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Магистратура 2019/2020

Экономика и право: избранные главы

Статус: Курс по выбору (Прикладная экономика)
Направление: 38.04.01. Экономика
Когда читается: 2-й курс, 1, 2 модуль
Формат изучения: Full time
Преподаватели: Окулич Даниш
Прогр. обучения: Прикладная экономика
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 5

Course Syllabus


The course focuses on applications of quantitative economic models to the analysis of the legal and institutional systems. The rst part of the course is devoted to studying formal and informal institutions including models of corruption and crime, legal process, and institutions development. The second part of the course concentrates on contemporary issues in Law and Economics including intellectual property laws and privacy regulation.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • During the course the students will get familiar with applications of their economic toolbox to the analysis of both classical and contemporary legal and institutional issues.
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • know the classical models of economic analysis of law
  • be familiar with contemporary debate about the legal solutions, be able take a stance in the debate and defend their position using formal economic modeling
  • be able to individual analyze legal solutions and propose alternatives
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Crime and Litigation
    Economic consequences of crime. Rational crime model. Optimal punishment. Empirical studies of crime deterrence(*). Insucient and frivolous litigation. Burden of proof. Collective litigation (*).
  • Institutions
    Evolution of institutions and legal rules. Political economy of law. Empirical studies of institutional dynamics (*). Corruption.
  • Innovation
    Patents, trade secrets and contests. Patent races and troll patents. Optimal patent regulation. Copyrights and broadcast laws (*).
  • Reputation
    Economic models of reputation. Trademarks. Counterfeits. Certication (*).
  • Privacy
    Chicago School Approach. Privacy as a property right, unraveling. Privacy and price discrimination. Privacy and costly signaling (*). (*) If time permits
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Home assignments
  • non-blocking Mid-term exam
  • non-blocking Final exam
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (2 module)
    0.55 * Final exam + 0.15 * Home assignments + 0.3 * Mid-term exam


Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Gary S. Becker. (1974). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. NBER Chapters, 1. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.h.nbr.nberch.3625
  • George J. Stigler. (1974). The Optimum Enforcement of Laws. NBER Chapters, 55. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.h.nbr.nberch.3626
  • George J. Stigler. (1980). An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics. University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.fth.chices.10
  • Innovation and incentives, Scotchmer S., 2004
  • Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (1987). Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective. Journal of Law and Economics, (2), 265. https://doi.org/10.1086/467138
  • Posner, R. A. (1981). The Economics of Privacy. American Economic Review, (2), 405. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.aea.aecrev.v71y1981i2p405.09
  • Rose-Ackerman, S. (1975). The economics of corruption. Journal of Public Economics, (2), 187. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.pubeco.v4y1975i2p187.203
  • The theory of industrial organization, Tirole J., 2003

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Acemoglu, D., Cantoni, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2011). The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.7.3286
  • An informational theory of privacy. (2016). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2853468
  • Andrea Prat. (2005). The Wrong Kind of Transparency. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.945F5A7
  • Andrew F. Daughety, & Jennifer F. Reinganum. (2010). Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice between Privacy and Publicity. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2), 191. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.2.191
  • Banerjee, A. V. (1997). A Theory of Misgovernance. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.4852BDB0
  • Benjamin Hermalin, & Michael Katz. (2006). Privacy, property rights and efficiency: The economics of privacy as secrecy. Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), (3), 209. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-005-9004-7
  • Boldrin,Michele, & Levine, D. K. (2010). Against Intellectual Monopoly. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.cup.cbooks.9780521127264
  • Corruption Daron Acemoglu, & Thierry Verdier. (2000). The Choice Between Market Failures and. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.62AD44E1
  • Daron Acemoglu, & Alexander Wolitzky. (2018). A Theory of Equality Before the Law. NBER Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.nbr.nberwo.24681
  • Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, & James A. Robinson. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.EA5A5507
  • Ehrlich, I. (1973). Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. Journal of Political Economy, (3), 521. https://doi.org/10.1086/260058
  • Ehrlich, I. (1981). On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, and Deterrence. American Economic Review, (3), 307. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.aea.aecrev.v71y1981i3p307.22
  • Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarrée, & Sungho Yun. (2010). Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils. RAND Journal of Economics, (1), 179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00095.x
  • Gilbert, R., & Shapiro, C. (1990). Optimal patent length and breadth. RAND Journal of Economics (RAND Journal of Economics), 21(1), 106–112. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555497
  • HODGES, C. (2015). US class actions : promise and reality. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.5A635DDC
  • Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. P. L. (1995). Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated? Economic Journal, (428), 145. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.ecj.econjl.v105y1995i428p145.59
  • Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Competition in Patent Races. (1983). Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.9CC477E2
  • Vincenzo Denicolò. (2000). Two-Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy. RAND Journal of Economics, (3), 488. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.rje.randje.v31y2000iautumnp488.501