Strategic Distribution in Multiparty Systems

Evidence from AKP's Kurdish Policy

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March 20, 2018

Abstract

The existing theories of distributive politics focus on two-party competition and the question of allocation to "core" versus "swing" voters in each party's electoral base. We argue that such a formulation does not cover the distinctive features of targeted redistribution in multi-party electoral systems. We extend the notion of core-swing voter duality with the introduction of an emergent third party, a two-dimensional ideological space, and a distinction between the core's two-dimensional ideology and that of the party. We show that contingent on ideological parameters, dominant parties have incentives to engage in *strategic distribution* to voters outside their conventional core or swing categories. The predictions of the model are confirmed using data from the Turkish elections held between 2002 and 2015, under Erdogan's AKP (Justice and Development Party). A variety of tests show a robust relation between social welfare provisions and the Kurdish vote for AKP. *Word Count: 9900*

Keywords: Distributive Politics, Multiparty Systems, Proportional & Plurality Representation, Public Goods Provision, Targeted Transfers, Turkish Politics

*Navid Hassanpour is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Higher School of Economics, Moscow. The author would like to thank Ena Redžić for research assistance, and Selim Erdem Aytaç for the data on the Turkish Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program. This is a preliminary draft, please do not cite or distribute without permission.

How do political parties allocate their resources among particular groups of voters in the electorate to maximize electoral leverage and their influence in the governance? do they have incentives to direct resources into their own electoral base to cement loyalty, or are they motivated to win votes from the segments of the society in between poles of political activity? From the outset it is clear that the answer mainly lies in the number of political parties involved and their policy positions in relation to major constituent blocs, and each other. Nevertheless, the existing work on the logic of distributive politics is limited to two-party formulations, and the constituents are often portrayed as to be either without ideological preferences (Myerson 1993), or positioned along a one-dimensional spectrum (Dixit and Londregan 1996). The consensus on the logic of distributive politics in two-party politics is that political parties have incentives to reward subsections of constituents in which there is a possibility of direct electoral gains. A number of pioneering studies of electoral politics in relation to redistribution note that the decision to reward the *core* or *swing* voters depends of the immediate electoral gains in the polls from such allocation of resources. (Cox and McCubbins 1986) in their formulation of the problem, for example, note that the risk aversion of the parties has a direct effect on their decision to invest resources in gaining votes from undecided voters, or to maintain loyalty and continuity among their own base. The prevalent view is that risk aversion (Cox and McCubbins 1986), inefficient redistribution among the swing voters away from one's own machine politics (Dixit and Londregan 1996), and lack of credible monitoring mechanisms (Stokes 2005) often limit the scope of operations that intend to sway votes of the swing voters and limit them to the extent where machine politics can monitor and redistribute efficiently. Such *pork-barrel*, i.e. micro-targeted distribution in exchange for political favor, and more programmatic distributive practices are the fixtures of the two-party electoral politics (Golden and Min 2013).

Given the differences between the logic of electoral competition between multiparty and two-party systems (Baron and Diermeier 2001, Austen-Smith and Banks 1988), it is not at all clear if distributive politics in a multiparty setting would follow the same logic as that

of bipolar political competition. The main existing models of two-party distribution predict distribution to segments of population that provide the highest marginal rate of electoral return to distributive investment (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Dixit and Londregan 1996). The existing models are built on two assumptions: there are two parties and all the eligible voters vote based on sincere preferences (Cox 2009). In contrast, proportional representation syetems, which in fact are known to redistribute more than plurality systems (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002), are likely to facilitate the emergence of third parties.[1] Such possibility of a third party is not reflected in the existing scholarship on distributive politics. Furthermore, it is well known that voters in proportional representation systems have incentives to vote strategically, i.e. vote for parties that are not their first choice (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988, Baron and Diermeier 2001, Cox 1997, Cox and Shugart 1996) in order to force or prevent coalitions. While the possibility of strategic voting on the side of the electorate is widely studied and formulated, a similar pattern of electoral influence on the side of the *parties* (not the voters), in terms of strategic targeting of the voters by redistribution is understudied. In the following, we argue that the addition of a potential third party to the race facilitates *strategic distribution* to its constituents, outside the conventional core-swing dichotomy, in the form of targeted transfers, such as conditional cash transfers to the poor, or public goods campaigns, such as free health care and educational assistance.

The division between the core and swing is the most meaningful when two parties are competing on a unidimensional policy space. In a two-dimensional policy space (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and in the presence of an additional third party, the two main political poles should have an incentive, contingent on the level of competitiveness of the race between them and the third party in a given districts, to allocate resources, such as pork, programmatic

[1]See (Cox 1997) Chapter 2 for an elaboration of the Duverger's Law and Hypothesis: the former postulates "the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system" and the latter maintains "the simple majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favors [sic] multipatyism" (Duverger 1954).

and targeted transfers, to voter blocs apart from their traditional core and swing voters. In turn, smaller parties are more reliant on salience of their competitive advantage, in contrast to policy position (Meguid 2005), hence the third parties are often not as close to their core as mainstream parties with well functioning and rehearsed political machines. We will argue that such disparities between party positions and its constituents become more important in multidimensional policy spaces, particularly because two parties policy point can coincide in one dimension, but widely diverge in the other. A clear example of such dynamics is present in the Turkish politics where religiosity and redistribution policy, or religiosity and ethnic identity tend to induce divisions among the electorate in two dimensions, not one.

The trajectory of Turkish electoral politics presents a perfect example for motivating and testing the logic of distributive politics in two dimensional policy space among three poles of political activity. The incumbent party in power, Justice and Development Party, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP), and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in 2002 through introducing a religious dimension to the ideological contests of Turkish politics. AKP and its two main leaders, Recep Erdogan and Abdullah Gül themselves are heir apparent of the first Islamist Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, who led the Islamist party Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) which was banned in 1998 by the Constitutional Court of Turkey. Both Welfare Party and Justice and Development Party emphasized welfare policies appealing to the Turkish underclass, along with fervent Islamist tendencies. The same religious demonstrations resulted in the arrest, imprisonment and banning of Erdogan shortly after the dismissal of Erbakan and Welfare Party. The strong focus of both parent and protege parties on welfare policies provides a unique opportunity distributive politics in relation to ideological positioning in multiparty systems. In the 1970s Erbakan stuck a nationalist alliance with the leader of the secular party Republican People' s Party (CHP)'s Bülent Ecevit which oversaw the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (Ahmad 1993). By 2002, the salience of welfare dimension in AKP's movement had grown. Later in the paper, we will argue that our model anticipates AKP's strategic distribution to Kurdish areas (Yörük 2012,

Akdağ 2011), and that the allocation of public goods, in the form of free healthcare programs (Yörük 2012) and conditional cash transfers (Aytaç 2014), can not be solely attributed to the underdevelopment in Kurdish areas. AKP's move away from the nationalist narrative in the early 2000s, and its reversion to the Turkish nationalist agenda after 2011 should be seen in the same light.[2]

The emergence of AKP in the Turkish political scene added a novel dimension to the political competition in the country absent (and banned) in electoral politics before: religion. Later we will argue that the new strategic hold on religiosity, allowed AKP to reach the voter base of parties rooted in underdeveloped areas, both on the left and right of the traditional political spectrum. The traditional positioning of parties on the left-right spectrum, would bundle AKP with nationalist parties such as MHP, The Nationalist Movement Party *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, to the right of traditional center left party, CHP, which itself lied between the conservative parties and the radical, leftist and secular Kurdish parties such as PKK The Kurdistan Workers' Party *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, (Akdağ 2011) and its more moderate counterparts such as HDP The Peoples' Democratic Party *Halkların Demokratik Partisi*. Such a formulation would not predict an outreach to the popular base of leftist Kurdish parties by the AKP political machine and its welfare policies. In other words, a unidimensional logic would be incapable of providing a convincing logic for the transfer of public goods and targeted welfare programs AKP has bestowed upon the Kurdish population,[3] as the resources would be better used if they are allocated to conservative, but not Islamist, parties. The first step to synthesize the two-dimensional space of Turkish politics is to decouple two policy dimensions, depicted in Figure (1): along dimension 1,

[2]Erdogan himself was banned from politics because of religious incitation in Siirt, a city with a Kurdish majority, and later after removal of the ban, was elected as an AKP member of parliament via a by-election in Siirt.

