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**The effect of death reminders on the attitudes about ideal state
in the post-Soviet countries**

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Introduction

Global warming, pandemics, terrorist attacks, military actions as an agenda that we encounter in everyday life can cause several consequences, in particular, the fear of death (Pereira, Medeiros, Bertholini, 2020; Pyszczynski et al., 2021). The death reminders led to both adaptive (e.g., meaningful relationships, symbolic “legacy”) and maladaptive strategies (e.g., avoiding, feeling the “meaninglessness” of life) to reduce the “paralyzing” fear (Menzies, 2012). In political sphere the death reminders influenced on the political attitudes and preferences (Burke, Kosloff, Landau, 2013; Crowson, 2009a; Feldman, Johnston, 2014; Onraet et al., 2011; Schoen, Schumann, 2007).

In psychological studies to measure political preferences researchers focus on the political ideologies. Political ideologies are defined as a set of attitudes, beliefs, and values about desirable structure of society and the means to achieve it (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009). The analysis of ordinary views about state mostly indicated the contradictory results, in other words, people tended to choose “ideologically” contradictory positions (Knight, 2006). Therefore, to avoid the ambiguous interpretations of the concept of “ideology”, which is also used in political science, in this paper, we focus on the category “political attitudes” in the international perspective. In the post-Soviet context, as a non-representative context, we use the category of “attitudes towards ideal state”. In psychological studies, researchers mostly orient on the analysis of the ordinary views about desirable structure of the society (Report on the project “Ideal Russia. Imagine!”, 2018).

Previous studies about the effect of death reminders on the political attitudes were mostly realized in the USA (Burke et al., 2013; Landau et al., 2004). In this context, researchers analyzed the political dichotomy “conservatism/liberalism” (Jost et al., 2009). Conservatism is defined through the support for traditional values, discrimination, patriotism, militarism, and the market economy. Liberalism is defined through the preference for paternalism, equality, social justice, and tolerance (Everett, 2013). Psychological studies showed that in different spheres (social and economic) people tended to demonstrate the inconsistent preferences, e.g., conservatism in social issues but liberalism in economic issues (Jost, 2006). The mentioned contradiction in different

spheres of social life led to the analysis of political attitudes as a multidimensional construct (Duckitt et al., 2002; Jost et al., 2003). In the historical perspective, “social” (right-wing authoritarianism) and “economic” (social dominance orientation) foundations of political attitudes considered through different motivational bases in the framework of the Dual Process Model (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt et al., 2002; Pratto et al., 1994). Further, in line with CMSC (Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition), Jost and colleagues (2003) proposed the universal foundations of political attitudes towards change and hierarchy: conservatives support for the maintenance of the “status quo” and “hierarchy”, while liberals – “innovations” and “equality”. However, some studies emphasized that the content of political attitudes was depended on the sociocultural context and political discourse (Stenner, 2005).

In the post-Soviet context, the mentioned structure of political attitudes was not represented (Aspelund et al., 2011). The results of previous research showed that in Russia, Latvia, and Lithuania orientations towards maintenance of the status quo and inequality were not associated with self-placement on the ideological continuum (Aspelund et al., 2011). In the post-Soviet context, to measure political attitudes researchers focused on the support for politicians/political parties, the suggestions of which were not correspondent with the ideological continuum (Shestopal, 2016). The current tendency induced a question about the nature of political attitudes that allowed to indicate people with different views about the desirable structure of the state (Malinova, 2007).

Previous studies in Russia showed the foundation of “freedom/control” in different spheres of social life (Prusova, Gulevich, 2020). However, this foundation showed the low consistency in the different spheres of social life that might indicate both a multidimensional structure of political attitudes and specific principles of structure, e.g., in the political and economic spheres. Therefore, in the current study we focused on the attitudes about ideal state, including the desirable structure of different spheres (e.g., governmental support, political control) and outcomes (e.g., high level of economic development).

Besides the content of political attitudes, to indicate the political preferences researchers emphasized the psychological foundations (Crowson, 2009a; Feldman, Johnston, 2014; Onraet et al., 2011; Schoen, Schumann, 2007). T. Adorno (1950) noted that attitudes might be considered as a reflection of the personality. To organize the various psychological foundations in the political preferences, researchers developed the theory of conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003). To measure political conservatism researchers used not only ideological continuum but also scales of right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, system justification, support for conservatives on the political arena (Jost, Sterling, Stern, 2018; Jost et al., 2017). In line with CMSC, the support for political conservatism is linked with different psychological needs: epistemic (openness to experience, need for cognitive closure, order, structure and cognition, tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty, cognitive complexity, cognitive rigidity, dogmatism) (Caprara et al., 2006; Gerber et al., 2011; Jost, 2006; Kruglanski et al., 2006; Osborne, Sibley, 2020; Roets, Van Hiel, 2006; Rokeach, 1960; Van Hiel, Onraet, De Pauw, 2010), existential (belief in a dangerous world, belief in a competitive world, fear of death, threat to the stability of the social system, anxiety, loss prevention, threat to the self-esteem, anger, and disgust) (Burke et al., 2013; Federico, Hunt, Ergun, 2009; Shook, Ford, Boggs, 2017) and relational needs (Jost, 2021). These psychological factors showed the stable effect in the different socio-political context despite of the specifics in content of political attitudes (Stankov, 2017).

However, researchers found contradicted tendencies in the effect of death reminders on political attitudes. In some studies, the reminders of death increased the support for conservatism, in others – pre-existing attitudes (both conservatism and liberalism) (Burke et al., 2013). The mentioned results induced the question about the effect of death reminders on political attitudes in different socio-cultural contexts.

