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THE PROBLEMS OF IMMANENTISM IN UNSTABLE ONTOLOGIES

EXTENDED ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF WORK

The relevance of a research topic

Becoming is a fundamental problem of philosophy: the question of how to conceive Being as one and unchangeable, not excluding time as a source of variability, occupies an important place in Antiquity, because “if changing, the one can no longer be the one”\(^1\) and self-identical\(^2\). One of the classic solutions to this problem is an ontological separation of Being and Becoming, accompanied by the epistemological division of truth and opinion: if the first is related to the “access” to Being as unchangeable reality, the second refers to Becoming\(^3\). The separation of a single Being as a transcendent limit from the multiplicity and Becoming, which are immanent to the world, became a means of substantiation of the imperative of stability, formulated ontologically, because this operation implied the division of Being/Nonbeing\(^4\), which ordered all other distinctions: what is – doesn’t become, what becomes – is not. From this perspective, Becoming is thought as a transition from Nonbeing to Being, and the priority remains for the second one. Thus, Becoming and instability primarily pass under the rubric of Nonbeing, and it puts those who risk asking a question about the possibility of the unstable ontology in a difficult situation. A hypothetical condition of this possibility is radical immanentism, i. e. the denial of assumptions of any transcendent foundations. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly describe the “mechanisms” of metaphysical thinking, and then outline the contours of the problem field, along the way clarifying the main concepts I use (unstable ontologies, virtual, actual, etc.).

Without any risk of harming the dual terminological frame in this context the notions of “Being” and “Nonbeing” can be substituted by such notions as “possible” and “real”. The “real” means existing in the given moment of time. The

\(^2\) “The thesis of eleates, if to express it formally-logically, would be reduced to... the law of identity: A is A” (Gaidenko P. P. Istoriya grecheskoy filosofii v ee svyazi s naukoy. M., SPb., 2000. P. 117).
\(^4\) The division Being/Nonbeing is itself derived from a primary distinction of the observer and the observed (Luhmann N. Samoopisaniya. M., 2009. P. 38).
“possible” refers to something that is not yet arisen (not existing), but which can arise. This conceptual apparatus helps to describe the world in the aspect of its changeability. But the real is ontologically primary, because, according to Parmenides, there is no Nonbeing. That’s why, despite the fact that the development of such a world implies some degree of indeterminacy, the latter is very insignificant, because the possible means an always determined non-existent, which is prescribed some purpose of realization. For example, the seed is possible in relation to the real plant. Here, one might recall Aristotle’s idea of the seeds of things, which refers to the idea of Anaxagoras that each body corresponds to a certain form of basic origin. Thus, every object (real) corresponds to some "seed" (possible). In this case we are dealing with a kind of “metaphysical preformism” – a philosophical position, which consists in the fact that any existent initially has a certain individual purpose. The primary ontological distinction and all its derivatives allow to reduce the world to its current image: “the deep ontological distinction introduces quasi-normative postulate, which should be understood as the requirement of the order”5. Thus, the ontology acts as a stabilizing tool, the ultimate expression of the “cinematic mechanism of thought” which allows us to think Becoming only with the help of its reflection in a series of discrete images. To find the way out of this epistemological situation one can try to supple the dual terminological frame with the third term, the way Hegel did it; for him the uncertainty of pure being requires the transition to its negation, and then the connection of assertion and negation in the third notion. However, this decision would not seem so innovative if we assume that since the time of Thales “philosophers have argued about whether the idea should focus on Three or Two, whether it should achieve One or, at least, should strive to achieve it; in truth, all converged on a Dyad”6 – in contrast to Hegel, who chose to stay on the triad. This “answer to the question of preferences” allows us to think Becoming as a historical process, controlled by the cunning of the mind, and therefore – the teleological

5 Ibid. P. 38.
process. In the Hegelian perspective, the purpose of history is to achieve One, i. e. its end\(^7\) as the completion of negative human activity and the elimination of the gap between human and natural, Nonbeing and Being. However, in this case we still think the change as a transition from point to point, but not a continual process of non-teleological becoming. Hence, Becoming is understood as a linear progressive process.

Thus, in hastily outlined above philosophical positions the change occurs progressively – from simple to complex or vice versa; however, taking similar approaches seriously, we, nonetheless, will be compelled to admit that we think not Becoming but the fixed existents, not time, but its spatial incarnations. In addition, it is impossible not to question the novelty of the new\(^8\): if the "beginning is also the end", how appropriate it is to talk about novelty in principle? To circumvent these deadlocks arising from the orientation towards dualistic models, we need to rethink the very idea of change. Common sense tells us that the new is so only in relation to the old, from which it differs. Thus, the new “initially” is subordinate to the already visible, its difference is considered secondary to the identity, i. e. we exclude time and think Becoming in a “cinematographic” way, as “something” discrete. But abandoning the idea that gives priority to identity can help us make the necessary change of perspective: what if conceiving identity as a starting point is a mistake? The means for such a shift, in particular, one can find in a conception of Gabriel Tarde, whose thesis is that existence is differentiation, while identity is just a quite rare species of difference (like quietness is a special case of the movement, or the circle – a kind of ellipse). In this sense, Tarde, in fact, performs the inversion of the traditional metaphysical dogma. This inversion leads to the conclusion that the change is changing itself and there can be no evidence that the degree of change increases or decreases over time. It undermines the idea of

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\(^7\) According to Hegel, becoming as an "unrestrained movement" is not able to resist in its " abstract mobility, for, since being and nothing disappear in becoming, and only this disappearance is contents of the concept of becoming, it is itself, therefore, a kind of disappearing fire that fades in itself, devouring its material" (Hegel G. W. F. Entsyklopediya filosofskikh nauk. T. 1. Nauka logiki. M., 1974. P. 228).

\(^8\) “...How should we understand the new... in a world governed by deterministic laws?” (Prigogine I., Stengers I. Vremya, haos, kvant. M, 1994. P. 7).
Becoming as a linear process: the construction of the railway station, for example, is simpler and slimmer than the construction of the medieval castle, but the construction of the first requires a more complex set of tools and specialties. It’s important that the difference is always accompanied by the repetition: despite the fact that “the development of civilization makes people in many ways more different, this occurs not otherwise as a result of the equation of them in other ways through increasing uniformity of the laws, habits and languages”\textsuperscript{9}. At the same time, the increase in uniformity necessarily entails the decrease in stability. Here we should consider a concept of instability.