[3]For example, (Aytaç 2014)'s focus is on AKP's approach to other small, conservative and right wing parties such as MHP, which are close to AKP in the traditional unidimensional spectrum.

Kurdish-Turkish nationalism, lies AKP along with MHP and CHP to the right, and Kurdish parties to other end of the spectrum. Traditionally, Turkish politics was played along the very same dimension, but more recently AKP's entrance to Turkish politics has added a second dimension, i.e. secular-religious divide. The very same novel dimension, allows AKP to appeal to Kurdish voters who, on this new dimension, lie far from their traditional leftist parties' secular and anti-religion positions. Combined with low income levels of the Turkish population and the absence of other more nationalist Turkish parties from Kurdish provinces, the religious appeal, made overtures to the Kurdish population a priority for AKP (Akdağ 2011, Yörük 2012). AKP's free health care programs (*Green Card*s) (Yörük 2012) and Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) (Aytaç 2014) heavily influenced the Kurdish population. Later we use a number of public health indicators to demonstrate a significant relation between the public goods dynamics and the AKP vote among the Kurdish population, in the presence an array of control variables dictating the allocation of such services, other than the Kurdishness of their targets.

Using a strategic theoretical setup with three parties, two mainstream, and one emergent, we will show that at the equilibrium the ideologically "advantaged" mainstream party has an incentive to allocate resources to the base of the emergent party, at the detriment of its own traditional core, and the feasibility of such an equilibrium is dependent on the salience of ideological dimension in play. We also consider allocations to the traditional swing and core voters between the two mainstream parties, and show that the advantaged party is at a better position to target the other mainstream party's voters. The predictions of the model are tested against a panel dataset of Turkish electoral politics, both general and local hold between 2002 and 2015.



Figure 1: Party position represented by quadrangles, the Turkish electorate concentrations are depicted by circles, the radius represents the comparative size of each electorate segment. Third (Kurdish) parties' 2-dimensional policy position does not coincide with their base's.

Related Work

The discussion of the electoral logic of targeted transfer and public goods provision builds on insights from studies of electoral politics in the form of redistributive arrangements, where voters choose the one party providing higher welfare, with or without ideological tendencies counted in the utility calculations (Cox and McCubbins 1986), (Myerson 1993) and (Dixit and Londregan 1996). The existing scholarship on the topic (Golden and Min 2013), (Shepsle and Weingast 1981), (Rodden 1991), (Iversen and Soskice 2006), (Lupu and Pontusson 2011), (Persson and Tabellini 2003), (Iversen and Soskice 2009) finds proportional representation in parliamentary systems to induce more targeted distribution than plurality systems (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2007), (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002), (Austen-Smith 2000), (Shugart 1999), (Lizzeri and Persico 2001).

Note that mirror interpretation of the same comparison between distribution in plurality and PR system maintains that the same level of distribution should have larger electoral effects in plurality vis a vis proportional representation systems.[4] In addition to redistributing more widely, compared to the plurality rule, proportional representation systems have been shown to motivate party positioning farther from the center of the political spectrum (Cox 1990), (Cox 1987), (Myerson and Weber 1993). The "centrifugal" and "centripetal" effects themselves are conditioned on the level of electoral competitiveness (Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2016).

Strategic voting is common and prevalent in PR systems (Cox and Shugart 1996), (Abramson et al. 2010), (Patty, James M. Snyder, and Ting 2009), (Shikano, Herrmann, and Thurner 2009), helping to force coalitions (Sinopoli and Iannantuoni 2008). It is also argued that PR systems, in general, motivates higher rates of turnout (Herrera, Morelli, and Nunnari 2016), (Cox 2015), (Cox 1999), (Myerson 1999). Later in this study we argue that the parties have incentives to strategize on redistribution to induce voting, in parallel to

[4]In the following sections, this conjecture will be formulated and tested in the context of the Turkish electoral politics.

strategic voting itself on the side of the electorate.

The logic of special interest politics (Grossman and Helpman 2001), (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987), (Lindbeck and Weibull 1993) comprises the basis for the theory that presents poverty alleviation programs as tools for efficient electoral clientelism (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2016), and supervised pattern of patronage and clientelism (Robinson and Verdier 2013), (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014), particularly machine politics at the electoral 'core' (Stokes et al. 2013, Stokes 2005) (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014).

(Nichter 2008), and (Cox 2009) note that turnout buying is distinct from buying support, and mobilization and persuasion are two distinct components of distributive politics. This is an insight central to decoupling a parties voter base from its policy position, in other words, the base's voting for the associated party can not be taken for granted, particularly for emergent parties.

There is a significant scholarship on the negative effect of ethnic diversity on the provision of public goods (Habyarimana et al. 2007), (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999), while some have argued for qualifications (Wimmer 2016), (Baldwin and Huber 2010). In addition to the logic of ethnically motivated transfer (nevertheless to non-coethnics in our case), we examine the connection of ethnic 'diversity' (and not only the Kurdish share of the population) with AKP's public goods provisions.

Patronage and transfer in lieu of votes are common in Turkey (Sayari 2014). Clientelism in Turkey, in particular, is widespread (Koc, Hancioglu, and Cavlin 2008), (Mutlu 1996) and has deep roots in Turkish politics before (Ahmad 1993)[5] and after (Akdağ 2015) the start of AKP on the Turkish political scene. AKP in Turkey has implemented patronage patterns that in addition to the religious Turkish population target the Kurds for strategic reasons (Somer 2011), (Akdağ 2011), (Şener Aktürk 2011), (Esmer 2001), (Acemoglu and

[5]Prime Minister Turgut Özal's so called 'fund economy' in the 1980s operated based on pork-barrel (Ahmad 1993) pp. 190-91.

Ucer 2015). Patterns of transfer to the majority Kurdish areas has been subject of a number of existing studies, notably (Akdağ 2011) (Aytaç 2014), and (Yörük 2012). The existing studies of the phenomenon, however, either categorically overlook the logic of transfer to the Kurdish areas (Aytaç 2014), (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç 2015),[6] or see it as a containment for unrest, not a welfare strategy with electoral implications. Instead, we provide an alternative explanation based on the electoral logic of transfer to the voters of Kurdish parties.

The Logic of Strategic Distribution in Multi-Party Systems

(Cox 2009) mentions two main assumptions of the extant analyses of electoral politics as a redistributive process: first, they assume that all voters turnout to vote, second, the number of parties are exogenously given to be two. Neither of these theoretical assumptions hold in proportional representation elections. In the case of multiparty elections, particularly for smaller parties, there is no effective political machine that can define a 'core' based on either a strong preference for a the given party of the side of the core, or the effective possibility of directing goods and provisions towards the core by the party. In such scenarios, the possibility of mobilization of a group of voters itself becomes an endogenous part of the theory, it is not true that all parties can mobilize their sympathizers to the polls, and voters' participation rates have an important influence on the distributive policies.[7] Furthermore, the presence of a third party introduces the possibility of 'strategic distribution' defined as the allocation of goods into voter blocs who do not represent the highest immediate marginal return to investment for the parties directing public goods and targeted transfers. To add a third

[6]The ethnic and ideological variables are at times included, but more than often are overlooked in the theoretical discussion.

[7](Nooruddin and Simmons 2015) mention a targeted reward mechanism for voter participation and turnout in India.

component to the formulation, it is important to note that in proportional representation system with the possibility of the emergence of smaller so called "third parties", electoral competition is not limited to a unidimensional political spectrum, where the two main parties can converge on policies according to the Duverger Law. Instead, it is likely that smaller third parties attempt at operating on a dimension unaligned with the main axis of competition among the major two parties. Examples of this positioning are abound: in Turkey, Kurdish parties stress Kurdish nationalism, while the two main party blocs (AKP vs. CHP and MHP) clash over the role of religion in politics and society. Kurdish parties do not stress out such issues, as most of their core supporters are religious and do not see the an emphasis on left atheism of Kurdish parties agreeable. In the following we argue that AKP used the very same dissonance between Kurdish parties to absorb Kurdish vote and prevent Kurdish parties from reaching the draconian 10% entry threshold. For accounting for such an additional ideological dimension, one needs to extend the (Dixit and Londregan 1996) to the cases in which ideological positioning is beyond the traditional left-right linear distinction.

