Comparative Analysis of Policy Advisory Systems in the Countries with Democracy and Hybrid Regimes

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Summary

According to contemporary approaches, policy making process includes not governmental officials only, but other actors of public policy field: members of expert community, representatives of influence and pressure groups, NGOs activists etc. The objective of this paper will be the comparative analysis of institutes and practices of expert participation in governmental decision preparation in the countries with democracy and hybrid regimes. We will use Christina Boswell’s approach to the analysis of political functions of expert knowledge. She formulated three main functions of such knowledge in policy making – instrumental, legitimizing and substanting functions (two last functions are joined in symbolic functions usually). This functions in countries with democracy regimes realized by means of different kinds of experts advisory committee, experts professional association and varieties of analytical centers and think tanks.

We proposed that in countries with hybrid political regimes we have much more narrow spectrum of such structure, which results in absence of political subjective of expert community and more strong realization of symbolic functions of experts knowledge by comparison with instrumental function. The service functions of experts exists additionally in such countries, when experts are ready to prove any decision of officials by pseudo-scientific arguments and rhetoric.

Modern political and public life assumes what might be termed a constant interplay between political institutions – the state in various incarnations, civic organizations, political parties, business, and the academic community. The character of this interplay is made possible by stable and transparent legal norms supported by an independent judiciary. In contrast is the field of public policy, which can depend on the position and opinion of an authoritarian leader – a so called “sovereign” or “king of the castle.” In this case one can observe political dynamics

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that are more monarchical than state-oriented\(^3\). But in every political regime – more democracy or more authoritarian – the officials need participation of experts in decision making processes.

The process of collaboration of officials and members of academic community was subject of analysis in many papers and books\(^4\). Recently special volume was published, devoted to analysis of different approaches to institutes and practices of government – science relations\(^5\). Sheila Jasanoff, famous researchers as in field of natural science, as in field of experts knowledge\(^6\), proposed recently, that instead of so named *linearity-autonomy* model, where academicians try to resolve problems based in science basement only, and then politician make their decision with take in account the social and political consequences of proposed by academicians decisions, the new *virtuous reason* model realized now. ‘From this perspective, the object is not to separate science entirely from political consideration but rather to see how the integration of science with politics can best advance desire public ends. The aim is not to instrumentalise science but to conform its practices to wider social values, especially in the treatment of uncertainty and ignorance\(^7\).

We propose, that some combinations of this models exist in real policy process. The attention of other researches focused on the functions, realized by experts during policy making processes. Harry Collins with his co-authors divided ‘Specialist Expertises’ and ‘Ubiquitous Expertises’\(^8\). Åse Gornitzka and Ulf Sverdrup, whose activity focused at the roles of experts in decision making process in EC, concluded, that expert groups do not formally make political

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decisions, but feed the decision making processes by giving expert advice, providing scientific knowledge, sharing practical experience and information, and serving as forums for exchange of information. They made a distinction between formal and informal expert groups: ‘Formal expert groups are established by a Commission decision or other legal acts, while informal groups are established by the DGs themselves in agreement with the Secretariat General and without reference to such a formal legal act. In principle, formal groups may be regarded as more institutionalized than informal groups. Secondly, we make a distinction between temporary and permanent groups. Expert groups that are either explicitly defined as permanent or that have been in operation for more than five years are coded as permanent groups.’

In this paper we will concentrate our attention at the approach to the functions of experts, elaborated by Christina Boswell and her colleagues. Usually researches allocated two functions of expert knowledge – instrumental and symbolic. Instrumental – in the sense to help politicians to make more true and knowledge-based decision, how to resolve existing social or political problem. But the Weberian account also implies a second, more symbolic function of expert knowledge: the use of knowledge as a means of legitimizing particular decisions, or legitimizing bureaucratic domination *per se*. On this account, knowledge signals the organization’s conformity to rational rules, underpinning the authority of policy-makers and their decisions. So in the first case, knowledge is valued for its instrumental role; in the second, it is valued symbolically, as a means of demonstrating the credibility of the organization or its decisions.

