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The Legitimacy Puzzle:

Why So Many People Confuse the Absence of Democracy with Its Presence

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ABSTRACT
A puzzling paradox consists in the fact that large population segments in many countries confuse the absence of democracy with its presence. Significantly, these are also the countries where widespread support for democracy coexists with severe deficiencies in the latter, including its outright absence. Addressing this puzzle, we introduce a framework to sort out the extent to which populations over-estimate their countries' democraticness. We find that over-estimating democracy is a widespread phenomenon, although it varies systematically across countries. Out of a dozen possible influences, cognitive stimulation and moral emancipation—what we call "enlightenment forces"—provide the strongest anti-dote against over-estimating democracy. In fact, enlightenment forces not only reduce over-estimations of democracy; they actually drive people towards under-estimations, thus increasing *criticality* rather than *accuracy* in assessments. Hence, the enlightening effect is more *normative* than *cognitive* in nature. We conclude that—by elevating normative expectations—enlightenment forces release pro-democratic selection pressures in regime evolution.

Key words: authoritarianism - autocracy - democracy - enlightenment - legitimacy
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INTRODUCTION

Since decades, scholars interested in the legitimacy of democratic rule examine how widespread support for democracy is in given countries (cf. Klingemann 1999). Accordingly, much of this work focuses on questions addressing people's regime preferences directly (Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Fails & Pierce 2010). Most studies in this field presume that the chances of a country to become and remain democratic are larger when a wider share of the population expresses support for democracy (Dalton 2007).

Obviously, this presumption rests on the belief that the extent of popular support for democracy is indicative of an incumbent regime's legitimacy. If, for instance, support for democracy is widespread in a democracy, the regime is supposedly legitimate and more likely to persist (Mattes & Bratton 2007; Diamond 2008). By contrast, if democratic support is widespread in a non-democracy, the regime apparently lacks legitimacy, which might help preparing it for transition (Mishler & Rose 2002; Shin & Tusalem 2009).

Should these premises be accurate, we face a puzzle that Alvarez-Moreno and Welzel (2014: 59) label the "paradox of democracy": widespread support for democracy often coexists with severe deficiencies in the latter, including its outright absence. Indeed, Klingemann and Welzel (2008: 67) illustrate that support for democracy as widespread as 80, 85 and 90 percent coexists with absent democracy in countries like Zimbabwe, Azerbaijan and Morocco. Newer evidence (documented in Figure 5 below) demonstrates that this paradox also includes such countries as China, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Belarus, Singapore, Qatar, Uzbekhistan and many other autocracies – all of which show support for democracy spanning 70 percent and more of the population, all the while authoritarianism blossoms (Walker 2016).

How can we explain the frequent coexistence of widespread support for democracy with the absence of the latter? One possibility is that mass demands are irrelevant for the level of democracy that the elites are willing to supply. But this would be a far-reaching conclusion, questioning a renowned school of thought in political culture that goes back to Lipset (1960), Almond and Verba (1963), Easton (1965) and Eckstein (1966). Before jumping to such a conclusion prematurely, we consider an alternative.

Perhaps, the same figures in mass support for democracy mask deeply encultured differences in democratic expectations. In some countries, many people might say that they support democracy, and maybe even strongly so, but if—for whatever reason—these people have not learnt to be critical in their judgements, they are likely to evaluate regime realities as rosier than they actually are. Asked to assess their country's democratic performance, these people then evaluate it *better* than it really is: the case of "democratic *over*rating."

In other countries, a similar number of people might say that they support democracy but when these people have internalized a critical spirit, the reality more easily falls short of people's expectations, in which case they evaluate their regime's democratic performance as *worse* than it really is. In this situation, we face "democratic *under*-rating."

Building on this rationale, our key proposition is two-fold. First, democratic over- and underratings reveal the level of people's democratic expectations: *low* expectations in the case of *over*ratings; *high* expectations in the case of *under*ratings. Second, depending on the level of democratic expectations, overt mass support for democracy changes its meaning: it indicates the legitimacy of democratic rule only in the case of *high* expectations, whereas in the case of *low* expectations it can mean the exact opposite: the legitimacy of authoritarian rule.

Our article provides the first confirmation of this *democratic expectations framework*. Specifically, we show (*a*) that people in many countries around the world rate the democratic qualities of their regime's as much better than they actually are. Moreover, we highlight (*b*) that mass-scale cognitive stimulation and moral emancipation—what we call "enlightenment forces"—provide a strong anti-dote against democratic overratings, stronger even than democracy itself. Finally, we illustrate (*c*) that the enlightenment forces not only reduce democratic overratings; they actually drive people towards underratings, increasing *criticality* rather than *accuracy* in assessments. Hence, where it happens people's enlightenment is more *normative* than *cognitive* in nature, elevating democratic expectations rather than expanding democratic knowledge.

From the viewpoint of democratic mass mobilization, this is an encouraging result because risen expectations embody a motivation to improve things to the better that widened knowledge *per se* would not necessarily incorporate.

The remainder of this article is organized in two parts, each consisting of three sections. In the *theory* part, section one reviews the literature. Section two introduces our theoretical framework. Section three formulates testable propositions of why democratic overratings might be prevalent in some countries but not others. In the *empirics* part, section four describes the data, variables and methods used to test these propositions. Section five presents the evidence, supplemented by plausibility checks in section six. Finally, the concluding section discusses the implications of our findings.

THEORY

Literature Review

Scholars increasingly criticize that looking at people's avowed preferences for democracy is of limited value, unless we know that these preferences derive from similar expectation standards (Schedler & Sarsfield 2007; Ferrin & Kriesi 2017). Thus, instead of taking equivalence in expectations for granted, researchers now examine questions asking people what they think democracy means. The initial findings seemed encouraging, as they indicate that people all over the world agree on a liberal notion of democracy (e.g.

Dalton, Shin & Jou 2007; Diamond 2008; Bratton 2009; al-Braizat 2010). This notion emphasizes universal suffrage, free and fair elections, universal freedoms and other emancipatory features that are at the heart of democracy's original meaning in liberal thought (Sartori 1987; Dahl 1989; Held 2006).

However, when one asks people for their agreement with authoritarian re-definitions of democracy, as an item battery of the World Values Survey does, the picture of a consensus on democracy's liberal core evaporates (Norris 2011; Shin & Cho 2010; Welzel 2013; Cho 2014; Shin 2015; Shin & Kim 2016). To be sure, when confronted with the alternatives, most people in Western countries reject authoritarian meanings of democracy. But this rejection remains a singularity of the West. Elsewhere, we find broad support for authoritarian meanings of democracy (Moreno-Alvarez & Welzel 2014; Shin 2015; Welzel & Kirsch 2017).

So far, the literature on in-equivalences in people's views of democracy focuses on how people define democracy. Scholars consider variation in these definitions as the result of an "enlightenment effect" emanating from learning, education and communication. The predominant interpretation of this enlightenment effect is *cognitive*: public responses show what people *know* about democracy, as Norris (2011) and Shin (2015) point out.

The latter two authors are also among the first to analyze a question asking people *how democratic* they believe their country is, on a scale from 1 ("not all democratic") to 10 ("completely democratic"). Both Norris and Shin relate people's democracy assessments on this scale to expert judgements from Feedom House and Polity, which supposedly indicate how democratic a country *really* is.[1] Again, as with notions of democracy, the authors interpret people's assessments of democracy from a cognitive point of view: judging how *accurately* people evaluate their country's democraticness.

Moreno-Alvarez and Welzel (2014) follow the idea of "reality-checking" people's subjective democracy assessments. But they apply a different criterion, not asking how accurate but how critical people assess their countries' democraticness. They argue that *over*ratings are *un*critical because they derive from *low* expectations that make people see their democratic reality as rosier than it is. Likewise, *under*ratings are *critical* because they result from *high* expectations that make people see their democratic reality as bleaker than it is.

We characterize these two ways of mapping people's subjective democracy assessments on "objective" standards as the *democratic knowledge* and the *democratic expectations* approach.

[1] Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) rates countries on extensive lists of "political rights" and "civil liberties," while Polity (www.systemicpeace.org/polity) uses "executive constraints," "contestation of public office" and the "inclusiveness of the electorate" as criteria. All of these are aspects of democracy that are largely consensual in political theory and liberal thought, relating back to the Enlightenment philosophers Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mill and the Federalists (cf. Sartori 1987; Dahl 1989; Held 2006).

Conceptual Framework

Democratic knowledge is a valuable good from the standpoint of an *educated* public that *understands* democratic realities as they are. Evidently, the criterion to judge democratic knowledge is *accuracy* in people's democracy assessment. By contrast, *democratic expectations* are the preferable good from the standpoint of an *ambitious* public that *aspires* for better democratic realities than there are. To judge the level of democratic expectations, *criticality* rather than accuracy in people's democracy assessments is the criterion.

The two approaches agree in their negative judgement of democratic *over*ratings, albeit for different reasons: the knowledge approach judges overratings as undesirable because they are an expression of *in*accuracy; the expectations approach judges overratings as undesirable because they are a sign of *un*criticalness.

Besides this nuanced difference, the two approaches differ fundamentally in their judgement of democratic *under*ratings. From the knowledge point of view, underratings are as undesirable as overratings because both express inaccuracy. In striking contrast, the expectations point of view sees underratings as desirable because they signify criticality (Alvarez-Moreno & Welzel 2014: 66-67).

In the latter perspective, overratings and underratings are not to be judged as equal deviations from accuracy but as opposite standards of expectation – with underratings indicating a demanding public and overratings an undemanding one. The democratic expectations approach sees this difference as crucial because mobilizing mass pressures for democratic improvements can only be expected from an ambitious public. For democratic expectations embody a drive that democratic knowledge as such does not incorporate. Hence, democratic expectations are essential for the continuous evolution of democracy (Alvarez-Moreno & Welzel 2014: 61-62).

Our study builds on Moreno-Alvarez and Welzel's approach while extending their evidence on four accounts: (*a*) analyzing a wider set of alternative influences on popular democracy assessments, (*b*) using different versions of over- and underrating measures, (*c*) testing the merits of the criticality perspective against those of the accuracy perspective, and (*d*) doubling the coverage of countries.

Observational Propositions

We are interested in how people internalize expectation standards so low that they rate democracy better than it is (overrating), or so high that they rate democracy worse than it is (underrating). Accordingly, we assume that influences which elevate expectations will place people's democracy assessments farther into the (critical) underrating zone. By the same token, influences that lower expectations should locate assessments farther into the (uncritical) overrating zone. So what are plausible influences on democratic expectations?

The most obvious point of departure is institutional learning (e.g., Rohrschneider 1994; Jennings 1996). From the learning point of view, people possess high democratic

expectations when they have firmly internalized democratic norms through their socialization. A broad, mass-scale internalization of democratic norms that reproduces itself over the generations depends on enduring democratic traditions (Mishler & Rose, 2002; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Fails & Pierce 2010). In other words, democratic expectations should be higher in countries with longer democratic traditions. Hence, our *first proposition* is that *popular democracy assessments are located the farther away from the (uncritical) overrating zone and the farther into the (critical) underrating zone, the more enduring the democratic traditions of a country are*.

In the perspective of institutional learning, people internalize expectations as passive recipients of socialization processes. This is quite different in Welzel's (2013; 2014) theory of emancipation. Here, certain mechanisms of psychological awakening activate in people an autonomous drive towards emancipation, that is, towards control over their lives and self-determination in their judgements, decisions and actions (Deci & Ryan 2000). People's emancipatory drive awakens through the mind-empowering impulses of modernization, in particular education, information, communication and other forms of cognitive stimulation (Lerner 1958; Inkeles & Smith 1974; Pinker 2011; Flynn 2012). In unison, cognitive stimulation and its resultant emancipatory drive, generate "enlightenment forces" that elevate people's normative expectations, including specifically their democratic expectations. In contrast to the democratic learning perspective, the theory of emancipation allows democratic expectations to rise independent of the presence of democracy. Thus, the second proposition suggests that *popular democracy assessments are located the farther away from the (uncritical) overrating zone and the farther into the (critical) underrating zone, the more people are exposed to cognitive stimulation and the stronger their emancipatory drive has grown*.

Kuran's (1995) *Private Truths - Public Lies* offers a different explanation. Due to this approach, surveys in non-democratic countries are incomparable to those in democratic countries. The reason is simple: in non-democratic countries, state-sponsored repression breeds fears that prompt people to judge their country's democraticness as rosier than they really think it is ("public lies"). Alternatively, such overratings might not be blatant lies but genuine perceptions, for a similarly plausible reason: repression depresses people's normative expectations to levels so low that they *really* don't recognize an existing lack of democracy as what it is (Lasswell 1951; Kohlberg 1986). Regardless of whether the mechanism is breeding public lies or depressing expectation standards, both lead to the same conclusion, which is our third proposition: *people's democracy assessments are located the farther away from the (critical) underrating zone and the more into the (uncritical) overrating zone, the more repressive the state is*.

Apart from outright repression, there are more subtle methods of intimidation. These methods, too, might depress democratic expectations and, accordingly, breed overestimations. A state's ability to use such methods depends on the influx of extra revenues that reduce the need to tax the citizens' incomes. A non-taxing state in the possession of extra revenues is able to stifle anti-regime mobilization because it can use its funds to subsidize supporters and punish opponents (Conrad & DeMeritt 2013). The clearest example of such "unearned revenues" are oil and gas rents. Indeed, oil and gas

revenues represent the most lucrative source of rent-seeking economies. Consequently, the *fourth proposition* holds that *people's democracy assessment is located the farther away from the (critical) underrating zone and the more into the (uncritical) overrating zone, the stronger the rent-seeking economy is*.

There is a large literature on the cultural boundedness of democracy, arguing that democracy is not a universal idea that appeals equally to every culture. Indeed, scholars like Huntington (1996) argue that liberal democracy is essentially a Western concept to which non-Western cultures, in particular Islam, resist to various degrees. In line with this statement, Shin (2015) demonstrates that democratic values co-vary significantly with cultural zones, showing the strongest presence in the "Protestant West" and the weakest in the "Islamic East." This evidence suggests that democratic expectations are highest in countries with a Protestant heritage and weakest in those with an Islamic heritage. The *fifth proposition*, accordingly, maintains that *people's democracy assessment is located the farther away from (uncritical) overrating and the more into (critical) underrating zone, the more pronounced the Protestant heritage and the less pronounced the Islamic heritage is*.[2]

EMPIRICS

Research Design

Methods and Data

While democratic traditions and other systemic properties only vary at the country level, emancipatory drives and cognitive stimuli vary at both the country and individual level. For this reason, they can affect people's democratic expectations at both levels as well as through an interaction between the two. Obviously, this issue can only be examined in a multilevel framework, for which reason "hierarchical linear regression" is the method of our choice.