In the presence of high electoral thresholds, dominant parties have an incentive to allocate resources to sizable vote bases of radical and marginal parties approaching the electoral threshold in order to prevent them from entering the legislature.

Ethnic and religious divisions among seculars and Islamists and the Turkish and Kurdish population, present a unique case for detecting examples of strategic distributive politics targeted at minority parties' constituencies.[8]

[8]Turkey's case also confounds the notion of programmatic and pork-barrel distribution, as geographic allocation of goods in a country where social and economic classes are geographically concentrated can be interpreted both as a general government policy, or targeted pork barrel. This is because due to geographical concentration of the clients, general rules of distribution in theory, become local in implementation.

The Model

Consider the following strategic formulation. There are two mainstream parties, P_1 and P_2, both with population base p_i of size $(1-\alpha)/2$, who share the same position on the first ideological dimension, and an emergent party P_3, whose position is in line with P_2 in second ideological dimension, while its population base is in line with its corresponding party in the first ideological dimension, and with mainstream party P_1 in the second dimension.[9] The distance between the emergent party and the two mainstream parties on the first ideological dimension, d_2, is larger than the distance between the two mainstream parties along the second ideological dimension d_1, i.e. $d_2 > d_1$, see Figure (2). There are three main population bases, each corresponding to one of the three parties, the two mainstream parties' bases are of size $(1-\alpha)/2$ each, while the emergent's party base's size is α, $\alpha < 1/3$.

The mainstream parties 1 and 2 have a budget constraint B. Party 1 allocates $(b_1, b_2, 1-b_1-b_2)B$ to the other mainstream party's base, the emergent's party's base, and to its own base, respectively. The same allocations for Party 2 are $(c_1, c_2, 1-c_1-c_2)B$. Emergent Party 3 is incapable of making monetary transfers.

The utility population group i gains from voting for party j is based on two components, ideology distance and transfers. Each of the three population groups decides on voting for a given party j, based on a utility per capita comprised of the targeted transfers from party j to population i T_{ij}, its distance d_{ij} from the party j's policy position, and its own size $\alpha_i N$, where N is the total population.[10] Utility of

$$U_{ij} = -d_{ij}^2 + T_{ij}/(\alpha_i N) \tag{1}$$

[9] In the Turkish context, for example the two mainstream parties are AKP and CHP with a shared position on Turkish nationalism, the third party is the Kurdish party (e.g. HDP) with religiosity as the second ideological dimension.

[10] Without loss of generality we assume the budget constraint is adjusted to account for the balance between ideology and transfer utility.



Figure 2: Party positions and their electorate concentrations are represented by quadrangles and circles respectively. The size of P_1 and P_2's bases are $(1-\alpha)/2$, the size of the third party P_3's base is α, $\alpha < 1/3$, $d_1 < d_2$.

In the following we examine the decisions by three population groups and the corresponding transfers at the equilibrium. We first consider the decision made by the emergent party base, p_3. The allocations to Party 3's base by Party 1 and Party 2 are b_2 and c_2. The corresponding square distances are d_2^2 and $d_1^2 + d_2^2$. For Party 1 being able to win the votes of population bloc p_3,

$$-d_2^2 + \frac{b_2 B}{\alpha N} > -d_2^2 - d_1^2 + \frac{c_2 B}{\alpha N}$$

to defeat the allocation from Party 2. There are no values of c_2 that can violate the condition above, because Party 2's strategies are dominated by Party 1's. Hence in the case of sufficient ideological distance on the second dimension

$$c_2^* = 0$$

at the equilibrium, and b_2 is taken to be the minimum value that makes voting for party 2 more profitable than voting for party 3:

$$-d_2^2 + \frac{b_1 B}{\alpha N} > -d_1^2.$$

Taking $\alpha N/B = \beta$, that means

$$b_2^* = \beta(d_2^2 - d_1^2),$$

for $d_1^2 < d_2^2 < d_1^2 + 1/\beta$.

In addition to allocating b_2 and c_2 to the emergent party's base, mainstream parties 1 and 2 allocate budget portions b_1 and c_1 to each other's base, and $1 - b_1 - b_2$ and $1 - c_1 - c_2$ to their own. In the following, we show that the decision to tend to one's own base voters or the other party's is dependent on ideological distance between the two mainstream parties 1 and 2.

Theorem 1. *When the ideological distance between the two mainstream parties, d_1, is suf-*

ficiently high, the two parties allocate resources only to their own base. In contrast, when d_1 is small enough, they allocate resources (mainly) to the base voters of the other mainstream party, and not to their own base.

Proof. Consider the decision on the side of party 2's base, to vote for own's party,

$$\frac{(1-c_1-c_2)B}{(\frac{1-\alpha}{2})N} > -d_1^2 + \frac{b_1 B}{(\frac{1-\alpha}{2})N}.$$

$c_2^* = 0$, putting $\frac{1-\alpha}{2}\frac{N}{B} = \gamma$, the above gives the following condition for keeping Party 2's base,

$$d_1^2 > (b_1 + c_1 - 1)/\gamma.$$

The same condition for keeping Party 1's base is

$$\frac{(1-b_1-b_2)B}{(\frac{1-\alpha}{2})N} > -d_1^2 + \frac{c_1 B}{(\frac{1-\alpha}{2})N}.$$

Which again simplifies to

$$d_1^2 > (b_1 + c_1 - 1 + b_2^*)/\gamma.$$

Parties 1 and 2 want to keep their base set of voters at the equilibrium and win over the base voters of the other mainstream party, hence Party 1 optimizes b_1 with the following two objectives:

$$\begin{aligned} d_1^2 &< (b_1 + c_1 - 1)/\gamma \qquad \text{for winning Party 2's voter base} \\ d_1^2 &> (b_1 + c_1 - 1 + b_2^*)/\gamma \quad \text{for winning own's voter base} \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, Party 2 optimizes c_1 with the following two objectives:

$$\begin{aligned} d_1^2 &> (b_1 + c_1 - 1)/\gamma \qquad \text{for winning own's voter base} \\ d_1^2 &< (b_1 + c_1 - 1 + b_2^*)/\gamma \quad \text{for winning Party 1's voter base} \end{aligned}$$

Consider the first set of inequalities for Party 1. Given the fact that b_2^* is non-negative, it is impossible for d_1 to satisfy both conditions. With the distance between two party, $d_1^2 > (b_1 + c_1 - 1 + b_2^*)/\gamma$ (and $d_1^2 > 1/\beta$ from the previous calculations for b_2^*), the first condition for Party 2 is also satisfied, and both parties allocate all of their resources to their base voters, $c_1^* = b_1^* = 0$. In contrast, when $d_1^2 < (b_1 + c_1 - 1)/\gamma$, the first condition for Party 1, and the second condition for Party 2 hold, and the two parties allocate b_1^* and c_1^* to the voter base of the other mainstream party, and at the equilibrium,

$$1 < b_1^* + c_1^* < 2 - b_2^*.$$

There is a continuum of inter-party base allocations at the equilibria.

□

Four regions of d_1 and d_2 are possible. We assumed $d_2^2 > 1/\beta$, in this regimes, based on the values of d_1, there are two set of equilibria possible. When d_1 is sufficiently small, the parties allocate resources to each other's base, and Party 1 allocates resources to Party 3's base to win over the base of the emergent party, and the remaining to its own base. When d_1 is large, Party 1 allocates resources only to the base of the emergent party (Party 3), and to its own base, not the base of the other mainstream party. Table (1) summarizes the main equilibria regimes.

The Turkish case shows a shift from the second regime to the first and third regimes, in which Party 1, (here AKP) stopped allocating to the Kurdish parties base, and focussed on the more conservative parts of the base of the competing establishment parties such as MHP and CHP. Increasingly anti-Kurdish campaigns helped to form new alliances with more

conservative factions of the MHP (and CHP) bloc.