Research problem

The research problem is defined through the contradictory results in the death reminders effect on political attitudes (Burke et al., 2013). To indicate the death reminders effect, researchers focused on the Terror Management Theory (TMT) (“cultural worldview” hypothesis) and Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition (CSMC) (“the

conservative shift” hypothesis) (Jost et al., 2003; Solomon et al., 1991). The “cultural worldview” hypothesis showed that the death reminders (pictures of destroyed buildings, dead people, funeral homes, news about terrorist attacks) reinforced pre-existing political attitudes: liberals tended to be more liberal, conservatives - more conservative (Burke et al., 2013). The “conservative shift” hypothesis posited that the death reminders enhanced the support of conservatism regardless of the pre-existing attitudes (Jost et al., 2003). The results of meta-analysis confirmed both hypotheses in different socio-political contexts, e.g., “conservative shift” ($r=.22$) and “cultural worldview” ($r=.35$) (Burke et al., 2013).

The contradictions in the results might be explained through specifics of the existential threat, e.g., collective and personal fear of death (Hirschberger et al., 2016). Previous studies showed that collective fear of death (war and terror attacks) enhanced the “conservative shift”, personal fear of death – “cultural worldview” (Burke et al., 2013). However, the mentioned assumptions were not analyzed in the framework of one experimental procedure (Burke et al., 2013). To shed light on the differences in the death reminders effect in the cross-cultural perspective, we conducted the study in the post-Soviet countries. At the same time, the differences in results might reflect the specifics of cultural context and the content of political attitudes (Burke et al., 2013). To analyze the universality of the death reminders effect, in the current study we focus on the political attitudes in different spheres of social life in the post-Soviet countries.

The aim of the study was to indicate the effect of death reminders on the attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries.

Object of the study - attitudes about ideal state.

Subject of study - the effect of death reminders on the attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries.

To analyze the mentioned aim, the following objectives were presented:

1. Analyze the structure and content of political attitudes.
2. Indicate the role of psychological factors in the political attitudes.
3. Analyze the effect of death reminders on political attitudes.

4. Develop the questionnaire of attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries.
5. Develop the plan for an experimental study to analyze the death reminders effect on the attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries.
6. Indicate the main spheres of social life and foundations of ideal state in the post-Soviet countries.
7. Examine the correlations between psychological factors and attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries.
8. Examine the effect of the personal and collective death reminders on the attitudes about the ideal state in the post-Soviet countries.
9. Analyze the mentioned results in the framework of the TMT and CMSC.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. The reminders of personal death enhanced the polarization of pre-existing attitudes about ideal state.

Hypothesis 2. The reminders of collective death enhanced the “conservative shift” in the attitudes about ideal state independently of pre-existing attitudes.

In the framework of the PhD theses, the following **research questions** were formulated:

1. What spheres of social life and principles of the “desirable” structure of the state are presented in the discourse?
2. What structure of attitudes about the ideal state represents in the post-Soviet countries?
3. What are the psychological foundations for the attitudes about ideal state?
4. Does the influence of the reminders of death on attitudes about the ideal state depend on the context?

The empirical foundation of the study consisted of 8614 participants, e.g., Russians (2818), Belarussians (1226), Kazakhstanis (1639), Uzbeks (1151), and Ukrainians (1781). Study 1 included 5 steps: analysis of the political programs, interview (110 participants: 20 Belarussians, 20 Ukrainians, 20 Uzbeks, 30 Russians, and 20 Kazakhstanis), verification of the developed statements about the ideal state (1234

Russians, 735 Uzbeks, 776 Kazakhstanis, 838 Ukrainians, 754 Belarussians), factor structure of questionnaire about ideal state (1641 participants: 610 Russians, 252 Belarussians, 299 Ukrainians, 225 Uzbeks, and 255 Kazakhstanis), and correlations between political attitudes and psychological factors (1280 participants: 466 Russians, 200 Belarussians, 219 Ukrainians, 171 Uzbeks, and 224 Kazakhstanis). In the Study 2 (the death reminders effect on the political attitudes), 365 Kazakhstanis, 475 Russians, and 406 Ukrainians took part.

Theoretical and methodological basis of the study

The theoretical and methodological foundations of the PhD theses consisted of the following studies:

- studies about the content and the structure of political attitudes in the post-Soviet (Malinova O.U, Shestopal E.B.) and foreign (Feldman J., Van Dijk E., Jost J.) contexts;
- studies about the individual psychological predictors of political attitudes and death reminders (“conservative shift”) in the framework of the CMSC (Jost J., Hunyady O, Napier J.L.);
- studies about the death reminders effect on political attitudes in the framework of the TMT (“cultural worldview”) (Greenberg J., Solomon S., Pyszczynski T.);
- studies about the features of socio-economic and political context in the post-Soviet countries (Golovnin M., Greenberg R., Haerpfer C., Kizilova K.).

Methods

In Study 1 the interview and the questionnaire methods were used. The author's questionnaire was used to indicate the attitudes about the ideal state (46 and 11 dichotomous statements) and measures of the right-wing authoritarianism (Chertkova et al., 2017; Altemeyer, 1998), need for cognitive closure (Roets, Van Hiel, 2011), openness to experience (John, Donahue, Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, Soto, 2008; Shebetenko, 2015), social dominance orientation (Gulevich, Agadullina, Huhlaev, 2018; Pratto et al., 1994), belief in a competitive world (Duckitt et al., 2002; Gulevich, Anikeenok, Bezmenova, 2014), belief in a dangerous world (Duckitt et al., 2002; Gulevich, Anikeenok, Bezmenova, 2014); self-placement on the ideological continuum (left-right, liberal-conservative). Study 2 included the experimental procedure with the following

questionnaires and techniques: the author's questionnaire of attitudes about the ideal state, the modified version of the mortality salience manipulation (Rosenblatt et al., 1989), word-completion task (Greenberg et al., 1994), PANAS (Osin, 2012), additional task, and vignettes with political programs.

Scientific novelty of the research

1. The questionnaire of attitudes about ideal state has been developed. In the post-Soviet countries, the structure of political attitudes consisted of political respect/control and state support/independence from state support.

2. The current research showed the correlations between psychological foundations and attitudes about the ideal state in the post-Soviet countries. We analyzed the relationship between attitudes about the ideal state (political respect/control and state support/independence from state support) and ideological predispositions (right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation), existential needs (belief in a dangerous world, belief in a competitive world), and epistemic needs (openness to experience and need for cognitive closure).