Instability means the impossibility of applying the measure to Becoming, i.e. inability to predict changes: some events can change the course of evolution, which, therefore, is unstable\textsuperscript{10}. Taking time and instability into account requires a revision of classical rationality. Here we should talk about “open rationality” (V. Budanov), which is focused not only and not so much on Being (identity), but on Becoming (difference). The open rationality is postmetaphysical. It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the prefix “post”, which is possible through making clear what is attached to it. One can indicate four aspects of traditional understanding of metaphysics: first, we are talking about the theory of absolute totality; second, a theory which draws a distinction between being and phenomenon; third, theory, admitting that there is something above/below the natural; fourth, the theory of an entity that allows to know what is, through the separation of "meaningless mereological amounts" from the fact that there is something rather than nothing\textsuperscript{11}. These aspects presuppose the assumption of a "foundation", the last [reasonable] ground. The term “metaphysics” refers to the teaching about the first reasons, the key impulse of which is the search for the universals and the desire to build a total system of the world. This impulse is inseparable from the axiological system centered around stability. To provide a ground for itself, metaphysical thought is forced to set a limit for itself, pre-defined basis, however ,”if physics finds no

\textsuperscript{9} Tarde G. Monadologiya i sociologiya. Perm, 2016. P. 46.
limits, it is completely unclear where there can be this beyond, in the sense of meta, which is beyond physics”\textsuperscript{12}. In this sense, the refusal to establish the last grounds can be considered as a postmetaphysical step.

Now let us turn to the concept of “unstable ontologies”. It was brought into the philosophical vocabulary by Oliver Marchart in the mid-2000s\textsuperscript{13}. The Austrian scholar used it to identify the “convergence point” of the three directions in the field of the continental philosophy of the XX-XXI centuries: “ontology of lack”, “ontology of abundance” and “ontology of difference”. These largely incompatible philosophical lines have at least one important similarity: they can be placed in the “post-foundational” horizon, i. e. in the space of thought, eliminating the access to the ground of being as a full presence. Hence the definition of unstable ontologies as ontologies, within which the deconstruction of the sufficient reason, is carried out. At this point three important remarks should be made.

First, I assume the probability that the concept of “philosophy of instability” (I. Prigogine) may be more successful, because it better conveys the idea of designing a stable theoretical system that would serve to describe the non-self-identical (unstable) objects. However, I tend to use the original Marchart’s concept for two reasons: 1) any concept bears the signature of its author (Deleuze/Guattari); 2) “philosophy of instability” refers to synergetics, the appeal to which would require serious physical and mathematical competence, which I in no way possess.

Second, the notion of “ontology”, which emerged in the XVII century, connotes stability and functions as a requirement of order, which, in our case, leads to the fact that the concept of unstable ontologies turns out to be a kind of oxymoron. However, I propose, this difficulty can be circumvented. If formula “to engage in fighting the metaphysics is still to engage in metaphysics”\textsuperscript{14} is true,

\textsuperscript{12} Kuznetsov V. Vzaimosvyaz edinstva mira i edinstva kultury. M., 2013. P. 67, 64.
nothing prevents us to extrapolate this schematic into the field of ontology. Based on this, we will have to admit that the slogan “to turn over the ontology, to remove the foundation, to cancel the beginning and the end”\textsuperscript{15}, despite the emphasized anti-ontological message, is still a purely ontological manifestation, because to engage in “turning over” the ontology – still means to engage in ontology.

Third, this research is focused on working out the “plots” of Post/Deleuzian philosophy, therefore, at first glance, it may seem that would be more appropriate to use the concept of “ontologies of becoming”\textsuperscript{16}, coined by Andrew Pickering as an opposite to the “dualistic ontologies”. But, to my mind, the concept of ontology of becoming does not convey the unstable character of the latter: Becoming takes place even in the ontology of Plato, but that doesn’t make it less stable.

It is critical to give a brief description of the three types of unstable ontologies, selected by Oliver Marchart, and to explain why my attention will be focused on the so-called ontology of abundance. Let us begin with the “ontology of lack”, which is associated with Kojevian interpretation of “The Phenomenology of Spirit”. Kojeve divides the world into two poles – identity (nature) and negativity (subject). If natural being is always equal to itself and, in this sense, is not lacking in anything, then the existence of the subject is determined by its ability to negate: the subject can’t be conceived as something “complete” – it’s given only as a lack of itself. The subject, which has lost its capacity for negation of the given, according to Kojeve, ceases to be a human subject – a being negative and, therefore, historical. It is in this sense that I say that in the ontology of lack, the presence (subject) is determined by the constitutional absence (lack of both self-identity and identity with the surrounding [nonhistorical] natural world). Thus, the key characteristic of the ontology of lack is, to my mind, the appeal to the motive of “anthropological negativity”, i. e. the conceptualization of a human being as an “agent of negativity”. In the “ontology of difference”, which originates in the work of Heidegger and subsequently developed by Derrida, we find the problematization

of difference, the concept of which serves to fix the phenomenon of constant
difference of presence from itself, not allowing to reach any stable basis of Being.
The ideas of the representatives of the line of difference can be briefly described as
follows: the traditional Parmenides’ ontological paradigm presupposes the division
of Being and Nonbeing: the first is, and the second is not. But this opposition itself
refers to the primary operation of differentiation, thus there is a difference between
Being and Nonbeing, identity and negativity, but the difference itself, according to
the logic of the representatives of this philosophical line, cannot be conceived as a
beginning, because the beginning must be identical to itself, and the difference
remains different from itself – in this sense it can’t become an ontological
“foundation”. The key concept of deconstruction – “differance” – is by no means
another name of negation, lack. This Derridian neologism contains two semantic
aspects: [1] differentiation, i. e. the process of differentiation, during which binary
oppositions arise (for example, ontological (general) and ontical (private)) and the
terms of these oppositions gain certainty, and [2] temporalization, i. e. the constant
postponing of access to the fullness of presence (and meaning): each term (or sign,
because the basic theoretical referent of the deconstruction is, in addition to the
Heidegger’s philosophy, the linguistic theory of Saussure) contains a trace of
another term (sign) and refers to it, being incomplete, not self-identical. Thus,
“Being”, which in Derrida and his followers’ pantextualist philosophy is thought of
rather as a “cultural text” than directly given reality, becomes a network of
signifiers referring to each other, but forming no totality. The “ontology of
abundance”, which has been developed by Deleuze and his followers, comes from
the principle “there is always more”, which replaces the ontological question “why
is there something and not nothing?” I suppose, the two key concepts in
Deleuze/Guattari’s philosophy are “actual” and “virtual”. Virtual and actual –
unlike possible and real – do not form a stable opposition, because virtual is
everything that is immersed in the process of actualization. The virtual is not the
opposite of a real or a copy of it – it is the abstract power of existence that pushes
the process of actualization, being resolved in a string of phenomena and, thus, acts
as the engine of continuous becoming\textsuperscript{17}. One, therefore, should talk here not about virtual reality, but about the reality of the virtual. Here we are dealing with “being” in the aspect of its fundamental uncertainty, formlessness. The actual is represented by discrete assemblages of the existent, whereas the virtual is continuous and non-discursive. The virtual is in any case not possible, rather the contrary (concept mobilized as a tool of radical critique of a category of possible).

