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The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same time

Our social identity helps to define who we are and how we are relate to others. It includes our self-concept as well as the various groups of people with whom we identify. Much historical research in social psychology focused on the self, with less emphasis on the social aspects of identity. Recent studies, including that of Marilynn B. Brewer, have balanced personal and social factors.

Brewer (b. 1942) earned her Ph.D. in social psychology from Northwestern University in 1968. After teaching at the University of California at Los Angeles, she began her current position at Ohio State University. Brewer served as president of Society for Personality and Social Psychology in 1990 and the president of the American Psychological Society in 1994.

Thus section, “The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same time,” was published in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin in 1991. In it, Brewer describes her model of optimal distinctiveness, in which social identity is seen as a balance between the need for similarity to others and a need for uniqueness and individuation. This approach reflects the current view in social psychology that social identity is a multidimensional concept including both self-concept and group membership. As you read this article, think about the groups you identify with and how they help form your own self-concept. How important is group identity versus individual uniqueness in developing a social identity?

Key concept: optimal distinctiveness model of social identity

Most of social psychology's theories of the self fail to take into account the significance of social identification in the definition of self. Social identities are social definitions that are more inclusive than the individuated self-concept of most American psychology. A model of optimal distinctiveness is proposed in which social identity is viewed as a conciliation of opposing need for assimilation and differentiation from others. According to this model, individuals avoid self-construals that are either personalized or too inclusive and instead define themselves in terms of distinction category memberships. Social identity and group loyalty are hypothesized to be
strongest to those self-categorizations that simultaneously provide for a sense of belonging and a sense of distinctiveness….

In recent years, social psychologists have become increasingly “self”-centered. The subject index of typical introductory social psychology text contains a lengthy list of terms such as self-schema, self-complexity, self-verification, self-focusing, self-referencing, self-monitoring, and self-affirmation, all suggesting something of a preoccupation with theories of the structure and function of self. The concept of self provides an important point of contact between theories of personality and theories of social behavior. Yet there is something peculiarly unsocial about the construal of self in American social psychology.

The self-terms listed above are representative of a highly individuated conceptualization of the self. For the most part, our theories focus on interior structure and differentiation of the self-concept rather than connections to the external world. Particularly lacking as attention to the critical importance of group membership to individual functioning, both cognitive and emotional. The humans species is highly adapted to group living and not well equipped to survive outside group context. Yet out theories of self show little regard for this aspect of our evolutionary history. As a consequence, most of our theories are inadequate to account for much human action in the form of collective behavior. The self-interested, egocentric view of human nature does not explain why individuals risk or sacrifice personal comfort, safety, or social position to promote group benefit (Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1989).

Even a causal awareness of world events reveals the power of group identity in human behavior. Names such as Azerbaijan, Serbia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Tamil, Eritrea, Basques, Kurds, Welsh, and Quebec are currently familiar because they represent ethnic and national identities capable of arousing intense emotional commitment and self-sacrifice on the part of individuals. Furthermore, they all involve some form of separatist action – attempts to establish or preserve distinctive group identities against unwanted political or cultural merger within a larger collective entity. People die for the sake of group distinctions, and social psychologists have little to say by way of explanation for such “irrationality” at the individual level.

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

It is in the context that I have been interested in the concept of social identity as developed by European social psychologists, particularly Henri Tajfel and John Turner and their colleagues from the University of Bristol (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Although social identity theory has been introduced to U.S. social psychology, as a theory of self it is often misinterpreted. Americans tend to think about social identities as aspects of individual self-concept – part of internal differentiation. But the European conceptualization is one involving extension of the beyond the level of the individual identity.

A schematic representation of social identity theory is presented in Figure 1. The concentric circles represent definitions of the self at different levels of inclusiveness within some particular domain. Personal identity is the individuated self – those characteristics that differentiate one individual from others within a given social context. Social identities are categorizations of the self into more inclusive social units that depersonalize the self-concept, where I becomes we. Social identity entails “a shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person” (Turner et al., 1987, p.50).

The concentric circles in Figure 1 also illustrate the contextual nature of social identity. At each point in the figure, the next circle outward provides the frame of reference for differentiation and social comparison. To take a concrete example, consider my own identity within the social occupation domain. At the level of personal identity is me as an individual researcher and a teacher of social psychology. For this conceptualization of myself, the most
The immediate frame of reference for social comparison is my social psychology colleagues at UCLA. The most salient features of my self-concept in this context are those research interests, ideas, and accomplishments that distinguish me from the other social psychologists on my faculty.

My social identities, by contrast, include the interests and accomplishments of my colleagues. The first level of social identity is me as member of the social area within the department of psychology at UCLA. Here, the department provides the relevant frame of reference, and social comparison is with other areas of psychology. At this level the most salient features of my self-concept are those which I have in common with other members of the social area and which distinguish us from cognitive, clinical, and developmental psychology. At this level of self-definition my social colleague and I are interchangeable parts of a common group identity – my self-worth is tied to the reputation and outcomes of the group as a whole.

A yet higher level of social identity is the Department of Psychology within UCLA. At this level, the campus becomes the frame of reference and other departments the basis of comparison. The next level of identification is represented by UCLA as institution, with other universities providing the relevant comparison points. And, finally, there is my identification with academia as a whole, as compared with nonacademic institutions in the United States of the world.

