Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Russia: Media vs. Surveys

Anna SHIROKANOVA (LCSR HSE)
Irina BUSURKINA (LCSR HSE)
Olga SILYUTINA (HSE SPb)
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

Concept: Part of the immigration conservatism as a dimension, alongside socio-cultural conservatism

In the ESS: attitudes (jobs, crime), who should be allowed to come

EVS: tolerance towards immigrants, concern about them, attitudes (jobs, crime, welfare, culture)

WVS: immigrants as neighbours, attitudes (jobs)
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Russia (2013)

Moscow Nervous after Violence Erupts

Moscow authorities are apprehensive following anti-immigrant riots in a southern suburb on Sunday night. And though neo-Nazis continue to stir xenophobic sentiments, it's clear that the Kremlin has done its own part to fuel these attitudes.

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Russia: Nationalists Press Anti-Immigrant Agenda

By Reuters

Nov. 4, 2013

Thousands of nationalists rallied across Russia on Monday in a sign of the growing strength of far-right political forces galvanized by an anti-immigrant agenda. Monday was National Unity Day, a holiday that commemorates the liberation of Moscow from Polish invaders in 1612. Hard-line nationalists have adopted it to hold annual marches. This year's rallies were larger and more numerous than in previous years, with one near Moscow drawing about 8,000 people. Although nationalist organizations attract the
However,
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Russia

Russia Wants Immigrants the World Doesn’t

While Europe and the U.S. tighten border controls, former Soviet states are encouraged by Moscow to send their workers.

By Leonid Ragozin

14 марта 2017 г., 09:00 GMT+3

On a brutally cold February day, hundreds of laborers from Uzbekistan mill around in the snow and mud of a construction site 10 miles outside Moscow. Surrounding them are a series of unfinished 18-story apartment blocks meant to serve as homes for Russian military officers.
Background: Economic situation

- Labour market needs migrants
- 2nd-4th largest immigrant population (over 11 million, 15% of workforce)
- 4th largest shadow economy, 39 per cent of annual GDP (ACCA report, 2019), 13 of GDP in salaries and informal sales (Rosstat, 2017)
- Migrant labour part of the 2014 Olympics construction sites and the 2018 FIFA World Cup
- Immigrant hierarchy exists - by religion, looks, knowledge of Russian
Background: “Labour market needs migrants”

- Economic growth of Russian economy
- Ebbs and flows
- +10% in 2000
- -8% in 2009
- Negative in 2014
- Currency fall in 12.2014
Background: “Labour market needs migrants”
Background: “Labour market needs migrants”
Background: “Large immigrant destination”
Background: A national community

- Russia is multi-ethnic and multi-religious itself; 7 percent of Russian citizens are Muslim
- As a result, xenophobia, when present, extends to Russian citizens fitting the ‘Other’ as well
- Fears and risks:
  - Public health
  - Terrorism
  - Employment (economic displacement)
- „Populist anti-immigrant sentiment is common” (Moscow Carnegie Center, 2013)
- A majority of 66 per cent in polls support stricter immigration rules (2013)
Background: Outbursts of Violence against Immigrants

2007 – riots against violence to Russians in Karelia

2010 - nationalist riots at the Manezhnaya square (Moscow)

2013 – immigrant raids in response to attack on the police in Moscow, deportation campaigns during Moscow mayor electoral campaign

Nov 4, 2013 – the “Russian March” nationalist demonstration on the National Unity Day
Background: Changes in Legal Regulation

1991 – 2007 – free flow of immigrants to Russia

2007 – country caps (quotas)

2010 – work permits (language test, US 70 / month); customs union citizens are exempt (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan)

2013 – a new concept of migration policy through 2025 introduces mandatory deportation of illegal migrants

2018 – a new concept of migration policy through 2025 simplifies rules for immigration
Previous findings

- Anti-immigrant moods and widespread xenophobia push the restrictions on immigrants and more generous parental leave policies for Russia families (Kingsbury 2019)
- Anti-immigrant mobilization by regional social movements (see Lawrence & Peshkova, 2015)
- Support for the unconditional deportation stems from perceiving ethnic groups as a weak security threat (“fear of groups typically seen as non-threatening”), not so much from survival rhetoric and identity threat (Alexseev 2011)
Previous findings

