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THE "GERMAN PARTY" IN RUSSIA IN THE 1730S: EXPLORING THE IDEAS OF THE RULING FACTION

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THE "GERMAN PARTY" IN RUSSIA IN THE 1730S: EXPLORING THE IDEAS OF THE RULING FACTION

This article explores the policies pursued by the key "German" ministers of Empress Anna Ioannovna (r. 1730-1740). This period has been traditionally presented as a "reign of Germans" who allegedly acted in ways that were oppressive, ill-conceived, and detrimental for Russia's true interests. Recent scholarship successfully debunked the notions that the "Germans" acted as a cohesive political faction and demonstrated that their policies were largely sensible and successful. Did the "foreignness" of these German-born ministers matter, however? As this article argues, many of these policies could actually be linked to the influences of the Halle Pietism and represented an important "disciplinary moment" in early modern Russian history.

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2 The study was implemented in the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2016.
The notion of the 1730s, the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna (r. 1730-1740), as the era of “Bironovshchina,” of a “German yoke,” was very much a truism in the nineteenth-century historiography and popular imagination; from there it transited, if only in cruder form, into the Soviet textbooks. There is no need to reproduce this narrative in much detail here. Briefly speaking, it asserts that in the 1730s “the Germans,” embodied most visibly by “Biron” (Ernst Johann von Bühren), Anna’s favorite, dominated the court and the government of the Empire and used their dominance to pursue policies that were beneficial to them, but detrimental to Russia. They engaged in corruption and profiteering, pilfering Russian treasury. They packed the army and bureaucracy with ever more “Germans,” pushing aside worthy Russian servitors. They let the Petrine institutions and principles of government to decline and fade away, replacing them with the “German” ones, silly and inappropriate for Russia as these were. And to preserve their dominance, they unleashed a campaign of terror against good Russian patriots and against just about anybody who dared to raise his voice in opposition to these abuses and outrages, culminating in the Volynskii affair in 1740. This narrative certainly reflects a campaign of propaganda launched by Empress Elizabeth in the 1740s to legitimize her coup as a necessary and patriotic deed. It also reflects the emergence of Romantic (and eventually, less than romantic) Russian nationalism in the nineteenth century, where the “German” served as an important “other” in juxtaposition to whom “Russianness” was imagined and defined.

A significant amount of research has been done in the last few decades by the leading scholars of the eighteenth century effectively dismantling the key elements of this myth. Political alignments of Anna’s era were not defined by “Germanness” or “Russianness,” and the German-speaking ministers did not form a united mafia-like front. Though they did align with each other sometimes, they also fought against each other viciously in alliances with their Russian colleagues — in short, it was the court politics as usual, driven by ambition and political expediency, not any “national” affinities. Indeed, whether there existed any common “German” identity in this era is highly questionable. Furthermore, the share of “foreigners” in the top service ranks under Anna did not expand as compared to Peter I’s reign; and many, if not the most of “German” ministers and generals of Anna’s reign were, in fact, old Petrine hands, tried and trusted associated of the empire’s founder. Moreover, under Anna “foreigners” actually lost some of the privileges they previously enjoyed, such as higher salaries. While they might have been corrupt and prone to promote their clients, no less so were the “good Russian patriots,” both during Anna’s reign, and under Peter I before, or under Elizabeth after that. Repressions

3 Most recently, it has been restated by N. I. Pavlenko, who defined “Bironovshchina” as “the entire complex of events of Anna Ioannovna’s reign: concentration of power in the hands of a handful of Germans patronized by the empress; terror against aristocratic families and church hierarchs; plunder of the treasury; trade policies harming the interests of the state; diplomatic failures; the Belgrade peace treaty that did not correspond to the material and human costs of the war.” N. I. Pavlenko, Vokrug trona (Moscow: Mysl’, 1999), 368.
certainly took place, but they were neither broader, nor bloodier than during Peter's reign. Nor it is possible to argue that the policies of Anna’s government were somehow manifestly destructive, unsuccessful, and “unpatriotic,” either in the foreign affairs, or in the military sphere, or in the economic domain. If anything, hers was a rather successful reign on all of these fronts, while the government, as N. N. Petrukhintsev demonstrated, did pursue a sensible, if uninspiring program of administrative and fiscal normalization.

Yet, the inescapable fact is that the “Germans” were there. There was not necessarily a “flood” of “Germans” after Anna’s accession in numerical terms, but N. N. Petrukhintsev does find a “qualitative shifts” in terms of their standing within the government. Unlike under Peter I, they did assume the commanding roles in the 1730s for the first time. Throughout most of Anna’s reign the government of the empire was de-facto headed by Count Heinrich Johann Friedrich (a.k.a. Andrei Ivanovich) Ostermann (1686–1747), in charge of the foreign policy and the leading voice in domestic affairs, and Field-Marshall Burchard Christoph von Münnich (1683–1767), the head of the Military College. Added to them should be Ernst Johann von Bühren (1690–1772), Empress Anna’s favorite, whose behind-the-scene role in government is increasingly emphasized by recent research, and Karl Gustav von Löwenwalde (d. 1735),

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6 Petrukhintsev, “Nemtsy v politicheskoi elite,” 86.


another influential courtier. Not only these people controlled the key levers of government in the formal sense, they were also predominant in setting the directions of policy due to their privileged access to the sovereign. Indeed, Ostermann was referred to by the contemporaries as the “soul of the Cabinet,” that is, of a special body that was created early in Anna’s reign to mediate her relationship with the rest of government and quickly superseded the Senate and other agencies.

