

Comparative Politics of Eurasia

Higher School of Economics 2017-18

Mondays 6-9 PM

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Coordinator: TBD

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Course Description: This course is a graduate seminar on comparative politics of modernization and development in Eurasia with an emphasis on research design and empirical analysis. The lectures formulate a comparative theory of modernization, political stability and political change, while the seminars focus on data methods in the context of six canonical cases: Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Germany and Japan. We verify the theoretical trajectories of development in these countries, study their political experiments with popular mobilization and institutionalization of democracy and autocracy. At the end of the instruction period, students are expected to produce a research paper based on the results of their work during the course.

Comparative politics of modernization and development are outlined as a paradigm for inquiry, the formulation includes three theoretical axes and an empirical complement:

1. Elements of political participation: electoral mobilization (turnout), economic mobilization (shifts in sectorization)
2. Elements of political stability: institutions of electoral politics (presidential, or parliamentary politics), (de)stabilizing themes (nationalist unification, ethnic, religious, economic classification), party formation and alliance
3. Elements of political instability and disorder: breakdown of order (revolts, coups) and civil violence, breakdown of institutions—autocratic or democratic (corruption, fraud), breakdown of themes (new nationalist/ideological mobilization, religious radicalization, economic restructuring)
4. Microlevel studies of political modernization: democratic and authoritarian consolidation, economic transformation and social change in focal Eurasian polities

Each session is divided into a lecture and a seminar. Lectures are focussed on analytical theory on the themes outlined above, while seminars are specifically focussed on data methods,

i.e. structuring empirics for the aforementioned case studies. Pragmatic limitations of the cases shape our empirical strategies.

By the end of the first module each student adopts **a)** a theoretical puzzle **b)** a case study nation-state whose sub-national statistics they use to provide an—albeit imperfect—answer to a theoretical puzzle of comparative politics. Innovative research designs are encouraged.

Students are expected to synthesize the concepts outlined in class, devise an empirical strategy to examine the implications of their theoretical argument, and use data to test the validity of their comparative arguments. Working on the six aforementioned cases is strongly encouraged, but exceptions are made on a case by case basis. Those who intend to finish the equivalent of a conference paper during the course, are required to produce a plan for a microlevel quantitative—or qualitative—study of their own, and start preliminary analysis by the end of the first module. Extra points are given to successful compilation of primary data, of quantitative type, during the course.

Evaluation: The grade for this course is based on (eight) *responses* to assigned readings for lectures (500 words each, for a total of 40%), attendance in lectures and seminars (10%), and the final paper—6000 words and empirical analysis—(50%). The responses to assigned readings should be sent to the instructor in the digital format, on the day before the lectures.

The final paper should include some elements of theory building and production of empirics. Students can opt for a 30-30% division of the final paper grade, into two reports (3000 and 6000 words), each due at the end of two modules.

To emphasize, the final grade of the course is based on cumulative grades obtained during the semester (the final paper and the written reading responses).

Readings: Assigned weekly

Office Hours: TBD

Prerequisites: undergraduate level courses on 1) comparative politics 2) research methods

Course Type: TBD

Learning Objectives: Research design and implementation in comparative politics

Learning Outcomes: Final report in the format of a conference paper/policy appraisal memo including data analysis and student presentations

Outline and Schedule of Lectures¹

Section 1: Political modernization: participation and institutionalization – 4 sessions

- **Lecture 1: Modernization as a comparative paradigm**
 - **Lecture 2: Turnout and the electorate**
 - **Lecture 3: Participation in politics and economy**
 - **Lecture 4: Economic and political sectorization**
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Section 2: components of political stability– 4 sessions

- **Lecture 5: Choice of electoral systems, presidentialism and parliamentarism**
 - **Lecture 6: Institutionalization of democracy and rule of law**
 - **Lecture 7: Institutionalization of Authority**
 - **Lecture 8: Symbiotic coexistence of authoritarianism and democracy**
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Section 3: components of political change and instability - 4 sessions

¹Seminars are dedicated to the discussion of case studies and relevant data methods.

- **Lecture 9: Civil conflict and Collective Action**
- **Lecture 10: Ethnic politics**
- **Lecture 11: Resource economy and rentier consolidation (Institutional corruption)**
- **Lecture 12: Electoral dysfunction**

Conclusion:

- **Lecture 13: Discussion and student presentations**
- **Lecture 14: Discussion and student presentations**

Student Projects: Final Draft of Project Report

Weekly Readings:

Segment 1: Modernization as a comparative paradigm

- Mancur Olson (1993) "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development" *American Political Science Review* 87(3) 567-576
- Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. (1997) "Modernization: Theories and Facts" *World Politics* 49(2) 155-183
- Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (2003) "Endogenous Democratization" *World Politics* 55(4) 517-549
- Daniel Ziblatt and Aditya Dasgupta (2015) "How did Britain Democratize: Views from the Sovereign Bond Market" *Journal of Economic History*, 75(1) 1-29
- Richard Nadeau and Michael Lewis-Beck and Eric Belanger (2012) "Economics and Elections Revisited" *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(5) 551-573
- Ryan Kennedy (2010) "The Contradiction of Modernization: A Conditional Model of Endogenous Democratization" *Journal of Politics* 72(3) 785-798

