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Магистратура 2019/2020

Современная политическая наука

Статус: Курс обязательный (Политика. Экономика. Философия)
Направление: 41.04.04. Политология
Когда читается: 1-й курс, 2, 3 модуль
Формат изучения: Full time
Прогр. обучения: Политика. Экономика. Философия
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 5

Course Syllabus


Many of the questions that political scientists study are timeless. Who votes for whom, how and why? How do politicians compete for political support and maintain themselves in power? How does the organization of the state shape incentives for investment, corruption, and for policies that promote (or retard) inequality? The answers to these questions are central both to our understanding of real world outcomes - economic growth, poverty, inequality - and to promoting policies to shape them. Despite their obvious importance, however, few of these questions have clear cut answers. As with any science, new findings are constantly released that challenge our understanding of older findings or expand it in new an important ways.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • This course seeks to provide a broad overview of the current state of the literature in several key areas of contemporary Political Science. By the end of the course, students should both understand the state of the art in the discipline, and how this recent work fits into the grand arc of research in Political Science.
  • The course also seeks to provide students with a better understanding of modern methodological tools and research design, as well as how to apply them to developing and critiquing a research agenda. The course places particular emphasis on the potential pitfalls of causal analysis, how to spot them in the works of others, and how to attempt to overcome them in one's own work. By the end of the course, students should have the necessary tools to constructively critique the work of others, as well as an understanding of how to use these tools to design cutting edge research of their own.
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Students should also have the necessary tools to constructively critique the work of others, as well as an understanding of how to use these tools to design cutting edge research of their own.
  • By the end of the course, students should both understand the state of the art in the discipline, and how this recent work fits into the grand arc of research in Political Science.
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Course Introduction: Politics as a Science and the Challenge of Causal Inference
    The first session will briefly discuss the history of political research and outline the main areas in which modern political science differs from older traditions of studying politics. We will then discuss the basic problem of causal inference that animates much of contemporary work and is necessary for properly constructing research designs. We will end with a discussion of how to read and critique political research from a scientific perspective.
  • Data and Research Design
    The second session will discuss the major challenges of conducting both qualitative and quantitative research. In the first part of the lecture, we will briefly discuss the unique problems that each tradition has in making causal inferences and recent advances in resolving them. We will then discuss how scientists can build confidence in their work, with a particular focus on problems of validity and reliability. We will end by discussing the advantages and trade-offs inherent in qualitative versus quantitative research designs, as well as how these can be used to compliment each other in mixed methods research.
  • Determinants of Vote Choice
    The third session will introduce the basic concepts and arguments behind con- temporary literature on vote choice. We will discuss the differences between so- ciotropic and egotropic theories of voting behavior and how they are operational- ized in contemporary research. We will also discuss distributive and clientalistic programs of delivering benefits to voters, how to distinguish them, and how they fit into strategies of generating voter support.
  • Identity Politics
    The fourth session will introduce the basic concepts and theories that animate contemporary research on the nature of identity and how it shapes political out- comes. We will discuss how these theories are applied to contemporary research on using examples from debates on how identities emerge, how they change, and their influence on political preferences.
  • Democratic Parties, their Influence, and Representation
    The fifth session will discuss the purposes behind parties in democratic systems and the various typologies often used to classify them for research purposes. We will then discuss how parties link politicians to voters and how they aggregate the preferences of voters. We will conclude by discussing how electoral systems condition the ways in which parties represent their voters and evaluating how and when they do so using examples drawn from recent work on gender politics and descriptive representation.
  • Electoral Rules and their Origins
    The sixth session will present basic concepts from modern work on electoral sys- tems and introduce the major classification schemes used. It will then present the basic competing arguments that animate recent debates behind why democratic countries adopt particular sets of electoral rules. We will conclude by discussing some of the consequences of choices over electoral rules for turnout, representa- tion, and inequality.
  • Autocratic Survival
    The eighth section will characterize the differences between autocratic and demo- cratic regimes, as well as the most commonly used typology for distinguishing between different families of autocracy. It will then introduce major theories of democratization (i.e. autocratic collapse) and discuss contemporary arguments about the survival strategies regimes use to stabilize their rule and maintain power.
  • Autocratic Parties, Dominant Parties, and their Purposes
    The ninth section will discuss the phenomenon of autocratic dominant parties. It will begin by distinguishing them from similar structures and democratic regimes and showing changes over time in their use among the world’s autocratic regimes. The lecture will then discuss the major problems that dominant parties are de- signed to solve in autocratic regimes. Finally the lecture will look at how au- tocratic parties intersect with the population more broadly by examining their influence on investment and the degree to which they are responsive to (and rep- resentative of) the populace as a whole.
  • Political Protests
    The tenth section will define collective action and lay out the major forms of coordination failures that make it difficult groups to act together. It will then discuss the different forms of collective action relevant to the literature on con- tentious politics (including protests) and present three views on why and when protests form. The session will conclude by applying these views to contemporary discussions about popular versus elite mobilization in protests.
  • Institutions, Investment, and Property Rights
    Session eleven lays out the core problems and calculus that animate investment decisions by firms and individuals. It then discusses how institutions – human constraints on human interaction – introduce a fundamentally political element to this calculus. Using the Glorious Revolution as an example, it discusses how weak institutions can retard investment and the ways in which they can be strengthened to promote it. Various critiques of North’s seminal theory on the role of insti- tutions in the political economy of investment are presented. The session ends with a discussion of how recent work has attempted to untangle the relationship between institutions and the economy using novel research designs.
  • Corruption and Governance
    Session twelfth defines corruption, discusses the major ways in which contem- porary work operationalizes the concept, and discusses the trade-offs in popular measures. It then briefly discusses the origins of corruption and conditions which appear to foster it. The session concludes by discussing the effects of corruption on real economies and the ways in which it can distort or enhance outcomes.
  • Business-state relations
    Session thirteen discusses the channels by which firms influence politicians and how they can shape policy. It begins by defining lobbying and how it is studied in contemporary work. It then presents some stylized facts about the types of firms that engage in lobbying, the strategies they tend to use, and the implications of how firms lobby (and for what) for policy outcomes. It then discusses the phenomenon of state capture and how state interference in firms influences their own behavior and the overall economy.
  • Varieties of Capitalism and the Welfare State
    Session fourteen presents the Varieties of Capitalism approach to political econ- omy and discusses its relationship to previous theories attempting to understand how economic systems differ and sustain themselves. It then discusses the two main economic types defined by the approach: coordinated and liberal market economies. The two systems are contrasted and examples are given for how they fundamentally shape economic behavior by both firms and schools. An appli- cation is then provided which relates the nature of economic systems to firms’ preferences over social policy and their lobbying behavior.
  • Civil War and Violence
    Session fifteen defines Civil War and discusses historical trends in the geography and timing of their onset. It then presents the major theories of civil war onset and provides some examples of modern research that attempts to test these theories against each other.
  • Conclusion and Elective Topic
    The final lecture will bring together the concepts and topics introduced in the course and briefly discuss how they inform and overlap each other. The remainder of lecture will be used for an elective topic will be chosen by the students after the first exam. This topic will cover an important theme that relates to the research interests of the majority of students, but which they do not feel was adequately covered elsewhere in the course plan. These can include (but are not limited to) topics such as US domestic politics, foreign policy, individual economic preferences, education in politics, gender politics, etc., as well as original suggestions proposed by the students themselves.
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Intermediate Assessments
  • non-blocking Participation
  • non-blocking Final Exam
  • non-blocking 2 Referee Reports
  • non-blocking Research Critique
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (3 module)
    0.3 * 2 Referee Reports + 0.2 * Final Exam + 0.2 * Intermediate Assessments + 0.15 * Participation + 0.15 * Research Critique


Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green, & Edward H. Kaplan. (2004). The Illusion of Learning From Observational Research. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.310980E1
  • Boas, T. C., Richardson, N. P., & Hidalgo, F. D. (2014). The Spoils of Victory: Campaign Donations and Government Contracts in Brazil. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002238161300145X
  • Bonneau, C., & Cann, D. (2015). Party Identification and Vote Choice in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections. Political Behavior, 37(1), 43–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9260-2
  • Busemeyer, M. R. (2014). Skills and Inequality : Partisan Politics and the Political Economy of Education Reforms in Western Welfare States. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=838784
  • Daniel Treisman. (2011). Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin. American Journal of Political Science, (3), 590. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00500.x
  • Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.E930B5F7
  • Gans-Morse, J. (2017). Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case of Post-Soviet Russia. American Political Science Review, (02), 338. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v111y2017i02p338.359.00
  • Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2012). Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures. Journal of Politics, 74(2), 621–635. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001952
  • John Mcmillan, & Pablo Zoido. (2004). How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru. Journal of Economic Perspectives, (4), 69. https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330042632690
  • Kreuzer, M. (2010). Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation. American Political Science Review, (02), 369. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v104y2010i02p369.392.00
  • Leemann, L., & Mares, I. (2014). The Adoption of Proportional Representation. Journal of Politics, 76(2), 461–478. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001394
  • McDoom, O. S. (2012). The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict. International Security, 37(2), 119–155. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00100
  • Noam Lupu. (2013). Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina. American Journal of Political Science, (1), 49. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00615.x
  • Posner, D. N. (2004). The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.CEAEF5DB
  • Rebecca Weitz‐Shapiro. (2012). What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism. American Journal of Political Science, (3), 568. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00578.x
  • Reuter, O. J. (2017). The Origins of Dominant Parties : Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=1491929
  • Reuter, O. J., & Robertson, G. B. (2015). Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes. Journal of Politics, 77(1), 235–248. https://doi.org/10.1086/678390
  • Reuter, O. J., & Szakonyi, D. (2019). Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia. American Political Science Review, (02), 552. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v113y2019i02p552.568.00
  • Robertson, G. B. (2011). The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes : Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia. New York: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=344606
  • Stanley L. Engerman, & Kenneth L. Sokoloff. (2005). Colonialism, Inequality, and Long-Run Paths of Development. NBER Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.nbr.nberwo.11057
  • Weller, N., & Barnes, J. (2014). Pathway Analysis and the Search for Causal Mechanisms. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.6CCB83D6