We use data from the fifth and sixth World Values Survey (henceforth: WVS), conducted between 2005 and 2014. The WVS interviews nationally representative samples of adult residents with a targeted minimum sample size of 1,000 respondents per country. The rule is to field a standardized questionnaire in face-to-face interviews using

[2] The last proposition is a culture-level, not an individual-level, hypothesis. The point is not that individual Protestants and Muslims have specific democratic expectations. Instead, we believe that high or low democratic expectations are encultured in the collective mentalities shaped by these religious legacies, so that individuals socialized into these mentalities internalize the expectations most typical of the given culture – no matter what their own religious denomination might be. Hence, we focus on the dominant religious heritage of given countries. Besides, we actually tested whether *individual* Protestant and Islamic denomination affects democratic expectations, independent of the persons' location in Protestant and Islamic countries. We found no evidence for such an influence (see footnote 13 for more details).

the prevalent local languages. Details on question wording, fieldwork organization, sample design and data collection are available online, at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

The WVS provides by far the broadest country coverage when it comes to popular assessments of democracy. The assessment of democracy question is included in the WVS since its fifth round, which explains our limitation to rounds five and six. To avoid giving countries more weight that have been surveyed in both rounds ($N = 33$), we only take the *latest* available survey from each country, weighting national samples to equal size ($N = 1{,}000$).[3] We document question wordings, response formats, coding procedures, descriptive statistics, command syntaxes, alternative model specifications and supplementary findings in an Online Appendix (henceforth: OA), available at the end of this paper.

Because the fifth and sixth WVS are on average only five years apart and because the set of overlapping countries covered in both rounds is limited, there is an insufficient database for a meaningful longitudinal analysis.[4]

These limitations leave us with about 93,000 respondents from 75 countries. Figure 3 (further below) documents the composition of the country set, showing a balanced coverage of developed and developing economies, democratic and non-democratic regimes as well as Western and non-Western cultures from all inhabited regions of the globe. Because the sample includes the largest populations from each region, it represents more than ninety percent of the world population.

Tapping attitudes in surveys is vulnerable to two types of systematic error: a respondent has an attitude but refuses to reveal it; a respondent does not have an attitude but reveals one (Converse 1964; Alwin 2007). A possible indication of the first problem is missing response in questions that are delicate in certain contexts, like asking residents in non-democracies to assess their countries' democraticness. A possible indication of the second problem is respondents who give ostensibly contradictory answers to simple questions appearing twice in slightly different format, such as the WVS questions on the centrality that politics takes in one's personal life and one's subjective interest in politics.

To get a sense of the magnitude of these problems, we calculate per country (1) the percentage of respondents not answering the democracy assessment question as well as (2) the percentage of respondents answering the questions on the centrality of politics in their personal lives and their subjective interest in politics in contradictory ways, as explained in the OA (p. 43). The analysis there shows that these problems are of minor proportion. Including the percentages of missing and contradictory responses

[3] We also ran our analyses by taking always the earliest available survey from each country, which produces similar results.

[4] However, as the OA (p. 25) shows, country-level change in emancipatory drives from the fifth to the sixth WVS correlates at $R = -0.42$ with country-level change in democracy ratings ($N = 33$; $P = 0.001$, 2-tailed), suggesting that an increase in emancipatory drives associates with shifts in democracy ratings away from the (uncritical) overrating towards the (critical) underrating side.

among the country-level predictors in our models does, accordingly, *not* alter our results (see OA, p. 36, 44).

A particularly alarming type of measurement error are responses that are likely to be faked by either the interviewer or the polling organization (Slomczynski, Powałko & Krauze 2015; Kuriakose & Robbins 2016). To treat this problem, we replicate our analyses by (1) eliminating "perfectly" duplicate respondents and (2) down-weighting "nearly" duplicate respondents in proportion to their proximity to perfect duplication. As documented in the OA (p. 41), these treatments do not change the results reported here.

The Outcome Variable: Over- vs Underrating Democracy

The fifth and sixth WVS ask people to assess "*how democratically is this country governed? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is 'not at all democratic' and 10 means that it is 'completely democratic,' what position would you choose?*" Like every other variable, we standardize this scale into a normed range from minimum 0 to maximum 1, with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions.

In contrast to the classic "satisfaction with democracy"[5] question, this new question does neither suggest that the respondent's country is a democracy, nor does it imply that the respondent cares about democracy. It also does not address a subjective feeling but asks for a *factual* assessment, which makes it natural to "fact-check" the responses in terms of how much they deviate from "objective" realities.

For instance, when respondents from different countries assess their own country's democraticness similarly, say at 0.6 on our standardized scale, this same score means something different when these countries' actual democraticness differs substantially. Imagine a German and a Russian who both rate their respective country's democraticness at 0.6. Let's further assume that Germany's actual democraticness is at 0.9, while Russia's is at 0.2. If so, the German respondent's 0.6 scoring means an *under*rating of 0.3 scale points (or 30 percentage points). In the case of the Russian respondent, the same 0.6 scoring means an *over*rating of 0.4 scale points.

Generalizing this example, we calculate the respondents' *democratic over- vs. underrating* by subtracting the given country's actual democraticness at the time of the survey from each respondent's assessment of her country's democraticness, after standardizing both measures into the same 0-to-1 range. Figure 1 illustrates the logic.

The resulting *over- vs. underrating index* has a theoretical minimum of -1 for the most extreme underrating: the case when the country scores at the top (at 1) while the respondent sees it at the bottom (at 0). The index has a theoretical maximum of +1 for the most extreme overrating: the case when the country scores at the bottom (at 0) while the respondent sees it at the top (at 1).

[5] The "satisfaction with democracy" question is no longer included in the WVS since its fifth round. In previous rounds, it was phrased as follows: "*How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country*?" The response format was a ten-point scale from "not all satisfied" (1) to "completely satisfied" (10).

Our treatment leaves the within-country distribution of people's democracy ratings unchanged. Thus, within countries, higher and lower ratings retain their relative position. However, our procedure shifts the distribution centers between countries. Specifically, it centers each country's distribution on where the accurate rating in this particular country is located, which obtains the zero-position for every country. By means of this centering, subjective democracy ratings become comparable across countries at different levels of democracy – comparable in terms of how demanding people's expectations are with respect to "objective" democracy criteria.

Figure 1. The Concept of Over- vs. Underrating Democracy Levels



AD - **A**ctual **D**emocracy level of one's country
RD - **R**ated **D**emocracy level of one's country
RD – AD < 0 Underrating Democracy of one's country
RD – AD > 0 Overrating Democracy of one's country

There are various possibilities to interpret democratic over- vs. underratings. For one, people might perceive their regime's reality with different accuracy, which then would produce misratings among the less perceptive people. This possibility does not seem very plausible, however. The "electoral integrity" data from the WVS show that

people tend to see the same regime reality similarly: most people recognize roughly accurately how even the playing field in their country's elections is and do not shy away from pointing out manipulation when it is obvious (Norris 2014). But awareness of electoral unfairness has little influence on people's democracy ratings.[6]

Another possibility is that democratic over- and underratings reflect different levels of importance that people attribute to democracy. As we will point out in greater detail in the plausibility check section, this possibility is not supported by the data either. People attribute great importance to democracy everywhere and there is no difference in this matter between authoritarian and democratic regimes.

Figure 2. Over- vs. Underrating Democracy (country-pooled individual level data)



[6] This is evident in the weak, pooled individual-level correlation between people's democracy ratings and their electoral fairness ratings (using a summary measure over the six fairness items, loading on the first principal component): R = 0.20 ($N \approx$ 38,000; P = 0.001, 2-tailed).

The third possibility is that people's understandings of democracy differ in how demanding they are – demanding with respect to the expectations that people have about what counts as "democratic." In our eyes, this is indeed the most plausible interpretation of democratic over- vs. underratings. Consider, for instance, when two persons from the same country rate their regime's democraticness differently, one rating it much higher than the other. This does not necessarily mean that the two persons see a different reality but rather that they possess different expectations about what counts as democratic. Apparently, the one of the two persons who rates the regime's democraticness higher has lower expectations in this respect.

Now assume that people from different countries rate their regimes' democraticness similarly high, despite the fact that there is a big gap in these regimes' actual democraticness. Again, this does not necessarily mean that people fail to see the regime reality as it is but rather that they evaluate what they see differently because their normative expectations differ. Accordingly, people who rate the less democratic regime high operate under lower expectations about what counts as democratic.

Some readers might still doubt that people in non-democracies have democratic expectations in the first place. The reason seems obvious: the elites in these countries would do everything to stifle expectations that challenge their legitimacy. Against such doubts, one should note that authoritarian regimes actually do use the label "democracy" to describe themselves. Accordingly, the proportion of states worldwide that are constitutionally defined as "democratic" increased from less than ten percent in 1950 to more than ninety-five percent today (Marquez 2016: 12). Authoritarian propaganda often denounces liberal democracy as "Western-style" in order to pitch an own culture-specific version against it, selling its authoritarian features as "true" democracy. Hence, people in all kinds of regimes are told to be governed in the best of their interests, which the propaganda declares as the real meaning of democracy (Brown 2001).

The key question is, of course, which "objective" measure of democracy we should use to gauge people's subjective democracy ratings. We work with various possibilities. For one, we use Alexander and Welzel's (2010) "effective democracy index." The index has been defended against undue criticism and thoroughly re-validated by Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel (2012). In substance, the effective democracy index provides a conditional measure of democratic freedoms, capturing freedoms on the condition that rule of law sets them effectively into practice. Specifically, the authors use the combined civil liberties and political rights measures from Freedom House as the base component, which they then downweight for deficiencies in rule of law, evident from the World Bank governance indicators, that Freedom House fails to tap.

Second, we use the newly released democracy measures from the "varieties of democracy project" (V-Dem), focusing on the indicators of "electoral," "participatory," "liberal," "deliberative" and "egalitarian" democracy (Coppedge, Gerring & Lindberg et al. 2015). Third, we use the Freedom House/Polity combination proposed by Hadenius and Teorell (2012).

Because all of these democracy indicators are closely correlated (see OA-Table 21, p. 42), the yield small differences in results. Yet, it is noteworthy that the index of

effective democracy correlates strongest with people's "raw" democracy ratings.[7] Moreover, we obtain the most clearly shaped patterns in people's over- vs. underrating when we use the effective democracy index as the yardstick of our estimation.

Very close to effective democracy, the next most strongest patterns in democratic over- vs. underratings appear when we use the V-Dem measures as the yardstick of people's assessments – in descending order of pattern clarity from liberal to egalitarian to deliberative to participatory to electoral democracy. We obtain the weakest results by far when we measure people's democracy assessments against the yardstick of the combined Freedom House/Polity measure.

In the findings section, we present the strongest results, referring to effective democracy as the yardstick. The OA (pp. 28-30) documents in detail the other results. The findings differ in pattern clarity but not in direction, depending on which democracy indicator we use.

Let us conclude this section by addressing two more validity concerns. For one, scholars might suspect that how people score on the democratic over- vs. underrating index is merely a matter of where the benchmark—the countries' actual democraticness—is located. It would be – but only if people invariantly choose the middle position on the original rating scale, in complete ignorance of the regime reality in which they're living. The distribution of people's original ratings is far from such an invariant center clustering: the two middle positions on the original rating scale (5 and 6) are chosen by just 28 percent of all respondents, whereas a similar percentage chooses one of the two most extreme positions at the low or high end of the original rating scheme (1 and 2 or 9 and 10, respectively). Hence, it is variable inaccuracy in people's subjective regime *perception*, and not the objective regime reality in and by itself, that determines where on the over- vs. underrating index they are placed.

The second validity concern relates to the question of random guesses. If people had no subjective notion of democracy and, accordingly, just gave a random guess when asked how democratic their country is, our index would measure non-attitudes. But how would the overall response pattern look like, if most respondents randomly guess their countries' democraticness? Since respondents indicate their position on a ten-point scale, the chance that a random guess hits the country's actual democraticness accurately is 0.1. Hence, the larger the proportion of respondents is who guess their countries' democraticness randomly, the closer to 0.1 should the average accuracy rate in the pooled data be.

The observed ratings do not conform to such a random distribution. In fact, the average accuracy rate among our roughly 93,000 respondents is an astounding 0.66.[8] At

[7] People's country-aggregated "raw" democracy ratings correlate as follows with the various measures of the countries' actual democraticness from the same years as the surveys (Pearson's *R*s): 0.42*** (effective democracy), 0.41*** (deliberative democracy), 0.40*** (egalitarian democracy), 0.39** (liberal and participatory democracy), 0.35** (electoral democracy), 0.29* (Freedom House/Polity combination), ($N = 73$; for all correlations).

[8] These results are obtained from re-calculating the over- vs. underrating index into an accurate rating index, such that the highest possible accuracy is 1.0 and the lowest possible is

the same time, 75 percent of all respondents get it more right than wrong, with an accuracy rate above 0.5. What is more, 50 percent of the respondents have an accuracy rate above 0.7 and 0.9 is the most frequent single accuracy score. Finally, to what extent respondents over- or underrate democracy correlates with the country-specific probability to do so *randomly* at $R = 0.29$.[9] This correlation is significant but when we square it and look at it in terms of explained variance, the conclusion is that random chance only explains eight percent of the extent to which respondents over- or underrate democracy. Hence, popular democracy assessments are by no means mostly random, which reduces the concern about non-attitudes. We will probe further into this issue in the plausibility check section.

Treatment Variables

Our first proposition refers to the countries' *Democratic Traditions*. Since individuals do not vary in the democratic traditions of their country, there is no individual-level measure in this case. The best measure of democratic traditions in our eyes is Gerring, Thacker and Alfaro's (2012: 5-6) "democracy stock" index. As with all country-level treatments, we take data from the year of the survey in a country (see OA, p. 19).

To capture *Cognitive Stimuli* at the individual level, we use two variables: educational achievement and information intake. We measure educational achievement using a nine-point ordinal scale as documented in the OA (p. 7). Information intake summarizes responses to the usage frequency of ten different sources of information, including various media types, the Internet and conversation with other people (OA, p. 7).

At the country level, we measure cognitive stimuli using Dreher et al.'s (2008) globalization index. The index measures a country's integration into international exchange in communicational, migratory, economic and political matters. Arguably, a more extensive exchange on these accounts implies a greater influx of diverse cognitive stimuli into a country.[10]

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0. This calculation is performed by (1) squaring the scores on the over- vs. underrating index (which transforms negative deviations from 0 into positive ones), (2) taking the square root of the squared scores (which reproduces the absolute values of the deviations before squaring) and (3) subtracting the scores from 1 (which inverts the deviation scale into an accuracy scale). After these transformations, an underrating of -0.90 turns into an accuracy rating of 0.10 (low accuracy) and an overrating of 0.10 into an accuracy rating of 0.90 (high accuracy).