The point to be made with this illustration is that the self-concept is expandable and contractable across different levels of social identity with associated transformations in the definition of self and the basis for self-valuation. When the definition of self changes, the
meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation also changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation also changes accordingly…

**OPTIMAL DISTINCTIVENESS THEORY**

My position is that social identity derives from a fundamental tension between human needs for validation and similarity to others (on the one hand) and a countervailing need for uniqueness and individuation (on the other). The idea that individuals need a certain level of both similarity to and differentiation from others is not novel. It is the basis of uniqueness theory, proposed by Snyder and Fromkin (1980), as well as a number of other models of individuation (e.g. Codol, 1984; Lemaine, 1974; Maslach, 1974; Ziller, 1964). In general, these models assume that individuals met these needs by maintaining some intermediate degree of similarity between the self and relevant others.

The theory of social identity provides another perspective on how these conflicting drives are reconciled. Social identity can be viewed as a compromise between assimilation and differentiation from others, where the need for deindividuation is satisfied within in-groups, while the need for distinctiveness is met through inter-group comparisons. Adolescent peer groups provide a prototypical case. Each cohort develops styles of appearance and behavior that allow individual teenagers to blend in with their age mates while “sticking out like a sore thumb” to their parents. Group identities allow us to be the same and different at the same time.

**FIGURE 2** The Optimal Distinctiveness Model
The model underlying this view of the function of social identity is a variant of opposing process models, which have proved useful in theories of emotion and acquired motivation (Solomon, 1980). Instead of a bipolar continuum of similarity-dissimilarity, needs for assimilation and differentiation are represented as opposing forces, as depicted in Figure 2.

As represented along the abscissa of the figure, it is assumed that within a given social context, or frame of reference, an individual can be categorized (by self or others) along a dimension of social distinctiveness – inclusiveness that ranges from uniqueness at one extreme (i.e., features that distinguish the individual from any other persons in the social context) to total submersion in the social context (deindividuation) at the other. The higher the level of inclusiveness at which self-categorization is made, the more depersonalized the self-concept becomes.

Each point along the inclusiveness dimension is associated with a particular level of activation of the competing needs for assimilation and individuation. Arousal of the drive toward social assimilation is inversely related to level of inclusiveness. As self-categorization becomes more individuated or personalized, the need for collective identity becomes more intense. By contrast, arousal of self-differentiation needs is directly related to level of inclusiveness. As self-categorization becomes more depersonalized, the need for individual identity is intensified.

At either extreme along the inclusiveness dimension, the person’s sense of security and self-worth is threatened. Being highly leaves one vulnerable to isolation stigmatization (even excelling on positively valued dimensions creates social distance and potential rejections). However, total deindividuation provides no basis for comparative appraisal of self-definition. As a consequence, we are uncomfortable in social contexts in which we are either too distinctive (Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990; Lord & Saenz, 1985) or too undistinctive (Fromkin, 1970, 1972).

In this model, equilibrium, or optimal distinctiveness is achieved through identification with categories at that level of inclusiveness where the degrees of activation of the need for differentiation and of the need for assimilation are exactly equal. Association with groups that are too large or inclusive should leave residual motivation for greater differentiation of the self from that group identity, whereas too much personal distinctiveness should leave the individual seeking inclusion in a larger collective. Deviations from optimal distinctiveness in either direction – too much or too little personalization – should drive the individual to the same equilibrium, at which social identification and group loyalties most intense…

**DISTINCTIVENESS AND LEVEL OF IDENTIFICATION**

The primary implication of this model of social identity is that distinctiveness per se is an extremely important characteristic of groups, independent of the status or evaluation attached to group memberships. To secure loyalty, groups must not only satisfy members’ needs for affiliation and belonging within the group, they must also maintain clear boundaries that differentiate them from other group. In other words, groups must maintain distinctiveness in order to survive – effective groups can not be too large or too heterogeneous. Groups that become overly inclusive or ill-defined lose the loyalty of their membership or break up into factions or splinter groups.

To return to the concentric circle schematic of Figure 1, the optimal distinctiveness model implies that there is one level of social identity that is dominant, as the primary self-concept within the domain. In contrast to theories that emphasize the prepotency of the individuated self, this model holds that in most circumstances personal identity will not provide the optimal level of self-definition. Instead, the prepotent self will be a collective identity at some intermediate
level of inclusiveness, one that provides both shared identity with an in-group and differentiation from distinct out-groups.

1.1 What is the author's view on social identity development? Which social groups did contribute in development of your own social identity? What other social identity theories do you know?

1.2 People want to be unique but in the same time there is a strong need in belongingness. How the author solves the conflict between these two strivings? Why does it happen?

2. Case: In the middle of the school semester one school in Moscow has admitted a Roma girl. A teacher disliked the new pupil from the very first days. The teacher was making comments on her appearance and behavior very often. After 2 months, the girl refused to go to school.

If you were a school psychologist what would you recommend to do in order to resolve this situation? To analyze the situation and provide recommendations use theories of Social Psychology.
Recommended literature: