varied nature of the studied community. This variety stems from the political positions of these “Germans,” the road that brought them to the Soviet Union and their lifestyle as well as individual psychological makeup. The relationships and the hierarchy inside the group have been investigated in detail.

The insistent efforts undertaken in the 1920s—1930s to transform Soviet society into a society of a “new Soviet man” according to a single uniform pattern were the focal point which, in the years of the Stalin repressions, led to a clash between social groups and the machine of power. The author has identified and clearly presented the stages by which the task of social transformation (the realization of which moved from theoretical formulas, initiatives at the bottom level presented as a “creative response” to the initiatives from above to the decision to liquidate the “alien elements”) arrived at repressions. The book clearly demonstrates that the stages of the repressions against the “Germans” coincided with the quest for the ways and means needed for closer integration of Soviet society which lasted till the mid-1930s. Integration could have been positive—foreign activists could have been involved in the social and public life of the Soviet people to feel that they were involved in a common cause and were needed. The Soviet leaders to whom “personal power raised no barriers” (p. 224) opted for the simplest method—indiscriminate elimination of all alien elements whose experience of Soviet realities was too short to let them master the new rules.

The author described by stages the German operation of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) to demonstrate how the machine of violence worked. It functioned on the basis of the principles well-known to all Soviet citizens: socialist emulation in toadying to power; achievements in terms of quantity rather than quality; bureaucratic overzealousness; arbitrariness, disdain for laws, and, finally, punishment of “transgressors” who, in their enthusiasm,
“have gone beyond the limits.” The principle of “simplification of the task” was applied to all Germans: if it was hard to prove, real offences, or transgressions of the law, were pushed aside; repressions were unfolding on the basis of easily proved (albeit false) accusations: relatives or friends were arrested and accused as members of an organized subversive group. This helped camouflage a purely formal approach which excluded a large group of people from normal life on the strength of their ethnic origins.

Microhistory leaves vast space for new hypotheses which are more and more evident as the object of investigation comes closer. In this particular case the author has offered many conclusions going beyond his initial research project, viz., about the scope of violence in the Weimar Republic, the forms of antifascist struggle; contribution of German émigré scientists to Soviet science; the “social freezing” trends in the Stalin Russia, the parallels between the Soviet and Nazi regimes, etc. The book is brimming with hypotheses of all types which call for further substantiation. The author deemed it necessary to warn that “the fragmentary nature of the source base may suggest unjustified conclusions when individual cases are viewed as a system” (p. 13). At the same time, to ward off possible criticism, he demonstrates too much caution. Indeed, any investigation conducted at the crossroad of theories, concepts, methods and disciplines (a comprehensive analysis of an event) invariably asks more questions than provides answers. In the final analysis, this depends on the level of confidence in the author’s scholarly level and his theoretical consciousness and logical coordination of his theoretical postulates. In the context of the changed methodological landmarks, these simple scientific criteria have preserved their priority in our days and age. The author’s easily detectable doubt of the results of his own work (which, in fact, looks quite valuable and correct) can be described as the book’s only shortcoming. The lack of confidence in the results of the study and their possible criticism are rooted in the vaguely defined specifics of the method employed.

It was accepted long ago that the author’s highly personal and clearly expressed position is not an inevitable evil but the main attraction which orients the author and the reader: they are both concerned with answers to the same question: Which way does not lead to get under the pressure of the road-roller of history? Without going into details of the author’s design I can promise that the reader will find the answer even if it is disconcerting.

T. Nekrasova
Translated by Valentina Levina
This volume, which consists of five sections, is based on the materials of the Zverev International Biennial Conference on American Studies: Americans in Pursuit of Their National Identity/Identities.

The first section “Re/vising American Identity: Racial and Ethnic Affiliation” consists of eleven chapters. It opens with the article by Richard Crepeau, Professor at the College of Arts & the Humanities at the University of Central Florida who keenly feels the loss of his ethnic affiliation. The ancestors of his French father moved from Bordeaux to Canada early in the 17th century; early in the 20th century the family moved to Minnesota. His father spoke French as a child; at school and later he used English; as a result, his son did not inherit the ability to speak French or an awareness of being partly affiliated to the French nation. His mother belonged to a family with English, Irish and German roots, which left no trace in Crepeau’s self-awareness. He is an American, pure and simple. If not, who is he after all?

Natalya Pastushkova of the Russian State University of the Humanities (RGGU) analyzes Maria Amparo Ruiz de Burton (1832-1895) a Mexican-American or American-Mexican author who, while seeking stability in a precarious border situation never feared to reveal the duality of her position.

Prof. Jose B. Fernández of the University of Central Florida has been studying the problem of quest for identity in Cuban-American novels. “Cuban literature, Cuban literature in exile, Cuban-American literature—can anyone say where one ends and the other begins?” wondered Cuban-American literary critic Rodolfo Cortina (p. 34). In his survey of how the identity issue was treated by Cuban authors since the 19th century Fernández pays particular attention to the novels written by four Cuban-American authors of the “intermediate generation”—Roberto Fernández, Gustavo Firmat, Virgil Suárez and Cristina García.

Prof. Irina Morozova of the RGGU and Anna Lillios, Associate Professor at the University of Central Florida, co-chairs of the project “discussing Zora Neale

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Hurston’s *Their Eyes Were Watching God*” (see Irina Morozova, Cynthia Ruder and Anna Lillios’ “Lessons of Joint Russian-American Student Projects”) submitted the articles “Eatonville of Zora Hurston as a Locus of Afro-American Identity” and “Americanism of Zora Neale Hurston” correspondingly.

Olga Antsyferova of the Ivanovo State University in her article “The Problem of Passing Narrative in Afro-American Literature” has skillfully fit the novel of passing into the classical cultural tradition. Her discussion of the collision of racial passing (racial pretension, racial mimicry, concealed identity-p. 65) in world classics cannot but impress by its clear placement in the strict system of coordinates suggested by Mikhail Bakhtin.

Tatyana Fyodorova (Ivanovo State University) continued this profound discussion in her own contribution to the conference “Passing of Nella Larsen: the Problem of Interpretation.”

The second section entitled “The Poetics of Self-Identification of American Culture and Literature” deals with the problem of aesthetic self-identification and interpretation of the specifics of poetics of American culture. The contribution by Olga Panova (Moscow State University) “A New Discovery of America: American Modernism As a Cultural-Nationalist Project” deserves special mention. The author has concentrated not on American modernism as a transnational project of sorts where Thomas Eliot, Ezra Pound, Gertrude Stein and Hilda Doolittle figured prominently, but on modernism as a “cultural-nationalist project” created by William Carlos Williams, Sherwood Anderson, Waldo Frank and Gertrude Stein, an expat patriot, etc. The clearly structured article (which identifies five elements as the basic component parts of the modernist cultural-nationalist concept) reads like a brilliant and captivating lecture the end of which is perceived as a sad necessity, however, it promises continuation. The lectures of Aleksey Zverev (the present collection is dedicated to his memory) stirred up similar expectations. I hope that we will see Olga Panova’s textbook on American modernism.

In his article “An ‘Alien Tongue’ and Comic Forms in Literary Works by Native Americans” Aleksandr Lavrentyev of the State University of Udmurtiya analyzes the beauty and the tragic aspects of the “alien tongue” subject on the basis of Scott Momaday’s *House Made of Dawn* (the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction, 1969).

The majority of the contributions to the fourth section “Dialogue between America and Europe: Text, Context, Intertextuality” are marked by an outstanding subtlety of hearing and vision.

In her “The Ghost of Hamlet: *J. Alfred Prufrock* of T. C. Eliot and *Hamlet* by Jules Laforgue” Prof. Olga Polovinkina (RGGU) has convincingly demonstrated that Prufrock was “no Hamlet and was not intended to be him.” “He is a ‘companion,’ a Ghost of Hamlet who imitates his posture, a man of a new epoch, a melancholic captured by the trivial” (p. 309). The author demonstrates a lot of witticism and irony to explain how and why Prufrock, while differing considerably from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, resembles Hamlet of Jules Laforgue, the protagonist of one of his *Moralités légendaires—Hamlet, ou Les Suites de la piété filiale.*
Galina Kovalenko, Professor at the St. Petersburg State Academy of Theatrical Art, who has contributed her “Intertextuality and the Problem of Scenic Text,” has answered in the negative her own question “Should we recognize an implicit quote from Shakespeare in the first word of the play’s title (Edward Albee’s *The Goat, or Who Is Sylvia?*) as related to the origins of the tragedy and relate the play’s idea to the philosophy of Thoreau and Waldo Emerson to enjoy reading or watching a play? There’s no need of it” (p. 319). One can agree with her. The cultural codes hidden deep in the play will be recognized at a deep and, probably, subconscious level, yet reading the elegantly written text and accepting the clearly formulated solutions help you enjoy the recognition of the cultural codes.