- An “ethnic hierarchy” (Bessudnov 2016; Bessudnov & Scherbak, forthcoming) is shared by ethnic groups in Russia (shared by Azerbaijani, Kazakhs, etc.)
  - Greater acceptance of Ukrainians and Moldovan, hostility towards immigrants from the Caucasus, South-East Asia, Central Asia
- Ethnicity is by far the most important predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes, followed by immigration experience, location, religion and education (in this order)
- Immigrant groups size matters more for the groups lower in the ethnic hierarchy
Previous findings

- “The predictive power of statistical models explaining anti-immigrant prejudice is considerably lower in Russia compared to Western European countries” (Bessudnov 2016)
- More stratified approach (Gorodzeisky, Glikman, 2018) -- but see the figure:
  - ethnic majority group: perceptions of collective (state) vulnerability*
  - ethnic minority groups: individuals’ vulnerable socioeconomic position, and conservative views and ideologies (i.e., self-interests)

Table A3. Models Summary for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>R Square Model 1a</th>
<th>R Square Model 2b</th>
<th>R Square Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.026</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.175</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Index: dissatisfaction with the state’s economy, government, education, and health services
Previous findings: What theories do work?

- Search for new national identity borders in Russia (Hjerm, 1998) + high anti-foreigner sentiment
- Neither *competition* nor *cultural model* is meaningful in predicting anti-foreigner sentiment (Gorodzeisky, Glikman & Maskileyson, 2015)
- The *group threat* theory (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010) seems to work best
- “negative views about immigrants are mostly driven by concerns about the effect of immigration on society at large” (Bessudnov, 2016), not on personal well-being
Our goals in this project

To connect media coverage to extant knowledge and explain more of the anti-immigrant attitudes

Compare the discourse on immigrants in high anti-immigrant attitude countries (Russia vs. ///) / high immigration countries

Which theories have higher shares in media discussions?

Can media discourse predict survey attitude changes?
Sources and Data

- “Public.Ru” is an online catalogue of Russian-language media (Russia and abroad)
- Search query:
  - near(labor*,migra*,immigra*,migra*Russia) \textbf{not} (emigra*,Poland) \textbf{and} near10 (labor migrants,immigrants,migrants Russia)
- 2011-2018; from 2000 to 2010, less than 50 documents / year in the catalogue.
- On Public.ru there are several libraries:
  - central print media
  - central news agencies
  - regional print media
  - regional news agencies
  - press online
  - internet resources
  - internet media
  - internet government
  - foreign media
Sources and Data

We need some benchmark for the total number of publications in public.ru across years.
Sources and Data

Share of texts on “families in Russia” and “flats in Russia”, total (assumed to be neutral topics)
Sources and Data

- Fading interest in the issue
- Switch to international politics in the media in 2014

Share of texts on “migrants” to the average on “families in Russia” and “flats in Russia” (assumed to be neutral topics), separately for newspapers and online sources
Analytical Technique


1. Text preprocessing
2. Create a network of collocations per year (1000/year)
3. Cluster each network (Louvain algorithm) -- several clusters each year
4. Label the clusters (through the most specific collocations)
5. Calculate distances between clusters across years (similar collocations)
6. Connect the most similar clusters across years into a “river network”
Results

Legend: size of the rectangle = share of discourse
color = discourse stream
line thickness = closeness between pieces of discourse
Results: What can we observe in it?

1. The most important / discussed incoming countries: Tajikistan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova; but also China
2. Ebb and flow of migrants (following the economic situation)
3. Most problematic issues of law regulation (residence registration, language test)
4. New streams emerging
5. See the share of these topics over time
Further Steps and Questions

Media frame policy perceptions. Can media discourse help explain the anti-immigrant attitudes?

What were the positions on immigrants from Central Asia after the 2014 Crimea annexation?

Not only explore but also predict with known discourse in previous years:

- Take two countries with high anti-immigrant sentiments
- Compare the discourse: is it similar?
Code for the river network

https://github.com/olgasilyutina/simple_dynamic_topics

Thanks for your attention!