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Russian Reforms in Regions: Is Authoritarian Modernization Everywhere Authoritarian?[1]

Russian reforms of 2000s are often unconditionally referred as an almost canonical example of an authoritarian modernization. Some scholars prefer to define this type of modernization as a technocratic one. The latter term is unquestionably appropriate if by it we mean that design process of Russian reforms in 21st century is mostly experts-driven.[2] Nevertheless, given that the Russian regime cannot be described as fully authoritarian,[3] we doubt that there was no place at all for political process (in terms of politics) and for the positive and meaningful role of democratic institutions in the design and implementation of the reforms. In what follows we will try to support this point of view with the examples and some statistical evidence from some of the Russian reforms in the beginning of century. We will start with outline of our opinion on there, why and how politics and democratic institutions can affect policy process in Russian case, being a nominally federal state with a hybrid type of political regime. Then we will describe how this instances of politics influence looked from empirical point of view in the given case. And we will end up with conclusions and some thoughts on possible further issues concerning our problem.

Hybrid features of Russian State

Contemporary Russia is a political hybrid in a lot of meanings. Foremost, there is hybrid political regime or, according to most authors, a regime of an electoral authoritarianism.[4] This means that despite uneven and unfair political process, there are some formal democratic procedures and institutions. Most of the time they are almost completely imitative but under some circumstances they can be of a greater significance.

Second important feature of the Russian state in the context of this work is its mixed nature of territorial organization. According to its Constitution, Russia is a

[2] Gelman V., Starodubtsev A. Opportunities and Limitations of Authoritarian Modernization: Russian Reforms of the 2000s // Russian Politics. 2014. №4. Pp. 6-30.
Gelman V. Y. The deadlock of authoritarian modernization // Pro et Contra. 2009. Vol.13. № 5-6. P.51-61.
[3] Schedler, A. 2015. Electoral Authoritarianism. Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource. 1–16.
[4] Robertson, G. B. (2010). The politics of protest in hybrid regimes: Managing dissent in post-communist Russia countries. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press
Gelman V. Ya. From the fire into the fire: Russian policy after the USSR. SPb, 2013. .

federal state with three independent layers of authority: federal (or central), regional and municipal (local). But most scholars specialized in the subject of federative relations in Russia claim that the given case of territorial organization cannot be considered as a federation in the full sense even formally. This is the case due to lack of at least one competence that is under complete control of any tier of authority except of federal one[5]. The other deviations from pure-federations are actual violation of vertical division of powers; unevenness of formal and informal rules for different types of regions etc.

If one will try to define way and type of the last Russian modernization, one will encounter set of features that cannot be related with any of 'pure' concepts. Some claim that reforms can be either technocratic (designed by narrow circle of experts) or political (product of wide and inclusive discussion and deliberation); others prefer to separate cases of modernizations into authoritarian and democratic ones (which dates back to polemics between Huntington's[6] and Lipset's[7] points of view). These divisions are not theoretically equivalent but are intersected logically and in reality. Nevertheless, in our opinion, Russian case cannot be undoubtedly classified as the authoritarian or technocratic modernization. Despite that nature of Russian policy process is primarily authoritarian and technocratic, we claim that there was a place for sometimes significant influence of politics and positive role of democratic institutions.

In our opinion this influence is possible due to hybrid nature of Russian state outlined above. Hence, the moments when politics and democratic institutions become significant should be derived from mixed features of Russian regime and territorial organization.

Political struggle at the federal level

At the federal level of policy process there seems to be a little place for positive role of democratic institutions (in the meaning of the more or less equal opportunity of population to affect the decision-making directly or through fairly elected representatives). The reasons to argue that is destruction of checks and balances; absence of opposition in the parliament; excessive formal and real presidential powers; controllable outcomes of federal elections (presidential and parliamentary) obtained due to formal electoral engineering, use of administrative resources and semi-legal (or even illegal) practices. The one feature present at the federal level of Russian politics and policy which is shared with democratic regimes is the effects of political business cycle.[8] That is that even in hybrid regimes with unfair elections authoritarian leaders need to demonstrate their popularity. This requirement makes then to take popular and often populist measures before the

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[5] Riker. 1975. Federalism, in Handbook of Political Science. In Handbook of Political Science, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, Vol 5., p 101

[6] Huntington S. Political order in changing societies. New Haven and London, 1965. 263 p.

[7] . Lipset S. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N. Y, 1960. P. 27—63.

[8] Nordhaus W. The political business cycle// Review of economic studies. 1975. Vol.42. №2. Pp.169-190

elections. We will not come back to this issue later because it is unclear to which extent this influence of electoral cycle is a democratic feature or a manipulative practice in a regime of an electoral authoritarianism. Besides there are doubts that this mechanism would positively influence the process of modernization.

In spite the situation with democracy there is still plenty of space for politics in policy process at the federal level. Even if we imagine that design of reforms conceptions is completely left for technocratic experts, we can barely imagine a situation when their proposals will be accepted and implemented without obstacles and changes. Theoretically, this could be only possible if experts' suggestions are in accordance with authoritarian leaders', different rent-seekers' and bureaucracy opportunistic interests. (The latter is almost impossible due to built-in bureaucratic characteristic to resist all the changes which almost always mean labor and time costs for this type of actors.)[9] Hence, to be successful in acceptance of their normative views on a given policy, experts generally should form an advocacy coalition to reassure key actors and groups in decision-making process or to break their resistance. Their counterparts (if given) could tend to adoption of an alternative design of a policy and they also can form such coalitions. These advocacy coalitions are built around shared beliefs (of different depth) could consist of actors of a different kind: politicians, experts, bureaucrats, journalists, representatives of business and academic community or civil society. Generally, it is true that the wider such a coalition is, the more resources it has (finances, personal contacts, influence on public opinion etc.) and, therefore, the more chances it has to adopt a supported alternative.[10] However, it is unnecessary to include actors and groups external to 'inner' circle. As soon as we have shown almost complete inability of population to affect policy process at the federal level, we expect that the coalitions formed by reformers and their counterparts, if given at all, will consist primarily of top-level bureaucrats, admitted experts and representative of business closely related to state structures. Other actors (external experts, representatives of business and civil society) could help with elaboration of reforms' content but they are rather useless in persuasion of authoritarian decision-maker(s).[11] Though, at least theoretically, there could be come exemptions. If some coalition can significantly influence public opinion and then this public will widely and strongly express its position on some issue, it could affect the final decision (which was the case of 2005 direct payments reform in Russia).