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Andy Baker, Barry Ames, & Lucio R. Renno. (2006). Social Context and Campaign Volatility in New Democracies: Networks and Neighborhoods in Brazil’s 2002 Elections. American Journal of Political Science, (2), 382. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00190.x
  • Banerjee, A., & Duflo, E. (2008). The Experimental Approach to Development Economics. CEPR Discussion Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.cpr.ceprdp.7037
  • Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Imbert, C., Mathew, S., & Pande, R. (2019). E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs : Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India. The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS). Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.wrk.warwec.1224
  • Bates, R. H., Coatsworth, J. H., & Williamson, J. G. (2007). Lost Decades: Postindependence Performance in Latin America and Africa. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050707000447
  • Cederman, L.-E., & Girardin, L. (2007). Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies. American Political Science Review, (01), 173. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v101y2007i01p173.185.07
  • Coppock, A., & Green, D. P. (2015). Assessing the Correspondence between Experimental Results Obtained in the Lab and Field: A Review of Recent Social Science Research. Political Science Research and Methods, (01), 113. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.pscirm.v3y2015i01p113.131.00
  • Cusack, T. R., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2007). Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review, (03), 373. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v101y2007i03p373.391.07
  • Cusack, T., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2010). Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review, (02), 393. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v104y2010i02p393.403.00
  • Decentralization and the development of nationalized party systems in new democracies: evidence from Latin America. (2010). Comparative Political Studies, 43(5), 606–627. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008330285
  • Ernesto CALVO, & María Victoria MURILLO. (2014). When parties meet voters: assessing political linkages through partisan networks and distributive expectations in Argentina and Chile. América Latina Hoy, (0), 15. https://doi.org/10.14201/alh2013651544
  • Frye, T. M., & Iwasaki, I. (2011). Government directors and business–state relations in Russia. European Journal of Political Economy, (4), 642. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.poleco.v27y2011i4p642.658
  • Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2011). Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies. Journal of Comparative Economics, (2), 123. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.jcecon.v39y2011i2p123.139
  • Joshua A. Tucker. (n.d.). Articles Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.B8E73856
  • Macartan Humphreys, & Jeremy M. Weinstein. (2008). Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War. American Journal of Political Science, (2), 436. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00322.x
  • Margalit, Y. (2013). Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession. American Political Science Review, (01), 80. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v107y2013i01p80.103.00
  • Margarita Estevez-abe, Torben Iversen, & David Soskice. (2001). Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.CF23C076
  • Paul Pierson. (2002). Coping with permanent austerity : welfare state restructuring in affluent democracies. Revue Française de Sociologie, (2), 369. https://doi.org/10.2307/3322510
  • Philip A Schrodt. (2014). Seven deadly sins of contemporary quantitative political analysis. Journal of Peace Research, (2), 287. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.sae.joupea.v51y2014i2p287.300
  • Reuter, O. J., & Gandhi, J. (2011). Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties. British Journal of Political Science, (01), 83. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.bjposi.v41y2011i01p83.110.00
  • Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077
  • Szakonyi, D. (2018). Businesspeople in Elected Office: Identifying Private Benefits from Firm-Level Returns. American Political Science Review, (02), 322. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v112y2018i02p322.338.00
  • Timothy Besley, & Torsten Persson. (2009). The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. American Economic Review, (4), 1218. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1218
  • Timothy Frye, John Reuter, & David Szakonyi. (2012). Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace. HSE Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.hig.wpaper.08.ps.2012