- Daniel Treisman, (2014) “Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover,” *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4) 927-942
- Samuel Huntington, (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, selections
- Theda Skocpol (1979) *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, selections
- Barrington Moore (1966) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston: Beacon Press, selections

Lecture 2: Turnout and the Electorate

- Thomas Cusack and Torben Iversen and David Soskice (2010) Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems, *American Political Science Review* 104(2) pp. 393-403
- Isabella Mares (2015) *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting*, New York: Cambridge University Press, select chapters
- Daniel Ziblatt and Aditya Dasgupta (2015) “How did Britain Democratize: Views from the Sovereign Bond Market” *Journal of Economic History*, 75(1) 1-29
- Saumitra Jha, Kris Mitchener and Masanori Takashim (2015) “Swords into Bank Shares: Financial Instruments, Violent Conflict Resolution and Reform in Meiji Japan”
- Navid Hassanpour (2015) “Modernization Theory and Development Without Democracy: Evidence from Elections to the Iranian National Assembly 1906-1975”
- Rory Truex (2014) “The Returns to Office in a ”Rubber Stamp” Parliament.” *American Political Science Review* 108(2) 235-251.
- Pasha Mahdavi (2015) “Explaining the Oil Advantage: Effects of Natural Resource Wealth on Incumbent Reelection in Iran.” *World Politics* 67(2) 226-267.
- Andrew Eggers and Jens Hainmueller (2009) MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Post-war British Politics, *American Political Science Review* 103(4): 513-533
- Daniel Ziblatt (2006) “How Did Europe Democratize?” *World Politics* 58(2): 311-38
- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, (2000) Why did the West Extend the Franchise? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pp. 1167-1199

- Daniel Ziblatt (2009) “Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany.” *American Political Science Review* 103(1): 1-21
- Andre Blais (2006), “What Affects Voter Turnout?” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9:111-125

Lecture 3: Participation in politics and economy

- Seymour Martin Lipset. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” *American Political Science Review*, 1959
- Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996.
- Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) *Modernization and Bureaucratic-authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, selections
- Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social Change*, 1971, pp. 384-401.
- Adam Przeworski et. al. (2000) *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, selections
- Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi (2002) *Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered*, *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 151-79
- Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Lecture 4: Economic sectorization and political outcomes

- Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, select chapters
- Carles Boix (2011) “Democracy, Development, and the International System” *American Political Science Review* 105(4) 809-828.
- Douglas North (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* Cambridge University Press, selections

- Edward Glaeser, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004) Do Institutions Cause Growth? *Journal of Economic Growth* 9: 271-298
 - Kathleen Thelen (2004) How Institutions Evolve. *Cambridge University Press*, selections
 - George Tsebelis (1995) “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism,” *British Journal of Political Science* 25, 3 , 289-325
 - Matthew E. Carnes and Isabela Mares (2007) “The Welfare State in Global Perspective,” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, 868-885
 - Robert Dahl (1971) *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Yale University Press, selections
 - Arend Lijphart (1999) *Patterns of Democracy*, Yale University Press
causal identification using observational data
 - Alberto Abadie and Alexis Diamond and Jens Hainmueller (2010) Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*
 - Christopher Winship and Stephen Morgan (1999) The Estimation of Causal Effects from Observational Data, *Annual Review of Sociology* 25: 659-707
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Segment 2: Elements of political stability

Lecture 5: Choice of electoral systems, presidentialism and parliamentarism

- Carles Boix (1999) “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies” *The American Political Science Review* 93 (3): 609-24.
- Thomas Cusack and Torben Iversen and David Soskice (2010) Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems, *American Political Science Review* 104(2) pp. 393-403
- Rippa Norris (1997) “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian, and Mixed Systems” *International Political Science Review* 18(3): 297-312

- David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (1988) Elections, Coalitions, and legislative Outcomes *American Political Science Review* 82(2): 405-422
- Carles Boix (2010) Electoral Markets, Party Strategies, and Proportional Representation, *American Political Science Review* 104(2) pp. 404-413

Lecture 6: Institutionalization of democracy and rule of law

- Myerson, Roger. 2008. "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State," *American Political Science Review* 102 (February): 125-139.
- Douglas North and Barry Weingast (1989) "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England" *Journal of Economic History* 49(4) 803-832
- John Aldrich (1993) "Rational Choice and Turnout," *American Journal of Political Science*, 37: 246-278
- Robert W. Jackman "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 81:405-23
- Raymond Duch and Randy Stevenson. (2005) "Context and the Economic Vote: A Multi-Level Analysis." *Political Analysis* 13 (4)
- Gary Cox, "Electoral Rules, Mobilization, and Turnout" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18:49-68
- Barry Burden and David Canon and Kenneth Mayer and Donald Moynihan (2014) "Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform" *American Journal of Political Science* 58(1) 95-109

