

The Center for Institutional Studies

TERRITORIAL SELF-MANAGEMENT: PREREQUISITES, OPERATION, AND OUTCOMES

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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

- Citizen's self-organization for addressing local problems could take various forms from political and social movements which demand better accountability and performance from governments, to "material" grassroots communities initiatives (*Subbotniki*).
- Community initiatives could add to or enhance government-supplied public goods and services, or governments could outsource to communities some of its functions.
- Both forms of collective actions require specific types of social capital, defined as general capacity for collective action in pursuit of common interests of the participants. Political collective action requires civic culture, whereas apolitical collective initiatives need grassroots (also known as "horizontal") social capital.



BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY

- Institution of Territorial Self-Management (TSM) takes an intermediate position between these versions it tackles concrete "material" problems in communities' life, and as such is apolitical, but also involves local governments that provide various support to such community initiatives.
- TSM is an officially recognized institution which under the Russian law accommodates such government-supported community initiatives.
- Government and civil society are often considered as alternatives; TSM is their meeting place and engagement platform.
- TSM can be considered as a means of outsourcing of municipal services to local communities with partial public funding (cost-sharing).



TSM COMMUNITIES IN RUSSIA

- Established in Russia in the early 1990s as an apolitical form of community participation, TSM were expected to facilitate civic involvement in local affairs, mobilize additional resources into local public sector, and implement synergies between governments and civil society.
- Today, there are more than 27 600 TSM communities in Russia (Report on the status of TSM in Russia, 2018).
- Our project analyses the prerequisite for the establishment of TSM communities, and their operational characteristics and outcomes. We use empirical data collected in the city of Kirov, Russia, where this model is particularly popular.



TSM COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES

- Better citizens' awareness about needs and opportunities of local communities.
- Stronger incentives of TSM members to use efficiently available funds and resources.
- TSM accumulate social capital in communities
- TSM produce a multiplier effect by augmenting initial seed money provided by local governments
- TSM implement Ostrom's principles of successful self-organization.



TSM RISKS AND WEAKNESSES

- They could breed paternalism and patronage relations with the local authorities.
- They could result in declining public monitoring over the municipal government energy and attention of civil society is diverted into solving specific private problems and seeking earmarked government support for those.
- The system of municipal grants to TSM is non-transparent and could be used to "buy" loyalty of grant recipients.



KIROV TSMS

- Kirov TSMs are engaged in improving residential buildings and adjacent areas, developing local communal infrastructure (e.g. parks, playgrounds etc.), supporting socially vulnerable groups in the community, producing community development plans, assisting police in maintaining safety and security of local areas, monitoring the performance of local utilities, organizing recreational activities, etc. (Shagalov, 2015; Shagalov, Rubin, 2019).
- There are over 600 TSMs in the city of Kirov (pop. circa 500,000), involving more than 4% of city residents and providing services to over 25%.
- Over ¾ of TSMs are based in apartment buildings.



TSMS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

• We are taking advantage of a large number of TSMs operating in the same city and hence in an identical environment while still producing different outcomes. This enables us to conduct statistical analyses to test various hypotheses about the creation, operation, and factors of the success and failures of TSM.



RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- Under which circumstances and prerequisites the TSM are likely to be created?
- To what extent support of the local authorities serves as a catalyst for citizens' selforganization?
- Whether TSM strengthen loyalty of population to local authorities?



DATA

Our data combine three perspectives on TOS:

- (i) municipal public servants
- (ii) TSMs chair persons and members
- (iii) local residents

Surveys:

- TOS managers (100 individuals), 2013.
- Public servants (104 respondents), 2013.
- City residents (representative sample, 3000 respondents), 2014.



TSM PREREQUISITES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ownership of housing	0,222**	0,192**	0,204**	0,230**
	(0,088)	(0,089)	(0,095)	(0,099)
Income	0,282***	0,282**	0,229***	0,239**
	(0,046)	(0,046)	(0,050)	(0,052)
Grassroot social capital (day-to-day			0,355***	0,334***
interaction with neighbors and mutual			(0,049)	(0,050)
assistance)				
General trust			0,173***	0,001
			(0,049)	(0,062)
Controls (districts)	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	2861	2826	2582	2504
R^2	0,025	0,044	0,087	0,114



TSM PREREQUISITES

I rely	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)
Responsibility for local affairs				0,289*** (0,063)
Seek solutions in cooperation with local authorities				0,348*** (0,054)
Our ability to change something on our won is limited				0,383*** (0,123)
I seek solutions to community problems by cooperating with other community members				0,148 (0,171)
I seek solutions to community problems by better controlling local governments				0,094 (0,164)
I rely on relatives and friends				-0,150 (0,178)
Local elections participation				0,031 (0,103)



TSM PREREQUISITES (RESULTS)

What makes TOSs more likely – social capital, civic pessimism city-wide and civic competence locally:

- Creation of TSM predictably requires grassroots social capital which powers up local collective action
- It also requires rudimentary civic culture, i.e. sense of responsibility for local affairs, in odd combination with civic helplessness (inability to make a difference without government support), and paternalism (seeking government support as a preferred means to deal with local problems), while downplaying conventional mechanisms of democratic accountability
- TSM creation is positively tied-up with property rights. Generally, property owners are more socially active people they have greater stakes in surrounding urban infrastructure and are more settled which enables them to develop horizontal ties to each other (DiPasquale, Glaeser, 1999).