Yelena Apenko of St. Petersburg State University who asked “The Negro of Peter the Great in the Rapping: Who Needs It?” has turned to Alice Randall’s *Pushkin and the Queen of Spades* (2004) as an example of treatment of Pushkin as an Afro-Russian by Afro-American authors. “The world outlook of the Russian poet is likened to the world outlook of Black Americans therefore the ‘Afro-Russian’ nature of Aleksandr Pushkin includes ‘dual awareness’, an acute feeling of discrimination and humiliation” (p. 343).

The fourth section—“America and the World of the ‘Other’: Imagological Strategies” look at the representations of the I-image and the image of the “Other” and the varied methods designed to create and use these images in building up a national picture of the world.

The fifth section, “Centers of American Studies in Russia,” contains information about two centers of American studies in the Russian Federation: the Udmurtiya and Pomorye state universities (in May 2011 the latter became part of the Northern (Arctic) Lomonosov Federal University). The Organizing Committee of the Zverev International Biennial Conferences and the editorial board of the reviewed collection intend to include this section in all future collections of this sort. Indeed, the article “American Club as an Organizational Form of Extra-Classroom American Studies” (based on the experience of the Pomorye University) is a very useful contribution. Aleksey Feldt has demonstrated that what began as a site in the VK social network was gradually developing from one project to another. A combination of the virtual and the real, “electronic” organizational forms (video conferences, work in social networks, electronic correspondence, videos, etc.) with the traditional forms (discussions, conference and business games) proved successful. This scholars led to highly interesting Round Tables, meetings with American diplomats, scholars engaged in American studies, public figures and also educational games in English, movies and bookcrossing.

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L. Yegorova  
Translated by Valentina Levina
To survive in this pragmatic world and hoping to prove their relevance, philosophers often tackle tasks that have never been the subjects of philosophy before. Philosophy tries to be “useful,” i.e., relevant to the “key” problems of our time ranging from the methodology of science to bioethics and gender studies. In the West the trend has become so prevalent that few people are aware that philosophy can and must be different and that by engaging with the problem of whether abortions should be allowed or banned it is betraying its true goals.

All this goes to show that philosophy is losing awareness of its foundations and understanding of its essence; one gets the impression that the transformations philosophy has undergone in recent decades (from the 1960s) have become irreversible.

Something similar is happening in Russia as well. However, either due to Russia’s “backwardness” (as claimed by contemporary Western liberals who have long regarded us from the “postmodernity” distance) or, on the contrary, owing to its living roots in the thick of national culture which rejects stillborn groundless constructs, we are still convinced that philosophy is an utterly serious and vital discipline in its traditional shape that has survived over centuries. Unfortunately, this important conviction is seldom explicitly reflected by literature. Vladimir Varava’s book stands out as an uncompromising statement of this view of philosophy: the author takes up the cudgels not only against the tendency to reduce philosophy to concrete knowledge, but against attempts to harness philosophy to working out the “solely correct” path of moral, religious and national development. Paradoxically, the book is profoundly relevant precisely because it is profoundly not up-to-date: considering that the terms “modernity” and “postmodernity” have become synonymous with perversion and degradation of philosophy, a return to the eternal foundations of philosophy provides the only chance to trace the path toward its revival as the key factor in the development of man, society and culture.
The main thrust of the book is the author’s conviction that philosophy is essentially and absolutely unique in that it cannot be reduced to any concrete form of knowledge or creativity, be it science, religion or art, even in their broadest definition. The author goes further asserting that not only philosophy cannot be reduced to other forms of human activity, but that it is superior and primary with regard to them in the sense that scientific, religious or artistic perception of reality and man are impossible without some form of philosophical understanding.

The approach to the definition of philosophy expounded in the book may at first glance strike one as being unusual and at odds with the centuries-old tradition of interpreting philosophy. In truth, the definition of philosophy in the book proceeds from old historical forms of defining philosophy, especially the form characteristic of the last really significant school of European philosophy—existentialism—understood in the broadest sense, so that it includes even such a key figure as Martin Heidegger (who, of course, denied that he belonged to that school). Proceeding from Aristotle’s view that philosophy begins in the capacity to wonder, V. Varava ingeniously elaborates the metaphoric and almost casual definition into a rigorous and profound concept that adopts the main principles of existentialism. Within this approach philosophy turns out to be the capacity (and there he draws on the idea of Merab Mamardashvili) to wonder not only at something “wonderful,” but at everything that exists, at Being As such, while the act of wonderment, which is the essence of philosophy, is understood not as a cognitive, but as an existential act, as the original act of man’s Being not reducible to anything, an act that turns man into a profound, self-conscious individual.

In promoting this understanding of philosophy, Varava invokes Heidegger and his thesis that in philosophy there occurs “the fundamental event of presence,” i.e., the key event of human Being. However, seeking to “ontologize” the meaning of philosophy the author is more consistent than the German philosopher. Heidegger can be interpreted to mean that philosophy only expresses and gives discursive shape to the original existential act, the act of human Being, while the author of the book under review fully identifies the content of philosophy with the existential act. Taking issue with Ivan Ilyin who also took an “ontological” view of philosophy, but still asserted the primacy of real life (the existential act) over philosophy as the expression of the meaning of life, V. Varava vehemently argues the opposite: “human life with all its spiritual specificities and uniqueness arises from the philosophical act, i.e., when man experiences philosophical wonderment. Therefore in order to live, it is necessary to be exposed to the influence of philosophy: it is in this sense that one can speak about the absolute significance of philosophy vis-à-vis life” (p. 29).

The author contrasts the definition of philosophy “in terms of Being” with the more common definition “in terms of culture” that puts the meaning of philosophy in the overall context of culture. The latter definition should be seen as an addition to and elaboration of the former because philosophy is also “discursive practice,” i.e., is represented in the shape of various texts that use the mod-
els of a scientific or religious treatise or a work of art. However, when discussing the essence of philosophy we have to be aware of its marked difference from all the other forms of culture. This means that in its primary meaning philosophy cannot be defined through any rational proposition, the same way as it cannot be done with respect to the main “object” of philosophy, Being. “Being is not a category but what gives birth to wonderment,” writes Varava (p. 32). Because philosophy is aimed at expressing, or rather, constituting the metaphysical essence of man, it turns out to be as mysterious and inexpressible as this essence. The underlying content of philosophy can only be understood “apophatically,” that is, through a negation of any form of certainty. This is the main message of the book which consistently rejects all the modern forms of describing philosophy by associating it with concrete areas of knowledge and culture that have a clear-cut pragmatic character: science and religion, ethics and aesthetics, sociology, political science, etc.

The relationship between philosophy and religion comes under particularly close scrutiny because the Russian national tradition prizes the unity of philosophy and religion and even claims that this makes the Russian tradition superior to that of the West. V. Varava categorically rejects the common argument that religion is superior to philosophy because it offers direct access to God whereas philosophy interprets the supreme beginning as an abstract Absolute. If philosophy is defined as the primary existential act in which man reveals the infinite depth and mystery of his being and Being in general, the relationship between philosophy and religion should be reversely described: it is this act that should form the basis of the religious view of the world. Therefore V. Varava argues that the Greek philosophy in its most profound forms of understanding man and the world implicitly contained the truth that was later explicitly revealed by Christianity: it is not by chance that the full Christian truth was only revealed through Christian philosophy. “Christianity, of course, can exist without philosophy, but then nobody would know about it. Only philosophy elevates the private and intimate religious experience to the level of spiritual universalism inherent in humankind’s nature... The fact that is often forgotten, kept back or deliberately suppressed is that all the bedrock principles and foundations of the Christian faith were formulated, and hence reflected on in the language and categories of Ancient Greek philosophy. It is not by chance that the Apostle looking down solemnly with an air of spiritual triumph on the ruins of the Greek culture, was astonished, even perplexed, to see in the midst of Pagan circumambulation a temple to ‘the unknown God’ whose very presence greatly devalued, if not actually canceled the revolutionary triumph of the new faith that purported to be absolutely novel in the structuring and understanding of human life and culture” (pp. 65-66).

This central thesis (which explains the book’s title) cannot be understood without serious reservations. For it means that Christianity introduced nothing in essence into European history compared to what had been said (if only implicitly) by the Greek philosophy. One may agree of course that in philosophy the principle of development is less evident than in other spheres, for example, in
science; in that sense antique philosophy does contain in embryo practically all the concepts and ideas of later Christian philosophy. However, it is impossible to completely deny development in the sphere of philosophy, and V. Varava does not deny it either. The “embryo” has to undergo a complex and substantive process before it turns into a complete “organism,” and that requires a certain environment. Such an environment for the development of philosophical ideas was created by the birth of Christianity which of course cannot be entirely reduced to antique philosophy.

