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Магистратура 2019/2020

Экономика общественного сектора

Статус: Курс по выбору (Менеджмент в СМИ)
Направление: 42.04.05. Медиакоммуникации
Когда читается: 2-й курс, 2 модуль
Формат изучения: MOOC
Прогр. обучения: Менеджмент в СМИ
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 3

Course Syllabus

Abstract

This course offers an introduction into the public economics theory. It does not aspire to cover theories of taxation, public expenditures, regulation etc. at length and in-depth. Rather, our ambition is to give a bird's-eye view of central themes of public economics and related disciplines, and teach concepts, logic, and ideas, rather than methods of analysis, which would require an entirely different course format. Our choice of topics covered by the course reflects a trade-off between salience and centrality, on the one hand, and suitability for a brief online introductory course, on the other. The course content is neither comprehensive (which would be a "mission impossible" for virtually any public economics course"), nor representative of other such courses. With these limitations and caveats in mind, we encourage our students to continue their public economics studies in a more regular fashion, and see our role inter alia in motivating interest in such "continued education".
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • Our ambition is to give a bird's-eye view of central themes of public economics and related disciplines, and teach concepts, logic, and ideas, rather than methods of analysis, which would require an entirely different course format.
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Able to Understand central themes of public economics
  • Able to Discuss main concepts, logic, and ideas of public economics
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Government in a Market Economy
    The discussion on reasons calling for government presence in market economies. Key advantages of markets over governments which make privately taken decisions highly efficient in the absence of externalities. Market mechanism. Inefficient outcomes. Possible solutions to inefficiency. Coasean agreements or public coercion (governements) and their discuss conditions, advantages, and disadvantages related to these solutions.
  • Design of Government: A Tax Theory Primer
    This lecture covers the positive and normative theories of taxation, ways and means to collect public revenues, and existing informational, administrative, political constraints governments have to deal with. We consider lump sum tax as first best option which implementation in practice, unfortunately, is severely restricted by informational asymmetry. Then follows a cursory introduction into one of the most beautiful (but also most technically complex) parts of public economics which characterizes optimal tax schedules minimizing welfare losses subject to information constraints; such analysis is carried out in the so-called Mirrlees economy. Another focal point of the lecture is the role of elasticity in selecting taxes and how the concept of elasticity can be applied to the analysis of time inconsistency in taxation.
  • Scope of Government
    This lecture covers the discussion how governments perform their key functions such as public regulation and public service delivery using three cases. Alternative means to control externalities. The case of private firms harm to third parties (employees, customers, local communities etc.). a) Imposing mandatory requirements upon firms to take precautionary measures, (b) allowing damaged parties to sue firms in the court of law, and (c) leaving such incidents to Coase-style private solutions. The case of two modalities of public service delivery, namely in-house, by government agencies, or through outsourcing to private sector firms. The phenomenon of regulatory capture.
  • Politics of Public Economics
    This lecture begins with an analysis of how public economic policies differ from each other in democracies and autocracies. We next turn to politics of public economics in democracies and begin with the classical result about non-existence of a universal rule of democratic aggregation of preferences (Arrow's impossibility theorem). Then introduce so-called single-peaked preferences and discuss the role of median voter in collective decision making. Another problem occurs in polarized societies where even economically optimal democratic choice leaves people far to the left and/or far to the right from the median quite unhappy with a majority will. Possible solutions include restricting democratic procedures to smaller and hopefully more homogenous groups and charging user fees for a public good. We discuss the costs and benefits of these two approaches.
  • Working of the Government
    This lecture covers the discussion on external and internal agency problems, i.e. relations between government (as an agent) and society (the principal) and between rank-and-file bureaucrats (the agents) and their bosses (the principals). Ex ante and ex post accountability system in an external agency. Incentives within the bureaucracy including vertical monitoring and career concerns. Economics of corruption.
  • Government and Society
    The role of society in public sector economics. Social capital and its duality: its substitutional and complementary relations to government. Interplay between government and social capital is philanthropy. “Paradox of social capital”. The salience of civic culture for good public sector governance. How communities can respond to a lack of government-supplied public goods and services by apolitical self-organization in order to substitute for what they haven’t received from the government. The link between social capital and the size of government (public sector).
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Intermediate test
  • non-blocking Final exam
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (2 module)
    0.5 * Final exam + 0.5 * Intermediate test
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Economics of the public sector, Connolly S., Munro A., 1999
  • Теория игр : учебник и практикум для академического бакалавриата, Шагин В. Л., 2014

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • An introduction to game theory, Osborne M. J., 2009
  • Intermediate public economics, Hindriks J., Myles G. D., 2013
  • Иной путь : экон. ответ терроризму, Де Сото Э., Пинскера Б., 2008