3. The research was oriented on the analysis of the death reminders on the attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet perspective. We analyzed the contradictions between the hypotheses of “cultural worldview” and “conservative shift” in line with threat specifics (collective and personal fear of death), foundations of political attitudes (political control/respect and state support/independence from state support) and countries (Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan).

4. The online procedure for the death reminders was adapted in the post-Soviet countries. Previous TMT studies were realized in the laboratories. In the pandemic situation, the experimental procedure was transferred into online version with additional restrictions for assessing the inclusion of participants and debriefing.

Theoretical significance

1. The research included the analysis of attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries considering the specifics of political and socio-cultural contexts.

2. The research showed the correlations between psychological factors (openness to experience, need for cognitive closure, social dominance orientation, right-

wing authoritarianism, and social beliefs) and attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries.

3. The research examined the effect of death reminders (hypotheses of “cultural worldview” and “conservative shift”) on attitudes towards the ideal state in the post-Soviet countries considering different types of threats.

Practical significance of the study

1. The questionnaire of attitudes about the ideal state might be used in the different post-Soviet countries to indicate political attitudes, preferences, and voting behavior.

2. The definition of the main predictors of political behavior (both personal and situational) might be useful in the development of political programs.

3. The current study allowed to indicate the role of different threats on the political attitudes that might reduce the fear of death.

4. Results of the study might be used in the education, e.g., courses in political and social psychology.

The reliability of the results was reached by the theoretical and methodological foundations of the study, the reliability of the questionnaires, the sufficient sample size to test hypotheses, and the adequacy of statistical methods. Data analysis was realized with the software packages SPSS 27.00 and R (R Studio). We used the procedures of correlational analysis, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, and multivariate linear modeling (MANOVA).

Thesis for defense:

1. Structure and content of political attitudes about desirable organization of the society in the post-Soviet countries showed the cultural specifics.

2. Attitudes about the ideal state linked with psychological factors that used in the international studies to indicate the political liberalism/conservatism or left/right views.

3. The reminders of death influenced on the attitudes about ideal state in the post-soviet countries and this effect depended on the specifics of the threat (personal fear of death and war).

Approbation of the research results

The results of the study were presented in the publications that were realized in the National Research University Higher School of Economics, School of Psychology (02.27.02), and discussed at the international conferences and scientific seminars «Culture matters».

Publications

Prusova I., Gulevich O. Terrorism news and Attitudes Toward Countries: The role of Mortality Salience and Intergroup Threat // Psychology in Russia: State of the Art. - 2021. – Vol.14. – № 2. – P.101–117. DOI: 10.11621/pir.2021.0207

Prusova I., Gulevich O. The effect of mortality salience on the attitudes toward state control: The case of Russia // International Journal of Psychology. – 2020. – Vol. 55. – №2. – P. 305–314. DOI: 10.1002/ijop.12571

Prusova I. S. Influence of the Fear of Death on the Notion of Ideal Politician // Psychology. Journal of Higher School of Economics. – 2015. – Vol. 12. – № 3. – P. 41–51.

Prusova I. S. Development a Measurement of Attitudes about Ideal State// Social Psychology and Society. – 2021. – Vol.12. – №3. – P. 103–127. DOI:10.17759/sps.2021120308.

Prusova I. S., Gulevich O. A. The Influence of Mortality Salience on Attitudes towards Other Countries: The Role of Right-Wing Authoritarianism // Psychology. Journal of Higher School of Economics. – 2020. – Vol. 17. – № 3. – P. 520–536. DOI: 10.17323/1813-8918-2020-3-520-536

Conferences

32nd International Congress of Psychology. 2021. Prague. Paper: The Role of System Justification in Attitudes Toward Gender Inequality.

32nd International Congress of Psychology. 2021. Prague. Paper: Political Attitudes in the Post-Soviet Countries.

25th International Congress of Cross-Cultural Psychology. 2021. Prague. Paper: System Justification and Intergroup Relations in the Post-Soviet context.

Virtual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology ISPP. 2021. Montreal. Paper: The effect of mortality salience on populist attitudes in Russia.

Virtual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology ISPP. 2020. Berlin. Paper: The effect of mortality salience on attitudes toward war.

Lomonosov. 2019. Moscow. Paper: The effect of death reminders on the attitudes toward national outgroups.

Annual Meeting of Society of Australian Social Psychologists. 2019. Sydney. Paper: The effect of mortality salience on attitudes towards national outgroups.

Annual scientific meeting ISPP (International Society of Political Psychologists). 2019. Lisbon. Paper: The Effect of Mortality Salience on Political Attitudes in Russia.

Annual scientific meeting ISPP (International Society of Political Psychologists). 2019. Lisbon. Paper: The Effect of Mortality Salience on Attitudes Toward National Outgroup.

Projects

1. Project «The psychological predictors of political attitudes in the post-Soviet countries» («Project Fair», NRU HSE, supervisor Prusova I.S.) was oriented on the analysis of political attitudes in the post-Soviet countries. During the project, participant analyzed the structure of political attitudes through cross-cultural perspective.

Volume and structure. PhD thesis included the introduction, two chapters, conclusion, references, and applications (1-9). The references consisted of 492 titles. The text of the dissertation contained 30 tables and 1 scheme.

Main Structure of the Thesis

Introduction consisted of research problem, aim, objectives, object, subject, hypotheses, theoretical and methodological foundations, research novelty, theoretical and practical significance, theses for defense, and approbation of the results through publications and conferences.

Chapter 1 of the dissertation presented a theoretical background. The chapter included the theoretical analysis of the nature and the structure of political attitudes in the international perspective, the role of individual psychological predictors, and the reminders of death.

Paragraph 1.1. considered the structure and the content of political attitudes. The ideological continuum ('left-right', 'liberalism-conservatism'), the content of political attitudes in different countries, social and economic bases of political attitudes, and specific 'independent' foundations were presented (Caprara et al., 2017; Jost, 2021; Kim, Kang, Yun, 2012; Roets, Au, Van Hiel, 2015).