One can try another tack to bolster V. Varava’s thesis. His book argues that philosophy in its primary sense is an existential act that reveals the mysterious depths of human Being, therefore Christianity, which in its original genuine form, in the form of Christ’s teaching, was aimed at revealing the infinite essence of man, can itself be construed as a philosophy. But in that case it makes even less sense to consider the “philosophical” content Jesus brought to the world to be entirely reducible to antique philosophy, even in the form of worshipping “an unknown God.” The Christian concept of man stresses the features that one does not find in any antique theory, notably the idea that man is potentially infinite and absolute.

We feel that a certain confusion in the author’s views arises from the fact that he does not distinguish clearly enough the “official” Christianity as embodied in the historical Church and the original, genuine Christianity whose meaning was distorted and lost by the historical Church, but lived on in the systems of Christian philosophy (“heretical”). “Official” Christianity indeed hardly offered anything new compared to the peak achievements of antique philosophy which the “official” Christianity adjusted to its own needs and which alone enabled it to be alive and effective. But that is precisely why the most penetrating thinkers in the history of European philosophy, seeking to go further in understanding man than Antiquity had achieved, were committed to “restoring” the true meaning of Christianity, i.e., restoring the genuine teaching of Jesus Christ (which had been distorted and forgotten). To repeat, within V. Varava’s frame of reference the primary meaning of that teaching should be seen as “philosophy” and not “religion,” so that one can agree that philosophy understood in this way is primary with regard to religion; but one cannot agree that all the new content this teaching revealed about human Being was already present in antique philosophy. Besides, if we still accept the view that the teaching was brought to the world by the man named Jesus Christ—even if we call him a “philosopher” and not a religious prophet—it would be fair to call his conception Christianity and not simply a philosophy.

The fact that Russian philosophy has consistently sought to restore the true teaching of Christ (there are clear signs of it already in Pyotr Chaadayev’s Philosophical Letters) gives grounds for defining it as religious philosophy. We would like to take issue with V. Varava’s critique of that proposition. He interprets it to mean that Russian philosophers harnessed philosophy to support “official” religiosity, that is, traditional Orthodoxy, which distorted the essence of philosophy. The author, seeking to bolster his interpretation, invokes the works of Nikolay...
Poltoratsky and Nikolay Zernov, but in our opinion today one cannot claim that they reflected the true intent of Russian philosophy. One can find adherence to “official” religiosity only with some, and by no means the most important, Russian thinkers while the main trend interpreted Christianity (the genuine teaching of Jesus Christ) in the way that V. Varava champions, that is, as a “philosophy,” as an existential act that reveals the unfathomable mystery of the human essence. Only, one has to keep in mind that Russian thinkers lived and worked under severe church censorship and pressure from the conservative social environment, which is why only a few of them dared to challenge the “official” religiosity: that is why their works are full of tragic vacillations between “heresy” and the “canon.” V. Varava rightly points out that the core of the Russian philosophical tradition is associated with unusual thinkers such as Fyodor Dostoevsky, Lev Tolstoy, Nikolay Fyodorov and Andrey Platonov, who defy pigeonholing in the framework of rigorous rationalist philosophy and who obviously challenged “official” religiosity. However, lumping these thinkers together as representing a distinct tradition of “moral (literary) philosophy,” and, what is more, their juxtaposition to the representatives of the “religious philosophy” (that is, to all the most renowned Russian philosophers), as the author of the present book does, is wrong and not helpful in understanding the meaning and pattern of the development of Russian philosophy as a whole.

To come back to the book’s central thesis—the definition of philosophy as the primary existential act in which man constitutes, creates himself and understands his position in Being. When interpreted in this way, philosophy is an indispensable and most important part of the life experience of every human (whether conscious or unconscious), moreover, in this case we have to recognize philosophy as the foundation of all forms of culture and creative activities because the existential act, being the foundation of man’s essence, explains all the forms of his creative activity. Therefore the decline of philosophy in the past fifty years has been in many ways the sign and cause of the deepening crisis of culture, or indeed the disappearance of culture in the substantive spiritual form in which it had existed for centuries. Because of the degradation of philosophy man forfeits his essence, his depth, becomes “one-dimensional,” superficial, and likewise his knowledge, art and faith become superficial, bereft of true creative and existential depth.

However, being a true Russian thinker, V. Varava, while lamenting the degradation of modern man and modern culture, still believes that revival and transformation are possible. This is guaranteed by philosophy which is immanent to our being: “It is the most shelterless form of the human spirit which everybody shuns but without which no one who considers himself to be a true human being can do... it is the most mysterious form of human being whose existence is so human that man does not notice it” (p. 70).

We should return, from the barren wanderings in the wilderness of “Postmodernity” filled with the ghosts of “dead” metaphysics and “overcoming” man, to the fertile soil of traditional philosophy, which is not afraid to speak about man’s spiritual depth and encourages man to understand this spiritual depth. The
meaning of true philosophy lies not in “overcoming” and leaving behind all that was before, but, on the contrary, in “perpetually repeating what was before,” but that is not the same as epigonism, the regurgitating of the old truths or stagnation, because “the same thing” is the creative essence of man, his spiritual “fire,” something man is called for by the whole history of philosophy which is replete with lofty examples of such “spiritual fire.” By revisiting these lofty examples and repeating all that is eternal in philosophy we would not merely repeat what was before, but create our own unique world, create a new culture that is full of spiritual content.

I. Yevlampiyev, P. Kolychev

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*
The book penned by Viktor Sheynis is devoted not only to the Constitution. To paraphrase the epigram by Aleksndr Pushkin on Nikolay Karamzin’s History of the Russian State, we can say that V. Sheynis’s materials on the political history of Russia of the past two centuries prove without any partiality the viciousness of despotism and autocracy, the terror of the whip. The story of attempts to create for Russia the Law that would stand above the ruler, the story of small successes and big failures that occurred along the way amounts to a gloomy chronicle. Retelling it in this review would be a sure way to miss its central meaning and plunge the reader into melancholy. It will be much more productive to dwell on the deep conceptual generalizations and “participant’s observations” of the author of the book. Viktor Sheynis is a unique personality: a scholar, politician and one of the Fathers of the Constitution currently in effect. He manages, not only in the book under review but also in a large previous work,¹ to combine in his description of the political battles “the effect of being there, on the battlefield, in person” with the conveyance to the reader of the smallest nuances known only to those who went through all those battles themselves as accurate impartial chroniclers reporting every vicissitude of the battles.

Three Epochs of Constitutional Creativity

The author analyzes every effort to create the fundamental law for Russia originating either from the ruling power or from its opponents, or even, much

¹The review was first published in Russian in the journal Politicheskiye issledovaniya (POLIS), No. 3, 2014.
more rarely, from its partners. During the pre-Soviet period the general logic was the same: the top leadership failed to notice for a long time that it was lagging behind the actual historical time and ignoring the signals coming from the forward-looking part of society. Later, the top authorities suddenly realized (or were forced to realize) their backlog and began reforming the social system (seeing it as rather a means to adjust the ruling machinery to the handling of new tasks for running the state and for ensuring security against external threats). They borrowed some elements from the ideas of their opponents, while seeking to keep intact the main thing: their monopoly control over the space under their dominance, and to prevent the emergence of another self-sufficient entity of the political process, be it the opposition, civil society, or the politically advanced business class. The author argues against the idea that a liberal project was premature for Russia in the early 20th century: “history is not a strictly deterministic but an alternative process” (p. 69), some steps of the liberal plan are reflected, one way or another, in the actions of the authorities, and, most importantly, the legal consciousness of the majority of citizens “matures in conditions of a legal progress, not in anticipation of it,” respectively, the liberalization drive from above pushes on and legitimizes changes in social relations. Let us keep in mind these two conclusions which have not lost their relevance today: it is the top authorities that desire to hold onto their monopoly right to direct changes; the legal consciousness follows upon the law-and-order establishing process, but by no means forestalls it.

The four Soviet-era constitutions, the author convincingly shows, reveal “the growing gap between the actual social and governmental practices and the constitutional norms” (p. 139). The first Constitutions did not hesitate to declare that the state was a dictatorship—true, the dictatorship of the proletariat, which, according to the Bolsheviks, was much superior to the “bourgeois” democracy. The 1936 Constitution, although it moved away from those terms and promised some alleviation of the political course, coincided with an increase in repressions. “It was Stalin’s trick designed to mask the terror” (p. 246), the author notes citing the American historian Robert Tucker, whose Soviet wife spent many years in Stalin’s camps.