Ideological Distance Parameters	Allocations at the Equilibria
d_1 large, d_2 large	d_2/d_1 large: P1 and P2 allocate to their own bases d_2/d_1 small: P1 to P3's base and its own, P2 to own base
d_1 large, d_2 small	P1 to P3's base and its own, P2 to own base
d_1 small, d_2 large	P1 and P2 to eachother and their own bases
d_1 small, d_2 small	P1 to P3's base and its own, P2 to P1's base and its own

Table 1: Resource Allocations at the Equilibria

The theoretical model outlined above predicts a strategic transfer of resources to the voter base of the emergent party, solely based on electoral calculations. In the Turkish context, one can replace Party 1 with AKP, Party 2 with CHP (and MHP), Party 3 with a variety of Kurdish party active between 2002 and 2015, including HDP, ideological dimension 1 with Turkish-Kurdish nationalism, and ideological dimension 2 with religiosity and secularism. In the following, we will detect the existence and effect of such transfers on the Kurdish vote for AKP. The same relation does not exist between the non-Kurdish AKP voters and the allocation of health care services and public goods transfer.

The equilibrium outcomes of the model summarized in Table (1), in the context of the Turkish politics, predict AKP allocations to the Kurdish political base, as long as the Turkish-Kurdish nationalist divide has not superseded the religiosity divide between the secular parties and AKP. As such, and against the notion of AKP's political agenda being solely Islamist, the model anticipates a significant relation between public goods allocations to the Kurdish population (and by proxy Kurdish areas, as the Kurdish population is geographically concentrated), prior to the escalation of the anti-Kurdish campaign, and increasing distance d_2 between AKP and other secular parties from the Kurdish political base. The Turkish electoral and socioeconomic data in the next sections are used to test and verify the existence of such distributive mechanisms.

Turkey under AKP Rule: Data Description

Turkey's General elections during the period 2002 to 2015 were held based on a closed proportional representation system,[11] operates with the highest entry threshold among any notable parliamentary electoral system in the world (10%) (Council of Europe 2010). On the other hand, Turkish *local* elections are administered based on a simple first-past-the-post system with simple majority rule (*Turkey's Electoral Law* 2015). Using data from both general and local election we demonstrate a disparity in the effectiveness of distributive programs on the Kurdish vote for AKP.

To showcase the importance of the electoral threshold in Turkish general elections, it suffices to examine the 2002 elections which brought AKP to power. In the 2002 general elections, AKP won 34.2% of votes cast, in comparison to 19.5% for CHP, its secular rival, while 46.3% of votes which had been cast for a house of parties unsympathetic to AKP's cause were not represented (Council of Europe 2010). Those above 5% were: DYP a center right party (led by Süleyman Demirel) 9.54%, MHP, The Nationalist Movement Party *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, a right wing party 8.36%, GP 7.25%, DEHAP a Kurdish party 6.22% (later banned), ANAP 5.13%. AKP acquired 66.9% of seats with 34.2% of votes.[12]

The vote percentages of the three electoral blocs in Turkish politics, AKP, CHP, and Kurdish parties are depicted in Figures (3a) and (3b) for general and local elections, respectively. The general elections held between 2002 and 2015 saw an increasing shift towards higher voter shares for Kurdish parties in the Kurdish provinces (evident in Figure (3a)) and an increase in AKP share of votes towards 2007 and 2011 and a decline in the first general elections in 2015. The reenactment of the 2015 elections demonstrates an upward shift in

[11]Electoral districts are mainly on the province level. The only exceptions are the following three provinces: currently Ankara is represented by 2 districts, Istanbul by 3 districts, and Izmir by 2 districts (*Turkey's Electoral Law* 2015).

[12]Note that the Russian Federation implements a similarly high entry threshold at 7% since 2007. With a 5% threshold in the Duma elections of 1995, 49.5% of votes were not represented.

AKP's popularity. Local elections between 2004 and 2014, for electing mayors and members of urban and rural councils, in contrast show a declining vote share for AKP in 2009 and 2014 compared to 2004. In the next section we will use the electoral data for measuring the effect of public goods provision on the rates of Kurdish vote for AKP. The geographical distribution of AKP vote in three major general elections in 2002, 2007 and 2015 (June) are included in Figures (4a), (4b) and (4c). The geographical distribution of AKP votes in 2007 shows a more evenly spread political base. In general the electorate from inner Anatolia, both in the east and west of the country show higher rates of support for AKP.

The ethnicity data we have used is extracted from a survey question on mother tongue of respondents in Turkey's Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (*Turkey Demographic and Health Survey* 2003, 2008, 2013). The data was used in conjunction with the electoral data in the panel analysis included in the next section. The Kurdish population is concentrated in Southeast Anatolia, and in general shows lower levels of socioeconomic development. A cartographic representation of Kurdish population's distribution is in included in the appendix. The socioeconomic control variables, i.e. economic sectorization data, population statistics on total numbers and levels of urbanization, levels of unemployment, labor force participation and gross regional product (GRP) in each economic sector are extracted from (*Regional statistics of Turkey* 2017), and verified against (*Turkey's Statistical Yearbook* 2006, 2009, 2013) and (*Statistical Indicators, 1923-2009* 2006). We employ a number of indicators for measuring the extent of welfare programs and public goods provision, particularly in the health sector, these are numbers of hospitals and hospital beds, as well as number of physicians and nurses per province for a given election year. Later we will show that such statistics measure the electoral significance of a number of free healthcare programs (Yörük 2012) which AKP initiated and administered in the 2002-2015 period.

The panel used in the following section for analysis is comprised of $N = 648$ data points, and $K = 40$ variables for each datapoint on the province level. We have built the panel by

combining the electoral, demographic, and economic data outlined above.[13]

Methods and Results

To detect the electoral consequences of AKP's welfare and public goods provisions program after 2002 we employ a variety of fixed effect panel regression models with the level of support for AKP, or for their Kurdish political competitors as the dependent variable. To detect any significant effect of interaction between the Kurdish population and the public goods provision on AKP (and Kurdish) vote we examine the effect of interaction terms between indices of public goods provision and levels of Kurdish population as the variable of interest. The results are included in Tables (2) to (12). All of the regressions in Tables (2) to (2) are fixed effects panel models with robust standard errors. Those in Tables (9) to (12) are OLS.

In Table (2) the percentage of AKP vote in *local* elections, on the province level, is regressed over a number of control variable, i.e. log of population, data on economic sectorization, labor participation rate, unemployment, literacy, and the level of urban population, and the variables of interest including the interaction of Kurdish population with levels of public goods provision. The standard errors for the fixed effects panel regressions are heteroskedacticity-robust. In the results in Table (2) the interaction term between the num-

[13]Available data is assigned to closest election year in the panel dataset. Labor participation rates and unemployment levels in 2007 are from 2008. Also 2014, 2015 (June), and 2015(November) labor participation rates and unemployment levels are from 2013, illiteracy data in 2002 is from the year 2000 data, illiteracy data in 2007 and 2009 are from year 2008 data, and illiteracy in year 2004 is the average of data for years 2000 and 2008. Data on the percentage of Kurdish population in 2002 is from the 2003 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), furthermore Kurdish population data in 2004 is from the 2003 DHS data, and the 2007 and 2009 data from the 2008 DHS, and 2011, 2014 and 2015 Kurdish population data are from the 2013 DHS. In addition to the healthcare programs, a brief depiction of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program is included in the appendix.

Figure 3: Vote Percentage, General and Local Elections, 2002-2015

(a) General Elections



(b) Local Elections

Figure 4: AKP Vote %

(a) 2002



(b) 2007



(c) 2015, June



ber of hospitals per capita and percentage of Kurdish population, shows a robust and positive effect on the levels of votes for AKP. The Kurdish population percentage per province, however, demonstrates the fact that AKP does not collect the Kurdish votes in the Local elections, where the seats are distributed based on a simple majority rule. Any additional percentage of Kurdish population translates to half a percent lesser vote for AKP. AKP's vote in local elections is outside urban areas, and shows a negative relation with unemployment. Overall, Table (2) shows that although Kurds exert a burden on AKP's local electoral machine, wherever there has been an increase in the level of healthcare, the Kurdish voters have rewarded AKP.[14]

The healthcare parameters are of utmost interest, because of the importance of free healthcare campaigns among AKP-initiated public goods campaign. The Kurdish population have been effectively targeted by such programs. In fact, a *green card* program offers free healthcare, many of whose benefactors are Kurdish (Yörük 2012).