Virtual is different from the possible, because the second lacks reality, whereas the virtual, without being actual, nevertheless has it. The process of realization of the possible is subjected to the rules of similarity and restriction: the real “exists in the image of the possible, which it realizes”, but the realization is carried out selectively: “realization implies a restriction, according to which some opportunities... are rejected or suppressed, while others «pass» into reality”\textsuperscript{18}. The rules of actualization of the virtual are the other ones: these are difference and divergence: “…in order to be actualized, the virtual cannot be developed by elimination or limitation, but must create its own lines of actualization in positive acts. The reason for this is simple: while the real exists in the image and similarity of the possible realized by it, the actual, for its part, does not куыуылуу the virtuality embodied by it at all. It is the difference that is primary in the process of actualization”\textsuperscript{19}. In other words, the concept of the virtual is a necessary means of breaking with the logic of the pre-existent sample and priority of identity, because the very virtual refers to the differentiation as the process of production of the new. In this sense, virtuality is just another name of time: differentiation and time are synonymous\textsuperscript{20}. This synonymy is due to the fact that it is time that acts as a source of difference, the force of de-identification and destabilization, while time is not

\textsuperscript{17} Massumi B. Vooobrazhaya virtualnoye. URL: https://iphrs.ru/upfile/root/biblio/pj/pj_12/2.pdf
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. P. 307.
thought of as discrete. This continual process corresponds to what Bergson described as duration. The concepts of duration, memory and life impulse (Élan Vital) allow Bergson/Deleuze to describe the mechanism of becoming as actualization. At every moment, time splits into “passing present” and “remaining past”, while the past is for time the same as the meaning for the language, and the idea – for thought: “the World is rooted in the previous / internal, fixed time, in the virtual horizon”, i. e. in cosmological memory, therefore, if in the context of ontology of abundance we can talk about “being”, then this being refers to the past as a kind of fixed engine, paradoxical nature of which is due to the fact that, being “still”, the past is constantly growing: “if the past is constantly growing, it is preserved endlessly”. Virtual and actual, as mentioned above, do not form an opposition: here we deal with the quasi-dualistic distinction between extensive and intensive multiplicities. It is with this operation of separation of two modes of multiplicities – intensive and extensive (virtual and actual) that the idea of abundance is related: the virtual is understood as an infinite resource because any measure cannot be applied to it. In the framework of the ontology of abundance we encounter: [1] a complete rejection of teleology – the actualization is conceived as Becoming without purpose; [2] the idea of fundamentally indefinite Being; [3] understanding of all things as (self)differing; [4] the postulation of ontological co-existence of the virtual and the actual.

The described model of becoming distinguishes the Deleuzian “picture” of the world from the closed metaphysical universes of stability, with which we meet,

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21 The fact is that “the more something is humanized, the less the side of the natural process that is associated with movement and decomposition affects it. In everything that lasts for some time as a human, man maintains a certain constancy – and above all in himself” (Lacan J. Imena otsa. M., 2006. P. 34).

22 Bergson defines duration as “the continuous development of the past, absorbing the future and swelling as it moves forward” (Bergson H. Tvorcheskaya evolutsiya. M., 2015. P. 12); duration assembles the past and the future in “variation of its eternally alive present” (Deleuze G., Guattari F. Tyshacha plato: Kapitalizm I shyzofreniya. Ekaterinburg, M., 2010. P. 316).

23 “…Duration, in fact, defines a virtual multiplicity (what differs in nature). While Memory appears as the coexistence of all the degrees of difference in this multiplicity, in this virtuality. Finally, the Life-Impulse refers to the actualization of this virtual according to the lines of differentiation in accordance with degrees…” (Deleuze G. Empirizm I subjektivnost: opyt o chelovecheskoy prirode po Yumu. Kriticheskaya filosofiya Kantia: ucheniye o sposobnostyah. Bergsonizm. Spinoza. M., 2001. P. 322).


for example, in the philosophy of Leibniz or Spinoza, whose “Ethics” tells about the universe, in which nothing “new” occurs\textsuperscript{26}. While in all of the three presented above ontological types – “lack”, “difference”, “abundance” – we are faced with the instability and groundlessness\textsuperscript{27}.

The appearance of unstable ontologies, in my opinion, is associated with an important trend in the continental philosophy of the XX century – a movement towards the final rejection of the division of the world into sensual and intelligible, or phenomenal and noumenal. The beginning of this operation, which can be called “de-transcending”\textsuperscript{28}, was laid in the XIX century, namely – in the philosophy of Hegel: “... «The Phenomenology of Spirit» – is just the great book that proclaims the disappearance of the two worlds; from now on there is a single world. The formula of Hegel is this: behind the curtain there is nothing to see. From a philosophical point of view, this means that the phenomenon is no longer a phenomenon, behind which there is a certain entity; the phenomenon is a phenomenon that refers to the conditions of its appearance. There is only one world. At this point, the philosophy breaks the last tie that binds her to theology”\textsuperscript{29}.

It is the system of Hegel, in whose eyes the world is becoming both a platform and a product of the desire of absolute spirit to perfection, to the final identity, gives rise to the emergence of the ontology of lack, because it is the interpretation of “The Phenomenology of Spirit” which the Alexander Kojeve's seminar was dedicated to, it had been led in the Higher practical school in Paris from 1933 to 1939. Kojevian project was aimed at the production of a kind of anthropological theory of negativity, lack and desire. It was a kind of attempt to “heideggerization of Hegel”\textsuperscript{30}. Hegel’s ideas are important to Kojeve because it was Hegel who

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] This is due to the presence in this universe of an actor who is “the cause of his absolute unchangeability throughout time (and even before time)” (Eco U. Rol chitatelja. Issledovaniya po semiotike teksta. SPb., 2007. P. 60).
\item[28] In other words – the overthrow of Platonism, coupled with the arbitrary assumption of the illusion of the “rear worlds”, criticized by Nietzsche (Gasparyan D. E. Vvedeniye v neklassicheskuyu filosofiyu. M., 2011. 398 pp.).
\end{footnotes}
introduced the fundamental to the latter category of negativity. But through the assimilation of negativity and Heideggerian idea of the finitude (internal temporality of Dasein) Kojeve creates existential, anthropological version of the Hegelian dialectic, the application of which excludes nature. This version of Hegel’s philosophy became very popular in France in the 1930s-1960s, and in this connection, negativity rose to the status of a tool of liberation, because the dialectic of slavery and domination, interpreted as a struggle for recognition, starts the “locomotive” of history, which is the history of gradual human emancipation. Thus, Kojeve, in some way distancing from Heideggerian contemplation and radicalizing Hegelian idea of historicity, understood the negation as a truly constructive act. Nevertheless, Kojevian reading of dialectics, in which the lord and the slave are inextricably linked to each other in the struggle for recognition, which is a fundamental historical antagonism, involves a somewhat distorted understanding of the Heideggerian idea of the finitude. In “Being and time”, the German philosopher postulates the internal temporality of Dasein based on its finitude, thus defining Dasein as being-to-death. In the same time finitude cannot be confused with the end of life, because death never can be achieved as such – we can only watch another death, but not our own. Whereas, according to Kojeve, the lord is the one who is ready to accept his finitude and risk his life in the struggle for recognition, thus forcing the slave to recognize the lord in him. But this recognition is forced. Full recognition is achievable only in the final synthesis, in other words – at the end of history, the idea of which occupies an important place in Kojeve’s philosophy, but is not fully consistent with the aforementioned unattainability of death in Heidegger. This prompted followers of Kojeve to radicalization of his model. One of the significant attempts in this direction was Sartrian. It was most fully represented in the main work of the philosopher, entitled quite in the spirit of Kojeve’s “dualistic ontology” – “Being and nothing”. Developing the idea of the unsolvable nature of negativity, Sartre reworked the traditional ontological question of “being-as-being” into the theory of “being-as-
lack”\textsuperscript{31}. The philosopher divided reality into two poles – being-for-itself (consciousness) and being-in-itself (nature), giving the first the status of “agent of negativity”, and the second – again in accordance with the Kojevian teachings – positivity, identity. The constitutional element of the human dimension of existence is negation, which makes it possible to speak of “humanization of nothing”\textsuperscript{32}. Because consciousness is always the consciousness of something, it is doomed to incompleteness, because it inevitably retains the need for an external object. Thus, in the “heart” of the subject – there is lack of identity. Moreover, it is useless to fight this, because the imaginary future integrity is unattainable. The foundation of being cannot be found. For Sartre, like Kojeve, negativity and lack are productive, not nihilistic categories. The conception of the other important follower of Kojeve – Jacques Lacan – can be described (of course, very generally) as a kind of fusion of Freudianism, Kojevian dialectics and the idea of “lack of being”. It is also necessary to mention the name of Georges Bataille, who, in my opinion, occupies a very unusual place in the ontology of lack, as will be discussed in more detail below. Since the 1960s, the admiration for Hegelian dialectic has been replaced by its harsh criticism. In the previously praised system was found an unexpected dimension: if earlier in the ideas of Hegel intellectuals found the way to gradual liberation, now the dynamic triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis was accused of a kind of violence, because the dialectical movement to elimination of contradictions in the synthesis could be read as the dissolution of others in our own, in other words – the potential colonization. The possibility of such an approach to the interpretation of dialectics was noted long before the 60s (back in 1929) one of the brightest representatives of Russian philosophy Mikhail Bakhtin, who spoke very negatively about the ideas of Hegel: “The single becoming spirit, understood in a Hegelian way, can give rise to nothing but a philosophical monologue. Least of all, on the basis of monistic idealism can flourish a plurality


