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Бакалавриат 2019/2020

Эмпирика отраслевой организации

Направление: 38.03.01. Экономика
Кто читает: Отдел сопровождения учебного процесса в Совместном бакалавриате ВШЭ-РЭШ
Когда читается: 4-й курс, 3, 4 модуль
Формат изучения: Full time
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 6

Программа дисциплины

Аннотация

The course is dealing with an empirical analysis of Industrial Organization (IO). Some knowledge of IO theory and Applied Econometrics is preferred. The course is designed for 3rd and 4th year students.
Цель освоения дисциплины

Цель освоения дисциплины

  • The objective of the course is to familiarize students with basic concepts of analysis in Empirical IO. Also the participants of the course will employ basic commands in STATA software and will do practical exercises.
Результаты освоения дисциплины

Результаты освоения дисциплины

  • After the course the students are expected to be qualified in solving microeconomic practical questions. By employing data sets and statistical/econometric software they can evaluate preferences of consumes, production technologies of firms, competition structure of industry and so on.
Содержание учебной дисциплины

Содержание учебной дисциплины

  • Introduction
  • Oligopoly empirics
  • Productivity and Costs
  • Differentiated Product Markets
  • Price Discrimination
  • Entry and Exit
  • Auctions
Элементы контроля

Элементы контроля

  • неблокирующий Created with Sketch. Problem set 1
  • неблокирующий Created with Sketch. Final test
    Open book format
  • неблокирующий Created with Sketch. Proplem set 2
  • неблокирующий Created with Sketch. Problem set 3
Промежуточная аттестация

Промежуточная аттестация

  • Промежуточная аттестация (3 модуль)
    0.5 * Problem set 1 + 0.5 * Proplem set 2
  • Промежуточная аттестация (4 модуль)
    0.7 * Final test + 0.3 * Промежуточная аттестация (3 модуль)
Список литературы

Список литературы

Рекомендуемая основная литература

  • Evans, D. S., & Heckman, J. J. (1986). A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function with an Application to the Bell System: Erratum. American Economic Review, (4), 856. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.aea.aecrev.v76y1986i4p856.58
  • Glenn Ellison. (1994). Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee. RAND Journal of Economics, (1), 37. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.rje.randje.v25y1994ispringp37.57
  • Reiss, P. C., & Wolak, F. A. (2007). Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization. Handbook of Econometrics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.h.eee.ecochp.6a.64
  • Severin Boreinstein, & Andrea Shepard. (1996). Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets. RAND Journal of Economics, (3), 429. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.rje.randje.v27y1996iautumnp429.451
  • Slade, M. E. (1987). Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion. Journal of Industrial Economics, (4), 499. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.bla.jindec.v35y1987i4p499.516
  • Timothy Dunne, Mark J. Roberts, & Larry Samuelson. (1988). Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries. RAND Journal of Economics, (4), 495. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.rje.randje.v19y1988iwinterp495.515
  • Timothy F. Bresnahan, & Peter C. Reiss. (1990). Entry in Monopoly Market. Review of Economic Studies, (4), 531. https://doi.org/10.2307/2298085

Рекомендуемая дополнительная литература

  • Berry, S. T. (1992). Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry. Econometrica, (4), 889. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.ecm.emetrp.v60y1992i4p889.917
  • Christensen, L. R., & Greene, W. H. (1976). Economies of Scale in U.S. Electric Power Generation. Journal of Political Economy, (4), 655. https://doi.org/10.1086/260470
  • Goldberg, P. K. (1996). Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases: Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Journal of Political Economy, (3), 622. https://doi.org/10.1086/262035
  • Harry J. Paarsch, Stephen G. Donald, & Jacques Robert. (2006). An empirical model of the multi-unit, sequential, clock auction. Journal of Applied Econometrics, (8), 1221. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.854
  • Olley, G. S., & Pakes, A. (1996). The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry. Econometrica, (6), 1263. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.ecm.emetrp.v64y1996i6p1263.97
  • Philip A. Haile, & Elie Tamer. (2003). Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions. Journal of Political Economy, (1), 1. https://doi.org/10.1086/344801
  • Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993). Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions. Journal of Political Economy, (3), 518. https://doi.org/10.1086/261885
  • Shepard, A. (1991). Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration. Journal of Political Economy, (1), 30. https://doi.org/10.1086/261739
  • Steven Berry, James Levinsohn, & Ariel Pakes. (1995). Automobile prices in market equilibrium. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.6F437C07
  • Steven T. Berry. (1994). Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation. RAND Journal of Economics, (2), 242. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.rje.randje.v25y1994isummerp242.262
  • Victor Aguirregabiria. (1999). The Dynamics of Markups and Inventories in Retailing Firms. Review of Economic Studies, (2), 275. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00088