Whether these people thought of themselves as “Germans” is questionable, of course, and it is even more questionable whether they felt any affinities to each other on that account. What is much harder to question is that all these people grew up outside of Russia and outside of Russian political and religious culture. As for von Münnich and Ostermann, it is no secret that they were extremely well-read and well-versed in contemporary Western European political literature, and von Münnich in particular was an enthusiast of Fenelon. Moreover, throughout their lives they maintained well-documented affiliations with the Pietist movement in Halle, and their subsequent behavior in exile indicates that this affiliation remained important for them.9 In that regard, we might also add to these officials Archbishop Feofan Prokopovich (1681-1736), who played the leading role in the affairs of the church throughout the first half of the reign.10 He was certainly not a “German” in any sense, but being born and educated in Ukraine (and later, in Western Europe) he did belong to a political culture and intellectual tradition that was very different from the Russian one. Extremely well-read, he also shared strong Pietist sympathies and connections; it is not for nothing that his enemies accused him of crypto-Protestantism. The views and sensibilities of von Bühren are yet to be studied in detail (his extensive correspondence in German remains virtually unexamined by scholars), yet his apparent one-time study at the Pietist-influenced University of Konigsberg might be indicative here.

Are we really ready to claim that all of this is irrelevant? Is it really credible to suppose that someone like von Münnich and Ostermann viewed the world through the same lenses as a typical Petrine servitor, that in their basic anthropological, indeed, ontological sensibilities such people did not differ from their Russian colleagues of the Petrine and immediate post-Petrine generation? Certainly these sensibilities did not necessarily translate into a coherent, much less coherently formulated policy program; and these people were shrewd, cynical, and often

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unprincipled political players. Still, it appears at the very least plausible that their intellectual and religious sensibilities had to be reflected, however vaguely, in their basic “administrative instincts,” in the ways in which they saw human nature and understood human interactions – and this, in turn, had to have shaped somehow the policy choices they made at the helm of the Russian Empire. Yet, since the discussions of the role of “Germans” in the 1730s have been hijacked by vulgar nationalism, serious scholars appear unwilling to consider potential meaning and implication of the “foreignness” of key ministers’ of Anna’s reign. This is not a reason to ignore it altogether, however. There has to be a sophisticated, historically sound way to discuss this particular dimension of Russia’s eighteenth century.

This article argues that by focusing on the religiously-infused anthropological notions and on the governamentalities informed by them we can tentatively identify some common themes in the policies pursued by Anna’s German-born ministers. This is not to be taken to mean that these ministers consciously pushed for a comprehensive program of reforms: they were certainly not a “party” in that sense. Nor were they a party, as has been amply demonstrated, tactically, in terms of court politics. Rather, these common themes reflected their shared – often, Pietist-inspired – anthropological and ontological sensibilities as well as the policy patterns and blueprints familiar to them. What is offered below is an attempt to read their policies from this perspective. In particular, I focus on promotion of education; religious policies; and reorganization of noble service. Overall, I stress two themes. First is the focus on interiorization, on the alleged difference between external (false) and interiorized (“true,” “sincere,” “willing,” and therefore, superior) obedience. Second is the shift from the normative to the instrumental mode, to developing more intrusive and systematic bureaucratic tools of observation, regulation, and assessment that was intended to effect this interiorization. This instrumental mode, as I argue, was characteristic of Anna’s era and reflected the peculiar anthropological sensibilities of her “German” officials.

**Pietism and State-Building**

The notion that religious sensibilities played an important role in early modern state building is increasingly emphasized both in historiography and in historical sociology. The pioneer in that regard was, naturally, Max Weber who suggested that there was a connection between Protestant doctrine and the superior professional ethos of an “ideal” (i.e. Prussian) bureaucracy. There is also extensive literature on the connections between “confessionalization,” both Protestant and Catholic, and “social disciplining” as central for state-building. Most recently, historical sociologist Philip Gorski in particular must be singled out for asserting the importance of religious factors behind the efforts to construct the institutions of early modern
state in Western Europe. Drawing on the ideas of Michael Foucault, Weber, Gerhard Oestreich, and Norbert Elias, he posits a shift from physical coercion to non-coercive forms of control over society and individuals as the key element of modernity. He also stresses the “subtle but important differences between confessions” in that regard, emphasizing in particular the role of peculiarly Calvinists understanding of disciplina in producing intense focus on “voluntary” and “inward” obedience that found its expression in the development of the “disciplinary” techniques of modernity. In fact, Gorski explicitly takes to task Michael Foucault for ignoring the religious underpinnings of the “panoptical technologies.”

While Gorski’s focus is on the Calvinism, he acknowledges that Pietism also played an important role the “disciplinary revolution” in Brandenburg-Prussia: both on the level of ideas, as an inspiration for certain policies, and on the level of actors, specific confessional networks that drove this revolution from below and that the rulers allied themselves with. Indeed, there is extensive literature that links the origins of the Prussian administrative machine specifically to the collaboration between the Hohenzollerns and Pietists, as this movement was the source of much of the clerical personnel and of some of the key disciplinary techniques employed by king Friedrich Wilhelm I. The key issue for me here is not whether it was actually due to these techniques that the Hohenzollerns were able to transform their poor, sparsely populated and otherwise unpromising principality, lacking any natural resources, into a great military power. Rather, I am interested in the ways the Pietist doctrinal background provided motivation for

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12 Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution, 105-12.

some of the key actors behind these efforts – and also gave meaning to the invasive and burdensome disciplinary techniques themselves that they designed and implemented.