Paragraph 1.1.1 indicated the universal scales for the measurement of political attitudes. Mostly, to evaluate political attitudes, researchers used the ideological continuum ('left/right', 'liberal/conservative') (Bobbio, 1996; Feldman, 2003). The mentioned categories were mostly used in the evaluations and classifications of political programs, ideologies, and views (Bobbio, 1996; Feldman, 2003). The numerous studies showed that the 'left-right' and 'liberal-conservative' dichotomies might be considered as the same categories (Jost et al., 2003). However, some studies showed the partial accordance between the ideological continuums. The inconsistency might be explained with specifics of discourse (Morgan, Skitka, Wisneski, 2014); support for the attitudes that out of the ideological continuum (Carmines, Ensley, Wagner, 2012); low level of interest (Otjes, 2018), specifics of political attitudes in different spheres of social life (Stimson, 2004).

Paragraph 1.1.2 showed the analysis of the 'liberalism/conservatism' and 'left/right' in the different cultural contexts. In the USA, researchers emphasized the cultural (social) foundation that reflected in the "multiculturalism", "premarital relations", "migrants", "church", "abortion", and "prostitution" (Henningham, 1996).

Further, Everett J. also indicated the economic foundation (“business”, “social benefits”, “ownership of weapons”, “taxation”) (Everett, 2013). In China political attitudes were considered through the perspective of different spheres, e.g., political (“multiparty system”, “individual rights from state intervention”), socio-economic (“protectionism”, “state ownership”, “price setting”), and national (“attitudes toward West”, “nationalism”, “cultural sovereignty”) (Pan, Xu, 2018). In the Central Asia the political attitudes were analyzed through categories of “justice”, “redistribution policy”, and “the role of the state” (Ergashev, Seitov, 2016). In Armenia researchers used such foundations as “responsibility of the state/person for social well-being”, “equal distribution of wealth/priority of individual achievements”, “state/private property”, “competition is bad/good” (Mkrtichyan, Vermishyan, Balasanyan, 2016). In Hungary, political attitudes were considered through categories “conventionalism”, “socialist conservatism”, “right-wing conservatism”, and “libertarianism” (Enyedi, Todosijević, 2003).

Paragraph 1.1.3 considered the political attitudes through social and economic foundations (Crawford, 2017). In the historical perspective, the suggestion of two foundations represented in the Dual Process Model of Ideology that defined the different motivational bases (belief in a dangerous and belief in a competitive world) in the support for “social” (right-wing authoritarianism) and “economic” (social dominance orientation) aspects (Duckitt et al., 2002). Numerous studies showed the associations between the right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and political conservatism (Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund, 2017; Choma, Hanoch, 2017; Crawford, Pilanski, 2014). However, in the different spheres the mentioned categories demonstrated the contradictory results and analyzed as independent constructs (Beattie, Chen, Bettache, 2022; Federico, Malka, 2018). The analysis of the “social” and “economic” foundations in the structure of political attitudes considered in the CMSC (Jost et al., 2003). Conservatives/rightists support for the “status quo” and the existing “inequality”, whereas liberals/leftists – “changes” and “equality” (Jost et al., 2003). Studies in the post-Soviet countries demonstrated the ambiguous results because of differences in the content of the status quo (Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund, 2017; Thorisdottir et al., 2007).

Paragraph 1.1.4 showed the analysis of political attitudes through independent foundations (Kerlinger, 1984). Liberalism and conservatism linked with different functions and needs. Conservatism linked with nationalism, support for religious and cultural traditions, ingroup loyalty, and protections of intergroup boundaries (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Liberalism linked with the priority to civil liberties, social and economic equality (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). To indicate the independent foundations in the political attitudes, researchers focused on the values (Theory of Basic Human Values and Moral Foundations Theory) (Caprara et al., 2006; Caprara, Zimbardo, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2010). The Theory of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2010) illustrates the differences between the leftists and rightists: the leftists support values of universalism, benevolence, self-direction, and stimulation; the rightist expressed the values of conformity, traditions, security, power, and achievement (Caprara et al., 2006; Hoffman, 2000; Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2010). In line with the Moral Foundations Theory, “individualizing” foundations (care, fairness) were positively associated with liberalism, “binding” (loyalty, authority, and purity) - with conservatism (Graham, Haidt, Nosek, 2009; Wright, Baril, 2011). However, the current tendencies might not be represented in the post-Soviet countries (Piurko et al., 2011).

Paragraph 1.2 included the information about the role of the psychological factors in the support for political attitudes. Previous studies indicated the strong correlations between political attitudes and psychological foundations in the different socio-cultural contexts in the framework of the CMSC (Jost, Sterling, Stern, 2018; Jost et al., 2017; Sterling, Jost, Pennycook, 2016). Besides the individual psychological predispositions, in this paragraph the effect of death reminders was analyzed, e.g., “conservative shift” (CMSC) and “cultural worldview” (TMT) (Burke et al., 2013). The results of meta-analysis showed that both hypotheses were confirmed: “conservative shift” ($r=.22$) and “cultural worldview” ($r=.35$) (Burke et al., 2013).

