

“Weighted committee games”

Players in a committee, council, or electoral college often wield asymmetric numbers of votes. Binary decision environments are then conventionally modeled as weighted voting games. We introduce weighted committee games in order to describe decisions on three or more alternatives in similarly succinct fashion. We compare different voting weight configurations for plurality, Borda, Copeland, and antiplurality rule. The respective geometries and distinct numbers of structurally non-equivalent committees have escaped notice so far. They determine voting equilibria, the distribution of power, and other aspects of collective choice.

“Shapley apportioning of cartel damages”

Cartel members are liable jointly and severally: one may be forced to compensate victims on behalf of all. EU law stipulates that others must pay internal redress in proportion to “relative responsibility for the harm”. We operationalize this responsibility by evaluating counterfactual damages had one or more cartelists rejected collaboration. Formalizing causality and other requirements calls for aggregation of counterfactual overcharges via the Shapley value. We characterize damage allocations for important benchmarks, propose approximations and evaluate ad hoc suggestions based on market shares or profits. A new decomposition of the Shapley value allows to establish non-trivial bounds on payment obligations.