of non-conjoint minds”. Another influential critic of the Hegelianism is the representative of the Frankfurt school of social research, Theodor Adorno; he offers the project of negative dialectic that is not so much an alternative to the Hegelian, as its radicalization. For Adorno, Hegel’s dialectic is not negative enough – it should be replaced by negative dialectic as a way of thinking that most successfully reveals contradictions in [social] reality. Adorno criticizes synthesis as an act of identifying thinking and doubts the truth of systematic knowledge as a form of totality. Another important figure in the process of revision of Hegelian dialectics, in my opinion, is Gilbert Simondon, who opposed his theory of becoming to the one that was developed in the system of the German philosopher: if for Hegel contradiction of thesis and antithesis is removed by negation, and the synthesis involves negation of negation, due to which development passes to a different level of complexity, then Simondon declares the absence of the result of synthesis, in fact, there is only a “synthetic complementary relationship”, whereas the actual synthesis is never carried out: the absence of a “synthetic rhythm”, thus, is tantamount to the absence of a basis for a new thesis. In other words, Simondon understands becoming not as an ascent to a certain goal, but as a permanent process of invention, involving the formulation and solution of problems in conditions of metastability. This approach is extremely close to Bergsonist/Deleuzian position applying for complete elimination of negativity as a false idea. This step is already visible in the early works of Deleuze, who criticizes dialectics because the Hegelian logic, according to him, is “the logic of lack replenishment”. Moreover, an important place in the system of the French philosopher takes the motive for abandoning the dualism of the subject and object, in other words – breaking with the anthropological position that was occupied by

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Kojeve, Sartre and Lacan, because, according to Deleuze, consistent ontology is that one, which is based on the idea of unity of being, incompatible with the anthropological theory of negativity, clearly separating the cognizing subject from the cognitive object. This “protest” against the dualism leads to the emergence of the ontology of abundance, which contingent date of birth is 1972, i. e. the year of publication of Deleuze/Guattari’s treatise “Anti-Oedipus”. This work presented an innovative conception of desire – non-Hegelian and non-existentialist. Its essence is expressed in the following formula: “not desire is underpinned by needs, but rather needs stem from the desire”. In other words, Deleuze/Guattari’s theory proclaims the ontological priority of the abundance and positivity over lack and negativity. This inversion is evidential attempt to break with Hegel, however, in the opinion of Marchart, at the level of argumentation it is very difficult to understand what “phenomenon” is really “prior”, so the only thing left is to choose one of the warring positions.

However, I do not see my task as maintaining a dispute over what is “valid” or “original”, which, due to the terminology used, risks collapsing into a metaphysical register. My choice [of abundance] is justified by the features of post/Deleuzian philosophy. If Heidegger, following Husserl, who claimed the transcendent character of the world, understood the being-in-the-world as transcendence, which could not impose a mark on all of the theorists whose concepts were inspired by the phenomenological direction (including Kojeve, Sartre and Derrida), one of the identifying characteristics of the ontology of abundance is a strict immanentism.

Deleuzian immanentist philosophy of Becoming has its political implications: thinking in terms of the fixed entities – means to come from the priority of identity, or simply tautology, but “the tautology – is always the ideology

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that rationalizes the system of government. This is one of the reasons for interest in immanentism, manifested by such socio-political thinkers as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Maurizio Lazzarato, Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Paolo Virno, Peter Sloterdijk and many others. This research analyzes their conceptions and demonstrates that such philosophical movements as postoperaism, accelerationism and the social philosophy of Sloterdijk are not simply influenced by Deleuzianizm, but represent specific products of translation of his ideas into the language of socio-political theory. One should not forget that the task of philosophy, according to Deleuze/Guattari, is “resistance to the present”, so in the end of my work I turn to the problematics of “subversive affirmation” to show how this tactic embodies immanentist ideas, particularly associated with abundance and humor, in political/aesthetic practices. My thesis is that the only consistent practice of resistance in conditions of immanence, i.e. the impossibility of the external position, is hyperidentification. The relevance of the given dissertation research is proportional to its contribution to the clarification of the immanentist strategies in the conditions of re-actualization of the Deleuzian heritage in contemporary continental philosophy.

There arises a list of problems which are directly related to the immanentist approach in the framework of the unstable ontologies:

– First, while recognizing the impossibility of elimination of the gap between the speculative Deleuzian ontology, postoperaist political theory and social philosophy of Peter Sloterdijk, it is necessary to demonstrate that the theories of Negri/Hardt, Sloterdijk and others attempt to adaptation Deleuzian ontology to political and social philosophy. Hence, a need to identify the basic “mechanism” underlying these theories. I propose that this mechanism refers to a conceptual pair of virtual/actual, which allows us to classify these theories as ontologies of abundance.

– Second, I propose that in this context we should refer to the problem of the subject and to reconstruct the way in which it is conceptualized within the philosophical approaches that are associated with the “anthropological negativity” in order to match these constructions with the “affirmativist” ideas of the proponents of the ontology of abundance that presumably will clarify the question of the elimination of the transcendent in their conceptions.

– Third, it must be illustrated how, within the ontology of the abundance, the transcendent is eliminated, and thereby confirm (or refute) the claim for its elimination. I would argue that this issue is directly related to the specific conceptualization of the substance and rethinking the traditional ontological One/Many problem.

