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Магистратура 2018/2019

Микроэкономика II (продвинутый уровень)

Статус: Курс обязательный (Финансовая экономика)
Направление: 38.04.01. Экономика
Когда читается: 1-й курс, 2 семестр
Формат изучения: без онлайн-курса
Прогр. обучения: Финансовая экономика
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 5

Course Syllabus

Abstract

This course consists of four parts: game theory, contract theory, mechanism design, and social choice theory. Game-theoretical part covers static and dynamic games, both of complete and incomplete information. All other parts use tools introduced here. Theory of contracts focuses on the principal-agent models with asymmetric information and unobservable actions. As examples of mechanism design problems, we cover auctions and two-sided matching. We end the course by social choice theory that studies preference aggregation rules and their normative appeal.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • teach to design mechanisms taking into account the asymmetry of information;
  • enable students to apply game-theoretic concepts to carry out theoretical research
  • identify and model real life situations where the studied concepts are applicable
  • critically evaluate theoretical research in economics
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Outline the fundamental principles of strategic reasoning
  • Predict the equilibrium outcomes among agents with strategic power
  • Evaluate the impact of information asymmetries on strategic reasoning and equilibrium outcomes
  • Explain the role of time and observation of the opponents' moves in dynamic strategic interaction
  • Predict the long term outcomes of repeated strategic interaction
  • Evaluate the role of communication in determining economic outcomes
  • Outline the main tradeoffs in models with adverse selection and moral hazard
  • Apply deferred acceptance algorithm to one-to-one matching problems
  • Be able to discuss properties of different social choice functions
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Game theory
    Dominance and rationalizability Nash equilibrium Incomplete information games Dynamic games Repeated games Cheap-talk, signaling, persuasion games
  • Contract Theory
    a. hidden information: screening b. hidden action: moral hazard
  • Matching theory
    a. deferred acceptance algorithm b. lattice structure of stable matchings c. strategy-proofness: impossibility result
  • Social choice theory
    a. Arrow impossibility theorem b. restricted domain: single-peaked preferences and median voter theorem
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • blocking exam
  • non-blocking intermediate test 1
  • non-blocking intermediate test 2
  • non-blocking homeworks
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (2 semester)
    0.5 * exam + 0.1 * homeworks + 0.2 * intermediate test 1 + 0.2 * intermediate test 2
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Contract theory, Bolton P., Dewatripont M., 2005
  • Martin J Osborne, & Ariel Rubinstein. (2009). A Course in Game Theory. Levine’s Bibliography. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.cla.levrem.814577000000000225
  • Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oxp.obooks.9780195102680
  • Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1992). Two-Sided Matching. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.cup.cbooks.9780521437882

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Mathematics for economists, Simon C. P., Blume L., 1994