Институциональная экономика

Бакалавриат 2019/2020

Статус: Курс по выбору (Совместная программа по экономике НИУ ВШЭ и РЭШ)

Направление: 38.03.01. Экономика

Кто читает: Отдел сопровождения учебного процесса в Совместном бакалавриате ВШЭ-РЭШ

Где читается: Факультет экономических наук

Когда читается: 3-й курс, 1, 2 модуль

Формат изучения: без онлайн-курса

Язык: английский

Кредиты: 6

Контактные часы: 64

Full Syllabus

Abstract

What are institutions? Do they matter for economic outcomes? If so, why? And if they matter, then what determines "good" institutions? In this course we will go through the main lessons learnt from the last 15 years of research, which have witnessed an explosion of empirical and theoretical work on institutions that revolutionized several fields of economics. The journey will start with a macro perspective: do institutions matter for economic growth? It will continue with the distinction between political institutions (e.g., elections) and economic institutions (e.g., property rights) and the interplay between the two. We will then adopt a more micro perspective: which institutional features matter? First, we will review the evidence concerning the effect of economic institutions such as property rights and courts contract enforcing contracts. Second, we will review the evidence concerning political institutions and how they shape the selection and incentives in office of politicians. Third, we will review the evidence about bureaucrats, i.e., those civil servants who implement policy-making but are not elected (differently from politicians) and are often invisible to citizens (differently from, say, teachers or doctors). Finally, we will return to the macro perspective: what determines the breakdown of the state and the emergence of conflict? What do we know about the long-term consequences of conflict? Can we explain simultaneously the economic choices of the state (such as public service delivery and investments in legal and fiscal capacity) as well as political choices regarding the use of violence, which in turn determine peace, repression or conflict? The course will be based primarily on the critical review of empirical work guided by simple economic theory.

Learning Objectives

The main objective of this course is to demonstrate how institutions work in various spheres, what happens if they become weak or inefficient. We will talk about the institution of property rights and about contracts, will look for historic examples and analyze modern cases, will find evidence of the fact that institutions are vitally important for the prosperity of countries as well as for making the simplest transactions between citizens possible.

Expected Learning Outcomes

After learning the course, students will know key concepts and methodology of institutional theory; how new institutional theory was developed; main instruments and approaches institutional economists use.
After learning the course, students will be able to: - apply received knowledge to the practical cases; - write essays on economic issues; - understand and critically discuss economic literature.
After learning the course, students will have skills of: - extracting ideas from theoretical literature and apply them to the real cases; - writing essays on economic issues; - analysing articles and scientific papers on the institutional topics.

Course Contents

Introduction and Macro Perspective
Democracy and democratization. Do institutions affect political preferences?
Unpacking Institutions
Elections Media Property rights Labor coercion Judiciary/ Law and Order Electoral manipulation and corruption
Political Institutions and Politicians
Electoral rules and form of government Rents from office, electoral fraud and vote-buying
Institutions and the (invisible) Bureaucracy
Corruption vs bureaucrats’ mismanagement Bureaucrats: they matter, but they are not elected
Back to the Macro Perspective
Citizens’ collective action problem Inst. Persistence vs Change Emergence of Institutions

Assessment Elements

Participation in class
Quizzes in class and home assignments
Research proposal
Final essay
Bonus presentation

Interim Assessment

Interim assessment (1 module)
0.7 * Quizzes in class and home assignments + 0.3 * Research proposal
Interim assessment (2 module)
0.45 * Final essay + 0.45 * Interim assessment (1 module) + 0.1 * Participation in class

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

Alberto Alesina, & Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln. (2007). Goodbye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People. American Economic Review, (4), 1507. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.4.1507
Hornbeck, R. (2010). Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.DBD7E352
Olken, B. A. (2006). Corruption and the costs of redistribution: Micro evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Public Economics, (4–5), 853. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.pubeco.v90y2006i4.5p853.870
Raymond Fisman, Florian Schulz, & Vikrant Vig. (2012). Private Returns to Public Office. NBER Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.nbr.nberwo.18095
Toke S. Aidt, & Raphaël Franck. (2015). Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832. Econometrica, 505. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.wly.emetrp.v83y2015ip505.547

Recommended Additional Bibliography

Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009). Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.1CC27F24
Claudio Ferraz, & Frederico Finan. (2011). Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. American Economic Review, (4), 1274. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
Di Tella, R., Galiant, S., & Schargrodsky, E. (2007). The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.EEF9EF66
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.E930B5F7
Frederico Finan, & Laura Schechter. (2012). Vote-Buying and Reciprocity. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.F6849742
Fuchs-Schündeln, N., & Schündeln, M. (2015). On the endogeneity of political preferences: Evidence from individual experience with democracy. Science, 347(6226), 1145–1148. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa0880
Khan, A. Q., Khwaja, A. I., & Olken, B. (2015). Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv042
King, G., Pan, J. J., & Roberts, M. E. (2013). How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055413000014
Marianna Belloc, Francesco Drago, & Roberto Galbiati. (2016). Earthquakes, Religion, and Transition to Self-Government in ItalianCities. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (4), 1875. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw020
Michael Callen, & James D. Long. (2015). Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.A0716D58
Raúl Sánchez De La Sierra. (2015). On the Origins of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.B0094C3C
Rema Hanna, & Shing-Yi Wang. (2017). Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, (3), 262. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150029

Course Syllabus