As a manuscript

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DETERMINANTS OF SINGLE-PARTY DOMINANCE PERSISTENCE IN VARIOUS TYPES OF POLITICAL REGIMES

SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION
for the purpose of obtaining academic degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science HSE

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Research design

Statement of research problem. The existing academic literature on the factors of dominant party regimes persistence mostly focuses on regimes with any duration. There is a problem of insufficient attention to specific factors influencing the durability of single-party dominance within the set of "absolute" dominant party regimes that overcome a critical duration threshold.

Thus, the following question needs to be clarified: "why are dominant party regimes that overcome a critical duration threshold have different longevity?" Main focus of existing literature is oriented to revealing determinants of the emergence of single-party dominance. My research aims to fill the gap and concentrates on single-party dominance persistence among regimes that overcome a critical longevity threshold.

Literature review. Dominant party regime’s extraordinary longevity is a part of the mainstream research in political science, but most of academic literature relates to case-study research on country-specific regimes characteristics.

Most significant contribution to developing the comprehensive understanding of the dominant party regimes and the nature of the emergence and persistence of single-party dominance is provided by K.Greene2, S.Huntington and C.Moore3, A.Arian and S.H.Barnes4, S.Levitsky and L.Way5, T.Pempel6, H.Giliomee and

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1 The terms ‘single-party dominance’ and ‘dominant party regime’ are used as synonyms in the research.


S.Mainwaring and T.Scully, G.Cox, B.O’Leary, M.Kuenzi and G.Lambright, N.Van de Walle, A.Ware, P.Dunleavy, J.Blondel, O.Reuter, R.McDonald, J.-F.Caulier and P.Dumont are important due to conceptualization and operationalization of single-party dominance.

G.Sartori, H.Templeman, A.Lijphart, J.Linz, S.Mainwaring, M.Shugart and J.Carey, M.Laver, A.Hicken and H.Stoll, J.Hsieh, O.Kharitonova consider effects of institutional design on the emergence and persistence of dominant-party regimes. Particularly, H.Templeman argues that parliamentary regimes are more durable. However, this argument requires re-

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examination because it resulted from the research sample that included political regimes that both ceased and continued to exist.

The connection between electoral systems and dominant-party regimes is a topic of studies by A. Lijphart$^{48}$, M. Duverger$^{49}$, G. Sartori$^{50}$, R. Taagepera and M. Shugart$^{51}$, A. Blais$^{52}$, D. Rae$^{53}$, W. Riker$^{54}$, K. McElwain$^{55}$, P. Norris$^{56}$, D. Farell$^{57}$, S. Bowler$^{58}$.

Three main areas of exploring the mechanisms of single-party dominance left beyond the dissertation - elitist studies, economic studies and electoral fraud studies. Elitist approaches have been developed by B. Magaloni$^{59}$, W. Riker$^{60}$, B. Geddes$^{61}$, O. Reuter and T. Remington$^{62}$. The common view of economic theories states that high support for dominant parties is a response to good economic performance of

the government. B.Magaloni, S.Lindberg, S.Huntington argue importance of electoral fraud for maintaining power by the ruling parties.

There are a lot of studies that analyze the characteristics of country-specific dominant-party regimes, in form of case-study research and comparative research. Among such studies, for example, are the following: Y.Chu on Taiwan, B.Magaloni on Mexico, A.Zolberg on African regimes, G.Esping-Andersen on Sweden, D.Mabry on Mexico, D.Slater on Great Britain, J.Pontusson on Sweden and Great Britain, F.Boucek on Great Britain, Italy and Japan, M.Shalev on Israel, S.Johnson on Japan, U.Cornelius and A.Craig on Mexico, C.-L.Lin on Taiwan, H.Otake on Japan and Germany, H.Binen on African regimes.

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66 Huntington S.P. Political Order in Changing Societies. – New Haven: Yale University, 1968.
J. Myburgh and H. Giliomee on South Africa\textsuperscript{81}, T. Inoguchi on Japan\textsuperscript{82}, M. Bogaards on African regimes\textsuperscript{83}, E. Krauss and J. Pierre on Sweden and Japan\textsuperscript{84}, M. Kreuzer on Germany\textsuperscript{85}, A. Levite and S. Tarrow on Israel and Italy\textsuperscript{86}, M. Aronoff on Israel\textsuperscript{87}, K. Matlosa and S. Karume on South Africa\textsuperscript{88}, M. Muramatsu and E. S. Krauss on Japan\textsuperscript{89}, A. Abedi and S. Schneider on Canada, Australia, Germany and Austria\textsuperscript{90}, B. Ames on Mexico\textsuperscript{91}, S. Tarrow on Italy\textsuperscript{92}, T. Eisenstadt on Mexico\textsuperscript{93}, S. Lindberg and J. Jones on African regimes\textsuperscript{94}, S. Friedman on South Africa\textsuperscript{95}, R. Kaufman on Mexico\textsuperscript{96}, P. Toit on Zambia and Malawi\textsuperscript{97}, H. Giliomee and C. Simkins on South

