Two models of the political ideologies development in the framework of Euro-Christian civilization in the XIX-XX centuries

I. The conceptual basis for the models:
   1. The transit of the Euro-Christian states to the New – liberal-bourgeois – Order had the different dynamics, but the common logics.
   2. During the liberal-bourgeois revolutions of the XVII-XVIII centuries, the main political antagonists were the liberals (who defended the interests of the becoming bourgeoisie) and the traditionalists (who defended the interests of the aristocrats and the Church).
   3. Taking as the conceptual basis the character of relationship between the liberals and traditionalists, we can build two models of political ideologies development in the framework of the Euro-Christian civilization – the classical and the peripheral ones.

II. Two kinds of the models
   1. The classic model was typical of the Great Britain and France (and – with some reservations – of the USA).
   2. The peripheral model was typical of all other countries in the framework of Euro-Christian civilization: Germany, Italy, Spain, Eastern Europe and Russia (and – with some reservations – of Japan).

III. The main features of the classic model
   1. In modern times, the dominant political ideology in the Great Britain and France is liberalism.
   2. The British and French liberalism gradually formed in the XIII-XVIII centuries and determine the character and specificity of the liberal-bourgeois revolutions in these countries in the XVII-XVIII centuries.
   3. The Liberalism has been «grafted» to the Great Britain and France «genetically»: the liberal ideas, attitudes and values had been implemented in the social practice relatively quickly and had the constant institutional realization.
   4. The dominance of liberalism has allowed Great Britain and France to pass the phase of capitalist modernization before the other countries and relatively harmoniously.
   5. Institutional immunity of the Great Britain and France to the political radicalism (fascism or communism) which for other countries was a tool for rapid modernization by forcible mobilization of the nation.
   6. The strategic alliance of The Great Britain and France (with very few exceptions) during the XIX-XX centuries is the one more argument in favor of their attachment to the common model.

IV. The main features of the peripheral model
   1. A lack of the own «genetically grafted» liberal ideology: liberalism was borrowed from outside (from the Great Britain and France).
   2. Being the borrowed ideology, liberalism cannot get constant political institutionalization: the social and economic backwardness impeded the confirmation of liberalism.
   3. The general weakness of the national bourgeoisie, and – as the other side – the economic, political and cultural «power» of the medieval estates (nobility and the Church) who based on the medieval traditionalism.
4. At the time of the Great French Revolution, the states of the peripheral model have come up with the political attitudes that were fundamentally different from the states of the classical model: further, this gap increased only.

5. The general semi-feudal backwardness of national economies and unfinished bourgeois modernization: the need to accelerate the development that was only possible to realize by the right or left dictatorships.

6. The main conflict is not between the liberalism and conservatism as the bourgeois political ideologies (in the Great Britain and France), but between the liberalism and traditionalism. The local conservatism separates from the previous medieval traditionalism with great difficulty.

V. Two models in the comparative perspective

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<th>The countries</th>
<th>The classic model</th>
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<td>Liberal-bourgeois revolutions of the XVII-XVIII centuries</td>
<td>Liberals against Traditionalists</td>
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<td>Capitalistic modernization of the XIX century</td>
<td>Liberals against Conservatives</td>
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<td>Susceptibility to right- and left dictatorships in the first half of XX century.</td>
<td>Susceptibility is absent: Liberals and Conservatives together against Fascist and Communists</td>
<td>Fascism or Communism: local Conservatives support fascism; a defeat of the Conservatives leads to Communism (Russia and Eastern Europe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic transit</td>
<td>Democracy is sustainable; transit is not necessary in principle</td>
<td>Successful transit is the obligatory condition for democracy</td>
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<td>Consistent pattern: historically, democratic transit as a result of military defeat (Germany, Italy, Japan) is developing more rapidly and successfully than by the natural means (Spain, Eastern Europe and Russia)</td>
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VI. The conclusions:
1. For the classical model – with its emphasis on liberalism – the politic institutionalization of the right or left radicalism is unacceptable.
2. For the peripheral model – with its emphasis on traditionalism – the politic institutionalization of the right or left radicalism is natural.
3. In a broader perspective:
   - the traditionalism leads to the establishment of dictatorship in the «third world» countries,
   - for the «catch-up model» a dictatorship is the necessary and natural part of the political system.