Table (3) extends a similar analysis as the one in Table (2) to more models, and a variety of interaction terms between the Kurdish population percentage and indices of healthcare provisions such an number of physicians and nurses per capita and number of hospital and hospital beds per capita. Majority of these variables, when interacting with the levels of Kurdish population, show a statistically significant effect on AKP's vote in local elections. Again, this is in spite of Kurdish areas' overall negative effect on AKP's electoral results in local . Turnout rates show a negative effect on the dependent variable.[15]

Given the negative effect of the Kurdish population rates on AKP's electoral prospect, the pressing question is if there is any electoral strategy behind the allocations. In the model

[14]The relation between public goods provision and the level of Kurdish population in a given province is examined in the appendix. We do not find Kurds to be significantly discriminated against, in terms of the provision of public goods in Turkey.

[15]In Table (3) population and log(GRP) are included in all model calculations, but are not included in the table.

outlined in the previous section we argued that in a two-dimensional ideological space and in a three-party model, the mainstream parties have strategic incentives to allocate resources to the base of an emerging political movement. The empirical test for such an argument, in local elections, was presented in Tables (2) and (3). Compared with the general elections with their critical 10% threshold, never breached by the Kurds before 2015, local elections present a direct testing ground for measuring the electoral return to distributed resources. The general elections, however, portray a different effect: Tables (4) and (5), do not show a significantly negative connection between AKP's votes in general elections and the rates of Kurdish population. They in fact show a *positive* relation between Kurdish population percentages and AKP vote that is significant in a number of models. The interaction term between public goods indices and the rates of Kurdish population here is *not* contributing to AKP votes, while the Kurdish areas do vote for AKP in general elections. This fact shows that in general elections, AKP is competitive in Kurdish areas, and its success is likely to depend on factors other than resources alone, candidates for such reasons can be the religious appeal of AKP in the absence of chances for a Kurdish party to pass the 10% threshold.[16]

In Table (6) we examine the possibility that welfare provisions in Kurdish areas may contribute to turnout levels. The answer to that question is negative, there is no significant relation between interaction of Kurdish population and welfare provision in their relation to turnout. Unemployment shows a positive influence on turnout. Therefore, here public goods provision, if at all, contributes to persuasion, but not as much mobilization, in Kurdish areas.

Next, we turn to the determinants of the votes for Kurdish parties in local and general elections in Tables (7) and (8). In both local and general elections, the provision of public goods, in the healthcare sector, interacts positively with the rates of Kurdish population in relation with percentage of votes for Kurdish parties.[17] In contrast to the results on the

[16]In Table (5) Unemployment is included in all model calculations, but are not included in the table.

[17]Note that votes for the independent candidates representing Kurdish political movements are also coded as votes for Kurdish parties.

AKP vote presented in Tables (2) and (3), the effect of interaction is stronger and more significant in general elections. In other words, while provision of public goods has helped AKP, mostly in local elections, it has boosted the level of votes for Kurdish political entities in both general and local elections.

Tables (9) to (12) include OLS regressions of AKP and Kurdish parties' vote shares in local and general elections. The rates of Kurdish population show a negative effect on AKP vote, particularly in more recent general elections, but the effect is weaker in local elections. This can be attributed to the effect of public goods provisions on AKP prospects among the Kurds in local elections demonstrated previously. The negative effect of unemployment on AKP vote shows signs of economic voting. As expected, Kurdish parties' fortune is highly correlated with the levels of Kurdish population in a given province. For AKP, the general elections in 2007 is shown to present a singular outcome, in which Kurdish provinces did not, in average, vote against AKP. In contrast, the effect of Kurdish population on AKP vote is increasingly negative post-2011 onwards.

Overall, the portrait of Turkish elections under AKP rule, in Tables (2) to (12), demonstrates a significant interaction between welfare provision and the vote base of the Kurdish parties. We showed that, compared to AKP, such an effect is more pervasive for the Kurdish parties themselves. In local elections both rivals in Kurdish areas, i.e. AKP and Kurdish political parties, have electorally benefitted from public goods provisions in the health sector.

Table 2

	AKP Percent, Local Elections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elec.Partic.Rate	−0.005		−0.671***	
	(0.259)		(0.186)	
log(Totalpop)	23.703	23.709	16.345	12.601
	(15.466)	(15.534)	(16.239)	(16.142)
Urbanpop	−0.361*	−0.361*	−0.542**	−0.729***
	(0.170)	(0.172)	(0.175)	(0.177)
Kurdish%	−0.432***	−0.432***	−0.461***	−0.482***
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Hosp.perCapita	−567.063**	−567.444**	−625.494**	−764.835***
	(189.845)	(187.149)	(207.062)	(218.132)
Illiterate%	−0.068	−0.068	−0.379	−0.457
	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.296)	(0.298)
AgricGRP%	−7.130***	−7.145***		
	(1.367)	(1.112)		
IndusGRP%	−6.970***	−6.985***		
	(1.315)	(1.034)		
log(GRP)	−0.616	−0.715	6.774	−7.630
	(9.649)	(9.045)	(8.586)	(8.729)
Labourpartic.rate	−0.639***	−0.639***	−0.709***	−0.704***
	(0.168)	(0.165)	(0.171)	(0.173)
Unemployment	−0.126	−0.126	−0.380	−0.675**
	(0.255)	(0.255)	(0.248)	(0.248)
Kurdish%:Hosp.perCapita	9.643***	9.641***	9.734***	9.748***
	(2.445)	(2.445)	(2.671)	(2.779)
Observations	241	241	241	241
R^2	0.409	0.409	0.339	0.294
Adjusted R^2	0.035	0.042	-0.057	-0.121
F Statistic	7.826*** (df = 13; 147)	8.536*** (df = 12; 148)	7.707*** (df = 10; 150)	7.000*** (df = 9; 151)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3

	AKP Percent, Local Elections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elec.Partic.Rate		−0.691***	−0.744***	−0.723***
		(0.204)	(0.210)	(0.189)
Urbanpop	−0.729***	−0.349*	−0.379*	−0.508*
	(0.177)	(0.174)	(0.188)	(0.198)
Kurdish%	−0.482***	−0.474***	−0.408**	−0.213
	(0.113)	(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.130)
Hosp.perCapita	−764.835***			
	(218.132)			
PhysiciansperCapita		−11.493**		
		(4.263)		
NursesperCapita			−3.316	
			(4.401)	
Hosp.BedperCapita				−1.526
				(2.028)
Illiterate%	−0.457	−0.229	−0.088	−0.423
	(0.298)	(0.311)	(0.343)	(0.317)
Labourpartic.rate	−0.704***	−0.814***	−0.827***	−0.718***
	(0.173)	(0.177)	(0.186)	(0.188)
Unemployment	−0.675**	−0.546*	−0.564*	−0.403
	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.263)	(0.292)
Kurdish%:Hosp.perCapita	9.748***			
	(2.779)			
Kurdish%:PhysiciansperCapita		0.294**		
		(0.094)		
Kurdish%:NursesperCapita			0.183*	
			(0.078)	
Kurdish%:Hosp.BedperCapita				0.031
				(0.055)
Observations	241	241	241	241
R^2	0.294	0.337	0.318	0.303
Adjusted R^2	-0.121	-0.061	-0.090	-0.115
F Statistic	7.000*** (df = 9; 151)	7.617*** (df = 10; 150)	7.010*** (df = 10; 150)	6.523*** (df = 10; 150)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 4