Moreover, we can take a wider point of view on the concept of politics. With some imagination we can draw a parallel between our policy reformers and scientists whose activities were studied by B. Latour. Former ones strive to converse their own normative views into real arrangements of political reality. Latter ones are interested

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[9] Gelman V., Starodubtsev A. Opportunities and Limitations of Authoritarian Modernization: Russian Reforms of the 2000s // Russian Politics. 2014. №4. Pp. 6-30.

[10] Sabatier P., Jenkins-Smith H. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Avalon Publishing, 1993. 290 p.

[11] The Presidential Human Rights Council, which is of little use in politically connected affairs, is a good example of this

in transformation of their opinions on nature of some phenomena into universally shared 'scientific facts'. Both of them – a reformer and a scientist – are primarily aimed to persuade others (decision-makers in the first case and academic community in the second one). One of the Latour's crucial thoughts is that besides human nature allies one should make alliances with 'actors' of non-human nature (previous facts, instruments, results of experiments etc.).[12] With a certain narrowing of Latour's concept we can claim that for the reformers it is also important to rely on this non-human 'actors'. But in our case this would be academic knowledge, material resources, previous experience, early and/or experimental results of policy transformations. We can even represent this process as some kind spiral: support from human actors leads to more opportunities to obtain a non-human allies which lead to more support from human actors… If there is more than one point of view, supporters of each of these alternative will follow this spiral competing with each other for the allies. This is exactly what politics is.

Therefore, the struggle for the persuasion of decision-makers between supporters of different policy alternatives, process of coalition building is first of assumed points where politics could interfere in primarily (but not purely) technocratic and authoritarian policy process. This in turn could bring in the drawbacks and advantages of political way of reforms: its slow, often too compromise character and more deliberative nature.

Regional dimension of Russian policy process.

Other suggested moments where politics and democratic institutions (in the certain sense) can influence policy process are connected with regional dimension of reforms. As we already noted, one key feature of Russian federalism is absence of at least one activity on which regional authorities could 'make final decisions'[13]. There are only so-called mutual competences of federal and regional levels in primarily socio-economic spheres (healthcare, education, culture, infrastructure etc.) and an opportunity for the federal center to endow some powers to regions for completion of particular tasks. It is clear that the extent and breadth of powers of regional authorities is under full control of the federal center.

Taking all of this into account, we can suggest that regional differentiation of reform process could happen only if changes refer to these sphere of mutual competence and/or if the federal center initially allows some discretion at lower layers of power. Besides, given that federal level controls agenda and makes all core decisions, we expect that more often regions will vary in the process of implementation though in some cases some discretion in reforms' content is also possible.

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[12] Latour,B. Science in Action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. – Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1987. - 274 p.
[13] Riker William, 1975, 'Federalism', in Greenstein Fred and Polsby Nelson (eds), Handbook of Political Science, Addison-Wesley, Reading, vol. V, 93-172

Returning to the issue of possible effects of politics and democratic institutions on the policy process, we argue that there are at least three major spots where it could take place at the regional level.

We must note that Russian regions differ in the position of regional political regimes on democracy/authoritarianism imaginary continuum and in the quality of their relations with the federal center. The latter situation exists due to different extent of fiscal dependence of regions on the federal center. Besides, some scholars claim that there exist some specific mode of relations – political one: regions are supported by the federal center (first of all, financially) not according to their socio-economic performance but by the extent of their political loyalty, i.e. ones who can provide more 'right' votes and sustain politically calm situation will get federal backing[14]. Drawing from premises of the rational choice new institutionalism, we suggest that regional political elites do not cordially welcome any reforms, as soon as they imply the need to undertake additional efforts and may be potentially dangerous for habitual ways of securing their powers, i.e. they imply some additional costs. In this situation, the regions-center relations and influence of democratic features of regime could play a role of institutional barriers making regional authorities to follow the course of a reform. First mechanism refers primarily to implementation of changes that are of crucial interest of federal elites (e.g. of some populist decisions or change which could provide better controllability and accountability etc.). Democratic institutions (giving that they exist in a region at all) could restrict actions of regional elites in the both processes: design and implementation. If public is deeply interested in some transformations and there are relatively strong democratic ways to influence regional authorities it can potentially compel decision-makers to adopt desired changes and then to implement them as careful as possible. Of course, one can barely find any democratic region or a region which is greatly independent on the federal center. Nevertheless, as we stated above, Russian regions can be located at the continuums of dependence/independence and of democracy/authoritarianism. For us this means, that we will expect that 1) more dependent regions will demonstrate better implementation of reforms which are of interest of the federal elites; and 2) more democratic regions will perform better in the transformations that are of interest of population.

The third point there politics could matter is the same situation of struggle for persuasion of decision-makers as described for the federal level in the cases when regional stage allows some discretion in the content of changes.

Therefore, above we have proposed four possible points in Russian mostly authoritarian and technocratic policy process, where politics and democratic institutions can potentially significantly affect design and implementation of reforms. This influence is possible due to hybrid nature of Russian state at least

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[14] Starodubtsev A. You can not lose money: regional politics and federalism in modern Russia. St. Petersburg: Publication. European Univ., 2014. 195p.

considering its political regime and territorial organization. We argue that these points are: struggle for adoption of desired policy alternatives among different often experts-driven coalitions both at the federal and regional levels; influence of region-state relations where regional policy is often interrelated with regional politics; possible role of democratic institutions in some regions as the barriers for regional elites to resist changes.

In following part we will demonstrate how these moments of political and democratic influence looked like in reality using examples of different Russian reforms of 2000s. Firstly, we will turn to the design process of administrative, tax and pension reform on the federal level, describing the different shapes of coalition struggle (or lack of it). Secondly, we will provide statistical evidence of regional differentiation in the significance of the dependence on the federal center and democratic institutions for implementation of administrative, educational and healthcare reforms.