The most notable, for our purposes, embodiment of Pietism was the pedagogic theory and practice developed by August Hermann Francke (1663-1727), a pastor, teacher, and the founder of an extensive pedagogic enterprise that included charity schools, an orphanage, an elite boarding school, and the first pedagogical institute in Central Europe. It was also Francke who was instrumental in orchestrating the movement’s cooperation with the Prussian state that, again, was largely organized around the school-church nexus, as the Pietists supplied the monarchy with organizational templates and motivated teachers to implement them. Francke’s pedagogic innovations followed directly from his theological views, as Pietists stressed the need for a personal “conversion experience” that was understood in terms of the opposition between coerced and superficial, on the one hand, and “voluntary” and sincere, on the other. In order to cultivate the student’s ability to freely and voluntarily accept faith and works, teachers had first to transform, even to break his will. This was to be attained by a number of pedagogical methods. These included compulsory attendance and taking roll call; continuous monitoring and recording, including the daily recording by teachers of each child’s progress and character; “mak[ing] proper use of [one’s] time” through introduction of clear schedule of daily activities, where every hour was consigned to a particular task. Finally, Francke highlighted the need to strictly control and supervise student behavior at all times; this constant supervision was most easily attained, of course, at a boarding school and/or an orphanage. In short, he “sought to create a completely regulated and self-enclosed environment, neutralizing the impact of the outside environment and thus ridding pupils of any bad habits they might have developed outside the institution.”

Note that for Francke disciplining the body and disciplining the soul were directly linked, as “indecent demeanor” and “disorderly posture” gave witness to “disorder in the mind” and “testify to your secret mental turmoil.”

Another important element of Francke’s pedagogical theory and practice was his emphasis on the “calling” (Beruf), or “inner vocation” (vocationem internam), of students. Pietist theology envisioned a divinely ordained social organism where every member performed an essential function depending on his “natural [i.e. God’s] gift,” thus recognizing inherent, “natural” differences between people in intelligence and other endowments. The key task of educators and of the state was, therefore, distinguishing among the “temperaments” (Gemüter) of the subjects not only “to know more about how each can be controlled and whether each should be treated more strictly or more softly,” but also “to discover the capacity of the intelligences

and what in particular each child is skilled for, so that the gifts that God has implanted in each can be awakened and applied to the common welfare.16 Again, this meant a premium on developing formal mechanisms of monitoring and assessment.

Arguably, the key institution where the Pietist theologically-inspired pedagogy and the needs of the Hohenzollern monarchy came together was the Berlin Cadet Corps, or Kadettenanstalt, the most “disciplinary” military school of its time, that was also to become the single most important supplier of officers for the army.17 Richard L. Gawthrop emphasizes Friedrich Wilhelm I’s desire to make his officers “obedient instruments,” which required a “complete break from the cavalier conception” of the military profession: cadets were expected to “make fulfillment of their vocational duty the overriding factor in their lives.” In order to achieve the transformative goals, however, the Berlin Cadet Corps employed all the key disciplinary techniques designed at Francke’s schools, including the round-the-clock monitoring; recording of moral and scholarly progress; a rigid schedule of daily activities, etc. Cadets were put in barracks and organized into companies, which facilitated constant supervision by either staff or other cadet. Every year the Corps’ commander was required to submit reports on the performance and moral conduct of every cadet and officer. These reports were read by the king personally and served as the basis for his personal examination of individual cadets and officers and hence, all promotions. Strict discipline was accompanied by religious indoctrination: prayer, attending sermons, and Bible reading were all important elements of a daily schedule at the corps. The first commander of the Corps was a devoted Pietist, as were, of course, military pastors attached to the Corps.18 The Kadettenanstalt was, however, a part of a broader pattern: the king’s troops were made to regularly attend church sermons, and Pietist graduates of Halle received a virtual monopoly of appointments as military pastors.19

The active presence of the Pietists in Russia predated the reign of Anna by many decades, of course: it was driven by the efforts of teachers and pastors connected to Halle to find employment, but also by Francke’s own missionary enthusiasm. Numerous studies document his hopes to penetrate the Orthodox Church and his determined work to influence educational

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19 On the role of the Pietist network in religious indoctrination in the Prussian army, see Marschke, Absolutely Pietist. Note that the king’s attempts to reshape the morals of his graduates did not stop with the cadets’ graduation from the corps: he issued numerous orders prohibiting his officers from “going into debt, playing cards, drinking excessively, and so on.” Gawthrop, Pietism and The Making, 235.
practices in Russia by maintaining an extensive network of correspondence, patronage, and support.\(^20\) Even though scholars have been aware of these connections for a long time, they generally refrained from drawing any conclusions from them. In particular, Gorski’s notion of “disciplinary revolution” has been drawn upon by the late Professor V. M. Zhivov to analyze the policies of the Russian church and state in the late seventeenth-eighteenth centuries. Zhivov did acknowledge that the soteriological doctrine of the Russian Orthodoxy was not really conductive for the disciplinary turn, and that one among other reasons why, in his opinion, the government-sponsored attempts at religious disciplining in early eighteenth Russia failed. Curiously, however, he did not discuss the role of the “ultimate disciplinarians” in post-Petrine Russia – the Pietists-connected German-born officials.\(^21\) Most recently A. V. Ivanov initiated serious study of the role of the Pietist influences in the evolution of the Russian Orthodox Church in the eighteenth century, focusing in particular on the figure of Prokopenchik and on his close associates, yet, avoided going beyond the ecclesiastical domain in his analysis.\(^22\) However, one could arguably find traces of Pietist influences in a number of policies pursued during the 1730s.