\textsuperscript{91} Ames B. (1970) Bases of Support for Mexico’s Dominant Party // American Political Science Review, 64.
Russia scholars that focus on topics concerning dominant party regimes are E.Meleshkina, Y.Korgunyuk, B.Makarenko, G.Golosov.

Russian scholars are active in debates on prospects for developing a dominant party system in Russia. Particularly, studies by E. Meleshkina, V. Gel’man, A. Melville, D. Streltsov. Also, Russian scholars are active in debates on prospects for developing a dominant party system in Russia. Particularly, studies by E. Meleshkina, V. Gel’man, A. Melville, D. Streltsov.
Y.Korgunyuk, B.Makarenko, R.Turovsky, A.Makarkin, A.Kynev, G.Mikhaleva, G.Golosov, M.Zavadskaya and P.Panov discuss the transformation of the party system and political regime in Russia towards single-party dominance.

There is an insufficiency of academic studies that analyze, first, the determinants of single-party dominance survival within regimes that overcome the critical longevity threshold, and second, explore the dominant party regime from the perspective of the conditions for their persistence.

**Research question.** The main research question is formulated as follows: what institutional and political factors determine the persistence of single-party dominance?

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**Aim and objectives.** The aim of the study is to reveal the determinants of the persistence of single-party dominance. To achieve this aim, the following objectives are set:

1) To study theoretical approaches to understanding the dominant party regimes as a specific type of political regime;
2) To develop conceptualization and operationalization of single-party dominance;
3) To carry out a theoretical analysis of institutional and political factors’ impact on the persistence of single-party dominance;
4) To develop theoretical hypotheses on the relationship between the institutional and political factors and the persistence of single-party dominance;
5) To carry out correlation analysis, regression analysis and survival analysis in relation to the linkage between institutional and political factors (independent variables) and the single-party dominance persistence (dependent variable);
6) To determine the degree of institutional and political factors influence on the persistence of single-party dominance.

**Hypotheses.** The following hypotheses are formulated and tested for the aims of the research:

1) H1: Single-party dominance in parliamentary regimes has a longer duration than in presidential ones;
2) H2: Regimes with a higher electoral system’s disproportionality have a longer duration of single-party dominance;
3) H3: Regimes with a higher electoral support for the ruling party’s competitors have a shorter duration of single-party dominance;
4) H4: Regimes with prior experience with electoral democracy have a longer duration of single-party dominance than regimes without prior experience with electoral democracy;
5) H5: Regimes with more frequent chief executive turnover have a longer duration of single-party dominance.

**Scope and limitations of research.** The study does not explore the whole set of factors that determine the survival of dominant party regimes. The research concentrates on the role of institutional and political factors in determining persistence of single-party dominance. The limited scope is justified by the insufficient attention to this research focus in existing literature. The choice of a relatively «narrow» set of determinants allows to conduct a deeper analysis of the relevant topics, looking more closely at the nature of the causal dependencies from the theoretical perspective.

The research attempts to reveal the institutional and political factors determining the longevity of single-party dominance, regardless of whether it occurred in a democratic or an undemocratic regime. This decision, first of all, is made because of the focus on single-party dominance as an independent descriptive characteristic of political regimes. It is definite that there are different mechanisms maintaining single-party dominance under democratic and authoritarian regimes. However, it is also true that the existence of single-party dominance as such is a significant characteristic of the political regime, regardless of whether it occurred under democracy or authoritarianism. Single-party dominance has a significant influence on the functioning of political institutions, electoral competition between the incumbent and the opposition, the resource distribution among various actors. This choice is also explained by the relatively small size of the sample and the unfeasibility of its further reduction in the context of the need for a valid empirical assessment of hypotheses.