Tax, pension and administrative reforms: struggle of coalitions

To illustrate the situation with struggle between supporters of different policy alternative we will shortly describe the federal stage of three different reforms: tax, administrative and pension. We have chosen these cases as the examples due to several reasons. First of all, processes at the federal level are the main stage for all of these reforms and two of these reforms are almost fully limited by this stage. All the key decisions of tax and pension reforms were made in federal committees and they were implemented mainly by adoption of corresponding legislation in the State Duma. Secondly, these reforms started in similar context but ended with significantly different results: success of the tax reform; dubious outcome of transformations in the administrative sphere; and almost no real changes in the sphere of the pensions insurance.

All the three reforms begin under the same conditions of the simultaneity dilemma: [15] a crisis in the respective policy subsystem left no choice for the political elite, except to move in the direction of reforms. Despite that final decisions barely could be made without the authoritarian leader (the president), in the situation of uncertainty and incompleteness of information there should be some backlash for possible change of desired policy alternative. Therefore, different competing groups could try to convince the autocrat to support their positions

15 Gelman V. Ya. From the fire into the fire: Russian policy after the USSR. SPb, 2013. P. 67-68.
Offe K. The dilemma of simultaneity: democratization and market economy in Eastern Europe // Turns of history: Post-socialist transformations through the eyes of German researchers / Ed.-p.: P. Shtykov, S. Shvanits; sci. Ed. V. Gelman. M .; SPb .: Summer Garden, 2003. T. 2. S. 6-22

In the course of reforms, in all three cases, coalitions of reformers-liberals (in fact, team of experts lead by G. Gref) and their opponents were created. And the motivation of the reformers easily fits into the hierarchy of beliefs, proposed by Sabatier.[16] The basis is liberal ideology; the development of liberal concepts for liberal politicians; adapting them to a specific situation, trying to maximize the implementation of deep liberal beliefs. The interests of their opponents, with some exceptions (e.g. the communists' protest against the flat tax scale) are purely pragmatic: control over financial flows, reluctance to change the way the subsystem formed in the subsystem, etc.

It is noteworthy that the nature of the tactics of manipulation used by political entrepreneurs[17] of both sides was reduced to an emphasis on the cognitive component of the arguments (the reform is good, since it will increase the budget's fillability, facilitate governance mechanisms, create a strong model in the long run; no need in the reform due to the lack of finances, greater importance of the current perspective, etc.) That is, these reforms have become a field of struggle between pragmatists and entrepreneurs, for whom, at least at first glance, the normative beliefs were more important.

However, the discrepancies are already visible at the first stages of reforms' design.

The tax reform is an example of the successful pursuit by reformers of various tactics for persuasion of key decision-makers. The alliances within the government (the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the Ministry of Finance), an appeal to the allies of non-human nature (the early results of the reform, references to previous experience, etc.) made it possible to translate the interests of the political elite (the president) in such a way as to secure its support. This, among other things, made it possible to exclude a group of opponents from the process of developing the reform, which, in turn, further consolidated the resources of the reformers and strengthened their position in the eyes of the elite. [18]

In cases of transformations in the administrative and pension systems, the reformers did not have time to react to the changed context. If in the nineties objective conditions had forced politicians to largely support the ideas of reformers, then in the 2000s the priorities of the elite changed. This demanded from the reformers a more skilful argumentation of positions, the creation of broader and more powerful alliances to direct the interests to more liberal transformations. What, as follows from the above, did not happen. Coalitions of opponents of radical change, on the contrary, have successfully used the changes that have taken place, concluding broad alliances within the bureaucracy and successfully mixing and changing the interests of decision-makers. In fact, this led to a shift in the priorities of the country's leadership from carrying out structural reforms aimed at a long-term

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[16] Sabatier P., Jenkins-Smith H. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Avalon Publishing, 1993. 290 p.
[17] Kingdon J. W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Longman, 2003. 2nd ed. Pp. 165-208
[18] Gel'man V. Starodubtsev A. Op. cit Pp. 15-17; 23

perspective, to providing support for various target groups (electorate, bureaucracy) at the moment.[19]

The partial success of administrative reform (as opposed to pension reform) can also be partially explained by the argument about coalition struggles. In the case of pension reform, there was a strong and broad alliance of anti-reformers. Hence, the outcome of the relatively long lasted political struggle starting in early 1990s was shift from a liberal pension model through a liberal model with some conservative inclusions to a conservative model with some shallow and formal liberal elements.[20] It can also be added that the pension reform would be more acutely perceived by society, which gave its opponents additional powerful justification for their positions aimed primarily towards short-run.[21] During the development of the concept of administrative reform, there was no clearly identifiable, consolidated group of opponents from any side. There was a background bureaucratic rejection of transformations broadcasted into the commission for the design of the reform by a number of its high-ranking representatives. That is, opponents of the reform could not finally convince the political elite that the absence of serious changes is in real interests of key decision-makers.

Thus, we cannot say that features of Russian regime and principles of policy process necessary require the eradication of politics from policy process at the federal level. Moreover, we have shown that, in fact, political struggle among supporters of different policy alternatives even within some closed circle could make a significant impact on the final decisions of authoritarian elite. Besides, we saw that instances of reforms can differ by the extent of significance of politics component. Hence, there is no uniform and pure mode of modernization already at the federal level, even given same decision-makers, key actors (including experts) and timing, in the Russian case. This in turn means that drawbacks and positive sides of each of 'pure' type of modernization are possible in the given case (e.g. 'compromise squared'[22] in the case of the pension reform).

Education, healthcare and administrative reforms: opportunities for politics and democratic institutions in regions

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[19] Sungurov A., Tinyakov D. Administrative reform and its projects in modern Russia: were coalitions of support // Social Sciences and Modernity. 2016. №2. Pp. 39-51;
Administrative reform. Interview with M. Dmitriev // History of the New Russia. Essays, interviews. In 3 volumes. T. 1 / Under the general. Ed. PS Filippov. St. Petersburg, 2011. P. 198-216.
[20] Nuances of pension reform. Interview with M. Dmitriev // History of the New Russia. Essays, interviews. In 3 volumes. T. 2 / Under the general. Ed. PS Filippov. SPb, 2011. S. 206-207
[21] Sinyavskaya OV The History of Pension Reform in Russia // The History of the New Russia. Essays, interviews. In 3 volumes. T. 3 / Under the Society. Ed. PS Filippov. SPb, 2011.Pp. 200-201.
[22] Dekalchuk A. A. Choosing between Bureaucracy and the Reformers: The Russian Pension Reform of 2001 as a Compromise Squared, in: Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016. Ch. 10.