The rights proclaimed in that constitution, including the right to vote, remained on paper. After that, V. Sheynis notes, the Soviet system in constitutional law was able only to “update heraldry and carry out technical alterations of the power structure” (p. 293). But do not let us underestimate the innovation of the Brezhnev Constitution (1977) with its “state of advanced socialism” and the notorious article 6, the two “keystones” of the Communist monopoly on power and property, which, according to Mikhail Gefter, were equal to compulsion to a single way of life (p. 331). Those two phenomena are still preventing the consolidation of a democratic state on Russian soil. They appeared in the already fading totalitarian system and failed to extend its life. However, it had been noted in Cyril Parkinson’s Law that the most pompous imperial-style buildings were erected on the eve of the collapse of empires.
The third era covered the period from Gorbachev’s liberalization to the present day. In it we saw both what was usual in the tsarist era—frantic attempts to catch up with the historical time and “repairing the ship at sea”—and the enduring Soviet-style love of declarativeness. But there appeared something new: for the first time in Russian history, a discussion of the basic rules of life and politics became so open and competitive, for the first time the outcome of the struggle was not a foregone conclusion or compliant exclusively with the will of one supreme authority. This process is described by the author of the book in all details, both political and legal. As a result, Russia got the Constitution that is in effect today.

The author states: “The Constitution, that is clearly imperfect with a doubtful legitimacy of the procedure for its enactment became the starting point of public accord” (p. 845).

Indeed, how easily we forget the depth of the crisis, not only the crisis of the state but also of morality and of life principles that befell Russia less than a quarter of a century ago. The Fundamental Law could not pull us out of that crisis all by itself but it laid at least some basis on which it was possible to establish both a political system and a new social consensus. That was so because Russia did not have the luxury to postpone the debates and the adoption of the Constitution until better, more peaceful times. But the same Constitution, according to the author, “laid the foundation for the regeneration of authoritarianism in other forms” (p. 846).

Could the Constitution Be Made Better?

This question, not as rhetorical as it seems, has two dimensions. The first one is recorded in the Constitution as the balance of powers vested in the branches and giving a clear advantage to the authority of the President and to the entire executive vertical. The second dimension deals with the question of whether the text of the Constitution could safely protect society from the inevitable encroachments of the top authorities to gain control over the widest possible scope of political and public life.

The answers to these questions are intertwined as closely as the questions themselves. In his description of the alignment of forces in the final rounds of the fight the author is extremely accurate: the project that came out of the walls of the Constitutional Council in July 1993, “...fairly adequately reflected the balance of political forces in the country” (p. 813). The fighting of those forces was centered on the four “major positions,” i.e., “the dissolution of Parliament, the degree of control over the government, the calling of a referendum, and the President’s veto” (p. 822)—these are the key points in any institutional system of checks and balances. In the course of the then political struggle the deputies and politicians who had not been well versed in political science, came up with a fairly rational comprehension of those four “sore points.”
While agreeing in general with the author’s critical thrust in addressing the imperfections in the Constitution of 1993, we consider it necessary to note that in today’s conditions none of the following provisions would have got into the text of the Fundamental Law: either any clearly defined rights and freedoms of the citizens inviolable for amendments, or a ban on the state ideology, or trials by jury, or the removal of local self-government from under the domination (vertical) of the state authority, or who knows what else (for example, limiting the powers of the President to two consecutive terms of office).

After the sad events of October 1993, when the then Russia’s Supreme Soviet was shelled, a clearly understandable logic entered into force: as the author acknowledges, the severity of the political struggle (we will add: the fate of the just started postcommunist reforms) prompted “to lay the prevalence of the presidential ... authority over that of the Parliament” (p. 752). The author does not give an unambiguous answer as to whether it was possible under those circumstances to avoid that. It should be noted, however, that even in the situation of a just gained victory, Boris Yeltsin made a few important amendments “in his own favor,” but still took the project drafted by the Constitutional Council as the basis—without it the legitimacy of the project to be submitted to a referendum would be close to zero.

I did not find in the book the idea which I had repeatedly heard V. Sheynis voice: the developers of the Constitution understood that Yeltsin would seek to maximize the expansion of presidential powers, and therefore set themselves the task to leave in the draft Fundamental Law a widest possible field “unfilled” for the balance of forces on it to be determined by future practice. In reality, this field was filled out not only by the President but by the bureaucracy at all levels. The republic we have is not superpresidential or even—also V. Sheynis’s favorite expression—“half-baked parliamentary.” It is also half-baked judicial and half-baked entrepreneurial and half-baked law-governed, and, most importantly, half-baked civic.

I have already written that the Constitution was adopted like “clothing for growth” (an expression encountered also in the book among the author’s judgments) with three different meanings. The first of them is a “narrow” one dealing with the creation of legal norms and institutions, which did not exist in Russia at the time of adoption of the Constitution, such as constitutional laws, trials by jury, and full-fledged local self-governments to be followed by the filling of the entire legislative field. Despite the costs and reservations, this task was fulfilled within a historically short period of time.

The second one denotes the fate of “the gaps” that neither the Constitution nor the positive law as a whole but only political practice can fill. The gaps are about the relationship between the federal center and the regions, their joint competencies, the space between the federal government and the local self-governments, the nuances and practice of relations between the branches of power, etc. In fact, as already pointed out, the bureaucratic hierarchy (the notorious “vertical of power”) came to reign in them for the most part.
The reason for this is in the third meaning of the concept “clothing for growth.” Back at the time of problem statement V. Sheynis proceeded from the sad assertion that “never did any [Russian] Constitution restrain the top leaders when they acted in breach of constitutional norms” (p. 15). How ironic was the tone with which the thoughtful scholar of the American Presidency Richard Neustadt noted that there is no separation of powers, there is a constant tug of war between the branches of power. So we can see the outcome of this “tug”: the President and after him the whole bureaucratic hierarchy (the “vertical”) kept steadily building muscles, were nourished by the budgetary resources under their control and abusing the oil revenue doping in the past decade. But the other governmental institutions were on a starvation diet. The reasons are many. Some are subjective as errors and inability of the liberal parties to reach agreements, opportunism of the elites, some of whom were concerned under the new circumstances with their selfish interests, not the constitution. There are also objective reasons: under the personalistic presidential power the parties are left to compete for a share of seats in the institutionally week legislatures, which prevents them from gaining power and authority. But we discern the main reason in the weakness of civic culture. No institutions will prevent an expansion of power; no party will escape adulation and servility, unless it gains support from the expressed will of the citizens to participate in determining their own destiny and influencing politics.

But precisely because of this—as the author argues convincingly—the Russian rulers, from Peter I to Putin, did not allow the emergence of other political entities beyond their control, all of them be it in the economy or society, were given the role of implementers of the heavenly plans, the role of “cogs” in a large and omniscient machine. That is why Russia’s ruling elite regards any unauthorized activity, especially relating to the political sphere, as encroachment on their monopoly to dominate and control resources, and therefore defends it by spoiling the institutions of development. Here is how the author summarizes the political system’s development: “the electivity of authorities was ousted from both the executive and the legislative levels ... Federalism retreated under the onslaught of a unitary state. The judicial system ‘basmanizirovalas’ (became obedient to orders from above) ... its elements shifted ... under the control of the executive branch of power. The redistribution of property has been carried out with even greater violations of existing laws than its original acquisition ... the powers that have been able to easily enforce the laws that infringe upon the constitutional rights of citizens through an obedient parliament... independent television has been smashed... politics in Russia have ceased to be open to the public” (p. 983).

Only the following decades of development—with all its costs—created a bourgeoisie in Russia, the subject, without which, according to the known statement of Barrington Moore, there is no democracy.2 The new small and slow-growing middle class has become a reality. Having worked out a rational economic conduct, the new bourgeois wants to gain the right to participate in the
sociopolitical life but is increasingly limited by the obstacles posed by the hide-bound political system. We have seen these people act as observers at polling stations and demonstrators on Bolotnaya square, we see them among tens of thousands of civil society activists. These people are different in everything, including their political views, but they are united by their desire to change life for the better through their own efforts. It is in them, the citizens, that the top authorities see their most dangerous opponents, because the latter will urge the government to abide by the norms of the Russian constitution. According to Sheynis, the obvious success of the drafters of the Constitution in the precise recording of the rights and freedoms in the chapters immune against constitutional amendments, is now overturned insofar as “the public authorities and officials of all ranks violate the rights and freedoms bypassing the Constitution” (p. 833). “The conservative wave” and forcing anti-Western sentiments in recent years are all frantic attempts to stop the development of civic culture of the people, which alone can change the balance of forces in the “tug of war.”