Paragraph 1.2.1 presented the theory of Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition (hypothesis of “conservative shift”) (Jost et al., 2003). The CMSC posits that political conservatism is a set of attitudes including the “maintenance of the status-quo” and “hierarchy”. The preference of political conservatism is induced by the epistemic

needs (openness to experience, tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty, dogmatism, cognitive rigidity, cognitive complexity, need in cognition, structure, order, and cognitive closure) (Caprara et al., 2006; Gerber et al., 2011; Jost, 2006; Kruglanski et al., 2006; Osborne, Sibley, 2020; Roets, Van Hiel, 2006; Rokeach, 1960; Van Hiel et al., 2010), the existential needs (belief in a dangerous world, belief in a competitive world, fear of death, threat to the stability of the social system, threat to the self-esteem, anger, anxiety, disgust, loss prevention) (Burke et al., 2013; Federico et al., 2009; Shook et al., 2017), and relational needs (Jost, 2021). Despite of numerous factors, the relatively stable predictors of political attitudes are openness to experience and need for cognitive closure (epistemic needs), belief in a dangerous world and belief in a competitive world (existential needs). In line with CMSC, the effect of the death reminders is defined through hypothesis of “conservative shift” (Jost et al., 2003). Political conservatism might be considered as a universal defense that reflected in the tendency to support the familiar things to reduce the risk from potential threats and uncertainty (Jost, 2017). Therefore, under the threat or uncertainty people tended to demonstrate the “conservative shift” independently of pre-existing attitudes, e.g., support for the right politics and politicians, control, and nationalism (Jost, 2021; Nail et al., 2009).

Paragraph 1.2.2 presented the TMT (hypothesis of “cultural worldview”). Results showed that the death reminders might induce both “conservative” and “liberal” shifts. TMT posits that the death reminders actualize two defense mechanisms, e.g., the proximal and distal. The proximal defense transforms the conscious information about death into unconscious form through the rationalization and deny (Greenberg et al., 1994). Thereafter, the distal defense is activated through self-esteem and cultural worldview (Greenberg et al., 2001). TMT defines the self-esteem as an individual version of the cultural worldview (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). The results showed that the death reminders enhanced the self-esteem in contrast to neutral condition (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Cultural worldview proposes the predictable structure of the world with traditions, norms, and standards (Greenberg et al., 1992). In line with the “cultural worldview” hypothesis the death reminders enhance the motivation to maintain the cultural worldview and self-esteem. The current hypothesis was confirmed in different contexts and spheres

(political attitudes, support for political leaders, nationalism, religion, pro-ecological attitudes, punishment for offence, and militarism) (Burke et al., 2013). In line with “cultural worldview” hypothesis, people tended to demonstrate the favorable attitudes towards those who support the similar views and negative towards those with opposite views (Greenberg et al., 1992; Pyszczynski et al., 2006). However, the polarization effect appeared only for significant categories (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). In the political sphere the death reminders led to polarization of pre-existing attitudes, e.g., liberals tended to be more liberal, whereas conservatives – more conservative (Burke et al., 2013).

In **Paragraph 1.2.3** the TMT (“cultural worldview”) and CMSC (“conservative shift”) were compared (Anson et al., 2009). To shed light on the contradictory results researchers focused on the measurement of political conservatism and specifics of threats (Anson et al., 2009; Hirschberger et al., 2016). The death reminders show the complex construct that may be defined through the real threat (personal and collective) and the “cultural worldview” threat (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, 1997; Hirschberger et al., 2016). Moreover, the inconsistency in results might be linked with the content of threats (“liberal”, “conservative”) and the level of threats (personal and collective) (Hirschberger et al., 2016). Previous studies demonstrated that the personal fear of death linked with the hypothesis of “cultural worldview”, whereas collective – with “conservative shift”. However, some studies showed that the collective fear of death might induce both the “conservative shift” and “cultural worldview” (Burke et al., 2013).

At the same time, the contradictions in results might be associated with differences in the definition and measurement of political conservatism. Besides ideological continuum, researchers also used the categories of prejudices, support for politicians, ingroup favoritism, independent analysis of social and conservative foundations, and actual agenda (Brandt et al., 2014; Greenberg et al., 1990; Jost et al., 2003; Malka et al., 2014; Nail et al., 2009).

Paragraph 1.3 showed the features of the socio-political and economic context in the post-Soviet countries. The post-Soviet space is a combination of the Soviet past in the cultural, institutional, economic, political spheres and results of the collapse (Letnyakov,

2018). In the historical perspective, the consequence of the transition is reflected in the differences of the economic, political, and social development.

Paragraph 1.3.1 demonstrated the features of the social policy in the post-Soviet countries. In the post-Soviet context, the priority of the egalitarianism and state support has been noted in the areas of education and healthcare (Habibov, 2013). Through Social Progress Index, the post-Soviet countries were included in 4 clusters out of 6 (from 2 to 5 in the world ranking): in the second cluster - Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia; in the third - Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan; in the fourth - Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and in the fifth - Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (Social Progress Index, 2022). In the post-Soviet countries, the high level of poverty (Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan) and social inequality (Russia) were indicated (World Bank Dataset, 2022).

Paragraph 1.3.2 showed the features of economic development (GDP, Economic Freedom Index) in the post-Soviet countries. The Baltic countries, Russia, and Kazakhstan illustrated the high positions in GDP, while Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan – the lowest one (World Bank Dataset, 2022). Through Economic Freedom Index, the post-Soviet countries might be divided into the following categories: countries with relatively low rates - Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia; countries with relatively high rates - Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia (Economic Freedom Index, 2022).

Paragraph 1.3.3 emphasized the features of political sphere in the post-Soviet countries. The forms of government (parliamentary, presidential, and mixed), the features of the ideological foundations in the discourse, and the Democracy Index were presented. The transition to pluralism of ideas and a wide range of political parties in the post-Soviet context led to the problem of “partial ideologies” and mutually exclusive “ideological” positions in the political programs (Malinova, 2007). Through Democracy Index the post-Soviet countries were divided into the following groups: countries with deliberative democracy (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), hybrid regime (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,

Georgia, Ukraine), and authoritarianism (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia) (Democracy Index, 2021).

Paragraph 1.3.4 showed the features of international politics in the post-Soviet countries. In the political discourse, the orientation towards the ‘preservation’ of cultural distinctiveness and integration processes were presented. Orientation towards cultural distinctiveness reflected in the strengthening of the national language, positive image of the country, and protectionism (Lombardozzi, 2019). In the post-Soviet countries, the different positions in the issue of integration (EU, NATO or CIS, CSTO) were indicated. The mentioned foundations were represented in the political discourse (Pantin, 2022).