	AKP Percent, General Elections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elec.Partic.Rate	−0.124		0.252	0.254
	(0.169)		(0.192)	(0.192)
log(Totalpop)	−0.670	−1.044	−23.507**	−23.469**
	(7.167)	(7.095)	(8.026)	(8.002)
Urbanpop	−0.021	−0.024	0.165	0.174
	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.102)
Kurdish%	0.039	0.040	0.096	0.065
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.099)	(0.054)
Hosp.perCapita	−197.992*	−199.107*	−79.296	−100.626
	(77.657)	(77.838)	(93.583)	(87.667)
Illiterate%	0.234	0.272	−0.101	−0.085
	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.169)	(0.160)
AgricGRP%	0.686***	0.670***		
	(0.073)	(0.072)		
IndusGRP%	−0.023	−0.012		
	(0.077)	(0.075)		
log(GRP)	7.547***	7.349***	5.467***	5.474***
	(0.745)	(0.633)	(0.877)	(0.875)
Labourpartic.rate	−0.254***	−0.251***	−0.335***	−0.335***
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Unemployment	−0.303*	−0.318*	−0.030	−0.036
	(0.153)	(0.159)	(0.189)	(0.188)
Kurdish%:Hosp.perCapita	−0.028	−0.007	−0.985	
	(1.573)	(1.571)	(2.073)	
Observations	401	401	401	401
R^2	0.574	0.573	0.445	0.444
Adjusted R^2	0.445	0.446	0.283	0.285
F Statistic	31.820*** (df = 13; 307)	34.459*** (df = 12; 308)	24.817*** (df = 10; 310)	27.630*** (df = 9; 311)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 5

	AKP Percent, General Elections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elec.Partic.Rate	0.262	0.252	0.255	0.368*
	(0.188)	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.179)
log(Totalpop)	−21.964**	−23.507**	−22.019**	−20.848*
	(8.459)	(8.026)	(8.286)	(8.212)
Urbanpop	0.069	0.165	0.088	−0.022
	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.098)
Kurdish%	0.246*	0.096	0.198*	0.480***
	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.092)
NursesperCapita	0.235			
	(1.620)			
Hosp.perCapita		−79.296		
		(93.583)		
PhysiciansperCapita			2.354	
			(1.875)	
Hosp.BedperCapita				1.351
				(0.930)
Illiterate%	−0.418	−0.101	−0.195	−0.631***
	(0.228)	(0.169)	(0.182)	(0.179)
log(GRP)	5.184***	5.467***	5.287***	4.724***
	(0.845)	(0.877)	(0.879)	(0.812)
Labourpartic.rate	−0.272***	−0.335***	−0.301***	−0.244***
	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.073)
Kurdish%:NursesperCapita	−0.131*			
	(0.062)			
Kurdish%:Hosp.perCapita		−0.985		
		(2.073)		
Kurdish%:PhysiciansperCapita			−0.123*	
			(0.062)	
Kurdish%:Hosp.BedperCapita				−0.215***
				(0.040)
Observations	401	401	401	401
R^2	0.460	0.445	0.450	0.497
Adjusted R^2	0.303	0.283	0.290	0.351
F Statistic (df = 10; 310)	26.375***	24.817***	25.370***	30.663***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 6

	Elec.Partic.Rate, Local & General					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
log(Totalpop)	−0.042	13.500*	3.068	5.584	−2.302	−2.708
	(4.379)	(5.536)	(2.531)	(6.183)	(2.616)	(2.602)
Urbanpop	−0.050	0.266***	0.026	0.279***	0.046	0.058
	(0.049)	(0.075)	(0.042)	(0.071)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Kurdish%	−0.046	−0.042	−0.021	0.032	−0.014	−0.065*
	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.033)
PhysiciansperCapita	1.596	7.751***	0.199		−0.555	
	(1.152)	(1.513)	(0.642)		(0.621)	
Hosp.perCapita				207.812**		
				(67.778)		
Hosp.BedperCapita						0.401
						(0.362)
Illiterate%	0.035	0.161	−0.295***	0.116	−0.371***	−0.256***
	(0.107)	(0.133)	(0.063)	(0.122)	(0.061)	(0.065)
AgricGRP%	3.122***		0.128***			
	(0.319)		(0.029)			
IndusGRP%	3.167***		−0.091***			
	(0.315)		(0.024)			
log(GRP)	20.128***	15.333***	1.594***	21.482***	1.562***	1.620***
	(2.702)	(3.140)	(0.269)	(3.273)	(0.239)	(0.228)
Labourpartic.rate	−0.080	−0.044	−0.029	−0.008	−0.036	−0.056
	(0.042)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.066)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Unemployment	0.007	0.346***	0.113	0.439***	0.184**	0.155*
	(0.067)	(0.097)	(0.067)	(0.091)	(0.068)	(0.065)
Kurdish%:PhysiciansperCapita	0.044	0.051	0.003		0.004	
	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.023)		(0.023)	
Kurdish%:Hosp.perCapita				−0.022		
				(1.056)		
Observations	241	241	401	241	401	401
R^2	0.876	0.768	0.673	0.740	0.638	0.646
Adjusted R^2	0.798	0.632	0.576	0.586	0.535	0.545

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 7

	Kurdish Party Percent, Local Elections				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
log(Totalpop)	13.182	15.232	15.470	18.059	13.664
	(10.536)	(10.352)	(11.133)	(11.334)	(11.720)
Urbanpop	−0.334*	−0.294*	−0.147	−0.323*	−0.234
	(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.144)
Kurdish%	0.164	0.174	−0.216	0.115	−0.113
	(0.093)	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.070)	(0.092)
Hosp.perCapita	275.730	345.971*			
	(151.714)	(165.024)			
PhysiciansperCapita			0.734	6.153*	
			(1.963)	(2.801)	
NursesperCapita					2.599
					(2.561)
Illiterate%	−0.902***	−0.657**	−0.371	−0.648**	−0.201
	(0.223)	(0.243)	(0.217)	(0.235)	(0.234)
AgricGRP%	4.117***				
	(0.899)				
IndusGRP%	4.126***				
	(0.928)				
log(GRP)	−9.796	−0.492	−2.472	−3.124	−1.174
	(9.023)	(7.155)	(7.630)	(7.799)	(8.481)
Labourpartic.rate	0.185*	0.186*	0.073	0.179	0.119
	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Unemployment	0.304	0.449	0.212	0.433	0.313
	(0.222)	(0.241)	(0.239)	(0.238)	(0.241)
Kurdish%:Hosp.perCapita	−1.833	−1.493			
	(2.903)	(3.260)			
Kurdish%:PhysiciansperCapita			0.295***		
			(0.083)		
Kurdish%:NursesperCapita					0.175**
					(0.060)
Observations	241	241	241	241	241
R^2	0.381	0.288	0.355	0.283	0.314
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	-0.131	-0.025	-0.133	-0.090
F Statistic	7.603*** (df = 12; 148)	6.802*** (df = 9; 151)	9.246*** (df = 9; 151)	7.488*** (df = 8; 152)	7.678*** (df = 9; 151)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 8

	Kurdish Party Percent, General Elections				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
log(Totalpop)	10.848*	17.784***	14.173***	14.605***	13.891***
	(4.271)	(3.856)	(3.968)	(4.041)	(3.897)
Urbanpop	−0.223***	−0.293***	−0.231***	−0.331***	−0.198**
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.065)
Kurdish%	−0.109	−0.124	−0.123	0.055	−0.178*
	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.055)	(0.072)
Hosp.perCapita	223.904**	185.085*			
	(77.256)	(77.281)			
PhysiciansperCapita			−2.675	−1.361	
			(1.445)	(1.522)	
NursesperCapita					−0.648
					(1.010)
Illiterate%	−1.199***	−1.044***	−1.028***	−1.271***	−0.777***
	(0.122)	(0.115)	(0.136)	(0.113)	(0.156)
AgricGRP%	−0.209***				
	(0.051)				
IndusGRP%	−0.026				
	(0.055)				
log(GRP)	−2.824***	−2.293***	−1.977***	−2.023***	−1.828***
	(0.445)	(0.423)	(0.388)	(0.405)	(0.369)
Labourpartic.rate	0.223***	0.256***	0.190***	0.222***	0.155**
	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.054)
Unemployment	0.334**	0.234	0.185	0.267	0.170
	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.133)
Kurdish%:Hosp.perCapita	5.349**	5.658**			
	(1.844)	(1.937)			
Kurdish%:PhysiciansperCapita			0.165**		
			(0.051)		
Kurdish%:NursesperCapita					0.168***
					(0.040)
Observations	401	401	401	401	401
R^2	0.554	0.529	0.508	0.486	0.537
Adjusted R^2	0.421	0.394	0.368	0.341	0.405