Lecture 7: Institutionalization of authority

- Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski (2007) "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies* 40(11) 1279-1301
- Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. 2006. Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships, *Economics and Politics* 18(1):1-26
- Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler (2010) "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament" *American Political Science Review* 104(3): 482-502

- Quintin Beazer (2015) “Political Centralization and Economic Performance: Evidence from Russia” *Journal of Politics* 77(1) 128-145
- Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter and David Szakonyi (2014) Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace, *World Politics* 66(2) 195-228
- Mary Gallagher (2002) Reform and Openness: Why China’s Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy, *World Politics* 54: 338-372
- Magaloni, Beatriz. (2006) Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Kimuli Kasara and Pavithra Suryanarayan (2015) “When Do the Rich Vote Less Than the Poor and Why? Explaining Turnout Inequality across the World” *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3) 613-627

Lecture 8: Symbiotic coexistence of authoritarianism and democracy

- Lisa Blaydes (2006) “Who Votes in Authoritarian Elections and Why? Determinants of Voter Turnout in Contemporary Egypt”, 2006 APSA Annual Meeting
- Pierre Landry and Deborah Davis and Shiru Wang (2010) “Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties” *Comparative Political Studies* 43(6) 763-790
- Yiqing Xu and Yang Yao (2015) Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China, *American Political Science Review* 109(2) pp. 371-391
- Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar (2009) “Elections Under Authoritarianism”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12: 403-422
- Milan Svobik, Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability, Government Performance, and the Consolidation of Democracy (2013) *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 685-702
- Gary W. Cox, “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems,” *American Journal of Political Science* 34, 4 (November 1990), 903-935.
- Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

- Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, “Introduction” and “Elections and Representation” in Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, eds., *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation* (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
 - Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000
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Segment 3: Elements of political instability

Lecture 9: Civil conflict

- Charles Tilly (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*, New York: Addison-Wesley, select chapters
- Mancur Olson (1971) *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, select chapters
- Navid Hassanpour (2016) *Leading from the Periphery and Network Collective Action*, Cambridge University Press, select chapters
- Stathis Kalyvas (2006) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, select chapters
- Susanne Lohmann (1994) “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91.” *World Politics*, 47
- Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001) *Dynamics of Contention*, Cambridge University Press, selections
- Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003
- Kuran, Timur. 1991. “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” *World Politics* 44 (October): 7-48.
- James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (1990), selections
- Monica Toft and Yuri Zhukov (2015) “Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus”, *American Political Science Review* 109(2) 222-238

Lecture 10: Ethnic politics

- Kate Baldwin and John Huber (2010) “Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision”, *American Political Science Review* 104(4) 644-662
- J. Habyarimana, M. Humphreys, D. Posner, and J. Weinstein (2007) “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” *American Political Science Review* 101(4), 709-725
- Thad Dunning and Janhavi Nilekani (2013) Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils, *American Political Science Review* 107(1), 35-56
- James Fearon and David Laitin (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War *American Political Science Review*, 97(1) 75-90
- Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2011) Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide, New York: Cambridge University Press, select chapters
- Mark Beissinger (2002) Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, New York: Cambridge University Press, select chapters

Lecture 11: Resource curse

- Michael Ross (2015), “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18:239-259
- Thad Dunning (2008) *Crude Democracy, Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes* Cambridge University Press, selections
- Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo (2011) Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse *American Political Science Review* 105(1): 1-26.
- Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon (2004) Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa *Comparative Political Studies* 37(7): 816-841
- Kevin Morrison (2009) Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability *International Organization* 63(1): 107-138

Lecture 12: Electoral dysfunction

- Leonard Wantchekon (2003) Clientelism and voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin *World Politics* 55(3): 399-422
- Tatiana Kostadinova (2003) “Voter turnout dynamics in post-Communist Europe” *European Journal of Political Research* 42: 741-759
- Isabela Mares and Lauren Young (2016) “Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes” *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:267-288
- Horracio Larreguy and John Marshall and Pablo Querubin (2016) “Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers” *American Political Science Review* 110(1) 160-179
- Kevin Croke and Guy Grossman and Horracio Larreguy and John Marshall (2016) “Deliberate Disengagement: How Education Can Decrease Political Participation in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes” *American Political Science Review* 110(3) 579-600
- Ora Reuter and Graeme Robertson (2015) “Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes” *Journal of Politics* 77(1) 235-248
- Alberto Simpser (2012) “Does Electoral Manipulation Discourage Voter Turnout? Evidence from Mexico” *Journal of Politics* 74(3) 782-795