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Бакалавриат 2019/2020

Экономика отраслевых рынков

Направление: 38.03.01. Экономика
Когда читается: 4-й курс, 1-4 модуль
Формат изучения: Full time
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 10

Course Syllabus


Industrial Economics, or Industrial Organization (IO), is the area of economics that studies firms and their interaction. During the course we will study firms and markets as institutions, the state of competition, the strategic interaction among firms, the industrial policy and decisions companies make within the market environment. IO is a course in applied economics theory. Topics include imperfect competition, contracts, price discrimination, and intellectual property rights. Pre-requisites: The course requires knowledge of intermediate microeconomics theory, basic econometrics, and calculus. Third-year game theory is a plus in understanding the material
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • to expand the students’ knowledge in the field of microeconomic theory and develop skills for applying microeconomic concepts to different market structures;
  • to provide students with knowledge of how real businesses operate and interact ;
  • to prepare students for graduate studies in economics and finance.
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Explain and use simple models of third-degree price discrimination, use two-part tariff and tie-in sales as a form of second-degree price discrimination
  • Use the models of a vertical relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer, be able to evaluate various efficiency arguments for vertical restraints
  • explain the notions of exogenous and endogenous sunk cost industries
  • analyze the determinants of market structure
  • compare the theory of market structure with the S–C–P paradigm
  • outline the rationale for competition policy and for industrial policy towards R&D
  • explain the difficulties and dilemmas in competition policy with respect to mergers, restrictive agreements, and abuses of market power
  • assess different ways of regulating a firm under symmetric information and under asymmetric information, evaluate the implications of a dynamic analysis of regulation.
  • evaluate direct and indirect network effects and their impact on parties involved, explain path dependence and conditions under which networks may fail
  • explain the difference between markets and platforms, effect of information and externalities in the case of platforms; analyze Rochet & Tirole (2004) model.
  • Analyse bilateral bargaining issues
  • Analyze the impact of asymmetric information with one owner and one manager
  • Analyse exogenous cost markets
  • Analyse both simultaneous move and sequential move games
  • Explain Bertrand and Cournot competition in general contexts
  • Outline the relationship between Bertrand and Cournot with endogenous capacities
  • Determine conditions under which collusion is profitable
  • Explain dynamic competition between incumbent firms and new entrants
  • Be able to analyze Hoteling model
  • Explain competition in product quality broadly defined
  • Explain how repeated interaction can lead to monopolistic outcomes
  • List the sources of market power
  • Outline the problem of firm control under asymmetric information
  • Explain the purpose of a firm, from both a technological and transaction cost perspective
  • Assess empirical results on collusion
  • Analyse monopolistic competition in simplified settings
  • Asses the role of search costs in undermining competition and leading to price dispersion
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • The Firm
  • Separation of Ownership and Control
  • Principal Agent Problem
  • Market Structure and Market Power
  • Strategic Interaction
  • Short-Run Price Competition
  • The Bertrand Paradox
  • Dynamic Price Competition
  • Entry Deterence, Predation
  • Product Differentiation: Non-Price Competition
  • Production Differentiation: Price Competition
  • Diamond Paradox and Price Dispersion
  • Price discrimination
  • Vertical relations
  • The determinants of market structure
  • Competition and industrial policy
  • Regulation
  • Networks
  • Platforms and e-markets
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking written home assignments
  • non-blocking midterm test in the middle of Fall semester
  • non-blocking exam at the end of the Fall semester
  • non-blocking midterm test in the middle of the Spring semester
  • non-blocking final exam by the end of the Spring semester
  • non-blocking UoL exam
    not counted to the final course grade
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (4 module)
    0.15 * exam at the end of the Fall semester + 0.4 * final exam by the end of the Spring semester + 0.15 * midterm test in the middle of Fall semester + 0.15 * midterm test in the middle of the Spring semester + 0.15 * written home assignments


Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=nlebk&AN=11386

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Porter, R., & Armstrong, M. (2007). Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: North Holland. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=207251