The single-party dominance is described as the long control over chief executive by a single party. Therefore the research sample includes quite different regimes by the nature of a dominant party, i.e. cases of stable independent governments that entirely consisting of dominant party’s members, as well as cases of coalition governments with the participation of minor parties. The criterion of
maintaining party control over chief executive with regime duration for 18 years or more well reflects the reality of single-party dominance. Even under the coalition government, party that holds chief executive post clearly has a distinctly dominant status within the party system, which essentially surpasses that of all other parties. The question whether the dominant party control over the agenda is monopolistic or the dominant party is forced to share it with its minor coalition partners is not considered and left beyond the scope of the present research. Thus, it seems fair to choose the control over chief executive as a criterion to describe dominant party regimes.

The causality of the single-party dominance persistence by the influence of institutional and political factors is explored within the ceased regimes. This decision is due to, first, the original research design, and second, the need for an empirical assessment of the effects of the institutional and political determinants on the single-party dominance persistence.

Independent variables have a static measurement. In particular, mean values for the entire period of single-party dominance are used for two independent variables and for one control variable. The basis for this approach originates from the focus of the research on the comparison within regimes, rather than on exploring the evolution of any regime during the period of its existence. The usage of mean values limits the consideration of factors’ internal dynamics due to the fluctuations of corresponding variables during the period of single-party dominance. However, it is not critically important for the objectives of the present comparative analysis. Fluctuations are moderate, and mean values expressed differences among regimes correctly.

Methodology. The research is carried out within the framework of the rational choice institutionalism, the principles of which are used to analyze the institutional and political determinants of dominant party regimes persistence. The core of rational choice institutionalism is the idea of the actors’ rational behavior and institutions as a patterns of actors’ interaction.
The understanding of institutions relies on the approach of J.March and J.Olsen. In their view an institution is defined as «a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances»\(^{128}\).

**Methods.** The methods of multivariate statistical analysis (correlation analysis, regression analysis, survival analysis) are used for an empirical assessment of the impact of institutional and political factors on the single-party dominance persistence.

**Selection of empirical data.** Single-party dominance is defined as the long continuous control over chief executive by a dominant party for 18 years or more in a system with regular competitive elections. 18-year threshold was chosen because this period is minimal, under which a regime exists at least for three electoral cycles.

The research sample includes dominant party regimes that occurred from 1950 to 2015 and collapsed no later than December 31, 2015. The choice of time interval is explained by the need to make sample entirely consisting of so-called present regimes. The sample includes 30 cases of single-party dominance that occurred in 27 countries\(^{129}\).

The identification of determinants of the single-party dominance persistence (dependent variable) is carried out through the analysis of the impact of the following institutional and political factors (independent variables):

1) The type of institutional design (parliamentary or presidential);
2) The level of electoral system’s disproportionality in parliamentary elections (calculation of the Gallagher Index);

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\(^{129}\) Austria, Guyana and Luxembourg have two periods of single-party dominance, that counted as a separate cases.
3) The level of electoral support for the ruling party’s competitors (calculation as 1 minus the share of the votes for the ruling party - the party that controls chief executive post);
4) The prior experience with electoral democracy (presence or absence);
5) The frequency of a chief executive turnover (the ratio of the number of individuals who controls chief executive post for one year or more, to the regime’s duration in months).

The following control variables are analyzed in the research:

1) The term length of high elected office;
2) Type of political regime;
3) The degree of dominant party’s control in the governing coalition.

Variable «The level of electoral support for the ruling party’s competitors» does not differentiate opposition parties in terms of their closeness to the dominant party. Such operationalization is caused by the intention to forward this predictor to the electoral choice between the ruling party, that seeks to have a maximum autonomous dominance, and all other parties, support for them under persistent control over government by dominant party is indicates an alternative trend. There are several cases of close, stable and long-term cooperation between independent parties (Belgium, Germany, Australia). Such combined structures are considered as dominant parties.

Perhaps, the selected control variables could be also classified as independent variables due to they originally belong to political or institutional factors by their nature. Nevertheless, these variables are specified as control ones, because there are no theoretical hypotheses on their connection with longevity of single-party dominance.

These control variables are selected to examine their possible influence on the dependent variable. In the case of the term length of high elected office it is the possible connection of the duration of single-party dominance with term limits and
the frequency of regular elections. In the case of the political regime type it is the possible influence of the democratic or authoritarian context on single-party dominance persistence. In the case of a degree of a dominant party’s control in the governing coalition it is the probable significance of the effect of one-party or multi-party government.