\textit{Nobility and Service}

Reform of noble service introduced by Anna’s government of 1736/37 was one the key initiatives of the reign.\(^23\) While the new system reaffirmed the principle that all nobles have to


serve, it also limited the term of mandatory service from indefinite to 25 years – a step that tends to be interpreted as a “concession” to the nobility in the wake of the 1730 succession crisis. The authors of the reform also sought to systematize registration of young nobles for service, and they introduced a curriculum of mandatory studies and a sequence of regular examinations that the young nobles were supposed to take (see the next section). Again, both the reviews of the servitor class and the obligation to study are found in some form already under Peter I; notable, however, is the effort to make monitoring and record-keeping much more regular and formalized than the first emperor ever cared to do.

What made the new regulatory framework truly different, however, is the notion that the nobles should be given an opportunity to choose the field of their study and the branch of their service. The decree of May 6, 1736 asserted this principle as a basic rule, pointing out that the government created schools and paid “salaries” to the pupils so that noble children could “study whatever science they have the inclination for.” Further on, it instructed local officials to enroll noble teenagers into army and garrison regiments “according to their wishes,” while younger noble minors were to study “grammar and other sciences, whichever they themselves might desire.” Likewise, the decree of February 9, 1737, stipulated that the choice of schools was to be based “on their inclination ... whichever they appear to have ability for.” The government, thus, was now in the business of assessing and recording not only the observable physical fitness for service, but also the intangible “desires” and “inclinations” of the subjects. Furthermore, the system of examinations introduced in 1736/37 was understood as a tool not of enforcement and control, but also of manipulation, of “encouragement” and motivation: the government now explicitly sought to induce “zealous diligence” and “application” in servitors. The decree stipulated that promotions were to be bestowed on those “who made more progress in their studies and display a diligent effort,” and decrees were to be sent to their place of service with detailed descriptions of their achievements “so that others were urged towards similar diligence and zeal and refrained from soul-damaging idling around and other indecencies.” On the other hand, the government’s papers from that era often refer to servitors deemed “hopeless” (beznadezhnyie), i.e. those who did not exhibit “diligence” and “zeal” and did not respond to “encouragement”: on the basis of regular monitoring and assessment of their character such nobles were to be weeded out from the schools and banned to lower ranks “forever.”

24 The system promoted by the government was, thus, to result in the elevation of a select elite of nobles who possessed an interiorized “willingness” and “desire” to serve.

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24 On the practical implementation of this system, see Igor Fedyukin, “Nobility and Schooling in Russia, 1700s-1760s: Choices in Social Context,” *Journal of Social History* 49 (2016): 558-84.
While the 1736/37 reform is important in its own right, it also reflects a broader pattern. Indeed, the idea that the servitors were to be assigned according to their génie, or “natural inclination,” so as to motivate – to “encourage” – them was the trademark of the government’s policies throughout the 1730s. Thus, rather than pressing young nobles into the Noble Cadet Corps founded in 1731, as Peter I would have undoubtedly done, Anna’s government called for volunteers. Numerous other documents likewise emphasized that a good servitor must serve “willingly” – and the administrators were not to expect this “willingness” as a matter of course, but rather to purposefully produce it. Throughout the 1730s the government gradually shifted from a system of promotion based either on seniority, or on election by one’s fellow officers to one based on “merit,” as such method was deemed best suited to “encourage” nobles. The principles of governing via “encouragement” are also evident in other policies and proposals from that period. Thus, Ostermann suggests that the Senate and the Colleges submit weekly or monthly reports on their activities, which would be examined either by the ruler personally, or by a specially appointed person. This attention, he believed, would “encourage” [pobudit] the governmental departments to be more “attentive.” According to Peter I’s collegial system, each governmental bureau was administered by a board. Ostermann, however, suggested putting each member of these boards in charge of separate sub-departments. According to his plan, boards members should have an area of personal responsibility, which would give each of them the opportunity to display their “diligence and zeal” [prilezhanie i rachenie], and thus would encourage him. 25

Notably, practical discussions regarding new principles of noble service began in the early 1730s at the Military Reform Commission presided at this point by von Münnich. These debates continued throughout the entire decades, and various proposals to this effect were linked, one way or another, either to von Münnich, or to Ostermann. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the 1730 crisis Ostermann advised empress Anna that it was “appropriate” to reward her most loyal supporters “regardless of seniority or other circumstances, so as to encourage [ankurazhirovaniia] others.” In a similar vein, Ostermann argued that the nobles avoided naval or civil service because there were fewer opportunities for promotion there. Therefore, nobles serving in the navy and in the bureaucracy should be “encouraged” [pridat’ revnovania]. Rather than reflecting the lobbying by the Russian nobility, these ideas were consistently opposed by the Senate packed with Russian-born dignitaries who asserted the impossibility of organizing

service on the basis of “ambition” and “encouragement.” The 1736/37 reform, in particular, appears to have been designed in the Cabinet, either by von Münnich, or by Ostermann, and it took place precisely during the period between the death of P.I. Iaguzhinskii (April 1736) and the appointment of A.P. Volynskii (February 1738), when the Cabinet was fully under Ostermann’s control.26

Education

That the “dark era” of Anna Ioannovna was also notable for the government’s efforts to promote education had been noted by scholars long time ago.27 I would argue, however, that these efforts were also qualitatively new in the sense that they were underpinned by an instrumental understanding of schooling that was explicitly conceived as a tool for producing subjects of a particular kind, loyal and zealous, and ultimately, as a tool for (re)producing political order. Despite Peter I’s enthusiasm for teaching and learning, his focus was on education as apprenticeship, and not on vospitanie in the sense of shaping the loyalty of the subject. This instrumental, political understanding of schooling was never really articulated by him as a matter of policy. In fact, Olga Kosheleva argues – correctly, I believe – that Catherine II was actually the first Russian ruler to “conceive of ways of manipulating its subjects through the school system.”28 While the earliest vision of a “disciplinary” school in Russia was formulated by Prokopovich in his 1721 Ecclesiastical Regulation, the relevant passages did not receive any input from Peter I and seem to reflect Prokopovich’s own views; nor were they ever systematically implemented.29