– Fourth, what needs to be called into question is not only the critical potential of Post/Deleuzian philosophy in contemporary conditions, but the very relevance of criticism as a way to “resist to the present”.

**Research Object and Subject**

**The object** of research are philosophical conceptions of the representatives of the ontology of abundance.

**The subject** of research is a model of becoming, based on the conceptual pair virtual/actual.

**Research Purpose and Tasks**

**The purpose** of this work is to demonstrate that the model of Becoming as actualization is basic for the construction of the immanentist ontologies that are analyzed in the framework of this research.

Achieving the purpose requires solving the following **tasks**:

– To establish similarities and differences in the interpretations of the subject in the ontology of lack and different versions of the ontology of abundance;
– To address the problem of the One and the Multiple in the ontology of abundance and to show, how a specific conceptualization of multiplicity allows us to overcome the ontological dualism;

– To carry out a critical analysis of affirmativist and accelerationist approaches and to show the place the negativity can take in the Post/Deleuzian philosophy.

**The degree of development of the problem.** The concept of unstable ontologies has not gained wide popularity in philosophical literature. An attempt to deprive this concept of peripheral character and apply it to the study of an extensive list of contemporary continental conceptions was made in the book of Sergei Zherebkin⁴⁰ – the only current work on unstable ontologies published in Russian. The book certainly has an important propaedeutic value, and its author develops an interesting critical toolkit, but my task is to keep the distance from relating to the established forms of “critical theory”, because my argument is that any critique which forgets about the hypercritical nature of the criticized object (and this is usually late capitalism)⁴¹, tends to fall not even in the children illness of leftism, but in “Manichaeism”. The critique, thus, blocks the access to instability, being realized through simultaneous legitimation of its object and the critics themselves⁴². The problem of immersion strongly encourages a change of perspective: instead of the non-critical use of critical tools, it is necessary to make a more detailed analysis of ontological models, and that is vital in the case of unstable ontologies, because the concept was coined in the field of socio-political theory, while the meeting of politics and ontology turns out to be problematic⁴³. Based on this, I would prefer to return the unstable ontologies to their speculative “soil”, referring to the central problem of Deleuzian immanentism – the problem of

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⁴³ «The politicization of ontology marks a regression to an anthropomorphic myopia; the ontologization of politics falters the moment it tries to infer political inscriptions from metaphysical description. <...> An emancipatory politics oblivious to epistemology quickly degenerates into metaphysical fantasy, which is to say, a religious substitute. The failure to change the world may not be unrelated to the failure to understand it» (Brassier R. Ponyatiya i obyekty // Logos. 2017. T. 27. # 3. P. 240-241).
Becoming, but this decision in any case is not equivalent to the “scraping” of political implications (because it is simply impossible), the decision relates to a more cautious attitude towards them. To work out the conceptions associated with unstable ontologies, in the proposed study I used a wide range of textual sources that can be divided into several groups. First of all, these are the basic [post]structuralist texts of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari\(^44\), the postoperaist texts of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt\(^45\), Paolo Virno\(^46\), Maurizio Lazzarato\(^47\), and the work of Peter Sloterdijk\(^48\), who developed a nontrivial “spherological” model of relational ontology. The second group of sources includes the works by Western and native commentators and historians of contemporary philosophy\(^49\).

The third group includes the studies of current continental philosophers, whose developments are directly connected to the ontologies of becoming, immanentism, affirmativism, accelerationism. A special place among them is given to Benjamin Noys\(^50\), the British scholar, the author of the terms “accelerationism” and “affirmativism”, whose works are important in the context of the critique of acceleration and the affirmative mode of thinking associated with the Post/Deleuzian philosophy. An interesting attempt to inscribe negativity into Deleuzian philosophy is taken in the book of Andrew Culp\(^51\). In the same text block there should be mentioned nontrivial works of Nick Land\(^52\), Eduardo Viveiros de Castro\(^53\) and Manuel DeLanda\(^54\). The texts of Alain Badiou\(^55\) and


Giorgio Agamben\textsuperscript{56} play an important role in clarifying the issues of Becoming and Life in Deleuzian philosophy. Here I should also mention the names of Gerald Raunig\textsuperscript{57} and Frederic Jameson\textsuperscript{58}. The fourth – and the last – group consists of the texts by contemporary Russian researchers, whose developments are directly related to the issues of this dissertation. Among them works by: Vasily Kuznetsov\textsuperscript{59}, Yakov Svirsky\textsuperscript{60}, Dmitry Kralechkin\textsuperscript{61}, Oleg Aronson\textsuperscript{62} and Yoel Regev\textsuperscript{63}.

\textbf{Theoretical and Methodological Basis.} In accordance with the purpose and tasks of the study, such methods as comparative and immanent analysis of texts, as well as the historical method, necessary for the reconstruction of contexts which are important for understanding the above problems, were used.

\textbf{Research Scientific Novelty}

1. Research represents the first attempt in the Russian research literature to establish connections between conceptions of those representatives of unstable ontologies, who claim to be immanentist.

2. Research constitutes an effort to analyze the virtual/actual conceptual pair and to show that it is basic for understanding the model of Becoming in the ontology of abundance, something that has not yet been done in the Russian research literature.


\textsuperscript{56} Agamben G. Absolute Immanence // Potentialities. Collected Essays in Philosophy. URL: http://scs.res.in/dataarchive/textfiles/textfile.2010-11-02.8261782670/file


\textsuperscript{63} Regev Y. Nevozmozhnoje i sovpadenije: o revoljutsionnoj situatsii v filosofii. Perm, 2016. 146 pp.
3. Research ventures to clarify the concept of abundance, which has no precedent in the Russian research literature.

**Research Main Theses:**

1. The virtual/actual conceptual pair is basic for understanding the functioning of the unstable ontologies claiming to be immanentist. This conceptual pair plays a crucial role in the ontologies of abundance.

2. The concept of abundance is directly related to the division of two ontological regimes – virtual and actual. The virtual, as fundamentally indefinite, implies an unlimited number of possible actualizations. Thus, being [virtually] turns out to be excessive to itself.

3. The political theory of postoperaism adopts the basic model of Deleuzian philosophy, related to understanding Becoming as actualization, for development of the conception of multitude as a contemporary collective labor subject, whose specific form of unity relates to the shared intellectual and linguistic abilities.

**Theoretical and practical value of the dissertation.** The main provisions and conclusions of the dissertation can be used in the specialized courses in contemporary philosophy as well as in textbooks on the actual continental theory. The results of the analysis of various conceptions, obtained in dissertation, can serve as a basis for further study of unstable ontologies, immanentism and contemporary philosophy of Becoming. The concept of unstable ontologies is almost unknown in Russian academic community, while it is directly linked to the current developments in the field of continental philosophy and political theory. This significantly increases the relevance of the present work and its importance in the context of studying new types of ontologies.

**Approbation of the research results.** The main provisions and results of the dissertation were presented at the VI all-Russian conference of students, postgraduates and young scientists «Philosophy. Language. Culture». Report: the

The structure of the thesis is determined by the purpose and tasks of the study. The dissertation consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a bibliographic list.