9 To calculate this correlation, we create a new variable, labelled "random chance," assigning all overrating respondents the country-specific probability of overrating by random chance (which is 1 minus the country's 0-to-1 actual democraticness), and all underrating respondents the country-specific probability of underrating by random chance (which is the given country's 0-to-1 actual democraticness). Then we calculate the correlation between the respondents' scores on the over- vs. underrating index and the random chance variable.

10 We also used alternative measures of cognitive stimuli, including the mean number of schooling years, tertiary enrollment ratios and the number of Internet hosts by 1,000 inhabitants. None of these measures correlates as strongly with over- vs. underrating de-

To capture *Emancipatory Drives*, we use Welzel's (2013) index of emancipative values. In rebutting criticism, the validity of this index has been thoroughly re-examined, with confirmatory results (Welzel & Inglehart 2016). At the individual level, emancipative values are measured by a twelve-item formative index. The index construction is described in detail by Welzel (2013: Online Appendix, 22-27). In terms of content, the emancipative values index covers four domains of emancipation: sexual liberty, gender equality, democratic voice and child autonomy. At the country level, we follow the standard practice and calculate arithmetic population means of the emancipative values index.

To measure *State Repression*, we use Gibney et al.'s (2015) "political terror scale." Based on reports by Amnesty International and the US State Department, this measure captures state-sponsored violations of human rights (OA, p. 19).

We proxy the strength of a country's *Rent-seeking Economy* taking Ross's (2008) estimates of the per capita value of a country's oil and gas exports (see OA, p. 20).

To measure the extent to which the Protestant heritage in a country outweighs that of Islam, we use La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny's (1999) estimates of the percentage of Protestants and Muslims during the 1980s, measured in decimal fractions of 1. Following Inglehart and Welzel (2005), we subtract the fractions of Muslims from that of Protestants and label this difference index *Protestant-vs.-Islamic Heritage*. This procedure is suited to capture the adversarial effects of Protestantism and Islam in a single measure.[11]

At the individual level, there are a few variables that we merely include to account for hidden confounding factors. This relates, first of all, to *political interest* (OA, p. 10) because it is plausible to assume that interested people consume more information and, thus, perceive more accurately how democratic their country really is. Moreover, we include gender and age (OA, p. 10-11) as standard demographic controls, with no specific expectations about their effects.

FINDINGS

Figure 3 displays country means in over- vs. underrating democracy for our roughly seventy-five countries. Country means vary massively. At the high end, we measure +0.55 in Vietnam and +0.40 in Rwanda, China and Kazakhstan, indicating a drastic overrating of these countries' democraticness. At the low end, we find scores of -0.45 in Slovenia and the UK and around -0.40 in Finland, Estonia and Canada, indicating substantial underratings of these countries' democraticness. Closest to accuracy, albeit still on the

mocracy as does Dreher et al.'s globalization index (see OA, p. 20). Since all of these are indicators of modernization, we also used alternative modernization indicators, including the Gross Domestic Product per capita in purchasing power parities (logged and unlogged) and the Human Development Index. Again, these measures correlate weaker with over- vs. underrating democracy than does Dreher et al.'s globalization index (see OA, p. 23).

[11] Separating the two measures does not provide stronger evidence on the influence of religious heritage.

overrating side, we see Morocco, Armenia and Singapore. Brazil, Georgia and Tunisia are closest to accuracy on the underrating side.

Figure 3. Over- vs. Underrating Democracy (country means)



Note: Countries are either from round 5 (2005-2009) or 6 (2010-2014), taking whichever was most recent. See OA-Table 1 (OA, p. 4-5) for details.

By mere eyeballing, it is hard to recognize any commonality among the countries close to accuracy, which already suggests that variability in people's perceptions does not take a patterned shape over accuracy matters. By contrast, juxtaposing countries at the over- and underrating ends reveals several clear patterns. Countries at the overrating end are less developed, have little if any democratic track record and include many Islamic populations but not a single Protestant or Catholic population. Countries at the underrating end represent an almost perfect mirror image of these features: they are

economically developed, can usually be characterized as consolidated democracies and do not include any Islamic, yet many Protestant and Catholic populations.

Table 1 correlates the prevalence of over- vs. underrating per country with the proposed influences at that level. Obviously, cognitive stimuli and emancipatory drives—what we call enlightenment forces—correlate by far closest with over- vs. underrating democracy, at R = -0.79 (cognitive stimuli) and -0.76 (emancipatory drives). Since these are negative correlations, they tell us that the enlightenment forces shift public assessments systematically from over- to underrating. Democratic traditions (R = -0.65) and a Protestant-vs.-Islamic heritage (R = -0.54) operate in the same direction, albeit less strongly so. Among the influences that significantly favor overrating, we find state repression (R = 0.68) and rent-seeking economies (R = 0.42).

Table 1. Correlations among Country-level Predictors of Over- vs. Underrating Democracy Levels

		2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Over- vs. Underrating Dem.	-.79***	-.76***	-.65***	.68***	.42**	-.54***
2	Cognitive Stimuli	-	.74***	.63***	-.65***	-.39***	.52***
3	Emancipatory Drives		-	.76***	-.62***	-.41***	.78***
4	Democratic Traditions			-	-.43***	-.39***	.64***
5	Repressive States				-	.30*	-.46***
6	Rent-seeking Economies					-	-.51***
7	Protest.-vs.-Islam. Heritage						-

Note. *** p ≤ .001,** p ≤ .01,* p ≤ .05. N's range from 64 to 75 due to occasional missing data. 2. Freedom of Press, Physical Integrity Rights Index, Coalition Size and Selectiveness of the Electorate and Combined Political Terror Scale are conceptually closely related to our dependent variable, hence, they have been excluded from further analysis. Protestant-vs.-Islamic Heritage measures the share of Protestants as percentage of population in 1980 minus the share of Muslims as percentage of population in 1980.

As OA-Table 5 shows, country-level influences that can be disaggregated to the individual level operate in the same direction at this level, although at lower strength – as is usual given the large random measurement error inherent in individual-level data. Apparently, emancipatory drives represent by far the strongest negative correlate of over- vs. underrating democracy at the individual level (R = -0.37). Cognitive stimuli, including information intake (R = -0.24) and educational achievement (R = -0.08), correlate considerably weaker with over- vs. underrating democracy.

To visualize the strongest country-level correlations, Figure 4 shows a series of scattergrams, always with over- vs. underrating at the vertical axis and the alternate influences at the horizontal axes. More such scatterplots are shown in the OA (see pp. 24-27).

Figure 4. Cognitive Stimuli, Emancipatory Drives, State Repression and Over- vs. Under-rating Democracy







Table 2. Explaining Cross-national Differences in Over- vs. Underrating Democracy Levels

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Cognitive Stimuli	-1.25***		-0.99***		-0.96***		-1.03***		-0.73***	
	(0.121)		(0.152)		(0.158)		(0.178)		(0.201)	
Emancipatory Drivers		-1.79***		-1.47***		-1.70***		-1.37***		-0.81**
		(0.185)		(0.283)		(0.353)		(0.297)		(0.330)
Democratic Traditions			-0.28***	-0.20	-0.25**	-0.20	-0.27**	-0.18	-0.25**	-0.21*
			(0.105)	(0.133)	(0.114)	(0.133)	(0.107)	(0.135)	(0.102)	(0.127)
Protestant-vs. Islamic Heritage					-0.07	0.15				
					(0.105)	(0.136)				
Rent-seeking Economies							0.02	0.26	-0.00	0.16
							(0.193)	(0.196)	(0.184)	(0.186)
Repressive States									0.30***	0.36***
									(0.110)	(0.116)
Constant	0.99***	0.92***	0.96***	0.89***	0.96***	0.93***	0.99***	0.82***	0.66***	0.46***
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.090)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.157)	(0.147)
Observations	67	68	67	68	67	68	64	64	64	64
R2	0.621	0.586	0.660	0.599	0.663	0.606	0.655	0.603	0.693	0.659
Adj.R2	0.615	0.579	0.650	0.587	0.647	0.588	0.638	0.583	0.672	0.636

Table 2 documents country-level, multivariate regressions, displaying a sequence of models of increasing complexity. For reasons of parsimony, we limit models to the strongest correlates of over- vs. underrating seen in Table 2. Except for model 3, which solely includes cognitive stimuli and emancipatory drives, we only incorporate either of these two enlightenment forces whenever additional treatments enter the model. The reason is simple: because cognitive stimuli and emancipatory drives correlate at $R = 0.75$, there is too much collinearity when retaining both of these enlightenment forces in addition to alternative influences.

In all models of Table 2, cognitive stimuli and emancipatory drives retain a highly significant and strongly negative effect. The same holds true for state repression: here the effect is also always significant, albeit with a positive sign, which means that repression favors overrating. By contrast, democratic traditions, rent-seeking economies and the Protestant-vs.-Islamic heritage[12] *always* turn insignificant, whenever either of the enlightenment forces or state repression enter the model.

The linear hierarchical regressions in Table 3 replicate the results from Table 2 as concerns the country-level influences: again, enlightenment forces and state repression exert the decisive influences, which are adversarial.[13]

Table 3. Multilevel Regression Explaining Over- vs. Underrating Democracy Levels

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy			
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL				
Female Sex	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Educational Achievement	0.003	0.005*	0.003	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political Interest	0.052***	0.054***	0.052***	0.054***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Emancipatory Drives	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.079***	-0.069***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Information Intake	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
COUNTRY-LEVEL				
Democratic Traditions	-0.184	-0.271***	-0.220*	-0.257***
	(0.131)	(0.104)	(0.122)	(0.098)
Rent-seeking Economies	0.257	0.0170	0.154	-0.008
	(0.190)	(0.187)	(0.178)	(0.177)
Repressive States			0.365***	0.301***
			(0.111)	(0.106)
Emancipatory Drives	-1.358***		-0.795**	
	(0.288)		(0.316)	
Cognitive Stimuli		-1.026***		-0.734***
		(0.172)		(0.193)

to be continued…

[12] When we split this variable up into separate measures for Protestantism and Islam, the same conclusion holds.

[13] This is apparent also in their negative bivariate correlations: cognitive stimuli correlate at R = -0.65 and emancipatory drives at R = -0.62 with state repression (see again Table 1).

...continuation *Table 3*

CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS				
Emancipatory Drives$_{CL}$ #Educational Achievement	0.272*** (0.023)		0.272*** (0.023)	
Emancipatory Drives$_{CL}$ #Information Intake	0.054** (0.023)		0.054** (0.023)	
Emancipatory Drives$_{CL}$ #Political Interest	0.072*** (0.026)		0.072*** (0.026)	
Emancipatory Drives$_{CL}$ #Emancipatory Drives$_{IL}$	0.299* (0.161)		0.300* (0.161)	
Constant	0.170*** (0.021)	0.177*** (0.020)	0.022 (0.049)	0.053 (0.047)
Observations	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943
Countries	64	64	64	64
chi2	30673	28158	26403	25184
AIC	6175	6351	6167	6345
BIC	6342	6482	6344	6485
Log-Likelihood	-3069	-3162	-3064	-3158
Variance intercept	0.0297	0.0257	0.0254	0.0229
Variance slope (EVI)	0.0198	0.0240	0.0198	0.0240
Variance residual	0.0626	0.0628	0.0626	0.0628

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

At the individual level, the most noteworthy and consistent finding is that emancipatory drives exert a considerably stronger (negative) influence on over- vs. underrating than all other influences combined, including political interest, information intake and educational achievement. The latter even turns insignificant under control of the other influences. In line with our correlation analyses, the individual-level influences usually operate in the same direction as their country-level aggregations but their effects are by a large margin weaker than those of their aggregates.[14] Apart from the regularity of this pattern, an additional reason to find it so pronounced here lies in the construction of our outcome variable: the fact that one of its two components—actual democraticness—is

[14] With religious variables, this is even more the case. Most obviously, Muslim self-identification has a positive individual-level effect on over- vs. underrating democracy, which evaporates into insignificance, however, when Protestant-vs.-Islamic Heritage (or just the proportion of Muslims) enters the model at the country level. Thus, the tendency to overrate democracy is a collective tendency of Islamic culture, not an individual tendency of Muslims. Accordingly, non-Muslims in Muslim-majority countries overestimate democracy as much as do most of the Muslims in these countries. Likewise, Muslims in Muslim-minority countries withstand that tendency as much as do most non-Muslims in these countries. Similar results apply to Protestantism as well as to strength of religiosity: no individual-level effects of these variables when their country-level prevalence enters the model (see OA, p. 35).

constant for all individuals in the same country diminishes the within-country relative to the between-country variation.[15]

Table 3 also documents cross-level interactions, showing that country-level emancipatory drives moderate some of the individual-level influences. But only two of these interactions—those with educational achievement and political interest—are highly significant. In the case of political interest, the interaction is positive but very small – too small indeed to call for a big explanation. With educational achievement, the interaction is of sizeable magnitude and shows a positive sign, suggesting that individual-level education operates increasingly into the direction of overrating as emancipatory drives rise at the country-level. Given that education should increase criticality, the direction of this interaction seems counter-intuitive. Yet it is not when one considers that the baseline of countries with strong emancipatory drives is located deep in the underrating zone. Thus, the positive effect of individual-level education in such countries does *not* mean a shift all the way into overrating but simply the reduction of an already pronounced underrating.

PLAUSIBILITY CHECKS

The mainstream in the literature interprets people's democracy assessments as a matter of factual knowledge. Should this approach be more appropriate than our's, we would obtain more powerful explanations of people's democracy assessments when we re-measure them in terms of their accuracy. Thus, we transform our over- vs. underrating index into an *accuracy index* that treats both over- and underratings as deviations from a correct assessment. This is done by performing the procedure described in footnote 8.

OA-Table 10 (p. 32) replicates the country-level regressions from Table 2 while exchanging the outcome variable, now using the accuracy index. The bottom line is that—in comparison to the models in Table 2—the explained variance drops by fully thirty percentage points, from about 65 percent when over- vs. underrating is the outcome variable to about 35 percent when it is accuracy. Furthermore, under mutual controls, *nothing* shows up as a significant influence on accuracy. In a multilevel framework, this conclusion repeats itself (see OA, p. 33).

The over- vs. underrating index captures people's democracy assessments from the viewpoint of democratic *expectations*. The accuracy index, by contrast, operationalizes these assessments from the viewpoint of democratic *knowledge*. The fact that the former shows a more meaningful pattern than the latter leads to a straightforward conclusion: people's democracy assessments are more inspired by expectations than they are informed by knowledge. Hence, democracy assessments are normative rather than cognitive in nature.