MULTIPLYING SEED MONEY

COMPARATIVE DATA OF GRANT CONTESTS TO SUPPORT LOCAL INITIATIVES IN 2007 - 2012

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Applications	20	47	51	66	56	127
Winners	15	29	51	54	55	119
Participation (individuals)	500	1347	4681	4890	4956	-
Participation (organization)	_	_	81 333	101 747	126 095	-
Additional funding	27	42	181	186	225	-
Local funding	0,7	1,4	4,0	5,0	6,3	-
City funding	-	_	741	196	200	-
Deputies' funding	0,7	1,0	3,0	3,0	4,0	8,0
Total funding	1,3	2,4	8,9	10,0	11,8	-

Source: City Kirov government



TSM NICHES

Activities of TOS	Where TSM should be most usefully engaged? (opinions of public servants)	How effective TOS are (TSMs chair persons)
Improvement of community infrastructure	85	3,0
Informing public on community issues and problems	12	2,8
Cultural and sports events	17	2,3
Assisting police in maintaining public order	10	2,3
Helping vulnerable people (children, seniors, veterans, disabled)	15	2,2
Submission of regulatory and community development proposals to municipal governments	5	2,0
Participation in community development grant competitions	51	-
Monitoring local utilities and housing maintenance organizations	20	-
Appeals to local governments	10	-
Control over local authorities	5	-
Increase of civil engagement during elections	2	-
Organization of protest movements and political meetings	2	-

NOTES: * allowed the choice of any number of responses.

^{**} the estimation was performed by respondents by means of giving points on the scale from 1 to 4, where 1 – TSM is absolutely inefficient; 2 – TSM is inefficient; 3 – TSM is efficient; 4 – TSM is very efficient.



TSM AND LOYALTY OF POPULATION

	Satisfied	Performance
Cooperation with authorities	-0,265***	-0,240***
Cooperation with authorities	(0,044)	(0,040)
Conoral truet	0,236***	0,275***
General trust	(0,025)	(0,023)
TCM dummy	0,214***	0,147***
TSM dummy	(0,047)	(0,043)
Responsibility	0,146***	0,042*
	(0,025)	(0,023)
Crossroot assist sonital	0,137***	0,039**
Grassroot social capital	(0,020)	(0,019)
Flactions portionation dummy	-0,123**	-0,210***
Elections participation dummy	(0,042)	(0,038)
Trust to family members	-0,091***	0,080***
Trust to family members	(0,021)	(0,020)
Limited conchilities to shopes on thing	0,077*	0,167***
Limited capabilities to change anything	(0,039)	(0,036)
Draelivity to apportunion	0,003	-0,093***
Proclivity to opportunism	(0,016)	(0,015)
Controls (income, owner)	Yes	Yes



TSM AND LOYALTY OF POPULATION (RESULTS)

- Our regressions show that the existence of TSM markedly and highly significantly improves residents' satisfaction with local governments and their evaluation of government performance. This sense of gratitude for government's earmarked and targeted support ("we've been listened to, and our needs have been addressed") clearly demonstrates the paternalistic angle of TSM, and their dual value to local governments as (i) means of resource mobilization (recall TSM multiplier), and means of strengthening grassroots loyalty of residents.
- It is noteworthy that once TSM dummy is controlled for, the general experience of interacting with local governments contributes *negatively* to government's assessment, perhaps because such experience reflects unsuccessful attempts to solve problems with local authorities. effective way to strengthen loyalty of population to local authorities.
- Participation in elections is also negatively correlated with government assessments perhaps because such participation could be an outcome of government pressure ("administrive resource"), or be protest vote.



EXIT OR VOICE

TSM communities could have a "dark side" as they divert communities from root causes of local problems, i.e. lack of efficiency and accountability of local authorities. TSM prefer to solve the city issues in collaboration with the local authorities without controlling them. Thus, in addition to direct positive effect from the TSM activities could generate indirect negative effect that can prevail over direct effect under certain conditions (Menyashev, Polishchuk, 2018).



CONCLUSIONS

- TSM are patently apolitical, they target specific community projects and almost never facilitate political collective action.
- TSM implement comparative advantages of local communities in contrast with local government letting co-production synergy be exploit.
- TSM are able to mobilize additional resources for urban development and, therefore, partially compensate for the severe deficit in municipal budgets.
- TSM are more likely to emerge in communities with higher propensity for local collective action, where people are skeptical about the efficacy of conventional mechanisms of democratic accountability, and prefer to collaborate with municipal governments on specific projects.
- Driving force of TSM –paternalism in the society. By supporting TSM, governments address several concerns: expand resource base in the public sector, increase citizens' loyalty to municipal authorities, and preemptively convert civic energy turning communities from governments' collective controllers to "supportive partners". This shifting focus of civil society to targeted transfers and specific projects could adversely affect the quality of municipal governance (Nannicini et al., 2013).