THE MAIN CONTENT OF THE WORK

The introduction outlines the contours of the problem field, clarifies the main concepts used, defines the tasks, purpose, object, subject and presents the key theses of the study.

Chapter I. “The problem of the subject in unstable ontologies” is devoted to the analysis of different conceptions of the subject in unstable ontologies.

In paragraph 1. “From the restricted negativity to the general negativity” I analyze the conception of Alexander Kojeve, which is basic for understanding the ontology of lack, and demonstrate the place given in it to the subject. Kojeve carries out an anthropological interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy, dividing the world into two opposite poles: negative, referring to human existence, and positive, associated with the natural dimension of being. In this sense, history is dialectical, whereas nature has nothing to do with dialectics. Such ontology is dualistic only nominally, since being and nothing are two meanings of being, at the intersection of which there is a dialectics. According to Kojeve, the privileged status of human as a negative being is based on the ability to create history. In the course of negation, the human subject goes beyond its limits, and that is the key to its humanity. The lack of self-identity of the subject implies completion; this leads to teleology, which finds its place in the conceptualization of the end of history: the dialectics of slavery and domination, interpreted as a struggle for recognition, has an unexpected dimension – full recognition is possible only at the end of history. If
a human is a negative being by necessity, the end of history entails his disappearance, i.e. signifies the collapse into ontological homogeneity. This problem becomes one of the central for Georges Bataille, whose position I have compared with a Kojevian one. The task of Bataille is to think over the preservation of the human after the end of history in the form of some negative residue – the unemployed negativity. This assumption is not so much a deliberate attempt to undermine Kojevian position, as uncovering its possible ultimate effects: assuming that a human, being a negation of the existent and himself, negates all the foundations, one should also assume that the negativity, thus understood, in its limit leads to the negation of the humanity of man, i.e. to elimination of the agent of negation. In this sense, Bataille shifts negativity from the register of “restricted economy” into the register of “general economy”. Thus, I demonstrate that the approach of Georges Bataille occupies an intermediate position between the ontology of lack and the ontology of abundance, and hence it is consistent with the Noys’s characterization: “protoaffirmationism”. So, in the philosophy of Bataille, we are faced with the affirmation of an excess of negativity, directly related to his attempt to bring negation beyond the limits of the anthropological matrix: from the “restricted” economy of negativity – to the “general” one, hence the Bataille’s keen interest in transgression as an experience of “self-loss”.

In paragraph 2. “The death of the subject” I explore one of the basic motives of theoretical anti-humanism, which appears under the name of “the death of the subject”. For this I appeal to the projects of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault. I reconstruct and comment on the thesis of Althusser, according to which the subject is the ideological concept and is produced by social power through interpellation, ideological recruitment. The inevitable consequence of this interpretation is the need to eliminate the subject from scientific discourse. Foucault carries out the line of anti-humanism further, stating that the existence of the subject is completely determined by three parameters: the biology of its body, the system of labor relations and the language. Transformation of these parameters
will inevitably lead to the disappearance of what is meant by man within the existing discursive system. These theoretical solutions prepared the ground for further study of the problematic of the subject in ontology of abundance of Deleuze/Guattari.

In paragraph 3. “Subject, structure and becoming” I deal with the post/structuralist conceptualization of the subject, carried out by Deleuze. The connection of the subject, structure and becoming is demonstrated. For this, I reconstruct and comment on the Deleuzian criteria of structuralist thought, which in his own philosophy is enriched by bergsonist intuitions, that as a result leads to conceptualization of the structure as a system of transformations, any representation of which is included in it. The structure has an internal time – the time of actualization. This rhizomatic conceptualization of structure as a dynamic open system allows to eliminate dualism of structure and operation, i.e. the structure is not opposite to becoming, but, on the contrary, assumes conceptualization of becoming as actualization of the virtual. At the same time, the only Deleuzian subject is structure itself: any structure is a virtual infrastructure hidden by its actualizations, i.e. the structure is the basis, the “foundation”, or “that-which-lies-before”, which, according to Heidegger, is the subject. I also appeal to the motive of the production of subjectivity, analyzing the concept of the “pliable subject”, i.e. one which changes constantly in the course of interaction with external forces, and then I consider the interpretations of the subject in PostDeleuzian philosophy of Sloterdijk and postoperaists – Virno, Negri, Hardt, – who continue to hold the line, outlined in the early works of Deleuze, on the basis of which the question of the subject is inseparable from questions of becoming, newness, future.

In Chapter II. “The problem of the one and the multiple in unstable ontologies” I analyze a number of immanentist conceptions which are characterized by the usage of the conceptual pair virtual/actual, and I demonstrate
the specific refraction of the problem of the one and the multiple that takes place in these conceptions.

**Paragraph 1. “The postpluralist theory of multiplicities”** is devoted to the problem of the one and the multiple in Deleuze/Guattari’s ontology of becoming and in conceptions of their followers. One of the defining features of unstable ontologies is the elimination of the unity of the foundation, which is replaced by the “initial plurality”\(^{64}\). But here, in my opinion, we are faced with the implicit difficulty: the characteristics of plurality as “initial” rehabilitates the metaphysical logic of the ultimate foundation: a plurality of elements in the philosophy of Anaxagoras is not a guarantee of its “classification” as an unstable ontology. The challenge, therefore, is not in the multiplication of the elements, which do not lose the characteristics of simplicity, but in changing the perspective: simple elements – in the singular or in the plural – are impossible in the ontology, where the opposition simplicity/complexity is canceled: in post-metaphysical philosophy of Deleuze there is nothing simple\(^{65}\), which is why the establishment of the opposition simplicity-complexity is incorrect. The situation in which the appeal to the beginning is forbidden, pushes to develop a different way of thinking. Moreover, if you consistently pursue a post-metaphysical line, the opposition of the single/multiple is also beginning to be questioned, hence the need for the reconceptualization of multiplicity in “postpluralistic” key. The term “postpluralism”\(^{66}\) refers to an ontological approach in which the one is not thought of in opposition to the multiple, and refers to the formula of Deleuze/Guattari: “PLURALISM = MONISM”\(^{67}\). This decision is directly related to the immanentist character of the post/Deleuzian philosophy: the history of continental philosophy can be divided into two main directions – line of the immanent, which includes Spinoza and Nietzsche, and then Deleuze, and the line of the transcendent, where

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\(^{64}\) Zhereblin S. Nestabilnye ontologii v sovremennoj filosofii. SPb., 2013. P. 28.  
we find the names of Kant, Husserl, Levinas and Derrida. The one in the first tradition, of course, can not be conceived as something transcendent – indeed, some slogans of Deleuze/Guattari can give the impression that their task is to "subtract" the one from philosophical thought. At first glance, this is nothing but call for the elimination of unity, however, the gesture of negation of unity can be interpreted as a performative contradiction, that is rightly pointed out by Vasily Kuznetsov: the fact that the rejection of unity, oddly enough, leaves us with a full opportunity to speak about the world in general – albeit in the mode of the denial of his unity. The problem of unity/multiplicity in unstable ontologies, the defining feature of which is strict immane ntism (i. e. in ontologies of abundance), should be formulated in the form of the question of how to conceive of unity not in opposition to multiplicity. So, within the framework of the Deleuze/Guattari’s project, we meet with such a solution as postpluralism. This solution is related to quasi-dualistic separation of two types of multiplicities (virtual/actual). In the context of the paragraph I traced this decision not only in the works of Deleuze/Guattari, but also in the texts of other theorists such as Castoriadis, DeLanda, etc. In addition, I pointed out the direct connection of postpluralism with the ideas of Leibniz. I compare Deleuze/Guattari’s project with the conception of Latour, whose “actant-rhizome ontology” is presumably one of the closest “relatives” of Deleuzianism. In addition, in paragraph I reconstruct the positional Badiou-Deleuze “conflict” which allows us to better articulate the conceptions of both theorists. Badiou’s intuition seems right: Deleuze does not eliminate the One, but this “One” is “dynamic and constantly varying”; it does not necessarily have to be viewed in opposition with multiple – because it turns out to be much more flexible, not bringing its elements under common features.