Throughout the 1730s, however, the “German” ministers presided over the creation of a network of “garrison schools” echoing a similar system founded earlier in Prussia 30 ;

26 Fedyukin, “Chest’ k delu um i okhotu razhdaet”, 108-10; “Zapiska dlia pamiati grafa Andreia Ivanovicha Ostermana.”
27 See Lipski, “Some Aspects of Russia's Westernization.”
30 PSZ RI, vol. 8, № 6188, 928-30; “Predstavlenie general-admirala grafa Andreia Ivanovicha Ostermana v 1740 godu...,” in Pamiatniki novoi russkoi istorii: Sbornik istoricheskikh statei i materialov, izdavaemyi V. Kashpirevym, ed. V. Kashpirev, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg: Tip. Maikova, 1873), 261; V. N. Benda, “Garnizonnye voennye shkoly v XVIII v.,” Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i iuridicheskie nauki, kul’turologiya i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki 4, 2 (2012): 33-36. Originally, the concept of “garrison schools” was invented in Prussia within the context of confessional tensions. The first school for the children of court servants and garrison soldiers of Calvinist faith, as separate from an elementary school for the local (Lutheran) populace in general, was established in Potsdam as early as 1662. By 1720s, however, Friedrich Wilhelm I was expanding these basic teaching arrangements into a universal system by ordering a garrison school to be founded wherever a regiment was posted. Dorwart, The Prussian Welfare State, 174-75.
establishment of the Noble Cadet Corps that, again, was explicitly modeled after a similar, Pietist-inspired institution in Berlin; and creation of a comprehensive regulatory framework for education of the nobility designed by the Cabinet as a part of the 1736/37 reform of noble service. Indeed, addressing in 1740 Princess Regent Anna Leopol’dovna, Ostermann argued that “nothing [was] as important for the state as good schools,”31 and invited the ruler to “extend schools throughout the Empire.”32 Crucially, the ministers of the 1730s went beyond normative calls for learning and studying: the trademark of their policies was the developments of administrative instruments and techniques focused on achieving exteriorization of prescribed models of thinking and behavior through monitoring, observation, formalized assessment, and regulation of the students’ schedule and space.33

Most prominently, an expansive array of disciplinary instruments was implemented at the Noble Cadet Corps, founded in 1731, directed by von Münnich, and staffed with scores of German expatriate officers, some of them previously connected to such Pietist-influenced institutions as the Noble Cadet Corps of the University of Konigsberg.34 The Corps’ documents emphasized “constant observation” (nadziranie), seclusion, and regulation of the daily routine with a view of changing the morals of the students and reshaping them into “true nobles.” The teachers were to make sure that the cadets “waste less time on walking around and inappropriate entertainment,” and to “diligently watch their mores, habits, and deeds, so that they behaved according to the demands of virtue, politeness, due humility, and honor, while lies, unfaithfulness, and other vices inappropriate for nobility were rooted out from them early on.” This was to be achieved by confining the cadets within an enclosed compound, producing a

31 “Predstavlenie”, vol. 3, 261.
32 “Zapiska dlia pamiati grafA Andreia Ivanovicha Ostermana,” 2.
detailed schedule of the say and numerous internal regulations (such as Rules on how to act in the grand hall where the cadets dine and a Regulation on how to behave in class), as well as involving cadets themselves in monitoring each other. The Corps also developed a sophisticated system of written reporting on the cadets’ behavior and progress in studies by teachers and officers; these reports appear to have been regularly analyzed, summarized, and used for conducting formal examinations. The same principles and techniques are formulated, even only more assertively and clearly, in a proposal for reform of the Naval Academy from Ostermann’s papers. One finds here a similar set of pedagogical methods designed to shape the students’ emotions and aspirations, such as recording their conduct in special “books of observation” (knigi obzervatsii) to be further inspected by the director and analyzed at the weekly faculty meetings. The students were to study “with joy and desire,” to be “diligent and obedient,” and not just to obey their teachers and commanders, but to “love them as their own parents,” and generally to learn to “lead well-ordered lives” (zhit’ reguliarno).

Going beyond the Cadet Corps, as a part of their 1736/37 reforms of noble service Anna’s ministers sought to establish a curriculum of mandatory studies for all young servitors and, importantly, to back it up with a system of regular examinations. The decree of February 9, 1737 sought to make sure that not only “all the nobles were educated, and fit for military and civil service,” but also that they were “making diligent efforts towards this end.” According to the new regulation, after registering with the Master of Heraldry in St. Petersburg, or with their local governor at the age of seven, a young noble was supposed to present himself for regular examinations at twelve, sixteen, and finally, twenty. At each point he was to demonstrate the mastery of a prescribed set of subjects. If successful, he could, depending on certain conditions, opt for continuing studies at home, enrolling in one of the state schools, or joining the active service; if not, he was liable to be drafted into the navy as a common sailor.