This brings us to yet another twist in the subject under discussion. It might seem that the author contradicts his own assertion that no constitution can restrain the government by expressing the opinion that “had a compromise been reached in 1993 on the separation of powers between the branches of government, much of today’s life would look differently” (p. 788). The entire point lies in this contradiction, if you remember the metaphor of a tug of war: the better the starting point and the positive law norms, the harder it is for the government to consolidate its monopoly and easier for the citizens—if they are citizens, not subjects—to assert their rights. We dare to suggest that had these citizens been more active in the past, even under the present Constitution, no rollback of this kind would have happened. A similar idea about “the political activism being replaced by apathy and resignation on the part of a large segment of society” is found in the book by Viktor Sheynis (p. 1028). Whether a different course of events was possible is a topic for a substantial discussion beyond the scope of this text. But we emphasize: just as the author warns us “as long as the current political system remains intact, any constitutional reform is dangerous” (p. 1012): there is a greater risk of losing the “good” norms than of eliminating the “bad” ones.

Annals Are Not Closed

The last section of the book is devoted not only to a variety of thoughts and an overview of draft constitutional amendments, but also to reflections on the fate of authoritarian rule in Russia or, to be exact, to hopes for overcoming it. The previous attempt to break out of the authoritarian way failed. The current state of Russian politics—judging by all the objective circumstances—requires a new attempt: no authoritarian modernization has worked in Russia, and the corruption of institutions in order to preserve the monopoly of power does not leave the
country much hope for the future. However, the government is trying to sit on two chairs, one for “letting off steam” through a partial return of political competition and the other for launching at the same time “a conservative wave” to consolidate its dominant position.

The matter is not that those at the top of the Russian government are not liberals. All of the liberalization moves in the history of Russia were made by the leaders whose views were far from liberal: Alexander II, Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin came to realize that without liberal reforms Russia was doomed to disaster. Theirs was not just a sense of a leader’s mission, but of its specific form—the mission of change as the only way to save the country from the crisis. Such changes have always produced and released new social forces which entered into an inevitable conflict with the “liberalizers” and that dramatically slowed down the reforms as the government remained their main driving force.

The favorable conjunction of circumstances during the Putin era helped the Russian authorities to stabilize the situation and build a power-property system. It seemed to give the country a chance to reduce the risk of social upheavals and to move forward in its institutional and political development, but we witnessed instead the above described consolidation of the monopoly and political marginalization of the forces configured on changes.

We agree with V. Sheynis that Medvedev’s rule denoted “certain decompression of the authoritarian regime” (p. 995): Medvedev, at the level of declarations in his famous article clearly outlined the scale of Russia’s historic backlog and adequately set the task of “... modernization based on the values and institutions of democracy ... Instead of an archaic society in which the leaders think and decide for all, let us become a society of intelligent, free and responsible people.” Alas, within the construction of the “tandem” in power one of its two members has failed to show—or has been unable to show—“a sense of the mission for change,” with which all the leaders who carried out major reforms were marked. In any case, over two years have elapsed since his departure from the highest office, but none of the problems inherent in political regimes with a low level of political pluralism, has come close to a solution. The plummeting effectiveness of the government, the declining power legitimacy and the lack of mechanisms for power continuity—all are dangerous symptoms of the growing crisis of the regime. The present-day politics provide us with no sensible reason for believing that the top authorities are aware of the symptoms and will seek a solution through opening up the political system for involvement of citizens in state governance.

Pessimistic coloring of this conclusion is not a final sentence. V. Sheynis showed us the history of constitutional disputes as a continuous process. The objective processes of development of the state and the ongoing development—with all the costs and bends—of civic culture will eventually put on the agenda admission and consolidation in the Russian Fundamental Law of the standards and norms relevant to a modern state looking to its future.
NOTES


B. Makarenko

*Translated by Vadim Polyakov*
V. TOLOCHEK. The Problem of Style in Psychology: Historical-Theoretical Analysis, Moscow, Institute of Psychology, RAS, 2013, 320 pp.

Vladimir Tolochek’s monograph is one of the first contemporary attempts to place the studies of style as a highly varied phenomenon in a methodological context; it is a wide panorama of studies of style in different scholarly traditions and different models. The author has, in fact, generalized his own experience of more than thirty years of systematic studies of the problem of style using high-performance sport and administrative activities as models.

The problem of style formulated in the late 1920s by Alfred Adler has not lost its topicality yet the still unresolved methodological problems slowed down in the past and are slowing down today psychological studies of the styles of labor activity, management and governance, cognitive styles, life styles, etc. This makes the monograph, which can be described as an attempt at methodological reflection on the main approaches to style and at a general methodological basis of style studies, an important theoretical effort.

V. Tolochek relies on what has been done in Russia to develop scholarly traditions; he has consistently analyzed them and integrated with what has been done abroad in style studies. He has pointed to the very similar critical assessments of the problem of style found in scholarly publications of those who studied different styles—cognitive styles, the styles of leadership, etc.—and tries to go beyond the limits of scholarly approaches and ideas about the styles accepted and developed in psychology.

He relies on historical-theoretical analysis to formulate the tasks of identification of the essential properties of style and its description as an integral phenomenon, the different manifestations of which have been scrutinized differently in numerous approaches in the last few decades. To identify and explain some of the causes of the crisis in the studies of style in psychology and the noticeably
decreased interest in the problem V. Tolochek has analyzed the history of style studies in psychology, historical situations and the “concepts of man” as well as latent social requirement and the disciplinary factors per se (scientific paradigms, traditions, criteria of the scientific/nonscientific, specifics of methodological instruments, etc.) in close connection with the changes of social objects (people, institutes and values dominating in society).

In his studies of the phenomenon of style the author relies on the ideas about a structural-functional organization of styles and identifies the component parts of the first (basic or lower) level as “subjectively comfortable conditions of activity”; the second level, as “operational components,” and the third, as “ideal regulators (types of organization of activity)”.

In his approach to the integral concept of styles the author relies on two basic provisions:

1. the integral concept initially building up within the logic of development of the studies of one scientific school—the school of Wolf Merlin and Yevgeny Klimov;

2. the key problems of the integral concept of styles do not represent a sum total of varied ideas but are a product of identification of psychological mechanisms inherent in the organization of psychological systems of different scales and specific styles gathered into more “general” groups.

This approach is organized as a stage-by-stage ascension to a fuller reflection of the essential properties of styles accompanied by concretization of scholarly concepts in the following chain: IAS ➔ PAS ➔ AS ➔ LS ➔ SM (individual activity styles ➔ professional activity styles ➔ activity styles ➔ life styles ➔ styles of man).

The author has set himself a practically “extreme” task of studying the phenomenon as belonging to a complete, integral cycle of evolution of styles—emergence, consolidation, development, involution, mutual transitions, functioning. He has offered his own explanation of the unity of space manifesting different styles—the space of styles (related to the structural-functional organization of the subject’s different styles) and the cycle of styles as a mechanism of the emergence and self-development of style, the functional and genetic interaction between styles of various levels typical of any particular person. V. Tolochek explains the style as a phenomenon of the subject’s adaptation to the environment which proceeds by levels and adaptation to specific conditions. This is not a one-time adjustment to the conditions of the subject’s activity, to his environment and the activity of other subjects or specifics of subculture but never-ending active and passive interactions between them. It is presupposed that the styles are not final or frozen forms: under pressure of changed environments, demands to activity or even man himself the styles become more qualitatively complicated or even perfectioning or are reduced and start crumbling.

The monograph offers and substantiates a logically valid general concept of style as an integrated phenomenon in its structural-functional organization and identifies the main determinants of its emergence and functioning:
(1) individuality of man (the individual psychological component);
(2) conditions of and demands for activity;
(3) social microenvironment (the sociopsychological component);
(4) external environment (social meso- and macroenvironment).

The author has pointed to constructive studies of several related problems of psychology—individual/collective activity, activity/vital functions, integration/disintegration of individuality, etc.—as very promising areas for the study of style in psychology. This means that the historical-theoretical studies of the problem are not limited to its “analysis” but are further developed and complemented with one of the possible variants of the “synthesis,” viz., the demonstration of a correct and substantiated “compression of space” of the variables, facts and scientific traditions.

This work, like many other scholarly studies, is not free from certain shortcomings: it abounds in “accompanying comments” frequently related to particulars of interrelated scholarly problems, which makes it harder to grasp the “general line” of the analysis of the problem of style as integrated and convincing. This can be explained by the highly complicated process of moving toward the main and the most essential elements of style as a phenomenon. We should recognize, at the same time, that the author’s scholarly position is independent and original.

The monograph consists of six chapters. Chapter One “Psychology of Individual Distinctions and the Problem of Styles” looks at the general prerequisites and the first historically created approaches to the studies of style; the methodological limits, the results of studies they predetermine; the related problems (psychology of adaptation, style, abilities and man’s resources), debatable questions related to style and individual distinctions.

The Chapter “Styles As Adaptation to the Environment and Integration of Man’s Resources” looks at the most prominent traditions—studies of cognitive, emotional, psychomotor, styles, the styles of self-regulation, behavior, communication, activity and life styles. They are studied as psychological mechanisms of adaptation and integration of intra- and extrasubject resources.