In the **Conclusion** for theoretical background the main points about the structure and content of political attitudes, the role of psychological foundations, and death reminders were presented (hypotheses of “conservative shift” and “cultural worldview”).

In the **Chapter 2** the results of two studies were presented that included the procedure of the study, methods, sample, results, and discussion.

Study 1 examined the structure of attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries and psychological factors. The current study included 5 independent steps.

Step 1 showed the analysis of political programs in 5 countries: Uzbekistan (5), Belarus (15), Russia (53), Kazakhstan (6), and Ukraine (41). **Procedure** included the information about the specifics of analysis, e.g., definition of spheres that were represented in programs, analysis of frequencies. **Results** indicated the high representatives of social policy, healthcare, education, economics, industry, agriculture, army and police, culture, science, sports, media, housing and communal services, ecology, public administration, and foreign policy. The analysis allowed to define the categories of political control/freedom (role of state in the socio-political and economic questions), governmental support for everyone/only for those who need (redistribution policy), military/peaceful politics, and orientation towards foreign experience/national politics. In the section **Discussion** the main spheres, structure of state, and political discourse were considered.

Step 2 included the interviews about the ideal state in the post-Soviet countries. The aim of the Step 2 was to indicate the main spheres of social life and foundations of

the ideal state. **Sample** included the information about 110 participants from Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus. **Procedure** consisted of the interview guide (6 questions). In the **Results**, the main categories were indicated and, thereafter, the frequencies were calculated. Results showed that people focused on the social politics, healthcare, public administration, police, agriculture, ecology, media, economy, industry, culture, education, international politics, sports, housing and communal services, army, and science. In the current research we defined such foundations as governmental control/freedom (the role of the state in the different spheres of social life), centralization/decentralization (the redistribution politics), state/private ownership (specifics of economic system), unification/diversity (different positions in discourse), state support/independence from state support (socio-economic well-being through state support or self-activity), national policy/foreign experience (orientation to preserve one's cultural experience or foreign experience), militarism/peace-making policy (international relations). In **Discussion** the main spheres of social life and the structure of ideal state were analyzed in accordance with political discourse and limitations.

Step 3 oriented on the verification of the developed statements (279) about the ideal state through the series of online surveys. **Sample** consisted of the information about 4337 participants from Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. **Procedure** included the information about items and evaluation (“clarity”, “importance”, and “agreement”). In **Results** the strategy for selecting items was presented, e.g., criteria of “importance” and “clarity” ($M > 5$) and variance of responses in the “agreement”. The final version of the questionnaire included 46 dichotomous items. **Discussion** indicated the structure of political attitudes in the post-Soviet context.

Step 4 presented the analysis of 6-factor (political control/respect, peaceful/military politics, state/private ownership, state support/independence from state support, unification/diversity, and centralization/decentralization) structure of attitudes about ideal state. **Sample** included the information about 1641 participants from Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. **Procedure** and **Methods** consisted of the information about the order and content of the questionnaires, e.g., attitudes about ideal state and socio-demographic characteristics. **Results** included the information about the

confirmatory and exploratory factor analysis and reliability analysis. Results showed the poor fit of the 6-factor model. **Discussion** indicated the main positions about the structure of political attitudes in the post-Soviet countries.

Step 5 showed the analysis of 2-factor structure of attitudes about ideal state, and correlational analysis between psychological predictors and attitudes about ideal state. **Sample** illustrated the information about 1280 participants from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. **Procedure** and **Methods** included the information about the order and content of measures. Participants completed the questionnaires of right-wing authoritarianism (Chertkova et al., 2017), social dominance orientation (Gulevich et al., 2018), need for cognitive closure (Roets, Van Hiel, 2011), openness to experience (Shebetenko, 2015), social beliefs (belief in a dangerous worldview, belief in a competitive worldview) (Gulevich et al., 2014), attitudes about ideal state, self-placement on the ideological continuum ('left-right', 'conservative-liberal'). **Results** consisted of the information about the confirmatory factor analysis, the analysis of invariance, and the correlational analysis. The results showed that the 2-factor structure of attitudes about ideal state was represented only in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Thus, the correlational analysis with psychological foundations was conducted for the mentioned countries. The results of the correlational analysis were presented in the Table 1. Political respect was positively associated with openness to experience (Ukraine), income (Russia), but negatively with right-wing authoritarianism (Russia), belief in a dangerous world (Kazakhstan), and social dominance orientation (Ukraine). The independence from state support was positively associated with belief in a competitive world (Kazakhstan, Ukraine), need for a cognitive closure (Russia, Ukraine), income (Ukraine), but negatively with age (Kazakhstan). **Discussion** consisted of the main points about the structure of political attitudes and psychological factors.

Table 1. Psychological factors and attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries

| № | Factors | M | SD | α | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
|------------|-------------------------------|-------|--------|----------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|---------|-------|----|
| Russia | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Political control/respect | 4.12 | 1.61 | .778 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | State support/independence | 3.99 | 1.46 | .891 | -.380*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | Liberalism/Conservatism | 4.03 | 1.64 | | -.162*** | .066 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | Left/Right | 3.56 | 1.63 | | .090 | .090 | .155*** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | Right-Wing Authoritarianism | 3.93 | 1.19 | .897 | -.123** | .080 | .463*** | .054 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Belief in a dangerous world | 4.35 | 1.21 | .845 | -.059 | .042 | -.002 | -.056 | .183*** | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | Belief in a competitive world | 3.41 | 1.10 | .821 | .059 | .019 | -.048 | .162*** | .112* | .228*** | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | Need for Cognitive Closure | 3.73 | 0.69 | .793 | -.055 | .091* | .220*** | -.011 | .359*** | .372*** | .037 | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Openness to experience | 3.30 | 0.55 | .767 | .065 | -.013 | -.096* | -.017 | .073 | .174*** | .030 | .021 | | | | | | |
| 10 | SDO | 2.95 | 0.94 | .846 | -.054 | .076 | .080 | .286*** | .061 | -.092* | .356*** | -.131** | -.175*** | | | | | |
| 11 | Age | 35.80 | 11.10 | | -.032 | .018 | .272*** | -.132** | .248*** | -.068 | -.130** | .207*** | -.021 | -.118* | | | | |
| 12 | Education | 3.23 | 0.93 | | -.012 | .008 | -.003 | .056 | -.030 | -.065 | -.014 | .029 | .036 | .030 | .172*** | | | |
| 13 | Income | 3.18 | 0.95 | | .096* | -.014 | .005 | .181*** | .048 | -.113* | .147** | -.007 | .033 | .100* | -.125** | .110* | | |
| 14 | Gender | | | | -.067 | .088 | -.129** | -.037 | -.034 | .004 | -.167*** | .052 | .024 | -.191*** | -.021 | .192*** | -.039 | |
| Ukraine | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Political control/respect | 4.49 | 1.61 | .785 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | State support/independence | 3.71 | 1.68 | .912 | -.308*** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | Liberalism/Conservatism | 3.42 | 1.74 | | .085 | .050 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | Left/Right | 3.22 | 1.78 | | .022 | .114 | .264*** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | Right-Wing Authoritarianism | 3.79 | 1.03 | .833 | -.103 | .099 | .266*** | .022 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Belief in a dangerous world | 4.61 | 1.37 | .880 | .133 | -.011 | -.036 | .167* | .202** | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | Belief in a competitive world | 3.28 | 1.08 | .780 | -.037 | .134* | .142* | .111 | .258*** | .150* | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | Need for Cognitive Closure | 3.69 | 0.59 | .763 | .068 | .136* | .137* | -.051 | .276*** | .281*** | .136* | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Openness to experience | 3.39 | 0.58 | .782 | .161* | .004 | -.030 | -.004 | .066 | .135* | -.064 | -.015 | | | | | | |
| 10 | SDO | 2.90 | 0.89 | .730 | -.141* | .045 | .223*** | .220** | .138* | -.158* | .361*** | -.019 | -.170* | | | | | |
| 11 | Age | 36.27 | 11.345 | | .041 | -.086 | .080 | -.045 | .019 | .022 | -.199** | .069 | .037 | -.115 | | | | |
| 12 | Education | 3.31 | 0.88 | | .016 | -.059 | -.012 | -.030 | -.103 | .004 | -.043 | .101 | -.011 | .012 | .082 | | | |
| 13 | Income | 3.09 | 0.92 | | .045 | .152* | .059 | .207** | .060 | -.040 | .182** | .058 | .162* | .140* | -.154* | -.011 | | |
| 14 | Gender | | | | .000 | .100 | .099 | -.013 | .091 | .030 | .061 | .059 | .020 | -.051 | -.229*** | .065 | .085 | |
| Kazakhstan | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Political control/respect | 3.82 | 1.64 | .800 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | State support/independence | 4.13 | 1.55 | .903 | -.444** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | Liberalism/Conservatism | 3.50 | 1.70 | | .226** | -.083 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | Left/Right | 3.44 | 1.76 | | .018 | .088 | .196** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | Right-Wing Authoritarianism | 3.99 | 1.00 | .844 | .051 | -.097 | .221** | .000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Belief in a dangerous world | 4.23 | 1.36 | .878 | -.131* | .118 | .021 | -.097 | .078 | -- | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | Belief in a competitive world | 3.45 | 1.18 | .812 | .031 | .136* | -.089 | .070 | -.039 | .155* | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | Need for Cognitive Closure | 3.61 | 0.58 | .700 | .086 | .040 | .099 | .070 | .258** | .131* | .030 | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Openness to experience | 3.33 | 0.49 | .708 | -.041 | .067 | -.032 | -.146* | .081 | -.014 | -.039 | -.081 | | | | | | |
| 10 | SDO | 2.76 | 0.94 | .785 | .034 | .107 | .097 | .238** | -.015 | -.079 | .299** | -.002 | -.243** | | | | | |
| 11 | Age | 30.49 | 10.11 | | .070 | -.189** | .288** | .112 | .185** | -.090 | -.237** | .182** | -.085 | .033 | | | | |
| 12 | Education | 3.14 | 0.96 | | .007 | .046 | .099 | .036 | .015 | -.082 | .021 | .128 | -.013 | .091 | .306** | | | |
| 13 | Income | 3.29 | 1.03 | | .073 | -.042 | -.067 | .047 | -.050 | -.059 | .094 | -.140* | .112 | .013 | -.139* | .040 | | |
| 14 | Gender | | | | .048 | .071 | -.091 | -.162* | .008 | -.086 | -.281** | .062 | .021 | -.126 | .021 | .115 | -.019 | |

Study 2 examined the effect of death reminders on the attitudes about ideal state in the post-Soviet countries. The online version of the experiment was conducted in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia. **Sample** included the information about participants: Ukraine (406), Kazakhstan (365), and Russia (475). In the **Procedure** the information about the order of stimuli and questionnaires were presented. During the experimental procedure, participants completed the questionnaire of attitudes about ideal state that allowed to divide participants into groups with high and low points from subscales: those who support political control/respect and state support/independence from state support. Then participants were randomly answered for two open-ended questions: group 1 (dental treatment), group 2 (reminders of personal death), and group 3 (reminders of war) (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Thereafter, participants completed two questionnaires (word-completion task (Greenberg et al., 1994) and PANAS (Osin, 2012)), additional task (puzzles), and evaluated the level of preference and willingness to support the political candidates with different programs (political respect/control and state support/independence from state support). In the **Results**, the manipulation check and main analysis were presented. The results showed the main effect of death reminders, and the interaction between pre-existing attitudes, the reminders of death, and country (Table 2 and 3). The reminders of personal death enhanced the shift toward political control in the preference of political candidate with political control/respect program among supporters of political control. The reminders of collective death (war) enhanced the shift towards political control in the preference of political candidate with political control/respect program among supporters of political respect. However, the effect of death reminders might be considered as culturally specific. In Kazakhstan the reminders of death led to the “conservative shift” in the political foundation (political control/respect) ($F(2, 362) = 5.50, p = .004, \eta^2 = .029$), while in Ukraine - “liberal shift” in the economic foundation (state support/independence) ($F(2, 403) = 7.36, p = .001, \eta^2 = .067$).