An empirical examination of the determinants of the single-party dominance persistence is carried out through the means of correlation analysis, regression analysis and survival analysis.

**Contribution to the discussion of the problem in existing literature.** The contribution to the research field is follows:

1) The causality of single-party dominance persistence is explained by the influence of institutional and political factors and analyzed within regimes that have already overcome the critical duration threshold;

2) Author's original conceptualization of the single-party dominance persistence as the duration of its functioning with the time threshold for the qualification of confirmed single-party dominance has been developed. This conceptualization makes it possible to obtain the most accurate and reliable empirical estimates of the impact of political and institutional factors on the single-party dominance persistence;

3) An integrated system of theoretical assumptions has been developed and theoretical hypotheses have been formulated and tested on causality of the single-party dominance persistence by impact of institutional and political factors (the type of institutional design, the level of electoral system’s disproportionality in parliamentary elections, the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors, prior experience with electoral democracy, the frequency of chief executive turnover) were formulated;

4) The effects of institutional and political factors (the type of institutional design, the level of electoral system’s disproportionality in parliamentary elections, the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors, prior
experience with electoral democracy, the frequency of chief executive turnover) on single-party dominance persistence were empirically assessed.

The theoretical significance of the research is summarized in the following points:

1) The single-party dominance persistence was conceptualized as the duration of continuous control over chief executive by the dominant party for 18 years or more;
2) The theoretical model of the relationship between institutional / political factors and single-party dominance persistence was developed;
3) The methodological approach for determining the degree of impact of the institutional and political determinants of dominant party regimes persistence was developed, implemented and evaluated;
4) The statistically significant effects were revealed for single-party dominance longer duration in the conditions of lower level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors and under the presence of prior experience with electoral democracy.

The practical significance of the thesis is determined by the fact that it is aimed at assessing the effects of institutional and political factors on the dominant party regimes persistence that occur widely in modern world.

**Statements to be defended.**

1) The empirical analysis of the causal institutional and political factors of single-party dominance requires that the single-party dominance persistence to be conceptualized and operationalized. In this way the single-party dominance persistence is interpreted as the duration of continuous control over chief executive by the dominant party with the establishment of a critical duration threshold of 18 years in order to qualify as a confirmed single-party dominance under regular competitive elections;
2) The single-party dominance as such largely determines the logic of political competition between the incumbent and the opposition. That validates regimes’ empirical analysis based on this conceptualization;

3) The single-party dominance persistence can be considered as a variable, the variation of which is explained by five key institutional and political factors. The corresponding theoretical hypotheses for these factors have been formulated. In accordance to them the single-party dominance duration is longer under the parliamentary type of institutional design, higher electoral system’ disproportionality, a lower level of electoral support for the ruling party’s competitors, presence of prior experience with electoral democracy, higher frequency of chief executive turnover;

4) A statistically significant effects both of the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors and the prior experience with electoral democracy on single-party dominance persistence have been revealed. The results of statistical analysis demonstrate the absence of a statistically significant linkage of the single-party dominance persistence with the type of institutional design, the level of electoral system’ disproportionality and the frequency of chief executive turnover.

**Analysis of data and findings**

In *the Introduction*, the research design is presented. The Introduction includes statement of research problem, literature review, research question, aim, objectives and hypotheses of research, scope and limitations of research, methodology and methods of research, criteria of selection of empirical data, contribution of research to the discussion of the problem in existing literature, statements to be defended, publications and results of approbation of research.

The *first chapter* sets out the conceptual and theoretical foundations for the study.
Section 1.1. The ways to analyze single-party dominance considers theoretical approaches to defining single-party dominance, as well as author's conceptualization of the single-party dominance phenomenon. Main theoretical ways of understanding single-party dominance rely on such factors as control over certain share of votes and seats in parliament, long-term control over chief-executive, systematic control over the political agenda, the role in forming the ruling coalition, strong identification of the dominant party with the state.

In terms of the required proportion of seats in the parliament, scholars propose criteria varying from the relative majority\textsuperscript{130} to exceeding absolute majority, i.e. 70\% of seats\textsuperscript{131}. In order to operationalize the moment of the regime’s transition to dominant party regime, researchers suggest to use the number of electoral cycles (generally 3 or 4\textsuperscript{132}) or the number of years of continuous rule (generally 15-20 years\textsuperscript{133}). Within the framework of understanding single-party dominance through the control over the political agenda, dominant party regimes are characterized by a strong systematic influence of the ruling party on the political decision-making process\textsuperscript{134}. The understanding of single-party dominance as a strong dominant party’s identification with the state is primarily used in relation to authoritarian regimes since much importance is given to the dominant party’s role as a mechanism for elite coordination.