In paragraph 2. “The concept of multitude in postoperaism” I analyze the postoperaist conceptualization of the multitude. The multitude in this context

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71 Ibid. P. 111.
refers to the collective subject of late capitalism: “this category is designed to combine under the sign of the exploited class of worker – the «physical» and «immaterial» labor, production and non-production sphere”72. Thus, multitude in some way comes to replace the proletariat in conditions of the new spirit of capitalism, which is inseparable from project thinking and immaterial labor, and therefore associated with the mobilization of such resources as language, imagination, information, creativity. The work of Deleuze/Guattari has, of course, had a decisive influence on the development of this concept within the post-operaist framework.

Multitude is a rhizomatic, self-organizing system, hence its fundamental difference from “people” and “crowd”. If the people consist of heterogeneous individuals whose social differences are synthesized and reduced to a state of uniformity, then the multitude is deprived of the quality of internal unity. This, however, does not mean that it is fragmented and anarchic. The multitude differs from the crowd because the singularities that make up the latter do not show themselves as individuals, so they are extremely prone to manipulation from the outside, whereas the multitude is defined as a complex, internally diverse, active social entity whose structure and activities are based not on identity, but on that which it has in common, i. e. on the “life of the mind”, shared linguistic abilities, everything that passes under the rubric of general intellect73. I demonstrate that the multitude does not eliminate the unity but redefines it: the “general intellect”, which means the shared linguistic abilities, the common abilities to affirmative action, becomes the One for the multitude. It is shown that here we also encounter the conceptual pair virtual/actual, because in postoperaist philosophy the infra-individual is a kind of analogue to the virtual and is used for the conceptualization of the process of individuation of the multitude, i. e., ultimately, becoming as actualization.

In paragraph 3. “Plural spherology” I scrutinize the “spherological” model of relational ontology, developed by Peter Sloterdijk. One of the key concepts of Sloterdijk is “foam”. This concept is introduced to describe a complex social system conceived as an innumerable plurality of adjacent cells. The need to use the concept is dictated by the fact that foam, being an analogue of the metaphor of the network, makes it an additional content aspect, as it allows to emphasize the spatial volume of the cells themselves. Plural spherology, being a theoretical heir to Deleuze/Guattari’s postpluralist ontology, suggests a similar solution to the problem of single/multiple: foam is directly related to the philosophical decision to think unity as a result. In this sense, Sloterdijk demonstrates consistent immanentalism, because such philosophical step necessarily entails the rejection of any form of transcendent wholeness, beyond the level of interacting units. It is shown that the so called plural spherology deals with ontology of the polispheric world, which holds together the multiplicities of the co-isolated spheres, or form-processes.

In Chapter III. “The problem of abundance in unstable ontologies: affirmation, acceleration and return to negativity” it is argued that the problem of abundance is primarily the problem of the subversive potential of affirmativism, and this problem can be formulated in the form of the question: how, consistently pursuing a line of affirmative thinking, and therefore – focusing on the difference (new), one can evade its recuperation? In this Chapter I reconstruct basic affirmativist decision of refusal of negativity, and demonstrate its possible implications through a critical review of affirmativism, accelerationism and the attempt to rehabilitate negativity in PostDeleuzian philosophy.

In paragraph 1. “Affirmation” I reconstruct Bergson’s argument, according to which negativity is a pseudo-idea. I show how this philosophical conclusion is reflected in the conceptualization of: desire as an infinite resource in Deleuze/Guattari’s theory; labor as a productive superabundance in the conception of the processes.

74 Sloterdijk P. Pluralnaya sferologiya. Tom III. Pena, SPb., 2010. P. 293.
of Negri/Hardt; “initial wealth”, or irreducible background, in the philosophy of Sloterdijk. All these decisions one way or another refer to the model becoming as actualization, however, as I demonstrate, attempts to derive political recommendations from Deleuzian ontology of becoming are inevitably faced to serious difficulties.

The question of how productive is the affirmative way of thinking, “reformatted” into socio-political philosophy, still remains open. Based largely on the arguments of Bergson, who denoted negativity as a pseudoidea, Deleuze/Guattari developed a positive ontology of production, one of the cross-cutting “themes” of which was the provision that the desire is excessive and in any case does not refer to an anthropomorphomorphic matrix with its inherent intensionality and negativity. Similarly interpreted desire was positioned as a productive force.

This idea was accepted by Negri/Hardt, who almost equated desire with work, which, as a productive excess, was understood as a “ticket” to a post-capitalist future. However, according to Dmitry Kralechkin's fair remark, Deleuze/Guattari's philosophy is associated with a peculiar “systemic error” in relation to critical thinking, since they get rid of the traditional tool of liberation – the category of negativity: “inhuman” desire, which is referred to in the “Anti-Oedipus”, does not arise from the previous lack, and, therefore, does not refer to its subject. This desire “lives a life without purpose”, because the existence of the latter brings us back to the lack that distinguishes the world into meaningful and insignificant elements. Moreover, we are in fact faced with equation: purpose = fascism. In this sense, the established divisions of “progressive” and “regressive”, “totalitarian” and “democratic”, “productive” and “destructive” should be erased, because all these oppositions are inseparable from antagonism, and hence – negativity, and, ultimately, involve the reconstruction of a more or less clear program with an appropriate task, which Anti-Oedipus obviously aims to prevent.

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In paragraph 2. “Acceleration” I produced a critical analysis of such direction of PostDeleuzian philosophy as accelerationism. The accelerationist hypothesis is that capitalism has hidden productive forces sufficient to overcome it. In addition, within the framework of the accelerationist experimental mythology, a specific ontologization of fiction associated with the concept of hyperstition and inseparable from the affirmation of the excess of realities as fictional systems is carried out. Noting the non-triviality of the basic accelerationist solutions, I show that the choice of excess and acceleration is not quite productive, because, in the end, involves incorrect interpretation of the ideas of Deleuze/Guattari, fundamental to the accelerationist thinking.