For the analysis of regional dimensions of features of Russian way of modernization, we decided to choose cases of administrative. Educational and healthcare reforms because they imply both regional stage of implementation and some discretion in decisions on the extent of participation in reform processes and/or their actual content. E.g. regions could create committees that defined key directions of transformations in administrative system; they could set different priorities for expenditures from compulsory medical insurance fund; they could choose when to join the USE (unified state exam) program at the experimental stage. In what follows we will present results of statistical analysis of role of political factors in performance of Russian regions in implementation of these reforms. We will concentrate on subject of our interest, i.e. role of democratic institutions and of dependence on the federal center. The very content of the reforms will be left out of our analyses and will be mentioned only if it will help to explain the process of our analysis.[23]

Firstly, we would like to briefly remember our theoretical premises, describe our dependent and independent variables and working hypotheses.

Starting from key assumptions of rational choice new institutionalism,[24] we expect following:

1. Regional governments and heads of regions in particular, are primarily interested in preserving their power;

2. Socio-economic transformations are possible only insofar as they lead to the attainment of this goal or are imposed by existing institutional constraints

3. The democratic nature of the region, the openness of regional authorities leads to the strengthening of the importance of public influence as an institutional barrier and promotes socially beneficial transformations

4. In the situation of hybrid political regime[25] of electoral authoritarianism on the scale of the state as a whole, on the one hand, the role of the federal center in ensuring the political interests of regional elites is greatly significant, and on the other hand, the region's ability to provide electoral loyalty is important. [26] In this case, the strategies of regional elites may include the achievement of their aims not through effective public governance, but through building relationships with the center according to a certain model of political loyalty in exchange for the provision of transfers.

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[23] Information about the content of reforms may be found in the series of interviews and articles in History of the New Russia. Essays, interviews. In 3 volumes. / Under the general. Ed. PS Filippov. St. Petersburg, 2011.

[24] Hall P., Taylor R. Political science and three new institutionalisms // Political studies. 1996. № 5(44). P. 942-46.PS Filippov. St. Petersburg, 2011. P. 198-216.

[25] Gelman V. Ya. From the fire into the fire…

[26] Starodubtsev A. You can not lose money: regional politics and federalism in modern Russia. St. Petersburg: Publication. European Univ., 2014. 195p.

5. In addition to regional elites, the regional administrative system is involved in the process of transformation. Moreover, the interests of officials are the preservation of the workplace and the reduction of possible costs. As soon as any transformation means costs, the bureaucracy will potentially resist them.

After outline of our theoretical premises we will describe the variables used in regression analysis. We start with dependent variables reflecting the performance of regional authorities in considered set of activities.

In the case of healthcare reform we use the regional difference in morbidity (number of diseases per 1,000 population) and total mortality (ratio of deaths as a consequence of natural and anthropogenic causes to the total size of the population) between 2012 and 2000 as a dependent variables. [27] Positive dynamics will be represented by negative values of the variable (reduction of morbidity and mortality), and vice versa. These indicators are chosen due to the fact that the reform was primarily aimed at preventing disease and reducing mortality. Taking into account the relatively high degree of decentralization on this mutual competence (healthcare sphere), we assume that this parameter will, on the one hand, assess the activities of regional authorities in the development of the health system. On the other hand, with some caution this variable can be interpreted as the willingness of the authorities to implement provisions of healthcare reform. (In any case, one of the main directions of the reform – the expansion and qualitative improvement of the medical examination is directly and explicitly aimed at reducing morbidity).

For the analysis of transformations in the education system, we decided to separately assess the readiness of the region to participate in the reform and effectiveness of activity of regional authorities in this field. To do this, in the first case, the dependent variable will be the measure of the amount of years in which the subject participated in the program of the unified state examination, for the period from 2000 to 2008 (regions varied in years the entered the program). [28] Thus, the value of this variable for regions that have participated since the beginning of the experiment will be equal to eight years; and the figure for regions that have joined the project at the last moment will be equal to one year. Since the decision to participate in the experiment had to be coordinated with the regional executive authorities, a greater number of years would indicate greater willingness of the subject to participate in the innovation process (at least in the education sphere).

To reflect the success of management of regional authorities in the field of education, we use the difference between 2012 and 2000 in terms of number of graduates per 10,000 of the population of the subject of federation. [29] One of the most developed and completed components of the educational reform is the mechanism of the USE (Unified State Exam), aimed to enhance academic mobility and competition between Universities for students. That means that positive value of the given dependent variable signifies an increase of competitiveness of regional higher education

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[27] Data source: Rosstat
[28] Data source: annual lists of regions participating in the USE experiment from 2001 to 2007
[29] Data source: Rosstat

institutions (including improvement due to the successful actions of the regional authorities). On the contrary, negative value of the indicator would imply a reduction in the attractiveness of Universities of the subject.

We estimate the degree of administrative reform implementation in regions by the difference between 2012 and 2008 in the amount of ineffective expenditures on state administration in subject (in millions of rubles). This indicator is chosen due to the fact that, first, it corresponds to the basic and least stuck direction of the reform – orientation towards economic efficiency in the framework of a managerial approach. Secondly, the amount of ineffective costs on the organization of state administration is used by the federal center for general evaluation of the activities of regional bodies of state power. The positive difference shows the growth of inefficient spending, and a negative a decrease. This indicator was calculated by the officially designed formula that is used for evaluation of regional authorities. 30 This formula implies subtraction of some supposed 'normal' amount of expenditures on state administration for the region of a given size from overall regional expenditures on this subject. Formula includes a coefficient of regional size which makes the indicator sensitive to the differences of scale though it is measure in real absolute units. This is made in such a way that less populated regions are penalized in a greater degree for 'excessive' expenditures.31

Choice of period of analysis is explained by the fact that the regional stage of the reform had started in 2007 and fully continued time since 2008. In addition, before 2008 separate item of expenditure on the functioning of the government entity and the Executive authorities was absent in reports on the execution of regional budgets.