We have already pointed out some distributional features, suggesting that popular democracy assessments do not primarily derive from random guesses. But we can

[15] 48% of the variation in over- vs. underrating democracy is between and 52% within countries, pointing to an intra-class correlation of $R = 0.69$ ($P = 0.001$, 2-tailed).

test more directly to what extent our findings are affected by random chance. To illustrate the idea, Vietnam's actual democraticness is close to 0, so a Vietnamese who gives just a random guess of how democratic her country is, has a probability of almost 1 to overrate and a probability of close to 0 to underrate. When the country's actual democraticness is close to 1, as in Norway, the probabilities of randomly over- and underrating just turn upside-down. In light of these concerns, a nagging question is whether our findings are contaminated by random guesses. Linked to this question is the issue that—if people's democracy assessments are indeed mostly random—then the fact of whether they turn out as over- or underraters is barely a matter of their own assessment but mostly determined by their country's actual democraticness.

To address these concerns, we create a variable called "random chance" that assigns all overraters the country-specific probability of ending-up by pure chance as an overrater (which is 1 minus the 0-to-1 score of the country's actual democraticness). For underraters, analogously, "random chance" is the country-specific probability of ending-up by pure chance as an underrater (which is the 0-to-1 score of the country's actual democraticness).

Now we run an individual-level regression, predicting people's over- vs. underrating by their emancipatory drives and random chance. The random chance effect is positive significant ($R_{partial}$ = 0.29) while the effect of emancipatory drives remains negative significant ($R_{partial}$ = -0.37) and even slightly increases its explanatory power compared to the mere bivariate correlation (R = -0.33).

Performing the same regression at the country-level, the effect of random chance is significant positive ($R_{partial}$ = 0.47). Country-level emancipatory drives retain a significant negative effect ($R_{partial}$ = -0.80) whose explanatory power is again even a bit larger compared to the bivariate correlation (R = -0.76). Replicating the multi-level model from Table 3 under the inclusion of random chance, does not produce any substantive changes. This is documented on OA-Table 12 (p. 34). In conclusion, people's democracy ratings incorporate a significant but minor degree of randomness. The effect of this randomness is modest and does not overshadow the influence of the other variables.

We conclude that democratic over- and underratings are indicative of how legitimate people consider authoritarian and democratic rule. Specifically, we suggest that—when people rate political realities as much more democratic than they are—people have low democratic expectations, which lends legitimacy to authoritarian rule. Vice versa, when people rate political realities much less democratic than they are, they have high democratic expectations, which lends legitimacy to democratic rule.

This reasoning involves two implications whose validity we have not yet directly tested. One implication is that the word "democracy" represents for most people indeed a valuable good that they readily use to judge political realities. The second implication is that—despite its universal approval as an evaluation standard—people define democracy differently, even to the point that they completely re-define it in authoritarian ways, especially where democratic overratings are prevalent.

As for the first implication, it is indeed the case that most people consider democracy a highly desirable good. This is obvious from a WVS question asking people to indicate "*How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?*", on a scale from 1 ("not at all important") to 10 ("absolutely important"). Across all our roughly 93,000 respondents, the average rating on this scale is as high as 8 (with a standard deviation of only 2). The median is 9 and the mode is 10, a score that more than 40 percent of the respondents select. Moreover, there is not the tiniest difference between overraters and underraters in these distributional features. In light of these figures, it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the word "democracy" represents a highly valued good that overwhelming majorities of people around the world use readily to judge their countries.

But democracy's universal appreciation masks dramatic differences in how people define it. As Figure 5 illustrates, these differences in definition map closely on democratic over- and underratings. Specifically, what Welzel and Kirsch (2017) characterize as "authoritarian re-definitions of democracy" prevails in countries with widespread democratic overratings. This evidence suggests that people overrate democracy precisely because they re-define it autocratically[16], which further supports the idea that people actually hold low democratic expectations in these cases, despite their strong endorsement of the term democracy.

Since both democracy ratings and notions correlate strongly with emancipatory drives, and much less so with cognitive variables[17], it is obvious that orientations towards democracy have more to do with normative standards than with factual knowledge.

Arguably, critical reality assessments embody a stronger motivation to change things to the better than is the case for accurate assessments. If so, participation in protest activity should associate more strongly with critical than with accurate democracy ratings. Indeed, this is what we find: participation in such activities as "signing a petition," "joining a consumer boycott" and "attending a peaceful demonstration" correlate significantly more closely with critical than with accurate democracy ratings, at the individual as well as the country level.[18] So indeed, critical democracy assessments constitute a stronger mobilizing force than is the case for just accurate assessments.

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16 The corresponding correlation at the individual level (documented in footnote 15) lends credibility to this interpretation.

17 At the individual level, over- vs. underrating democracy correlates with authoritarian notions of democracy at R = 0.29. Both correlate with emancipatory drives at R = -0.33, while they correlate with information intake at R = -0.16 ($N \approx$ 93,000; P = 0.01, 2-tailed, for all reported correlations). Correlations with educational achievement are also significant negative but weaker. At the country level, the correlations between aggregate versions of the same variables have the same signs but are double and triple as large (Welzel & Kirsch 2017).

18 At the individual level ($N \approx$ 82,000; P = 0.01, 2-tailed, for the reported correlations), protest activity correlates at R = 0.15 with democracy assessments measured in terms of accuracy and R = -0.27 with these assessments measured in terms of criticality (over- vs. underrating). At the country level (N = 65; P = 0.01, 2-tailed, for the reported correlations), protest activity correlates at R = 0.52 with democracy assessments measured in

Figure 5. Authoritarian Re-Definitions of Democracy and Democratic Overratings



ANDs: Authoritarian Notions of Democracy

Kuran's "public lies - private truths" framework offers the main alternative explanation of why people might overrate democracy. Accordingly, people in repressive regimes know perfectly well that their countries are undemocratic but say the exact opposite to avoid punishment. In light of our findings, this possibility is no longer plausible. If the biggest concern of people in repressive regimes was indeed to avoid punishment for saying something that the officials might not like, then these people would refrain from openly stating a desire for democracy—provided they actually knew that their regime is of a different kind. But the data tell us something completely different: the proportion of respondents avoiding to answer the desire for democracy question is 2.9 percent in more repressive regimes compared to 2.6 percent in less repressive regimes[19] – an entirely negligable difference. Besides, the medium desire level for democracy is—as we

terms of accuracy and R = -0.67 with these assessments measured in terms of criticality (see OA, p. 39). Given the polarity of the over- vs. underrating scale, criticality grows to the negative end, which explains the negative sign of the reported correlations.

19 We distinguish more from less repressive regimes by separating countries above and below the scale midpoint of our state repression indicator. If this seems like a crude distinction, we can assure that the fine-grained differentiation in state repression shows no significant correlation with response refusal in expressing democratic desires.

mentioned—as high as eight on a ten-point scale, in more as well as in less repressive regimes.

DISCUSSION

People's assessments of their own countries' democraticness have received scant attention. The few studies addressing this issue follow a "factual accuracy" approach, looking at how *correctly* people assess their countries' democraticness. Intuitive as this approach might seem, we offer a different perspective that emphasizes "normative criticality" rather than "factual accuracy."

Testing which of these approaches is more appropriate, we measured people's democracy assessments both in terms of accuracy and criticality. It turns out that critical assessments map more closely than accurate ones on a host of individual- and country-level characteristics that are relevant for democracy. Also, critical assessments have more predictive power than accurate ones over peaceful protest activity. We conclude that analyzing popular democracy assessments is more revealing under criticality than under accuracy criteria.

Our over- vs. underrating index is designed along these criteria. The evidence suggests that higher scores on this index indicate weaker normative demands for democracy and, hence, more legitimacy for non-democratic rule. The fact that overwhelming majorities of even the most extreme overraters nevertheless express strong support for democracy does not contradict this conclusion. It rather unmasks support for democracy as a counter-indication of what it pretends to be in these situations. This conclusion resolves the legitimacy puzzle, that is, the frequent coexistence of mass support for democracy with the absence of the latter: when democratic support indicates the opposite of what it seems to indicate, it is in no conflict with democracy's absence.

Looking at the influences that predict democratic over- vs. underrating, we find that cognitive stimuli and emancipatory drives operate as enlightenment forces that enhance people's normative expectations, which is manifest in democratic underratings. State repression, by contrast, provides a force of "endarkenment" that lowers normative expectations, visible in democratic overratings. Other influences—including democratic traditions, religious heritages and rent-seeking economies—prove insignificant under control of the adversarial forces of enlightenment and endarkenment.

In the absence of longitudinal evidence, it is impossible to establish causality beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, our causal interpretation that democracy assessments are a consequence rather than an antecedent of enlightenment forces remains a matter of theoretical plausibility for now. But we feel confident that our line of reasoning has indeed the credit of plausibility. It is clear that people perform assessments under cognitive and normative standards that must already be in place when these assessments are performed. Hence, to assign cognitive stimuli and emancipatory drives causal primacy over democracy assessments seems reasonable.

Still, the most important limitation of our study is lack of longitudinal evidence. Thus, we cannot answer such questions as whether overratings are increasing in re-

gimes that experience a resurgence of authoritarianism, like in Russia or Turkey, or whether a shift towards underratings follows or precedes transitions away from authoritarian rule. To fill this gap, it is important to retain the democracy assessment question in future rounds of the WVS. Fielding it as well in other cross-national surveys that are regularly repeated should rank high on our priority list in designing future surveys.

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THE LEGITIMACY PUZZLE:
Why So Many People View the Absence of Democracy as Its Presence

ONLINE APPENDIX (OA)

This document is the Online Appendix to our journal article "The Legitimacy Puzzle." It comprises five sections. Section I gives an overview of the data samples and country coverage. Section II describes the variables and recoding procedures at the individual and country levels. Section III provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the article. Section IV features illustrative figures that are not displayed in the paper. Section V shows the results of several robustness tests. Feedback to our analyses is highly welcome; if you wish to provide your feedback, please write to cwelzel@gmail.com.

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SECTION I: COUNTRY AND WAVE COVERAGE

The individual-level data for our analyses are taken from the fifth and sixth World Values Survey (henceforth: WVS), conducted between 2005 and 2014. We only include the data starting the fifth wave, when the assessment of democracy question has been asked for the first time. We also only take the latest available survey from each country, weighting national samples to equal size (N = 1,500). When overlapping countries are excluded, both the fifth and sixth WVS rounds cover 75 countries.

The WVS interviews nationally representative, random probability samples of adult country residents with a targeted minimum sample size of 1,000 respondents per country. Sub-contracted national polling agencies field a standardized English master questionnaire, translated into the main national language(s), preferably conducting face-to-face interviews. Only a few countries deviate from the preferred face-to-face mode, including Australia and New Zealand, where mail-back self-administered questionnaires have been used, and the Netherlands, where the interviews have been conducted via the Internet. Further Details on fieldwork organization, sample design and data collection are available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

OA-Table 1 (below) gives an overview of the country/wave coverage and sample sizes of the latest survey used. It includes a total of 93,784 respondents from 75 country samples. Because the selected countries cover the largest populations in each global region, the data represent more than ninety percent of the world population.

OA-Table 1. Country and wave coverage of the round-five and six WVS

Country	**Wave**		**Country**	**Wave**	
	2005-2009	2010-2014		2005-2009	2010-2014
Algeria		1,200	Estonia		1,533
Argentina		1,030	Finland	1,014	
Armenia		1,100	France (1963-)	1,001	
Australia		1,477	Georgia		1,202
Azerbaijan		1,002	Germany		2,046
Bahrain		1,200	Ghana		1,552
Belarus		1,535	Guatemala	1,000	
Brazil		1,486	HongKong		1,000
Bulgaria	1,001		Hungary	1,007	
Burkina Faso	1,534		Indonesia	2,015	
Canada	2,164		Iran	2,667	
Chile		1,000	Iraq		1,200
China		2,300	Italy	1,012	
Colombia		1,512	Japan		2,443
Cyprus (1975-)		1,000	Jordan		1,200
Ecuador		1,202	Kazakhstan		1,500
Egypt		1,523	Korea, South		1,200

to be continued…

...continuation *OA-Table 1*

Country	Wave		Country	Wave	
	2005-2009	2010-2014		2005-2009	2010-2014
Kuwait		1,303	Serbia and Mont.	1,220	
Kyrgyzstan		1,500	Singapore		1,972
Lebanon		1,200	Slovenia		1,069
Libya		2,131	South Africa		3,531
Malaysia (1966-)		1,300	Spain		1,189
Mali	1,534		Sweden		1,206
Mexico		2,000	Switzerland	1,241	
Moldova	1,046		Taiwan		1,238
Morocco		1,200	Thailand		1,200
Netherlands		1,902	Trinidad and Tob.		999
New Zealand		841	Tunisia		1,205
Nigeria		1,759	Turkey		1,605
Norway	1,025		Ukraine		1,500
Pakistan (1971-)		1,200	United Kingdom	1,041	
Palestinian Auton.		1,000	United States		2,232
Peru		1,210	Uruguay		1,000
Philippines		1,200	Uzbekistan		1,500
Poland		966	Vietnam	1,495	
Qatar		1,060	Yemen		1,000
Romania		1,503	Zambia	1,500	
Russia		2,500	Zimbabwe		1,500
Rwanda		1,527			

OA-Table 2 shows the distribution of near duplicates across all countries included both in the fifth and six rounds. The left part of the table shows the share of observations which exceed a maximum percent match of 85% (which should be 0, since every single observation with such a high percent match is suspicious). The right part of the table shows the average maximum percent match by country and wave (which should be about 66%). Due to the high share of observations, which are likely to be (near) duplicates we dropped Ethiopia and India.

The documentation of near duplicate responses intends to shed light on faked data. Duplicate responses in *OA-Table 2* document per country the share of the respondents who have at least one identical "clone" in the same sample, as concerns the answers to the first 65 substantial questions of the round-five and six WVS questionnaires. The existence of identical duplicates over large groups of variables might indicate faked responses, in which case we measure false preferences.

Accounting for near-duplicates by weighting observations by the inverse share of their maximum percent match does not affect our findings.