In Section 1.2. Conceptualization of single-party dominance the author develops conceptualization of a single-party dominance.

The conceptualization of a single-party dominance combines two key criteria:

1) regular competitive elections with the participation of more than one party or candidate;
2) continuous control over chief executive by a party for 18 years or more.

Section 1.3. The characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism within the dominant party regimes covers differences of a single-party dominance under democratic and undemocratic regimes. The analysis suggests that the democratic / authoritarian context of single-party dominance determines different mechanisms of its endurance. However, the existence of single-party dominance as such is an important characteristic of a political regime, which largely determines the allocation of resources, the logic of political competition between incumbent and opposition, and therefore it becomes a regime-distinguishing notion. Regardless of the degree of democracy within a particular dominant party regime, there is some merging of government institutions with the dominant party structure, as well as the weakening of electoral competitiveness and, consequently, a declining probability of any turnover in power as a result of elections.

Section 1.4. The origins of the rise of single-party dominance studies main theoretical approaches to explaining the nature of dominant party regimes and key conditions for its emergence. These include the absence of significant social cleavages in the society, the need to overcome the fragmentation of social structure and the social demand for power consolidation.

Section 1.5. Ensuring elite integration is devoted to the dominant parties as mechanisms for coordinating elites. Due to the fact that the ruling party dominance is sustained through continuous electoral superiority over the opposition, the dominant party becomes a leading unchallenged political actor with a crucial influence on the political decision-making process135. Thus, the dominant parties co-opt a lot of politicians seeking seats, offices and a successful political career136. The

attraction of large political and corporate groups by the dominant party, in turn, leads to the elite integration around the dominant party structure. Therefore the dominant party gains resource advantage over opposition. So ruling party’s competitors have low electoral support to win elections and gain control over chief executive office.

**Section 1.6. Incumbent and opposition within the electoral space** studies the nature of political competition under single-party dominance. The consolidation of single-party dominance creates stable expectations at the levels of political elites and voters. Generally, these expectations can be summarized as a lack of any alternative at the political arena and a lack of party choice for pragmatically minded political actors. Under such conditions, the incumbent gets a steady superiority over the challengers for a long time.

The second chapter develops theoretical implications for the effects of institutional and political factors on the single-party dominance persistence. These effects are introduced in the theoretical hypotheses describing the nature of the relationship between institutional and political factors and the single-party dominance persistence.

**Section 2.1. The type of institutional design** considers the influence of institutional design on the single-party dominance persistence. The effect of institutional design on the single-party dominance persistence is explained through three key implications: influence of the dominant party on the election results, ideological identification of incumbent and challengers, problems of election campaign’s organization.

Under presidentialism, the opposition is able to more successfully overcome the ruling party advantage in electoral support\(^{137}\). The candidates’ personal characteristics, individual profiles and political views are more important in

presidential elections, while the role of party affiliation is more important in parliamentary ones.

Parliamentarianism and presidentialism have different consequences for the candidates’ agenda formation. The direct and fixed presidential mandate, which does not depend on the support of the parliamentary majority, stipulates candidates’ autonomy from the ideological positions expressed in party platforms to create agenda in accordance with own political views. In particular, it leads to leaning towards the median voter and avoiding extreme views. The more blurred ideological identification of candidates in presidential regimes eliminates the advantage of the dominant party in greater ideological flexibility.

In parliamentary regimes, single-party dominance becomes more durable due to greater importance of incumbent’s advantages over opposition in electoral campaign organization. Parliamentarianism expose the opposition to difficult problem of ensuring the most efficient way of turning electoral support into seats in parliament and cabinet.

The following theoretical hypothesis about the relationship between the type of institutional design and the single-party dominance persistence is formulated:

H1: Single-party dominance in parliamentary regimes has a longer duration than in presidential ones.

Section 2.2. The level of electoral system’s disproportionality in parliamentary elections analyzes the effects of the level of the electoral system’s disproportionality in parliamentary elections on the single-party dominance persistence. This factor refers to the level of correspondence between the shares of votes and seats. It is measured by the Gallagher's Index.