Christina Boswell proposed, ‘that in addition to its instrumental function, expert knowledge can play two alternative, symbolic, functions. The first of these is a *legitimizing* function. By being seen to draw on expert knowledge, an organization can enhance its legitimacy and bolster its claim to resources or jurisdiction over particular policy areas. In this sense knowledge can endow organizations with ‘epistemic authority’’. The second is a *substantiating*

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function. Expert knowledge can lend authority to particular policy positions, helping to substantiate organizational preferences in cases of political contestation.⁰¹²

Realization of this function depends on the organizational framework of expert activity of academic community representatives. First of all, it may be pure personal activity, where expert are invited by officials for concrete (and may be solely) case.⁰¹³ Secondary, it may be activity into some expert or advisory board of councils. This situation usually guarantee more independent position of experts and this advisory board sometimes can works years and years.⁰¹⁴

Expert advisory council can be analyzed as examples of special example of ‘boundary organizations’, which was laid out in 1999 by David Guston, and later developed by a number of authors. This ‘boundary organizations’ emerge on the borders between academia and policymakers – or more accurately, national and regional leaders. These organizations understand the inner working both of governmental organizations and of academia. Thanks to this, they become what might be termed ‘adapters,’ organizing constructive engagement. This advisory board have some level of organizational resistance, and therefore expert – members of this board are more independent to some pressure of officials, and probability of realization of instrumental function are higher them in case of individual experts.

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Such probability is more higher when expert activity take place in framework of special kind of independent analytical centers, called ‘think tanks’\(^{17}\), because this structures were created mostly independently from any governmental structure, or after initial stages they start to be independent from government (as it was in case of very known think tank – RAND corporation\(^{18}\)). This think tanks can be analyzed as special kind of boundary organizations also\(^{19}\).

We must to add, that a strong professional associations play a important role for support of independent position of experts in their collaborations with officials. This associations (for example, American Political Science Association was established in 1903) can realized of function of ‘inner control’ of quality of expert advices.

In first part of this paper we shortly analyzed expert functions and forms of collaboration of expert community with governmental structures in countries with stable democracy regime, where constant political control guarantee of real level of governmental responsibility for the peoples, organized in civil society. Situation in Russia and some other post communist countries is different in many directions. The practical absence of political control (all parliament parties could not be named as parliament opposition) and very weak citizen control results in the absence of responsibility of Russian top level officials. In this situation instrumental function of expert is not so required by Russian officials.

Material of this part of paper are based on the materials of Internet, expert communications and personal experience of author, who is leader of one of the Russian think tank\(^{20}\). Other recourse of information is special research, realized by author in 2012-2015 years in Russian regions. Near to forty semi-structured expert interview was made, and four focus groups was organized in Russian regions during this time. It was a few researches devoted to Russian expert communities, we can mention papers of Andrey Makarychev, Nina Belyaeva,

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Lyudmila Volynkina, Elena Kazakova, Olga Malinova. Some more publications devoted to development of think tanks in Russia, and their evolution from 90th to 00th.

Expert communities in field of political science in 90th consisted of two main and strongly separated parts. The first of them was participants of democracy movement of perestroika time and also (partly) politicians of the first romantic wave, elected in 1989-1990 to Soviet and Russian Congresses of Deputies, or to regional or city council of deputies (or their colleagues). The second consisted from ‘new specialist’ in electoral management, who successfully organized some election campaigns and then called-for new campaigns in new regions and cities. The subject of our analysis now will be the first part.

One of the best example of this group is the Center (than Foundation) INDEM (Information for Democracy). The roots of this center go back to the 1970s when the young mathematician Georgiy Satarov and the historian Sergey Stankevich met and started to study of the political forces status in the USA Congress together. They used mathematical and statistical methods and computer techniques for analyzing poll results. The creative tandem of Georgiy Satarov and Sergey Stankevich, which existed for over 10 years, acquired new quality when Sergey Stankevich became People’s deputy of the USSR in 1989. A year later he was appointed deputy chairman of the Mossovet. (Moscow City Council). It was at this time that a new subject of studies emerged – why people vote the way they vote. Furthermore, for the first time, there was demand for analysis and forecast of election results in different political factions. In that situation it became necessary to set up an independent research structure, a small institute which

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could study the new political reality for the purpose of promoting the new democratic institutions in Russia.