OA-Table 2. Near duplicates distribution of the round-five and six WVS

Near duplicates - share of observations which exceed a maximum percent match of 85%						**Near duplicates - average maximum percent match by country and wave**					
Country	Wave			Wave		Country	Wave			Wave	
	5 (in %)	6 (in %)		5 (in %)	6 (in %)		5 (in %)	6 (in %)		5 (in %)	6 (in %)
Algeria		17.8	Lebanon		1.2	Algeria		63.6	Lebanon		53.8
Andorra (a)	0.0		Libya		0.7	Andorra (a)	56.2		Libya		60.9
Andorra (b)	0.6		Malaysia		4.5	Andorra (b)	57.6		Malaysia		67.1
Argentina		0.4	Mali	2.8		Argentina		56.3	Mali	63.2	
Armenia		0.0	Mexico		0.0	Armenia		59.7	Mexico		54.1
Australia		0.0	Moldova	15.1		Australia		55.3	Moldova	62.3	
Azerbaijan		2.1	Morocco		3.3	Azerbaijan		64.3	Morocco		67.2
Bahrain		8.8	Netherlands		0.0	Bahrain		62.1	Netherlands		55.2
Belarus		2.6	New Zealand		0.0	Belarus		60.3	New Zealand		51.7
Brazil		0.0	Nigeria		10.6	Brazil		57.1	Nigeria		65.9
Bulgaria	0.2		Norway (a)	0.0		Bulgaria	57.7		Norway (a)	56.1	
Burkina Faso	2.3		Norway (b)	0.0		BurkinaFaso	62.2		Norway (b)	55.7	
Canada	0.0		Pakistan		12.3	Canada	54.2		Pakistan		67.8
Chile		16.1	Palestine		2.5	Chile		65.7	Palestine		58.2
China		0.6	Peru		0.8	China		62.2	Peru		56.1
Colombia		0.5	Philippines		0.0	Colombia		53.9	Philippines		56.3
Cyprus		3.3	Poland		0.0	Cyprus		60.2	Poland		56.0
Ecuador		0.8	Qatar		0.0	Ecuador		57.8	Qatar		63.9
Egypt		5.2	Romania		0.0	Egypt		67.8	Romania		56.8
Estonia		0.0	Russia		0.6	Estonia		57.0	Russia		57.7
Ethiopia	48.7		Rwanda		1.5	Ethiopia	80.9		Rwanda		62.9
Finland (a)	0.0		Serbia/Monten	2.2		Finland (a)	53.6		Serbia/Monten	59.3	
Finland (b)	0.0		Singapore		0.1	Finland (b)	53.3		Singapore		55.6
France (a)	0.0		Slovenia		0.0	France (a)	52.7		Slovenia		56.6
France (b)	0.0		South Africa		0.1	France (b)	52.8		South Africa		55.5
Georgia		0.0	South Korea		0.8	Georgia		62.6	South Korea		55.9
Germany		0.0	Spain		0.5	Germany		57.3	Spain		60.7
Ghana		0.8	Sweden		0.0	Ghana		62.1	Sweden		56.8
UK split_a	0.0		Switzerland	0.0		UK (split_a)	52.8		Switzerland	54.2	
Guatemala	0.2		Taiwan		0.2	Guatemala	57.8		Taiwan		55.9
Hong Kong		0.0	Thailand		7.2	Hong Kong		52.1	Thailand		62.0
Hungary (a)	0.4		Trin/Tobago		0.2	Hungary (a)	57.8		Trin/Tobago		56.2
India		37.4	Tunisia		2.1	India		71.7	Tunisia		65.8
Indonesia	8.5		Turkey		1.3	Indonesia	66.5		Turkey		63.5
Iran	0.8		Ukraine		0.7	Iran	59.5		Ukraine		59.1
Iraq		2.2	United States		0.0	Iraq		60.8	United States		55.6
Italy	0.0		Uruguay		0.0	Italy	55.7		Uruguay		57.0
Japan		0.0	Uzbekistan		0.7	Japan		54.1	Uzbekistan		65.9
Jordan		0.0	Viet Nam	5.0		Jordan		60.3	Viet Nam	66.4	
Kazakhstan		12.6	Yemen		0.0	Kazakhstan		66.9	Yemen		64.1
Kuwait		6.1	Zambia	6.1		Kuwait		61.5	Zambia	59.2	
Kyrgyzstan		14.7	Zimbabwe		4.6	Kyrgyzstan		66.3	Zimbabwe		61.9

SECTION II: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND CODING PROCEDURES

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

Educational Achievement

This variable based on WVS round-five and six question V248:

V248. "What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [*NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete*]:"

1 No formal education
2 Incomplete primary school
3 Complete primary school
4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
5 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
6 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
7 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
8 Some university-level education, without degree
9 University-level education, with degree

To transform this variable into an index, we use the following command syntax:

```
compute educachieve=(v248-1)/(9-1).
recode educachieve (sysmiss = -99).
mis val educachieve (-99).
```

Information Intake

This variable is based on WVS round-five and six questions V217 to V224 and V225:

"People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never [*Interviewer: read out and code one answer for each*]":

	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
V217. Daily newspaper	1	2	3	4	5
V218. Printed magazines	1	2	3	4	5
V219. TV news	1	2	3	4	5

V220. Radio news	1	2	3	4	5
V221. Mobile phone	1	2	3	4	5
V222. Email	1	2	3	4	5
V223. Internet	1	2	3	4	5
V224. Talk with friends or colleagues	1	2	3	4	5

V225 "How often, if ever, do you use a personal computer? (Read out and code one answer):"

1. Never
2. Occasionally
3. Frequently
4. Do not know what a computer is (do not read out, code only if volunteered)

To transform this variable into an index, we use the following command syntax:

```
recode v217 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.75) (3= 0.5) (4= 0.25) (5 = 0) into infnewsp.
recode infnewsp (sysmiss = -99).
mis val infnewsp (-99).

recode v219 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.75) (3= 0.5) (4= 0.25) (5 = 0) into inftvnews.
recode inftvnews (sysmiss = -99).
mis val inftvnews (-99).

recode v220 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.75) (3 = 0.5) (4 = 0.25) (5 = 0) into infradionews.
recode infradionews (sysmiss = -99).
mis val infradionews (-99).

recode v221 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.75) (3= 0.5) (4= 0.25) (5 = 0) into infphone.
recode infphone (sysmiss = -99).
mis val infphone (-99).

recode v222 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.75) (3= 0.5) (4= 0.25) (5 = 0) into infemail.
recode infemail (sysmiss = -99).
mis val infemail (-99).

recode v223 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.75) (3= 0.5) (4= 0.25) (5 = 0) into infweb.
recode infweb (sysmiss = -99).
mis val infweb (-99).

recode v224 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.75) (3= 0.5) (4= 0.25) (5 = 0) into inftalk.
recode inftalk (sysmiss = -99).
mis val inftalk (-99).

recode v225 (1 = 0) (2 = 0.5) (3 = 1) (4= 0) into pcuse.
recode pcuse (sysmiss = -99).
mis val pcuse (-99).
```

```
compute infconnec1 = (infnewsp + inftvnews + infradionews + infphone + infemail + infweb +
inftalk + pcuse)/8.
recode infconnec1 (sysmiss=-99).
mis val infconnec1 (-99).
var lab infconnec1 'information intake'.
```

Emancipative Values

To capture Emancipative Values, we use Welzel's 12-item index of "emancipative values", which is described in detail in Welzel (2013, Online Appendix: pp. 22-27). The appendix is accessible via the following link: www.cambridge.org/de/download_file/473755/. The index of emancipative values is an additive measure of four sub-indices, each of which in turn is an additive summary of three items. The four sub-indices address:

(1) *sexual liberty* (summarizing tolerance of homosexuality, abortion and divorce),
(2) *gender equality* (support of women's equal access to education, jobs and public office),
(3) *democratic voice* (priorities for freedom of speech and people's say in local as well as national affairs) and
(4) *child autonomy* (support of independence and imagination and refusal of obedience as child qualities).

The additive summary of these sub-indices into the index of emancipative values indicates a respondent's overall support of universal freedoms. The reliability of this index has recently been thoroughly re-examined, with strongly confirmatory results (Welzel & Inglehart 2016).

Protestants and Muslims Denominational Self-Identification

This variable is based on WVS round-five and six questions V144:

V144. Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one?

We code answers according to the respondents' self-identification as either Protestant (V144=62) or Muslim (V144=49), as follows:

```
recode V144 (62=1) (sysmiss=sysmiss) (else=0) into protid.
recode protid (sysmiss =-99).
mis val protid (-99).

recode V144 (49=1) (sysmiss=sysmiss) (else=0) into muslid.
recode muslid (sysmiss =-99).
mis val muslid (-99).
```

Political Interest

This variable is based on WVS round-five and six question V84:

V84. "How interested would you say, are you in politics? Are you [*Interviewer: read out and code one answer only*]":

1 Very interested
2 Somewhat interested
3 Not very interested
4 Not at all interested

The following syntax transforms the original coding into a 0-to-1 index:

```
recode v84 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.66) (3 = 0.33) (4 =0) into intpol.
recode intpol (sysmiss = -99).
mis val intpol (-99).
```

Centrality of Politics in Personal Life

This variable is based on WVS round-five and six question V7:

V84. " For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is [*Interviewer: read out and code one answer only*]":

1 Very important
2 Rather important
3 Not very important
4 Not at all important

The following syntax transforms the original coding into a 0-to-1 index:

```
recode v7 (1 = 1) (2 = 0.66) (3 = 0.33) (4 =0) into life_politics.
recode life_politics (sysmiss = -99).
mis val life_politics (-99).
```

Female Sex

This variable is based on WVS round-five and six question V240:

V240. [*Interviewer: code respondent's sex by observation*]:

1 Male
2 Female

The following syntax transforms the original scale into a 0-1 dummy variable:

```
recode v240 (1=0) (sysmis=sysmis) (2=1) into sex.
recode sex (sysmiss = -99).
val lab sex "female" 0"male".
mis val sex (-99).
```

Age

This variable is based on WVS round-five and six questions V241 and V242 in which respondents are asked to indicate their year of birth, followed by their respective age:

V241. "Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19____ [*Interviewer: write in last two digits*]"

V242. "This means you are ____ years old [*Interviewer: write in age in two digits*]."

We standardize answers into a 0-to-1 index, using the following syntax:

```
compute age = (v242-16)/(99-16)
recode age (sysmiss = -99).
mis val age (-99).
```

Authoritarian Notions of Democracy (ANDs)

This variable is based on WVS round-six questions V132, V135 and V138:

"Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy" [*Interviewer: read out and code one answer for each*!]?"

	Not an essential characteristic of democracy									An essential characteristic of democracy
V132. Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V135. The army takes over when government is incompetent.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V138. People obey their rulers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Based on these items, the command syntax to generate the AND-index reads as follows:

```
compute demrelig=(v132-1)/(10-1).
recode demrelig (sysmiss=-99).
mis val demrelig (-99).
```

```
compute demarmy=(v135-1)/(10-1).
recode demarmy (sysmiss=-99).
mis val demarmy (-99).

compute demobey=(v138-1)/(10-1).
recode demobey (sysmiss=-99).
mis val demobey (-99).
```

The following procedure creates the AND-index in such a way that whenever all three of its components are available, the resulting index is the average of these three, whereas when one component is missing it is a linear transformation of the available two components. The formula for the linear transformation (constant and component coefficients) is obtained from regressing the three component average on the two specific components in question. Since there are three possibilities of which combination of two components is available, this procedure has to be performed separately for each combination.

```
mis val demarmy demobey demrelig ().

if  (demarmy ne -99) and (demobey ne -99) and (demrelig ne -99) ands=(demrelig + demobey +
demarmy)/3.

if (demarmy = -99) and (demobey ne -99) and (demrelig ne -99)
ands=.054+.454*demrelig+.393*demobey.

if (demarmy ne -99) and (demobey ne -99) and (demrelig = -99)
ands=.043+.441*demarmy+.397*demobey.

if (demarmy ne -99) and (demobey = -99) and (demrelig ne -99)
ands=.134+.406*demrelig+.394*demarmy.

recode ands (sysmiss=-99).
mis val ands demarmy demrelig demobey (-99).
mis val demobey demrelig ands ().
```

The following procedure calculates a scheme to weight respondents in proportion to the completeness of information on which their AND-score is based:

```
if (demobey ne -99) and (demrelig ne -99) and (demarmy ne -99) weight1=1.

if (ands ne -99) and ((demobey = -99) or (demrelig = -99) or (demarmy = -99)) weight1=.66.

mis val demobey demrelig ands (-99).
```

We replicated all of our analyses using this scheme as a weight. This did not change the results.

Liberal Notions of Democracy (LNDs)

This variable is based on WVS round-six questions V133, V136 and V139:

"Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy" [*Interviewer: read out and code one answer for each*]?"

	Not an essential characteristic of democracy									An essential characteristic of democracy
V133. People choose their leaders in free elections.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V136. Civil rights protect people from state oppression.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V139. Women have the same rights as men.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Based on these items, the command syntax to generate the LND-index reads as follows:

```
compute demelect=(v133-1)/(10-1).
recode demelect (sysmiss=-99).
mis val demelect (-99).

compute demcivri=(v136-1)/(10-1).
recode demcivri (sysmiss=-99).
mis val demcivri (-99).

compute demwomen=(v139-1)/(10-1).
recode demwomen (sysmiss=-99).
mis val demwomen (-99).
```

The following procedure creates the LND index in such a way that whenever all three of its components are available, the resulting index it is the average of these three, whereas when one component is missing it is a linear transformation of the available two components. The formula for the linear transformation (constant and component coefficients) is obtained from regressing the three component average on the two specific components in question. Since there are three possibilities of which combination of two components is available, this procedure has to be performed separately for each combination.

```
mis val demelect demcivri demwomen ().

if  (demelect ne -99) and (demcivri ne -99) and (demwomen ne -99) lnds=(demelect + demcivri +
demwomen)/3.

if (demwomen = -99) and (demelect ne -99) and (demcivri ne -99)
lnds=.118+.433*demelect+.423*demcivri.
```

```
if (demwomen ne -99) and (demelect ne -99) and (demcivri = -99)
lnds=.073+.419*demwomen+.465*demelect.

if (demwomen ne -99) and (demelect = -99) and (demcivri ne -99)
lnds=.116+.417*demwomen+.448*demcivri.

recode lnds (sysmiss=-99).
mis val lnds demwomen demcivri demelect (-99).
```

Importance of Democracy

This variable uses WVS round-six question V140:

V140. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important" what position would you choose? [*Interviewer: code one number only*!]:

Not at all important									Absolutely important
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

To normalize the original scale into a 0-to-1 index of "importance of democracy", we use the following syntax:

```
compute demimport=(v140-1)/(10-1).
recode demimport (sysmiss=-99).
mis val demimport (-99).
```

COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES

The country-level variables for Information Intake, Emancipative Values, Protestants and Muslims Denominations, Political Interest, Authoritarian and Liberal Notions of Democracy are per country aggregates of the respective individual-level variables, which all are documented in the preceding section of this appendix. We aggregate individual-level data by calculating the arithmetic mean per country population. For Protestant and Muslim Dominance the arithmetic means are calculated from individual-level dummy variables and are, hence, to be interpreted as the proportion of respondents in a country sample who belong into the respective categories.