Independent variables that were used in the analysis reflect our considerations regarding the possible influence of center-regions relations, role of democratic institutions and some control variables. In our models we used these figures both in average for the given period and in dynamics (difference between the end and the beginning of the considered period). As independent variables we used following: regional political regime; political loyalty of the region; financial dependence on the federal center; extent of administrative involvement of the center; bureaucracy ability to resist; gross regional product. Operationalization of these variables can be found in Appendix II.

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30 Source of formulas:

Administration site of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug. Monitoring of Yugra. (Date of circulation: 25/05/2017). URL: http://www.monitoring.admhmao.ru/site/(S(ybusjtyrt5boky45q3nylv55))/reports/OIV_0003_0003/default .aspxc

31 Data source: regional reports on the execution of the budgets

Before going to statistical analysis we present our set of working hypotheses.

1. The democratic nature of the regional regime contributes to the positive dynamics of transformations, since it is an institutional constraint on regional authorities and an incentive for reform.
   Therefore, we expect that the dynamics of towards the increase of democracy will be connected with the positive dynamics of changes in these areas (reduction mortality, morbidity and inefficient spending, growth in the number of graduates); more democratic regions generally will show more positive dynamics.

2. High political loyalty to the center in a given region demonstrates that in relations with the center it is often more important than the actual effectiveness of the activity for the assessment of regional authorities' performance. Therefore, we expect that the higher the political loyalty is, the less will be the positive dynamics of changes in this or that sphere.

3. The administrative presence of the federal center in a region is positively related to the dynamics of the changes assuming that the center is interested in the reforms. That is, an increase in the number of employees of federal structures is expected to lead to a more positive dynamics of the transformation processes.

4. The degree of financial dependence on the federal center can have a dual effect on the pace and quality of changes. So, in case of real interest of the center in any reform, a high degree of financial dependence of a region will act as a lever of additional influence on regional elites. However, relying on the theoretical considerations about the rare interest of the leader of the undemocratic regime in real transformations, we will rather expect that a high share of transfers is rather evidence of building a relationship with the center by the model of loyalty in exchange for money.32
   In other words, we assume that regional authorities in regions with a greater share of transfers in the structure of income are less interested in the additional costs of implementing reforms in the situation when it is enough to express enough degree of political loyalty.
   That is, more dependent regions will show less positive dynamics of transformations, given the political (or opportunistic) model of regional policy.

5. Finally, an increase in the number of officials in the administrative system of a region will mean an increase in the ability of the bureaucracy to resist change, and, consequently, their less positive dynamics.

In addition to the described variables reflecting the influence of the political characteristics of the region we also take into account the control variable of the change in the per capita gross regional product at the end of the period in comparison with the beginning (in thousands of rubles). 33 At the same time, it is logical to

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32 Starodubtsev A. You can not lose money: regional politics and federalism in modern Russia. St. Petersburg: Publication. European Univ., 2014. 195
33 Data source: Rosstat

expect that the growth of GRP will contribute to the positive dynamics of the changes.

In the course of data analysis, we used quantitative methods: regression analysis using linear and logistic models, various statistical tests.

The empirical database initially consisted of data on 32 variables in 92 regions (including those that had ceased to exist) for the period from 2000 to 2012. Later we excluded regions that have changed their administrative borders during this period because of difficulties with weighting of figures. Data were collected from open sources on the Internet (websites of Rosstat, Roskaznacheystvo, regional government bodies). The database was partly based on data taken from the materials of the work of the scientific research group of the Higher School of Economics Research of stability and variability of political courses.

After description of our data, variables and hypotheses we present the overall results of regression analysis.

Administrative sphere

In the analysis of the regional dynamics of the administrative system, the dependent variable was the dynamics of inefficient spending on the organization of the functioning of the executive branch. As dependent variables, we used the degree of political loyalty to the center, the extent of financial dependence on the center, the degree of democracy (both on average for the period and in the dynamics) and the change in the gross regional product over the period. Due the approximate normality od distribution of the dependent variable, we used the multiple linear regression model.

The only statistically significant variable in the general multiple regression model was the dynamics of regime democratization.

After conducting the tests for drop-out cases, we excluded from the model the cases of Moscow and the Kursk oblast' due to the excessively high indicators of hat-values and cook-distance, reflecting a strong effect on the regression line.

After the iterative comparison of models, we determined that the best model is a binary model in which the only independent variable is the change in democracy (Table 1):

Table 1. Influence of regional regime dynamics on the change in inefficient expenditures on the organization of the functioning of the executive branch.

Coefficients:				
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	-4.987	56.843	-0.088	0.930321
Regime dynamics	194.848	54.102	3.601	0.000566 ***

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Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 497.8 on 75 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.1474,   Adjusted R-squared:  0.1361
F-statistic: 12.97 on 1 and 75 DF,  p-value: 0.0005658
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The final model demonstrates that at a high statistical significance the variable of the change in the regional regime explains about 14% of the variation of the dependent variable, that is, the dynamics of the inefficient expenditures for the functioning of regional executive bodies. The direction of the connection is positive, that is, an increase in democracy leads to an increase in inefficient spending on public administration. Beta coefficient in the model shows that with an improvement in the rating of democracy by one point, the expected value of an increase in inefficient costs for the functioning of the regional executive power is about 195 million rubles.

Thus, in the case of changes in the administrative sphere, none of our hypotheses have been confirmed. On the contrary, an increase in the degree of democracy of the regime leads to an increase in spending on public administration. Most likely, this relationship reflects a purely economic pattern: ensuring the functioning of democratic institutions requires additional workers and additional costs.

Education system

To analyze the factors that influenced the dynamics in education, we used models with different dependent variables.