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 9

	AKP Percent, General Elections, By Year				
	(02)	(07)	(11)	(15-1)	(15-2)
Turnout	−0.041	0.407	−0.308	−1.220***	0.319
	(0.279)	(0.344)	(0.554)	(0.365)	(0.751)
log(Totalpop)	7.334*	23.507*	22.117*	4.628	13.490
	(2.997)	(9.884)	(9.592)	(8.116)	(10.163)
Urbanpop	0.138	0.229	0.236*	0.112	0.218
	(0.173)	(0.127)	(0.116)	(0.130)	(0.134)
Kurdish%	−0.338***	−0.132	−0.213*	−0.247**	−0.299**
	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.079)	(0.100)
PhysiciansperCapita	−3.575	1.769	6.869	4.065	6.462
	(4.458)	(3.363)	(5.288)	(3.336)	(4.209)
Illiterate%	−0.435	0.280	0.902	0.710	2.295**
	(0.402)	(0.584)	(0.728)	(0.853)	(0.869)
AgricGRP%	−0.339	−0.282	0.411	0.253	0.239
	(0.302)	(0.298)	(0.284)	(0.204)	(0.297)
IndusGRP%	−0.060	0.009	0.697**	0.403*	0.512*
	(0.133)	(0.238)	(0.259)	(0.200)	(0.242)
log(GRP)	−16.015**	−21.265*	−21.253*	−4.089	−12.800
	(5.450)	(9.349)	(8.977)	(7.211)	(9.381)
Labourpartic.rate	0.070	−0.231	0.336	−0.825*	−0.672*
	(0.217)	(0.202)	(0.254)	(0.326)	(0.318)
Unemployment	0.451	−1.316*	−1.246*	−1.521***	−2.267***
	(0.676)	(0.515)	(0.600)	(0.430)	(0.514)
Observations	80	81	80	80	80
R^2	0.376	0.275	0.346	0.528	0.460
Adjusted R^2	0.264	0.159	0.241	0.452	0.372
Residual Std. Error	11.570 (df = 67)	11.430 (df = 69)	11.301 (df = 68)	10.582 (df = 68)	12.603 (df = 68)
F Statistic	3.362*** (df = 12; 67)	2.379* (df = 11; 69)	3.274** (df = 11; 68)	6.921*** (df = 11; 68)	5.261*** (df = 11; 68)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 10

	AKP Percent, Local Elections, By Year		
	(04)	(09)	(14)
Elec.Partic.Rate	−0.313	−0.274	−0.123
	(0.332)	(0.314)	(0.653)
log(Totalpop)	24.081**	12.750	7.474
	(8.842)	(7.395)	(7.557)
Urbanpop	0.015	0.130	0.080
	(0.208)	(0.137)	(0.125)
Kurdish%	−0.350**	−0.104	−0.093
	(0.126)	(0.055)	(0.083)
PhysiciansperCapita	−3.158	−1.512	5.662
	(4.588)	(2.499)	(3.574)
Illiterate%	−1.544*	0.015	1.567
	(0.656)	(0.557)	(0.815)
AgricGRP%	−1.109***	0.168	0.246
	(0.279)	(0.234)	(0.226)
IndusGRP%	−0.416	0.199	0.499**
	(0.243)	(0.215)	(0.187)
log(GRP)	−25.744***	−10.242	−4.786
	(8.345)	(7.123)	(7.005)
Labourpartic.rate	−1.005	−0.424	−0.831*
	(0.301)	(0.235)	(0.333)
Unemployment	−1.261	−0.921*	−1.783***
	(0.572)	(0.365)	(0.408)
Observations	80	81	80
R^2	0.302	0.235	0.326
Adjusted R^2	0.189	0.114	0.217
Residual Std. Error	15.380 (df = 68)	9.539 (df = 69)	10.320 (df = 68)
F Statistic	2.670** (df = 11; 68)	1.932* (df = 11; 69)	2.990** (df = 11; 68)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 11

	Kurdish Party Percent, General Elections, By Year				
	(02)	(07)	(11)	(15-1)	(15-2)
Turnout	0.055	−0.583*	0.472	1.230*	0.172
	(0.161)	(0.283)	(0.592)	(0.511)	(0.730)
log(Totalpop)	−0.574	−26.491***	−6.697	−1.248	−6.241
	(2.197)	(6.039)	(6.534)	(9.633)	(9.887)
Urbanpop	0.082	−0.010	−0.114	0.034	0.010
	(0.097)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.114)	(0.106)
Kurdish%	0.270***	0.205***	0.422***	0.532***	0.508***
	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.067)	(0.084)	(0.094)
PhysiciansperCapita	0.044	−1.777	−5.491*	−4.611	−6.402*
	(1.543)	(1.942)	(2.739)	(2.433)	(2.754)
Illiterate%	1.036**	1.733***	0.811	2.254*	1.178
	(0.317)	(0.465)	(0.540)	(0.999)	(0.863)
AgricGRP%	−0.045	−0.042	−0.488*	−0.349	−0.381
	(0.240)	(0.133)	(0.217)	(0.257)	(0.290)
IndusGRP%	−0.009	−0.138	−0.481*	−0.424	−0.490*
	(0.055)	(0.131)	(0.221)	(0.218)	(0.214)
log(GRP)	3.665	24.501***	5.949	1.046	5.270
	(3.187)	(5.350)	(6.695)	(8.366)	(8.988)
Labourpartic.rate	0.072	−0.159	−0.553**	0.390	0.224
	(0.100)	(0.138)	(0.186)	(0.267)	(0.253)
Unemployment	0.059	0.239	0.455	0.623	1.025*
	(0.538)	(0.274)	(0.528)	(0.387)	(0.442)
Observations	80	81	80	80	80
R^2	0.849	0.804	0.842	0.870	0.832
Adjusted R^2	0.822	0.773	0.817	0.848	0.805
Residual Std. Error	5.895 (df = 67)	7.219 (df = 69)	8.027 (df = 68)	9.652 (df = 68)	9.992 (df = 68)
F Statistic	31.322*** (df = 12; 67)	25.702*** (df = 11; 69)	33.039*** (df = 11; 68)	41.195*** (df = 11; 68)	30.692*** (df = 11; 68)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 12

	Kurdish Party Percent, Local Elections, By Year		
	(04)	(09)	(14)
Elec.Partic.Rate	−0.064	0.210	−1.060
	(0.134)	(0.331)	(0.560)
log(Totalpop)	−12.454*	−18.133**	−1.607
	(4.914)	(7.035)	(8.803)
Urbanpop	0.054	0.061	0.065
	(0.053)	(0.070)	(0.101)
Kurdish%	0.080	0.279***	0.360***
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.084)
PhysiciansperCapita	3.464	−2.066	−5.505
	(3.401)	(2.364)	(3.091)
Illiterate%	1.487***	2.041***	−0.189
	(0.377)	(0.541)	(0.893)
AgricGRP%	0.057	−0.143	−0.288
	(0.154)	(0.207)	(0.241)
IndusGRP%	0.165	−0.094	−0.228
	(0.196)	(0.176)	(0.170)
log(GRP)	11.218***	17.728**	0.450
	(4.588)	(6.522)	(8.731)
Labourpartic.rate	−0.127	−0.037	−0.033
	(0.088)	(0.150)	(0.303)
Unemployment	−0.414	0.209	0.551
	(0.249)	(0.328)	(0.519)
Observations	80	81	80
R^2	0.613	0.807	0.724
Adjusted R^2	0.551	0.776	0.679
Residual Std. Error	6.762 (df = 68)	8.456 (df = 69)	10.079 (df = 68)
F Statistic	9.800*** (df = 11; 68)	26.184*** (df = 11; 69)	16.186*** (df = 11; 68)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Discussion

Controlling for a number of economic variables, in the previous section we found a robust relation between the interaction of Kurdish voters with public goods provisions in the health sector. We argued that the allocation of such services does show an effect of the electoral fortunes of political parties in Turkey, and not only those of the dominant one, AKP.