The Chapter “Joint Activity and Interaction of Subjects” offers a critical analysis of the problem of studies of “individual” and joint activity and interaction of subjects and substantiates the identification of professional-functional and sociopsychological groups of interacting subjects as “units” of style studies.

The Chapter “Leadership Styles” analyzes the specifics of different approaches (axiological, functional, resource and ecological) to the problem; identifies and analyzes the styles of administration; judging/refereeing/umpiring and business consulting.

The Chapter “Styles As a Psychological Phenomenon” justifies the ideas of unity and integrity of the phenomenon of style and the multitude of its manifestations; supplies argumentations for the ideas of a general structural-functional organization of styles. It discusses the key problems of further studies, offers
new methodological approaches and principles of explaining the phenomenon of style; looks at the mechanisms of integration of intra-, inter- and extrasubject resources, justifies the necessity of turning to the ecological paradigm, introduction of a system of new concepts (space, etc.). It also discusses the heuristic potential of V. Tolochem’s concept *Professional Activity Styles* (PAS) in connection with the prospects of further studies of the phenomenon.

Each chapter deals with urgent problems, brings together the problems of style and a new range of scholarly problems and practical tasks, potentially topical within the problem range of the studies of style. On the other hand, the author points out that many important problems have not yet been discussed at the level adequate to their scientific status.

M. Kholodnaya

*Translated by Valentina Levina*
ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Editorial note: We continue to inform you about the contents of the leading RAS journals published in Russian and confirm our readiness to help our readers order translations of any article mentioned below.

VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK
(Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)

No. 5, 2014

Yu. Trutnev. The Role of the Academy of Sciences in the Creation of Thermonuclear Weapons.
A. Sidorov. Retrospective Look at Geology, Metallogeny and the Oreformation Analysis.
V. Kvint, V. Okrepilov. The Quality of Life and Values in the National Strategies of Development.
G. Kanarsh. The Past and the Future of the National Idea in Russia.
A. Samarin. Management of Regional Academic Institutions Network in the 1930s—1960s.

No. 6, 2014

A. Vasilyev. Arab Revolutions and the Protest Movement. The Reasons, Driving Forces, Results.
Is Peace in the Arab World Possible? Paper Discussion.
S. Lebedev. The Basic Models of Scientific Knowledge Development.
V. Shepelyov. The Noosphere Concept of V. Vernadsky.
V. Gavrikov, R. Khlebopros. The Problem of Creating of Carbon Forests: Much or Fast?
Ye. Tavokin. Corruption in Governmental Bodies.
V. Kotlyakov. Honorary Member of the Academy of Sciences and Honorary Member of the Russian Geographical Society. The 175th Birth Anniversary of N. Przhevalsky.

No. 7, 2014

I. Tsapenko, M. Yurevich. Knowledge Workers: What Role Do They Play in the Modern Economy?
A. Zhigalin et al. The Phenomenon of Okhotsk Sea Earthquake on May 24, 2013 in Moscow.
V. Nekhamkin, I. Polyakova. Antiprogressist Theories of Sociohistorical Dynamics.
S. Shvartsev. How Are the Complexities Formed?
A. Kapto. Overcoming of International Isolation As an Integral Part of the Revival of the Russian Sociology.

No. 8, 2014

V. Yakunin. Integral Project of Joint Development on the Eurasian Continent (Scientific and Practical Conception). The Real Prospect of Russia’s Development. Paper Discussion.
A. Terekhov. Scientific Cooperation in the Field of Carbon Nanostructures in the Mirror of Bibliometric Analysis.
A. Zhuravlyov, A. Yurevich. Happiness As a Scientific Category.
M. Shydlovsky, A. Lopukhin. Microbial Expansion in Archaeozoic Era As The Basis for Search and Interpretation of Alien Planets Analogues.
O. Mikhaylov. “Suitcase Master,” or Once Again about Dmitry Ivanovich Mendeleyev. The 180th Birth Anniversary.


V. Zolotaryov. The Lessons of the First World War.

VOPROSY ISTORII
(Problems of History)

No. 5, 2014

A. Kokoshin. The Historical Roots of the Blitzkrieg.

M. Osokin. Aleksey Yermolayevich Evert.

S. Nefyodov. The Origin of the Regular State of Peter the Great.

S. Shpakovskaya. Soviet Newspapers during the Great Patriotic War.

O. Barkova. The Literary Work of Russian Women Abroad. 1917-1939.

V. Polikarpov. Arms Production in Russia of the Early 20th Century.

T. Kuliyev. The Peasant Consumer Cooperation in Azerbaijan during the NEP.

V. Kurbatsky. Albania’s Foreign Policy at the Present Stage.

S. Bliznichenko, S. Lazarev. Pyotr Ivanovich Smirnov-Svetlovsky.

No. 6, 2014


Ye. Lupanova. Johann Backmeister.


P. Petrov. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Late 1930s—Early 1941.

S. Voytikov. “How We Should Reorganize Rabkrin (Workers’- and Peasants’ Inspection)?”

V. Volkov. Artel Hiring in the Industry of Russia in the Late 19th—Early 20th Centuries.


S. Gasratyan. The Relationship between Israel and Jordan in the Context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.


No. 7, 2014


A. Kiva. Deng Xiaoping.
V. Polyakov. Feliks Dzerzhinsky’s Expedition to Siberia in 1922.
M. Frolova. The Leib-Guards (of the Imperial Court) Cavalry Regiment in the 1814 Campaign.
S. Panin. Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and Its Impact on Political Relations with Afghanistan.
M. Feldman. V. Adamov and His Scientific Heritage.

**NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA**
(*Modern and Contemporary History*)

**No. 2, 2014**

Ye. Sergeyev. Actual Problems of Studying World War I.
B. Khavkin. Russian Front of World War I (1914-1918) (the End).
S. Malkin (Samara). The “Highland Problem” in Great Britain in the Beginning of the 18th Century.
V. Sogrin. Foreign Policy of G. Bush, Jr.: Genesis, Evolution, Results.
L. Ivanova. Somalia: Hope for the Peace in “the Most Dangerous Place on the Earth.”
T. Chernikova. Russia during Livonia War: Prerequisites and Possibilities of Entering Europe.
Ye. Migey. Poster As the Political Weapon of Republicans and Falange during the Civil War in Spain of 1936-1939.

**No. 3, 2014**

V. Zubachevsky (Omsk). Russia’s Policy in Central and Eastern Europe on the Eve and during World War I.
O. Volosyuk. Spain and Japan: The First Contacts in the 16th Century.
A. Borisov. Codenamed “Terminal”: To the 70th Anniversary of the Potsdam (Berlin) Conference.
Ye. Satanovsky. The Main Development Trends of the Near and Middle East.
T. Chernikova. Russia during Livonia War: Prerequisites and Possibilities of Entering Europe (the End).
M. Anisimov. Crisis of the Utrecht System in International Relations and the Elizabethan Russia.
I. Savelyeva. Professional Historians in “Public History.”
V. Sogrin. Status and Prospects of the American Studies in Russia.
E. Dabagyan. Death on the Take-Off: Nestor Kirchner, the First President of Argentina in the 21st Century.

ROSSIYSKAYA ARKHEOLOGIYA
(Russian Archaeology)

No. 3, 2014

K. Gavrilov, Ye. Voskresenskaya. The First Monument of the Early Period of the Upper Paleolithic in the Upper Desna Region.
V. Ilyushina. The Fedorovo Culture Ceramics of the Settlement Kuria 1 in the Lower Tobol Region.
N. Krenke. The Classification of the Seven-Bladed Ornaments of the Temple Rings of a Moscow Type and the Problem of Their Ethnic Interpretation.
N. Makarov et al. A Cathedral on a Plough: Cultural Layer and Plough Horizon under the Church of Boris and Gleb in Kideksha.
Ye. Devlet. On the Question of the Techno-Technological Peculiarities of Petymel Petroglyphs.
Yu. Yesin et al. Paint in Rock Art of the Okunev Culture of the Minusinsk Basin.

N. Lobanova. About the Chronology and Periodization of the Rock Carvings of the Lake Onega.


K. Komarov. The Site Alexandrov Mountain—the Archaeological Monument of the 5th BC—17th AD.


ETNOGRAFICHESKOE OBOZRENIYE
(Ethnographic Review)

No. 3, 2014

Special Section of the Issue: Space, Consumption, and Identities in Postsocialist Countries (Guest Editors—O. Gurova, J. Habeck).


O. Gurova. “People Dress So Brightly Here!”: Social Distinctions through Clothing in St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk.


A. Slanov. The Secret Tongue of Warriors: Ossetian Language of the Chase.

S. Pigar. Forms of Territorial-Political Self-Organization of the Abkhaz in the 18th—19th Centuries.


E. Holler. Bioindustry and the Ethics of Consumption As a Trend in the Contemporary World: Austrian and Russian Experiences.