In the first case, we looked at the cumulative number of years that the region participated in the unified state exam program. This dependent variable reflected the moment at which the subject of the federation entered the experiment and, potentially, readiness for change. To construct the model, we used the Poisson regression method. However, in the model obtained by us no significant variable was found. Change in the composition of the independent variables does not make any of them significant. Consequently, it can be concluded that the chosen macro characteristics of regional political systems did not influence the decision of the subjects to join the USE program.

The situation is more interesting if we use the indicator of the dynamics of the number of graduates of higher educational institutions per 10,000 people of the subject's population as a dependent variable. Due to the non-normality of the distribution, we transformed the dependent variable into a binomial variable, showing if the number of university graduates in the region increased or decreased from 2000 to 2012. Thus, about a quarter of the regions demonstrated a decrease in the values of this indicator. We, in turn, interpret this as a decrease in the

competitiveness of educational institutions due to insufficiently successful actions by regional authorities in this field.

Table 2 presents the best model of binomial regression, identified by a stepwise change in the composition of covariates. The model shows that dynamics of GRP, changes in the size of regional bureaucracies, and the degree of financial dependence on the center are significant as factors of the dynamics of the number of graduates. Moreover, an increase in the number of bureaucrats and an increase in the gross regional product enhance the chances for the region to be in the group with an increased number of graduates. Simplifying, it can be said that the growth in GRP and the increase in the number of public officials lead to an increase in the number of graduates of higher educational institutions in the region. At the same time, the more the region is financially dependent on the center, the more likely it will demonstrate the decrease in the number of graduates of higher education institutions.

Table . Factors of the dynamics of the number of graduates

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.11051	-0.27628	0.06244	0.59345	1.88793

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)	
(Intercept)	1.871e+01	4.621e+03	0.004	0.99677	
Num.of.bur.dynamics	1.538e-01	5.011e-02	3.070	0.00214	**
GRP.change	5.676e-03	2.404e-03	2.361	0.01823	*
Loyalty.avg.	-2.018e+01	4.621e+03	-0.004	0.99652	
Loyalty.high.	-1.882e+01	4.621e+03	-0.004	0.99675	
Loyalty.v.high.	-1.549e+01	4.621e+03	-0.003	0.99733	
Dep.low	-2.894e+00	1.336e+00	-2.167	0.03025	*
Dep. avg.	-3.027e+00	1.465e+00	-2.067	0.03873	*
Dep. high	1.588e+01	3.170e+03	0.005	0.99600	
Dep.v. high	-5.272e+00	3.148e+00	-1.675	0.09401	.

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

    Null deviance: 86.362 on 73 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 50.114 on 64 degrees of freedom
  (5 observations deleted due to missingness)

If the positive role of the growth of the gross regional product is quite natural, then the relationship with other variables can be interpreted in various ways.

An increase in the number of civil servants may indicate a tendency towards a proliferation of bureaucracy and the need for authorities to provide qualified personnel. On the other hand, the reverse causal relation is possible: increasing the proportion of young people with higher education increases the supply of labor, there is in some way an excess of people with a certain (for example, humanitarian) qualification, who then could find themselves in the civil service.

The simplest way to interpret the connection between the high share of transfers in the structure of the region's income with the decrease in the number of people who received higher education is to claim that the least developed regions receive the greatest help from the federal center in accordance with the egalitarian model of regional policy.[34] However, we have already referred to works showing that at the forefront of modern Russian regional policy are not economic justifications, but the task to ensure political loyalty of the regions.[35] Even if we assume that the task of transfers is targeted improvement of the situation in malperforming regions, a failure of such a model of regional support can be clearly seen. Instead of leading to an improvement in the situation at the expense of additional funds, the regions-recipients demonstrate the worst dynamics (at least in terms of the competitiveness of higher education institutions).

Anyway, we see that high financial dependence on the center leads to a lack of incentives for regional authorities to develop the education system in the region.. To maintain the budget balance in the situation of copious transfers, in fact, no active action (costs for regional elites and bureaucracy) on the development of the regional economy is required. So, the education system does not find development either.

Healthcare system

Considering regional changes in the healthcare sector, we used as dependent variables the differences of mortality and morbidity rates between the tart and the end of the period.

The distribution of the variable reflecting the dynamics of morbidity has a form close to normal, so we used the models of multiple linear regression.

By an iterative search of the covariate composition, we determined, that the best model - an additive model that takes into account the variation in GRP and the degree of dependence on the center (Table 3).

Table 3. Factors of the regional morbidity dynmics

Residuals:

[34] Seliverstov V. E. Two models of regional policy // Eco.- All-Russian economic journal. 2008, no. 4. P. 78-94.

[35] Starodubtsev A. You can not lose money: regional politics and federalism in modern Russia. St. Petersburg: Publication. European Univ., 2014. 195p.

```
    Min     1Q  Median    3Q     Max
-151.510 -45.670  -3.294  47.273 178.442


Coefficients:
           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 53.883737  20.542820   2.623 0.010719 *
change.grp  -0.024382   0.006549  -3.723 0.000398 ***
deplow      13.685604  24.939354   0.549 0.584945
depmed      53.305875  27.796911   1.918 0.059290 .
dephigh     46.548568  36.184460   1.286 0.202595
depv.high   90.285105  41.095520   2.197 0.031385 *
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1


Residual standard error: 79.79 on 69 degrees of freedom
  (4 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.2439,   Adjusted R-squared:  0.1891
F-statistic: 4.451 on 5 and 69 DF,  p-value: 0.001425
```

The model explains about 19% of the variation of the dependent variable. The GRP change has a high degree of significance. Moreover, the direction of relation is expectedly negative: a larger amount of funds allows to provide a better health care system, to organize the prevention of diseases, therefore, the incidence must be reduced.

It would seem that a similar mechanism will work in the case of filling the regional budget with transfers. However, with regard to this variable, the situation is exactly the opposite. Groups of regions with medium and very high degree of financial dependence show a statistically significant difference from a group of regions with a very low share of transfers in the structure of income. In dependent regions the projected morbidity is higher by 53 people per thousand of the population, and in regions that are highly dependent it is higher by 90 people, in comparison with those regions where the share of transfers is lesser than 15% of total income (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Relationship between the dynamics of morbidity and financial dependence on the center

This relationship can be explained in a similar way, as in the case changes in educational sphere: first of all, the lack of political and economic incentives for regional authorities to actively promote positive changes.