Over- vs. Underrating Democracy

The fifth and sixth rounds of WVS ask people to assess how democratic they think their country is, on a scale from 1 ("not at all democratic") to 10 ("perfectly democratic"). This variable consists of two parts. For one part, this variable uses WVS round-five and six question V141:

V141. And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is "not at all democratic" and 10 means that it is "completely democratic," what position would you choose? [*Interviewer: code one number only*!]:

Not at all democratic									Completely democratic
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

To standardize this scale into a normed over- vs underrating democracy index with range from minimum 0 to maximum 1, we use the following syntax:

```
compute democ=(v141-1)/(10-1).
recode democ (sysmiss=-99).
mis val democ (-99).
```

For the second part, we, first[1], use the update of Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel's (2012) "effective democracy index" (EDI), measured in the year of the survey in a given country. The effective democracy index provides a conditional measure of democratic freedoms, capturing freedoms on the condition that rule of law sets them effectively into practice. Specifically, the authors use the combined civil liberties and political rights measure from Freedom House as the base component, which they then downweight for deficiencies in rule of law, evident from the World Bank governance indicators that Freedom House fails

[1] We used alternative democracy indices, which can be found below, to ensure that the created index of over- vs. underrating is a robust measure.

to tap. This index has been validated against a host of alternative democracy measures by Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel (2012). The data for the EDI are provided by the Quality of Government Institute's annual data release at Gothenburg University, Sweden at: http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads.

In order to bring the EDI into the same 0-to-1 scale as the over- vs underrating democracy ratings ("democ"), we divide the original EDI scores by 100. Then we subtract from each respondent's own over- vs underrating democracy rating the respective country's normalized EDI-score, which then tells us to what extent a respondent *over*rates her/his country's democraticness (in case of *positive* differences) or to what extent s/he *under*rates it (in case of *negative* differences):

```
compute edin=edi/100.
compute overrate=democ-edin.
recode overrate (sysmiss=-99).
mis val overrate (-99).
```

Finally, we aggregate the individual-level scores on the over- vs underrating democracy index, by calculating the arithmetic population mean for each sample. Country scores on this index are displayed on the vertical axis of the left-hand diagram of Figure 3 in our article. The resulting over- vs. underrating democracy index has a theoretical minimum of -1 for the most extreme underrating: the case when the country scores at 1 and the respondent sees it at 0. The index has a theoretical maximum of +1 for the most extreme overrating: the case when the country scores at 0 and the respondent sees it at 1.

Alternative Democracy Measures

Other alternatives of *conditional* democracy measures are based on newly released democracy measures from the "varieties of democracy project" (V-Dem), focusing on the indicators of "electoral," "participatory," "liberal," "deliberative" and "egalitarian" democracy (Coppedge, Gerring & Lindberg et al. 2015). In the V-Dem conceptual scheme all those indicators are considered as essential elements of representative democracy.

Electoral Democracy Index

The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country (Coppedge, Gerring & Lindberg et al. 2016: 44). The index is formed by taking the average of the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive and freedom of expression; and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices.

```
compute overrate_vdem1=democ-elec_dem.
```

```
recode overrate_vdem1 (sysmiss=-99).
mis val overrate_vdem1 (-99).
```

Participatory Democracy Index

The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral (Coppedge, Gerring & Lindberg et al. 2016: 47). This index is formed by taking into account the level of electoral democracy, civil society participation, direct popular vote, elected local government power, and elected regional government power.

```
compute overrate_vdem2=democ-part_dem.
recode overrate_vdem2 (sysmiss=-99).
mis val overrate_vdem2 (-99).
```

Liberal Democracy Index

The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority (Coppedge, Gerring & Lindberg et al. 2016: 46). This index is formed by averaging the following indices: electoral democracy index, equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative constraints on the executive.

```
compute overrate_vdem3=democ-lib_dem.
recode overrate_vdem3 (sysmiss=-99).
mis val overrate_vdem3 (-99).
```

Deliberative Democracy Index

The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity (Coppedge, Gerring & Lindberg et al. 2016: 48). The index takes into account the level of electoral democracy, indicators of reasoned justification, common good justification, respect for counterarguments, range of consultation, and engaged society.

```
compute overrate_vdem4=democ-delib_dem.
recode overrate_vdem4 (sysmiss=-99).
mis val overrate_vdem4 (-99).
```

Egalitarian Democracy Index

The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate (Coppedge, Gerring & Lindberg et al. 2016: 49). To make it a measure

of egalitarian democracy, the index takes into account the level of electoral democracy, equal protection index and equal distribution of resources.

```
compute overrate_vdem5=democ-egal_dem.
recode overrate_vdem5 (sysmiss=-99).
mis val overrate_vdem5 (-99).
```

Freedom House/Polity

Lastly, we use the Freedom House/Polity combination provided by Hadenius and Teorell (2012). This index is formed from averaged Freedom House and Polity scores and ranges from 0 to 10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Hadenius and Teorell (2005; 2012) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.

```
compute overrate_fh=democ-fh_pol.
recode overrate_fh (sysmiss=-99).
mis val overrate_fh (-99).
```

Accurate Assessment Index

These results are obtained from re-calculating the over- vs. underrating index into an accurate assessment index, such that the highest possible accuracy is 1.0 and the lowest possible is 0. This calculation is performed by (1) squaring the scores on the over- vs. underrating index (which transforms negative deviations from 0 into positive ones), (2) taking the square root of the squared scores (which reproduces the absolute values of the deviations before squaring) and (3) subtracting the scores from 1 (which inverts the deviation scale into an accuracy scale). After these transformations, an underrating of -0.90 turns into an accuracy rating of 0.10 (low accuracy) and an overrating of 0.10 into an accuracy rating of 0.90 (high accuracy).

```
compute accuracy = (1-(sqrt(democ*democ))).
recode accuracy (sysmiss=-99).
mis val accuracy (-99).
```

Random Chance

Random chance variable assigns all overrating respondents the country-specific probability of overrating by random chance (which is 1 minus the 0-to-1 score of the country's actual democraticness), and all underrating respondents the country-specific probability of underrating by random chance (which is the given country's 0-to-1 actual democraticness). Since random chance is entirely based on the countries' actual democraticness, it captures completely the latter's effect on people's over- and underratings.

```
if  (overrate > 0) randchance = (1- edin).
if  (overrate < 0) randchance = edin.
recode randchance (sysmiss=-99).
mis val randchance (-99).
```

State Repression

State Repression is measured using Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke and Arnon's (2015) "political terror scale" (PTS). The PTS provides a 5-point ordinal scale based on the annual reports of human rights violations by (a) Amnesty International and (b) the US State Department. Averaging the two 5-point scales provides a more fine-graded index, which we use. The PTS measures physical repression on two accounts: the frequency of political repression over a given period of time and the size of the population affected by the abuse. Coding focuses on actual violations of physical integrity carried out through state agencies, rather than on non-state actors. Our analyses use PTS scores as a decennial average from 2005 to 2014 for each country, which creates even more fine-grained variation. Also, stretching the time span creates a more reliable index than using scores from single years. We standardize scores into a scale range from 0 for the least to 1 for the most repression, with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions.

Reference: Gibney, M., L. Cornett, R. Wood, P. Haschke & D. Arnon (2015). The Political Terror Scale 1976-2015 (data retrieved from the Political Terror Scale website at: www.politicalterrorscale.org).

Democratic Traditions

To measure democratic traditions we use Gerring, Thacker and Alfaro's (2012) "democracy stock" index, measured in the year of the survey in a given country. The measure is based on the -10 to +10 "autocracy-vs.-democracy" index from the Polity IV dataset. Scores are summed up over the last one hundred and fourteen years (1900-2014) applying a one percent depreciation rate. Thus, the index measures a country's historically accumulated experience with democracy, with a premium on more recent experience. We standardize the index into a normalized scale range from a minimum of 0 for absent democratic traditions to a maximum of 1 for the longest democratic traditions, with decimal fractions of 1 indicating intermediate positions. Two countries, Palestine and Hong Kong have no data entry. We assign a score of 0 to Palestine and Hong Kong because they are not independent states in which the people could exert democratic sovereignty.

Reference: Gerring, J., S.C. Thacker & R. Alfaro (2012). "Democracy and Human Development." *Journal of Politics* 74: 1-17.

Protestant vs. Islamic Heritage

This variable, first, accounts for Protestants and Muslims as percentage of population during the 1980s, measured in decimal fractions of 1. Second, we subtract the fractions of Muslims from that of Protestants and label this difference index *Protestant-vs.-Islamic Heritage*. The data are provided by the Quality of Government Institute's annual data release at Gothenburg University, Sweden at: http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads.

```
compute prot_islam=(pct_prot-pct_musl).
recode prot_islam (sysmiss = -99).
mis val prot_islam (-99).
```

Rent-seeking Economy

As a proxy for the presence of rent-seeking economies, we use the oil rents as a percentage of countries GDP. Oil rents are defined by the World Bank as the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production (World Bank, 2011). Since often oil rents turn out to play an important role in legitimizing the authority of the ruling elites, we control for this factor.

We use World Bank's estimates of the oil rents as a percentage of countries GDP. Data usually refer to the year 2014. If no data are available for a country for 2014, data from surrounding years are used, up to a maximum of +/- 3 years, with priority given to closer years. Data are included in the World Development Indicators Dataset (World Bank 2015). The data is accessible online at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

Reference: Jarvis M. et al. (2011). The changing wealth of nations: measuring sustainable development in the new millennium.

Stimulus Influx

To measure stimulus influx we use Dreher's (2006) "KOF globalization" index, measured accordingly in the year of the survey in a given country. The index combines the three dimensions of globalization: economic, social and political. An overall index of globalization refers to actual economic flows, economic restrictions, and data on information flows, personal contacts and cultural proximity. We standardize the index into a normalized 0 to 1 scale where minimum values for the lower-level of globalization and maximum values for the greater globalization.

Reference: Dreher, Axel (2006): Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization, Applied Economics 38, 10: 1091-1110.

School Enrollment

To measure education at the country level we use data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Education is measured as gross secondary enrollment ratio (total).

Reference: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015): http://www.uis.unesco.org. The data is provided by the Quality of Government Institute's annual data release at Gothenburg University, Sweden at: http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads.

Physical Integrity Rights Index

As a proxy for physical violence, we use Physical Integrity Rights Index taken from Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Dataset. This index is constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment and Disappearance indicators (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). We standardize the index into a normalized 0 to 1 scale where 0 stands for the absence of government respect for these four rights to 1 where full government respect for these four rights is present.

Reference: David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards. 1999. "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights." International Studies Quarterly, Vol 43.2: 407-18.

Internet Access

As a proxy for the presence of information technology, we use the number of internet users per 100 inhabitants. We extract the data from World Development Indicators (World Bank).

Reference: Holmberg, S., & Rothstein, B. (2014). Correlates of the Good Society(No. 13). QoG Working Paper.

Protest Activity

This variable is identical with Welzel's index of "social movement activity (SMA)," yielding an additive multi-point scale of a respondent's non-participation (coded 0), anticipated participation (coded 0.33) and actual participation (coded 1.0) in each of the following three activities: peaceful demonstrations, consumer boycotts and civic petitions. The index intends to measure a person's *psychological protest repertoire*, with a premium on actual over anticipated protest. The coding procedures are described in detail in Welzel (2013, Online Appendix: pp. 35-37). The appendix is accessible via the following link: www.cambridge.org/de/download_file/473755/.

SECTION III: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

OA-Table 3. Descriptive statistics (individual-level data)

	N	mean	min	max	sd	skewness	kurtosis
Over- vs. Underrating Democracy	93784	.18	-.98	.97	.37	-.12	-.56
Educational Achievement	102033	.56	.00	1.00	.31	-.12	-1.10
Information Intake	109208	.38	.00	1.00	.44	.48	-1.59
Emancipative Values	109208	.42	.22	.73	.11	.57	-.32
Political Interest	108083	.46	.00	1.00	.32	.03	2.01
Female Sex	109066	.52	.00	1.00	.50	-.09	-1.99
Age	108779	.69	.11	1.00	.17	-.48	-.61

OA-Table 4. Descriptive statistics (country-level data)

	N	mean	min	max	sd	skewness	kurtosis
Over- vs. Underrating Democracy	68	.16	-.30	.71	.27	-.20	-1.23
Accurate Assessment Index	68	.72	.29	.97	.15	-.42	-.12
State Repression	75	.37	.00	1.00	.25	.06	-.72
Democratic Traditions	75	.50	.09	.99	.25	.53	-.67
Protestant-vs.-Islamic Heritage	74	.42	.00	1.00	.25	-.28	-.56
Rent-seeking Economy	70	.08	.00	.61	.14	2.27	4.66
Stimulus Influx	73	.65	.28	.98	.17	.03	-.79
Physical Integrity Rights	75	.53	.00	1.00	.31	-.25	-.99
Internet Access	73	.48	.01	.98	.27	-.01	-1.05

OA-Table 5. Correlations among individual-level predictors of over- vs. underrating democracy performance

		2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Over- vs. Underrating Democracy	-.37***	-.24***	.19***	.05***	-.08***	-.002
2	Emancipative Values	-	.34***	-.06***	.05***	.21***	.07***
3	Information Intake		-	.15***	.07***	.36***	-.06***
4	Age			-	-.06***	.15***	-.01***
5	Political Interest				-	.11***	-.12***
6	Educational Achievement					-	-.02***
7	Female Sex						-

Note. *** $p \leq .001$,** $p \leq .01$,* $p \leq .05$. *N*s range from 87,827 to 109,208 due to occasional missing data.

OA-Table 6. Correlations among country level predictors of over- vs. underrating democracy performance

		2	3	4	5
1	Over- vs. Underrating Democracy	-0.71***	-0.73***	-0.75***	-0.56***
2	Internet Access	-	0.78***	0.85***	0.73***
3	GDP per capita		-	0.77***	0.53***
4	HDI			-	0.80***
5	School enrollment ratio				-

Note. *** $p \leq .001$,** $p \leq .01$,* $p \leq .05$. Number of countries (in parentheses) range from 6 to 68 due to occasional missing data.