Religious Policies

In the affairs of the church, the period under consideration is dominated by the personality of Feofan Prokopovich. If there remained any doubts as to the crucial role of Pietism in shaping Feofan’s agenda, Andrey V. Ivanov’s dissertation definitely put those to rest by not only

35 The Corps’ founding manifesto and charter are in PSZ RI, vol. 8, № 5881, 557-59; № 5894, 569-70. Also, P. F. Luzanov, Sukhoputnyi shl’akhetnyi kadetskii korpus (nyne 1-i Kadetskii korpus) pri grafe Minikhe (s 1732 po 1741 gg.) (St. Petersburg: Knigopechatnia Shmidt, 1907), 34; ibid, appendix 6; K. V. Tatarnikov and E. I. Iurkhevich, Sukhoputnyi shliakhetsnyi kadetskii korpus. 1732-1762. Obmundirovanie i snariazhenie (Moscow: Russkaia Panorama, 2009), 39-40.
37 PSZ RI, vol. 10, № 7171.
summing his personal connection with Halle, but more importantly, but demonstrating the doctrinal influences of Pietism in his writings. Obviously, much of Feofan’s contribution, both in terms of institutional reform of the church and in terms of doctrinal innovations, date to the last years of Peter I’s reign, including the *Ecclesiastical Regulation* and introduction of the synodal governance, production of the *Primer (Pervoe uchenie otrokam)*, etc. Yet, while Peter commissioned and approved these documents, there is some room for an argument about the relationship between the sovereign and his bishop. Peter’s personal contribution to documents on ecclesiastical matters is notably limited, as compared to his personal involvement in writing and editing some of the great collegiate and naval regulations: Feofan did not collaborate with Peter on these texts, but rather produced them for the emperor’s approval.

However, the actual degree to which these innovations should be attributed to Peter’s (rather than Feofan’s) is, actually, besides the point. Even if the reforms authored by Feofan in the early 1720s were “Petrine,” by the end of the decade it did not matter practically speaking. Again, as Andrey V. Ivanov reminds us, by 1727-1729 even the restoration of patriarchy was on the table, and references to Peter’s previous approval could not be counted upon to protect Feofan from accusation of heresy. That these reforms survived was not because they were “Petrine,” but because Feofan played an important role in the constitutional crisis of 1730 and ended up on the winning side politically. Note however that Feofan has been supported and patronized by Ostermann already in the late 1720s, i.e. before the constitutional crisis, and they also collaborated on producing the necessary instructional texts for educating the young emperor Peter II. Ostermann apparently also approved Feofan’s *The Hammer on the Rock of Faith (Molotok na Kamen’ Very)*, a vicious polemics against the latter’s philo-Catholics enemies.

There are good reasons to suspect, it seems, that this political alliance might have actually reflected doctrinal affinities as well. After winning in 1730, Feofan appears to have devoted most of his energy in the early 1730s to conducting a brutal campaign of repression against his enemies in the church hierarchy – and he died pretty much right after completing it. This purge was important not only in the sense that it eliminated any resistance to Feofan’s institutional and doctrinal innovations, but also in the sense that it opened room for advancing Feofan’s clients

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and disciples who shared doctrinal sensibilities: “by the 1740s and 1750s, the majority of the members of the Synod owed their presence in the institution to Feofan and his promotions.”

Going beyond this purge, notable is the focus of Anna’s government on expanding and upgrading the network of ecclesiastical schools. The need to establish and maintain schools “according to the Ecclesiastical Regulation” was asserted in an Imperial manifesto already on March 17, 1730, and scholars single out Anna’s reign for energetic measures in this area, including the Synod’s attempts to centralize control over such schools. P.V. Znamenskii in his classic study juxtaposed the 1730s not only to the previous period, but also to the subsequent reign of Elizabeth, as “there were no steps whatsoever towards improving [the ecclesiastical schools] throughout her entire reign.” Notably, the efforts to build a network of such schools were stepped up at the very end of the decade, i.e. already after Feofan’s death – and they followed up on a series of decrees in 1737 that sought to regulate and centralize the system of priestly appointments. These decrees essentially went parallel to the 1736/37 reform of noble service in the sense that they emphasized registration of all youngsters, mandatory studies, but also the rhetoric of “desires” - the priests’ sons were to be employed according to “in what they’ve studied and what they have a desire (окхоту) for.”

It is also during Anna’s reign, again, especially in its latter years, that Paul N. Werth finds a large and persistent campaign to convert the non-Christians population of the Volga region that affected hundreds of thousands of local inhabitants. Few elements of this campaign might be significant for our purposes here. On the one hand, it is the efforts to develop administrative mechanisms for conducting this campaign, that is, a special bureaucratic agency, Novoreshchenskaya kontora, and a network of all-important schools for the children of the newly-baptized. On the other, it is the rhetoric of “voluntary” conversion and the insistence on the futility of coercion and superficiality of conversion thus achieved. According to the Synod, “the human heart cannot be coerced, and a person, converted by force, though he will show himself as having converted, will merely be a Christian by external appearance, and in his heart he will be even more hardened than before,” while local agents were forbidden to “baptize [anyone] into the Christian faith against that person’s will or by force.” The decree of September 11, 1740, that set the overall framework for these efforts, likewise insisted that the missionaries “are by no means to impose coercion on those [who do not wish to convert], and are not to threaten them in any way.” Rather, that goal was to make sure that the inoverty convertible

43 PSZ RI, vol. 8, № 5518, 257.
their own accord” (*po svoei vole*). To induce them to baptize the government was willing to offer incentives – tax breaks, small gift (items of clothing), cash payments “so as to create a stronger desire for accepting the Greek creed” (*daby tem pridati k vospriiatiiu grecheskago zakona luchshiu ikhotu*). Still, Paul N. Werth is somewhat puzzled, it seems, to observe: “It may well have been possible to reconcile scripture with a justification of violence in matters of conversion, but to my knowledge the Russian church never made any attempt to do so.” Indeed, theologically sophisticated justifications for conversion through coercion were readily available, developed, for example, on the occasion of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in France and rooted in the Augustinian doctrine. The pointed renunciation of coercion also contrasted sharply, it seems, with Petrine and pre-Petrine approach: compare, for example, the policies of the most active late seventeenth-century bishop Afanasii of Kholmogory.46