A slightly different result is obtained if we use the change in the coefficient of total mortality as a dependent variable. The indicator also has a normal distribution, so we built linear models. The best model is the model with independent variables of the GRP dynamics and the degree of political loyalty to the center (Table 4).

Table 4. Relationship of the dynamics of mortality with GRP and loyalty to the center. Model 4a.

```
Residuals:
    Min      1Q   Median      3Q      Max
-2.52712 -0.48720 -0.08275  0.63366  2.15043


Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)    -2.0285774  0.3948681  -5.137 2.24e-06 ***

change.grp     0.0003043  0.0000865   3.518 0.000753 ***

Loyalty.avg.    0.3478548  0.4307874   0.807 0.422010
Loyalty.high.   0.8647054  0.4518192   1.914 0.059562 .
Loyalty.v.high.  0.9637778  0.5375029   1.793 0.077105 .
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Residual standard error: 1.105 on 73 degrees of freedom
  (1 observation deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.1891,   Adjusted R-squared: 0.1447
F-statistic: 4.256 on 4 and 73 DF, p-value: 0.003757

If, on the other hand, we start from a model in which the political regime variable is represented by the average value over a period, then we come to a model that has an even smaller value of the information criterion (i.e. it is better), which includes the covariates of the gross regional product dynamics and the average Carnegie- Center rating value (Table 5).

Table 5. Relationship between the dynamics of mortality and GRP and the political regime. Model 4b

Residuals:
    Min   1Q   Median   3Q   Max
-2.49399 -0.57558 0.03071 0.68916 1.91903

Coefficients:
          Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.984e-01 6.698e-01   0.446 0.65721
change.grp   2.863e-04 8.438e-05   3.394 0.00110 **
mean.regime -5.928e-02 2.198e-02 -2.697 0.00863 **

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 1.085 on 75 degrees of freedom
  (1 observation deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.1965,   Adjusted R-squared: 0.1751
F-statistic: 9.171 on 2 and 75 DF, p-value: 0.0002734

Both models reflect the relationship between the dynamics of the overall mortality rate and the increase in GRP. The projected quantitative change in the death rate with GRP growth by 1 thousand rubles per capita is small - about 0.0003 points. However, the marked dependence is highly statistically significant: when the per capita GRP grows, the overall mortality rate slightly increases. On the one hand, this phenomenon indicates the probable failures of the Russian health care system: a situation where economic development does not lead to an improvement in the quality of life of citizens. On the other hand, this pattern may reflect an increase in anthropogenic factors in the increase of mortality in more rapidly developing regions: criminal environment, environmental degradation, technogenic risks.

Model 4a reflects the relationship between the dynamics of mortality and the degree of political loyalty - the average share of votes casted for the United Russia at the

federal elections during the considered period. There is to some extent of statistically significant difference between highly loyal regions with regions that do not provide high number of votes for the party of power. So in regions with a high and very high political loyalty, the predicted mortality rates will be higher by 0.86 and 0.93 points respectively, than in regions that are low in loyalty to the center. (The pattern is illustrated more clearly in Figure 2). This model explains about 15% of the variation of the dependent variable.


Figure 2. Relationship between the increase in mortality and loyalty to the center

Model 4b reflects the inverse relationship between the mean in the regional democracy rating and the increase in mortality (Figure 3). That is, on average, more democratic regimes show a decrease in mortality (about 0.05 points for each rating point). This pattern is highly statistically significant, and the model as a whole makes it possible to explain about 18% of the regional variation in the death rate.

Figure 3. The relationship between the democracy and the dynamics of mortality

Thus, these models reflect the influence of two political factors on the dynamics of changes in the dependent indicator.

The positive correlation of the increase in mortality with the degree of political loyalty of the region as a whole is in line with our theoretical expectations. This dependence can again be interpreted as the lack of political incentives for change. In a situation where the activity of the regional elites is assessed primarily on their ability to provide electoral support to the federal authorities, all other criteria go into the background. Including the success of the activity of the authorities of the subject in carrying out socio-economic transformations. If, on the other hand, the share of votes for United Russia is perceived as a mildly distorted display of the real will of the voters, we can conclude that there is a certain degree of paternalistic attitude toward the state in less prosperous regions. So in regions where the death rate increased, citizens voted more for the party of power, probably, the expecting the resolution of existing problems.

However, relationship reflected in the model 4b indirectly testifies in favor of the first version of the interpretation, which notes the lack of political incentives in politically loyal regions. Democracy leads to the growth of political incentives for carrying out socially useful transformations. Transparency, polycentricity, the replacement of regional authorities, ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens, the independence of the media and public participation are institutional constraints to the actions of regional elites. In a situation of greater public accountability, it becomes more difficult for politicians and officials to follow exclusively personal and opportunistic interests aimed at increasing and maintaining influence, achieving certain posts and financial benefits, and reducing the costs associated with any additional activity.

Analyzing the changes in the size of ineffective expenses for the functioning of the executive authorities between 2008 and 2012, we were unable to find statistically significant political factors that provide dynamics in this direction. Nevertheless, we have found positive correlation of the growth of inefficient spending with the increase in the degree of democracy of the regime. As we assume, this relation is mostly economic in nature: ensuring the functioning of democratic institutions requires additional workers and additional costs

Considering the causes of the direction of dynamics (growth or decrease) of the number of graduates of higher education institutions for the analyzed period, we came to the conclusion that there is an opposite relation with the degree of financial dependence of the region on the federal center. We interpreted this pattern as the absence of economic and political incentives to the real development of the region's education system if the region is highly financially dependent on federal center.

A number of political factors of the regional variation emerged in the analysis of the dynamics in the health sector. So the direct dependence of the increase in morbidity with the increase in fiscal dependence on the center again indicates the political and economic shortcomings of the implemented opportunistic model of regional policy. Setting the cornerstone of the ability of regional elites to provide the necessary electoral results leads to a decrease in the success of the authorities of the subject in ensuring the improvement of living standards in the region. This is indicated by the revealed correlation of the increase in mortality with an increase in the regional average of voting shares casted for United Russia. Finally, the presence of an opposite relation from the region's greater democratization with increasing mortality confirms the importance of the regime characteristics of the region as institutional barriers that can make the authorities to support the socio-economic development of the region.