An important stage in the development of the INDEM Center was the invitation extended to its leader Georgiy Satarov to come to the Kremlin and work as an advisor to Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation. The period of work in the state administration strengthened the position of the Center and earned state commissions. It also provided Georgy Satarov with the invaluable experience of real participation in the decision-making process at national level, an experience which cannot be obtained by reading books, as well as possibility of fundraising. At the same time, the existence of the Center as a strong basis gave Georgy Satarov more independence in his work as an advisor to the President.

Other example of such tendency is Sergey Sulakshin - Doctor of physic-mathematic science, was in 1989-1992 deputy of Soviet Congress of Peoples Deputies and member of Supreme Council, then he was plenipotentiary of Russian President Boris Eltsin in Tomsk (1991-1993) and member of State Duma (1993-1999). He adds in 2000 to his doctoral dissertation in natural science dissertation in Political science and established in 2006 Center for problem analysis and governmental projects. In St.Petersburg author of this paper, doctor of biology science and head of committee for Science and Higher education of Leningrad/Petersburg City Council and his colleagues from political club ‘Perestroyka’ and from City Council (Lensovet) established SPb Center for humanities and political science STRATEGY.

This examples reflect situation of establishing independent research and policy oriented organizations, which can be named think tanks or public policy centers. In the 90th there were a lot of possibilities for financial support of such think tanks. It could be money from presidential administration, as it was in case of INDEM foundation, or Ministry for Education and Science, but also from international foundations, as it was in case of SPb STRATEGY Center, or money from Russian Oligarch Vladimir Yakunin, as it was in case of Sergey Sulakshin Center. The objectives for expert organizations can be formulated in President Administration or in other power centers in federal or regional level, or can be formulate by think tanks itself, if they can to receive support for it’s project from one of the international foundations. In the last situation they

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can to invite experts for its projects from universities and academic institutes, special in regional level.

In the end of 90th and beginning of 00th the salary, which such think tanks and some other NGOs can to propose for academician from universities and state research institute was more than their traditional salary. ‘The flowering of analytical centers was in 90th. It was connected with the serious stream on foreign grant money, which created more competitive conditions for experts, then traditional structures as Academy of Science, universities and governmental agencies, especially’\(^{26}\).

Sometimes such think thanks in process of realization some projects aimed for public participation in policy process, stimulate creation of community of experts in some concrete field. The participation of SPb STRATEGY Center in creation of community of budget analytics in the process of realization of project of public participation in budgetary process was a good example of such cases\(^{27}\). This case may be a good example of creation of some net of regional expert groups with center in one of the Russian capitals. This center was responsible for fundraising activity and for methodic coordination of this net activity. In this situation some independent think tanks aroused not only in Russian capitals, but in region centers also.

Situation with the will and readiness of officials to receive expert advice from university political scientists was correct described by university professor: ‘Starting from the 90th it was a few waves and situation was different. In 90th I observed, that officials did not understand well, how much they can use their leverage, and it was a period, when experts, whom now 60, invited constantly for consultations (officials ask their advises and consultations). In 00th situation is changing, and in this time experts invited for evaluation of state projects more often, they are included into consultative councils, affiliated to governmental agencies’\(^{28}\).

In other Russian region our respondent gave as such answer for the question about think tanks in his city: “The existed, and not in 90th only, but some late also. They existed in framework of instutialised scientific economic environment. The conditions of 90th need some explanation of situation for the ‘first faces’ in power. This conditions existed up to the mid of 00th. Later this demand was disappear, and the ‘first faces’ are changed.’\(^{29}\)."

\(^{26}\)Interview with Michael Dmitriev, President of Center for strategic research, Moscow, 01.03.2013.

\(^{27}\)Alexander Sungurov. Project «Social participation in the budgetary process» as an example of interaction between the expert community and civil advocacy groups in the post-Soviet Russia. Paper for International Conference on Public Policy, Grenoble, 26-28 June 2013, Panel 21-1 ‘Expertise and involvement’.