Going further, striking is the focus of Anna’s “German” ministers on the systematic Orthodox indoctrination of young Russian nobles. According to Ostermann’s project for reforming the Naval Academy, the first duty of future sailors was “having the fear of God and various Christian virtues (*dobrodeteli*).” Sunday afternoons were to be spent by future mariners for reading “godly books.” The project also included a separate chapter on the duties of the resident priest who had to instruct the students, to accompany them to the dining room, and to serve as an example of “constancy, sobriety, chastity,” etc. More specifically, on Saturday afternoons the priest was supposed to instruct students in Orthodoxy using Feofan’s 1721 Primer, and on Sundays and holidays he was to preach and to make students read Gospel, John Chrysostom, and Ephrem the Syrian. At the Cadet Corps, the priest was supposed “not only to conduct the usual prayers with [the cadets] daily,” but also to perform “catechization in the appointed hours.”48

The very idea of catechization was a novelty in Russia: overall, the Orthodox tradition did not consider it necessary and proper to instruct laymen in religious dogmatic. At the very end of his life Peter I pushed the Synod for producing a “short instruction for people,” or catechesis49; again, whether it was actually Feofan’s idea, or Peter’s own, seems to me to be an open question.


47 See the Corps’ charter of November 18, 1731, PSZ RI, vol. 43 (Kniga shtatov), part. 1 (Shtaty voenso-sukhoputnykh sil, 1711-1825), № 5881, 185.
48 N. A. Voskresenskii, *Zakonodatel’nye akty Petra I: Akty o vysshikh gosudarstvennykh ustanovleniakh. Redaktiitsi i proekty zakonov, zametki, doklady, doneseniia, chelobit’ia i inostranye istochniki*, vol. 1 (Moscow; Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1945), 143-44.
Regardless, religious indoctrination of troops and students in Peter’s time was in practice limited to prayers and sermons. Against this backdrop, the arrangements at the Cadet Corps and the project for reforming the Naval Academy were truly revolutionary. Even more so in that regard was the February 9, 1737 decree on the reform of noble service that also established for the first time the mastery of the “most obviously due and necessary laws and articles of our Greek Orthodox Faith” (“zakona i artikulov nashei pravoslavnoi kafolichskoi very grecheskogo ispovedaniiia”) as mandatory for young nobles alongside arithmetics and geometry. And characteristically, when a group of designated dignitaries supervised the examination at the Cadet Corps in 1739, it was not a Russian, but rather Karl Ludwig von Mengden, another key “German” minister and a Konigsberg graduate, who demanded that the resident priests – both the Lutheran and the Orthodox ones – also reported on their pastoral work. According to a deposition from the Orthodox priest, he conducted catechization on Wednesdays and Saturdays at 6 am each week. In 1743, on suggestion from the Synod, by that time dominated by Feofan’s disciples, catechization of nobility was made compulsory: all the young nobles had to learn “to truly know Most Gracious God, and our duty towards Him, and the dogmas of the Orthodox Christian creed, what is the true path towards our salvation.” Scholars increasingly note attempts to “institutionalize piety,” a “reform of piety,” or “the first systematic attempt to regulate popular Orthodoxy” beginning in Russia around circa 1740, yet they tend not to offer any explanation of this emphasis during Anna’s reign, or the reasons while the “reform of piety” subsided with the accession of Elizabeth. It appears plausible that these efforts at religious disciplining were directly linked both to the increasing domination of the Synod and hierarchy by Feofan’s disciples and that they should be understood in conjunction with other policies of Anna’s “German” ministers and in light of their Pietist sensibilities.

**Conclusion: The “German” Reign As Russia’s Disciplinary Moment?**

An oft-quoted anecdote describes Peter I trimming a human figure at the lathe in the company of his court mechanic, Andrei Nartov. “Happy that the work was going well, [Peter] asked of the mechanic Nartov: ‘How am I trimming?’ And when Nartov answered: ‘Good,’ then His Majesty said; ‘Just so, Andrei, I trim bones very well with a chisel, but I cannot shape up the stubborn with a cudgel.’” This is a striking image of Peter in his later years: a ruler burnt out after a quarter century-long reign, tired of his subjects’ intransigence, burdened by worries about

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50 PSZ RI, vol. 10, № 7171, 43; also the decree of April 24, 1737, to the same effect PSZ RI, vol. 10, № 7235, 130-31.
51 RGADA f. 248, d. 396, l. 137.
52 PSZ RI, vol. 11, № 8726 (April 20, 1743), 793-94.
his reforms’ survival after his death. Above all, it emphasizes the emperor’s own, if unwilling, admission that his chief tool of his governance has indeed been the infamous cudgel, and that the cudgel’s ability to effect change is limited. The big stick could, perhaps, break bones, but “shaping up the stubborn” is something altogether different. This admission, arguably, goes to the heart of a shift from spectacular applications of coercion to increased reliance on “disciplinary” methods of manipulating the ruler’s subjects that are supposed to characterize the modern era. Alas, the so-called Nartov stories have been shown to be, in effect, a work of fiction, composed in the second part of the eighteenth century.54

Fittingly, Nartov Jr., the son of Peter I’s court mechanic, to whose writings we owe this anecdote about the tsar’s disillusionment with the transformative powers of the cudgel, was himself a graduate of the St Petersburg Noble Cadet Corps. The sensibilities this story relates likely reflect the authors’ own experiences at von Münnich’s school rather than anything Peter himself might have said, and in this sense Nartov’s anecdote serves as a convenient metaphor for the evolution of Russian Imperial governamentality. Problematization of coercion (of the “cudgel”) appears to have been a distinctly post-Petrine phenomenon, as was the focus on developing the invasive bureaucratic mechanisms of monitoring, assessment, and manipulation designed to achieve interiorization of compliance. As this article argues, the new disciplinary governamentality could be linked to the specific policy initiatives pursued by Anna’s dignitaries – and to the recognizably Pietist influences and policy models. In that sense, the “German” ministers the 1730s ended up playing a key role in carrying further the project of “Westernization,” and did so by repudiating, in fact, some of the key elements of the Petrine paradigm.