SECTIOIN IV: FIGURES

OA Figure 1. Histogram accurate assessment index



OA Figure 2. Democratic traditions and over- vs. underrating democracy



OA Figure 3. Emancipative values and over- vs. underrating democracy by wave



OA Figure 4. Changes in emancipative values and over- vs. underrating democracy



OA Figure 5. Rated and actual level of democracy



OA Figure 6. Emancipative values and accurate assessment and over- vs. underrating democracy indices



SECTION V: ROBUSTNESS TESTS

OA Table 1. Country-level regression analysis using alternative democracy indicators for calculating over-vs. underrating democracy indices

	Egalitarian Democracy Index	Liberal Democracy Index	Deliberative Democracy Index	Participatory Democracy Index	Electoral Democracy Index	FH/Polity Index
Emancipative Values	-1.210***	-1.093***	-.971***	-.869***	-.804**	-.551
	(.286)	(.307)	(.314)	(.273)	(.317)	(.354)
Democratic Traditions	-.034	-.124	-.145	-.016	-.126	-.245
	(.133)	(.143)	(.146)	(.127)	(.148)	(.164)
Rent-seeking Economy	.252	.287	.305	.186	.274	.545**
	(.197)	(.211)	(.216)	(.187)	(.218)	(.240)
Constant	.571***	.559***	.523***	.504***	.323***	.168
	(.097)	(.105)	(.107)	(.092)	(.108)	(.120)
Observations	63	63	63	63	63	65
R-squared	.494	.479	.444	.352	.358	.364
Adj.R2	.468	.452	.415	.319	.326	.333
F-Test	19.16	18.05	15.69	10.67	10.99	11.63

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

OA Table 8. Country-level regression analysis - determinants of effective democracy

	Dependent variable: Effective Democracy Index
Democratic Traditions	0.733***
	(0.0679)
State Repression	-0.505***
	(0.0675)
Rent-seeking Economy	-0.141
	(0.119)
Constant	0.377***
	(0.0150)
Observations	69
Adj.R2	0.842

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

OA Table 9. MLM using alternative democracy indicators for calculating over-vs. underrating democracy indices

	Egalitarian Democracy Index		Liberal Democracy Index		Deliberative Democracy Index		Participatory Democracy Index		Electoral Democracy Index		FH/Polity Index	
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL												
Female Sex	0.011***	0.012***	0.011***	0.012***	0.011***	0.012***	0.011***	0.012***	0.011***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Educational Achievement	0.003	0.006**	0.003	0.006**	0.003	0.006**	0.003	0.006**	0.003	0.006**	0.002	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political Interest	0.052***	0.055***	0.052***	0.055***	0.052***	0.055***	0.052***	0.055***	0.052***	0.055***	0.051***	0.054***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Emancipative Values	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.080***	-0.069***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Information Intake	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
COUNTRY-LEVEL												
Democratic Traditions	-0.063	-0.124	-0.130	-0.176	-0.153	-0.234*	-0.017	-0.103	-0.135	-0.220*	-0.259	-0.256*
	(0.124)	(0.110)	(0.142)	(0.126)	(0.141)	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.137)	(0.123)	(0.158)	(0.134)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.172	0.088	0.246	0.181	0.275	0.209	0.169	0.119	0.245	0.172	0.507**	0.425*
	(0.185)	(0.192)	(0.212)	(0.220)	(0.210)	(0.220)	(0.183)	(0.193)	(0.205)	(0.215)	(0.234)	(0.242)
State Repression	0.289**	0.298***	0.116	0.122	0.116	0.149	0.076	0.119	0.160	0.192	0.141	0.096
	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.146)	(0.144)
Emancipative Values	-0.756**		-0.631*		-0.792**		-0.756**		-0.848**		-0.331	
	(0.319)		(0.367)		(0.364)		(0.316)		(0.354)		(0.410)	
Stimulus Influx		-0.492**		-0.385		-0.419*		-0.346		-0.458*		-0.354
		(0.219)		(0.251)		(0.252)		(0.220)		(0.245)		(0.264)

to be continued…

...continuation *OA-Table 9*

	Egalitarian Democracy Index		Liberal Democracy Index		Deliberative Democracy Index		Participatory Democracy Index		Electoral Democracy Index		FH/Polity Index	
CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS												
Emancipative $Values_{CL}$#Educational Achievement	0.266***		0.267***		0.266***		0.267***		0.266***		0.267***	
	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.022)	
Emancipative $Values_{CL}$#Information Intake	0.053**		0.053**		0.053**		0.053**		0.053**		0.053**	
	(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.021)	
Emancipative $Values_{CL}$#Political Interest	0.065***		0.065***		0.065***		0.065***		0.065***		0.063**	
	(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.025)	
Emancipative $Values_{CL}$#Emancipative $Values_{IL}$	0.289*		0.289*		0.289*		0.289*		0.289*		0.291*	
	(0.159)		(0.159)		(0.159)		(0.159)		(0.159)		(0.157)	
Constant	-0.057	-0.059	-0.109*	-0.111*	0.013	0.001	0.109**	0.091*	-0.010	-0.022	-0.205***	-0.185***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Observations	81,892	81,892	81,892	81,892	81,892	81,892	81,892	81,892	81,892	81,892	84,914	84,914
Countries	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	63	65	65
chi2	28209	28229	36697	36470	35585	35987	28391	28980	33974	34523	45266	44768
AIC	6221	6410	6238	6427	6237	6427	6219	6411	6234	6424	5625	5815
BIC	6398	6550	6415	6567	6414	6567	6396	6550	6411	6564	5803	5956
Log-Likelihood	-3091	-3190	-3100	-3199	-3100	-3199	-3091	-3190	-3098	-3197	-2793	-2893
Variance intercept	0.026	0.026	0.035	0.035	0.034	0.035	0.026	0.027	0.032	0.033	0.043	0.043
Variance slope (EVI)	0.020	0.024	0.020	0.024	0.020	0.024	0.020	0.024	0.020	0.024	0.019	0.023
Variance residual	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

OA Figure 5. Accurate assessment index and emancipative values



OA Figure 6. Accurate assessment index and internet access



OA Figure 7. Accurate assessment index and stimulus influx



OA Table 2. Country-level regression – Determinants of accurate assessment of democracy

	Dependent variable: Accurate Assessment Index					
State Repression	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.09	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Emancipative Values	0.39***	0.23	0.17			
	(0.134)	(0.181)	(0.186)			
Stimulus Influx				0.32***	0.25**	0.20
				(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.117)
Democratic Traditions		0.09	0.09		0.09	0.08
		(0.072)	(0.071)		(0.060)	(0.060)
Rent-seeking Economy			-0.10			-0.06
			(0.105)			(0.108)
Constant	0.55***	0.57***	0.61***	0.49***	0.49***	0.54***
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.092)
Observations	68	68	64	67	67	64
R2	0.346	0.362	0.374	0.379	0.399	0.394
Adj.R2	0.326	0.332	0.332	0.360	0.370	0.353

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

OA Table 3. MLM – Determinants of accurate assessment of democracy

	Dependent variable: accurate assessment index (AAI)					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.030***	-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.030***	-0.032***	-0.032***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Educational Achievement	0.034***	0.036***	0.036***	0.034***	0.036***	0.036***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political Interest	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.022***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Emancipative Values	0.039**	0.041***	0.041***	0.039**	0.041***	0.041***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.01)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.01)
Information Intake	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Democratic Traditions	0.057	0.079	0.087	0.071	0.071	0.081
	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Rent-seeking Economy	-0.116	-0.120	-0.055	-0.087	-0.087	-0.047
	(0.100)	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.102)
State Repression				-0.114*	-0.102*	-0.097
				(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.061)
Emancipative Values	0.385**			0.203		
	(0.153)			(0.177)		
Internet Access		0.176***			0.120*	
		(0.059)			(0.066)	
Stimulus Influx			0.282***			0.185*
			(0.095)			(0.112)
CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.125***			0.125***		
#Educ. Achievement	(0.019)			(0.019)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.022			0.022		
#Information Intake	(0.018)			(0.018)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.218***			0.218***		
#Political Interest	(0.021)			(0.021)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	-0.175			-0.176		
#Emancipative Values$_{IL}$	(0.131)			(0.131)		
Constant	0.668***	0.669***	0.666***	0.714***	0.710***	0.706***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Observations	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943
Countries	64	64	64	64	64	64
chi2	15332	14704	14428	14576	14188	14080
AIC	-29713	-29540	-29540	-29714	-29541	-29541
BIC	-29545	-29410	-29410	-29537	-29402	-29401
Log-Likelihood	14875	14784	14784	14876	14786	14785
Variance intercept	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.007
Variance slope (EVI)	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Variance residual	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

OA Table 4. MLM – Accounting for randomness

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.020***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Educational Achievement	0.006**	0.008***	0.008***	0.006**	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political Interest	0.051***	0.054***	0.054***	0.051***	0.054***	0.054***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Emancipative Values	-0.071***	-0.061***	-0.061***	-0.071***	-0.061***	-0.061***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Information Intake	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Randomness	0.286***	0.284***	0.284***	0.286***	0.284***	0.284***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Democratic Traditions	-0.181	-0.341***	-0.283***	-0.214*	-0.320***	-0.271***
	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.097)	(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.092)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.135	0.201	-0.089	0.038	0.067	-0.116
	(0.176)	(0.184)	(0.176)	(0.166)	(0.170)	(0.166)
State Repression				0.335***	0.384***	0.285***
				(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.099)
Emancipative Values	-1.398***			-0.883***		
	(0.267)			(0.295)		
Internet access		-0.483***			-0.276**	
		(0.112)			(0.117)	
Stimulus Influx			-1.009***			-0.735***
			(0.161)			(0.181)
CROSS-LEVEL						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.285***			0.285***		
#Educ. Achievement	(0.023)			(0.023)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.056**			0.056**		
#Information Intake	(0.022)			(0.022)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.128***			0.128***		
#Political Interest	(0.025)			(0.025)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.256*			0.257*		
#Emancipative Values$_{TI}$	(0.154)			(0.154)		
Constant	-0.031	-0.033	-0.023	-0.167***	-0.187***	-0.140***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Observations	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943
Countries	64	64	64	64	64	64
Chi2	27978	30371	26538	24104	25472	23550
AIC	1601	1846	1832	1593	1836	1827
BIC	1778	1986	1972	1780	1985	1976
Log-Likelihood	-781.4	-908.2	-901.1	-776.6	-902	-897.3
var_random_intercept	0.025	0.028	0.022	0.022	0.023	0.020
var_random_slope	0.017	0.021	0.021	0.017	0.021	0.021
var_residual	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.059

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

OA Table 5. MLM – Accounting for Protestant-vs. Islamic heritage

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Educational Achievement	0.003	0.005*	0.005*	0.003	0.005*	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political Interest	0.052***	0.054***	0.054***	0.052***	0.054***	0.054***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Emancipative Values	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.069***	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.069***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Information Intake	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Protestant-vs. Islamic Heritage	0.177	-0.104	-0.095	0.150	-0.041	-0.020
	(0.141)	(0.109)	(0.122)	(0.131)	(0.106)	(0.113)
Democratic Traditions	-0.189	-0.230**	-0.292**	-0.224*	-0.241**	-0.296***
	(0.129)	(0.112)	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.107)	(0.114)
State Repression				0.357***	0.292***	0.395***
				(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.110)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.322*	-0.031	0.262	0.212	-0.027	0.166
	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.202)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.187)
Emancipative Values	-1.614***			-1.024***		
	(0.350)			(0.371)		
Stimulus Influx		-1.002***			-0.733***	
		(0.173)			(0.193)	
Internet Access			-0.473***			-0.274**
			(0.121)			(0.124)
CROSS-LEVEL						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$ #Educ. Achievement	0.272***			0.272***		
	(0.023)			(0.023)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$ #Information Intake	0.054**			0.054**		
	(0.023)			(0.023)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$ #Political Interest	0.072***			0.072***		
	(0.026)			(0.026)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$ #Emancipative Values$_{II}$	0.299*			0.299*		
	(0.161)			(0.161)		
Constant	0.170***	0.176***	0.166***	0.025	0.056	0.008
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Observations	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943
Countries	64	64	64	64	64	64
Chi2	30089	27877	31573	26086	25108	26897
AIC	6175	6352	6365	6167	6347	6356
BIC	6352	6492	6505	6354	6497	6505
Log-Likelihood	-3069	-3161	-3168	-3064	-3158	-3162
var_random_intercept	0.028	0.025	0.031	0.024	0.022	0.025
var_random_slope	0.019	0.024	0.024	0.019	0.024	0.024
var_residual	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

OA Table 6. MLM – Accounting for contradictory answers of respondents regarding the importance of politics

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Educational Achievement	0.00	0.01*	0.01*	0.00	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political Interest	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Emancipative Values	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Information Intake	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Democratic Traditions	-0.25*	-0.37***	-0.29***	-0.27**	-0.34***	-0.28***
	(0.129)	(0.112)	(0.099)	(0.120)	(0.104)	(0.095)
Contradictions	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.26	0.30*	0.04	0.17	0.18	0.02
	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.179)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.171)
State Repression				0.33***	0.36***	0.26**
				(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.104)
Emancipative Values	-1.04***			-0.58*		
	(0.307)			(0.323)		
Internet access		-0.36***			-0.19	
		(0.124)			(0.125)	
Stimulus Influx			-0.87***			-0.65***
			(0.175)			(0.191)
CROSS-LEVEL						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.26***			0.26***		
#Educ. Achievement	(0.024)			(0.024)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.06**			0.06**		
#Information Intake	(0.023)			(0.023)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.07***			0.07***		
#Political Interest	(0.026)			(0.026)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.31*			0.31*		
#Emancipative Values$_{TI}$	(0.161)			(0.161)		
Constant	0.10***	0.09**	0.11***	-0.02	-0.04	0.01
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Observations	82,068	82,068	82,068	82,068	82,068	82,068
Countries	64	64	64	64	64	64
Chi2	27750	28719	25166	24740	25245	23375
AIC	5962	6142	6129	5956	6133	6125
BIC	6139	6281	6269	6142	6282	6274
Log-Likelihood	-2962	-3056	-3049	-2958	-3051	-3046
var_random_intercept	0.0273	0.0286	0.0234	0.0239	0.0242	0.0214
var_random_slope	0.0198	0.0242	0.0242	0.0198	0.0242	0.0242
var_residual	0.0625	0.0627	0.0627	0.0625	0.0627	0.0627

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals. *Contradiction* measures the percentage of respondents answering the questions on the centrality of politics in their personal lives and their subjective interest in politics in contradictory ways. In this regard a contradiction is defined by a respondent answering that politics is "Very important" in her personal life while simultaneously being "Not at all interested" in politics or vice versa.