I. Boyko. The Structure of Scythe, Hay Mowing, and Ethnocultural Adaptation of Ukrainians of the Carpathian Region (Late 19th—Early 21st Centuries).

VOPROSY FILOSOFII
(Problems of Philosophy)

No. 4, 2014

G. Kiselyov. History As Being.

Yu. Granin. Modernization of Russia: In a Rut of “Dependent Development.”

D. Nosov. Is Hannah Arendt a Philosopher?


V. Grebennikova, N. Nikitina. Continuous Education As Cultural and Historical Problem.

J. Hintikka. Philosophical Research and General Education.

N. Bonetskaya. Forerunners of Russian Hermeneutics.

K. Paromov. S. Bulgakov about “Downfall of Russian Autocracy” (1917-1922). E. Solovyov is 80 Years Old.

I. Polsky. Radical Critique of Civilization in Philosophy of Early Daoism.


Muju Ichien. Shasekishu 10b1-10b3 (Fragments Translated into Russian by N. Trubnikova).


O. Stolyarova. Sociology of Science and Philosophy of Science: Beyond Descriptivism and Normativism.

No. 5, 2014

A. Chumakov, A. Korolyov. Philosophy As Knowledge and Lifestyle.

A. Guseynov. Philosophy As an Ethical Project.

Interview with Th. Oyzerman.
I. Kasavin. Way through the Century. Theodor Oyzerman’s Philosophical Feat.
A. Guseynov. Patriarch of Russian Philosophy.
An Quinyan. Th. Oyzerman and Modern Marxist Philosophy.
V. Bazhanov. Varieties and Opposition of Realism and Antirealism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Is a Third Line Possible?
V. Kantor. What Dreams Could One Have in the Sleep of Death, or Life in Death.
D. Martinsen. The Devil of Ivan Karamazov and Epistemic Doubt.
M. Kiselyova. A Reader’s Diary and Poetics of the “Terrible.”
K. Stepanyan. Man in the Light of “Realism in Its Highest Sense” (Dostoyevsky, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Balzac, Makanin).
A. Toichkina. D. Chizhevsky’s Notes about Dostoyevsky and N. Strakhov.
D. Chizhevsky. Ivan Karamazov’s Devil and N. Strakhov. Translation by M. Karmanova, Publication and Commentaries by A. Toichkina.
I. Volgin. “A Writer’s Diary” As a World-Building Project.

No. 6, 2014

B. Pruzhinin. Interview with V. Zinchenko (Summer, 2013, a Fragment).
V. Lysenko. The Genesis of Atomism As a Problem of Language and Thinking.
Vyach. Ivanov. The Phoneme and the Writing Art in the Ancient Culture and Their Relationship to Atomism.
V. Yemelyanov. Elements by Democritus and Nabu-shum-lishir Tablet.
A. Verlinsky. Some Consideration on Greek Atomism and Alphabetic Writing.
G. Vdovina. Reality, Speech and Alphabetical Writing in Scholastic Tradition.
V. Vidunas. Classification of Sounds in the Phonetic Treatises of Ancient India.
A. Nedel. Linguistic Atomism: Chinese and Indo-European Patterns of Atomic Thinking.
V. Ivanov. “Atomism” in Phonic Constructs of Indian Tantra.

I. Kasavin. To the Epistemology of Communication: Strength and Weakness of Analytical Optimism.


Bao Ou. The Main Questions of Philosophy of Engineering.

Ye. Zhukova. Nikolay Stankevich’s Philosophy of Culture: To the Question of Russian Europeanism.

A. Yermichyov. Nasty Anecdote, or the Case of Two Professors.


S. Vorontsov. Stoic and Patristic Lines of Interpretation of the Four Virtues Scheme in the Works of Isidore of Seville.

J. Hintikka. René Thinks, Ergo, Cartesius Exists.


D. Bugay. On the Publication of Proclus Comment to “Timaeus.”

CHELOVEK
(Human Being)

No. 2, 2014

A. Pelipenko. Culture As a Field Formation.


A. Shuvalov. The Universum of Education Practices.


V. Khachaturyan. Archaisation Processes in Contemporary Russia.


Mazes of Consciousness, Pantries of the Memory. An Interview with Konstantin Anokhin.

O. Koval. Corporeity Experience and the Tribunal of the Reason. To the Question of Insanity.


M. Savelyeva. Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Thomas Mann in the “Twilight of the German Spirit.”
No. 3, 2014

S. Smirnov. Anthropology of Nomadism.
The Age of Ozyerman.
T. Adamyants. Lost in a Sociocultural Environment.
O. Sergeyeva. Elderly People Mastering the Computer.
O. Krivtsun. The Measure of the Human in Art: Historical Modifications.
I. Andreyev et al. Audiodrugs: The Sound instead of “Chemical Substances.”
S. Lebedev, M. Blagoyevich. Institutional and Personal Identification of Orthodox Christianity in Russia and Serbia.
L. Kiyashchenko, Ye. Grebenshchikova. The Molecular Age: Is It “the Purlieu of the Eternity?”
Yu. Mikheyeva. The Human Tragedy in Film Music by Alfred Shnitke.
V. Kantor. Herzen As a Prototype of Stavrogin.
In Memoriam of a Friend. The Word on Vladimir Petrovich Zinchenko.

PSYKHOLOGUICHESKY ZHURNAL
(Psychological Journal)

No. 6, 2013

V. Anikina. “A Thing of Art” As the Sign Object of Reflection.
T. Sysoyeva. Intensity of Stroop’s Emotional Effect and Emotional Intelligence.
V. Tolochech, V. Denisova. Dynamics of Professional Formation in Subject’s Opinion: Self-Assessments As Self-Sufficient Empiric Data.
T. Ivanova, Ye. Rasskazova. Sociodemographic and Organizational Factors of Satisfaction with Work.
K. Sudakov. System Organization of Mental Activity.
D. Lyusin, V. Ovseyannikova. Video Test for Measuring the Ability to Recognize Emotions.
V. Venda et al. Russian Priority in Development of Scientific Bases and Methods of Counting of Usability.
G. Vayzer. The 18th International Symposium “Psychological Problems of the Meaning of Life and Acme.”

No. 1, 2014

A. Zhuravlyov, A. Yurevich. Collective Meanings As a Premise for Personal Happiness.
Ye. Kozlova et al. Stability and Dynamics of Personality Features in Childhood: The Role of Gender and Age.
V. Konstantinov, M. Vershinina. Correlation between Ethnic Identity of Armenian Migrants and Their Living Conditions in Host Community.
O. Klypa. Interdisciplinary Approach to Study the Genesis of Psychological Thought in Old Russian Period.
B. Shefer, B. Shloeder. Internationality and National Peculiarity of Science.
I. Dzhidaryan et al. Composing of a Questionnaire for Studying the Ideas about Love.
A. Veraksa et al. Adaptation of the Russian Version of “The Sport Imagery Questionnaire (SIQ).”

No. 2, 2014

N. Polskaya. The Structure and Functions of Self-Injurious Behavior.
L. Dorfman, M. Baleva. Correlation between Creativity and Variativity.
P. Yanshin. Microkinetic Phenomenon in Research of Unconscious Reactions on Significant Semantic Stimuli.

N. Loginova. Essay on B. Ananyev’s Theory of Individual Mental Development.

A. Sidorenkov et al. Instruments for Studying the Types of Interpersonal Contradictions and Conflicts in Small Groups.


A. Sukharev. The Structure of Mentality of West European and Russian Society in the 10th—17th Centuries: Ethnofunctional Analysis.

**OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS)**

*(Social Sciences Today)*

**No. 3, 2014**

A. Obolonsky. Bureaucracy: In Search of a New Model (Evolution of Theory and Praxis of the State Governance in Recent Decades).


V. Avtonomov. A Few Words of Methodological Individualism.


A. Medushevsky. The Constitution of “Developed Socialism”: Where Have Been the Origin of the Principle of the Leading Role of the Party Emerged?

R. Simonyan. The Baltic States in the Context of the Disintegration of the USSR.


V. Tambovtsev. Rules As the Basis of Institutions.


M. Pantykina. Phenomenology of Law and Integrative Law Understanding.


**No. 4, 2014**

Ye. Balatsky. The Institutional Features of the Libertarian Model of the Economy.
M. Krasnov. The Birth of the Russian Constitution: The Scenario of Lassalle?
M. Urnov. Russia: Virtual and Real Political Prospects.
O. Shkaratan. Eurasian Vector of Russian Civilizational Transit. Article 2. The Historical Roots of the Specific Russian Civilization and Directions of Its Transit.
O. Bessonova. The Institutional Crisis and Evolutionary Possibilities of Its Overcoming.
N. Zarubina. Mutual Respect As a Factor of Institutionalization of Social Relations in Present-Day Russia.
N. Rozov. The Fate of Philosophy in the Context of Cyclical Dynamics of Russia.
A. Karpov. The University from Modernity to Postmodernity.
I. Kondakov. A “Terrible Holiday” of Russian Culture: In Memory of the Silver Age.
A. Kochetkov. The National State in the Conditions of Globalization.

POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)
(Political Studies)
No. 4, 2014

A. Kochetkov. The National State in the Conditions of Globalization.
P. Kozyreva, A. Smirnov. The Crisis of the Multiparty System in Russia.
N. Rabotyazhev. Between Tradition and Utopia: The Left-Wing Conservatism in Russia.
A. Verkhovsky, Ye. Strukova. Party Building on the Upper Right-Wing Flank of the Russian Political Spectrum.
L. Fishman. Liberal Consensus: A Drift from Neoliberalism to Communitarianism?
N. Litvak. To the Methodology of Diplomatic Correspondence: The Analysis of K. Leontyev’s Reports.
G. Yankovskaya. The Struggle for Identities in the Context of Modern Communications.
A. Tokarev. Labyrinths of the “Great Migration.”
S. Petrov. The State Governance and Political Networks.

GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO
(The State and Law)

No. 5, 2014

M. Marchenko. Democracy As an Attribute of a Law-Governed State and Its Flaws.
V. Zhukov. Sociology of Law in Russia and Positivism.
O. Orlova. Personality’s Political and Legal Activity in the Civil Society.
A. Nechayeva. Family Law and Pedagogy.
D. Boklan. Reflection of the Concept of Sustainable Development in International Investment Law.

No. 6, 2014

V. Tolstik, N. Trusov. The Notion of the Content of Law.
V. Yeremenko. On the Reform of the State Academies of Sciences of Russia.
V. Nikishin. The Right of Nature Use As a Factor of Providing the Favorable Condition of the Environment.
A. Nechayeva. The 21st Century and Our Children.
A. Solntsev. Modern Problems of Settling International Environmental Disputes.

No. 7, 2014

Ye. Deryabina. The Traits and Peculiarities of Sources of Law in European Union.
A. Malko, S. Afanasyev. The Russian Judicial Policy: Features of Formation with the Account Taken of the National and International Aspects.
V. Kryazhkov. Legal Regulation of Relations between the Indigenous Little-Populated Peoples of the North and the Mining Companies in the Russian Federation.

M. Maleyina. Definitions and Types of Intangible Goods As Objects of Personal Nonproperty Rights.


**VOPROSY EKONOMIKI**

*(Problems of Economics)*

No. 6, 2014

N. Akindinova et al. The Russian Economy at the Turning Point.

L. Freynkman, A. Yakovlev. The Agency for Strategic Initiatives As a New Type of Development Institution.


V. Kleyner. Corruption in Russia, Russia Sunk in Corruption: Is There a Way Out?

M. Podshivalova. The Quality of Basic Social and Economic Institutions Forming the Environment for Small Business Development.

O. Dmitriyeva, V. Chernov. Monotonousness and Stationarity of Pension Functions and Their Violation in the Now Existing Formulas and Those Envisaged in the RF Legislation Concerning the Pensions Calculations.

**SOTSIIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (SOTSIS)**

*(Sociological Studies)*

No. 4, 2014

O. Yanitsky. The Conception of Ecosocial Knowledge Revisited.

V. Podshivalkina, M. Biryukova. Political Subjectness As a Social Phenomenon. Praxeological Discourse.

D. Zamyatin. Space and Movement.

F. Masson. French Sociology and the State.

M. Kukartseva. Axel Honneth, a Social Theorist and Sociologist.


D. Perednya. Latent Results of Admission Cuts in Military Universities.


N. Yegorova, I. Sizova. Does the Russian Family Have Chances to Become a Solidary, Supportive One, Which Shares Common Interests?


Ye. Kulagina, M. Yeliseyeva. Schools Pedagogical Staff Resources at the Stage of Education Modernization: Experiences of Moscow, Russia, and the Developed Countries.

A. Nagimova, F. Safiullina. Combination of Studying in Universities with Labor Employment of Students in Kazan.


No. 5, 2014


Ye. Danilova. Discourse of Winners and Losers in Russian Transformations.


N. Zarubina. Simplified Social Practices As a Means for Adaptation to a Complex Socium.

A. Temnitsky. Becoming of a Hired Employee of Market Type under Conditions of Transformation of Property Relations.


Ye. Tavokin et al. Corruption in the State Power Bodies of Russia.


A. Smolkin. Labor Potential of Aged People.

L. Tikhonova, L. Fokeyeva. The Population’s Longevity in Belarus As a Factor of Human Potential Level Dynamics.

V. Bachinin. Sociology and Theology: Once Again on Comtean Episode in Intellectual History.

A. Oleynik. Collection, Aggregation and Processing of Qualitative Data.

S. Myasnikov, A. Rotmistrov. On Measuring Political Paternalism: Methods and Application of Results.

Ye. Shestopal. Sociological Surveys and Electoral Forecasts—Some Methods and Aspects.
No. 6, 2014

Academician G. Osipov Is 85 Years Old.
RAS Correspondent Member A. Zapesotsky Is 60 Years Old.
Our Congratulations to Zh. Zayonchkovskaya.
A. Arutyunyan. Contemporary Lobbyism: Forms, Methods, Manifestations.
V. Afanasyev. Carl Schmitt: From the History of Political Thought.

No. 7, 2014

The Time (Acme). Sociological Investigations Began 40 Years Ago.
M. Gorshkov. Social Inequalities As an Object of Sociological Analysis.
V. Levashov. The Social State: Historical Genesis and Dynamics of Its Making in Russia.
V. Yadov. Post-Soviet Societies Transformations: What Is More Significant—the Historically Traditional or the Recent Past?
Zh. Toshchenko. Economic Consciousness and Behavior after a Quarter of Century (the Late 1980s—Early 2010s).
A. Zhuravlyov, A. Yurevich. Psychological Factors of Corruption.
G. Tatarova. Coherence of Integrative Processes As a Precondition for Improvement of Empirical Research Quality in Russia.
Yu. Volkov. The Creative Class As a Alternative to Political Radicalism.
N. Romanovsky. Once More on Theoretical Sociology.
V. Shcherbina. Social Technologies: A History of Term, Content Transformation, and Contemporary Condition.
I. Obraztsov. Process of Institutionalization of Military Sociology in Russia.

VOSTOK (Oriens)

No. 2, 2014

V. Tishin. A Note on the Dual Structure of Power of Turkic Khaganate.
P. Dudin (Ulan-Ude). Mongolian Alashan Republic As a Political Project of the 1940s.
P. Tsvetov. Trân Văn Giàu, a Historian and a Revolutionary (1911-2010).
M. Pavlova. Hymns of Tamil Bhakti Poets and Their Audience: The Text and Its Context.
M. Repenkova. Turkish Detective Novel (Background).

No. 3, 2014

L. Alayev. Where Were Medieval Indians Living?
A. Gorokhov (Tobolsk). Sociopolitical Structure and Internal Political Life in Ancient Israel during David’s and Solomon’s Reigns (1010-931 BC).
V. Molodyakov. Colonial Taiwan As seen by Soviet Analysts, the 1920s—1930s.
M. Pakhomova. China and the Arab Countries: The Nature of Interaction.
N. Ulchenko. Perspectives of Economical Developments of Turkey.
M. Kameneva. Transformation of the Concept of Culture in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

**VOPROSY LITERATURY**
*(Problems of Literature)*

**No. 3 (May-Juny), 2014**

I. Shaytanov. Can We Come to an Agreement? Literature versus Politics and Power.

K. Sultanov. Identity by Aytmatov, or Universality of the Particular.


The Contemporary Novel: Ideology or Philosophy?

Student Booker.

A. Tatarinov. Are They Found on the Opposite Poles? *New Novels of Sergey Shargunov and Vladimir Sorokin*.

A. Zherebin. The Problem of Translation in Hermeneutical Interpretation.


K. Volkov. “Gogolizatsiya” (Gogol Tones) of the Text: *Nikolay Gogol* by Vladimir Nabokov and *The Art of Gogol* by Andrey Bely.


Ye. Timoshenko. *Invitation to a Beheading* and *The Trial* Nabokov and Kafka.

L. Karasyov. Chekhov: the Beginning and the End of the Text.


**VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA**
*(Problems of Linguistics)*

**No. 3, 2014**

A. Vyrenkova (Moscow) et al. The Grammar of Errors and the Construction Grammar: The Case of “Heritage Russian.”
A. Vydrin (St. Petersburg). Dedicated Impersonal in Ossetic: Towards a Typology of Impersonality in Iranian.

I. Gorbunova (Moscow). Phasal Polarity in Atayal Language.

L. Moskalyuk (Barnaul). German “Language Islets” in Altay.

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