Thus, we have shown that democratic institutions and politics (both at the regional level and in the center-regional relations) can significantly influence policy process in regions. Nevertheless, again hybrid nature of Russian state imprints in these processes: the role of politics and democratic institutions differs from case to case. If a reform is really important for the federal center, center-regional relation will be most likely a significant factor. But due to opportunistic nature of Russian regional policy, a situation when political loyalty of regions is more important than their socio-economic performance, possible political and economic incentives for development are lost. Democratic institutions could still restrict the resistance of regional authorities to implement transformations. But in this case the spheres of these changes must be of really crucial importance for public.

General conclusions

A) As expected, the main points where politics and democratic institutions become significant are following: coalitions struggle at the stage of design; center-regions relations; democratic institutions at the regional level.

B) There is no single model for all reforms. In some of them democratic institutions and politics play a great role in some less.

B) Drawbacks and advantages of both types of modernization could simultaneously emerge in the course of modernization. This situation is due to the hybrid nature of the political regime and territorial organization. Seemingly, the inner nature of a concrete reform defines the extent of influence of politics and democratic institutions. E.g. if an autocrat would not have any exact desired outcome that political struggle of alternative groups can make sense and affect the result; or if the reform is of key public interest, then democratic institutions (if they do matter at all in a given region) can force implement and sometimes even design needed decisions.

E) Consequently, perhaps, we should talk about a hybrid type of modernization. Then the following questions may be of interest: which features of both 'pure' types lead to better results of modernization? From what in a hybrid mode depends, which of these features will manifest themselves to a greater extent? And is it possible to artificially and controllably combine the features of two 'pure' types?

APPENDIX I: formula of inefficient expenditures on the organization of the functioning of the government of the subject and bodies of executive power

$$ExP_{reg} - \frac{ExP_{total}}{EXP_{\cdot reg} \times EXP_{\cdot total} \times K}$$

where: $⟦ExP_{reg}$ are expenditures of the consolidated budget of the subject of the Russian Federation on the organization of the functioning of the government of the subject and bodies of executive power; ExP_{total} - the total expenditure of the budgets of the regions of the Russian Federation on the organization of the functioning of the government of the subject and bodies of executive power; $EXP_{\cdot reg}$ – overall expenditures of the consolidated budget of the region of the Russian Federation; $EXP_{\cdot total}$ - the total amount of expenditures of the budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation; K is the scale coefficient. 36

Due to the use of the scale factor, this indicator is already weighted, although it is measured in absolute units. The coefficient itself was calculated by the formula:

$$0,7 + 0,5 \times \frac{POP_{avg.}}{POP_{reg.}}$$

, where $⟦\frac{POP_{avg.}}{POP_{reg.}}$ is the ratio of the average regional population to the population of the given region.

APPENDIX II. Operationalization of independent variables.

The concept of political regime on the basis of neoinstitutional theory in the most clear way was formulated by V. Gel'man. According to this author, the political regime is:

"the constellation of actors in the political process, institutions of political power, resources, and strategies for the achievement or retention of power". 37

Speaking of regional dimension of the political regime it is necessary to mention the concept of another Russian researcher R. Turovsky, who proposed three "axis" of

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[36] Data source: regional reports on the execution of the budgets
[37] Brie M., Gelman V., Ryzhenkov S. (ed.). Russia's regions. M., 2000. P. 12-20.

measurement of regional regimes: oligopoly/monopoly; relations with the federal center; democracy-authoritarianism. 38

The degree of democratic character of regional political regimes is evaluated by the expert rating of the Moscow Carnegie Center. 39 The rating, developed by A. Titov and N. Petrov, measures the aggregate extent of a democratization of regional regimes on the following variables:

"regional political structure... ; openness/closeness of political life ... ; democratic elections... ; political pluralism ... ; the independence of the media... ; corruption ... ; economic liberalization including privatization of ... ; civil society... ; elites: quality, reproduction/replacement ... ; local self-government" 40

In our models for the quantitative assessment of changes in the degree of democratic regime, we use the difference in rating between the initial and final points of the period under consideration (the positive difference reflects an increase in democracy). In addition, we use the average over the entire period to show is the region generally more authoritarian or democratic.

Relations of the regional authorities with the federal government were estimated in three dimensions: the degree of political loyalty of the subject; the degree of financial dependence on the center; the degree of administrative involvement of the center in the life of the subject.

The political loyalty has been measured by the average number of votes casted by population of region for the ruling party ("United Russia") in the federal parliamentary elections of 2003, 2007 and 2011. 41 The regions were divided into four groups: low degree of loyalty (45%), the average degree of loyalty (45-55%), high degree of loyalty (55-75%), a very high degree of loyalty (over 75%). It should be noted that due to falsification of election results, use of administrative resources, these figures in many cases will reflect the loyalty of the regional authorities to the center and their desire to provide the "right" result rather than exclusively the attitude of the population towards the ruling party

Financial dependence on the center was assessed by the average share of transfers in income structure of the region for the given period. Regions were also divided into groups with very low (up to 15% of the income), low (15-30%), medium (30-45%) high (45-60%) and very high (over 60%) degree of financial dependence.

[38] Turovsky RF Regional political regimes in Russia: to the methodology of analysis // Polis. 2009. № 2. Pp. 83-92

[39] Petrov N. Titkov A. Reting the democracy of the regions of the Moscow Carnegie Center: 10 years in service. / M., 2015. S. 25-28.

[40] Ibid p. 5-6.

[41] Data source: CEC of the Russian Federation

Dynamics of administrative involvement of the center in the region's life is reflected by the change in the number of employees of Federal agencies per 10,000 population. 42

We operationalized the bureaucracy ability to resist as the number of public officials per 10 000 population: the larger the bureaucracy, the greater its potential to inhibit the transformation. In the models this figure is also used in dynamics. 43

42   Data source: Rosstat
43   Data source: Rosstat