Table 2. The effect of death reminders on the preference and readiness to support for political candidate with political control/respect program

| Independent variable | Dependent variable | SS | df | MS | F | p | η^2 |
|--|--------------------|---------|------|--------|-------|------|----------|
| Country | Preference | 8.54 | 2 | 4.27 | 1.61 | .201 | .003 |
| | Support | 3.75 | 2 | 1.88 | 0.68 | .508 | .001 |
| Reminders of death | Preference | 23.09 | 2 | 11.55 | 4.34 | .013 | .007 |
| | Support | 14.25 | 2 | 7.12 | 2.57 | .077 | .004 |
| Political control/respect | Preference | 122.43 | 1 | 122.43 | 46.06 | .000 | .036 |
| | Support | 105.70 | 1 | 105.70 | 38.15 | .000 | .030 |
| Country * Reminders of death | Preference | 33.14 | 4 | 8.28 | 3.12 | .015 | .010 |
| | Support | 13.47 | 4 | 3.37 | 1.22 | .302 | .004 |
| Country * Political control/respect | Preference | 21.33 | 2 | 10.66 | 4.01 | .018 | .006 |
| | Support | 31.66 | 2 | 15.83 | 5.71 | .003 | .009 |
| Reminders of death * Political control/respect | Preference | 27.95 | 2 | 13.98 | 5.26 | .005 | .008 |
| | Support | 13.33 | 2 | 6.66 | 2.41 | .091 | .004 |
| Country * Reminders of death * Political control/respect | Preference | 7.47 | 4 | 1.87 | 0.70 | .590 | .002 |
| | Support | 23.80 | 4 | 5.95 | 2.14 | .073 | .007 |
| Error | Preference | 3264.20 | 1228 | 2.66 | | | |
| | Support | 3402.12 | 1228 | 2.77 | | | |

Table 3. The effect of death reminders on the preference and readiness to support for political candidates with state support/independence program

| Independent variable | Dependent variable | SS | df | MS | F | p | η^2 |
|---|--------------------|---------|------|--------|-------|------|----------|
| Country | Preference | 357.55 | 2 | 178.77 | 52.41 | .000 | .079 |
| | Support | 455.71 | 2 | 227.86 | 68.86 | .000 | .101 |
| Reminders of death | Preference | 7.34 | 2 | 3.67 | 1.08 | .341 | .002 |
| | Support | 2.25 | 2 | 1.13 | 0.34 | .712 | .001 |
| State support/independence | Preference | 15.07 | 1 | 15.07 | 4.42 | .036 | .004 |
| | Support | 27.64 | 1 | 27.64 | 8.35 | .004 | .007 |
| Country * Reminders of death | Preference | 20.24 | 4 | 5.06 | 1.48 | .205 | .005 |
| | Support | 20.65 | 4 | 5.16 | 1.56 | .183 | .005 |
| Country * State support/independence | Preference | 23.99 | 2 | 12.00 | 3.52 | .030 | .006 |
| | Support | 12.94 | 2 | 6.47 | 1.96 | .142 | .003 |
| Reminders of death * State support/independence | Preference | 2.47 | 2 | 1.24 | 0.36 | .696 | .001 |
| | Support | 13.92 | 2 | 6.96 | 2.10 | .122 | .003 |
| Country * Reminders of death * State support/independence | Preference | 23.86 | 4 | 5.97 | 1.75 | .137 | .006 |
| | Support | 31.89 | 4 | 7.97 | 2.41 | .048 | .008 |
| Error | Preference | 4188.50 | 1228 | 3.41 | | | |
| | Support | 4063.56 | 1228 | 3.31 | | | |

Discussion included the information about the death reminders through perspective of TMT, CMSC, collective and personal fear of death, orientation towards control, “cultural worldview”, and potential limitations.

Conclusion included the main points about the conducted research.

1. Political attitudes as a part of cultural worldview are defined as a set of views about the “desirable” structure of society and means to achieve it (Jost et al., 2003). In the international studies to measure political attitudes researchers used the ideological continuum (‘left-right’, ‘liberal-conservative’). The limitation of this measurement is linked with contradicted preferences in different spheres of social life (social and economic) (Stimson, 2004). Nowadays researchers analyze the political attitudes as a multidimensional construct (Jost et al., 2003; Malka et al., 2014).

2. The political dichotomy conservatism/liberalism was not represented in the post-Soviet countries (Caprara et al., 2017). To analyze political attitudes in the current research, the category of “ideal state” was used (Shestopal, 2018). In the current study the structure of attitudes about ideal state included the political respect/control (the role of the state in the political decisions) and state support/independence from the state support (support from the state or autonomy in the socio-economic issues). The current structure was represented in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

3. Attitudes about ideal state linked with psychological factors in the post-Soviet countries (Feldman, 2013; Jost, 2019). Attitudes towards political control/respect and state support/independence from state support were associated with epistemic needs (openness to experience, need for cognitive closure), existential needs (belief in a dangerous and belief in a competitive worldview), and ideological predispositions (right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation).

4. The reminders of death influenced on the attitudes about ideal state. Previous studies showed that the death reminders led to “cultural worldview” in framework of TMT, whereas in CMSC – “conservative shift” (Burke et al., 2013). The differences in hypotheses might be linked with the specifics of threats, e.g., the collective threat (reminders of war, terrorism) led to the “conservative shift”, the personal fear of death – “cultural worldview” (Jost et al., 2017; Landau et al., 2004).

5. The results of the current research indicated the effect of the death reminders on the attitudes about ideal state in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The reminders of the personal death led to the enhancement of political control among those who support the political control, whereas reminders of the collective death – towards political control among supporters of political respect. However, the effect of death reminders was varied in the cultural contexts that might reflect the differences in actual agenda (political or economic) in the mentioned countries.

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