The logic of the effects of the level of electoral system’s disproportionality on the single-party dominance persistence is examined in the context of ideological identification of the incumbent and the opposition, as well as coordination problems between the challengers.
The resource and electoral advantage of incumbent over opposition has greater significance in plurality systems. The ideological attractiveness of the dominant party for the median voter matters more in plurality settings. Under proportional representation settings, this advantage does not play such an important role. Therefore, the opposition’s chances of winning the elections are improved. Moreover, opposition gains advantage from leaning electoral behavior towards original structure of voters’ preferences.

It was revealed that the peculiarities of plurality systems effects (in particular, the inducing two-party or two-bloc system), expose the opposition to difficult problem of providing internal coordination. Challengers should be cooperative to nominate consolidated candidates. In proportional representation systems, opposition parties can be successful by nominating several party lists and gaining the increasing aggregate share of seats in parliament.

As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated about the relationship between the level of electoral system’s disproportionality and the single-party dominance persistence:

H2: Regimes with a higher electoral system’s disproportionality have a longer duration of single-party dominance.

Section 2.3. The level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors clarifies the impact of the level of electoral support of the ruling party's competitors on the single-party dominance persistence. Due to the fact that single-party dominance is maintained in competitive elections, the threat of losing power by a dominant party as a result of defeat in elections increases under conditions of higher level of electoral support for its competitors. Thus, the likelihood of dominant party rule collapse as a result of higher share of votes for the challengers is increasing.

As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated on the relationship between the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors and the single-party dominance persistence:
H3: Regimes with a higher electoral support for the ruling party’s competitors have a shorter duration of single-party dominance.

**Section 2.4. The prior experience with electoral democracy** deals with the effects of the prior experience with electoral democracy on the single-party dominance persistence. The specification of the presence of prior experience with electoral democracy for dominant party regimes is realized by examining at least one observation of electoral turnover in power prior to the emergence of single-party dominance.

The presence or absence of prior experience with electoral democracy is recognized as an important factor influencing the functioning of political institutions within dominant party regimes. Single-party dominance, which emerges under conditions of prior experience with electoral democracy, is likely to stem from the political structure of society. In this way the dominant party represents the demand for a certain policy supported by a large social groups. So long-term stable incentives are created for the upholding of single-party dominance.

Single-party dominance in regimes without prior experience with electoral democracy, and with survival mechanisms based on the incentives and interests of the ruling party, rather than on the social demands, is more exposed to threat of breakdown due to low electoral support and vulnerability to social and economic challenges.

As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated on the relationship between the prior experience with electoral democracy and the single-party dominance persistence:

H4: Regimes with prior experience with electoral democracy have a longer duration of single-party dominance than regimes without prior experience with electoral democracy.

**Section 2.5. The frequency of the chief executive turnover** analyzes the impact of chief executive turnover frequency. The indicator is calculated as the ratio
of the number of persons holding the chief executive post (only persons with the term of office of 1 year and more are considered in order to exclude temporary individuals), to the period of single-party dominance (in months).

It is assumed that longer duration will characterize those dominant party regimes which passed the test of the chief executive turnover and did not collapse as a result. It is proposed to use the quantitative index of the frequency of chief executive turnover.

As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated on the relationship between the frequency of the chief executive turnover and the single-party dominance persistence:

H5: Regimes with more frequent chief executive turnover have a longer duration of single-party dominance.

The third chapter provides an empirical assessment of theoretical hypotheses through multivariate statistical analysis, including correlation analysis, regression analysis, survival analysis.

Based on the results of the multivariate statistical analysis, the theoretical model of the research was evaluated as quite efficient in explaining the persistence of single-party dominance. Two predictors have a statistically significant effects on the single-party dominance persistence - the level of electoral support for the ruling party’s competitors and the prior experience with electoral democracy. All control variables were statistically insignificant.

Thus, the following theoretical hypotheses were confirmed:

1) H3: Regimes with a higher electoral support for the ruling party’s competitors have a shorter duration of single-party dominance;
2) H4: Regimes with prior experience with electoral democracy have a longer duration of single-party dominance than regimes without prior experience with electoral democracy.
The Conclusion summarizes the results of the dissertation and outlines the prospects for further research.

Publications

The results of the study have been presented in the following publications:

Publications in peer-reviewed journals


Publications in other journals

Approbation of research

The contents and results of the study have been presented at the following conferences:


4. 1st Inter-University Student Conference on Political Science. Moscow, Russia. 05.03.2011. Topic of the paper: Dominant Party Authoritarian Regimes: Key Characteristics and Reasons for Stability.