As I mentioned in the beginning of this article, this is not to suggest that the “German” ministers pursued a coherent policy of “disciplining” Russia. However, as I sought to demonstrate, their initiatives were linked in the sense that they were based on similar anthropological assumptions – but also in the sense that they were also likely to originate from the Cabinet, largely controlled by Ostermann. They also tended to be intertwined and to mutually supplement and to reinforce each other. Finally, they could be also interlinked on the level of personalities, reflecting doctrinal affinities, but also the networks of support and patronage. Thus, the first Orthodox preacher at the Noble Cadet Corps (1732-36) was Luka Konashevich, who was also Feofan’s client and had connections with the bishop’s Pietist-inspired school on the Karpovka River. Konashevich made efforts to discipline his flock at the Corps – for example, by cooperating with the school’s German commanders in regulating the cadets’ behavior in

church. His replacement at the Corps was Varlaam Skamnitskii, likewise a Feofan’s protégé and a member of the Karpovka circle, and then Platon Petrunkevich, also a Feofan’s client. (Needless to say, the first Lutheran preacher at the Cadet Corps was Thobias Plashing, a Halle Pietist). The Lutheran Priest Both Konashevich and Skamnitskii would become bishops in the same decade, and Konashevich was active both in the reformation and expansion of schools in his dioceses and in spearheading the campaign for mass conversion on the Volga. 55

Moreover, could it be that the stereotypes of “pedantic Germans,” deeply entrenched in the Russian public imagination already by the late eighteenth century, were actually onto something – that they reflected the tensions produced by the very real disciplinary impulses of “German” officials in Russian service? In 1723, soon after his arrival to Russia, von Münich complained to the Prussian envoy of the low quality of the Russian officers, whom he considered “clumsy,” “ungeschickt.” Ten years later, he might note in an order after inspecting a unit under his command that the corporals did not have the braids on their sleeves; that a junior lieutenant had pointy, rather than square-toed shoes, and that his hat was oversized; and that the bayonets were worn inappropriately by many troopers. Indeed, many officers, allegedly, could not salute properly themselves – much less to drill their own troops. And after one of his visits to the Corps, von Münich was disturbed by the fact that “many of [the cadets] wear dirty jackets and instead of neckties they wear silk scarves” and demanded that candles were to stand in chandeliers in a “straight and proper” manner. 56 He was not unique in that regards, as the Corp’s director, Baron Johann Ludwig von Luberas (d. 1752), tried – without immediate success – to get the reveille sounded exactly at the appointed hours, while Gustav von Bühren, the favorite’s brother, regulated fasting at his Izmailovskii Guards, ordered troopers quartered too far from the church to come to pray to his quarters, and demanded that officers rented lodging close to their troops to prevent drunkenness, quarrels with the local inhabitants, and other outrages. 57 Was it a matter of idiosyncrasy, a ridiculous pettiness on the part of these officials? Or of a true military professionalism (notably, all these demands appear to have been alien to the Russian military realities of their time)? Or was it a reflection of their disciplinary instincts based, perhaps, on broader anthropological, religiously infused sensibilities that did not necessarily betray their


direct Pietist affiliations, but might echo broader effects of social disciplining in Western Europe?

This article calls for considering seriously the role of “Germans,” in the history of Russia’s early modern empire from that perspective. Their numbers in Russian service were by no means negligible. As S.V. Chernikov points out, “foreigners” (including Baltic Germans) did account for 40% of officers of general rank, and in technical branches they were even more dominant; their share among the service elites actually did grow in 1739-1741 and could reach as high as 70% in the field army.\(^{58}\) Is there an argument to be made that the Pietist networks – and the Baltic (and Ukrainian, for that matter) elites affected by Reformation/Counterreformation more generally – provided crucially important agents for what amounted for Russia’s “disciplinary moment,” however imperfect and superficial? If that was the case, Russia would not be unique, for did not the rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia relied on support from the Calvinist minority within the elite to build a disciplined absolutism within their own realm? Indeed, while Michael Foucault presented École Militaire, founded in Paris in 1750, as an inspiration for the Panopticon, Joseph Pâris-Duverney, the founder of the French institution, assured Louis XV that “among all the models that could be taken to form [the École Militaire], there could not be a better one than the Cadet School in Petersburg established in 1732 by the Field Marshal von Münnich.” Allegedly, upon assuming command of the Russian troops von Münnich realized that it was only “discipline” that they lacked - but in order to discipline the soldiers, he needed to train the Russian nobles first, “to tame their ferocious character.”\(^{59}\)

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\(^{58}\) Chernikov, “Rossiiskii generalitet,” 55.
\(^{59}\) Archives Nationales (Paris), Le carton des Rois, K 149.1. No. 5.1, “Memoir: Collège académique,” April 22, 1750. I am extremely grateful to Gemma Tidman of the University of Oxford for sharing these documents with me and to Harold Guizar of York University for providing further advice regarding their authorship.