Thus, in the framework of the paragraph I analyzed the two main “forms” of accelerationism associated with the names of Nick Land and Alex Williams / Nick Srnicek. Their common point of reference is the “accelerationist” fragment from the “Anti-Oedipus”, the main message of which is that it is necessary to “go further in the movement of the market”, i. e., following the logic of the system, move towards absolute deterritorialization. It should be noted that the logic of Deleuze/Guattari – long before the emergence of accelerationism – has already been subjected to bitter criticism. However, I am inclined to believe that criticism itself is to some extent redundant, because the absolute deterritorialization is asymptotic. Therefore, the accelerationist rate does not seem productive to me.

There is no doubt that capitalism has a powerful potential for deterritorialization, but this is not sufficient reason to attribute to capitalism the ability to absolute deterritorialization. Here one can presumably find the main mistake of Land, which, in particular, his former CCRU “colleague” Mark Fisher pointed to; he noted that Land’s “remix” of Deleuze/Guattari’s ideas was in many ways superior to the “original”, but Land’s understanding of capitalism turned out to be fatal, because it reduced what the French philosophers called “schizophrenia”

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to capitalism, losing the basic insight of Deleuze/Guattari: capitalism always complements deterritorialization with compensatory reterritorialization \(^78\). The current “accelerationist renaissance” is directly related to the affirmation of the need for intervention, consisting in the capture of technological forces. However, according to Noys, such an idea remains hopeless today, leading to the desire to find the missing hope in the past \(^79\). The counterargument of left-wing accelerationism is that any futurism to some extent is retrofuturism, because in trying to imagine the future we always turn to means, ideas and concepts from the past \(^80\). It seems impossible not to agree with this thesis, but it supposedly erodes the fundamental assumption for accelerationist thought of the possibility of achieving absolute deterritorialization, which refers to the unimaginable: a body without organs is a body without an image \(^81\). The conclusion to be drawn from this is that, within the framework of accelerationist theory, we are faced with attempts to “bewitch” the future by imposing on it a static image – utopian or apocalyptic, i.e., ultimately, to cancel the time by “humanizing” it. The impulse of deterritorialization presumably requires movement in the opposite direction, whereas “people still remain a problem – even if only as a brake, interruption or moment of inertia” \(^82\). This problem is not solved within the framework of accelerationism, which makes the rate of acceleration and excess ineffective.

In paragraph 3. “A return to the negativity and its alternative” I appeal to the latest trend that is trying to “inscribe” the negativity in Deleuzian philosophy, i.e. to overcome affirmativism. A similar impulse is best represented in the work of Andrew Culp, who opposes the affirmative interpretation of the philosophy of Deleuze, the so-called dark counter-canon. According to Culp, the

The drawback of affirmativism is that it presupposes tolerance, which becomes a barrier to changing conditions of existence.

The Culp’s project is directed against “connectivism” and “productivism”. Connectivism means organizational logic focused on the integration of heterogeneous elements into a single network system. This logic refers not only to the theoretical calculations of contemporary philosophers dealing with the description of networks, assemblages, rhizomes, dispositives, etc., but also, for example, to Google’s geopolitical strategy aimed at global influence. Productivism refers to a position that reduces production to reproduction.

I pointed out that Andrew Culp’s project was not the first attempt of the “negative” interpretation of Deleuze’s work. The very expression “dark Deleuzianism” was introduced by Alexander R. Galloway in 2011 to characterize the political configuration, in accordance with which the affirmation of positivity and acceptance of the multiple in a variety of forms leads however to the fact that affirmativism was intended to exclude: a rigid binary division between the transparent world and the “dark continents”, in other words, a space controlled by state power, and the invisible areas inhabited by contemporary guerrillas and network terrorists. Some cross-cutting motives and slogans of Andrew Culp’s project can be found already in the manifestations of Hostis. An attempt to develop Deleuzian ideas in disconnectivist way was taken by Nicolas Thoburn. Contribution to a “negative” reading of Deleuze has been made by Benjamin Noys, and Daniel Barber.

So, I analyzed Andrew Culp’s project and pointed to its weaknesses. Then I offered a brief outline of my solution to the problem of the subversive potential of PostDeleuzian affirmative philosophy of becoming, which, in my opinion, could be

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associated with hyperidentification – specific tactics based on the affirmation, key features of which are exessiveness and insincerity.

The model of subversive affirmation can easily be discovered in the texts of Deleuze. Here it is necessary to remember two ways to circumvent the power of law: either to reject the law, going back to its principles, or, on the contrary, to undermine the law, referring to its consequences – to obey the law with excessive zeal88. The first method is associated with irony and inseparable from the ascent to the principles in order to refute them, while the second – with humor, which refers to the consequences. So understood the humor is the foundation of hyperidentification.

In hyperidentification, or subversive affirmation, as I have shown, it is easy to see the scenario of “double life” outlined by Andrew Culp. The difference lies in the fact that the proposed by him negative reading of Deleuze claims to break with metaphysical thinking, but rehabilitates teleology, whereas hyperidentification does not produce any stable image of the future, being a consistent immanentist tactics.

In conclusion I summarize the results of the work.

The main task of metaphysics, as Whitehead once formulated it, is to clarify the meaning of a single phrase: “all things change”89. In a sense, the research presented above is focused on this particular problem. However, firstly, the very problem of becoming in this work is transferred from the metaphysical register to the post-metaphysical one, namely: in the context associated with those immanentist approaches in contemporary continental philosophy, which allow to think of becoming as a nonlinear and unstable process, and, secondly, necessarily correlates with attempts to derive political recommendations from speculative ontology. Thus, the task was to clarify the model of becoming, which is supposedly fundamental to the ontology of abundance – the only line of three types of unstable ontologies, representatives of which claim strict immanentism.

89 “Clarifying the meaning of the phrase «all things change» is the main task of metaphysics” (Whitehead A. Process and reality. URL: http://www.gumer.info/bogoslov_Buks/Philos/uaith_fil/05.php).
In the study, I showed that the conceptual pair virtual/actual is the basic for understanding the way of functioning of unstable ontologies, claiming the rejection of the transcendent. It plays a central role in the ontology of abundance. The concept of abundance is directly related to the allocation of two ontological regimes – virtual and actual. The first, being fundamentally indefinite, implies an unlimited number of possible actualizations. Similarly conceptualized being appears virtually abundant to itself. The model of becoming as actualization is adopted by the representatives of postoperaism to develop the conception of multitude. Thus, the purpose of this thesis can be considered achieved.

Publications on the thesis

On the topic of the thesis there have been published 10 scientific papers (volume 7,2 p. s.), 5 of which are published in leading peer-reviewed journals recommended by the HAC of the Ministry of education and science of Russia, the volume of the articles – 4.1 p. s.

Works published by the author in the leading peer-reviewed scientific journals recommended by HAC of the Ministry of education and science of Russia:

4. Shalaginov D. S. Ontology of abundance and the problem of precarity // Ideas & Ideals. – 2015. – V. 1. – № 4. – P. 78-87 (0,8 p. s.).

Other publications on the topic of the thesis:


7. Shalaginov D., Serzhan E., Kosyakova V., Prantikova S. Necroleninism: an essay on disfiguration of the future // Siniy divan. – 2017. – № 22. – P. 172-190 (0,2 p. s.).