The main question, which we asked at the beginning of this study was: why would dominant parties support a hostile, and disadvantaged, minority? We argued that the reason, in addition to the welfare exigencies of the minority population, was electoral strategizing. We argued that the effect in a three-party setup can be formulated based on ideological distances that exist among mainstream parties and emergent political groups associated with the minority. The model predicted an outreach to the minority, prior to the voters of the rival mainstream party. In the context of Turkish politics and electoral competition since 2002, we demonstrated that the Kurdish population electorally responded to the provision of public goods, and their positive response was not only for AKP, it extended to the Kurdish parties as well. It is important to note that such provision of public goods was not a mere reward to AKP voters, including its Turkish base among the religious lower middle class. For example, the results of the panel regression in the appendix does not tie higher levels of public goods provision to prior voting for AKP.[18] In the theory section, we argued that more than a simple response to highest marginal electoral return, the dominant parties have strategic reasons for appeal to the minorities that are ideologically favorable to their position. Such effects are best detected in a two-dimensional policy space.

To demonstrate the contrasts between the logic of redistribution in traditional unidimensional policy space with a majority rule and that of a proportional representation with an entry threshold in two-dimensional space, we argued that in such a setup, the ideologically advantaged dominant party has an incentive to allocate to a small minority, in spite of lack

[18]The link between public goods provision and turnout is recognized (Nooruddin and Simmons 2015).

of immediate electoral returns. In the Turkish context, we showed that the same allocation instead of suppressing minority parties, turned to have empowered them. Furthermore, the contrast between local and general election rules helped to emphasize the strategic nature of such allocations.

Here, we further develop the logic by examining another dimension of the PR system (in addition to the multi-dimensional policy space) that motivates resource allocation beyond maximization of marginal rates of return. Consider a general PR system. The function from the votes to legislative seats is defined by two main components, the threshold for entry T, and the function mapping the allocations and the ideological positioning into the percentage of votes allocated for the main party in a given political group. Here in this formulation we focus on the allocations between the incumbent party (one of the two main parties) and the emergent one, because the interaction between the two main parties, in relation to their base voters follows a logic similar to the one outlined in prior work.[19] In any administrative entity in which the smaller party is competitive, the main party has an incentive to invest, to prevent its reaching the threshold of electoral entry. This happens in spite of such an investment bringing no immediate marginal rate of electoral benefit.[20] To paraphrase, the existing literature on redistributive politics, in the presence of multiple interest groups[21] (Myerson 1993), (Dixit and Londregan 1996), (Cox and McCubbins 1986) maintains restrictive conditions on functions that represent the electoral return to distributive investments. Such continuity assumptions are often violated in proportional representation systems with vote thresholds for entry as high as those in Turkish (and Russian) politics. Parties have

[19]For a summary see (Cox 2009).

[20]In mathematical terms, the main issue is with the conclusions in prior derivations, for example those in (Cox and McCubbins 1986) is that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, used for optimization of the electoral outcome, do not apply to the objective function in a PR systems, which is not differentiable at the electoral threshold.

[21]These groups can be thought of voter base for the parties.

incentives to distribute to interest groups with marginal rates of electoral return[22] that are not the most locally efficient. For example, based on the very same logic, AKP has an incentive to transfer to majority Kurdish areas, because AKP is the only non-Kurd political party that is viable in Kurdish areas, relying on its religious appeal to Kurdish and religious voters, in order to roll back main Kurdish parties from the punishing threshold of 10% is central to its performance in the majority Kurdish provinces. Losing these areas to Kurdish political parties represents a discontinuous and abrupt shift in the number of seats allocated to AKP in the Turkish parliament (which did occur after the June 2015 elections). In other words, at the brink of the 10% threshold itself, where a Kurdish party has gained $10 - \epsilon$ percentage of the votes, for the AKP holding on to that decreasing ϵ among the Kurdish voters becomes increasingly important, much more than the more easily attainable votes of the poor, Turkish and religious areas.



Figure 5: Below the electoral threshold, increasing or decreasing percentages of votes has no *immediate* influence on the number of seats in the legislature and the executive, but bears potential for major electoral shifts when the threshold is unusually high.

[22]Defined as number of votes gained per unit of financial allocation to the district.

Conclusion

The case of Turkish electoral politics, the ascendance of AKP, its quest for the Kurdish vote, culminating the 2007 election, empowering Kurdish parties such as HDP, in the process in the June 2015 elections, and hence turning against them in November 2015 to appeal to the voters of the other dominant party's base, provides ample variations for testing the theory we outlined in this study.

We argued that Turkish politicians traditionally aligned themselves along the ideological dimension of Turkish nationalism, hence Islamist politicians such as Erbakan had no choice other than allying themselves in highly nationalist endeavors such as invasion of Cyprus, along with Ecevit in the 1970s (Ahmad 1993). Later, in the 1990s, the very same alliance seemed to be impossible: Erbakan and his protege Erdogan were banned from politics, before Erdogan introduced a novel religious dimension to Turkish politics, and through that opening programmed an outreach to the mainly religious Kurdish minority. We demonstrated the logic for such a move, and in the empirics, showed that it also benefitted Kurdish parties, and their eventual entrance to the Turkish parliament, made AKP's majority government, and any continuation of the 'Kurdish Overture' untenable. After that incident (and the salience of the d_2 dimension in our model, see Figure (2)) Erdogan had no choice but to return to the nationalist appeal to MHP and CHP base, and to move away from proportional representation and towards a majority based political system, not in need of minority votes.

There are ready venues for extending this work both theoretically and empirically. In terms of case studies, Indian politics, with its division between nationalist Hindu and center left politics, in relation to a far left minority, which is similar to Turkey is geographically concentrated, comes to mind. In this case, the two ideological dimensions in the PR system map to nationalism, and redistributive ideology.

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Supporting Information

SI 1: Distribution of Seats in the Turkish Parliament under AKP

SI 2: Determinants of Public Goods Provision

SI 3: Kurdish Population Estimates and CCT Allocations

SI Section 1: Distribution of Seats in the Turkish Parliament under AKP

- General elections November 2015, total seats: 550
  - AKP 317 seats, CHP 134 seats, MHP 40 seats, HDP 59 seats
- General elections June 2015, total seats: 550
  - AKP 258 seats, CHP 132 seats, MHP 80 seats, HDP 80 seats
- General elections June 2011, total seats: 550
  - AKP 327 seats, CHP 135 seats, MHP 53 seats, Independents: 35 seats
- General elections July 2007, total seats: 550
  - AKP 341 seats, CHP 112 seats, MHP 71 seats, Independents 26 seats
- Turkish general elections November 2002, total seats: 555
  - AKP 363 seats, CHP 178 seats, Independents 9 seats[23]

[23]Source: (*Regional statistics of Turkey* 2017).

SI Section 2: Determinants of Public Goods Provision

Table 13

	1000 ∗Nurses/Totalpop	1000 ∗HospitalBedsNo/Totalpop	1000 ∗PhysiciansTotal/Totalpop
	(1)	(2)	(3)
lag(AKP Percent)	−0.003***	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log(Totalpop)	−1.788***	−0.677*	−1.144***
	(0.204)	(0.296)	(0.233)
Kurdish%	−0.001	−0.0004	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Elec.Partic.Rate	0.003	0.006	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Illiterate%	−0.010*	−0.006	−0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
AgricGRP%	0.043*	0.021	0.034
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.017)
IndusGRP%	0.046*	0.014	0.029
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.017)
ServGRPPerc	0.064**	0.036	0.040*
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.016)
log(GRP)	1.766***	1.207***	0.896***
	(0.126)	(0.221)	(0.113)
Labourpartic.rate	−0.002	0.016***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Unemployment	−0.010***	0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
ElectionType	−0.009	0.004	−0.011
	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.012)
Observations	562	562	562
R^2	0.806	0.462	0.607
Adjusted R^2	0.768	0.356	0.530
F Statistic (df = 12; 469)	162.552***	33.550***	60.325***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SI Section 3: Kurdish Population Estimates and CCT Allocations

Figure 6: Kurdish Population % and CCT Expenditure

(a) Kurdish Population %



(b) log(CCT Expenditure)



(c) CCT Expenditure per Capita