OA Table 7. Sample split: MLM – Underraters

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.022***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.023***	-0.023***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Educational Achievement	0.024***	0.045***	0.045***	0.024***	0.045***	0.045***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political Interest	0.005	0.015***	0.015***	0.005	0.015***	0.015***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Emancipative Values	-0.019	-0.016	-0.016	-0.019	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Information Intake	0.006**	0.008***	0.008***	0.006**	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Democratic Traditions	-0.058	-0.122***	-0.097**	-0.065	-0.113***	-0.092**
	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.037)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.137**	0.161**	0.088	0.116*	0.124*	0.082
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.068)
Repressive States				0.073*	0.107***	0.074*
				(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Emancipative Values	-0.359***			-0.243**		
	(0.100)			(0.116)		
Internet Access		-0.105**			-0.043	
		(0.041)			(0.045)	
Stimulus Influx			-0.245***			-0.169**
			(0.063)			(0.074)
CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.229***			0.229***		
#Educ. Achievement	(0.025)			(0.025)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.049**			0.048**		
#Information Intake	(0.024)			(0.024)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.117***			0.117***		
#Political Interest	(0.027)			(0.027)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.072			0.073		
#Emancipative Values$_{IL}$	(0.105)			(0.105)		
Constant	-0.173***	-0.174***	-0.171***	-0.203***	-0.217***	-0.202***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Observations	29,254	29,254	29,254	29,254	29,254	29,254
Countries	64	64	64	64	64	64
chi2	3377	3505	3096	3181	3208	3027
AIC	-21933	-21794	-21802	-21934	-21799	-21803
BIC	-21784	-21678	-21686	-21777	-21675	-21679
Log-Likelihood	10984	10911	10915	10986	10914	10917
Variance intercept	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Variance slope (EVI)	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006
Variance residual	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

OA Table 8. Sample split: MLM – Overraters

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Educational Achievement	-0.020***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.020***	-0.022***	-0.022***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political Interest	0.039***	0.039***	0.039***	0.039***	0.039***	0.039***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Emancipative Values	-0.045***	-0.046***	-0.047***	-0.046***	-0.047***	-0.047***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Information Intake	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Democratic Traditions	-0.116	-0.200***	-0.188***	-0.147**	-0.188***	-0.178***
	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.156	0.181	0.026	0.094	0.103	0.010
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.107)
State Repression				0.229***	0.240***	0.204***
				(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Emancipative Values	-0.827***			-0.459**		
	(0.173)			(0.189)		
Internet Access		-0.310***			-0.178**	
		(0.069)			(0.072)	
Stimulus Influx			-0.580***			-0.382***
			(0.106)			(0.117)
CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.053*			0.053*		
#Educ. Achievement	(0.030)			(0.030)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	-0.037			-0.037		
#Information Intake	(0.028)			(0.028)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	-0.015			-0.015		
#Political Interest	(0.033)			(0.033)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.175			0.176		
#Emancipative Values$_{TI}$	(0.127)			(0.127)		
Constant	0.316***	0.314***	0.320***	0.224***	0.218***	0.237***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Observations	53,689	53,689	53,689	53,689	53,689	53,689
Countries	64	64	64	64	64	64
chi2	13096	13106	12156	11740	11818	11220
AIC	-22905	-22906	-22913	-22914	-22916	-22920
BIC	-22745	-22781	-22788	-22745	-22783	-22787
Log-Likelihood	11471	11467	11470	11476	11473	11475
Variance intercept	0.010	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.008
Variance slope (EVI)	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Variance residual	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

OA Table 9. Individual level correlations: Protest activity, over-vs. underrating and accurate assessment

		2	3	4	5	6
1	Over- vs. Underrating Democracy	-.57***	-.26***	.05***	.05***	.03***
2	Accurate Assessment Index	-	.15***	-.02***	-.03***	-.02***
3	Protest Activity		-	.85***	.81***	.82***
4	Signing a Petition			-	.55***	.51***
5	Joining in Boycotts				-	.54***
6	Attending Demonstrations					-

Note. *** p ≤ .001,** p ≤ .01,* p ≤ .05. N's range from 81,984 to 93,721 due to occasional missing data.

OA Table 10. Country level correlations: Protest activity, over-vs. underrating and accurate assessment

		2	3	4	5	6
1	Over- vs. Underrating Democracy	-.84***	-.66***	.11	.17	.14
2	Accurate Assessment Index	-	.51***	-.08	-.15	-.15
3	Protest Activity		-	.96***	.94***	.88***
4	Signing a Petition			-	.87***	.75***
5	Joining in Boycotts				-	.79***
6	Attending Demonstrations					-

Note. *** p ≤ .001,** p ≤ .01,* p ≤ .05. Number of countries (in parentheses) range from 65 to 77 due to occasional missing data.

OA Table 11. Replication of table 3 using wave 5 instead of 6 if countries were surveyed twice

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	0.018***	0.020***	0.020***	0.018***	0.020***	0.020***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Educational Achievement	-0.003	0.001	0.001	-0.003	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political Interest	0.056***	0.058***	0.058***	0.056***	0.058***	0.058***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Emancipative Values	-0.103***	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.103***	-0.091***	-0.091***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Information Intake	-0.006**	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.006**	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Democratic Traditions	-0.243*	-0.360***	-0.304***	-0.329***	-0.368***	-0.285***
	(0.134)	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.127)	(0.106)	(0.097)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.309	0.479**	0.115	0.202	0.285	0.049
	(0.199)	(0.196)	(0.191)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.176)
State Repression				0.371***	0.369***	0.325***
				(0.118)	(0.111)	(0.095)
Emancipative Values	-1.294***			-0.638*		
	(0.293)			(0.342)		
Internet Access		-0.467***			-0.246**	
		(0.110)			(0.121)	
Stimulus Influx			-0.967***			-0.698***
			(0.172)			(0.176)
CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.211***			0.211***		
#Educ. Achievement	(0.025)			(0.025)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.118***			0.118***		
#Information Intake	(0.032)			(0.032)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.022			0.023		
#Political Interest	(0.027)			(0.027)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.241			0.241		
#Emancipative Values$_{TI}$	(0.182)			(0.182)		
Constant	0.213***	0.209***	0.216***	0.054	0.053	0.077*
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.045)
Observations	73,423	73,423	73,423	73,423	73,423	73,423
Countries	60	60	60	60	60	60
chi2	27334	27794	24956	24227	24389	21647
AIC	1955	2068	2058	1948	2060	2050
BIC	2120	2196	2187	2123	2198	2188
Log-Likelihood	-959.4	-1020	-1015	-954.8	-1015	-1010
Variance intercept	0.028	0.028	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.020
Variance slope (EVI)	0.023	0.026	0.026	0.023	0.026	0.026
Variance residual	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.059

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

OA Table 12. MLM after down-weighting "nearly" duplicate respondents

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)
Age	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Educational Achievement	0.0023	0.0069	0.0069	0.0023	0.0069	0.00691
	(0.0055)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.0055)	(0.008)	(0.00757)
Political Interest	0.051***	0.053***	0.054***	0.051***	0.0538***	0.0538***
	(0.0066)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.00641)	(0.00641)
Emancipative Values	-0.089***	-0.076***	-0.076***	-0.089***	-0.076***	-0.076***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Information Intake	-0.0082*	-0.008	-0.0082	-0.0082*	-0.008	-0.0082
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Democratic Traditions	-0.190	-0.333***	-0.278**	-0.230**	-0.315***	-0.267***
	(0.133)	(0.114)	(0.108)	(0.116)	(0.0991)	(0.100)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.258	0.311	0.0189	0.153	0.175	-0.008
	(0.191)	(0.207)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.203)	(0.191)
State Repression				0.367***	0.403***	0.304***
				(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.101)
Emancipative Values	-1.355***			-0.784***		
	(0.291)			(0.290)		
Internet Access		-0.486***			-0.270**	
		(0.114)			(0.123)	
Stimulus Influx			-1.021***			-0.729***
			(0.183)			(0.215)
CROSS-LEVEL EFFECTS						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.285***			0.285***		
#Educ. Achievement	(0.044)			(0.044)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.070**			0.070**		
#Information Intake	(0.035)			(0.035)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.077			0.077		
#Political Interest	(0.050)			(0.050)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.340***			0.341***		
#Emancipative Values$_{IL}$	(0.128)			(0.128)		
Constant	0.167***	0.163***	0.174***	0.0184	0.00191	0.0489
	(0.0222)	(0.0229)	(0.0206)	(0.0498)	(0.0515)	(0.0474)
Observations	82,724	82,724	82,724	82,724	82,724	82,724
Countries	64	64	64	64	64	64
AIC	2755	2850	2837	2747	2840	2831
BIC	2923	2981	2968	2924	2980	2971
Log-Likelihood	-1360	-1411	-1405	-1354	-1405	-1401
Variance intercept	0.03	0.03	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.0223
Variance slope (EVI)	0.013	0.018	0.018	0.013	0.018	0.018
Variance residual	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals.

OA Table 13. Correlations between democracy indicators and "aggregated" individual democratic assessments

	Aggregated individual democracy assessment	Effective Democracy Index	VDEM-Polyarchy Index	VDEM-Participatory Democracy Index	VDEM-Liberal Democracy Index	VDEM-Eaglitarian Democracy Index	VDEM-Deliberative Democracy Index	Freedom House/Polity combined
Aggregated individual democracy assessment	1							
Effective Democracy Index	0.42***	1						
VDEM-Polyarchy Index	0.35**	0.87***	1					
VDEM-Participatory Democracy Index	0.39**	0.89***	0.97***	1				
VDEM-Liberal Democracy Index	0.39**	0.93***	0.98***	0.97***	1			
VDEM-Egalitarian Democracy Index	0.40***	0.94***	0.95***	0.95***	0.98***	1		
VDEM-Deliberative Democracy Index	0.41***	0.89***	0.98***	0.96***	0.98***	0.96***	1	
Freedom House/Polity combined	0.29*	0.83***	0.95***	0.90***	0.93***	0.90***	0.93***	1

Notes: Number of countries N=66

OA Table 14. Share of contradictory answers and missing values by country

	Absent democratic assessment	Contradictory answers regarding politics		Absent democratic assessment	Contradictory answers regarding politics
Algeria	9.7	2.6	Mali	9.3	3.6
Argentina	1.9	1.2	Mexico	1.4	2.8
Armenia	5.9	1.3	Moldova	5.6	0.3
Australia	2.4	0.3	Morocco	13.3	1
Azerbaijan	0	1	Netherlands	8.6	0.3
Bahrain		6.5	New Zealand	3.8	0
Belarus	1	0.5	Nigeria	0	3.8
Brazil	4.8	1.8	Norway	1.3	0.4
Bulgaria	4.4	1.2	Pakistan	0	1.3
Burkina Faso	13.8	3	Palestinian Autonomous	3.2	0.7
Canada	4.3	0.4	Peru	2.8	2.1
Chile	2.1	1.5	Philippines	0	1.7
China	15.2	1	Poland	5.7	0.1
Colombia	2.6	2.1	Qatar		0.9
Cyprus	1.1	2.5	Romania	5.8	0.7
Ecuador	0.7	4.3	Russia	11.2	0.8
Egypt	0	2.6	Rwanda	0	2.8
Estonia	3.6	0.1	Serbia and Montenegro	3.9	1
Finland	1.7	0.2	Singapore	0.1	1.9
France	1.6	0.3	Slovenia	3.2	0.2
Georgia	4.7	0.3	South Africa	2.2	4.4
Germany	1.6	0.2	Spain	2.8	1
Ghana	0	2.4	Sweden	1.9	0.3
Guatemala		3.9	Switzerland	2	0.1
HongKong	0.1	1.2	Taiwan	5.3	1.5
Hungary	3.6	1	Thailand	0.8	2.3
Indonesia	9	1.1	Trinidad and Tobago	8.7	2.6
Iran	1.6	1.4	Tunisia	8.5	3.3
Iraq	1.8	0.5	Turkey	1.9	1.6
Italy	3.9	0.3	Ukraine	0	0.8
Japan	15.5	0.4	United Kingdom	4.9	0.7
Jordan	2.9	1.3	United States	3.5	0.2
Kazakhstan	0	0.7	Uruguay	3.7	1.8
Korea, South	0.2	0.8	Uzbekistan		1.8
Kuwait		3.2	Vietnam	6.1	0.5
Kyrgyzstan	0	2.4	Yemen	12.2	0.8
Lebanon	2.2	2.6	Zambia	3.3	4.3
Libya	5.4	2.2	Zimbabwe	0	2.8
Malaysia	0	1.3			

Notes: '*Absent democratic assessment*' measures the percentage of respondents not answering the democracy assessment question (OA p. 15). '*Contradictory answers regarding politics*' measures the percentage of respondents answering the questions on the centrality of politics in their personal lives and their subjective interest in politics in contradictory ways. In this regard a contradiction is defined by a respondent answering that politics is "Very important" in her personal life while simultaneously being "Not at all interested" in politics or vice versa.

OA Table 15. MLM – Accounting for absent democratic assessments

	Dependent variable: Over- vs. Underrating Democracy					
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
Female Sex	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Educational Achievement	0.00	0.01*	0.01*	0.00	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political Interest	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Emancipative Values	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.07***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Information Intake	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
Democratic Traditions	-0.18	-0.33***	-0.27***	-0.22*	-0.31***	-0.26***
	(0.130)	(0.117)	(0.102)	(0.121)	(0.107)	(0.097)
Absent democratic assessment	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Rent-seeking Economy	0.23	0.30	-0.02	0.14	0.17	-0.04
	(0.189)	(0.194)	(0.186)	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.176)
State Repression				0.36***	0.40***	0.29***
				(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.105)
Emancipative Values	-1.39***			-0.83***		
	(0.287)			(0.317)		
Internet access		-0.49***			-0.28**	
		(0.118)			(0.123)	
Stimulus Influx			-1.06***			-0.77***
			(0.171)			(0.193)
CROSS-LEVEL						
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.27***			0.27***		
#Educational Achievement	(0.024)			(0.024)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.05**			0.05**		
#Information Intake	(0.023)			(0.023)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.07***			0.07***		
#Political Interest	(0.026)			(0.026)		
Emancipative Values$_{CL}$	0.30*			0.30*		
#Emancipative Values$_{TI}$	(0.161)			(0.161)		
Constant	0.19***	0.18***	0.21***	0.04	0.02	0.08
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Observations	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943	82,943
Countries	64	64	64	64	64	64
Chi2	30514	31689	27763	26287	26878	24925
AIC	6175	6366	6351	6168	6356	6346
BIC	6353	6506	6491	6354	6505	6495
Log-Likelihood	-3069	-3168	-3161	-3064	-3162	-3157
var_random_intercept	0.0291	0.0313	0.0249	0.0252	0.0259	0.0224
var_random_slope	0.0198	0.0240	0.0240	0.0198	0.0240	0.0240
var_residual	0.0626	0.0628	0.0628	0.0626	0.0628	0.0628

Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. The output shows the estimated coefficients of different random slope models, allowing for random intercept and random slope of emancipative values, and the variance of the slope, the intercept and the level-1 residuals. Absent democratic assessment' measures the percentage of respondents not answering the democracy assessment question (OA p. 15).