\(^{28}\)Interview with A, professor of St. Petersburg State University, April 2015,

\(^{29}\)Interview with B, journalist, Voronezh, April 2015,
During the first decade of new century two parallel process took place in Russian social and political life. Many International foundation, who supported before activity of Russian NGO, ended their activity in Russia. The official reason was economical growth of our country, which can be results in growth of domestic resources for supporting of NGOs activity. This expectation was justified in 2001 by Michael Khodorkovskiy, whose foundation ‘Open Russia’ starts to support many NGOs projects. But, in November 2003 he was arrested, and this arrest was a clear signal to other Russian rich peoples. After first ‘Maidan’ in Kiev-2004 Russian officials starts to afraid of any independent NGOs activity as dangerous to their monopole power. This pressure results in reduction of independent think tanks, specially in Russian regions. Centralization of political life during presidential time of Vladimir Putin also resulted in reduction of needs of region officials in advices from regional experts – all instructions are received now from Presidential administration.

In this situation relationship between invited academicians from universities and governmental official in contemporary (second decade of XXI century) Russia are described by respondent, member of staff of regional assembly in one of Russian regions in such expressions: ‘Some university academicians are invited as experts. But it is doubtful that for realization of analytic needs of official, because there are concrete order for scientists. Customer know, what result of expertise he want to receive, and he received it finally’. Other respondents, who himself now member of regional assembly, giving us example, when power did not like listen to recommendation of fire official before staring of fire, said: «Prevention of fire and firefighting are two different functions. In contemporary conservative mentality [of power] this prognostic function did not claimed».

Professor of one of Siberian university: “They [region officials] collaborate with such experts, who answered “what do you want?” only. This experts wants to know, what results official desired to receive finally, and are ready to made ‘scientific background’ to this result”. Other university professor, from Central Russia: “I have impression, that expert community of city is needed by official as source of public support of concrete administration activity, but not for intellectual evaluation or intellectual support of their activity. Symbolic support is needed, this expert must used their symbolic capital for support of administration.”

One of participants of focus-group in Ekaterinburg on the question of moderator “Do official received recommendation of your expert council?” answered: “No, because we put very

30 Interview with C, member of staff of Regional Assembly and PhD in political science, Siberia, April, 2014.
31 Interview with D, member of Regional Assembly and PhD in sociology, South of Russia, March, 2013.
32 Interview with E, professor of Siberian university, June, 2014.
33 Interview with F, university professor of Central Russia, April, 2015.
acute questions, too painful for power. Our official usually adopt best recommendations or recommendation connected with non-important problems.\textsuperscript{34}. Other member of this focus-group stress on the possibility non passive, but active position of expert: “Any expert must understand, that any official and any governmental agency have some objective limitations. And if you can add to pure expert function some understanding, how to realize lobby function and what concrete governmental structure responsible for realization your proposal, than your expert function may be realized more effectively.\textsuperscript{35}.”

Professional associations in Russia is not very strong, and only start attempts to realize ‘inner control’ of quality of expert activity of their members. Recently organized discussion ‘About professionalism in politics and in political science’ at the web-site of Russian Political Science Association\textsuperscript{36} is a good example of such attempts.

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This preliminary analysis of variants of collaboration governmental structures with expert community in contemporary Russia allow us to conclude, that in conditions of disappearing of think tanks, specially at the regional level, expert community have a few political subjectivity and often ready to sell them self. In such situation we can define as \textit{function of prepaid results} – officials gave to ‘experts’ desirable result, and expert prepare to in some scientific background.

We can see, that other functions, which existed in countries with stable democracy, existed in Russia also. In 90\textsuperscript{th} and early 00\textsuperscript{th} instrumental expert function was claimed widely. Later \textit{legitimizing and substantiating} start to be more claimed. Strictly speaking sometimes \textit{function of prepaid results} took place in countries with stable democracy regime, but it is exception from the rule in situation of the wide political and citizen control. In situation of the lack of political and citizen control, which take place in contemporary, practices of realization of \textit{function of prepaid results} is the real threat to quality of political and policy decisions.

\textsuperscript{34} Member of focus-group, Ekaterinburg, November 2015.
\textsuperscript{35} Member of focus-group, Ekaterinburg, November 2015.
\textsuperscript{36} http://www.rapn.ru/in.php?part=1&gr=1623